MOLDOVA

“Many people voted against Maia Sandu not because they were influenced by Russia, but because they had real and legitimate reasons to not like her policies or party”

HubMP20

The victory of Party of Action and Solidarity  founder Maia Sandu over her opponent Alexandr Stoianoglo, backed by the Party of Socialists, in the recent Moldovan presidential election has been hailed by much western media as a vote for Europe against Russia. Inevitably, the reality is much more complex, and the close outcome was the result of multiple government failings, explains Vitalie Sprînceană in this interview.

Labour Hub: In February 2023, President Maia Sandu told reporters that Russian agents were planning to violently overthrow the country’s government. How significant has overt Russian interference in Moldovan affairs been since then, particularly during the election campaign?

Vitalie Sprînceană: The question of the Russian interference in Moldovan affairs is quite complex.  Formally, it has become increasingly difficult for Russia to exercise any influence in Moldova: Russian media channels (TV stations, web sites, pages on social media) have been banned, financial transactions between Moldova and Russia were terminated, direct flights between the two countries have also been suspended.

Of course, there is the suspicion that Russia is acting in Moldova through Ilan Shor, a fugitive Moldovan oligarch hiding in Moscow, and his political parties, but there was no official declaration from any Russian official to recognize Shor as a channel of Russian influence in Moldova. It could also be argued that Shor has his own political interests, without necessarily being a Russian puppet. The police claims it has identified a large network of people that have voted ”No” at the referendum on the EU (I would refer your readers towards this piece about the referendum and its stakes, that I wrote earlier), but, while proving that people have received money is relatively easy, proving that they voted as they were paid is almost impossible.

LH: Can you also comment on how and to what extent Russia has applied pressure to Moldova through his control over energy supplies?

VS: Moldova’s dependency on Russian energy supplies is a well-known fact. It is also well known that the country has failed to do anything to change the situation in the 30 years after it gained independence in 1991 – investing in renewables, building alternative lines of supply of electricity, etc.

Because of this, the question of energy supplies has been a very sensitive one. Most of the pro-Russian forces in Moldova made the argument of “cheaper Russian gas for Moldovans” central in their platform. The Moldovan population being poor, this argument gained a lot of traction.

Beyond these obvious facts, however, the reality is much more complicated. Here are some numbers.

Until 2020, the average natural gas procurement price in Europe and the Republic of Moldova was almost at the level of the European average price. In 2021, the European average gas procurement price was 586 dollars per thousand cubic meters, and the average price of the Republic of Moldova – 312 dollars. In 2022, the European average reached 1,448 dollars, and the price paid by the Republic of Moldova was 828 dollars. In 2023, the European average fell to 504 dollars, and the Republic of Moldova bought gas for 797 dollars.  Estimated for the first quarter of 2024, the European average is 300 dollars and the price paid by the Republic of Moldova is 595 dollars.

These numbers do not support a linear story where Moldovans would be punished by Russia with higher prices for energy supplies because of their turn to the EU. Before the Russian large-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Moldova was paying a price that was comparable with the average price paid by other European countries. The rise of prices after 2022 is due to the fact that Moldova started to buy the gas from other, non-Russian, sources and this proved to be more costly.

A very important thing to be said is that the negotiations between Moldova and Gazprom have never been public or transparent so we, as citizenry, do not know what the discussions are about: for example, is this really about Russian blackmail or there is something else, is Russia asking for political concessions in return for lower prices or this is a story created by the Moldovan government to justify the high prices?

With the electricity, is a completely different story: Moldova buys most of the electricity it uses from Transnistria, a non-recognized entity within the country. Transnistria produces electricity from gas that it does not pay for, imported from Russia (the region is formally pro-Russian). In the last few years, the Moldovan authorities have found a good political and economic solution: the push for lower prices for electricity from Transnistria in return for other concessions (a “green” license for the Metallurgical Factory in Rîbnița, for example).

To summarize the argument, it is plausible that Russia exerts pressure on Moldova, including political pressure, on the subject of energy supplies, but it is also true that the country does not do enough – and quickly enough – to break this dependence: investing in renewables (in 2023, for example, only 6% of electricity consumption represented renewable energy), finding alternative energy sources, increasing the efficiency in buildings, replacing fossil fuels with biomass, etc.

