Sunday, October 13, 2024

 

‘Political struggle against Putin’s regime is the best way to stop his war machine’: An interview with Russian oppositionist Ilya Yashin

Published 
Ilya Yashin

First published in Catalan at Ara. Translation by Dick Nichols for LINKS International Journal of Socialist Renewal

Ilya Yashin is a Russian opposition politician who was released from prison on August 1, in the prisoner exchange between Russia and the United States. Since his exile in Germany, he has been touring several European cities to reach out to the Russian diaspora, which has taken him to Barcelona. Yashin, now 41, was jailed in 2022 for criticising the invasion of Ukraine on his YouTube show. He was sentenced to eight and a half years in prison for denouncing the Bucha massacre. He is now free thanks to the largest prisoner exchange of the Cold War, in which sixteen Russian political prisoners and US citizens Evan Gershkovitx and Paul Whelan were exchanged for prisoners in the West claimed by Russia, including Spain’s Pablo Gonzalez, accused of espionage, and Vadim Krasikov, who shot a man in the head to death in a Berlin park on Moscow's orders.

What is the life of a Russian oppositionist in prison like?

I spent twenty-five months there. I had prepared myself mentally, because from the first day of the Ukrainian war I knew that if I did not leave Russia (and I was not willing) I would end up behind bars. Every day I woke up thinking, “If they don't arrest me today, it will be tomorrow.” And it was in the fourth month of the war.

Prison is very hard physically and psychologically, because it is designed to subdue you, to break you as a person. It is very easy to lose a part of your humanity, because the environment is very aggressive. But if you endure the psychological pressure, it can also become a place of personal and even spiritual growth. Ironically, I think my time in prison has made me more flexible. And I have learned to coexist with people who do not think like me, to coexist peacefully and reach agreements. And I think that understanding will be useful to me now.

Is there talk of war in Russian prisons?

Prisoners have become a key human resource for Putin’s war. Many prisoners end up agreeing to go to war, because especially if they have long sentences it is the only chance to get out of it. Almost every prisoner I was with knew someone who had gone to Ukraine. But the important thing is that they do not see it as a just, patriotic or noble war. They see it only as a source of money or a way to shorten the sentence.

You were released in the exchange, but you had always said that you did not want to leave Russia. How do you experience the fact that other opponents are still behind bars?

These are very contradictory emotions. Obviously, I am happy to be free: only two months ago I was handcuffed and in a cell with poor food and I could only communicate with criminals or officials. Now I am free, I can talk to you. And I can hug my mother every time she comes to visit me.

But at the same time I feel very guilty, because I cannot help thinking that my place on the plane that took us out of Russia had to go to someone else. In fact, I asked not to be exchanged because my political position was fully conscious. I am a Russian political activist and I was still a political activist in prison. I never considered leaving the country and I did not do it of my own free will. In fact, I was deported.

And I see that many others are still in prison in danger of losing their lives. Aleksei Gorinov [former Russian councillor imprisoned for criticising the war] is missing a lung and could die at any moment. Maria Ponomarenko, a journalist serving time for reporting on the war, is tortured and on the verge of suicide. Igor Baryshnikov [also an anti-war activist] has a tumour. While I am at liberty, they are still rotting in prison and their lives are in danger.

Can there be political change in Russia with a population paralysed by fear?

Historical change in Russia is inevitable and Putin’s regime is holding it back. It is holding it back with the use of force, but this will not last forever. Very serious internal contradictions are accumulating in Russia. What united people during these years was Putin’s promise of stability after the difficult reform era of the 1990s. Putin promised people tranquillity and prosperity. And now it is all over. People feel threatened, the country is becoming more and more isolated. The war in Ukraine has taken away the most important thing anyone can have: hope for the future. That is what Putin has taken away from us.

Today Russia is in a very painful situation, where it is desperately searching for its identity. The feeling is that everyone hates everyone else. People are constantly arguing. And these accumulated contradictions will eventually explode. The debate that will begin in Russia after the end of the war will determine where the country will go.

What impact did Navalny’s death have on the Russian people, on the opposition and on yourself?

Navalny was not just a politician. Just like Boris Nemtstov [Russian opposition politician who was assassinated in 2015], Navalny was a figure of systemic importance, around whom coalitions were formed and projects were built. It was a very serious loss for Russian society, because especially people of my generation associated their future with Navalny. When they killed him, they killed hope. No one will be able to take his place.

I believe that the vacuum he has left can only be filled by collective action. The Russian opposition has always been built around a great figure and I think we must now replace him with solidarity at the most basic level. If we succeed we will have a chance.

