Unexpected Victory: Pezeshkian’s Win Signals Hope For Iran’s Future – OpEd

 July 15, 2024 

By Fuad Muxtar-Agbabali

Will he be up to expectations?

The recent presidential election in Iran concluded with Massoud Pezeshkian emerging as the unexpected victor. This surprising outcome has sparked a wave of hope for a new political era in Iran among analysts and observers. As the preliminary results were announced, the United States was quick to reveal its stance. The State Department stated that the election results would not alter US policy towards Iran. “The election will not have a serious impact on our approach to Iran. Washington’s concern about Tehran remains unchanged,” a State Department representative said.   

Potential for change in Iranian policy   

The key question now is whether Pezeshkian can implement significant changes in Iran’s foreign and domestic policies. Despite the inherent constraints of the theocratic system, where the Supreme Leader holds ultimate authority, there are high hopes among the Iranian voters that Pezeshkian, a representative of the reformist wing, can at least strive for gradual changes. 

The Supreme Leader’s control over major aspects of foreign policy suggests that Pezeshkian will likely adhere to the established political line. However, some experts believe he might introduce domestic reforms to meet the expectations of his supporters and avoid widespread disillusionment. His classification as a reformist raises hopes for incremental changes that could improve the socio-economic conditions in Iran.

The State Department’s preliminary reaction reflects Washington’s cautious approach. The US is unlikely to adopt a clear-cut position on Pezeshkian’s election, particularly with the upcoming presidential elections in November 2024. The unresolved nuclear issue, coupled with Israel’s staunch position, complicates any potential positive shift in US policy towards Tehran. Additionally, the possibility of a Trump victory could further deteriorate US-Iran relations.   

Pezeshkian faces numerous challenges on both domestic and foreign fronts. Domestically, Iran’s socio-economic situation is dire, necessitating urgent reforms. The previous administration’s radical policies severely damaged relations with neighboring countries, including Pakistan, Afghanistan, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Iraq. The new president must work to repair these strained relationships.  Internationally, Iran’s pursuit of nuclear energy remains a contentious issue. Tehran is determined to acquire nuclear capabilities, a goal that continues to elicit strong reactions from the international community. Pezeshkian’s administration will need to navigate these complex dynamics while addressing domestic discontent.

Pezeshkian’s potential success hinges on his ability to balance domestic reforms with foreign policy initiatives. The Iranian deep state seems to have brought a reformist to power to take a “time-out” and address pressing issues. If Pezeshkian fails to deliver, he could be scapegoated as the main culprit, tarnishing the reformist agenda.  Supreme Leader Khamenei and his entourage, including the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC), will likely continue to exert significant influence over Iran’s foreign policy. Any substantial change in this arena will be challenging. However, Pezeshkian’s first 100 days in office will be crucial in setting the tone for his presidency and the country’s direction.

Strategic alliances & economic partnerships 

Strengthening strategic economic relations with Russia and other Asian giants will be a priority for the new president. Pezeshkian, of Azerbaijani origin, may also focus on enhancing ties with Azerbaijan and Turkey. His ethnic background and the support he received during the election campaign could play a role in shaping Iran’s domestic and foreign policies.

Immediately following the election, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev sent a congratulatory letter to President-elect Pezeshkian, inviting him to Azerbaijan. This gesture indicates Azerbaijan’s willingness to engage with the new Iranian administration. The move also underscores Baku’s determination to improve relations with Iran. This diplomatic gesture could pave the way for enhanced cooperation between the two countries, benefiting both sides.   

Pezeshkian’s ethnic background may also influence Iran’s policy towards Turkey. During his election campaign, he did not shy away from highlighting his Turkish roots, a move that resonated with many voters. This could lead to a new configuration in Iran-Azerbaijan-Turkey relations, with potential benefits for regional stability and cooperation.     