LH: To what extent was the election result the product of geopolitical factors – in particular the role of Russia and the appeal of the EU – rather than the performance of the economy and functioning of society domestically?

VS: My view is that Russian influence, if real, is greatly exaggerated in Moldovan affairs in the last few years and in this electoral campaign, particularly. The results were more influenced by domestic factors – failure of the government to deliver prosperity, failure of Maia Sandu and her party to deliver the promised reforms in the area of reforming the justice sector, failures in fighting corruption, failures in building a competent body of civil servants, the arrogance of the government, the fact that Maia Sandu was paying attention more to the foreign policy agenda and what foreign leaders said rather than listening to the local voices and grievances, rising inflation and impoverishment, increased costs for energy resources (electricity, heating, etc), lack of opportunities in the country, the fear (it does not matter if it was justified or not) of a likely confrontation between Moldova and Russia if Maia Sandu were re-elected, the frustration of ethnic minorities at not being heard by the government  in Chișinău, etc.

I believe that many people voted against Maia Sandu not because they were influenced by Russia, but because they had real and legitimate reasons to not like her policies or the party with which she is associated.

When I say that the ‘Russian interference’ argument is exaggerated, I have in mind also that using it uncritically contributes to the overlooking of these domestic factors and moves the discussion to Russia and Putin instead of focusing it on the concerns, fears and anxieties of the people.

I do not dismiss the geopolitical argument but I think that it is difficult to assess its importance. Because of this, sometimes it becomes not an argument to understand reality but one to refuse to address and question reality. To give you an example, when the Moldovan government invokes the argument of Russian interference, this begs some additional questions: if the intention of Russia to meddle with the elections was well known,  how was it possible, then, for the police/government to completely overlook this? It also takes away the voices of Moldovans who see that whatever concerns, anxieties, dreams and criticisms they have about the power, they are being  ignored and then collapsed under the roof of ‘geopolitics’. 

LH: Maia Sandu’s victory with 55% of the vote is clear enough. But this margin was achieved only thanks to the votes of the Moldovan diaspora voting from abroad. Why is Maia Sandu not more popular within Moldova itself – particularly outside the capital and in the more rural areas?

VS: We lack, I would say, good sociology in Moldova that would aim to explain, for example, the motivations of people’s vote. Moreover, for these elections exit polls were not organized  – they could have provided insights into the vote of various age groups, social classes, etc.

There was no single class or ethnic pattern of the vote for Maia Sandu and other candidates, with the possible exception of the Gagauz Autonomous Territorial Unit, which makes the picture very complicated. In Gagauzia, 95% of the vote went for the “No” option for the Referendum on the EU, and Aleksandr Stoianoglo won 97 % of the vote in the second round of the presidential elections.

At the same time, however, several things happened between the two rounds. One of them was an intensification of the anti-Gagauz rhetoric among the supporters of Maia Sandu, which might have made the Gagauz vote more homogeneous.

In other areas of the country one could not see such clear patterns. The electorate of Maia Sandu resides mostly in Chișinău and in the centre of the country; it is mostly the urban middle class, while the anti-Maia Sandu voters tend to reside in villages, small towns, tend to be pensioners and they are poorer.

Now, this whole ‘diaspora’ argument is complex and should be nuanced. Diaspora has become an increasingly influential factor in Moldovan politics recently, mostly because it votes for ‘pro-European’ political forces.

The logic of this vote is complex. There is a whole discourse about diaspora being a civilizational agent for the country and this motivates some people from the diaspora to vote.

For these elections and the referendum, however, the participation of the diaspora is to a large extent the result of PAS activists (including MPs) spreading concerns and fears among the Moldovans living in Western Europe. They spread the message that, if Stoianoglo or any candidate other than Maia Sandu won, Moldovans living in Western Europe should be ready for a deterioration of the relationship between Moldova and the EU (and UK). Messages such as ”you might be sent back to Moldova because the EU will break any relationship with a pro-Russian Moldova” circulated widely.

Also, we should not forget that much of the Moldovan diaspora is not diaspora in the traditional sense – they left the country but they continue to engage in discussions on social media, to talk to their relatives within the country about the situation. In this sense the diaspora is not as isolated from the situation in the country, as the opposition claims, and technology makes it easier.