Alexei Navalny was a friend of mine

What role do you think you can play in that change?

One of the problems we have is the atomisation of Russian society in general and also of the people who defend the values of freedom, humanism and democracy. By my example I want to show that we can participate in politics in a different way.

That is why I do events and debates on social networks. I want to show that we can talk to each other in a correct and respectful way and that we can find common ground for the future. This is the goal of my tour of European cities to meet compatriots who had to leave Russia because of the war, because of Putin's dictatorship. I also do streaming programs to address people who have stayed in Russia.

When you denounced the massacre committed by the Russian army in the Ukrainian town of Bucha, you knew you would end up in prison. Why did you do it?

Bucha was the excuse to arrest me. I was imprisoned for not keeping quiet and for telling people the truth about the war, the truth about what happened in Bucha and many other war crimes that Putin’s army was committing in Ukraine. I knew it would land me in jail, but I could not keep quiet. I think it was very important for a Russian politician to tell the truth about the war.

Do you think the Russian opposition should support Ukraine in the war?

There are different points of view, and this does not worry me. Some think that it is necessary to collect money for the Ukrainian army and give them moral and political support; others collect aid for refugees; others defend Ukrainian prisoners of war in Russian courts.

I think, like others, that political struggle against Putin’s regime is the best way to stop his war machine. I do not participate in fundraising for the Ukrainian army and consider that my role should be to change public opinion inside Russia.

What do you say to the Ukrainian offensive in Kursk?

It pains me that the war has come to my country, but I warned from the first days that Putin would not have it easy in Ukraine and that the war would eventually come to Russian territory. I am not happy, but I understand the logic of the Ukrainian leadership: they do not want Russian land, but have made this offensive as a form of self-defence. They entered the Kursk region to strengthen their bargaining power.

What is needed is for all Russian troops to withdraw from Ukraine. And when this has happened there will be no Ukrainian soldiers left on Russian territory. We must do everything possible to achieve this.

You met Pablo Gonzalez, the Spaniard accused of espionage in Poland who was also released in the exchange and received by Putin in Moscow. What do you think of his case?

Russia had recognised Pavel Rubtsov [his real name] as a spy at the time it exchanged him. Putin met him at the foot of the plane to shake his hand and he was wearing a T-shirt that said “The Empire Needs You”. The fact that he was put on an exchange list with other spies, with Krasikov, although many other Russian spies have been left behind in Western prisons, closes the debate.

I have no doubt that Pavel Gonzalez is a Russian intelligence officer. I know that he worked against the Boris Nemtsov Foundation, which is run by his daughter Zhanna Nemtsova, and that he stole documents from her computer. But in my case it did not hurt. In fact, it made me smile to think how uselessly the Russian secret services spend money.

I spent quite a lot of time with Pablo: whenever he came to Spain we used to meet and the last time I was in Barcelona, five years ago, he showed me around the city. I do not quite understand what the point of his work was: it seems that he was doing a psychological profile of me, but I have always been a public figure, I know that I am under the magnifying glass and I have nothing to hide. I think that when he met me he was convinced that I am not an extremist or a criminal. I guess that is the information he sent to Moscow.

He did not harm me, but the truth is that he pretended to be a journalist when in fact he was an agent gathering information. I must also say that I am glad he was put on the exchange list, because that allowed the release of real Russian journalists and activists, such as Vladimir Karamurza, Aleksandra Skotchilenko, Lilia Chanixeva or Ksenia Fadeeva. The release of Gonzalez for me is less painful than that of Krasikov, who was a murderer

(Video) Boris Kagarlitsky and the challenges of the left today

By Various
Published 12 October,2024


Scholars from across the globe gathered for an online conference on October 8 in honour of Russian sociologist Boris Kagarlitsky, who is serving a 5-year sentence in a Russian penal colony on the fabricated charge of “justifying terrorism.”

The line-up of distinguished speakers includes: US philosopher and feminist Nancy Fraser, University of Johannesburg Centre for Social Change director Patrick Bond, Russian sociologist Greg Yudin, Ukrainian historian Hanna Perekhoda, University Solidarity Trade Union (Russia) co-chair Pavel Kudyukin, and speakers from Russian-based organisations Feminist Anti-War Resistance.


You can view the entire video stream of the conference above.

