Norway Expels Russian Fishing Vessel for Security Reasons

Port of Batsfjord (Joachim Kohler / CC BY SA 4.0)

Published Dec 15, 2024 9:10 PM by The Maritime Executive

 

 

Norway has expelled a Russian fishing vessel that overstayed its welcome at the Port of Batsfjord. The decision was made in a King-in-Council meeting held on December 6, and lawmakers cited security reasons.

The 39-meter-long vessel Azurit has been moored in Batsfjord since May, but the reasons for its prolonged stay are unknown. But some media reports indicate that a Norwegian firm, Indistrikulde AS, had done repair works on the vessel at a cost of $96,000. The amount was yet to be cleared, leading the vessel to be detained. The government has however instructed that no public or private claim should hinder the vessel from leaving the port.

Azurit is registered to the Russian company Oceanprom, with St. Petersburg as its home port.

“The captain/shipowner is ordered to ensure that the vessel Azurit has left the Batsfjord Harbor within five business days after this decision is announced. If the vessel will not have left the harbor within the issued deadline, Norwegian authorities are ordered to tow it out to sea,” said a statement from the Norwegian government.

However, ship tracking sites show that Azurit is yet to depart from Batsfjord as of Saturday morning. The Norwegian newspaper Barents Observer reported that the captain of Azurit was notified of the expulsion order on December 9. On this basis, the Finnmark county Deputy Chief of Police, Trond Nilsen, said that the count for the five days’ grace period started when the captain was notified.

“So, from Saturday the 14th, we have the authority to take the needed action,” Nilsen told the Barents Observer.

In October 2022, Norway limited Russian fishing vessels to just three of its ports - Kirkenes, Batsfjord and Tromsø. This was part of Norway’s economic sanctions against Russia for invading Ukraine. In July, Norway further introduced tougher regulations on Russian fishing vessels landing catch in the three ports. The new regulations included time limits, with Russian vessels allowed a maximum of five working days at any port. In addition, the vessels would face increased scrutiny from the customs, the police and the Armed Forces. Specifically, Norway said it would increase police activity in the port of Batsfjord, and ensure the customs service and the police share information more closely.

Norway and Russia jointly manage the rich fish resources of the Barents Sea, with Båtsfjord as a key landing port. 

Top image: Port of Batsfjord (Joachim Kohler / CC BY SA 4.0)

Russia's Shadow Fleet Tankers Could Get Naval Escorts

File image courtesy Russian MOD

Published Dec 18, 2024 9:40 PM by The Maritime Executive

 

Days after six NATO members agreed to start checking the insurance paperwork of Russia's "shadow fleet" of tankers, Denmark's military intelligence service warned that Russia may begin dispatching naval escorts to follow along with these high-risk vessels. 

Since the G7 "price cap" restriction on Russian oil shipping took effect in late 2022, Russia has built up a fleet of anonymously-owned, questionably-regulated tankers, thereby minimizing exposure to Western restrictions on its oil exports. As these gray-market ships cannot obtain cover from the well-capitalized insurance markets in Europe, coastal states in the Baltic - like Denmark - are uncertain whether the shipowners would be able to pay claims in the event of a major spill. The risk of pollution is amplified by the shadow fleet's high average age, uncertain management and tendency to avoid pilotage.  

On Monday, six NATO nations with coastlines along Russia's Baltic and North Sea oil shipment route - the UK, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Poland and Estonia - agreed to ask shadow fleet tankers for proof of insurance at key transit points, Estonian Prime Minister Kristen Michal announced Tuesday. If the tankers do not answer the request, the non-response "will be assessed and addressed in coordination with our international partners," he said. 

On Wednesday, the Danish Defense Intelligence Service cautioned that rising tensions in the Baltic could prompt Russia to assign naval escorts to its controversial tanker fleet, further increasing friction between NATO and Russian forces. Other likely Russian actions in the Baltic Sea could include more GPS jamming - already a serious issue - and other electronic warfare activity. 

"We may also see Russia appear more threatening to Denmark and other NATO countries' military aircraft and ships. This entails a risk of misunderstandings and minor collisions between boats in the Baltic Sea," the agency warned. 

That risk may also extend to the Arctic, an area of increasing strategic importance. "Russia will demonstrate strength in the region through aggressive and threatening behavior, which will entail a greater risk of escalation than previously seen in the Arctic," warned the Danish Defense Intelligence Service.

 

Mauritius' New Government Rejects Diego Garcia Deal

The U.S. naval base and airfield at UK-administered Diego Garcia (NASA)

Published Dec 18, 2024 11:48 PM by The Maritime Executive

 

 

The UK Government’s chief negotiator, Jonathan Powell, made an emergency trip to Mauritius last week in an attempt to salvage the draft deal to surrender sovereignty of the Chagos Islands to Mauritius. The incoming and newly-elected government of Mauritius had rejected the draft agreement, which it inherited from the previous government of Pravind Jugnauth. Incoming Mauritian Prime Minister Navinchandra Ramgoolamed described the draft deal as having failed to deliver ‘the benefits that the nation could expect from such an agreement’. On his visit, Jonathan Powell submitted an updated proposal, which the Mauritian government is now considering, and which potentially could increase the amount of money offered to Mauritius. Press speculation in the United Kingdom is that the deal may now be dead.

Since the surprise revelation in September that negotiations for a deal had been re-opened and a draft agreement reached, opposition to the deal in the United Kingdom has hardened. Critics of the deal suggest that it will provide a back door to Chinese interference with the U.S. naval base at Diego Garcia, and have claimed that opposition to continued British sovereignty in the United Nations General Assembly had been orchestrated by the Russians and Chinese to suit their interests. 

There were also concerns that the Chagos Islanders were losing their British citizenship and being transferred to Mauritius without having been consulted, leading for calls amongst Chagos Islanders for a referendum on the matter - similar to those that have taken place amongst Falkland Islanders and Gibraltarians. Islanders are also pressing to be allowed to reoccupy one of the outer islands in the Chagos Archipelago, and have sought to remain British citizens, fearing discriminatory treatment by the Mauritian authorities.

