PAKISTAN 

Military Rule and the Disappearing Critics

by B.R. Gowani / August 6th, 2024

Democracy can be considered a commodity with multitude of varieties. Each elite ruling class claims theirs is the best suitable for its people, and thus imposes it on them. Mind you, not pure democracy — government of the people, by the people, for the people” — because that would amount to nothing less than socialism. The “democracy” that countries profess to practice is nothing but an interpretation of the ruling class in those countries with the aim to control its general populace.

India has Modi-cracy where one man, Narendra Modi, is running the show. A year ago, he boasted: “India is the mother of democracy.” If India is the mother of democracy, then Modi must be the illegitimate father of democracy who was till last month busy Hindu-izing the country. (He did not get a simple majority in the June 2024 elections, so his Hindu-ization project has slowed down, but it remains doubtful he’ll give up so easily. He could instigate a war with Pakistan, declare an emergency, and assume extraordinaire power. Never underestimate the power of elected fascists.)

England has monacracy and the taxpayers bear the burden of monarchy which can’t be called a true democracy.

The United States has oligacracy where a small group of extremely wealthy people decide the fate of more than 335 million common people in the name of democracy. Biden could fight the proxy war against Russia or support the genocide of Palestinians and nothing changes; but he loses a debate against Trump and the wealthy halt $90 million in donations.

Military Power

Then there is Pakistan’s militocracy. The military has ruled that country, directly or indirectly, for most of that nation’s existence. When the military favors a politician, that person becomes the prime minister but has to be subservient because the rein (important portfolios such as foreign policy, defense, etc.) is always determined by the military. When the premier tries to control the entire government machinery, that person is deposed and could be sent to prison. Politicians are at the army’s mercy.

The Pakistan military and governments constantly plead and beg the IMF, Saudi rulers, and UAE rulers for a billion dollars or more.

The military torpedoed Nawaz Sharis’s past efforts to improve relations with India. But it now wants better relations. The increase in trade with India can help Pakistan to overcome its dire economic and financial condition.

The 2018 election saw cricketer-turned-politician Imran Khan of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party become the Prime Minister, with the military’s blessing . But when Khan tried to do things his own way, a vote of no-confidence was engineered and Khan was ousted in 2022. At present, he’s in jail with over 100 cases registered against him. Even when a case is dismissed, police or some agency person issues another arrest warrant and he gets re-arrested. Khan, his wife Bushra Bibi, and some PTI members are entangled in this vicious cycle.

After more than a year in various prisons all over Pakistan, Sanam Javed of PTI was released on July 10, 2024 by the Lahore High Court (in Punjab province) but soon after the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) arrested her and took her to Islamabad. On July 14, she was let go but was re-arrested by the police of Balochistan. She was freed on July 15 by the Islamabad High Court which restrained police from arresting her till July 18. The IHC justice asked her to “avoid unnecessary rhetoric” or else the court would reverse its order. In other words, keep your mouth shut. Her lawyer guaranteed that she would refrain from such language. On June 18, the IHC considered her arrest to be illegal and she was set free. Immediately, the Punjab government challenged IHC verdict.

While in power, Khan had visited Russia the day it had launched the special military operation into Ukraine. Khan was also critical of the US. The US is never too busy not to interfere in other countries’ affairs. David Lu, the Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs, asked Pakistan’s then ambassador to the US, Asad Majeed, to get rid of Khan.

The army’s open hostility and its tactics to break up Khan’s party PTI by levying various charges and arresting and re-arresting PTI members, including Khan, saw Khan’s supporters out on the streets on May 9, 2023; they did some damage to military installations. The army in response, came up with an event called Youm-e-Takreem Shuhada-e-Pakistan or Martyrs’ Reverence Day to be celebrated on May 25 every year to remember the soldiers who lose their lives while serving.

Seven and a half months after Khan was ousted, in November 2022, the retiring army chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa conceded the army’s meddling in politics.

“… our army which day and night remains busy in serving the nation, is often made the subject of criticism.” “A major reason for this is the army’s interference in politics for the last 70 years which is unconstitutional.

“This is why in February last year [2021] the army, after great deliberation, decided that it would never interfere in any political matter. I assure you we are strictly adamant on this and will remain so.”

One wonders why leaders accept their lies and mistakes, or talk peace and the danger of military-industrial complex, etc only when they’re leaving or have left. Bajwa was lying.

Today, the army is still omnipresent. The current army Chief Asim Munir meets with the business community, invites winning athletes, issues regular statements, and so on. The current Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif of Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) took over power after military approval. His older brother and former three-incomplete-term prime minister Nawaz Sharif came back from exile with military’s approval.