0.00 Introduction: Andrea Levy and Alina Chetaeva

14:48 Opening address: Nancy Fraser

35:53 The Long Retreat (presentation and discussion)
Moderator: David Castle
Speakers: Bill Fletcher, Alex Callinicos and Jayati Ghosh

2:31:54 The situation for the left in Russia today
Moderator: Alexei
Speakers: Greg Yudin, Ilya Budraitskis and a representative of Feminist Anti-War Resistance

3:37:53 Presentation of the Daniel Singer Prisoner of Conscious Award
Suzi Weissman and Ksenia Kagarlitskaya

4:28:21 Imperialism(s) today
Moderator: Adam Novak
Speakers: Robert Brenner, Ilya Matveev and Hanna Perekhoda

6:15:09 Repression and the threat to intellectual freedom: Russia and beyond
Moderator: Fiona Dove
Speakers: Pavel Kudyukin, Patrick Bond, Anna Ochkina and Trevor Ngwane

7:51:34 Launch of the Kagarlitsky Network for Academic and Intellectual Freedom
Russia Boris Kagarlitsky Imperialism

 

One year after 7 October, Gilbert Achcar discusses the future of Gaza, Lebanon and the regional conflict

Published 
Gilbert Achcar

First published at Ahram Online.

On 7 October this year, the Palestinians in Gaza marked one year of the devastating war that Israel inflicted on them hours after the Hamas Al-Aqsa Flood Operation struck the south of Israel in the early hours of 7 October 2023.

Twelve months down the road, close to 50,000 Palestinians, mostly women and children, have been killed, with many more still to be recovered from underneath the rubble that has been amassing with every heavy Israeli raid on Gaza.

Over 100,000 Palestinians have been wounded, with many of them now suffering life-long injuries that are more often than not disabling. Gaza’s healthcare system, housing facilities, education system, and infrastructure are either devastated or badly damaged.

This has been the case despite the remarkable resilience of Hamas’s military wing, and the support it has received from Hezbollah in South Lebanon, whose rockets, fired at northern Israel, have put pressure on its military, and despite the recurrent international appeals for Israel to stop its genocidal war.

Emboldened by the failure of the international community to put a stop to his war on Gaza, and with the not-so-secret sympathy for his war on Hamas from several world capitals, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu took his assault on Hamas and Hezbollah to the next level with a series of assassinations of its leaders, including of Fuad Shukr, a leading Hezbollah figure in Beirut, and Ismail Haniyeh, the chief of the Hamas Political Bureau while he was in Tehran. Then there was the shocking elimination of Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah in Beirut on 27 September.

The killing of the Hamas and Hezbollah leaders and many of the fighters of both the Islamist resistance groups is part of the larger damage that both have suffered along with Israel’s destruction of significant parts of their military infrastructure, more so with Hamas in Gaza than with Hezbollah, at least so far, in South Lebanon.

According to Gilbert Achcar, a Lebanese professor of Development Studies and International Relations at SOAS (School of Oriental and African Studies), University of London, in the UK, the situation looks very difficult for Hamas.

Palestine 

“We can say for sure that Hamas has been smashed in Gaza, and I don’t think that Israel will let them reconstitute their apparatus and the whole infrastructure that was built over decades,” Achcar said. Worse still, he added, he does not think that Israel is going to leave Gaza this time around.

“We have to remember that when [former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel] Sharon carried out his withdrawal from Gaza in 2005, Netanyahu, then a member of the Israeli Government, resigned to protest this withdrawal,” Achcar said. Today, Netanyahu is set to stay in Gaza, one way or the other, he said.

According to Achcar, “at best” Gaza will be like the West Bank in that it will be divided into tiny townships, similar to the situation in South Africa during the apartheid years when the black African population was forced into designated restricted neighbourhoods.

“Things will be much worse for Gaza given its geographic isolation,” Achcar said.

However, resistance, and militant resistance in particular, will not be fully eliminated. “It will persist, but more in occasional attacks as has been happening in the West Bank. For sure there is no going back [for Hamas] to the situation of 6 October 2023.”

Achcar said that it should not be overlooked that Hamas “remains strong” outside Gaza. “It is there in the West Bank, Jordan, and in the refugee camps in Lebanon,” he explained. He added that the question today is not about whether or not Hamas will remain, because “Hamas will remain simply because [Netanyahu] cannot eradicate it.”

The question is rather what Hamas will be able to do from now on.

For Achcar, the latter is the bigger question, especially in view of what he said is the fact that the “Palestinians in Gaza are realising more and more the level of their defeat.”

“This has really been a genocidal war along with an intensity in destruction that I don’t think can be compared to anything other than Hiroshima,” he said, in a reference to the 1945 US atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan during World War II.

“The far-right Israeli Government, which [in essence] is a group of neo-fascists and neo-Nazis, will surely push for the permanent reoccupation of Gaza,” Achcar said.

