Anti-monarchists see an opportunity to prove their point in the coronation events.

Supporters of an elected head of state for Britain see the coronation as an opportunity to highlight the absurdity of having a royal family in the 21st century.

Anti-monarchy protesters gathered for a demonstration before the coronation in London on Saturday morning.

Credit...Pool photo by WPA


By Emma Bubola

NEW YORK TIMES
May 6, 2023

While some Britons prepared for King Charles III’s coronation by buying royal paraphernalia or cooking for street parties, a 21-year-old student in the northern city of Leeds instead ordered 50 beach balls bearing the words “No more royals.”

The plan is to throw them around at a protest at Trafalgar Square in central London on Saturday organized by Republic, a group representing Britain’s anti-monarchist movement, which its members say is being energized by the coronation.

“The coronation does a lot of good for the movement just by being itself,” the student, Imogen McBeath, said in an interview. “Absolutely ridiculous.”

During the events surrounding the death of Queen Elizabeth II last year, the British republican movement laid low, wary of appearing insensitive at a time of mourning. But with attention again turned to the royal family, the anti-monarchists of Republic, whose thousands of members range from their teens to their 90s, have embraced a new strategy.

They said they expected at least 1,000 people to turn up for Saturday’s protest, wearing yellow, holding banners and chanting, “Not my king.” Several anti-coronation parties are also planned around the country, with members eager to use the crowning of King Charles as evidence of the absurdity of having a monarchy in this day and age.

“They will put a glittery golden crown on his head in a Christian church,” said Matt Turnbull, a 35-year-old Republic member who lives in London and planned to attend the protest, in an interview. “Look at it, and just accept that something about this feels weird in 2023.”

Mr. Turnbull said that he expected the coronation to make his stomach turn, but that it also felt good that he would not be alone in having such a feeling. “The worse it makes me feel to watch it,” he said, “the more quickly we will move to abolish it.”

That Charles appears to be less popular than Elizabeth, his mother, is also rising the hopes of anti-monarchists. Although 58 percent of respondents in a recent poll by YouGov commissioned by the BBC said they still preferred a monarch to an elected head of state, the figures also suggested that a change may be underway, with only 32 percent of people aged 18 to 22 backing the idea.

Riz Possnett, 19, a University of Oxford student who uses they/them pronouns, said that the monarchy and its colonial legacy were an outdated symbol for modern, multicultural Britain.

“The British identity can come from better places than an unelected king,” they said. “The coronation reminds how weird and archaic our system is.”

They and Mx. McBeath, who also uses they/them pronouns, said they had once shown their disdain for the monarchy by sneaking into the King’s Bed in Windsor Castle, a building that can be visited as a tourist attraction, making out there and reading Prince Harry’s autobiography in protest.

They said the coronation would be a key moment to highlight the idea that the only reason Charles will have a dedicated party and public holiday is that he was born into the right family — especially as many people in Britain are struggling to afford food and electricity.

“I think the pomp and ceremony of that all, the king wearing a crown, will feel like a slap in the face to people struggling,” said Mx. Possnett.

After the organizers of the coronation invited millions of Britons to pledge an oath of homage to the monarch and his descendants — a suggestion that drew swift criticism from many quarters — a friend of Mx. McBeath’s wrote an alternative pledge. “Pledging allegiance to someone and all their children is not a democracy,” said Mx. McBeath.

The alternative pledge swears allegiance “to the living Earth and its People; not any nation state or Monarch. I will uphold the values of Democracy, Solidarity, Justice, Peace and Love.”

Mx. McBeath said they planned to attend the protest at Trafalgar Square on Saturday to listen to speeches, sing and chant.

“My goal is to have more fun than all the monarchists around,” they said.

RUDE AWAKENING

Giant penis mowed on to lawn where Bridgerton filmed before King Charles’s Coronation party

The lawn will host a garden party on Saturday.



King Charles III on a walkabout outside Buckingham Palace, London, to meet wellwishers ahead of the coronation on Saturday. Photo: PA — © PA


Níall Feiritear Yesterday

Tricksters have mown a giant penis into a famous 'perfect lawn' on one of Britain's most exclusive streets - just days before a coronation party.

Residents of the exclusive Royal Crescent in Bath were stunned to wake up to the large image on the grass outside their homes this week.