The Supreme Leader’s approval of Pezeshkian’s campaign strategy suggests a possible increase in the Turkish factor in Iran’s domestic and foreign policy. If Pezeshkian’s first foreign visit is to Azerbaijan or Turkey, it could signal a shift towards stronger regional ties.  

Conclusion: A test for Iran’s future  

Massoud Pezeshkian’s election as president marks a significant moment in Iranian politics. His reformist agenda, combined with his ethnic background, raises expectations for change. However, the entrenched theocratic system and the Supreme Leader’s overarching control present formidable obstacles.   

Pezeshkian’s success will depend on his ability to navigate these challenges and implement meaningful reforms. His first 100 days in office will be critical in determining whether he can meet the expectations of his supporters and foster a new era in Iranian politics.  

Iran faces a test on multiple fronts – domestically, regionally, and internationally. If Pezeshkian can leverage this opportunity to initiate dialogue with the West on the nuclear issue and improve socio-economic conditions, he could emerge as a transformative leader. The stakes are high, and the world will be watching closely to see if Iran can usher in a new era of stability and progress. 

Fuad Muxtar-Agbabali is a distinguished journalist from Azerbaijan and has authored many white papers on International Affairs and political analysis focused in the regions of Europe and Southern Caucasus.

The Gaza Genocide Deepens: The Reckoning Begins For The Perpetrators – OpEd

 July 15, 2024  

By Ralph Nader

In the early weeks of Israel’s massive bombardment and invasion of Gaza, the Israeli military was killing anyone who moved and destroying anything that stood.  In response to telephone calls from President Joe Biden and U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken urging Netanyahu to minimize civilian casualties reportedly he would respond:  Don’t lecture me, look at what you did to Hiroshima, Nagasaki and Dresden.

The combined official death toll from these two atomic bombs and the firebombing of Dresden was around 239 thousand civilians. After nine months of the Israeli government’s relentless day and night genocide war machine, bristling with the latest U.S. weaponry, Israel has killed far more than that number of Gaza civilians. In a tiny enclave with 2.3 million people (compared to the total population of Japan and Germany in World War II of 152 million), at least 300,000 Palestinians, mostly women and children, have been killed with more dying every day. Daily annihilations by F-16s, tanks, and arbitrary executions, combined with Israeli bans on food, water, medicine, electricity, and fuel have generated starvation, diseases, untreated injuries, homelessness for almost all Gazans. The destruction of Gaza’s hospitals and healthcare facilities adds to the military-caused casualty toll.

Forty-five thousand babies have been born into the rubble since October. Infants are plagued by contaminated water, poor nutrition, and a dire shortage of healthcare. Their mothers are starving. What about the plight of a similar number of one- or two-year-olds? What about  fifty thousand serious diabetics without insulin? An even larger number of cancer patients are denied their medicine and care. Hundreds of healthcare workers were killed with the hungry, exhausted, sick, and injured survivors staggering bravely to those broken down hospitals that haven’t been entirely demolished.

It isn’t as if major global health and food program organizations have not been sounding the alarms of famine, epidemics and military violence under the unfolding eradication of Gaza’s trapped defenseless inhabitants. Organizations such as UNICEF, the Global Food Program, Oxfam, the UN Humanitarian Agency, The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), USAID and Biden’s own Humanitarian adviser, David Satterfield, know the looming numbers that spell omnicide for the families of Gaza.

Back in December, Devi Sridhar, the chair of global health at the University of Edinburgh estimated half a million Gazans will likely die in 2024 if conditions causing tens of thousands of deaths in the last three months of 2023 continue. Conditions have gotten worse as the causes of mortality have grown and intensified week by week.

In an admittedly conservative estimate, three researchers published in the prestigious British medical journal “The Lancet,” that, as of mid-June, “it is not implausible to estimate that up to 186,000 or even more deaths could be attributable to the current conflict in Gaza.”