The United Kingdom has owned Diego Garcia within the Chagos Archipelago since 1814, and had hitherto rebuffed attempts by Mauritius to assert that the archipelago should have been transferred to Mauritius when it gained independence from Britain in 1968. The United Kingdom has leased the island of Diego Garcia to the United States for its exclusive use as a military base since 1966. The lease runs without break clause until 2036, with a renewal option thereafter.

The United States maintains a secure major airfield on Diego Garcia, as well as a naval support base that can host a full range of naval vessels from nuclear submarines to aircraft carriers. The protected lagoon is used as an anchorage for ships of MPS Ships Squadron Two, a strategic logistic reserve kept afloat and ready for use by US Marines and the US Army in the Middle East region should the need arise. At such times, the airfield becomes a key base for long-range strike and reconnaissance aircraft.  

Press reports suggest that the incoming Trump administration is opposed to the draft deal, and there is speculation that the British government will attempt to force an agreement through on revised terms before the presidential inauguration on January 20.

 

Video: Indian Navy Response Boat Hits Ferry, Killing 13

The Indian Navy response boat approaching the ferry at high speed (Indian social media)

Published Dec 18, 2024 5:13 PM by The Maritime Executive

 

On Wednesday, an Indian Navy fast response boat hit a ferry off the coast of Mumbai, killing 13 people. A massive search effort continued into Wednesday night to determine if there were any additional survivors. 

Navy officials told Indian media that the response boat was out on speed trials after undergoing an engine replacement. At about 1830 hours, a malfunction caused the engine to get stuck on full throttle, creating a runaway disaster. The crew attempted unsuccessfully to maneuver, then struck the ferry. 

A bystander video taken by passengers on the ferry shows the navy launch's final moments. It made a gentle S-turn away from the ferry, then turned around on an intercept course, maintaining high speed. The operator made several alternating course corrections to port and starboard before colliding. The ferry subsequently sank.

At the time of the collision, the ferry was underway to Elephanta Island off the coast of Mumbai, a popular pilgrimage site that houses a complex of ancient temples. There were roughly 110 people on board the vessel; 13 people died in the collision and the aftermath, including one Indian Navy sailor and two OEM contractors who had been aboard the response boat. 101 people were rescued, including four who were hospitalized in critical condition. After the initial response, 11 rescue boats and six helicopters remained operating in the area for signs of further survivors. 

India's government is offering families of the deceased a condolence payment of two lakh rupees ($2,350) each. 

How to interpret Russian general’s assassination in the heart of Moscow

Igor Kirillov, the head of the Russian army’s nuclear, chemical and biological operations, was accused by Kiev of using dirty weapons against Ukrainian populations.

MURAT SOFUOGLU
TRT/AA

19/12/2024

Maj. Gen. Igor Kirillov, the chief of the Russian military's radiation, chemical and biological protection unit, attends a briefing in Kubinka Patriot park outside Moscow, June 22, 2018.


Kiev claimed responsibility for the assassination of Igor Kirillov, a top Russian general, who is the most senior military officer killed by Ukraine in the course of the ongoing war between the two Orthodox Slavic-majority nations.


Kirillov, who oversaw the Russian military’s radiological, chemical and biological department, previously accused the US and its allies of running dangerous labs as “a front for illegal military and biological research” in Ukrainian territory.


The Krillov assassination in the heart of Moscow several kilometres away from the Kremlin has sent shockwaves across Russian elite circles, suggesting that even Moscovites might not be safe from the killing sprees stemming from the Ukraine war. His assistant Ilya Polikarpov was also killed in the attack.


“The assassination in Moscow can be interpreted in several ways. One such interpretation is that Ukraine's ‘allies’ have realised that the regime change they seek in Moscow can only be achieved from within through ‘decapitation’ - of critical human security infrastructure - among other hybrid actions/active measures,” says Ecaterina Matoi, a scholar at the Middle East Political and Economic Institute (MEPEI).


Ukraine claims to kill as many as 19 Russian generals, but Russia disputes Kiev’s death toll of its generals. Overall, military analysts assess that even losing several generals in combat is a big deal for a military force and Russia has lost at least eight generals up to date, according to Western sources.


Kirillov's killing means that “the Ukrainian special services have a very extensive surveillance network within Russia. They are able to target top Russian military and government officials at their private residences. Russian military leaders are not safe in the rear areas of this conflict,” says Keith Darden, a professor of politics, governance and economics at American University.


Kirillov was killed a day after a Ukrainian court indicted him in absentia for being instrumental in Russia’s use of banned chemical weapons against Ukrainians. Kiev threatened more killings after the Kirillov assassination.


A person walks past an apartment block in Moscow, Russia, Wednesday, Dec. 18, 2024, where a bomb killed Lt. Gen. Igor Kirillov, head of Russia's Radiation, Biological and Chemical Defense Forces and his assistant, Ilya Polikarpov.

 Photo/Dmitry Serebryakov


Spreading ‘terror’


“Obviously, one of the adjacent objectives is to spread terror among those Russian officials (military or otherwise) who know they may be next on an alleged assassination list,” Matoi tells TRT World, adding that the Moscow attack sends a message that “key Russian military generals are not safe anywhere.”


The Ukrainian killing of Kirillov is definitely “an escalation” in the Ukraine war, says Sergei Markov, a Russian political scientist, who advised President Vladimir Putin in the past, The “terrorist attack” on Kirillov can trigger Russia to target Ukrainian military and political leaders, according to Markov.


“We can see a big demand in Moscow now,” Markov tells TRT World, referring to harsh statements coming from Dmitry Medvedev, the deputy chairman of the Russian Security Council and a Putin ally, who said that “everything must be done to destroy the perpetrators who are in Kiev.”


But Matoi expects a more measured response from Russia, which will strike Ukraine harder after the recent killing as Moscow will tighten security in sensitive areas for the state, increasing security measures across border areas, particularly, regions bordering Central Asian states.


According to Russian authorities, one of the suspects of the recent attack is from Uzbekistan, a Central Asian state, which was a former Soviet republic. The 29-year-old suspect was detained by Russia.