Disappearing Critics

The intelligence agencies in Pakistan such as MI (Military Intelligence), IB (Intelligence Bureau), ISI (Inter Services Intelligence), etc. take care of the critics — journalists and common people — who write, speak, or protest against the military interference in government affairs.

Sometimes they are abducted, tortured, and then released. Other times they are killed with no clues left.

In 2011, the Islamabad Bureau Chief of Asia Times, Syed Saleem Shahzad was tortured and murdered. News anchor and journalist Arshad Sharif, a critic of military, was shot dead in 2022, by police in Nairobi, Kenya. In May 2024, four journalists were murdered. Since 1992, more than 60 journalists have lost their lives. Then there are those who have disappeared and never reappeared. In many instances, the victims are harassed and blackmailed, their phones are tapped, and they are detained illegally. The agencies never issue any kind of statement because that would be tantamount to accepting guilt.

Thousands of people are missing in Pakistan, without any clue as to where they are. The number of enforced disappearances in 2023 was 51.

Then there is the Pakistani province of Balochistan — a vast land mass with the smallest population that is underdeveloped and ignored by governments. This has caused resentment among the Balochis that has resulted in insurgency. The first six months of 2024 saw 197 persons missing — most of them Balochis. On July 28, three persons died and eight were injured during a clash between Balochistan Yakjehti Committee (BYC) and security forces. People from the province overcame roadblocks set up by the authorities and met at Gwader’s Marine Drive for the Baloch Rajee Muchi (Baloch National Gathering). BYC leader Dr Mahrang Baloch asked security officials to free the apprehended protestors. She proclaimed:

“Until the release of our people, the sit-in will continue at Marine Drive.”

More than 5,000 Balochis are missing. Families of missing and/or killed Balochis demonstrate holding photos of victims every now and then but to no avail. In protests, Baloch women are in the forefront. They live in a tortured state of mind not knowing whether their sons, husbands, fathers are alive or not. In January 2024, Pakistan’s caretaker prime minister, Anwaar-ul-Haq Kakar, got mad at Baloch protestors and called supporters and “relatives of those fighting against the state” as “advocates of terrorists in Balochistan.” Kakar himself hails from Balochistan.

On the night of May 14, 2024, the Kashmiri poet, journalist Ahmed Farhad Shah was kidnapped by four men outside his home while returning from a dinner. A petition from his family was filed with Islamabad High Court (IHC) saying that Shah was abducted for his criticism of ISI. According to his wife, Syeda Urooj Zainab, the agencies felt that Shah was a PTI and Imran Khan supporter, so they were after him. Zainab refutes that impression and says he has also supported PML-N when it was under pressure by the Pakistan’s military. One of the judges at IHC, Justice Mohsin Akhtar Kayani, initiated an enquiry and ordered that Shah be found and produced before the court. Two weeks later, it was reported that he was in police custody. But then the federal government asked the IHC on June 1 to close the case. On June 4, his bail was rejected by an anti-terrorism court in Azad Jammu and Kashmir. Critics are treated as terrorists! Since then, there has been no news on Shah, it is doubtful if they’ve found him.

The Advocate Imaan Zainab Mazari-Hazir, a Baloch, who is Shah’s counsel, has herself been harassed, threatened, arrested, re-arrested, for calling the Pakistan army “terrorists” and for supporting the protesting Baloch students.

Ahmed Farhad Shah is a poet whose poems are critical of the army. Here is the translation of one of his poems originally written in Hindi/Urdu.

he thinks of his own freewill

he thinks of his own freewill, pick him up
he’s somewhat different than our henchmen, pick him up
the arrogant ones we abducted before him, pick him up
he’s is enquiring about them, pick him up
he was clearly ordered what to speak and what not to, but he speaks his own mind, pick him up
the minions whom we honored with positions and rewards, he’s laughing at those clever souls, pick him up
he questions why there’s peace and security problem, he is the peace and security problem, pick him up*
he was told to see only what we show him, but he uses his own discretion, pick him up
this lunatic is questioning extent of our power, he has crossed the line, pick him up

* Farhad reminds his audience that just for raising the question of peace and security, fifty people were imprisoned.

B.R. Gowani can be reached at brgowani@hotmail.com. Read other articles by B.R..

