Sunday, July 14, 2024

Unexpected Victory: Pezeshkian’s Win Signals Hope For Iran’s Future – OpEd


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Will he be up to expectations?

The recent presidential election in Iran concluded with Massoud Pezeshkian emerging as the unexpected victor. This surprising outcome has sparked a wave of hope for a new political era in Iran among analysts and observers. As the preliminary results were announced, the United States was quick to reveal its stance. The State Department stated that the election results would not alter US policy towards Iran. “The election will not have a serious impact on our approach to Iran. Washington’s concern about Tehran remains unchanged,” a State Department representative said.   


Potential for change in Iranian policy   

The key question now is whether Pezeshkian can implement significant changes in Iran’s foreign and domestic policies. Despite the inherent constraints of the theocratic system, where the Supreme Leader holds ultimate authority, there are high hopes among the Iranian voters that Pezeshkian, a representative of the reformist wing, can at least strive for gradual changes. 

The Supreme Leader’s control over major aspects of foreign policy suggests that Pezeshkian will likely adhere to the established political line. However, some experts believe he might introduce domestic reforms to meet the expectations of his supporters and avoid widespread disillusionment. His classification as a reformist raises hopes for incremental changes that could improve the socio-economic conditions in Iran.

The State Department’s preliminary reaction reflects Washington’s cautious approach. The US is unlikely to adopt a clear-cut position on Pezeshkian’s election, particularly with the upcoming presidential elections in November 2024. The unresolved nuclear issue, coupled with Israel’s staunch position, complicates any potential positive shift in US policy towards Tehran. Additionally, the possibility of a Trump victory could further deteriorate US-Iran relations.   

Pezeshkian faces numerous challenges on both domestic and foreign fronts. Domestically, Iran’s socio-economic situation is dire, necessitating urgent reforms. The previous administration’s radical policies severely damaged relations with neighboring countries, including Pakistan, Afghanistan, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Iraq. The new president must work to repair these strained relationships.  Internationally, Iran’s pursuit of nuclear energy remains a contentious issue. Tehran is determined to acquire nuclear capabilities, a goal that continues to elicit strong reactions from the international community. Pezeshkian’s administration will need to navigate these complex dynamics while addressing domestic discontent.

Pezeshkian’s potential success hinges on his ability to balance domestic reforms with foreign policy initiatives. The Iranian deep state seems to have brought a reformist to power to take a “time-out” and address pressing issues. If Pezeshkian fails to deliver, he could be scapegoated as the main culprit, tarnishing the reformist agenda.  Supreme Leader Khamenei and his entourage, including the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC), will likely continue to exert significant influence over Iran’s foreign policy. Any substantial change in this arena will be challenging. However, Pezeshkian’s first 100 days in office will be crucial in setting the tone for his presidency and the country’s direction.


Strategic alliances & economic partnerships 

Strengthening strategic economic relations with Russia and other Asian giants will be a priority for the new president. Pezeshkian, of Azerbaijani origin, may also focus on enhancing ties with Azerbaijan and Turkey. His ethnic background and the support he received during the election campaign could play a role in shaping Iran’s domestic and foreign policies.

Immediately following the election, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev sent a congratulatory letter to President-elect Pezeshkian, inviting him to Azerbaijan. This gesture indicates Azerbaijan’s willingness to engage with the new Iranian administration. The move also underscores Baku’s determination to improve relations with Iran. This diplomatic gesture could pave the way for enhanced cooperation between the two countries, benefiting both sides.   

Pezeshkian’s ethnic background may also influence Iran’s policy towards Turkey. During his election campaign, he did not shy away from highlighting his Turkish roots, a move that resonated with many voters. This could lead to a new configuration in Iran-Azerbaijan-Turkey relations, with potential benefits for regional stability and cooperation.     

The Supreme Leader’s approval of Pezeshkian’s campaign strategy suggests a possible increase in the Turkish factor in Iran’s domestic and foreign policy. If Pezeshkian’s first foreign visit is to Azerbaijan or Turkey, it could signal a shift towards stronger regional ties.  

Conclusion: A test for Iran’s future  

Massoud Pezeshkian’s election as president marks a significant moment in Iranian politics. His reformist agenda, combined with his ethnic background, raises expectations for change. However, the entrenched theocratic system and the Supreme Leader’s overarching control present formidable obstacles.   

Pezeshkian’s success will depend on his ability to navigate these challenges and implement meaningful reforms. His first 100 days in office will be critical in determining whether he can meet the expectations of his supporters and foster a new era in Iranian politics.  

Iran faces a test on multiple fronts – domestically, regionally, and internationally. If Pezeshkian can leverage this opportunity to initiate dialogue with the West on the nuclear issue and improve socio-economic conditions, he could emerge as a transformative leader. The stakes are high, and the world will be watching closely to see if Iran can usher in a new era of stability and progress. 


Fuad Muxtar-Agbabali is a distinguished journalist from Azerbaijan and has authored many white papers on International Affairs and political analysis focused in the regions of Europe and Southern Caucasus.

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