The Royal Crescent is hosting a Georgian-themed Grand Coronation Party at the weekend.

A flyer for the party says says: "Celebrate the 300th anniversary of the Georgian era.

"Decorate your own regal crown, watch demonstrations on royal fashion and visit the Georgian Cook cooking up delicious recipes in the kitchen."

The Royal Crescent will be familiar to Netflix viewers as the location of the smash-hit Regency era drama Bridgerton.

Tweet

Meanwhile a People Before Profit TD has said that RTÉ's planned broadcast of King Charles’ coronation this weekend is “quite inappropriate”.

Paul Murphy said the state broadcaster should rethink their coverage of the event, which he believes is simply an “attempt to launder the reputation of the monarchy.”

“People are going to be asked on Saturday, through their TV screens, to swear allegiance to Charles, a man who nobody has cast a single vote for, a man who was titular head of the parachute regiment responsible for Bloody Sunday, a man who received suitcases full of cash from the Qatari prime minister.

“The idea that RTÉ - a public service broadcaster in a republic, which was colonised by the British empire - should be showing this as some major item, as opposed to featuring it for a couple of minutes in a news piece, seems to me to be quite inappropriate.”

RTÉ will televise the event from 10am on Saturday and while Murphy explained that he wasn’t trying to police public service broadcasting, he believes the coronation has no place on Irish television screens.

Another tweet

“The British monarchy is not some benign tourist attraction. It is built on racism, on slavery, on empire,” he said.

“They're going to spend something like £250m, they're going to give an additional £400m to do a full renovation of the palaces for Charles and Camilla.

“This isn’t some kind of neutral thing. Even the idea that the history of racism for the monarchy is something in the distant past... Camilla’s crown is being refurbished with £60m of Star of Africa diamonds. They were taken from South Africa in 1907.

“There’s going to be 6,000 British troops (and) 60 fighter jets. It’s going to be a display of obscene militarism and imperialism.

“Let’s see if people want to watch it. Even in Britain 70pc of the public say they don't care very much, or they don't care at all, about the coronation.

“In Ireland, I suspect the numbers who care are going to be substantially less,” Mr Murphy said.

‘A reality to be accepted’: Why Central Asia is increasing engagement with the Taliban

May 3, 2023

Devin Haas
@DevinAHaas

While the Taliban has few fans in the capitals of Central Asia, the region has been increasingly open to diplomatic engagement with the unrecognised rulers of Afghanistan. Geographic proximity, trade, security, and humanitarian concerns are key factors.

On April 17, Kazakhstan became the latest country in Central Asia to accredit Taliban envoys without recognising the Islamic fundamentalists who seized control of Afghanistan in August 2021 as the country’s legitimate government.

Diplomats from the previous civilian government of Ashraf Ghani continue to operate Afghan embassies in the West and many other regions.

“The arrival of representatives of the new administration in Afghanistan does not signify recognition. That remains the prerogative of the United Nations,” said Aibek Smadiyarov, a spokesperson for the Kazakh foreign ministry. “Let me remind you that such missions are already present in a number of countries – Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, China, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Pakistan.”

Smadiyarov said that the Taliban will be provided with the premises for an embassy in Astana and that Kazakhstan plans to open a trade liaison office in Kabul. 

Even Tajikistan, which has remained the most resistant Central Asian country to engagement with the Taliban, is beginning to take small steps towards diplomatic relations. Ethnic Tajiks comprise roughly a quarter of Afghanistan’s population, but the Taliban are historically rooted in the Pashtun communities that make-up roughly 40 per cent of the country’s people.

Tajikistan’s president, Emomali Rahmon, has stated that ethnic Tajiks—who he claims make up 46 per cent of Afghanistan—must be given a “worthy role” in an ethnically-inclusive government in order for Tajikistan to recognise the Taliban.

Rahmon has offered sanctuary to Ahmad Massoud, the most prominent leader of armed resistance to the Taliban, and a 2006 ruling by Tajikistan’s Supreme Court designating the Taliban as a terrorist organisation remains in place.

Nonetheless, even as diplomats from Afghanistan’s previous government continue to operate out of the embassy in Dushanbe, the Taliban have been permitted to take over the consulate in Khorog on the border of the two countries.