Despite Kiev’s attack near the Kremlin, Harden, who focuses on nationalism, state-building, and the politics of Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia, doubts that Moscow will escalate the war at this point as it is making progress on the battlefield in the Donbass.


Lionel Ingram, an expert on the Russian political system and a lecturer at University of New Hampshire, offered an assessment similar to Harden’s. “Russia has other serious issues at the moment that will deflect any focus on a response to this killing. They have not reacted strongly to other such events. Better, just replace the general and increase security,” Ingram tells TRT World.


Matoi also draws attention to the fact that the key Russian general’s killing happened a very short time after the fall of Syrian regime leader Bashar al Assad, an ally of Moscow, whose demise has been seen as a sign of diminishing influence of the Kremlin in the Middle East and elsewhere. Ukrainians helped opposition forces topple Assad, according to reports.

“It may have something to do with spreading or accentuating a feeling of insecurity, not only at the leadership level but also among the military fighting on the Ukrainian front, damaging their morale and inducing a feeling of mistrust among the population in the state's ability to provide the security,” she says, referring to possible ties between Assad’s fall and the Kirillov killing.


Why targeting Kirillov


Kirillov had been known for his statements on US-led biological labs in Ukrainian territories, accusing American Democratic lawmakers of funding bioweapon activities.


During a 2022 speech, Kirillov claimed that Metabiota, one of the key Pentagon contractors receiving support from Hunter Biden’s Rosemont Seneca Technology Partners, which is an investment fund, involved raising money for biolab projects in Ukraine. The UK and US media confirmed this account based on obtained emails. Hunter Biden is the son of the US president.


Kirillov was “an active speaker and agonizer of investigations about secret illegal American biological and chemical laboratories” for the creation of weaponry related to those labs in Ukrainian territories, says Markov. “That’s why Americans hit General Krillov,” says Markov, adding that a lot of people in Russia believe the assassination order was given by the US.


The US media labels accusations against Hunter Biden and the existence of US laboratories in Ukraine as conspiracy theories.


Harden suspects that Kirillov was targeted by the Ukrainians “in order to elicit a significant response from Russia” because Kiev “seems eager to have the war escalate” to gain greater US and European involvement for its war effort.


“Ukraine is taking more provocative and bolder actions now while Biden is still in office. The hope seems to be that if escalation takes place while Biden is in office, Trump will have his hands tied and not be able to withdraw US support for Ukraine,” Harden tells TRT World.


Ukrainian war killed more than 67,000 people in 2024, marking the deadliest period in the conflict.


According to Matoi, Kirillov’s professional training and his critical military position has made him a persona non grata for Kiev's "allies" beyond Western accusations against the Russian general’s use of chemical munitions against Ukrainians.


“General Kirillov is of great importance in the context of the conflict in Ukraine in the light of the accusations that have been and still are hanging over Kiev and its allies with regard to the existence of the biological laboratories on Ukrainian territory because he was consistently and with the utmost interest following the subject,” she says.


Putin under pressure


Increasing fatal attacks on influential individuals like Kirillov and Darya Dugina, a nationalist Russian journalist and the daughter of Alexandr Dugin, who is one of the leading political and intellectual elites of Moscow, has made many “angry”, according to Markov.


Russian society is “critical” of their leaders “including Putin” that Moscow has shown no powerful response to “such terrorist attacks”, he says.


The recent attack has also increased anti-immigrant sentiment in Russia since the alleged attacker hailed from Uzbekistan, according to Russia. He also says that the deadly Crocus City Hall concert hall attack in Russia's Moscow region was orchestrated by Tajik nationals in March.


All this can increase anger across Russia against migrants particularly from Central Asian countries, forcing Moscow to change its immigration policy, he adds.

SOURCE: TRT WORLD

Murat Sofuoglu is a staff writer at TRT World.
@Readingavenue

Morocco to vote on abolition of death penalty

December 12, 2024

by MEMO

A FAVORITE FLAG

Flag of Morocco [Kristin Harvey/Flickr]

Morocco is set to vote on the abolition of the death penalty for the first time, marking a milestone in the country’s human rights history. Justice Minister Abdellatif Ouahbi announced on 9 December that Morocco will support the UN resolution for a moratorium on the death penalty to be discussed at the UN General Assembly on 15 December.

“This is a commitment to protecting the right to life, in line with the Moroccan Constitution,” Ouahbi told Parliament, referencing Article 20 of the national document. The vote will introduce a two-year moratorium on executions, with plans to amend the penal code for permanent abolition.

The Moroccan Justice and Development Party (PJD) reaffirmed its position following an extraordinary leadership session on Tuesday and a communiqué issued yesterday. While acknowledging Morocco’s anticipated support for the UN resolution, the PJD stressed its principled stance on retaining the death penalty for the gravest crimes.

“We have reaffirmed our principled stance on maintaining the death penalty for the gravest crimes, such as premeditated murder and violations of the right to life, in line with the sanctions prescribed by the Holy Qur’an,” said the party.

The PJD argued further that the death penalty provides a “sense of justice” to victims’ families and serves as both a deterrent and a means of calming societal unrest.

Morocco has abstained from previous UN resolutions for over two decades. The country has not carried out an execution since 1993, although courts continue to sentence individuals to death, particularly for crimes like murder and terrorism. Currently, 88 people remain on death row, notes the New Arab.

Human rights activists see the decision as a significant step. The Moroccan Coalition for Human Rights stated: “We will continue our struggle until Morocco abolishes the death penalty from all civil and military laws.”

The National Human Rights Council reported that of Morocco’s 41 executions, 38 were politically motivated. Since 2020, 161 death sentences have been commuted to life imprisonment, reflecting Morocco’s gradual shift away from capital punishment.

Opinion

The most difficult question about stopping the war in Sudan

December 18, 2024 

by MEMO

A stuffed panda and a Sudanese flag are placed at a military checkpoint in Khartoum North on November 3, 2024.