He argued that it is hard to ignore the consensus that has been created in Israeli political quarters about the need to fight hard against Hamas after the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation. “I think it is quite similar to the way things were in the US against Al-Qaida after the attacks of 9/11,” he said, in a reference to the bringing down of the World Trade Centre towers in New York and the attack on the Pentagon in the autumn of 2001.

“This is why I think that the overall balance sheet for the 7 October operation is disastrous and that it was a huge miscalculation,” he said. He added that with the current situation on the ground in Gaza and the damage that Hamas has been enduring, it will be very hard for its leaders to speak of “a divine victory” or any such thing in the near future.

Achcar argued that the situation is very hard in many ways, not just because of the damage that Hamas and the entire population of Gaza have suffered, but also because there is no clear political alternative to Hamas. “Today, there is simply a political vacuum there,” he stated, while arguing that the Palestinian Authority (PA) as a whole and its leader Mahmoud Abbas have “zero credibility” and “zero popularity” in Gaza.

According to Achcar, the prominent and popular Fatah leader Marwan Barghouti, imprisoned by Israel since 2002, arguably a leader of the Second Intifada in 2000, could have been a political alternative to Hamas. However, he added that “there is no way that Netanyahu will release Barghouti.”

Unfortunate and distressing as it might be, Achcar said, “this is a very hard moment [for the Palestinians]. It is a moment of defeat for the [Palestinian] liberation movement and a moment of victory for Zionist arrogance.”

“This much we have to realise,” he stated.

Achcar is not willing to entertain the argument that despite all the actual and long-term damage that the military might of the Israeli Occupation has inflicted on Hamas and Gaza, Hamas has also imposed a new reality in which Israeli arrogance was subject to a shocking challenge in the early hours of 7 October 2023 and that the PA narrative, which had been introduced along with the September 1993 Oslo Accords, about negotiations and security coordination with Israel as a path towards Palestinian statehood, has also been dramatically defied.

He argued that nobody needed to do anything to show that the Oslo Process has long been dead. It has been dead since the Second Intifada, he said.

Former Palestinian leader Yasser “Arafat had the illusion of [securing] an independent Palestinian state [through negotiations], but this illusion died with Arafat,” 20 years ago in November 2004, he said. He added that Netanyahu was not going to allow a Palestinian state, and that this much the Israeli Prime Minister has himself said.

However, he argued, that what the Al-Aqsa Flood had brought about was not the elimination of a faulty and inconclusive process of negotiations and security cooperation with Israel. What it did, he argued, “is introduce a much worse political alternative” than the status quo put together by the Oslo Process.

A year after the beginning of the Israeli war on Gaza, coupled by persisting Israeli military operations in the West Bank, the Palestinian population “is scattered in what is even less than a Bantustan,” and the Israeli far-right “is pushing to expel the Palestinian population into Sinai. They would have done so, had it not been for the red line that the Egyptian government drew about it.”

Today, he anticipates that Netanyahu’s far-right colleagues in government will push to keep the Palestinians in Gaza in Rafah at the very southern point of the Strip and allow Israeli settlers to reclaim large parts of Gaza in the north and maybe middle of the Strip right up to the borders with Egypt.

“The only silver lining in this whole catastrophe is the increase of [world] solidarity with the Palestinian [people and cause], especially in the US,” Achcar said. “This is important for the future. It is important that the world realise that some 50,000 people, mostly women and children, have been killed by Israel in Gaza.”

Meanwhile, he added that the Palestinian resistance does require a new political alternative that is different from the liberation movements of the past and not just from Hamas. “There has been a need for a third force, but the current forces have not been allowing” this new force to find its way, he said.

It has to be admitted that this new force should not be military, he added. He argued that military force will not secure Palestinian objectives, simply because of the discrepancy in favour of Israel. “When your enemy is stronger, don’t fight him on his terrain but find another way to fight him,” he said.

Achcar argued that he is not prescribing something that the Palestinian path to liberation is unfamiliar with. He said that “the biggest moment of Palestinian impact was during the First Intifada” in 1988, when the left-leaning Palestinian leadership of the uprising “had the intelligence not to use the weapons they had.”

At that point, Achcar said, the Israelis were caught off guard, and it was then that they decided to negotiate with the Palestinians in Oslo, simply to end the First Intifada, “which was then the peak of the Palestinian struggle.” Today, he added, the Palestinians could benefit from regaining the spirit of that moment, rather than try to resurrect the militant path.

The non-military struggle of the Palestinian people, Achcar argued, created a camp within Israeli society that was calling for Palestinian statehood. On the other hand, he argued that the path of suicide bombings helped Sharon to promote his extremist policies.

