As Russia Pulls Back From the Nuclear Treaty, The Fate of Humanity Hangs in the Balance
The fragility of the arms control treaty lays bare the need for nuclear abolition.
FRIDA BERRIGAN MARCH 2, 2023
Peace activists wearing masks of Russian President Vladimir Putin and U.S. President Joe Biden march in support of the NEW Start Treaty on Jan, 29, 2021
(PHOTO BY JOHN MACDOUGALL/AFP VIA GETTY IMAGES)
There’s not a lot of good news.
The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists moved its Doomsday Clock to 90 seconds to midnight to dramatize the global peril posed by nuclear weapons and climate catastrophe. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine just passed the somber and maddening one year mark. Now, in apparent retaliation for President Joe Biden’s unannounced trip to Ukraine last week, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that his nation was done with the New START Treaty, the last remaining nuclear arms control agreement between the United States and Russia.
The New START Treaty, signed in 2011, curbed a decades-long arms race that produced tens of thousands of nuclear warheads, nearly bankrupted both nations and threatened the whole world with devastating nuclear firepower. The treaty capped at 1,550 per nation the number of nuclear warheads deployed on long-range bombers, submarines and intercontinental missile systems. Moscow and Washington further agreed to a schedule of regular inspections to confirm progress. In 2018, they mutually verified that each nation had taken enough warheads offline — by scrapping them or holding them in strategic reserve — to be in full compliance with the treaty. In 2021, they agreed to extend the terms of the treaty until 2026. But the two nations suspended inspections during the pandemic, and then the war in Ukraine ratcheted up tensions to near-apocalyptic levels.
Since Russia’s invasion a year ago, Washington and other allies have provided Ukraine with weapons, military aid, training and solidarity. The United States alone has supplied more than $27 billion in security assistance to Ukraine, including more than 1,600 Stinger anti-aircraft rocket systems, 8,500 Javelin anti-tank missile systems and over 1 million 155mm artillery rounds.hardware, training and ammunition.
The stakes were high from the beginning as nations lined up behind the invader and the invaded. Now, the future of arms control is at stake.
In a speech marking the anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, President Vladimir Putin highlighted Western interference in the war effort for his decision to opt out of New START. “They want to inflict a strategic defeat on us and claim our nuclear facilities,” the Russian president told parliament on February 21, thus “I am forced to state that Russia is suspending its participation in the strategic offensive arms treaty.” The Russian government later said it would continue to exchange nuclear data with the United States and abide by the treaty’s limits, but observers fear Russia is one step closer to full withdrawal.
Biden called Putin’s move “a big mistake,” urging Russia to come back to the table. There’s a chance that will happen, but this flashpoint demonstrates that arms control is a poor guarantor of global stability. And it points to the need for something new.
As Dr. Ira Helfand of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War declared, “If we don’t get rid of nuclear weapons, they’re going to be used. And if they’re used, nothing else that we’re doing is going to make any difference.”
The global community has an opportunity to push hard for nuclear abolition. The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) condemned Putin’s withdrawal from the treaty in strong terms. But Alicia Sanders-Zakre, ICAN’s policy and research coordinator, also stresses that “the weakening of the last remaining bilateral arms control agreement underscores the need for multilateral disarmament instruments, including the UN Treaty on the Prohibition for Nuclear Weapons,” or TPNW. So far, the TPNW has collected 92 signatory countries and 68 “states parties” still in the process of gaining ratification through their governing bodies.
The TPMW is the only global treaty to explicitly ban countries from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons. It also provides a verifiable pathway for nuclear disarmament. “Every country that joins this treaty strengthens the normative barrier against nuclear weapons,” notes Sanders-Zakre, “something that is desperately needed given the unprecedented level of nuclear risk we are facing.”
Florian Eblenkamp, an ICAN campaign officer, points to the upcoming G7 Summit as an opportunity to push the richest and most powerful countries in the world toward abolition. The meeting will be held in mid-May in Hiroshima, Japan — the first of only two cities to ever suffer the devastating impacts of a nuclear bomb attack, when the United States dropped the atomic bomb on August 6, 1945. Hiroshima is officially a “city of peace” and one role of the city government is to work for nuclear abolition. Mayor Kazumi Matsui is the President of Mayors for Peace, which represents more than 8,000 cities in 166 nations, and which issued a February 14 statement that read in part, “The only guarantee to protect humanity and the planet from the threat of nuclear weapons is their total elimination.”
As Dr. Ira Helfand of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War declared, “If we don’t get rid of nuclear weapons, they’re going to be used. And if they’re used, nothing else that we’re doing is going to make any difference.”