Crisis south of the border

Three Central Asian countries—Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan—border Afghanistan. Afghanistan has formed a key portion of trade routes between China, South Asia, Central Asia, and what is modern Iran and Russia since ancient times.

With 41 million people, Afghanistan is also an important market for Central Asia; in comparison, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan each have about a sixth of its population, Tajikistan has less than a quarter, Kazakhstan less than half, and Uzbekistan—the most populous country in Central Asia—has around 35 million people.

Afghanistan has been plagued by war since the Soviet invasion in 1979, and decades of conflict have prevented the meaningful development of its economy. Over the past two decades the percentage of Afghans living in poverty has climbed from 80 to 97 and the percentage of young children experiencing acute malnutrition has more than quintupled.

Prior to the Taliban’s return to power in 2021, 80 per cent of the Afghan government’s budget came from international donors. These donations have been halted, and the United States froze 9.5 billion US dollars of the Afghan central bank’s assets.

The Taliban has banned Afghan women from higher education and from working for the government, non-governmental organisations, and the UN—jeopardising the operation of remaining humanitarian actors in the country.

The Taliban is nevertheless eager for international recognition and access to the global economy, but Western powers are insistent that the group must first improve women’s rights, form an inclusive government, and provide guarantees it will not harbour terrorist groups.

Anatoly Sidorov, Chief of Joint Staff of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), estimated that there are 6,500 Islamic State – Khorasan Province (ISIS-K) fighters in Afghanistan. Some 4,000 of these are believed to be in provinces that border Tajikistan, a CSTO member.

“Instability in the regions is directly linked to the Taliban’s policy to repress religious and ethnic minorities, increasing level of violence and lack of unity,” said Sidorov.

Afghanistan is a major producer of opium, and drug trafficking also threatens regional stability. While the Taliban officially banned opium cultivation in April 2022, UN findings indicate opium cultivation increased 32 per cent in 2022 over the previous year. In some provinces, one-fifth of arable land is dedicated to opium cultivation, and amid complete economic collapse, the Taliban reported turned a blind eye on farmers planting their fields for the next season.

To provide for the irrigation needs of Afghan farmers, the Taliban is moving ahead with the 285-kilometre Qosh Tepa canal to divert water from the Amu Darya river. The Amu Darya, which is already dying, forms much of the border between Afghanistan and its northern neighbours of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan and the canal could jeopardise water security for the entire region. 

Balancing needs

Central Asian countries see no alternative to engaging with the Taliban, but they are wary of angering Western countries still working to isolate the Taliban economically and diplomatically.

Uzbekistan has taken an active role engaging the Taliban while closely working with the West to distribute humanitarian aid.

Afghanistan relies on a railroad linking the southern Uzbek city of Termez to its northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif via Hairatan for half of its imports and much of its aid. The railroad was built by Uzbekistan Railways in 2011 and is operated by its subsidiary, Sogdiana Trans. Sogdiana Trans suspended operations in February over a dispute regarding the renewal of its contract but resumed operations after a settlement was reached two weeks later.

Ismatulla Irgashev, special representative to Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, called the Taliban “a reality that must be accepted,” saying, “Imagine what happens if we don’t engage. More conflict, another civil war, more blood, poverty, suffering, threats to the neighbours and the international community.”

Uzbekistan has sent officials to Afghanistan to hold talks with the Taliban on the Qosh Tepa canal. Tashkent insists it will not recognise the Taliban until the international community moves to do so, but it cannot wait to engage them until then.

“We see a common future with immense common interests, no matter who is in power there”, said Irgashev.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and cost-of-living crisis dim growth prospects in emerging Europe and Central Asia

Ensuring food security in Europe and Central Asia

US withdrawal from Afghanistan sparks scramble for influence in Central Asia

Afghanistan Seeks to Control Its Own Water Destiny


The Taliban’s plan to upgrade Afghanistan’s water infrastructure is raising tensions with neighboring countries.

By Patrick Yeager

THE DIPLOMAT
May 06, 2023

Facing acute drought conditions, the Taliban government is undertaking an ambitious program to upgrade its water infrastructure. However, the program has elevated tensions with the countries surrounding Afghanistan. Kabul lacks the technical ability to harness its water resources fully, but it can make life more miserable for its water-challenged neighbors.