Why then does the media stick to the official Hamas Health Ministry’s huge undercount now at about 39,000 deaths? First, early on, the Ministry took its figures from names of the deceased provided by hospitals and morgues which are now devastated and inoperative. The Hamas regime doesn’t mind this undercount since it lessens the criticism that it cannot protect its own people and shelter them from what they knew was coming after October 7th from the most racist, genocidal, and expansionist Israeli regime ever.

Netanyahu – who has boasted over the years to his Likud Party, that he has backed and helped fund Hamas due to its opposition to a two-state solution – likes the vast undercount of his mass slaughter.

But there are other reasons for this adoption of the low Hamas figures. For Biden, it keeps down the intensity of domestic protests demanding decisive White House pressure on Netanyahu for a permanent ceasefire, the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza, and an end to the blockade to allow in the thousands of trucks carrying humanitarian aid paid for by the U.S.

Netanyahu’s long-time prohibition of all Israeli and foreign war correspondents from entering Gaza as independent reporters has concealed from the world much of the carnage in these killing fields. Finally, finally, on July 11, 2024, more than 70 media and civil society organizations, including the New York Times, the Washington Post, AP, CNN and the BBC signed an open letter demanding that Israel “give journalists independent access to Gaza.”

Palestinian journalists in Gaza are being hunted down by Netanyahu, who allows killing scores of reporters and their families. The survivors are bravely trying to report on the devastation for outsiders and social media.  Nonetheless, the mainstream press, to do its job, has to have reporters on the ground.

Netanyahu is a master at biding his time and stalling to keep his job. Despised by three out of four Israelis for both his domestic tyrannies and for collapsing his multi-tiered border defense on October 7, he is also under indictment for political corruption by Israeli prosecutors. Israeli street protests are getting larger by the week and the majority of Israelis want new elections now!

The reckoning over what Netanyahu’s savage terror state has done to innocent Palestinians from infants in incubators to the elderly in wheelchairs is coming to Israeli society. As the soldiers return, some will be narrating the horrors they saw and were ordered to produce. Already six reservists have told an Israeli magazine that they were encouraged to shoot and kill any Palestinian they saw on the street or in their homes. There are no operating rules of engagement as required by international law. They gave examples of the target practice, as they told the reporter they would no longer serve in Gaza.

Such soldiers are called “refuseniks,” who became a courageously articulate, if harassed, protest group about twenty years ago. (See Israeli Refuseniks Forsake Army Despite Post-October 7 Nationalist Frenzy, The Intercept January 2, 2024)

As more information flows through the weakening Israeli censorship system, the many Israeli human rights associations will be strengthened (See December 13, 2023, an open letter titled, “Stop the Humanitarian Catastrophe” to President Biden by 16 Israeli human rights groups which appeared in the New York Times).  The exaggeration of the Hamas threat to Israel, following a one-time homicide-suicide mission through a mysteriously open border into Israel on October 7, 2023 will become evident. Hamas had a militia of some 20,000 fighters with small arms and dwindling ammunition, hiding in tunnels against a military, nuclear-armed superpower with over 400,000 army soldiers, hundreds of tanks and 1500 F-16 pilots.

Joe Biden has just authorized another arsenal of 500 lb. bombs for Netanyahu to use against the remnants of Gazan civilian life. He touts his refusal to send Israel any more 2000 lb. bombs capable of destroying entire neighborhoods.

Meanwhile, deep in the Pentagon and U.S. intelligence agencies, analysts are creating scenarios of what forthcoming retaliation against our country could look like. With cheap, advanced armed drones increasingly producible by more makers anywhere, these scenarios are not the stuff of science fiction.

By kicking the two-state solution down the road for decades, favoring Israel, with supine Congressional backing, our presidents have assured that our own national security, not to mention our tradition of free speech in the U.S., is increasingly vulnerable.