 [AMAURY FALT-BROWN/AFP via Getty Images]

by Shafie Khader Saeed

Defining and understanding the nature of the civil war in Sudan which started on 15 April, 2023 is important if we are to develop the essence of the vision required for negotiating its end. Formulating this vision is at the core of the efforts of Sudanese civil society and political groupings.

Arguably the most important and most difficult question is related to the future of the Sudan Army and its leadership and the options available for its post-war role. The armed forces need to be reformed, and modernised, as do the police and security agencies in such a way that recognises and accepts their nationalism, professionalism and monopoly over the military’s regular role in Sudan, subject to democratic standards and under civilian supervision.

There is also a need to address this along with a decision on the future of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and other militias. The options possible need to be explored for them to accept the principle of Sudan having a single, professional army as above.

Of course, a ceasefire and an end to hostilities require both parties, the army and the RSF, to be at the negotiating table, in the Jeddah forum or any other agreed-upon format. This is not only for the purpose of discussing the mechanisms provided by regional and international experts for a ceasefire and redeployment of forces, but also for negotiations to be based on the national vision that includes answers to the difficult question I have referred to, and which are presented by Sudanese civil society and political groupings as a main project for a permanent ceasefire.

READ: RSF attacks main hospital in Sudan’s Al-Fasher, says health official

As for the future of the army and RSF, I believe it is necessary to begin by discussing the legal responsibility for the war as a crime against the country and its citizens. Those responsible for igniting it should be held to account, as should those guilty of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity, as well as other horrific violations of the laws of war.


A commission of inquiry should be established

With this in mind, a commission of inquiry should be established, possibly with local, national regional and international members examining the evidence of all that has taken place, including the massacres in Darfur, and then making recommendations for legal action, similar to what was done with the Serbian leaders in the Bosnian war. Any talk of amnesty or transitional justice must remain governed by international law, which stipulates justice for the victims and preventing impunity for war crimes. This process should be followed by discussions about the future role of the leaders of both the Sudanese Armed Forces and the RSF.

There are many options for the armed forces, ranging from an exit strategy to contributions to national solutions through the Defence and Security Council or National Security Council. This should be led by the head of the civilian authority, the Prime Minister, according to a law that defines its tasks and powers, including the preparation of national security policies and coordinating them in a way that serves the unity of Sudan and the safety and security of its sovereign territories. It would also supervise the integration and demobilisation processes and related steps agreed upon with the armed movements.

As noted above, this would plan and implement programmes to reform and modernise the Sudanese Armed Forces, as well as the police and security agencies, and secure their resources. I believe that there is no choice but to dissolve the RSF, though, disarm and demobilise its members and develop reintegration procedures for them below the leadership levels. These individuals can be absorbed by the armed and other regular forces, as well as civil service institutions in strict accordance with the law and the normal conditions for joining the state security forces and civil service. Comprehensive security arrangements should be put in place for other armed movements to govern their transition to civilian life, including allowing those who wish to become political organisations to do so.

As far as the investments and economic resources of the Sudanese Armed Forces and the RSF are concerned, they should be handed over to the civilian executive authority and invested in the reconstruction of what was destroyed by the war. Compensation can be paid from these resources to the victims of the war and those affected by it, and to develop and modernise the Sudanese Armed Forces, the police and security agencies.

These are just a few initial ideas which are open to discussion and development. There is no doubt that there are many other options that can be put on the table, but they must be presented with a genuine desire to find a way out of the incessant fighting which is damaging Sudan.

All involved must remember that accountability is important, especially for those guilty of war crimes.


No options come without a price to pay.

To sum up, the main goal of the process should be to reconcile the security and military sector with civil society and restore the lost trust between them. Also, it is not just a matter of dismantling and replacing, but rather developing and modernising the sector to keep pace with the concepts of civilian transformation.

Moreover, this cannot be done overnight. It requires a series of complex operations to be initiated during the transitional period, and its completion and the adoption of its results must be carried out by elected institutions. Reforms of the armed forces, police and security agencies have to be linked to the comprehensive reform of all other state institutions.

The decisions to be taken are not merely political, administrative or technical, and are not subject to political and media input. Rather, they should be based on internationally-agreed concepts and guided by successful experiences in other countries.

Finally, changes must be implemented from within the military and security institutions and their members, subject to the supervision of civilian institutions, including the government and the legislative council.

READ: Erdogan offers to mediate between UAE, Sudan

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.

COMPRADORS & QUISLINGS

Palestinian Authority proves loyalty to US, Israel by attacking Jenin

Tamara Nassar 

17 December 2024

ELECTRONIC INTAFADA

Palestinian Authority forces Jenin in the northern occupied West Bank on 16 December 2024. Mohammed NasserAPA images

The Palestinian Authority is demonstrating its value and proving loyalty to its Israeli and American masters through a deadly military operation in the northern occupied West Bank city of Jenin.

“The operation is a make or break moment for the Palestinian Authority,” one unnamed Palestinian official told Barak Ravid, an Israeli media figure with close ties to US and Israeli intelligence.

The deadly PA military operation in Jenin and its refugee camp, which is nearing a second week, is targeted at armed Palestinian resistance in the area which emerged to counter Israeli encroachment and land grabs.

PA leader Mahmoud Abbas launched the operation “to send a message to the incoming [Donald] Trump administration that the Palestinian Authority is a reliable partner,” Ravid wrote for Axios.

The PA’s “actions seem to be driven by its desire to offer a ‘valuable gift’ to the incoming US administration and win the favor of President-elect Donald Trump, by suggesting that its military operation in Jenin is capable of ‘cutting off the head of the resistance,’” one analysis piece in the Lebanese newspaper Al-Akhbar read.

Whether the PA can be successful in actually making a dent in resistance capabilities or the will to carry on is a different story.

There is buzz in Israeli media about the fragility of the Palestinian Authority, with concerns that some members within its ranks may shift their loyalties. This is why the PA is attempting to demonstrate its capabilities in suppressing armed resistance in areas where Israel grants it nominal control.

Asked for more weapons

The PA is employing Israel-like tactics to achieve this.

Since the military operation began, PA forces have occupied the Jenin government hospital, cut off electricity and water to the camp, shot and killed two youths in addition to a member of the armed resistance, creating a state of fear and uncertainty in the camp.