One last thing about the diaspora – we should not forget the fact that, while the government has acted to facilitate in any way possible the vote of the diaspora in the West (EU, UK, USA), it has also done everything to marginalize and limit the vote of Moldovans living and working in Russia. For a population of around 200-300,000 people, only two polling stations, both in Moscow, were provided with only 10,000 ballot papers. To compare – for the presidential elections in 2020 there were 17 polling stations. This other, ‘bad’ diaspora could have altered the results of the elections and the referendum in an unpredictable way.

What is clear, though, is that the diaspora is an important political player in the country and will remain so for a while (it is not incidental that most of the diaspora consists, right now, of people from the largest demographic cohort in Moldova – people born between 1980 and 1990, when Moldova experienced a baby boom). The pro-Russian political parties are right to point out that not all the diaspora is treated equally but are hypocritical to say that the diaspora should not participate in the elections – if the diaspora starts to vote differently they will be the first to praise it. 

LH: Maia Sandu has promised to unite the country. What are the main obstacles to that being achieved?

VS: Maia Sandu’s promise to unite the country worked mostly during the elections. Beyond the elections, Maia Sandu has focused on paying attention to social groups and voters that liked her and she has ignored groups that disliked her. One of these groups is the Gagauz community – around 140 000 people in the south of the country. After the war in Ukraine, Maia Sandu and her party started to use anti-Russian rhetoric that was perceived as Russophobia, which in turn has alienated a big part of the Russian speaking population (a rather heterogeneous group that includes ethnic Russians, Ukrainians, etc).

An additional error of Maia Sandu and the government was to employ rhetoric focused on youth, which in turn alienated some of the elderly, who felt neglected. In terms of rhetoric, Maia Sandu has used very moralistic language that labelled any person that was trying to get around by means of a small amount of corruption a thief. Leaving aside that, in terms of corruption, the PAS is no more or less corrupt than any Moldovan political party that has been in government. This language proved to be very confrontational and a lot of people resented this (in a country where sometimes a small amount of corruption is a way to get around bureaucratic inefficiency).

There is also a factor that manifested itself between the two rounds of the elections that has also helped create distrust and disunity. Probably unpleasantly surprised by the result, a big section of PAS sympathizers started to use anti-Gagauz slurs, suggesting that it would be a shame for the country to elect an ethnic Turk (the Gagauz are a Turkish ethnic group) for the president. The PAS was slow to react to this: also, the party was partially responsible for the heightened rhetoric – in her first intervention after the results of the first round and the referendum were made public, Maia Sandu claimed that the results were a plot against democracy in Moldova and people started to look for scapegoats – and their response was unconvincing.

Immediately after she won the elections, Maia Sandu appealed for unity, be it social or ethnic, but for this to work much more is needed than words.

The elections amplified the distrust between Moldovans and the minorities living in the country, especially the Gagauz, and this distrust will be very difficult to overcome. The elderly, the voters with pro-Russian sympathies, people that are sceptical about the EU, the diaspora in Russia – all these groups have perceived the rhetoric and the practices of the government (there were numerous interventions of the police against what was described as ‘agents of Ilan Shor’) as a sort of war against them.

Bringing these groups together, talking to them, listening to their grievances, making some concessions to them – all this seems very difficult right now, especially given the fact that next summer Moldova will hold parliamentary elections, which are crucial for all, including for the presidency of Maia Sandu.

Formally Moldova is a parliamentary country and the president has a largely ceremonial role. Maia Sandu is able to influence the internal politics and to shape the political agenda only because she controls the parliament and the government via the PAS, which currently has a comfortable majority.

But things might change – a parliament where the PAS does not have the majority and has to share it with other parties, or is even in the opposition means a different arrangement. In the event that the PAS loses the parliamentary elections next year – a scenario that looks very plausible in the light of the results for the referendum and the elections – the president will most probably reduced to the ceremonial role prescribed by the Constitution. 

Vitalie Sprînceană is a sociologist and activist in Moldova. He is editor at PLATZFORMA, a left wing media outlet in Moldova.

Image: President Maia Sandu. Source: Ceremonia de învestitură a Preşedintelui ales al Republicii Moldova, Maia Sandu. Author: Privesc.Eu Moldova,  licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported license.