‘A reality to be accepted’: Why Central Asia is increasing engagement with the Taliban
May 3, 2023
Devin Haas
@DevinAHaas
While the Taliban has few fans in the capitals of Central Asia, the region has been increasingly open to diplomatic engagement with the unrecognised rulers of Afghanistan. Geographic proximity, trade, security, and humanitarian concerns are key factors.
On April 17, Kazakhstan became the latest country in Central Asia to accredit Taliban envoys without recognising the Islamic fundamentalists who seized control of Afghanistan in August 2021 as the country’s legitimate government.
Diplomats from the previous civilian government of Ashraf Ghani continue to operate Afghan embassies in the West and many other regions.
“The arrival of representatives of the new administration in Afghanistan does not signify recognition. That remains the prerogative of the United Nations,” said Aibek Smadiyarov, a spokesperson for the Kazakh foreign ministry. “Let me remind you that such missions are already present in a number of countries – Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, China, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Pakistan.”
Smadiyarov said that the Taliban will be provided with the premises for an embassy in Astana and that Kazakhstan plans to open a trade liaison office in Kabul.
Crisis south of the border
Three Central Asian countries—Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan—border Afghanistan. Afghanistan has formed a key portion of trade routes between China, South Asia, Central Asia, and what is modern Iran and Russia since ancient times.
With 41 million people, Afghanistan is also an important market for Central Asia; in comparison, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan each have about a sixth of its population, Tajikistan has less than a quarter, Kazakhstan less than half, and Uzbekistan—the most populous country in Central Asia—has around 35 million people.
Afghanistan has been plagued by war since the Soviet invasion in 1979, and decades of conflict have prevented the meaningful development of its economy. Over the past two decades the percentage of Afghans living in poverty has climbed from 80 to 97 and the percentage of young children experiencing acute malnutrition has more than quintupled.
Prior to the Taliban’s return to power in 2021, 80 per cent of the Afghan government’s budget came from international donors. These donations have been halted, and the United States froze 9.5 billion US dollars of the Afghan central bank’s assets.
The Taliban has banned Afghan women from higher education and from working for the government, non-governmental organisations, and the UN—jeopardising the operation of remaining humanitarian actors in the country.
The Taliban is nevertheless eager for international recognition and access to the global economy, but Western powers are insistent that the group must first improve women’s rights, form an inclusive government, and provide guarantees it will not harbour terrorist groups.
Anatoly Sidorov, Chief of Joint Staff of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), estimated that there are 6,500 Islamic State – Khorasan Province (ISIS-K) fighters in Afghanistan. Some 4,000 of these are believed to be in provinces that border Tajikistan, a CSTO member.
“Instability in the regions is directly linked to the Taliban’s policy to repress religious and ethnic minorities, increasing level of violence and lack of unity,” said Sidorov.
Afghanistan is a major producer of opium, and drug trafficking also threatens regional stability. While the Taliban officially banned opium cultivation in April 2022, UN findings indicate opium cultivation increased 32 per cent in 2022 over the previous year. In some provinces, one-fifth of arable land is dedicated to opium cultivation, and amid complete economic collapse, the Taliban reported turned a blind eye on farmers planting their fields for the next season.
To provide for the irrigation needs of Afghan farmers, the Taliban is moving ahead with the 285-kilometre Qosh Tepa canal to divert water from the Amu Darya river. The Amu Darya, which is already dying, forms much of the border between Afghanistan and its northern neighbours of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan and the canal could jeopardise water security for the entire region.
Balancing needs
Central Asian countries see no alternative to engaging with the Taliban, but they are wary of angering Western countries still working to isolate the Taliban economically and diplomatically.
Uzbekistan has taken an active role engaging the Taliban while closely working with the West to distribute humanitarian aid.
Afghanistan relies on a railroad linking the southern Uzbek city of Termez to its northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif via Hairatan for half of its imports and much of its aid. The railroad was built by Uzbekistan Railways in 2011 and is operated by its subsidiary, Sogdiana Trans. Sogdiana Trans suspended operations in February over a dispute regarding the renewal of its contract but resumed operations after a settlement was reached two weeks later.