 

Was Hamas Leader Killed in Iran to Inflame Sectarian Conflict?

by Nauman Sadiq / August 6th, 2024

Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh – image from Press TV

On July 31, Chairman of the Hamas Political Bureau Ismail Haniyeh attended the inauguration of Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian. Hours later, he was reported killed in an “Israeli strike” along with his bodyguard in Tehran.

Simultaneously, Israel claimed it had killed senior Hezbollah commander Fuad Shukr in an airstrike in Lebanon’s capital, Beirut, and that its intelligence had confirmed that another top Hamas leader Mohammed Deif was also killed in a July 13 Israeli strike in Khan Younis, Gaza.

The reason the manipulative Zionist regime cunningly plotted to assassinate Ismail Haniyeh during his visit to Iran is two-fold. Firstly, the Islamic Republic over the years has established the reputation of being the torchbearer of the Palestine cause, particularly in the Islamic World.

While the craven Arab autocracies, under the thumb of duplicitous American masters enabling the Zionist regime’s atrocious genocide of unarmed Palestinians, were pondering over when would be the opportune moment to recognize Israel and establish diplomatic and trade ties, the Iran-led resistance axis, comprising Iraq, Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Ansarallah in Yemen, has claimed stellar victories in battlefields against Israel.

It’s worth pointing out, however, that Hamas’ main patrons are private donors in oil-rich Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States and Egypt, not Iran, as frequently alleged by the mainstream disinformation campaign. In fact, Hamas as a political movement is the Palestinian offshoot of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. And by mainstream media’s own accounts, the Shiite leadership of Iran and Hezbollah weren’t even aware of the Sunni Palestinian liberation movement Hamas’ October 7 assault.

Secondly, the treacherous murder of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran was clearly designed to inflame the sectarian conflict. Lately, it has become a customary propensity of Orientalist apologists of Western imperialism to offer reductive historical and theological explanations of Sunni-Shi’a conflict in the Middle East region in order to cover up the blowback of ill-conceived Western military interventions and proxy wars that have ignited the flames of internecine conflict in the Islamic world.

Some self-anointed “Arabists” of the mainstream media posit that the sectarian division goes all the way back to the founding of Islam, 1400 years ago, and contend that the conflict emerged during the reign of the fourth caliph, Ali bin Abi Talib, in the seventh century A.D. Even though both sects of Islam peacefully coexisted during the medieval era in the Middle East, Central Asia and the Mughal India, where several provinces, particularly the glorious State of Awadh, were governed by benevolent Shiite nawabs.

One wonders what the Western-led war on terror’s explanation would be of such “erudite historians of Islam” – that the cause of purported “clash of civilizations” between Christians and Muslims is to be found in the Crusades when Richard the Lionheart and Saladin were skirmishing in the Levant and exchanging courtesies at the same time.

Fact of the matter is that in modern times, the Sunni-Shi’a conflict in the Middle East region is essentially a political conflict between the Gulf Arab autocrats and Iran for regional dominance which is being presented to lay Muslims in the veneer of religiosity.

Saudi Arabia, which has been vying for supremacy as the leader of the Sunni bloc against the Shi’a-led Iran in the regional geopolitics, was staunchly against the invasion of Iraq by the Bush Administration in 2003.

The Baathist regime of Saddam Hussein constituted a Sunni Arab bulwark against Iran’s meddling in the Arab world. But after Saddam was ousted from power in 2003 and subsequently when elections were held in Iraq which were swept by Shi’a-dominated politico-religious parties, Iraq has now been led by a Shi’a-majority government that has become a steadfast regional ally of Iran. Consequently, Iran’s sphere of influence now extends all the way from territorially-contiguous Iraq and Syria to Lebanon and the Mediterranean coast.

Moreover, during the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Bush Administration took advantage of the ethnic and sectarian divisions in Iraq and used the Kurds and Shi’as against the Sunni-led Baathist regime of Saddam Hussein. And during the occupation years from 2003 to 2011, the once dominant Sunni minority was politically marginalized which further exacerbated ethnic and sectarian divisions in Iraq.

The Saudi royal family was resentful of Iran’s encroachment on the traditional Arab heartland. Therefore, when protests broke out against the Shia-led Syrian government in the wake of the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011, the Gulf States along, with their regional Sunni allies, Turkey and Jordan, and the Western patrons gradually militarized the protests to dismantle the Iran-led resistance axis, comprising Iraq, Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Ansarallah in Yemen.