The global community has an opportunity to push hard for nuclear abolition. The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) condemned Putin’s withdrawal from the treaty in strong terms. But Alicia Sanders-Zakre, ICAN’s policy and research coordinator, also stresses that “the weakening of the last remaining bilateral arms control agreement underscores the need for multilateral disarmament instruments, including the UN Treaty on the Prohibition for Nuclear Weapons,” or TPNW. So far, the TPNW has collected 92 signatory countries and 68 “states parties” still in the process of gaining ratification through their governing bodies.
The TPMW is the only global treaty to explicitly ban countries from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons. It also provides a verifiable pathway for nuclear disarmament. “Every country that joins this treaty strengthens the normative barrier against nuclear weapons,” notes Sanders-Zakre, “something that is desperately needed given the unprecedented level of nuclear risk we are facing.”
Florian Eblenkamp, an ICAN campaign officer, points to the upcoming G7 Summit as an opportunity to push the richest and most powerful countries in the world toward abolition. The meeting will be held in mid-May in Hiroshima, Japan — the first of only two cities to ever suffer the devastating impacts of a nuclear bomb attack, when the United States dropped the atomic bomb on August 6, 1945. Hiroshima is officially a “city of peace” and one role of the city government is to work for nuclear abolition. Mayor Kazumi Matsui is the President of Mayors for Peace, which represents more than 8,000 cities in 166 nations, and which issued a February 14 statement that read in part, “The only guarantee to protect humanity and the planet from the threat of nuclear weapons is their total elimination.”
ICAN, Hiroshima University and others are organizing a “Youth Summit” in Hiroshima ahead of the G7 meetings this spring, calling on young people from around the world to come and “experience the power of Hiroshima, a city that embodies the hope for a world without nuclear weapons.”
The G7 includes nuclear states the United States, France and the United Kingdom, as well as Canada, Germany, Italy and Japan. Russia left the international body in 2018, and China has yet to attain the requisite “developed nation” status despite its economic and military power. While Russia and China will not be in Hiroshima, they will be watching the proceedings closely.
Against the backdrop of the ongoing war in Ukraine, overheated rhetoric and collapsing bilateral arms control regimes, the G7 Summit is the perfect time for the richest and most powerful nations of the world to embrace the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. At 90 seconds to nuclear midnight, it is not a minute too soon.
FRIDA BERRIGAN writes for TomDispatch, Waging Nonviolence and other outlets. Her book, It Runs in the Family: On Being Raised By Radicals and Growing Into Rebellious Motherhood, was published by OR Books in 2015. She lives in New London, Conn., with her husband, three kids and six chickens.
Why Russia’s suspension of participation in New START augurs badly for arms control?
March 2, 2023
By Hamdan Khan
March 2, 2023
By Hamdan Khan
MODERN DIPLOMACY
On February 21st, President Putin while delivering his state of the nation address announced that “Russia is suspending its membership in the New START Treaty”. He went on to clarify that it was not a withdrawal but rather a suspension of participation. Interestingly, the treaty does not contain a provision about the parties (to the treaty) “suspending” their membership. Nevertheless, in article XIV the treaty recognizes the parties’ right to withdraw if they decide that “extraordinary events related to the subject matter” of the treaty have “jeopardized” their “supreme interests”. The withdrawing party would have to give notice containing “a statement of the extraordinary events”, which could jeopardize its supreme interests.
Signed in 2010, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) took effect in 2011 for a period of 10 years; in 2021, the treaty was extended for another 05 years. In article II, New START caps the number of deployed warheads for both countries besides limiting the number of deployed and non-deployed delivery systems. Moreover, the treaty delineates the locations for basing deployed and non-deployed warheads besides stipulating a comprehensive mechanism of notifications for the exchange of information about changes in respective arsenals and most importantly the on-site inspections for verifications.
What is behind Russia’s suspension of its membership?
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine prompted the Western capitals to rally around the sole agenda of disgruntling Russian objectives in Ukraine, which Moscow entwines with its existential security interests. Western sanctions against Russia and the unremitting supply of weapons to Ukraine — which empowered Kyiv to drastically roll back Russian advances — pushed the antagonism between Moscow and the West all times high since the end of the Cold War. As the zero-sum interplay thrived, the positive-sum arrangements, such as arms control, were predictably going to be a casualty and this is exactly what transpired.
In August 2022, Russia “temporarily” halted inspection activities citing the lopsided travel restrictions on its inspectors by Washington imposed in the wake of the war in Ukraine and “no obvious indication” of a decline in the number of COVID-19 cases in the US. Moscow, however, underscored its full commitment to the other provisions of the treaty and as per the US State Department, stepped up the notifications under the treaty. Later, the talks to resume inspections slated in November were postponed by Moscow accusing Washington of “toxicity and animosity”. In late January 2023, the US State Department spokesperson criticized Russia for refusing to allow inspections and cautioned that Russian actions threaten the “viability of US-Russia nuclear arms control”.
