Thursday, November 07, 2024

Nancy Fraser: Envisioning a path to a mature left that can meet the demands of the present crisis


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[Editor’s note: The following is an edited transcript of the opening speech given by Nancy Fraser at the “Boris Kagarlitsky and the challenges of the left today” online conference, which was organised by the Boris Kagarlitsky International Solidarity Campaign on October 8. Fraser is a critical theorist, feminist and professor of philosophy at the New School in New York City. Transcripts and video recordings of other speeches given at the conference can be found at the campaign website freeboris.info, from where the below is republished.]

Thank you very much, Andrea, Alina and all the organizers of this event. It's wonderful and very moving to hear words from Boris on this occasion and to feel a connection with him and with all of you. We’ve come together across many time zones and continents, across oceans and empires, in a display of international left solidarity. And that is a truly heartening and moving.

In fact, there are far too few events like this one. Boris Kagarlitsky is far from the only leftwing Russian anti-war activist who has suffered repression. And there are “Borises” everywhere — in Palestine and in Israel, in Iran and in China, in India and Brazil, in Germany and France, in the United States. Certainly, most repressed leftists are less well known to the international left intelligentsia than Boris is. But they are equally in need of our support. And this event, I hope, can serve as a model. In a moment of intense repression and acute crisis, we should be multiplying events like these again and again.

But of course, defending endangered comrades is the bare minimum when it comes to practicing international left solidarity. We should also take them seriously — by engaging deeply with their thinking and practice. And that means, as Kagarlitsky himself would remind us, that we must think with them and about them strategically. If they are truly our comrades, we must think about how to connect their struggles and predicaments with ours — and with the struggles and predicaments of comrades elsewhere.

Put differently, we need to pursue not simply resistance but emancipatory change. That’s precisely what Boris has asked us to do. Later in this conference we will be discussing his recent book, The Long Retreat, where this problem is front and center. There he writes of the need to go beyond “coalitions of resistance” to “coalitions of change.” I don’t want to steal the thunder of our distinguished panelists who will be talking about the book in a later session. But I want to note that it provides both a brilliant analysis of the current conjuncture and an impassioned plea for strategic thinking.

Kagarlitsky diagnoses an acute crisis of neoliberal capitalism. It is what some have called a “polycrisis,” a crisis that is multi-dimensional–at once economic, ecological, social reproductive, political, and geopolitical. For Boris, moreover, it’s a crisis that our global ruling classes cannot resolve. They cannot decarbonize the global economy in time to halt planetary conflagration. They cannot provide decent livelihoods and successfully manage global pandemics. They cannot protect us from the violence of armies, police, banks, landlords, and unhinged, infuriated mobs. They cannot defeat rising authoritarian movements even when the latter appear to threaten their rule. They cannot stop war. But Boris goes further still. It’s not just that our rulers cannot stop this nexus of horribles. It’s rather that they actually produce them, systemically and non-accidentally. Accordingly, and I fully agree, our polycrisis admits of no “enlightened capitalist solution”–if that phrase is not already a contradiction in terms.

For Boris, then, our crisis is systemic and objective — but not only. It is also subjective and hegemonic. Masses of people now intuit that that the predicaments they experience cannot be resolved by piecemeal reforms. Many of them want radical change. And so, they defect from politics as usual. Ditching established parties and worldviews, they think outside the box, looking for radical alternatives. But now, we have to ask: what do they find when they look for radical alternatives? According to Kagarlitsky, they find no credible socialist alternative, no confident bloc of leftwing social forces that conveys a programmatically serious and strategically sound commitment to deep structural change. On the contrary, the forces that might have coalesced in this sort of counter-hegemony were atrophied and disoriented over the course of a decades long retreat of the left. That’s Boris’s thesis.

What takes their place today? I see two main political formations, locked in mutual antagonism. There is first, the panoply of moralizing, identity-siloed groups that have lost whatever transformative emancipatory drive they once possessed and that function now as the junior partners of corporate capital, lending the latter a veneer of faux-emancipatory charisma. If you want to be nasty, you can call this formation “wokeism.” I prefer to call it “progressive neoliberalism.” There is also, second, a panoply of authoritarian populist countermovements, which, as Boris notes, mix legitimate economic grievances with ginned up regressive ethnocultural hatreds, blaming migrants and minorities instead of predatory capital. These two forces, progressive neoliberalism and reactionary populism, are locked in a series of sham battles which get nowhere near to the heart of things, and which leave the real culprits off the hook. The result is a morass of “morbid symptoms” that Antonio Gramsci would easily recognize.