Two years of drought have created widespread food scarcity in Afghanistan. The April 17 World Food Program Situation Report states Afghanistan is at the highest risk of famine in a quarter century. Many reservoirs around the country are running low. For example, the Band-e-Qargha is at about a third of its typical level, disrupting local tourist sites and limiting the water supply to Kabul. Many farmers are fearful for their crops this season. Agriculture accounts for half of Afghanistan’s gross domestic product, with 85 percent of the population working in the sector.

The Afghan Ministry of Energy and Water, currently led by the Taliban’s former military commander, governor, and agriculture minister Abdul Latif Mansoor, is not idle. On April 3, the ministry announced an ambitious program of more than 400 projects for the upcoming Afghan calendar year. The slate includes improving the Kamal Khan Dam in Nimroz Province and numerous smaller dams to improve irrigation and limit flooding.

The crown jewel of the Taliban’s effort is the massive Qosh Tepa Canal. The 285-kilometer canal project, which employs more than 5,000 people and 3,000 pieces of construction equipment, will irrigate an estimated 550,000 hectares of land if completed as designed.

However, the Taliban’s ability to unilaterally complete the announced list of projects is an open question. Construction timelines for most projects are difficult to find, and design details are scarce. Many Afghan experts have left the country after the Taliban assumed control, but some capability remains in Afghanistan.

Afghan engineers started the Tori Dam in September 2022, a $1.15 million project to irrigate 600 hectares of land and generate 1000 kilowatts of electricity. Like Qosh Tepa, Afghan firms are building the dam. However, the Afghans are cutting corners, raising concerns about efficiency and safety. Qosh Tepa is unlined, which means the canal could lose 60 percent of its water to seepage and face water quality issues.

A very small number of international partners are willing to engage with the Taliban, including cooperation on water infrastructure projects. The United Nations continues some cooperation, including the small Lodan Dam along the Kunar River, which is 80 percent complete. Turkey helped complete a $160 million upgrade to Kajaki Dam in Helmand Province in July 2022 and met with Afghan officials in April to negotiate further work at the facility. In January, Beijing’s China Road and Bridge Corporation expressed interest in building water storage dams in Afghanistan.

However, sanctions on Mansoor and other Taliban senior leaders complicate efforts to do business with the regime. Afghanistan’s limited transportation connections and poor infrastructure further challenge even determined partners. Additionally, the Islamic State’s local branch has brought the Taliban’s ability to provide security into question with separate attacks on a Pakistani envoy and Chinese diplomats and traders in Kabul.

Afghanistan has little hope of cooperating with its neighbors, as many of its projects come at their expense. As The Diplomat noted in April, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are aghast at Qosh Tepa’s progress as it deprives them of much-needed water. Both countries are facing extensive water shortages, and the Amu Darya River cannot afford to lose the 10 billion cubic meters the Qosh Tepa will divert. The Central Asian states lack a treaty framework to resolve these issues.

Similarly, Pakistan lacks a regulatory framework for the Kabul River, which flows from Afghanistan into the Indus. The neighbors share eight rivers across the Durand Line, and upstream work has historically caused trepidation in Islamabad.

Perhaps Kabul’s biggest problem is with Tehran, which claims the Kamal Khan Dam is withholding Iran’s share of the Helmand River, as dictated by the 1979 bilateral water treaty.

The Taliban have little choice but to keep building. Afghanistan’s economy, and perhaps its internal stability, depends on the efficacy of the water management project. While its neighbors are rightfully concerned about the impact of Afghanistan’s large projects on their water access, even the smaller dams will impact international water flows. The vast size of Afghanistan’s watersheds means that even small dams without flow controls, like the Tori and Lodan, will limit flows out of the country.

Despite this, Afghanistan’s neighbors are not without levers. Iran, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan all provide critical electricity to Afghanistan. Iran has also used the large number of Afghan refugees in its territory as leverage against Kabul. Conversation and diplomacy continue to keep tensions in check. However, water shortages will test the patience of Afghanistan’s neighbors. There is simply not enough water to go around, and the Taliban will use their position upriver to protect their interests.