During his state of the nation address, Putin alleged that repeated requests by Russia to inspect US facilities have been turned down by Washington. He claimed that “the West is directly involved in Ukraine’s attempts to strike” Russian strategic aviation bases and alleged that drones used in the attacks were “equipped and updated” by NATO. The attacks reportedly occurred in December 2022 at Engels air base which houses Russian long-range strategic bombers. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) later alleged that the US undertook the attempts to “probe the protection” of Russian strategic facilities and that attacks on the facilities were launched by the US “military-technical and intelligence assistance”. Putin also rejected that matters related to strategic weapon systems can be disassociated from the war in Ukraine and the Western avowals to inflict a “strategic defeat” on Russia. The Russian MFA claimed that the US policies aim to “undermine Russia’s national security”, which belies the principle of “indivisible security” enshrined in the preamble of the New START. It goes without saying that the antagonism intensified by the war in Ukraine had finally spilled over to strategic arms control.
What would change after Russia suspended its membership?
Russia’s MFA upheld that Moscow would “strictly comply” with “qualitative restrictions” for strategic arms set by the treaty until its annulment. It also affirmed that the exchange of notifications on ICBM and SLBM launches would continue as per the 1988 Soviet-U.S. agreement. If the parties choose to adhere to the two items, there are few chances of an immediate arms race imperiling strategic stability.
Nevertheless, provided the inspections had already been stopped, the notifications for “removal from accountability” and changes in data concerning the strategic arms enshrined in articles VI and VII respectively would likely come to an end and so would the meetings of the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BSC). The developments would essentially mark an end to reciprocal transparency and mutual trust, which would have been crucial once the attempts to conclude a follow-on agreement to New START were to be made.
How the suspension would affect the future of arms control?
New START was the last remaining arms control treaty between the US and Russia, which together account for nearly 90% of the world’s nuclear weapons. Once the five-year extension of the treaty annuls in 2026 and given the cynicism around a follow-on agreement, it would be the first time since 1970 that there would be no limitations on the US and Russian strategic arsenals and delivery means. The non-existence of arms control between Washington and Moscow coupled with the obsolescence of some of the existing strategic systems and the emergence of new systems with strategic applications, a new and more intense strategic arms race would likely unfold.
On top of that, apart from the nuclear rivalry between the US and Russia, Washington — besides its threat perception of North Korea and that of its Pacific allies like South Korea and Japan — has recently been vociferously expressing concerns about what it claims is the large-scale modernization and expansion of the Chinese nuclear arsenal, which, as per the estimates by Pentagon, could have as many as 1000 warheads by 2030. Likewise, President Putin in his address alluded to the nuclear arsenals of Great Britain and France, which are “directed against” Russia and form NATO’s “combined offensive capabilities”. He did not miss adding the caveat that before talks on Russia restoring its membership of New START, Moscow “must have a clear idea” of the strategic capabilities of Great Britain and France.
Therefore, it is unlikely that either the US or Russia would agree to new arms control unless their other respective nuclear adversaries are also brought into the fold. And if China is to join arms control talks — which it has shown little interest till now — Beijing would unlikely overlook India’s growing strategic capabilities, which itself is vying to gain a strategic edge over its arch-rival Pakistan. Even if all the Nuclear Weapons States (NWSs) agree to participate in arms control talks, not only the participation of more parties would render it difficult to reach a consensus, but also the inclusion of de facto nuclear powers in arms control talks would further add to the complications. Contrariwise, in the absence of arms control, the arms race between the USA and Russia would also channel down the nuclear chain to impact the force postures of all the NWSs.
On February 21st, President Putin while delivering his state of the nation address announced that “Russia is suspending its membership in the New START Treaty”. He went on to clarify that it was not a withdrawal but rather a suspension of participation. Interestingly, the treaty does not contain a provision about the parties (to the treaty) “suspending” their membership. Nevertheless, in article XIV the treaty recognizes the parties’ right to withdraw if they decide that “extraordinary events related to the subject matter” of the treaty have “jeopardized” their “supreme interests”. The withdrawing party would have to give notice containing “a statement of the extraordinary events”, which could jeopardize its supreme interests.
Signed in 2010, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) took effect in 2011 for a period of 10 years; in 2021, the treaty was extended for another 05 years. In article II, New START caps the number of deployed warheads for both countries besides limiting the number of deployed and non-deployed delivery systems. Moreover, the treaty delineates the locations for basing deployed and non-deployed warheads besides stipulating a comprehensive mechanism of notifications for the exchange of information about changes in respective arsenals and most importantly the on-site inspections for verifications.