Ralph Nader

Ralph Nader is a politician, activist and the author of Only the Super-Rich Can Save Us!, a novel. In his career as consumer advocate he founded many organizations including the Center for Study of Responsive Law, the Public Interest Research Group (PIRG), the Center for Auto Safety, Public Citizen, Clean Water Action Project, the Disability Rights Center, the Pension Rights Center, the Project for Corporate Responsibility and The Multinational Monitor (a monthly magazine).

Beyond Growth: Building A Sustainable And Inclusive Global Economy In 2024 – Analysis

July 15, 2024 
By Simon Hutagalung


The global economy in 2024 is facing a complex combination of factors, including modest growth, ongoing inflation, rapid technological progress, and various geopolitical and environmental issues. Each of these factors presents distinct challenges that require thoughtful and cooperative solutions to promote long-term worldwide economic well-being.

Analysis

The global economic outlook for 2024 showcases a patchwork of steady growth coupled with notable regional disparities. Emerging markets in Asia and Africa are witnessing comparatively higher growth rates fueled by the increased embrace of technology, expanding consumer populations, and substantial investments in infrastructure. Nonetheless, this positive outlook is restrained by sluggish growth in developed economies, particularly in Europe, where geopolitical tensions and inflationary pressures persist in eroding economic stability.

The ongoing issue of rising inflation is causing major challenges due to disruptions in energy markets and supply chains. High inflation is particularly harmful to those with lower incomes, leading to greater inequality. To address this, central banks worldwide are implementing tighter monetary policies, such as raising interest rates. However, these measures run the risk of hindering economic growth and even sparking recessions in already fragile economies.

The energy market continues to face significant volatility, influenced by geopolitical conflicts and the global transition towards renewable energy. Despite substantial investments in green energy projects to reduce carbon emissions, there is still a significant dependence on fossil fuels. This reliance not only perpetuates environmental degradation but also leaves economies vulnerable to fluctuating energy prices, which can disrupt economic stability and growth. Moreover, supply chain disruptions persist in global trade, resulting in shortages and increased costs. These challenges underscore the need for robust strategies to navigate the complexities of the energy market and global trade.

Global trade is still facing supply chain disruptions, causing shortages and increased costs for goods. With the challenges brought on by the pandemic, companies are working to diversify their supply chains to reduce risks. However, this realignment has its drawbacks; while it aims to create more resilient supply chains, it also has the potential to shift trade patterns, leading to new forms of economic tension and imbalance.

Technological advancements in 2024 continue to serve as a beacon of hope in the economic landscape. The growth of digital economies is underpinned by investments in artificial intelligence, automation, and cybersecurity, promising increased productivity and new economic opportunities. The adoption of digital currencies and blockchain technology is revolutionizing financial systems by enhancing transparency and efficiency. However, the rapid pace of technological change also poses significant challenges, including job displacement and exacerbation of economic inequality. The skills gap is widening, making the need for workforce reskilling more critical than ever to ensure that the benefits of technological progress are broadly shared.

Geopolitical tensions are adding another layer of complexity to the international economic situation. Heightened risks in Europe and Asia are undermining economic stability, confidence, and investor sentiment. Trade disputes and international sanctions are disrupting trade relations, creating an environment of uncertainty that hampers economic growth and cooperation. The economic sanctions imposed as a result of geopolitical conflicts not only affect the targeted nations but also have ripple effects on global markets, leading to economic inefficiencies and reduced growth prospects.

The world is increasingly recognizing the importance of addressing environmental concerns on a global scale. There is a growing emphasis on sustainability and the implementation of stricter environmental regulations to tackle climate change. While these actions are crucial for the long-term well-being of our planet, they also present immediate economic challenges. Balancing the need for economic growth with environmental sustainability requires carefully coordinated international efforts and the development of innovative solutions.