GUEST AUTHOR
Patrick Yeager
Patrick Yeager is an analyst at the U.S. Department of Defense. This views expressed here are his own and do not represent the views of the U.S. government.

Dashed Korean Dreams: The Plight of Migrant Workers

South Korea’s handling of migrant workers is a blotch on the country’s reputation.

By Eunwoo Lee

THE DIPLOMAT
May 05, 2023

This year’s Labor Day in South Korea saw an outpouring of migrant workers denouncing forced labor and discrimination. As if in a pointed snub, the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) renewed its commitment to ousting undocumented workers in a statement released on May 3.

Migrant workers in South Korea have lived on the edge for decades now. Although the government knows they are indispensable for harvesting agricultural produce and greasing the wheels of South Korea’s manufacturing base, it has neglected their grievances.

The countryside, hosting farms and factories, bears the brunt of South Korea’s uneven regional development and buckling demographics. Half the entire South Korean population lives in the greater Seoul area. A quarter of cities and towns – 59 out of 228 – are likely to disappear in the foreseeable future. Meanwhile, the working age population will shrink by half in the next 40 years, shedding around 17 million people.

Consequently, the South Korean government has turned to migrant workers to fill the void. Approximately 374,000 non-professional migrant workers are legally residing in South Korea. More than half of them hail from Southeast Asia, with E-9 visas reserved for laborers abroad without Korean ancestry. The visa limits their employment to agriculture, fishery, manufacturing, construction, and other arduous sectors. The South Korean government decided to issue 110,000 E-9 visas in 2023, the largest annual quota since their introduction in 2004. In addition, more than 410,000 undocumented workers toil in the shadows in such industries.

Their necessity notwithstanding, migrant workers have become easy targets of exploitation and social exclusion. It is a prevalent practice among Korean employers to lodge them in places unsuitable for accommodation. In one extreme case in March, a Thai worker died of hydrogen sulfide poisoning, having lived in a pigsty soaked in slops and excrement from a hundred pigs.

About 20 percent of migrant workers live in shanties, usually made up of corrugated steel sheets and shading nets. This is in spite of the government policy – instituted in 2021 after a Cambodian worker froze to death in a plastic greenhouse – that repeals employers’ recruitment applications if they quarter laborers in unauthorized constructions. The measure, however, allows temporary buildings approved by local municipalities to be used as accommodation. More than 60 percent of migrant workers currently live in shipping containers and panel structures.

The practice of letting out shabby dwellings is lucrative. The Ministry of Employment and Labor (MOEL)’s directives permit Korean employers to deduct up to 20 percent of migrant workers’ paychecks in exchange for room and board. The less the employers spend on quality, the more they can save. Some workers pay almost $400 a month for a rickety shack.

Hence, almost all employers opt to house migrant workers, the majority of whom live on or right next to their work sites. Living in greenhouses on fields, containers on aquafarming infrastructure, or annexes to industrial plants, they are under 24-hour surveillance by their employers – and often forced to overwork.

Living in such close proximity to their workplaces, they fall prey to various forms of abuse by their employers and supervisors. Surveys of female migrant workers found that around 12 percent of them had been sexually assaulted at some point. Entreaties for better treatment are met with physical violence. Some employers flat-out refuse to pay salaries and severance packages after years of hard labor.

This is why the International Labor Organization advises that “it is generally not desirable that employers should provide housing for their workers directly,” recommending instead “the provision of housing for their workers on an equitable basis by public agencies or by autonomous private agencies … separate from the employers’ enterprises.” Otherwise, workers are isolated from local communities without recourse to external help, subsisting on the whims of their employers.

In addition, the Employment Permit System (EPS) that administers E-9 visas traps migrant workers in a vicious circle. They receive their visa only when certain employers decide to hire them. Therefore, their visa’s validity hinges on perpetuating this initial employment.

From the get-go, this subordinate relationship creates ample room for employers to tweak working and living conditions to their benefits. Despite abuse, workers still need to secure legal consent from their original employers to transfer their E-9 status to another employer or extend their stay. Otherwise the migrant workers lose their legal right to stay, which is why they still stomach abuse and “behave well” in front of their employers. Accepting deplorable lodgings is one example.