Schools have been closed in the area, with students shifted to virtual learning. Jenin residents have observed a camp-wide strike for the fourth day in a row to protest the PA’s incursion.

UNRWA, the UN agency for Palestinian refugees, has been forced to suspend its operations in the area.

“Children remain out of school and camp residents are unable to access primary healthcare and other critical services,” Philippe Lazzarini, commissioner-general of UNRWA, said on Tuesday.

“For far too long, residents of Jenin and Jenin camp have been subject to a cycle of violence and destruction, rendering the camp nearly uninhabitable,” Lazzarini added, failing to mention that it was the Israeli military that subjected Jenin to widespread destruction and accelerated violence since Israel launched its genocide of Palestinians in Gaza in October 2023.

In September this year, Israel reportedly destroyed the vast majority of Jenin’s streets during a lethal multi-day raid of the city and its camp.

The PA operation is being carried out with full coordination with Israel, Hebrew media has reported. PA security chiefs even met with Michael R. Fenzel, a US lieutenant general who oversees so-called security ties between Israel and the Palestinians, ahead of the operation to go over planning details.

The PA officials handed Fenzel a detailed list of weaponry needed to intensify their offensive against Palestinians, Axios reported.

The US is now asking Israel to authorize the transfer of weapons to the PA, ensuring it can continue carrying out Israel’s dirty work.

Officials from the Joe Biden administration, including the US ambassador to Israel Jack Lew, requested that Israel approve “the urgent delivery of ammunition, helmets, bulletproof vests, radios, night vision equipment, explosive disposal suits and armored cars.”

Incoherent propaganda

Palestinian and US officials told Barak Ravid the operation was also launched “to try to prevent what happened in Syria from happening in the West Bank.”

One Palestinian official said that this was the “Syria effect. Abbas and his team were concerned that what happened in Aleppo and Damascus will inspire Palestinian Islamist group[s].”

This is, of course, incoherent with the Palestinian Authority’s other propaganda, which portrays armed Palestinian groups in the camps as part of an “Iranian-funded takeover,” as the unnamed Palestinian official told Ravid.

“The gunmen in Jenin are not resistance fighters, but mercenaries serving the dubious agenda of an outside party,” Anwar Rajab, the spokesperson of the PA “security” forces, said.

Rajab likened activities by the groups to “ISIS-style efforts,” highlighting this incoherence.

In reality, the resistance in the West Bank has existed as long as Israel’s military occupation has, and is a direct reaction to it. It is not motivated by external support.

This is a reality the PA understands and is undermined by, which is why the collaborationist body is willing to do everything in its power to prove its worth to its Israeli masters.

What is happening in Jenin?: The PA’s operation to crackdown on Palestinian resistance

The Palestinian Authority is in the midst of a deadly operation it says is to 'restore law and order' in the Jenin refugee camp, home to the Jenin Brigade. But as the PA seeks to assert its control, it could risks undermining itself in the process.

By Qassam Muaddi 

 December 17, 2024 
MONDOWEISS
Palestinian Authority (PA) security forces patrol Jenin in the Israeli-occupied West Bank on December 16, 2024. The northern West Bank city of Jenin has been the site of intense violence for several days after the PA, which coordinates security matters with Israel, had arrested several militants, prompting clashes with local armed resistance groups. (Photo by Mohammed Nasser/apaimages)


The Palestinian Authority continued its military operation in the Jenin refugee camp for the fourth consecutive day on Tuesday, clashing with local Palestinian resistance fighters. The operation, which was launched last Saturday, has so far left two Palestinians killed, a young boy and a fighter from the Jenin Brigade, the local resistance group in Jenin, who was wanted by Israeli forces. Several Palestinian security officers were also injured.

Tensions were building up between Jenin fighters and the Palestinian security forces since last week, when Jenin fighters stopped two Palestinian police vehicles and confiscated them, in protest of a wave of arrests of their members by Palestinian security forces. Palestinian security then sealed off the refugee camp, which led to an eruption of clashes between both sides.

The spokesperson of the Palestinian security forces, Anwar Rajab, said that the operation “aims at taking back the Jenin camp from elements outside of the law who have deprived citizens from their security and their right to access public services.” For his part, the spokesperson of the Jenin Brigade, who concealed his identity, told Al Jazeera that he and his men “are not outlaws, we are for implementation of the law, but where is the law when the Israeli army comes to arrest us?” adding that “the Palestinian Authority wants Jenin disarmed.”

“What does the occupation need to do so that the Palestinian Authority understands that it needs to direct its weapons to the occupation, rather than to its own people?” the spokesperson of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Mohammad Mousa said on Monday in a debate with the spokesperson of the Palestinian security forces Anwar Rajab on Al Jazeera. “The resistance fighters are the sons of the camp, defending themselves, their families, and their community, in the absence of anyone to defend them, and not once have they lifted a gun against their own people or against the Palestinian authority,” Mousa said.

“We will not allow Hamas and the Islamic Jihad to drag us into an all-out confrontation with Israel, which will lead to the destruction of our people,” replied Anwar Rajab. “Do you want us in [in the West Bank] to see the same fate as Gaza?” he went on. “We will not allow external forces to destroy our national project by targeting the West Bank through paid-off mercenaries, and our security forces will continue to chase down those mercenaries who receive suspicious support,” he said, to which Mousa replied by asking if “defending oneself and one’s country is a suspicious act?”

Contrary to Rajab’s statements characterizing the resistance fighters as “mercenaries” with “suspicious” means of support who have “deprived citizens” of their security, residents of the Jenin camp have historically been vocal in their support of the local armed resistance groups.

Although both positions have been confronting for years in the West Bank, it is the first time that the conflict has escalated to such a violent and explicit level. The Jenin Brigade was formed in late 2021 by a small group of militants from different political affiliations, as a result of repeated Israeli raids, especially after the capture of two of the six escapees from the Gilboa high-security Israeli prison in Jenin, in September of the same year. The Brigade grew in size and soon began to issue its statements as a branch of ‘Saraya Al-Quds’, or the Jerusalem Battalions, the armed wing of the Islamic Jihad.