Ismatulla Irgashev, special representative to Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, called the Taliban “a reality that must be accepted,” saying, “Imagine what happens if we don’t engage. More conflict, another civil war, more blood, poverty, suffering, threats to the neighbours and the international community.”
Uzbekistan has sent officials to Afghanistan to hold talks with the Taliban on the Qosh Tepa canal. Tashkent insists it will not recognise the Taliban until the international community moves to do so, but it cannot wait to engage them until then.
“We see a common future with immense common interests, no matter who is in power there”, said Irgashev.
May 3, 2023
Devin Haas
@DevinAHaas
While the Taliban has few fans in the capitals of Central Asia, the region has been increasingly open to diplomatic engagement with the unrecognised rulers of Afghanistan. Geographic proximity, trade, security, and humanitarian concerns are key factors.
On April 17, Kazakhstan became the latest country in Central Asia to accredit Taliban envoys without recognising the Islamic fundamentalists who seized control of Afghanistan in August 2021 as the country’s legitimate government.
Diplomats from the previous civilian government of Ashraf Ghani continue to operate Afghan embassies in the West and many other regions.
“The arrival of representatives of the new administration in Afghanistan does not signify recognition. That remains the prerogative of the United Nations,” said Aibek Smadiyarov, a spokesperson for the Kazakh foreign ministry. “Let me remind you that such missions are already present in a number of countries – Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, China, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Pakistan.”
Smadiyarov said that the Taliban will be provided with the premises for an embassy in Astana and that Kazakhstan plans to open a trade liaison office in Kabul.
Even Tajikistan, which has remained the most resistant Central Asian country to engagement with the Taliban, is beginning to take small steps towards diplomatic relations. Ethnic Tajiks comprise roughly a quarter of Afghanistan’s population, but the Taliban are historically rooted in the Pashtun communities that make-up roughly 40 per cent of the country’s people.
Tajikistan’s president, Emomali Rahmon, has stated that ethnic Tajiks—who he claims make up 46 per cent of Afghanistan—must be given a “worthy role” in an ethnically-inclusive government in order for Tajikistan to recognise the Taliban.
Rahmon has offered sanctuary to Ahmad Massoud, the most prominent leader of armed resistance to the Taliban, and a 2006 ruling by Tajikistan’s Supreme Court designating the Taliban as a terrorist organisation remains in place.
Nonetheless, even as diplomats from Afghanistan’s previous government continue to operate out of the embassy in Dushanbe, the Taliban have been permitted to take over the consulate in Khorog on the border of the two countries.
Tajikistan’s president, Emomali Rahmon, has stated that ethnic Tajiks—who he claims make up 46 per cent of Afghanistan—must be given a “worthy role” in an ethnically-inclusive government in order for Tajikistan to recognise the Taliban.
Rahmon has offered sanctuary to Ahmad Massoud, the most prominent leader of armed resistance to the Taliban, and a 2006 ruling by Tajikistan’s Supreme Court designating the Taliban as a terrorist organisation remains in place.
Nonetheless, even as diplomats from Afghanistan’s previous government continue to operate out of the embassy in Dushanbe, the Taliban have been permitted to take over the consulate in Khorog on the border of the two countries.
Crisis south of the border
Three Central Asian countries—Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan—border Afghanistan. Afghanistan has formed a key portion of trade routes between China, South Asia, Central Asia, and what is modern Iran and Russia since ancient times.
With 41 million people, Afghanistan is also an important market for Central Asia; in comparison, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan each have about a sixth of its population, Tajikistan has less than a quarter, Kazakhstan less than half, and Uzbekistan—the most populous country in Central Asia—has around 35 million people.
Afghanistan has been plagued by war since the Soviet invasion in 1979, and decades of conflict have prevented the meaningful development of its economy. Over the past two decades the percentage of Afghans living in poverty has climbed from 80 to 97 and the percentage of young children experiencing acute malnutrition has more than quintupled.