The labour market landscape in 2024 reflects significant shifts in the global economy. The increasing prevalence of remote work and the gig economy is altering the way employment opportunities are structured, offering greater flexibility but also introducing uncertainties related to job security and benefits. Additionally, the persistent gap in essential skills and the pressing need for workforce reskilling are pivotal issues that directly impact economic competitiveness. Failure to effectively address these challenges can result in enduring unemployment and underemployment, which in turn fuels social unrest and economic stagnation.

The financial markets in 2024 are experiencing a great deal of volatility due to economic uncertainties and policy changes. This volatility has the potential to lead to financial instability, which can erode investor confidence and potentially trigger economic crises. However, there is also a silver lining: emerging markets and sectors such as technology and healthcare are attracting significant investment, presenting new opportunities for growth and innovation.

It’s becoming increasingly evident that efforts to strengthen international economic cooperation through multilateral institutions are gaining traction despite their inherent challenges. While bilateral trade agreements and regional economic partnerships are being bolstered to promote collaboration and stability, conflicting national interests and priorities can impede effective international cooperation, making it difficult to comprehensively address global economic challenges.
Recommendations

To effectively navigate the complexities of the 2024 international economic landscape, a multi-faceted approach is essential. Policymakers should prioritize:

1. Collaborative Inflation Control: We need a collaborative effort between central banks and governments to create unified monetary and fiscal policies that can tackle inflation while still nurturing economic growth. This should involve specific measures to assist disadvantaged populations impacted by high inflation.

2. Energy Transition Management: It is crucial to increase funding for renewable energy sources while also managing a steady and fair shift away from fossil fuels. Governments need to offer incentives to support green energy initiatives, invest in research and development, and work towards making renewable energy options more accessible and cost-effective.

3. Chain Supply Resilience: It is important to support companies in building more resilient and diversified supply chains. Governments can contribute by playing a role in facilitating international trade agreements that promote stable and efficient supply chains.

4. Technological Integration and Workforce Reskilling: Investing in education and training programs is crucial for bridging the skills gap and preparing the workforce to adapt to technological advancements. Collaborations between the public and private sectors can play a key role in developing effective initiatives for reskilling.

5. Geopolitical Stability: It is important to prioritize diplomatic efforts to address geopolitical conflicts and alleviate tensions. International organizations have a vital role to play in actively mediating disputes and encouraging collaboration.

6. Environmental Sustainability: Implementing policies that strike a balance between economic growth and environmental sustainability is crucial. This involves the enforcement of regulations that restrict carbon emissions and the encouragement of businesses to embrace sustainable practices.

7 . Labor Market Reform: Develop policies that support the changing labour market, including safeguards for gig workers and initiatives that promote job security and benefits for remote workers.

8. Financial Market Stability: Enhance regulatory frameworks to reduce financial market volatility. Promote investment in emerging markets and innovative sectors to foster sustainable growth.
Conclusion

The economic landscape in 2024 is a complex mix of growth opportunities and significant challenges. Addressing persistent inflation, managing energy transitions, building resilient supply chains, integrating technological advancements, navigating geopolitical tensions, promoting environmental sustainability, and reforming labour and financial markets are all crucial for ensuring global economic stability and prosperity. Through coordinated and innovative policies, the global community can overcome these challenges and pave the way for a more sustainable and inclusive economic future.

The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own.

ReferencesGlobal Economic Prospects, The World Bank, 2024.
Energy Transition Outlook 2024, International Energy Agency.
Supply Chain Resilience Report, McKinsey & Company, 2024.
The Future of Jobs Report, World Economic Forum, 2024.
Geopolitical Risk Report, Eurasia Group, 2024.
Global Environmental Outlook, United Nations Environment Programme, 2024.
Financial Stability Report, Bank for International Settlements, 2024.



Simon Hutagalung

Simon Hutagalung is a retired diplomat from the Indonesian Foreign Ministry and received his master's degree in political science and comparative politics from the City University of New York. The opinions expressed in his articles are his own.