The armed resistance model in Jenin resonated deeply with Palestinians in the West Bank, so much so that the same model was replicated in other northern West Bank cities, like Tulkarem, Tubas, and Nablus, where local brigades began to increase their armed confrontations against invading Israeli forces, which have grown in frequency and violence in recent years. In July 2022, Israel employed armed drones to strike Palestinian fighters in Jenin, in a first air strike in the West Bank in more than 20 years. Israeli raids included massive military bulldozers which destroyed the camp’s infrastructure, from water pipes, to electricity networks, to public monuments.

In an effort to combat the rise of these groups, the Palestinian Authority, which maintains security coordination with Israel, tried to persuade Palestinian fighters to give up their arms, in exchange for negotiating their amnesty with Israel and receiving sums of money and jobs in public service. Only a very small number of fighters took the offers, and the resistance groups grew in size and in experience.

On Sunday, Axios reported that the US asked Israel to allow military aid to the PA amidst its ongoing operation in Jenin. Both Arab and Israeli observers have considered the PA’s operation as an attempt to show its capacity to control the West Bank ahead of Trump’s coming into office, especially amidst Israeli reported preparations for “an extreme scenario” in the West Bank, which would include “the dismantlement of the PA and a wave of violence”, according to the Israeli daily ‘Israel Hayom’, quoting Israeli army sources.

According to other analysts, the PA acted after fears that Palestinian militants would draw inspiration from the collapse of the Syrian regime, and try to topple the PA. These speculations come despite the fact that Palestinian resistance groups have rarely initiated confrontation with PA forces, focusing their efforts primarily on confronting Israeli forces.
Analysis: How does the Jenin operation relate to Gaza?

The timing of the PA operation in Jenin can’t be dissociated from the reported advances in ceasefire talks in Gaza between Israel and Hamas, especially with reported pressure from Donald Trump to conclude a deal to free the Israeli captives in Gaza before his inauguration.

In the past few weeks, the PA has been holding talks with Hamas and the rest of Palestinian factions in Cairo, simultaneously to Hamas’s indirect talks with Israel to reach an agreement on the topic of administrating Gaza after the war. Both Hamas and Fatah, the ruling party of the PA, agreed on forming a technocratic, independent committee to receive and administrate reconstruction aid to Gaza, and oversee reconstruction efforts and daily affairs in the strip.

Meanwhile, PA president Mahmoud Abbas appointed the head of the Palestinian National Council, the highest representative body of the Palestinian people, as his successor to organize elections in case he might be out of the picture.

These steps are seemingly in line with repeated US demands to see “a revitalized Palestinian Authority,” in the midst of a complete absence of any real “peace” negotiations with Israel, which has largely affected the political legitimacy the PA, as Israel openly flaunts plans to annex the West Bank and vocalizes its blatant rejection of a Palestinian state.

On Sunday, Israeli sources reported that the heads of Israeli settlement councils in the West Bank presented a request to the Israeli cabinet before its weekly meeting, asking to implement the same model of action practiced by Israel in Gaza on the West Bank, particularly the forced displacement of refugee camps and large military operations against Palestinian resistance groups. Earlier last week, Israeli commentators on Israel’s channel 14 discussed publicly the possibility of implementing Gaza’s model in the West Bank, after seeing the images of Jenin fighters confiscating PA police vehicles.

With these developments, and in the midst of a loss of the PA’s political leverage, it seems that its leaders want at the same time to prove their capacity to control security in the Gaza Strip after the war, and in the West Bank in coming years under an annexation-friendly Trump administration.

The blindspot of the PA’s strategy, however, lies within internal Palestinian tensions, which will only rise as civilians in the West Bank – who are generally favorable towards armed resistance groups like the Jenin Brigade and unfavorable towards the PA – watch the confrontations play out in Jenin.

While the current show of force by the PA might buy it some time and relevance, it likely won’t give it back its the political strength it seeks, which it can only regain by supporting, both in word and action, a united Palestinian stand against Israel’s occupation and genocide. And in order to do that, it needs to have all Palestinians on its side – something that likely won’t be achieved with its current strategy in Jenin.

Why is PA cracking down on resistance groups in occupied West Bank?

The US wants Israel to help the PA clamp down on Palestinian resistance groups. But can the potential military aid help the Mahmoud Abbas-led administration stay relevant?

Kazim Alam
TRT/AA 

17/12/2024

There has been a schism within Palestinian politics since October 2023 over whether to continue to pursue conciliation with Israel or revert to resistance. / Photo: AA

The US prodding of Israel to help the Palestinian Authority (PA) crack down on Palestinian resistance groups is unlikely to succeed and could even lead to further weakening of the Mahmoud Abbas-led administration in the occupied West Bank, analysts have said.

In a private request, the Biden administration has asked Israel to lift the ban on US military aid to the PA since the October 7, 2023, Hamas raid that triggered Tel Aviv’s genocidal war on Gaza, which has killed over 45,000 people in just over a year.

The request by the US is meant to help PA security forces in their ongoing crackdown against the Jenin Brigades, a coalition of Palestinian groups engaged in resistance against Israel.

In the largest-ever operation being conducted by PA security forces in years, the administrative body is trying to regain control of Jenin and its refugee camp from members of Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades of Fatah, Al-Quds Brigades of Islamic Jihad and Qassam Brigades of Hamas.


The PA lost control of Gaza in 2006 when Hamas won the elections in the tiny enclave, now under Israeli siege.


Analysts, however, see the PA’s crackdown as a last-ditch attempt to stay relevant in the face of growing support for Hamas and other resistance groups, increasingly seen by Palestinians as the true representatives of their cause.


“If Israel has been incapable of preventing Palestinian resistance from regenerating itself for 75 years, then it would be really naive to assume that the current crackdown by the PA in Jenin is going to do that,” says Tahani Mustafa, senior analyst for Palestine at the International Crisis Group.


“The operation is not going to be sufficient enough to limit resistance. In one form or another, resistance will resurface,” she tells TRT World.