Prior to the Taliban’s return to power in 2021, 80 per cent of the Afghan government’s budget came from international donors. These donations have been halted, and the United States froze 9.5 billion US dollars of the Afghan central bank’s assets.
The Taliban has banned Afghan women from higher education and from working for the government, non-governmental organisations, and the UN—jeopardising the operation of remaining humanitarian actors in the country.
The Taliban is nevertheless eager for international recognition and access to the global economy, but Western powers are insistent that the group must first improve women’s rights, form an inclusive government, and provide guarantees it will not harbour terrorist groups.
Anatoly Sidorov, Chief of Joint Staff of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), estimated that there are 6,500 Islamic State – Khorasan Province (ISIS-K) fighters in Afghanistan. Some 4,000 of these are believed to be in provinces that border Tajikistan, a CSTO member.
“Instability in the regions is directly linked to the Taliban’s policy to repress religious and ethnic minorities, increasing level of violence and lack of unity,” said Sidorov.
Afghanistan is a major producer of opium, and drug trafficking also threatens regional stability. While the Taliban officially banned opium cultivation in April 2022, UN findings indicate opium cultivation increased 32 per cent in 2022 over the previous year. In some provinces, one-fifth of arable land is dedicated to opium cultivation, and amid complete economic collapse, the Taliban reported turned a blind eye on farmers planting their fields for the next season.
To provide for the irrigation needs of Afghan farmers, the Taliban is moving ahead with the 285-kilometre Qosh Tepa canal to divert water from the Amu Darya river. The Amu Darya, which is already dying, forms much of the border between Afghanistan and its northern neighbours of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan and the canal could jeopardise water security for the entire region.
Balancing needs
Central Asian countries see no alternative to engaging with the Taliban, but they are wary of angering Western countries still working to isolate the Taliban economically and diplomatically.
Uzbekistan has taken an active role engaging the Taliban while closely working with the West to distribute humanitarian aid.
Afghanistan relies on a railroad linking the southern Uzbek city of Termez to its northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif via Hairatan for half of its imports and much of its aid. The railroad was built by Uzbekistan Railways in 2011 and is operated by its subsidiary, Sogdiana Trans. Sogdiana Trans suspended operations in February over a dispute regarding the renewal of its contract but resumed operations after a settlement was reached two weeks later.
Ismatulla Irgashev, special representative to Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, called the Taliban “a reality that must be accepted,” saying, “Imagine what happens if we don’t engage. More conflict, another civil war, more blood, poverty, suffering, threats to the neighbours and the international community.”
Uzbekistan has sent officials to Afghanistan to hold talks with the Taliban on the Qosh Tepa canal. Tashkent insists it will not recognise the Taliban until the international community moves to do so, but it cannot wait to engage them until then.
“We see a common future with immense common interests, no matter who is in power there”, said Irgashev.
The Taliban’s plan to upgrade Afghanistan’s water infrastructure is raising tensions with neighboring countries.
By Patrick Yeager
THE DIPLOMAT
May 06, 2023
Facing acute drought conditions, the Taliban government is undertaking an ambitious program to upgrade its water infrastructure. However, the program has elevated tensions with the countries surrounding Afghanistan. Kabul lacks the technical ability to harness its water resources fully, but it can make life more miserable for its water-challenged neighbors.
Two years of drought have created widespread food scarcity in Afghanistan. The April 17 World Food Program Situation Report states Afghanistan is at the highest risk of famine in a quarter century. Many reservoirs around the country are running low. For example, the Band-e-Qargha is at about a third of its typical level, disrupting local tourist sites and limiting the water supply to Kabul. Many farmers are fearful for their crops this season. Agriculture accounts for half of Afghanistan’s gross domestic product, with 85 percent of the population working in the sector.
The Afghan Ministry of Energy and Water, currently led by the Taliban’s former military commander, governor, and agriculture minister Abdul Latif Mansoor, is not idle. On April 3, the ministry announced an ambitious program of more than 400 projects for the upcoming Afghan calendar year. The slate includes improving the Kamal Khan Dam in Nimroz Province and numerous smaller dams to improve irrigation and limit flooding.