Similarly, during the Libyan so-called “humanitarian intervention” in 2011, the Obama administration provided money and arms to myriads of tribal militias and Islamic jihadists to topple the Arab-nationalist Gaddafi government. But after the policy backfired and pushed Libya into lawlessness, anarchy and civil war, the mainstream media pointed the finger at Egypt, UAE, Saudi Arabia and Russia for backing the renegade general, Khalifa Haftar, in eastern Libya, even though he had lived for more than two decades in the US right next to the CIA’s headquarter in Langley, Virginia.

Regarding the Western powers’ modus operandi of waging proxy wars in the Middle East, since the times of the Soviet-Afghan jihad during the eighties, it has been the fail-safe game plan of master strategists at NATO to raise money from the oil-rich emirates of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE and Kuwait; then buy billions of dollars’ worth of weapons from the arms markets in the Eastern Europe; and then provide those weapons and guerilla warfare training to the disaffected population of the targeted country by using security agencies of the latter’s regional adversaries. Whether it’s Afghanistan, Libya or Syria, the same playbook was executed to the letter.

More to the point, raising funds for proxy wars from the Gulf Arab States allows Western executives the freedom to evade congressional scrutiny; the benefit of buying weapons from unregulated arms markets of Eastern Europe is that such weapons cannot be traced back to Western capitals; and using jihadist proxies to achieve strategic objectives has the advantage of taking the plea of “plausible deniability” if the strategy backfires, which it often does. Recall that al-Qaeda and Taliban were the by-products of the Soviet-Afghan jihad, and the Islamic State and its global network of terrorists were the blowback of the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the proxy war in Syria.

Apart from Syria and Iraq, two other flashpoints of Sunni-Shi’a conflict in the Middle East region are Bahrain and Yemen. When peaceful protests broke out against the Sunni monarchy in Bahrain by the Shi’a majority population in the wake of the Arab Spring uprisings in 2011, Saudi Arabia sent thousands of troops across the border to quell the uprising.

Similarly, as the Arab Spring protests toppled longtime dictators of the Arab World, including Ben Ali in Tunisia and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, Yemenis also gathered in the capital’s squares demanding removal of Ali Abdullah Saleh.

Instead of conceding to protesters’ fervent demand of holding free and fair elections to ascertain democratic aspirations of demonstrators, however, the Obama administration adopted the convenient course of replacing Yemen’s longtime autocrat with a Saudi stooge Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi.

Having the reputation of a “wily Arabian fox” and being a Houthi himself, Ali Abdullah Saleh wasn’t the one to sit idly by and retire from politics in ignominy. He colluded with the Houthi rebels and incited them to take advantage of the chaos and political vacuum created after the revolution to come out of their northern Saada stronghold and occupy the capital Sanaa in September 2014. How ironic that Ali Abdullah Saleh was eventually killed by Houthis in December 2017 because of his treacherous nature.

Meanwhile, a change of guard took place in Riyadh as Saudi Arabia’s longtime ruler King Abdullah died and was replaced by King Salman in January 2015, while de facto control of the kingdom fell into hands of inexperienced and belligerent Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman.

Already furious at the Obama administration for not enforcing its so-called “red line” by imposing a no-fly zone over Syria after the false-flag Ghouta chemical weapons attacks in Damascus in August 2013 and apprehensive of security threat posed to the kingdom from its southern border along Yemen by Houthi rebels under the influence of Iran, the crown prince immediately began a military and air warfare campaign against Houthi rebels with military assistance from the crown prince of Abu Dhabi and de facto ruler of UAE, Mohammad bin Zayed al-Nahyan, in March 2015.

Mindful of the botched policy it had pursued in Libya and Syria and aware of the catastrophe it had wrought in the Middle East region, the Obama administration had to yield to the dictates of Saudi Arabia and UAE by fully coordinating the Gulf-led military campaign in Yemen not only by providing intelligence, planning and logistical support but also by selling billions of dollars’ worth of arms and ammunition to the Gulf States during the conflict.

Now, when the fire of inter-sectarian strife is burning on several different fronts in the Middle East and the Sunni and Shi’a communities are witnessing a merciless slaughter of their brethren in Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Bahrain, then it would be preposterous to look for the causes of the conflict in theology and medieval history. If the Sunni and Shi’a Muslims were so thirsty for each other’s blood since the founding of Islam, then how come they managed to survive as distinct sectarian groups for 1400 years?

Fact of the matter is that in modern times, the phenomena of Islamic radicalism, jihadism and consequent Sunni-Shi’a conflict are only as old as the Soviet-Afghan jihad during the 1980s when the Western powers with the help of their regional allies trained and armed Afghan jihadists to battle the Soviet troops in Afghanistan.