Kagarlitsky’s diagnosis of this conjuncture is close to mine, I think. But what is to be done? Is there a possible path today that can rebuild the left in the near future? Not just any left, of course, but one that follows Boris in rejecting sectarianism and utopianism in favor of grounded strategic thinking and political imagination. Can we envision a path to a mature left that could meet the demands of the present crisis? Or must we content ourselves with a well-managed retreat that will allow us to live to fight another day? But of course, if you take that second line, then you have to ask yourself: will there really be another day before the planet is consumed in flames?

These are questions that I long to discuss with Boris Kagarlitsky. I’ve never met him, but I have carried on a dialogue with him about these matters in my head. Truth be told, I’m a bit more optimistic than he is, more inclined to opt for counterhegemony, as opposed to managed retreat. In the remainder of this talk, I want to explain why.

I’ll focus on two issues. The first is class: how should a serious 21st Left understand the global working class today, and what strategies might it pursue as it seeks to constitute (substantial fractions of) that class as a political force? And the second is geopolitics: faced with the possible expansion of actual wars and ongoing genocides, what should the “foreign policy” of a mature international left look like? Each of these questions is deep and difficult. Each requires a combination of analytic and strategic thinking. To date, they have eluded what passes today for “the international left.” Yet no one who is serious about (re)building such a left can afford to ignore them.

I begin with class. Boris rightly assumes, and I fully agree, that class remains the crucial societal differentiation — and the crucial rallying point for a Left. But he also stresses, rightly too, that today’s global working class is not the industrial working class of previous centuries. Our question, then, is how is to understand that class today. How can we avoid defaulting to the outdated industrialist model without succumbing to fashionable ideas like “the multitude,” in which all cows become grey? Above all, how can we develop a class-based strategy that competes effectively with progressive neoliberalism and reactionary populism?

The key, I think, is to provoke splits along class lines within each of those two political blocs. In the case of progressive neoliberalism, this means peeling off rank-and-file working-class women, people of color, and migrants from the reigning corporate forces that now hold them hostage. In the case of reactionary populism, it means winning “old” working-class strata away from strongmen who channel their anger but betray their interests. In both cases, the trick is to change people’s views about who their allies and their enemies really are.

Hence, the strategic problem in a nutshell is: how to convince “progressive” feminists and anti-racist strata, on the other hand, and the “old” working class populist strata, on the other, that they have more to gain by allying with one another than by sticking with their current pseudo-“allies”?

Certainly, it would take tremendous political savvy and imagination to accomplish that. But class analysis supports the underlying idea. In fact, it was always wrong to equate the working class with the doubly free industrial proletariat. Properly understood, that class also includes those unfree or semi-free racialized subworkers, whose labor is coerced, unwaged or under-waged, and often disavowed, even as it supplies capital with the below-cost inputs the latter craves, and thus, is deeply entrenched in the global economy. By the same token, the full working class also includes now, and always has, those gendered workers who perform social-reproductive “carework,” work which is feminized, sentimentalized, underpaid if not unpaid, and often cast as “non-work,” but which supplies capital with labor power (of all kinds) and is therefore indispensable to accumulation. In general, then, capitalism relies on three analytically distinct but functionally inter-imbricated forms of labor: exploited, expropriated, and domesticated. It therefore tends to constitute what appear to three kinds of persons (really, workers). Thus, the global working class is divided, for systemic reasons, by gender and by color. Gender and race, in sum, are not alternatives to class but structurally entrenched divisions within it.

A left that is adequate for our time should adopt an expanded view of the working-class. On that basis, it could make a case for cooperation among class fractions that are currently divided from, and hostile to, one another. Urging a coalition of the exploited, the expropriated and the domesticated, such a left could show that the fates of all three fractions are intertwined, that none can be emancipated without the others, that they must join together to abolish the system that generates their perverse symbiosis.