“Sharon surfed on Hamas suicide attacks,” Achcar said. He added that Sharon also trapped Hamas into this path in order to pursue his policies.

Today, Achcar said the Palestinians need a new approach in gaining their liberation and a new style of leadership that “is progressive” and will work on three objectives.

The first, he said, is to lead a good part of Israeli society to split from the ideology and path of Zionism. The second is for the new Palestinian leadership to connect with the civil-rights movements in the Arab world. The third is to expand and consolidate the international solidarity that has been on the rise due to the horrific Israeli war on Gaza.

Lebanon

Regarding Lebanon, however, the question of the future of the resistance is much more layered, according to Achcar. This question has become even more pressing with the assassination of Nasrallah.

Nasrallah and his political and military choices, Achcar argued, cannot be seen in black or white. He agreed that while some people might think of Nasrallah as the man who shored up the oppression of the Syrian people by supporting the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in Damascus, others might see him as the “sayyed al-mokkawama” (the head of resistance), who was arguably Israel’s worst nightmare for three consecutive decades.

During this period, he imposed defeats on the Israeli Army, including making it withdraw from the south of Lebanon in 2000 which it occupied since the 1982 invasion executed by Sharon, as chief of the Israeli military at the time.

“Nasrallah was [all of the above]; he meant different things to different people,” Achcar said.

“To his base in Lebanon, to his allies in the region, and to [many Shia], he was surely the sayyed al-mokkawama,” Achcar said. If one were to examine the reaction to the Israeli assassination of Nasrallah, one would find that the sense of devastation and loss was not confined to those who subscribed either to Nasrallah’s base or his ideology.

Many in Lebanon, he said, thought of Nasrallah and will continue to think of him as a “strong leader who imposed the Israeli evacuation and who dared to stand up to Israel.”

However, he added that it is hard today to think of Nasrallah without thinking of the fact that when he got involved in Syria, “he and Hezbollah were perceived as an Iranian proxy,” without excluding their role in forcing the Israeli evacuation of south Lebanon.

In the final analysis, Nasrallah’s dominant image is that of the man who forced the Israeli evacuation from south Lebanon, resisted the Israeli onslaught in 2006, and who over the past year has forced a large number of Israelis to leave their homes in the north of Israel on the borders with Lebanon as an act of solidarity with Gaza.

“This is why his assassination is a major victory for Israel, and this is why so many Lebanese, including myself, who stand clearly on the left and who disagree with much of the ideology of Hezbollah, found his assassination really saddening,” Achcar said.

He added that it is hard to think of Hezbollah as it has become, either in political or military terms, without thinking of Nasrallah. With close to 30 years at the helm, he argued, Nasrallah was the one who made Hezbollah the way it has become. He was arguably, “in relative terms, the best possible leader of Hezbollah, given that while he was willing to fight, he had the intelligence and sensitivity to preserve lives,” especially of civilians.

Achcar recalled the famous interview that Nasrallah gave after the Israeli war against Lebanon in July 2006 that came in the wake of Hezbollah’s abduction of Israeli soldiers. Nasrallah said that had he anticipated the huge damage that Israel would inflict on Lebanon, his calculations would have been different.

In August 2006, a few weeks after the end of war, Nasrallah said that had he known that Israel would inflict such a huge damage on Lebanon, he would not have ordered the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers in an operation that Hezbollah fighters conducted during a secret crossing into the north of Israel.

This statement, Achcar said, was a message to the Lebanese people, “and Nasrallah had the courage and the conscience to make it.”

While he might not have been the major strategist that some people thought he was, during his years at the top of Hezbollah Nasrallah refrained from abducting or harming Israeli civilians because he did not want to subject Lebanese civilians to harm at the hands of Israel.

“This was part of his popularity… and this is why his death is a major loss for the country and not just for Hezbollah,” he added.

Such cautious and calculated political perceptions were perhaps shared with Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh “and this was one of the reasons why Netanyahu decided to assassinate these two leaders,” Achcar said.

Netanyahu did not want resistance leaders with political sensibility and with the courage and weight to pursue political settlements.

“Netanyahu is like Sharon,” Achcar said. Neither of these two men, he added, wanted or want to engage politically, and this is why Netanyahu does not want leaders with the ability or the intention to reach political settlements on any issue. He added that the replacement of Haniyeh with Yehiya Sinwar, who is much less inclined than his predecessor to consider pragmatic political compromises, is perhaps useful for Netanyahu’s on-going war against Hamas.