More significantly, however, the Iran-Iraq War from 1980 to 1988 between the Sunni and Baathist-led Iraq and the Shi’a-led Iran after the 1979 Khomeini revolution engendered hostility between the Sunni and Shi’a communities of the region for the first time in modern history.

And finally, the conflict has been further exacerbated in the wake of the Arab Spring uprisings in 2011 when the Western powers and their regional client states once again took advantage of the opportunity and nurtured militants against the Arab nationalist Gaddafi government in Libya and the Baathist-led Assad administration in Syria.

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Nauman Sadiq is an Islamabad-based geopolitical and national security analyst focused on geo-strategic affairs and hybrid warfare in the Middle East and Eurasia regions. His domains include neocolonialism, the military-industrial complex, and petro-imperialism. He is a regular contributor of investigative reports to alternative news media. Read other articles by Nauman.

The ASIO Astrologers: Terror Threats and Radicalisation Down Under

by Binoy Kampmark / August 6th, 2024

Bureaucrats tasked with protecting national security are often inclined to encourage insecurity.  It’s all part of the job prescription.  The imperative is understandable if chillingly amoral: increased budgets are demanded to counter threats, however spectral; justifications for existing budgets needlessly bloated are always sought.  In the Cold War, an old favourite was the teeth-chattering concern that the other side might just steal a march on the other in terms of nuclear missiles.  Legendary “missile gaps” were confected to frighten lawmakers.

In any logical sense, such distinctions were always superfluous, even idiotic: one can only destroy the planet once, and claiming to have the capacity to do so a hundred times over eliminates the relevance of having any such advantage to begin with. The threat, to that end, becomes purely psychic, a matter of ego and accountancy.

The director general of ASIO, Australia’s domestic intelligence service, is very much of the belief that drumming up threats is indispensable.  To that end, Mike Burgess is proving to be one of the most garrulous chiefs of what is otherwise a secretive profession.  Rather than working under the radar and plotting in the shadows, he has become a regular commentator on the gloomy state of the world, and, more relevantly, certain people who live in it.

On August 5, Burgess appeared alongside Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and Attorney-General Mark Dreyfus at a press conference.  It signalled something of a change in arrangements, given the administrative reshuffle of taking ASIO out of the hands of Home Affairs and placing them under the direction of the Attorney-General.

Such a change did nothing to temper the Burgess world view, one framed darkly and foreboding of the next threat.  “Australia’s security environment is degrading – it is more volatile and more unpredictable.” (When was it not degrading or volatile?)  He goes on to say that espionage and foreign interference had previously been “principal security concerns”.  No longer.  “While the threats to our way of life remain elevated, we are seeing an increase in extremism.”

Terms are lustfully used to signify danger. “More Australians are being radicalised and radicalised more quickly.”  Australians, in greater numbers, were “embracing a more diverse range of extreme ideologies” and content “to use violence to advance their cause.”

Peering into the lexical mangle, and one can detect certain tendencies on the part of the intelligence security establishment.  Burgess frowns on the way politics and political objectives have become issues of protest.  While paying lip service to the importance of political differences, debates and the role of protest, always a prelude to authoritarian disapproval, he laments “spikes in political polarisation and intolerance, uncivil debate and unpeaceful protests.”

The spy chief wishes to expand the nexus between politics and terrorism.  All “violent” acts or threats fall within this assessment, be it “violent protest, riot or an attack on a politician or our democratic institutions.”  Such events as the COVID pandemic and the October 7 attacks on Israel and its military response, had seen individuals embrace “anti-authority ideologies, conspiracy theories and diverse grievances.  Some are combining multiple beliefs to create  new hybrid ideologies.”  The prospect of war in southern Lebanon also posed further risks.

Who, then, are these individuals?  Those of the “lone actor” persuasion, prone to using such crude weapons as knives, guns or improvised explosives.  Or minors transfixed by ideology.  (An old ASIO favourite is to see teenagers, gorged on internet scrolling, as posing a terrorist threat, including those as young as 14.)

Having deluged the press corps with such grim warnings, though giving little by way of actual evidence, Burgess moved on to play with an old favourite of the security establishment: the National Terrorism Threat Level.  Such levels are rarely tangible but serve as catalysts of needless fear and warning.  With oracular force, he proposed an adjustment.  “After careful consideration and consultation, ASIO is raising the National Terrorism Threat Level from ‘Possible’ to ‘Probable’.  Our decision reflects the degrading security environment.”