The crown jewel of the Taliban’s effort is the massive Qosh Tepa Canal. The 285-kilometer canal project, which employs more than 5,000 people and 3,000 pieces of construction equipment, will irrigate an estimated 550,000 hectares of land if completed as designed.
However, the Taliban’s ability to unilaterally complete the announced list of projects is an open question. Construction timelines for most projects are difficult to find, and design details are scarce. Many Afghan experts have left the country after the Taliban assumed control, but some capability remains in Afghanistan.
Afghan engineers started the Tori Dam in September 2022, a $1.15 million project to irrigate 600 hectares of land and generate 1000 kilowatts of electricity. Like Qosh Tepa, Afghan firms are building the dam. However, the Afghans are cutting corners, raising concerns about efficiency and safety. Qosh Tepa is unlined, which means the canal could lose 60 percent of its water to seepage and face water quality issues.
A very small number of international partners are willing to engage with the Taliban, including cooperation on water infrastructure projects. The United Nations continues some cooperation, including the small Lodan Dam along the Kunar River, which is 80 percent complete. Turkey helped complete a $160 million upgrade to Kajaki Dam in Helmand Province in July 2022 and met with Afghan officials in April to negotiate further work at the facility. In January, Beijing’s China Road and Bridge Corporation expressed interest in building water storage dams in Afghanistan.
However, sanctions on Mansoor and other Taliban senior leaders complicate efforts to do business with the regime. Afghanistan’s limited transportation connections and poor infrastructure further challenge even determined partners. Additionally, the Islamic State’s local branch has brought the Taliban’s ability to provide security into question with separate attacks on a Pakistani envoy and Chinese diplomats and traders in Kabul.
Afghanistan has little hope of cooperating with its neighbors, as many of its projects come at their expense. As The Diplomat noted in April, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are aghast at Qosh Tepa’s progress as it deprives them of much-needed water. Both countries are facing extensive water shortages, and the Amu Darya River cannot afford to lose the 10 billion cubic meters the Qosh Tepa will divert. The Central Asian states lack a treaty framework to resolve these issues.
Similarly, Pakistan lacks a regulatory framework for the Kabul River, which flows from Afghanistan into the Indus. The neighbors share eight rivers across the Durand Line, and upstream work has historically caused trepidation in Islamabad.
Perhaps Kabul’s biggest problem is with Tehran, which claims the Kamal Khan Dam is withholding Iran’s share of the Helmand River, as dictated by the 1979 bilateral water treaty.
The Taliban have little choice but to keep building. Afghanistan’s economy, and perhaps its internal stability, depends on the efficacy of the water management project. While its neighbors are rightfully concerned about the impact of Afghanistan’s large projects on their water access, even the smaller dams will impact international water flows. The vast size of Afghanistan’s watersheds means that even small dams without flow controls, like the Tori and Lodan, will limit flows out of the country.
Despite this, Afghanistan’s neighbors are not without levers. Iran, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan all provide critical electricity to Afghanistan. Iran has also used the large number of Afghan refugees in its territory as leverage against Kabul. Conversation and diplomacy continue to keep tensions in check. However, water shortages will test the patience of Afghanistan’s neighbors. There is simply not enough water to go around, and the Taliban will use their position upriver to protect their interests.
GUEST AUTHOR
Patrick Yeager
Patrick Yeager is an analyst at the U.S. Department of Defense. This views expressed here are his own and do not represent the views of the U.S. government.
May 06, 2023
Facing acute drought conditions, the Taliban government is undertaking an ambitious program to upgrade its water infrastructure. However, the program has elevated tensions with the countries surrounding Afghanistan. Kabul lacks the technical ability to harness its water resources fully, but it can make life more miserable for its water-challenged neighbors.
Two years of drought have created widespread food scarcity in Afghanistan. The April 17 World Food Program Situation Report states Afghanistan is at the highest risk of famine in a quarter century. Many reservoirs around the country are running low. For example, the Band-e-Qargha is at about a third of its typical level, disrupting local tourist sites and limiting the water supply to Kabul. Many farmers are fearful for their crops this season. Agriculture accounts for half of Afghanistan’s gross domestic product, with 85 percent of the population working in the sector.