MOEL does allow migrant workers to find other jobs without their employers’ approval under proven circumstances of assaults, poor living conditions, and periodic payment default. However, when migrant workers enter a labor complaints center, the center often calls or summons their employers only to conclude all is well. Facing the language barrier, most workers forgo appealing. Even if they succeed in switching jobs, MOEL maintains a cap on the number of job transfers, which the United States Department of State cited as fueling human trafficking violations and labor exploitation in South Korea.

Undocumented migrant workers fare even worse. When they report cases of abuse to MOEL, the latter sends their dossiers to the Justice Ministry, which handles undocumented personnel with detention and repatriation. At times the ministry resorts to violence in rounding undocumented migrants up, even raiding cultural events and religious facilities to target nation-specific cohorts. Using such tactics, it has expelled 25,000 undocumented workers so far in 2023.

Running roughshod over migrant workers is hurting South Korea’s image as a cultural and economic powerhouse. Concerns have arisen over potential diplomatic fallout and reduced trade, as workers are forced to process food inimical to their religion and the South Korean media and politicians foment discrimination. More and more people are becoming disillusioned by the Korean Dream. The 2023 United Nations Universal Periodic Review exhorted South Korea to uphold migrant workers’ labor and housing rights.

The world is slowly waking up to the fact that Korean exports, in the end, come from migrant workers used up as grist for industrial mills.

Is Laos a Criminal State?

YES,CAMBODIA IS TOO

Last week’s attempted execution of a prominent government critic points to the recent rise of lawlessness and a sharp decline in public safety.

By Kearrin Sims

THE DIPLOMAT
May 05, 2023


The Patuxai monument in the center of Vientiane, Laos, by night.Credit: DepositphotosADVERTISEMENT


On April 29, an unknown assailant attempted to murder Anousa Luangsuphom. The administrator of a Facebook page that served as a platform for public political debate in Laos, Anousa, known by the nickname “Jack,” was shot twice at close range by in a Vientiane coffee shop. Following initial reports that Anousa had been killed in the attack, it later emerged that he survived and is recovering at a hospital in the Lao capital.

At just 25 years of age, Anousa represents one of a swelling number of young Lao citizens who are becoming more vocal about their country’s lack of political freedoms. Despite repeated efforts by the government to censor social media, online criticism of the party-state has been increasing, particularly among youth.

Anousa’s attempted murderer has not been apprehended, and there has been no announcement of a police investigation. He and his family must be protected.

This act of violence is just the latest in a growing list of human rights abuses against those who have sought to promote political transparency and freedom in Laos. These include Od Sayavong, Houayheuang Xayabouly, and Sombath Somphone – to name just a few of the more prominent cases. Houayheuang continues to be imprisoned for her criticisms of the government’s abysmal response to support survivors of the Xe-Pian Xe-Namnoy hydropower dam collapse, while the whereabouts of Sayavong and Somphone, both victims of enforced disappearance, remain unknown.

Laos has long been an authoritarian state with no tolerance for public criticism. Increasingly, however, it appears to be also becoming a criminal state, where corrupt elites have enmeshed themselves within the state apparatus for the purpose of accumulating wealth.

Take, for example, the Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone (GTSEZ) in the country’s northern province of Bokeo, where reports indicate that victims from more than 20 countries have been trafficked and forced to undertake cybercrime. Reports of torture, debt bondage, murder, and suicides have surrounded the zone, in which the Lao government holds a 20 percent stake. Alongside internationally trafficked victims, many vulnerable citizens of Laos have also been held captive in the zone, with families having to pay extortion fees to free their loved ones from prostitution and other forms of involuntary labor. Drug trafficking through Bokeo province has also accelerated rapidly since the GTSEZ was established.

Yet amid all this criminality, the Lao government recently awarded the zone’s chairman, Zhao Wei, a medal of bravery.

Zhao is an internationally-recognized criminal known to be engaged in drug trafficking, human trafficking, money laundering, bribery, and wildlife trafficking. That he was given an official state award in the midst of wide international media attention on his human trafficking operations speaks to the criminality of the Lao government and the waning of public safety and security.