To the clear of mind, these are meaningless utterances.  But for Burgess and the desk filing wonks, they constitute a world of pulsating realities.  “A threat level of ‘Probable’ means we assess there is a greater than 50 per cent chance of an onshore attack or planning in the next twelve months.”  This did not mean that ASIO had actual intelligence of an ongoing plan to attack, or even “an expectation of imminent attack.”  But relevant “subject matter experts” at the National Threat Assessment Centre had been busy using “analytical techniques to test, retest and contest their assumptions.”  The soothsayers, it would seem, are busy.

Such addresses as those given by Burgess generate their own sinister code.  That code promises further surveillance and control, a call for increased monitoring and cocooning of the Australian body politic and broader society from a wicked world.  While ASIO is tub-thumping about the dangers of increased radicalisation, the absurdly named office of the e-Safety Commissioner wages war against the offending defilements of the Internet.  With these officials in charge, the world will be made safe for censorship and docile thoughtFacebook

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Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge. He lectures at RMIT University, Melbourne. Email: bkampmark@gmail.com. Read other articles by Binoy.

 Glass cell provides glimpse inside molten salt reactors

06 August 2024

A custom-made glass test cell created by Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) has enabled researchers to observe how gases behave inside a molten salt reactor and investigate the complex chemistry that can occur in the molten salt solution.

Scientific glassblower Carlos Rodriguez Flores is seen fabricating the glass cell (Image: ORNL)

Some of the reactors that are currently being designed will operate on liquid fuel, where the fissile materials are directly dissolved in a molten salt solution that also acts as the reactor's coolant. But nuclear and chemical reactions can result in gases that bubble out of the molten salt, which can impact reactor neutronics and thermal hydraulic performance.

The glass test cell fabricated to visualise noble gas behaviour in a molten salt column (Image: ORNL)

To help investigate these effects, ORNL researchers designed and developed a customised glass test cell that can hold up to a litre of liquid molten salt. They injected small helium and krypton bubbles into the cell to observe how they moved through the column of molten salt, and were able to measure gas bubble velocity, size distribution, and interactions with neighbouring bubbles using high-speed cameras. The insights provided from the experiment will be used to help improve and validate simulation tools for molten salt-fuelled systems.

"Understanding gas generation and transport in molten salt reactors is essential to optimising their performance and safety," said Daniel Orea, ORNL lead R&D associate. "This unique glass test cell allows us to overcome certain engineering challenges caused by the high temperature and composition of salt and its two-phase liquid glass system."

The research project was supported through the US Department of Energy's Molten Salt Reactor Program.

MobileNuclear and PTT announce collaboration

06 August 2024

MobileNuclear Energy (MNE) is to collaborate with Peregrine Turbine Technologies (PTT) to integrate its MN-1 Mobile Microreactor system with PTT's supercritical carbon dioxide energy conversion system and advanced heat exchanger technologies.

The MN-1 system would fit in a shipping container (Image: MobileNuclear)

Virginia-based MNE's mission is to develop and deploy the first truly mobile, safe, sustainable, and affordable nuclear microreactor to provide the military and other government agencies with responsive, durable, and modular energy generation capability. MN-1 is a nuclear microreactor intentionally designed for mobility. Its compact reactor core and design features are optimised for small size, light weight, efficient energy production, affordability and safety. The MN-1 is a modular system, transportable by air, land or sea, and can optionally be integrated to operate in transit to provide power for propulsion systems, directed energy weapons, or other high-power "on the move" applications.

MNE and PTT's Nuclear Energy System subsidiary (PTT NES) plan to collaborate on the integration of PTT NES' patented supercritical carbon dioxide (sCO2) energy conversion systems, thermally compliant heat exchanger technologies, and high temperature helium blower and magnetic torque coupling with MNE's MN-1.

PTT NES's sCO2 system is essentially a closed loop heat engine and is fuel agnostic, meaning that it can operate on any high-grade heat source such as nuclear and concentrated solar, as well as on all air combustible fuels including sustainable biomass, biogas, refuse-derived fuels and natural gas.

The core power module - which would generate 1 MWt and 350 kWe - is equivalent in size to a standard 20-foot (6-metre) shipping container, populated with the microreactor and PTT's sCO2 turbine-generator as baseline capability. Add-on modules can seamlessly integrate with the power module to provide atmospheric water generation, hydrogen-based fuel production, heating and cooling, and other mission-tailored capabilities.