White Phosphorus And The Fog Of War: Blurred Lines Between Military Necessity And Civilian Damage – Analysis

File photo of a US Air Force Douglas A-1E Skyraider dropping a 100-pound (45 kg) M47 white phosphorus bomb on a Viet Cong position in South Vietnam in 1966. 

Photo Credit: United States Air Force, Wikipedia Commons

July 15, 2024 
By Girish Linganna


A chemical, called ‘white phosphorus’, is often used to manufacture artillery shells, rockets and bombs. When exposed to oxygen, it ignites and burns at a very high temperature of 815°Celsius. This reaction creates a bright light and thick smoke, useful in military operations. However, this incendiary chemical can result in grievous injuries to any person who comes into direct contact with it. White phosphorus is not considered a chemical weapon because it works mainly through heat and flames rather than toxicity. It can be delivered using felt wedges, or small pads, soaked in phosphorus and has a distinctly ‘garlic-y’ smell.


How Exactly is White Phosphorus Used?

White phosphorus is mainly used to shield the army’s activities on the ground. It creates a smokescreen, both during the day and at night, to conceal the movement of troops. Additionally, it disrupts infrared optics and weapons tracking systems, helping protect military forces from guided weapons, such as anti-tank missiles.

When white phosphorus explodes in the air, it covers a larger area compared to when it explodes on the ground. This makes it useful for hiding large troop movements. However, this also means that its burning effects spread over a wider area, which increases danger to civilians in such crowded places as Gaza. On the ground, in case of a white phosphorus explosion, the danger zone is more concentrated as the smokescreen persists for a longer time. The duration the smoke stays in the air depends on the weather, so it is hard to predict exactly how long it will last.

White phosphorus can also be used as an incendiary weapon. An incendiary weapon is a type of weapon designed to start fires or destroy sensitive equipment using fire. These weapons use such substances as napalm, white phosphorus, or thermite that can ignite and cause intense burns, spreading fire to targets. Incendiary weapons are also often used to damage enemy supplies, equipment and personnel, as well as to create smoke screens or signal flares.

Fires caused by white phosphorus can destroy homes and buildings, damage crops and kill livestock. Additionally, the limited resources available to medical providers in conflict zones make it even harder to treat severe burns. In 2004, during the second battle of Fallujah in Iraq, the US forces used white phosphorus to create smoke and force hidden fighters out into the open, where they were then attacked, even though their use is regulated under international law due to the severe injuries and suffering they can cause.
The Harmful Effects of White Phosphorus

Burns caused by white phosphorus scorching through to the bone can result in life-threatening injuries. These burns heal slowly and are likely to get infected. If any small piece of white phosphorus is not completely removed, it can make the wound worse after treatment and can reignite when it comes into contact with oxygen. Even 10% burns caused by exposure to white phosphorus can often be life-threatening. It can also cause damage to the lungs and lead to organ failure.

Those who survive initial injuries often endure lifelong suffering. Permanent tightening of the muscles and other tissues, known as contractures, limits their movement. Trauma from the attack, painful treatments and disfiguring scars can also cause psychological harm and social isolation.

White Phosphorus: Legality Under International Law

When used in munitions, white phosphorus is considered an incendiary weapon. Although international humanitarian law does not explicitly ban incendiary weapons, it requires states to take all possible precautions to prevent harm to civilians caused by these weapons.

Incendiary weapons come under regulations stipulated by Protocol III of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). Palestine and Lebanon are parties to Protocol III, but Israel has not ratified it. Protocol III bans the use of airdropped incendiary weapons in areas with “concentrations of civilians,” but it has two major loopholes.First, it limits some, although not all, uses of ground-launched incendiary weapons in densely populated areas. This includes white phosphorus artillery strikes in Gaza
Second, the protocol defines incendiary weapons as those designed mainly to start fires and burn people. This definition might exclude multipurpose munitions, such as those with white phosphorus, if they are used to create smokescreens, even though they still cause the same burning effects

CCW member-states have advised that this loophole be closed and the rules on using ground-launched incendiary weapons be tightened. Human Rights Watch supported the popular demand for CCW member-states to allocate time during their meetings to specifically discuss the status and effectiveness of Protocol III.