But what about geopolitics? The global working class is divided not only by gender and race but also by country. The left has long struggled with divisions of this last sort and must do so again today, in a new context marked by a declining and flailing US hegemon, blindly followed by passive, clientelized Europe; a rising China, still reluctant to assert itself forcefully and directly in geopolitics; and intensifying efforts, led by Russia, to constitute the BRICS into a counter- (if not anti-) US bloc. It’s an unstable scene that encourages all manner of testing and acting out, which can easily spin out of control — think Taiwan, for example. It’s a context, too, of intensified militarism, imperial rivalry, and hot war.

Those features suggest the need for a new kind of “proletarian internationalism”. This must include trans-border peace movements that forge solidarities among those who are now conscripted to kill one another. It must also include broad inter-linked anti-imperialist movements that disclose and oppose the big powers (state and corporate) that set up proxies to fight and die for them.

But other features of our conjuncture are equally pressing. “Climate change,” which is a euphemism for planetary heating, requires a genuinely global perspective, as do global pandemics and other threats to health that know no borders. Finally, there is no ignoring migration, which forms an explosive flashpoint, fueling hatreds throughout the world. That too urgently requires a left response.

Militarism, migration, war, ecosystemic collapse on a planetary scale: these represent the geopolitical face of the present crisis. What should a left for our time say about them?

The fact of the matter is, we do not have now, and have not had for a very long time, any real sense of what a left-wing foreign policy would be today. This is where the left is weakest, in my view. Here and there you find people who have some interesting ideas about how to reorganize production, reproduction, global finance, and our metabolic interaction with non-human nature. But foreign policy remains largely an uncharted space.

I don’t have a comprehensive proposal to offer. But I do want to insist on one small, but essential point. Leftists must figure how to keep two (or more) “no’s “in our heads at once and how to turn them into some new kind of “yes.” One example: No to Putin, No to NATO. Don’t say one without the other. That part is easy, I think. But what’s the “yes“ that those two “no’s” points to? That’s the hard part. In any case, another example: No to anti-Palestinian genocide, apartheid, occupation. But also: No to anti-Semitism. That one too should be easy for leftists, but although we don’t hear it nearly enough. But here again comes the hard part: how to put both those two “no’s” together and end up with a “yes” to something else?

The inability to deal with that last example is wreaking havoc and much repression in my part of the world — and in others. But the first one is of special interest here. An event dedicated to solidarity with Boris Kagarlitsky is a special opportunity for me, and one I don’t often have, to talk to fellow leftists from Russian and Ukraine. No to Putin, but also No to NATO. I really want to hear what you think about that. As an American leftist, who is also by definition anti-American, I can’t put all the blame for this war on Putin. But we may disagree about that. And I’m eager to discuss it with you.

I would have loved, of course, to discuss that, and all the other topics I’ve raised here, with Boris. What a shame that he’s not here! But how wonderful that all of you are!

Spanish state

Flooding tragedy strikes Valencian Community

Wednesday 6 November 2024, by Daniel Geffner

As the death toll continues to rise and the images and harrowing accounts of the tragedy experienced by tens of thousands of people in the Valencian Community as a result of what is known in meteorology as a “cold drop” or isolated high level depression, continue to shock us, it is becoming increasingly clear that the authorities have not acted with the determination and speed that the announced threat demanded.

While extreme weather events cannot be avoided, climate denial and cuts to public services tend to weaken, if not render impossible, the response to predatory capitalism that puts profits before the lives of people and the planet. The criminal negligence of the regional government and employers, who have favoured ‘business as usual’ over workers’ right to safety at work, contrasts with the empathy and solidarity shown by the popular classes in coming to the aid of those affected by the cold drop.

The outpouring of solidarity and the desire to help those affected show that, in the face of the TINA (“There Is No Alternative”) of Thatcherism and neo-liberalism, with its religion based on individualism and the commodification of life and society, it is possible to challenge not only its rhetoric but also its practice by creating popular power from below and from the left. That’s why 9 November must be a mass mobilization in solidarity with the victims of the cold drop to demand the resignation of the President of the Generalitat Valenciana, Carlos Mazón.

A tragic cold drop, but a beacon of hope

The cold drop hit the Valencian Country with extreme force on this tragic October 2024, already surpassing the floods of the last century in terms of death and destruction, while the number of dead and missing continues to rise and aid to the affected population has still not arrived three days after ‘zero hour’. Electricity, running water and mobile phone coverage have still not been restored, and roads are still cut off or inaccessible in many places. The shocking images and accounts of the tragedy suffered by tens of thousands of people have shaken us, and we are seeing a growing wave of empathy and solidarity with those affected.