Speaking before the speculation over the Israeli assassination of Hashem Safieddine, the potential successor of Nasrallah, Achcar argued that whoever the replacement of Nasrallah might be as leader of Hezbollah, Israel is unlikely to have anything but an easier way ahead because it is unlikely that any of the potential successors will be able to deliver the kind of complex performances that Nasrallah did, no matter their flaws.

“I just don’t think that there will be another Nasrallah,” he stated. This is partially why the Lebanese resistance will also need to think of alternatives that are much more political, progressive, and inclusive and are less militant and sect-based, he added.

Israel

Not excluding the Israeli losses during its recently initiated ground operation in the south of Lebanon, Achcar argued that as a result of its year-long genocidal war on Gaza and the assassinations of the leaders of Hezbollah, Hamas, and commanders of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, Netanyahu can now claim he has managed to regain the Israeli deterrence that was compromised with the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation and, before it, by the performance of Hezbollah as it redeployed in southern Lebanon after 2006.

In the eyes of Netanyahu, Achcar argued, “the fear of Israel is there again.” He added that there are now concerns about the Israeli retaliation to the Iranian missile attacks on Israeli targets on 1 October.

Another emboldening fact for Netanyahu is that US President Joe Biden has been mostly supportive of the Israeli wars waged to destroy Hamas and Hezbollah. “Irrespective of whatever he has said when the world was outraged at the horrors of the war over the past year, the Israeli war on Gaza is arguably the first fully joint US-Israeli war,” Achcar said.

Consequently, he argued that Netanyahu, who is not sure that former Republican US President Donald Trump will find his way back to the White House in November, will not want to take the risk of waiting for the expiry of such US support in case Democratic Party nominee Kamala Harris wins the November elections.

“This is especially so with regards to Netanyahu’s plans against Iran. Netanyahu would not want to face the pressure for self-restraint that Harris might impose,” Achcar said. He added that Netanyahu will remember that former US President Barack Obama, “prioritised the nuclear deal with Tehran,” over Netanyahu’s strong objections.

A new Middle East?

Whatever might happen on the Iranian front, Achcar argued, today the political landscape of the Middle East is one where Islamist movements of all shades have suffered huge losses. With the retreat of these movements, he added, there is a political vacuum that needs to be filled with a new form of political power that could be similar to the “very impressive young civilian leadership” of the 2019 Sudanese Revolution that ousted the regime of former President Omar al-Bashir.

“This is not an easy thing to do, and it might take a long time before we get there,” he said.

Meanwhile, Achcar would not conclude that the Middle East is changing in the way that Netanyahu wants, where the resistance to Israeli occupation is forever defeated, or at least disabled, and where normalisation with Israel has become the norm, irrespective of whatever happens with the Palestinian cause.

This, he said, is not at all likely. “The Saudis themselves are now saying that they will not normalise with Israel prior to a serious move towards Palestinian statehood.

Other factors that might prevent the emergence of the kind of Middle East that Netanyahu is hoping for, Achcar said, include the popular support in the region for the rights of the Palestinian people and the growing international support that is unlikely to be silenced by a limited Israeli military withdrawal from Gaza.

How Kenya’s Youth, Middle Classes and Working Poor Joined Force

Friday 11 October 2024, by Caroline Kimeu

I remember Kenya’s 
June 25 protests like they were yesterday. The energy on the streets of Nairobi was frenetic, filled with the sound of whistles, motorcycle honks, vuvuzelas (long horns used to cheer in soccer games) and loud blasts ofteargas.

“We are tired,” chanted the thousands of demonstrators who had turned out to oppose government plans to introduce wide-ranging tax hikes, on what would become the bloodiest day of the protests. Hoisting up Kenyan flags, they marched through one of the city’s main avenues, which was colored pink from water cannon spray, dodging rounds of rubber bullets and teargas. As the cloudy haze cleared up, a protester held a bandana over his mouth with one hand, defiantly holding up a placard with the other: “It’s not teargas but the fragrance of change,” it read.

The tax increase plan had attracted the ire of the country’s middle class and working poor, with its wide-ranging hikes on car ownership, medical bills, financial transactions, digital content creation and essentials like sanitary towels, oil and bread.

An analysis by World Bank economists shows that while tax policies and government expenditure policies in high-income countries cushion their poor, they make poor households even poorer in low and middle-income countries. Kenya currently spends more of its national revenue servicing debt than it does on all other spending combined, including spending on social security, health and education. This risks deepening inequality and throwing the country’s poorest even deeper into poverty.