Israel’s Use of White Phosphorus in Lebanon

Israel used white phosphorus munitions supplied by the US in an October 2023 attack in southern Lebanon. This attack injured at least nine civilians. A rights group claims this incident should be investigated as a war crime, based on a Washington Post analysis of shell fragments found in a small village.

US Utilizes Controversial Weapon Against ISIS

According to open sources, the US-led coalition fighting the ISIS in Syria and Iraq in 2017, has used artillery-delivered white phosphorus, raising serious concerns about the protection of civilians, Human Rights Watch has stated.

Phosphorus Munitions in Russia-Ukraine War

Ukraine alleged that Russia had launched an assault on the besieged city of Bakhmut with phosphorus munitions. UThe Ukrainian military released video footage sent from drones, showing a viciously flaming Bakhmut as an element that seemed to be white phosphorus rained down on the city, the BBC reported in May 2023.

Girish Linganna

Girish Linganna is a Defence, Aerospace & Political Analyst based in Bengaluru. He is also Director of ADD Engineering Components, India, Pvt. Ltd, a subsidiary of ADD Engineering GmbH, Germany. You can reach him at: girishlinganna@gmail.com

Afghan Canal Project Affecting Not Only Central Asia But China And Russia Too – Analysis

 July 15, 2024  

By Paul Goble

Afghanistan is pushing ahead with the construction of the Qosh Tepa Canal to divert water that has been flowing into neighboring countries to slow the desertification of its own territory and the threat of starvation to its population. The impact of Kabul’s decision on Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan has attracted some attention (see EDM, March 7).

Now, the project, launched in 2022 and slated to be completed by 2028, is having a far broader impact on more distant Kazakhstan as well as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which have long enjoyed the reputation of being “water surplus” countries that do not need water from others (Window on Eurasia, August 19, 2021; Cabar.asia, February 29; TASS, March 20; The Times of Central Asia, June 11). The canal is also affecting China and Russia’s influence as the two outside powers most heavily involved in regional geopolitics (see EDM, December 7, 2021; Radio Azatlyk, March 29, 2023; Forbes.kz, April 8). While the Taliban’s recent decision to self-finance the project will slow down construction, Kabul hopes to limit the leverage of other countries in the region to influence the canal’s completion and operation.   

The Afghan canal is on its way to having a more serious impact on Tajikistan than any other place in Central Asia. Water shortages in the country are already raising the specter of widespread hunger, and, given Dushanbe’s reliance on hydropower, the Qosh Tepa Canal will lead to a reduction in electric power production (TASS, March 20). Those twin developments, in turn, threaten to amplify Tajikistan’s difficulties in controlling its enormous but sparsely populated Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous region, a restive province bordering Afghanistan. China, Russia, and the United States have all tried to help Dushanbe stabilize the territory, lest the Taliban or other Islamist groups expand their influence northward (see EDM, June 22, November 3, 2022; ASIA-Plus, July 26, December 26, 2023; see Terrorism Monitor, October 31, 2023).

A harbinger of what may be ahead for Gorno-Badakhshan and Tajikistan more generally came on July 7 when a clash took place near the Qosh Tepa Canal between ethnic Tajiks in Afghanistan and their Taliban rulers. The fighting sent 11 people to the hospital. The Tajik protesters oppose Kabul’s plans for the canal. They fear that the central Afghan government will use the project to bring more Pashtuns into their region and sell the region’s enormous salt deposits to China, all while not giving any of the earnings to the Tajiks. Beijing has expressed its interest in pressing ahead on such an arrangement (Rivers.help, June 12; Eurasia Today, July 8 [1], [2]).