The PA forces have been clamping down on Jenin Brigades for many weeks, killing a commander and a 19-year-old cadre.


Quoting a Palestinian official, US publication Axios said the ongoing operation is a “make-or-break moment” for the PA.


Palestinians fighting in the Jenin camp accuse the PA of clamping down on resistance groups in the occupied West Bank at the behest of Israel.


The US wants Israel to approve the urgent delivery of ammunition, helmets, bulletproof vests, radios, night-vision equipment, explosive disposal suits and armoured cars to the PA.


The Palestinian security sector employs half of all civil servants, accounting for nearly $1 billion of the PA’s total budget, says Sami Al Arian, director of the Center for Islam and Global Affairs at Istanbul Sabahattin Zaim University.


The security sector alone receives around 30 percent of total international aid given to the Palestinians, including most of the funds coming from the US.


Palestinian women demonstrate against the PA security forces at the Jenin camp in the Israeli-occupied West Bank on December 17. Photo: Reuters


Why is Jenin important?


One of the 19 refugee camps in the occupied West Bank, the Jenin camp was established on the northernmost edge of the territory in 1953 to house Palestinians who fled their homes during the 1948 Palestine War.


With one of the highest rates of unemployment and poverty among all refugee camps in the occupied West Bank, the number of registered refugees in Jenin was 24,239 at the end of 2023.


Mustafa says Jenin has become the “epicentre” of the Palestinian struggle against Israeli occupation.


There has been a “huge schism within Palestinian politics” since October 2023 over whether to continue to pursue conciliation with Israel or revert to resistance, she notes.


“These two positions have become intractable since October 7, 2023. Eventually, they were going to come to a head, and that’s what we’re seeing today in Jenin,” she says, noting that the PA’s popularity has seen the “worst decline” in its history.


The result of that divide is that many Palestinians now consider Hamas their “de facto leader” as opposed to the PA, which is sticking to the politics of conciliation with Israel, she says.


“Hamas is the only one that is really advocating or fighting for Palestinians on the international stage or against Israel, especially given how much the situation has deteriorated not just in Gaza, but also in the (occupied) West Bank. There is a threat to the PA’s power base there,” she says.


According to Dr Ahmet Keser of Hasan Kalyoncu University, Hamas has been getting increasingly popular among Palestinians even after Israel’s full-blown war on Gaza following the October 7 cross-border attack.


Divisions within the Palestinian groups may tear apart the Palestine state-building effort though, he tells TRT World.


“Sporadic structures having little influence within the international community will weaken any possibility of achieving the objective of a sovereign Palestinian state,” he says.


Why is PA clamping down?


The coalition of resistance groups in the Jenin camp is united in their opposition to the PA. The resistance coalition includes even the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, the armed faction of the Fatah party that dominates the PA.


The Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades operates virtually independently from Fatah and cooperates with other resistance groups in the refugee camps in view of local considerations.


The resistance groups in Jenin consist of mostly “disenfranchised or disaffected Fatah youth”, which means the PA is losing its support base to groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad, says Mustafa.


“The PA is definitely feeling a threat to its hegemony,” she adds.


Another complicating factor is the disagreement over the so-called administrative committee in Gaza, an Egyptian-brokered proposal that seeks to bring Fatah and Hamas together for the purpose of managing the civil affairs after the end of Israel’s genocidal war.


But the PA retracted its approval of the deal amid Israel’s rejection of any role for Hamas in the future of Gaza.


PA President Mahmoud Abbas fears that all money will be diverted to Gaza – and away from the occupied West Bank, where the PA is the partial administrative authority – if Gaza gets a separate administrative committee, says Mustafa.


“Gaza will become the political centre of gravity coupled with the potential of Israeli full annexation of the West Bank,” she says.


US president-elect Donald Trump might allow for some form of ceasefire in Gaza in exchange for Israel’s annexation of the occupied West Bank, she says.


“That is a very real threat, which could signal the end of the PA.”


Dr Keser says the PA is trying to present itself as the sole and ultimate representative body of Palestinians by taking a clear-cut position against Hamas and other resistance groups controlling the Jenin camp.


But even if Israel distinguishes between the PA and Hamas for the time being to weaken the latter’s legitimacy and popularity, Tel Aviv’s long-term policy will remain the elimination of all Palestinian organisations, he says.

SOURCE: TRT World

Kazim Alam is a staff writer at TRT World.

OPINION

Amid ashes and blood, the Palestinian Authority carves its claim on Gaza

With the unprecedented destruction in Gaza, the Palestinian Authority sees an opportunity to position itself as central to the strip’s future — once again prioritizing its survival over the liberation of the Palestinian people.

By Bana Abu Zuluf and Ameed Faleh 

 December 16, 2024 3
MONDOWEISS

Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas chairs a meeting of the Palestinian leadership in West Bank City of Ramallah, on February 18. 2024. (Photo: Thaer Ganaim/APA Images)

Antonio Gramsci’s famous words—“The old world is dying, the new world is struggling to be born; now is the time of monsters”—capture the grim state of Palestinian politics today. Among Palestinians, one of the most glaring “monsters” is the Palestinian Authority (PA).

The PA’s legitimacy has steadily eroded, particularly under the leadership of Mahmoud Abbas, who has clung to power since his presidential mandate expired in 2009. Once touted as an interim administrative body, the PA now functions primarily as an arm of Israeli occupation, prioritizing its survival over the liberation of the Palestinian people.

Its role in the West Bank has become one of containment and counterinsurgency, a betrayal that fuels widespread anger among Palestinians. Now, with the unprecedented destruction in Gaza, the PA sees an opportunity to position itself as central to the strip’s future governance—but this is less a strategy for unity and more a desperate bid for relevance.

The PA’s decay

The erosion of the PA’s legitimacy has been a slow but steady process. In a 2023 poll by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, 62% of Palestinians called the PA a burden, while 68% said the Oslo process harmed Palestinian national interests. Corruption is rampant, with PA officials enriching themselves while ordinary Palestinians suffer. Much of its budget, funded by international donors, props up a bloated bureaucracy and security forces instead of addressing the needs of the people.