PTT's energy conversion system - successfully developed and demonstrated in collaboration with Sandia National Laboratories' Brayton Laboratory - is tailored for advanced nuclear reactors. It offers enhanced efficiency compared with traditional steam systems and air Brayton conversion systems, with a significantly reduced footprint. PTT says its systems have 1.5 times the efficiency of steam with less than one-third of the footprint, and over three times the efficiency of air Brayton conversion systems.

"MobileNuclear is excited to partner with PTT NES to integrate their sCO2 systems with our mobile microreactor," said MNE CEO Chris Pehrson. "It's a perfect marriage that will deliver the energy capacity that our customers need while maintaining the mobility that defines our microreactor system."

PTT NES CEO and Chief Technology Officer David Stapp added: "Advanced nuclear married to advanced sCO2 power conversion technology is a game-changer for large, distributed energy markets, both commercial and military. Peregrine's technology is right-sized to match with MobileNuclear's advanced reactor technology. The combination delivers breakthrough performance and capability that is unmatched. We are excited to team with this capable company."

PTT, based in Wiscasset, Maine, was formed in April 2012 and is focused on the development and deployment of advanced sCO2 turbine power generation, energy storage and propulsion systems.

In July last year, the company announced it had established a new subsidiary, PTT Nuclear Energy Systems, after it had "identified significant potential and opportunity for its breakthrough energy conversion technologies in the accelerating VSMR (very small modular reactor) and MMR (micro modular reactor) programmes (350 kW- 10 MW), and a clear intermediate-term opportunity in the SMR (small modular reactor) 30 MW to 100 MW class range". At the time, PTT said it was "working to field a family of its proprietary modular sCO2 energy conversions systems with initial capabilities ranging from 350 kW to 10 MW".

In April this year, Ultra Safe Nuclear Corporation announced it is to collaborate with PTT to integrate its Pylon microreactor with PTT's sCO2 energy conversion system and advanced heat exchanger technologies.

Sweden, USA agree to nuclear cooperation

02 August 2024

Sweden and the USA have signed a memorandum of understanding aimed at pursuing cooperation in industrial collaboration, technology development, and research and innovation in technologies related to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

Granholm (left) and Busch (right) signing the MoU (Image: @BuschEbba / X)

The MoU was signed by Sweden's Minister for Energy, Business and Industry Ebba Busch and US Secretary of Energy Jennifer Granholm in Washington, DC, on 1 August.

The partners said the agreement will "provide a framework for the participants to enhance overall cooperation between their respective government bodies, enterprises, and research institutions in policies and research and development activities relating to civil nuclear energy".

The MoU means that Sweden and the USA will exchange experience on issues related to policy, research and innovation related to supply chains, financing models, skills supply and development of advanced nuclear fuel.

Specific technological areas for cooperation include: nuclear power reactors, including advanced reactors such as small modular reactors; advanced nuclear fuel development; nuclear waste management; and nuclear safety and security.

The partners plan to exchange publicly available scientific and technical information, as well as share information and experiences on policies and regulations, and share and develop best practices on security of energy supply and demand for nuclear energy technologies. They will facilitate contacts between relevant public and private sector entities in both countries and encourage and promote dialogue, networking, and cooperation at all levels among government representatives, government bodies, enterprises along the value chain and research institutions through visits, workshops, meetings and other activities.

"Sweden and the United States will now cooperate on nuclear power," Busch said. "This is good for Sweden, the United States, the labour market and competitiveness. Our countries enjoy longstanding and good relations and I look forward to strengthening our cooperation and knowledge exchange in the area of nuclear power."

"Today's agreement further strengthens US cooperation with Sweden to diversify our supply chains and nuclear fuel supply, deploy new reactors, and find solutions to the management of our spent nuclear fuel," Granholm said in a post on X.

In October 2022, Sweden's incoming centre-right coalition government adopted a positive stance towards nuclear energy. In November last year, it unveiled a roadmap which envisages the construction of new nuclear generating capacity equivalent to at least two large-scale reactors by 2035, with up to ten new large-scale reactors coming online by 2045.

 ONTARIO

Bruce 3 refurbishment stage completed in record time

06 August 2024

The reactor removal series at Bruce unit 3 has been completed ahead of schedule thanks to experience gained from previous projects - with the removal of the calandria tubes setting a new record for Candu refurbishment.

(Image: Bruce Power)

Bruce 3 is the second unit to undergo Major Component Replacement (MCR). The process involves removing and replacing key reactor components including steam generators, pressure tubes, calandria tubes and feeder tubes and adding 30-35 years to the reactor's operating life. In total, six units at the Bruce site in Ontario are to be refurbished: the first to undergo the process, Bruce 6, returned to commercial operation last September.