The Afghan Ministry of Energy and Water, currently led by the Taliban’s former military commander, governor, and agriculture minister Abdul Latif Mansoor, is not idle. On April 3, the ministry announced an ambitious program of more than 400 projects for the upcoming Afghan calendar year. The slate includes improving the Kamal Khan Dam in Nimroz Province and numerous smaller dams to improve irrigation and limit flooding.
The crown jewel of the Taliban’s effort is the massive Qosh Tepa Canal. The 285-kilometer canal project, which employs more than 5,000 people and 3,000 pieces of construction equipment, will irrigate an estimated 550,000 hectares of land if completed as designed.
However, the Taliban’s ability to unilaterally complete the announced list of projects is an open question. Construction timelines for most projects are difficult to find, and design details are scarce. Many Afghan experts have left the country after the Taliban assumed control, but some capability remains in Afghanistan.
Afghan engineers started the Tori Dam in September 2022, a $1.15 million project to irrigate 600 hectares of land and generate 1000 kilowatts of electricity. Like Qosh Tepa, Afghan firms are building the dam. However, the Afghans are cutting corners, raising concerns about efficiency and safety. Qosh Tepa is unlined, which means the canal could lose 60 percent of its water to seepage and face water quality issues.
A very small number of international partners are willing to engage with the Taliban, including cooperation on water infrastructure projects. The United Nations continues some cooperation, including the small Lodan Dam along the Kunar River, which is 80 percent complete. Turkey helped complete a $160 million upgrade to Kajaki Dam in Helmand Province in July 2022 and met with Afghan officials in April to negotiate further work at the facility. In January, Beijing’s China Road and Bridge Corporation expressed interest in building water storage dams in Afghanistan.
However, sanctions on Mansoor and other Taliban senior leaders complicate efforts to do business with the regime. Afghanistan’s limited transportation connections and poor infrastructure further challenge even determined partners. Additionally, the Islamic State’s local branch has brought the Taliban’s ability to provide security into question with separate attacks on a Pakistani envoy and Chinese diplomats and traders in Kabul.
Afghanistan has little hope of cooperating with its neighbors, as many of its projects come at their expense. As The Diplomat noted in April, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are aghast at Qosh Tepa’s progress as it deprives them of much-needed water. Both countries are facing extensive water shortages, and the Amu Darya River cannot afford to lose the 10 billion cubic meters the Qosh Tepa will divert. The Central Asian states lack a treaty framework to resolve these issues.
Similarly, Pakistan lacks a regulatory framework for the Kabul River, which flows from Afghanistan into the Indus. The neighbors share eight rivers across the Durand Line, and upstream work has historically caused trepidation in Islamabad.
Perhaps Kabul’s biggest problem is with Tehran, which claims the Kamal Khan Dam is withholding Iran’s share of the Helmand River, as dictated by the 1979 bilateral water treaty.
The Taliban have little choice but to keep building. Afghanistan’s economy, and perhaps its internal stability, depends on the efficacy of the water management project. While its neighbors are rightfully concerned about the impact of Afghanistan’s large projects on their water access, even the smaller dams will impact international water flows. The vast size of Afghanistan’s watersheds means that even small dams without flow controls, like the Tori and Lodan, will limit flows out of the country.
Despite this, Afghanistan’s neighbors are not without levers. Iran, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan all provide critical electricity to Afghanistan. Iran has also used the large number of Afghan refugees in its territory as leverage against Kabul. Conversation and diplomacy continue to keep tensions in check. However, water shortages will test the patience of Afghanistan’s neighbors. There is simply not enough water to go around, and the Taliban will use their position upriver to protect their interests.
GUEST AUTHOR
Patrick Yeager
Patrick Yeager is an analyst at the U.S. Department of Defense. This views expressed here are his own and do not represent the views of the U.S. government.
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