In December 2022, Phankam Viphavanh retired as prime minister of Laos amid soaring inflation and a ballooning national public debt. The country’s economic woes may have been cause for his departure, but the discovery of a woman’s body in a suitcase in the Mekong River is also believed to have played a role. Like Anousa, this woman had also been shot multiple times, and those responsible for her murder have not been identified. The woman was later identified as a Lao millionaire; while not confirmed, it is rumored that she was the mistress of Phankam. The scandal surrounding her death may have also underscored his hasty, encouraged, retirement.

What is the state of public safety and security when the murderer(s) of a prominent and wealthy Vientiane businessperson, and possibly the prime minister’s mistress, go without arrest?

Concerning threats to international visitors, the mysterious 2015 death of Nara Pech, a 28-year-old Canadian national, should not be forgotten. Many of the details surrounding Pech’s death are unclear, but it is known that he died from stab wounds inflicted at Vientiane’s Wattay International Airport, after he had cleared customs. Shortly before his death, Pech left a harrowing voice message on his fiancée’s parents’ phone, stating, “I’m in Laos and they’re trying to hurt me. I need help… they took my boarding pass…” Surveillance video from the airport was withheld by the Lao government, who made the highly-unconvincing claim that Pech died from a self-inflicted stabbing.

What is the level of public security and safety when an international tourist is subject to a violent death in a country’s primary international airport?

When critics of the government are murdered, disappeared, or imprisoned in Laos, the party-state is sending a message to the population that free speech will not be tolerated.

Ironically, the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP) has long and repeatedly claimed public peace and stability as a central pillar of its legitimacy. Presented as a sign of good political governance, stability is in reality maintained through state violence and oppression to prevent political opposition and any criticism of the LPRP. As inequality and the harmful effects of elite capture increase, and as people’s lives become more difficult due to macro-economic mismanagement, the party-state is increasing the frequency and severity of its political oppression.

The message to remain silent about land acquisitions and displacements, dam collapses, extractive foreign investment, or any other “sensitive” matter related to elite profiteering at the expense of the poor, is delivered to the people of Laos through violence. It is a message directed at a domestic audience, in order to maintain single party-state rule at all costs. But it is also a message that the international community needs to hear.

Laos was once widely considered as a safe and welcoming country to visit, live, and work. The people of Laos remain as warm and welcoming as ever, but the country is becoming much less safe for citizens and for international tourism and business.

When the state colludes with and rewards international criminals such as Zhao Wei, when it fails to provide any answers as to the whereabouts of an internationally-esteemed community development worker whose abduction at a police-checkpoint in the nation’s capital is recorded on CCTV, and when it doesn’t immediately announce an investigation into the attempted assassination of a prominent social media figure – also captured on CCTV – public safety and security is eroded.

When the alleged mistress of the country’s prime minister is shot, stuffed into a suitcase, and thrown into the Mekong river, or when Vientiane is the last known whereabouts of three Thai political activists whose bodies were also found in the Mekong river, public safety and security erodes further.

When Lao political activists are not even safe in Thailand, when the trafficking of crystal methamphetamine skyrockets so much that the “largest drug bust in Asia’s history” is just one of three major seizures in Laos in a single week, or when a Canadian tourist dies (most likely as a result of murder) near a custom checkpoint at an international airport, Laos can no longer be considered a safe country.

To be sure, state violence remains predominantly targeted at those deemed threatening to the party-state, or at those whose homes or livelihoods happen to stand in the way of elite profiteering. But the message for the international community could not be more clear: come to Laos at your own risk.

GUEST AUTHOR
Kearrin Sims
Dr. Kearrin Sims is a lecturer in development studies at James Cook University. He researches regional connectivity and South-South cooperation within mainland Southeast Asia, with a focus on ethical development. His recent work examines the intersectional violence of large-scale infrastructures, political oppression, and development geopolitics. More information about his work can be found here.

Next fear about AI: Hollywood's killer robots become the military's tools

THAT HAS ALWAYS BEEN THE FEAR!

ANALYSIS
BY DAVID E. SANGER
NEW YORK TIMES

The military is trying to figure out what the new AI technologies are capable of when it comes to developing and controlling weapons, and they have no idea what kind of arms control regime, if any, might work.

AP file photo


WASHINGTON – When President Biden announced sharp restrictions in October on selling the most advanced computer chips to China, he sold it, in part, as a way of giving American industry a chance to restore its competitiveness.