The information available shows that the authorities did not act with the prudence, determination and speed that the announced threat demanded. Witness the delays in activating the alarm by the Valencian government, the lack of coordination between protection services - which led to delays in the delivery of much-needed help - and the collapse of telephone exchanges, which were overwhelmed by calls due to the astonishment felt by the majority of the population at the sight of the floods. To all this we must add the refusal of the Valencian government to accept the help of fire-fighters from other autonomous communities who were already ready to help.

The government’s criminal negligence benefited from the collusion of a business class that put pressure on the government not to raise the red flag in order to continue doing business, hoping that the rains would not fall as they did. This gamble in favour of the market and the compass of profit has led the bosses to favour business as usual to the detriment of workers’ right to safety at work. The capitalists have not changed course, and their profits have weighed more heavily than their employees’ right to life and safety.

In the face of the cold drop, this abnormal normality meant that employees remained locked up in their workplaces or at the wheel of their vehicles as the flood advanced in rapid and deadly waves, the civil protection alarm having sounded on mobile phones at 8.15pm, after the end of the working day for a large part of the population and two hours after the first overflows, which led to the blocking of the roads by hundreds of cars, which even today hinders access to the most affected populations. The public administration did not behave any better with respect to its agents who were not essential to deal with the cold drop (administration, teachers, health, and civil servants). The red alert that the government ignored meant that pupils went to school as normal, and schools and nurseries were not closed as a precautionary measure.

While extreme weather events cannot be avoided, their devastating effects can be mitigated by predicting and monitoring their development, drawing up emergency plans and actions, and providing sufficient human and material resources. An example that shows that the impact of the cold drop would have been much less if it had not been poorly managed is that of the UV (Universitat de València) which, faced with the warnings issued by the AEMET on 28 October, decided to cancel teaching activities and later, on the 29th, when the alert changed to red, decided to cancel all activities, thus avoiding thousands of movements.

This insensitivity on the part of the business class and the government, which had tragic consequences, contrasts with the empathy and solidarity shown by the popular classes in coming to the aid of those affected by the cold drop, seeking solutions to their precarious situation, offering accommodation so that they could spend at least one night in the home of a supportive stranger and, sometimes, even risking their own lives to save that of a stranger.

The climate crisis and global warming, according to scientific data, are increasing the frequency and intensity of these extreme weather events, and the Mediterranean region is the most vulnerable. The Mazón government’s climate denial is at the root of the serious shortcomings in the response to the cold drop. Inaction and delay are motivated by an ideology that denies the climate crisis.

In the field of public health, we have seen the harmful effects on health of the denial propagated and financed by the tobacco industry. By sowing doubts about the harmful effects of tobacco, since ‘lung cancer existed naturally’, preventive measures have been delayed, and the industry, by sowing these doubts, has continued to profit from its activity. Climate denial is harmful because it prevents us from acting on the real risks and threats, as well as on the causes behind them.

The departure of the far right Vox party from the Valencian government has not changed the Partido Popular’s climate denialist practice one iota. The far right has also left its mark on the ‘Law of Concord’ and its school policy, which is hostile to the Valencian language and culture. The far right has determined the priorities, and what was agreed at the time with the Partido Popular is still in force, i.e. the trivialization of its discourse and its reactionary vision.

If climate denial is fuelling the regional government’s inaction, the neoliberal policy of cutting essential public services is weakening its capacity to respond to the cold drop. The rollback of the welfare state and the outsourcing and privatization of public services - services for everyone - are being complemented by tax cuts for the rich. These negationist and neo-liberal positions would justify the closure of the Valence emergency unit. This is an example of what not to do in these times of climate emergency.

This position, which denies that change is already here and that this decade is vital to meeting the challenge of degrowth with social justice and improved quality of life, calls for firm and energetic action against predatory capitalism that puts profits before people’s lives and the health of the planet.

Horta Sud-Valencia, Paiporta, Sedavi, Chiva, Utiel and so many other towns witnessed the arrival of a human tide of solidarity that helped in every way possible, offering shelter, food, companionship, cleaning, affection and respect for the grief that so many families still face.