Unit 3 was taken offline to begin its MCR outage in March 2023. The removal of feeder tubes, pressure tubes, calandria tubes and other internal components has taken nine months, with the work carried out by the MCR project team, alongside vendor partners Shoreline Power Group (a joint venture between Aecon, AtkinsRéalis and United Engineers & Constructors) and ATS Industrial Automation. The removal of the 480 calandria tubes - seam-welded tubes which penetrate the cylindrical reactor vessel and accommodate the pressure tubes that contain fuel and coolant - was completed 11 days ahead of schedule on 26 July.

Leveraging the experience of tradespeople, and innovation through lessons learned and technological advancement, meant that the removal series was completed in less time than the same work had taken in unit 6's MCR.

"Each successive MCR outage brings an opportunity for performance improvement, and we're committed to returning these units to service safely and successfully to meet Ontario's clean energy needs well into the future," said Laurent Seigle, Bruce Power's executive vice-president, Projects. "To execute a project of this scale and complexity, it takes an ecosystem of nuclear professionals to work together toward a common goal," he added.

Shoreline's millwrights, boilermakers and electricians will now transition to commissioning, operating and maintaining a first-of-a-kind, six-axis robotic tooling system for reactor inspection and installation work including the replacement of 960 feeder tubes and 480 fuel channels as well as the calandria tubes. Automated tooling systems, the majority of which have been designed, tested and manufactured by ATS Industrial Automation, will be used in the cleaning and inspection of thousands of components on both faces of the reactor.

The next Bruce unit to undergo MCR will be unit 4, beginning in 2025. Units 5, 7 and 8 will also be refurbished over the next 10 years. The work will directly and indirectly create and sustain about 1500 jobs over the next 15 years in Grey, Bruce and Huron counties, and throughout Ontario, the companies said.

NexGen updates economics for Rook I

02 August 2024

The change in costs for the company's 100%-owned project in Saskatchewan reflects both inflationary changes over recent years and the advancement of engineering and procurement, optimised constructability, and enhanced environmental performance.

Rook I, in the southwestern area of the Athabasca Basin, Saskatchewan (Image: NexGen)

The updated estimated pre-production capital costs - or CapEx - are CAD2.2 billion (USD1.58 billion). The estimated average cash operating cost (OpEx) over the life of mine (LOM) of CAD13.86 per pound U3O8 (USD9.98 per pound) is described by the company as "industry leading".

Previously - in a feasibility study published in 2021 - the project's CapEx had been estimated at CAD1.3 billion, with average OpEx over the LOM at CAD7.58 per pound U3O8. The updated CapEx reflects some CAD310 million in direct and attributable inflationary increases since 2020, and around CAD590 million in increased CapEx from enhancements identified through advanced engineering and procurement activity since March 2021, the company said. The updated OpEx estimate reflects an increase of CAD2.65 per pound U3O8 due to inflationary adjustments and CAD3.63 per pound due to advanced design developments, advancement of procurement, and operational and ongoing elite environmental enhancements.

The design of the mine incorporates an underground tailings management facility, and most of the mine's reclamation will take place concurrently with production. As well as enhancing environmental performance during operation, this will reduce the risk of ongoing reclamation, costly decommissioning at the end of the production period, and the post-closure risk to the local environment and communities. Some CAD900 million of costs associated with the progressive reclamation over the LOM have already been incorporated into the CapEx, OpEx and sustaining capital costs, meaning that full closure costs at the end of the mine's life - expected to be around CAD70 million - will be "materially lower than other uranium mines in Canada".

NexGen is currently working to secure the federal and provincial approvals needed to move forward with the project, and says it is ready for major construction activities to begin immediately when the final federal environmental assessment approval is received: it has already received provincial environmental assessment approval. The project is now about 45% complete, and the company said it is "advancing well with the significant build out of the project development team that includes industry experts in shaft sinking, underground mining and development, and surface operations."

CEO Leigh Curyer said the updated capital cost is an "all-encompassing spend" to bring the project into production, with a payback period of 12 months. "It is a very exciting time at NexGen as the Company advances the finalisation of the Federal Environmental Assessment, readies for immediate commencement of construction on final Federal Approval, and in parallel continue to test the recently discovered Patterson Corridor East mineralisation 3.5kms east of the Arrow deposit," he said.

The Arrow uranium deposit at Rook I has measured and indicated mineral resources of 256.7 million pounds U3O8, supporting an 11-year LOM.

Researched and written by World Nuclear News