As I covered news of the day’s events, weaving my way through the crowd and speaking with protesters, it was clear that while the now-withdrawn tax hike plan had brought people to the streets, it was also the proverbial “straw that broke the camel’s back.”

The nationwide demonstrations grew into wider calls for the country’s leaders to cut government spending, crack down on corruption, and invest in development and essential services. The youth demanded an audit on how the nation saddled itself with soaring $80bn public debt, a fivefold increase in the last decade, tied to infrastructure projects dogged by corruption claims and concerns over financial viability.

I’ve come to view Kenyans as like a friend whose temper is not quick to boil over, but when it does, it erupts. During the June 25 protests, I knew that things had come to a head when protesters stormed Parliament after lawmakers approved the contentious bill, and set part of the building on fire. Several protesters were killed in ensuing clashes with the police. Like many Kenyans, I wondered if the uprising would push the country over the edge or reel it back from decades of poor governance.

Kenyan President William Ruto withdrew the bill on June 26, changing course amid escalations in violence and growing calls for his resignation. Online, many called it “too little, too late.” At least 39 people were killed by police in the last two weeks of protests, according to the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights. Up to 32 people suspected of playing a leading role in the protests say they were abducted by government agents over the course of the protests. A number were held incommunicado, without access to their families or legal representation, according to Amnesty International.

The government has shifted dramatically in its reactions to the events of the last three weeks, going from minor concessions to brutal police crackdowns on protesters, to withdrawing the bill and calling for dialogue. Even after Ruto revoked the bill, the wave of protests continued to sweep over the country. They slowed after turning bloody on June 25, and as many young people became reluctant to demonstrate after reports emerged, from activists and local media, that politicians had hired poor young people to disrupt and delegitimize the movement by looting local businesses and causing mayhem.

Ruto called the protests an “important inflection point” for the country, saying in a televised debate on June 30 that “candid conversations” on the debt crisis were necessary. He defended the finance bill, saying that the $2.7 billion that it would have raised in tax could have reduced borrowing and helped improve public services. “There are only two things you can do: Either you raise money from taxes or you borrow, period,” said Ruto. “There is no magic.”

Under growing pressure to address the mounting upheaval, Ruto agreed to calls from Kenyan youth for a live meeting on X (formerly Twitter). 163,000 live participants attended the July 5 discussions at its peak, and around 5.6 million users over the session. While some people viewed the engagement as a historic conversation between a president and a public openly opposed to his administration, others considered it a whitewashing exercise and boycotted the talks.

An hour before the event, Ruto announced that he would appoint an independent task force to audit the public debt. It will report its findings in three months. He also announced $1.39 billion in budget cuts, including on government spending. He dissolved 47 unnecessary state agencies, reduced the number of government advisers by 50% and suspended costly and controversial new appointments to the executive. He also scrapped the offices of the first lady, the spouse of the deputy president, and the prime cabinet secretary, as well as plans to renovate government offices. He suspended all nonessential state travel and banned state officers from participating in “harambees,” fundraising events that are viewed as opportunities for the political class to gain backing by corrupting the public.

Those changes, he said during the live talks, would address public anger over wasteful spending and what he termed the “obnoxious opulence” of state officers, while the government would need to borrow $1.3 billion to tackle the budgetary crisis after withdrawing the finance bill.

In just a matter of weeks, Kenya has witnessed a public awakening that’s prompted deep public scrutiny of the governance crisis that’s plagued the country for decades.

Kenyans are bearing the consequences of the country’s public debt through highly taxed goods, and there is a growing disconnect between the public and the government, which Kenyans accuse of corruption and wasteful spending, including overstaffing, excessive travel and corruption. The country’s lawmakers are known to carry wads of cash, drive fancy cars and live in posh estates.

The country has faced economic shocks caused by the lasting impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, currency depreciation, inflation, unemployment and recurring climate disasters like droughts and flooding. The difficult economy has also focused public attention on leaders’ performances as they attempt to address the economic challenges facing the country. In Kenya’s last elections, I found Kenyans more interested in debates over the cost of living, debt and youth unemployment than in the ethnic and personality-driven contests that have dominated many previous cycles.

Ruto rode in on promises to make life easier for the working poor, but the public is now disenchanted with the president, whom they have nicknamed “Zakayo” after the biblical tax collector Zaccheus. Some view the jet-setting president as more invested in the country’s international image than the situation at home, and accuse him of prioritizing the policies of lenders like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) over domestic needs.

The IMF had urged Kenya to increase domestic revenue collection to access more funding, at a time when many are grappling with the cost of living crisis and beset with questions over how the country’s debt was accumulated. While many are struggling to get by, some view Ruto as prioritizing debt repayments over their interests.