Life lessons in critical times, and certainly a good lesson for when we return to normal: learning to transform this popular solidarity into a fight for a society of equals where life and care are above the profits of a few, and to implement plans for reconstruction distanced from a model of urban speculation that, since the 1960s of the last century, has spread to flood-prone and at-risk areas.

Let’s raise the tide in the face of adversity, to organize this solidarity and this impetus to defend life against the profit and selfishness of a powerful and dangerous minority.
It is important to continue efforts to develop popular power from below and to the left.
But once we have come to terms with our grief, with all due respect and solidarity for those affected, the time has come to call to account the government of Carlos Mazón for its criminal negligence in taking the necessary measures to reduce the impact of the cold drop, and for having left so many people in need of help and terrified, and for so many deaths.

That is why we support the call for a demonstration on 9 November in Valencia to demand Mazón’s resignation for criminal negligence. Someone who has failed to defend the lives and safety of so many Valencians cannot remain as head of state.

2 November 2024

Translated by International Viewpoint from Viento Sur.

GERMANY

Die Linke Can’t Just Rely on Middle-Class Progressives
November 6, 2024
Source: Jacobin




A new study explains an uncomfortable truth for Germany’s Die Linke: the left-wing party’s base is today highly educated and middle-income. While the party’s new leadership promises to rebuild working-class roots, it won’t be easy.

Germany’s left-wing party Die Linke is in decline, and many members understand that fundamental change is needed if it is even going to survive. Its weakness was brought into sharp relief during the 2021 elections, when it suffered a catastrophic defeat, falling under 5 percent support. If it weren’t for a few victories in local contests, Die Linke would have fallen out of the federal parliament, the Bundestag.

Since then, a number of analyses have been published by exponents of Die Linke’s various currents. In his contribution to this debate for the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation — Die Linke’s think tank — Carsten Braband shows that the Left’s electorate hasn’t just shrunk, but has also moved decidedly into the middle class.

Die Linke’s defeats aren’t just due to unfavorable circumstances, but also the result of its own strategic orientation. By pointing out these facts, Braband is busting two of the myths that hinder efforts to rebuild the party.
Facts, Not Vibes

At the recent party conference in Halle, mentions of “class,” “class politics,” and “class perspective” earned roaring applause. But among the party intelligentsia, the question of whether Die Linke is still rooted in “class” is a hotly debated topic. This is at root an empirical question, so it’s surprising that there is such a slew of different answers. On closer inspection, it becomes clear that this controversy is in large part due to a reliance on different datasets, but also because the different sides of this debate use very different conceptual frameworks.

Last year, one such party intellectual, Mario Candeias, prominently denied that Die Linke had lost its working-class base. He found that most people among the party’s potential electorate — those who say that they would consider casting their vote for Die Linke — identified as Angestellte (white-collar employees), rather than as workers. But this identification doesn’t reflect objective facts.

That people don’t identify as workers can be seen as an expression of the reality that most don’t see the world through Marxist categories. White-collar employees also aren’t a class in the sense of a group with objective interests in a relationship of exploitation. We might doubt how much claims about the relative weight of different groups within Die Linke’s potential electorate tell us about its absolute decline across different segments of society.

Braband takes a different approach in his paper. Instead of analyzing Die Linke’s electoral potential, he looks at its election results since 2009. He divides the electorate into a working class and a middle class, as well as into different occupational categories inside these classes: the working class is made up of manufacturing workers, service workers, and office workers, the middle class of “sociocultural semi-experts,” “sociocultural experts,” “technical (semi-)experts” as well as middle and upper management.

His findings are dramatic. In 2009, around 20 percent of manufacturing workers still cast their vote for Die Linke. In 2021, a mere 4 percent remained. Among service workers, the party’s share of the vote saw a massive decline of 12 percentage points. In contrast, Die Linke still made inroads with middle-class voters in 2017, despite stagnant election results overall. Among “sociocultural experts” they still made gains in 2021.