But at the Pentagon and the National Security Council, there was a second agenda: arms control. If the Chinese military cannot get the chips, the theory goes, it may slow its effort to develop weapons driven by artificial intelligence. That would give the White House, and the world, time to figure out some rules for the use of AI in everything from sensors, missiles and cyberweapons, and ultimately to guard against some of the nightmares conjured by Hollywood – autonomous killer robots and computers that lock out their human creators.

Now, the fog of fear surrounding the popular Chat GPT chatbot and other generative AI software has made the limiting of chips to China look like just a temporary fix. When Biden dropped by a meeting in the White House on Thursday of technology executives who are struggling with limiting the risks of the technology, his first comment was "What you are doing has enormous potential and enormous danger."

It was a reflection, his national security aides say, of recent classified briefings about the potential for the new technology to upend war, cyberconflict and – in the most extreme case – decision-making on employing nuclear weapons.

But even as Biden was issuing his warning, Pentagon officials, speaking at technology forums, said they thought the idea of a six-month pause in developing the next generations of Chat GPT and similar software was a bad idea: The Chinese won't wait, and neither will the Russians.



"If we stop, guess who's not going to stop: potential adversaries overseas," the Pentagon's chief information officer, John Sherman, said Wednesday. "We've got to keep moving."

His blunt statement underlined the tension felt throughout the defense community today. No one really knows what these new technologies are capable of when it comes to developing and controlling weapons, and they have no idea what kind of arms control regime, if any, might work.

The foreboding is vague, but deeply worrisome. Could Chat GPT empower bad actors who previously wouldn't have easy access to destructive technology? Could it speed up confrontations between superpowers, leaving little time for diplomacy and negotiation?

"The industry isn't stupid here, and you are already seeing efforts to self regulate," said Eric Schmidt, a former Google chair who served as the inaugural chair of the advisory Defense Innovation Board from 2016-20.

"So there's a series of informal conversations now taking place in the industry – all informal – about what would the rules of AI safety look like," said Schmidt, who has written, with former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, a series of articles and books about the potential of AI to upend geopolitics.

The preliminary effort to put guardrails into the system is clear to anyone who has tested Chat GPT's initial iterations. The bots will not answer questions about how to harm someone with a brew of drugs, for example, or how to blow up a dam or cripple nuclear centrifuges, all operations in which the United States and other nations have engaged without the benefit of AI tools.



But those blacklists of actions will only slow misuse of these systems; few think they can completely stop such efforts. There is always a hack to get around safety limits, as anyone who has tried to turn off the urgent beeps on an automobile's seat-belt warning system can attest.

Although the new software has popularized the issue, it is hardly a new one for the Pentagon. The first rules on developing autonomous weapons were published a decade ago. The Pentagon's Joint Artificial Intelligence Center was established five years ago to explore the use of AI in combat.

Some weapons already operate on autopilot. Patriot missiles, which shoot down missiles or planes entering a protected airspace, have long had an "automatic" mode. It enables them to fire without human intervention when overwhelmed with incoming targets faster than a human could react. But they are supposed to be supervised by humans who can abort attacks if necessary.

In the military, AI-infused systems can speed up the tempo of battlefield decisions to such a degree that they create entirely new risks of accidental strikes, or decisions made on misleading or deliberately false alerts of incoming attacks.

"A core problem with AI in the military and in national security is how do you defend against attacks that are faster than human decision-making, and I think that issue is unresolved," Schmidt said. "In other words, the missile is coming in so fast that there has to be an automatic response. What happens if it's a false signal?"

Tom Burt, who leads trust-and safety operations at Microsoft, which is speeding ahead with using the new technology to revamp its search engines, said at a recent forum at George Washington University that he thought AI systems would help defenders detect anomalous behavior faster than they would help attackers. Other experts disagree. But he said he feared it could "supercharge" the spread of targeted disinformation.

All of this portends a whole new era of arms control.

Some experts say that since it would be impossible to stop the spread of Chat GPT and similar software, the best hope is to limit the specialty chips and other computing power needed to advance the technology. That will doubtless be one of many different arms-control plans put forward in the next few years, at a time when the major nuclear powers, at least, seem uninterested in negotiating over old weapons, much less new ones.