Many Kenyans I met on the streets felt that tax increases in recent years had made life more difficult yet hadn’t noticeably improved public services. I’ve watched the country’s poor turn to community-run groups for social support in emergency situations because state options are poor or unavailable, and the middle class resort to costly private services.

The country’s working-age youth, who make up just over a third of the country’s population, are grappling with the high cost of living while unemployed. One protester I spoke with during last week’s protests had a bachelor’s degree, yet could not find work and ended up taking a job as a security guard in the city center. It reminded me of warnings from grassroots leaders that the lack of opportunity and deepening wealth inequalities are “a time bomb” that could trigger an uprising by frustrated youth. Even as protests have waned, I’ve wondered if there are signs of this now.

I found it striking that public-driven social media protests, with no political or apparent leader, could trigger a mass street turnout. The protests were led by an unlikely group of Kenyans: under 27s (“Gen Z”), who were perceived until recently as apathetic to mainstream politics, and millennials, who were widely viewed as more inclined to digital activism over street marches. While Gen Z’s involvement carried important symbolism, I’ve also wondered if the media obsession with their leading role has led to narrow views about whose interests the movement represents. The youth are championing issues that affect the vast majority of Kenyans, and which have been the subject of decades-long struggles. We still have a long way to go, but many of the political and social freedoms we enjoy today were hard-won, and paved the way for the public awakening we are witnessing today.

When the protests first began, high-ranking officials downplayed the discontent that was mounting online. “Digital wankers,” Ruto’s economic adviser David Ndii called those protesting on social media. But online opposition represented deep-seated public anger over how the country is run, as became clear when the social media protests spilled onto the streets and tens of thousands marched across the country. Everyone, from influencers to informal workers rallied behind the calls for lawmakers to rule out the tax proposals.

The working poor showed up with fervor. Motorcycle riders ferried protesters in and out of a packed capital. Residents of Nairobi’s informal settlements, who make up more than half of the city’s population, filled the streets. A new generation of young, educated and upwardly mobile protesters also took to the streets, like the suited, bow tie-wearing Gen Z protester Kasmuel McOure. Influential figures like rugby player-turned-celebrity chef Dennis Ombachi became vocal, and established grassroots organizers like the hijabi activist Honey Farsafi ran public crowdfunding.

The heavy middle-class presence was a new development, mocked by one member of Parliament who called the youth protesters “iPhone-using, Uber-riding, KFC-eating and bottled water-drinking Kenyans” who were out of touch with real problems. Yet this demographic became instrumental in coordinating the protests. At the height of the protests, up to 60,000 X users at a time listened to a six-hour space debating the bill.

Techies developed artificial intelligence to help Kenyans understand it better, lawyers helped facilitate the release of those detained or abducted during the protests, the public translated concerns over the bill into common vernacular, and millions of shillings were raised for those killed or injured. Kenyans in the diaspora launched solidarity protests from major cities across the world and medics ran volunteer emergency response centers across the capital that saved many lives. It was unlike anything I’d ever seen, as a Kenyan and as a journalist, in a country where class differences have been known to divide, rather than unify, the public politically. The demonstrations attracted interest across the continent, becoming a subject of discussion in countries like Uganda, Nigeria and Ghana, where some people saw their struggles with government corruption and debt mirrored in the Kenyan uprising.

While protesters were largely united by calls for change, there were some tensions in the movement too. In its early days, moves by one activist to solicit funding from politicians were shot down over fears that the movement would be co-opted by the political class. Protesters were also divided on whether to attempt to occupy the State House — the president’s residence — after many were killed during the occupation of Parliament on June 25. Feminist organizers opposed the release and distribution of revenge porn of a female lawmaker who supported the tax measures. The public hunt for a police officer who killed a protester prompted different views on X over how he would be dealt with, and whether or not his family would be kept from harm.

The country’s political class has also found itself under deep public scrutiny. A specialized ChatGPT that lists politicians’ corruption scandals on demand circulated, along with spreadsheets of the current administration’s track record in achieving campaign pledges. The country’s first lady Rachel Ruto and other members of the political class had to cancel church appearances because of the growing pushback against what the public perceives as an “unholy alliance” between the church and the country’s leaders. Many believe the close links breed corruption and a lack of public accountability in both institutions.

While the measures Ruto announced on July 5 may have tamed the street protests and cooled the spiraling calls for his resignation, the public scrutiny of his government has risen to heights not seen in recent years, and that’s unlikely to die down any time soon.

July 9, 2024

New Lines