Because of its losses among working-class voters, says Braband, Die Linke’s electorate is more academic today than at any point in the past. What is also noticeable is that the party’s shrinking electorate is shifting more and more toward middle incomes. Between 2009 and 2021, Die Linke suffered its biggest losses in the lowest quartile of the income distribution.
What Goes Around Comes Around

These developments are a damning indictment of a socialist political party and have been downplayed within Die Linke. The insight that they made serious mistakes does not seem to have made its way to those that have been responsible for the party’s strategy in the past. Braband’s study now shows that certain positions Die Linke has taken have contributed to its defeats.

He identifies winning and losing positions among potential Die Linke voters in several policy areas as well as electoral trade-offs — positions that attract certain groups of voters but are off-putting to others. In terms of social policy, among potential Die Linke voters, as well as in the entire German electorate, there is broad support for substantially raising the minimum wage, for price controls on rent, electricity, and basic foodstuffs, and for raising taxes on the rich. No losing positions could be identified among Die Linke’s social-policy demands: only the blanket raising of unemployment benefits is a potential trade-off.

In contrast, positions supportive of immigration are largely met with rejection. Die Linke’s actual voters are much more open to making migrating to Germany easier than are voters in the party’s potential electorate. This indicates that its positions on migration policy are a reason why some potential voters end up not choosing Die Linke.

On the question of arms shipments to Ukraine, Die Linke’s electorate as well as potential voters are divided. But the data clearly shows that a majority of Green Party voters support such arms shipments, while a majority of people who vote for former Die Linke politician Sahra Wagenknecht’s new party are against them.

That means there’s a clear electoral trade-off here as well. Yet current nonvoters are split on further weapons deliveries as well. What’s also interesting is that Die Linke’s electorate is by far the most critical of increased military spending. On this question, there is a large gap between the party itself and its potential voters, likely making its current stance a losing position.

In the debate on the study, the focus was understandably on the strategic implications of its findings, but some of the most common interpretations are in fact somewhat far-fetched. The left-wing paper ND, for example, claimed that Braband is suggesting that Die Linke should seek “partial concessions to the Right.” But what the study delivers, first and foremost, is empirical knowledge. The strategic implications of Braband’s study are themselves dependent on values, and the goals that Die Linke wants to pursue.
Don’t Get “Triggered”

One of the central findings of the book Triggerpunkte (lit. “trigger points” as in a PTSD trigger) by Steffen Mau, Thomas Lux, and Linus Westheuser, which received a lot of attention in German left discourse over the last year and to which Braband refers to at several points in his study, is that, contrary to a common claim, society is not getting more polarized. There is, in fact, a broad social consensus on many questions. Only certain “triggering” issues are sources of strong conflict. It is not unthinkable for Die Linke to avoid precisely these issues in its political communication, without making substantive concessions.

In the eyes of many leftists, rhetorically de-emphasizing issues like migration already means compromising your position, because they see the current rise of the far right and backsliding on the rights of asylum seekers primarily as discursive phenomena. If instead, you see them as a form of “punching down,” with causes on a more material level, a strategic focus on class interests could be a way to politically disarm the country’s lurch to the Right. In the past, many people have voted for Die Linke even while assessing themselves as being more conservative on migration than they perceived the party to be.

Above all, the existence of electoral trade-offs means that if Die Linke wants to be successful again, it has to stray from its “all of the above” approach. If a potential turncoat voter from the Green Party, who is attracted by a poster with a pro-immigrant message is put off by one against weapons shipments at the next streetlight, and the reverse is true for a Wagenknecht sympathizer, the end result can only be a debacle at the polls. If Die Linke speaks to the material interests that unite the working class and avoids “trigger points” that divide it, this can be a way to halt the party’s decline.

The new party chairs of Die Linke, Ines Schwerdtner and Jan van Aken, seem to be aware of this. Both have come out in favor of a stronger political focus, which would center a small number of key economic demands. Political focus could also be a way to solve Die Linke’s much decried factional squabbling. In terms of labor, rents, and the welfare state, the party has always been fairly united. But this is easier said than done. As long as Die Linke has few roots in working-class neighborhoods and in workforces, it can only affect change through periodic interventions into political discourse. And those only get attention if they touch on precisely the “triggers” that they might better avoid.

Die Linke doesn’t just have to engage in politics for its class, but from within it. This will take years of patient work and a fundamentally different style of politics. Whether the party can manage that continues to be uncertain. But with the party conference at Halle, it has set out a turn in the right direction.