The wider impact of the Qosh Tepa Canal on Tajikistan and Central Asia means that Russia and China are being increasingly affected as well. Moscow is worried that any instability produced by growing water shortages could threaten its regional influence, potentially leading to the loss of its remaining military base in Tajikistan. Destabilization in Tajikistan could even open the way for the spread of Islamist radicalism into the Russian Federation, something the Kremlin is especially sensitive to in the aftermath of the Crocus City Hall attack (see EDM, March 26, May 2). Some in the Russian capital are even arguing that Russia must counter by reviving a Siberian river diversion project that would send water from Russian rivers southward into Central Asia. The project was rejected in the 1980s and remains deeply unpopular with Russians (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, January 29, 2023). Meanwhile, Beijing, while fearful of any expansion of Islamist influence, very much wants to expand its economic and military presence in Tajikistan and gain access to the salt in Afghanistan that will become available once Qosh Tepa is fully operational. China’s interests are divided in this endeavor, however, as have been its official policies (see EDM, December 7, 2021, June 22, 2022).

None of the countries affected by the Afghan canal project are finding it easy to deal with Kabul. The Taliban government has taken a hard line that the water on its territory is its own and has refused to join any of the regional accords that seek to allocate water throughout Central Asia more equitably (Podrobno.uz, January 27; Ritmeurasia.ru, February 21). After initially seeking foreign funding for the canal, which would have given leverage to the other countries in the region, Taliban officials declared that they are funding the project entirely on their own, even though this will slow the canal’s completion (TOLOnews, June 26; Rivers.help, June 30).

The Central Asian countries have compounded these problems by failing to adopt a united front. All but Tajikistan have attempted to find some common ground with Kabul. Dushanbe has instead taken a harder line, an approach that has made it easier for Afghanistan to ignore its immediate neighbors (see EDM, September 10, 2021). On their respective sides, Moscow is distracted by its war against Ukraine, and Beijing has pursued a divided policy on the canal. All this has allowed Kabul to ignore the complaints of outsiders and proceed with the project.   

What happens next depends largely on how Kabul reads the latest clashes in northern Afghanistan. If Taliban officials conclude that this was a local ethnic matter, the situation may not quickly escalate. However, if the regime decides that Tajikistan was behind these protests, the situation could quickly explode. In response, Kabul would likely expand its efforts to promote Islamist goals to the north, beginning in Tajikistan’s Gorno-Badakhshan region and then spreading more broadly. This course appears especially likely as Kabul has made clear that it sees the canal not only as a national project but also as a weapon to promote Afghanistan’s influence far beyond its borders (ASIA-Plus, January 14). If that happens, Dushanbe will face a serious political crisis, rivaling the worst of the past two decades. The other Central Asian countries will likely seek to present themselves as mediators despite past failures in that regard. Nevertheless, for the moment, they seem committed to including Afghanistan in international conversations rather than excluding it (Akorda.kz, September 15, 2023; The Times of Central Asia, June 11).

Russia and China are also likely to respond to any Kabul move, Moscow by increasing security at its base in Tajikistan and Beijing by leaning on its influence in Dushanbe and Kabul, lest it lose the gains it has made in both countries. Neither step will block the canal project, though both may slow Kabul’s response in Tajikistan. Meanwhile, due to minimal influence in Kabul, the United States has few options in this situation. Nevertheless, the wider impact of the Qosh Tepa Canal on Tajikistan and the geopolitics of Central Asia mean that Washington cannot stand aside or risk losing influence either to Islamist radicals or China and Russia. The United States is not without options: it can promote better water usage measures in Central Asia and even desalinization projects there—two moves that could reduce threats emanating from the Taliban and from Russia and China. This will only be possible, however, if Washington connects the dots between a canal project few have even heard of and the future of an enormous portion of Eurasia.

• This article was published at The Jamestown Foundation’s Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 21 Issue: 105