What is behind Russia’s suspension of its membership?
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine prompted the Western capitals to rally around the sole agenda of disgruntling Russian objectives in Ukraine, which Moscow entwines with its existential security interests. Western sanctions against Russia and the unremitting supply of weapons to Ukraine — which empowered Kyiv to drastically roll back Russian advances — pushed the antagonism between Moscow and the West all times high since the end of the Cold War. As the zero-sum interplay thrived, the positive-sum arrangements, such as arms control, were predictably going to be a casualty and this is exactly what transpired.
In August 2022, Russia “temporarily” halted inspection activities citing the lopsided travel restrictions on its inspectors by Washington imposed in the wake of the war in Ukraine and “no obvious indication” of a decline in the number of COVID-19 cases in the US. Moscow, however, underscored its full commitment to the other provisions of the treaty and as per the US State Department, stepped up the notifications under the treaty. Later, the talks to resume inspections slated in November were postponed by Moscow accusing Washington of “toxicity and animosity”. In late January 2023, the US State Department spokesperson criticized Russia for refusing to allow inspections and cautioned that Russian actions threaten the “viability of US-Russia nuclear arms control”.
During his state of the nation address, Putin alleged that repeated requests by Russia to inspect US facilities have been turned down by Washington. He claimed that “the West is directly involved in Ukraine’s attempts to strike” Russian strategic aviation bases and alleged that drones used in the attacks were “equipped and updated” by NATO. The attacks reportedly occurred in December 2022 at Engels air base which houses Russian long-range strategic bombers. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) later alleged that the US undertook the attempts to “probe the protection” of Russian strategic facilities and that attacks on the facilities were launched by the US “military-technical and intelligence assistance”. Putin also rejected that matters related to strategic weapon systems can be disassociated from the war in Ukraine and the Western avowals to inflict a “strategic defeat” on Russia. The Russian MFA claimed that the US policies aim to “undermine Russia’s national security”, which belies the principle of “indivisible security” enshrined in the preamble of the New START. It goes without saying that the antagonism intensified by the war in Ukraine had finally spilled over to strategic arms control.
What would change after Russia suspended its membership?
Russia’s MFA upheld that Moscow would “strictly comply” with “qualitative restrictions” for strategic arms set by the treaty until its annulment. It also affirmed that the exchange of notifications on ICBM and SLBM launches would continue as per the 1988 Soviet-U.S. agreement. If the parties choose to adhere to the two items, there are few chances of an immediate arms race imperiling strategic stability.
Nevertheless, provided the inspections had already been stopped, the notifications for “removal from accountability” and changes in data concerning the strategic arms enshrined in articles VI and VII respectively would likely come to an end and so would the meetings of the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BSC). The developments would essentially mark an end to reciprocal transparency and mutual trust, which would have been crucial once the attempts to conclude a follow-on agreement to New START were to be made.
How the suspension would affect the future of arms control?
New START was the last remaining arms control treaty between the US and Russia, which together account for nearly 90% of the world’s nuclear weapons. Once the five-year extension of the treaty annuls in 2026 and given the cynicism around a follow-on agreement, it would be the first time since 1970 that there would be no limitations on the US and Russian strategic arsenals and delivery means. The non-existence of arms control between Washington and Moscow coupled with the obsolescence of some of the existing strategic systems and the emergence of new systems with strategic applications, a new and more intense strategic arms race would likely unfold.
On top of that, apart from the nuclear rivalry between the US and Russia, Washington — besides its threat perception of North Korea and that of its Pacific allies like South Korea and Japan — has recently been vociferously expressing concerns about what it claims is the large-scale modernization and expansion of the Chinese nuclear arsenal, which, as per the estimates by Pentagon, could have as many as 1000 warheads by 2030. Likewise, President Putin in his address alluded to the nuclear arsenals of Great Britain and France, which are “directed against” Russia and form NATO’s “combined offensive capabilities”. He did not miss adding the caveat that before talks on Russia restoring its membership of New START, Moscow “must have a clear idea” of the strategic capabilities of Great Britain and France.
Therefore, it is unlikely that either the US or Russia would agree to new arms control unless their other respective nuclear adversaries are also brought into the fold. And if China is to join arms control talks — which it has shown little interest till now — Beijing would unlikely overlook India’s growing strategic capabilities, which itself is vying to gain a strategic edge over its arch-rival Pakistan. Even if all the Nuclear Weapons States (NWSs) agree to participate in arms control talks, not only the participation of more parties would render it difficult to reach a consensus, but also the inclusion of de facto nuclear powers in arms control talks would further add to the complications. Contrariwise, in the absence of arms control, the arms race between the USA and Russia would also channel down the nuclear chain to impact the force postures of all the NWSs.
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