It is this international recognition of Palestine by countries such as Ireland, Norway, and Spain that lends the PA some semblance of legitimacy within the framework of the two-state solution. But this recognition rings hollow for many Palestinians, who see the PA’s reliance on donor funding as proof of its prioritization of foreign interests.

The PA’s so-called “security coordination” with Israel exemplifies this dependency. Presented as a measure to ensure stability, it has functioned as a mechanism to suppress Palestinian resistance. It targets dissidents and dismantles grassroots networks, leaving many to view the PA not as a representative of Palestinian aspirations, but as a collaborator in maintaining the occupation.

The West Bank offers a stark picture of the PA’s complicity. Its security forces regularly suppress protests, detain activists, and silence dissent, often violently. During Israel’s ongoing genocide in Gaza, the PA’s repression escalated further. According to the Committee for Political Prisoners, the PA had killed five Palestinians and arrested dozens more by the end of 2023. Just in the past week, the PA has launched a security campaign to uproot the resistance forces in Jenin. Dubbed “The Protection of the Homeland,” the campaign aims to “[restore] the camp from the grip of outlaws who disrupted the citizen’s daily life and deprived them of their right to access public services freely and securely.” Similarly, in 2008, the PA enacted a counterinsurgency campaign in Jenin titled “Smile and Hope” in order to neutralize the resistance under the guise of law and order.

These actions are justified by the PA as measures to maintain “law and order,” but in reality, they have emboldened Israel’s control over the West Bank. Rather than supporting the broader Palestinian struggle, the PA has entrenched the status quo.

Palestinian Authority (PA) security forces patrol Jenin in the Israel-occupied West Bank on December 16, 2024. For more than a week, the northern West Bank city of Jenin has seen intense violence, after the PA, which coordinates security matters with Israel, had attacked and arrested several Palestinian resistance fighters. (Photo: Mohammed Nasser/APA Images)

The Gaza gambit

The PA’s conduct in Gaza follows a long history of political opportunism. Since 2007, when Hamas took control of the strip, the PA has treated Gaza with disdain, cutting salaries, withholding essential services, and imposing punitive measures causing misery and immiseration. Now, in the aftermath of an Israeli onslaught, the PA is seizing the moment to reinsert itself into Gaza’s governance.

The strategy is not new. After the Second Intifada, the PA capitalized on international support for reconstruction by introducing donor-driven governance reforms and positioning itself as a stabilizing force. Figures like Salam Fayyad, hailed as technocrats, were promoted to satisfy international demands for “good governance.” Yet these efforts did little to address the underlying causes of Palestinian suffering: apartheid, settler colonization, and the lack of sovereignty.

A similar script is unfolding today, with Mohammad Mustafa’s appointment as prime minister. While the PA touts Mustafa’s technocratic credentials as a step toward revitalization, such moves primarily aim to reassure international stakeholders that the PA remains a viable partner for reconstruction and counterinsurgency.

The PA’s ambitions in Gaza are complicated by rival actors. Hamas remains a significant force, despite the devastation in the strip. It views the PA’s overtures as a veiled attempt to reassert control under the guise of reconstruction.

Adding to the complexity is Mohammad Dahlan, a former Fatah strongman backed by the UAE, who has positioned himself as a contender for influence in Gaza. Dahlan’s 2017 rapprochement with Hamas allowed him to channel Emirati aid into Gaza, boosting his popularity. Recently, he has positioned himself as an alternative to both Abbas and Hamas, branding Gaza’s future under the mantra of “No Abbas, No Hamas.” Dahlan’s UAE backing and ability to mobilize resources pose a threat to the PA’s plans for Gaza, while Hamas continues to resist both forces.

The Committee of Community Support

In the face of these challenges, the PA has turned to a new mechanism: the creation of a Committee of Community Support. This committee, formed in agreement with Hamas in order to establish the “political capital” necessary for a ceasefire in Gaza, is tasked with administering Gaza’s daily affairs—health, education, infrastructure, reconstruction, aid distribution, and border crossings—until elections or a governance framework is agreed upon.

This move reflects the PA’s attempt to establish itself as an indispensable actor in Gaza’s reconstruction. Yet, key issues remain unresolved, particularly concerning the role of Gaza’s security forces and the resistance factions. These omissions suggest the PA is testing the waters, with three potential scenarios in play:Regional Security Oversight: The PA may aim to establish a regional security force led by the UAE, as proposed by Israel, while sidelining Hamas through hidden agreements. Such a move could hint at a rapprochement between Abbas and Dahlan.
Monopoly on aid and reconstruction regime: By monopolizing aid and reconstruction, the PA might seek to weaken both Dahlan and Hamas, presenting itself as an indispensable partner for international donors. However, Gaza’s resistance factions and public opinion are unlikely to tolerate a PA-controlled security presence.
Bid for Political Clout: The committee could provide the PA with a much-needed boost in political relevance. By cooperating with Hamas on this limited basis, the PA may hope to quell internal dissent and present itself as a stabilizing force in Gaza’s reconstruction.

While these scenarios reflect the PA’s desperate bid for survival, its quest for legitimacy among Palestinians remains questionable.

What comes next?

Gramsci’s “time of monsters” is an apt metaphor for the PA’s current role. It is a creature of the Oslo era, sustained by the very forces that perpetuate Palestinian suffering. Its reliance on external actors, from donor nations to international recognition, ensures its survival even as it alienates the Palestinian people by acting as a proxy for Israeli security interests.

The stakes for the PA were best articulated by a Palestinian Authority official at the start of the aggression against Gaza, who stated that “this time, Israel must destroy Hamas, otherwise [the PA] is done.” It is through this logic of eliminating Hamas, while keeping the flimsy status quo afloat in the West Bank through coercion and coordination with Israel, that the Palestinian Authority is negotiating the terms of the “Gaza cake.” Attempting to sideline both Hamas and Dahlan while trying to win a faltering international legitimacy, has been the raison d’etre of the PA in the wake of October 7. Israel’s genocide, as such, strengthens the PA’s bargaining position in its negotiations with Hamas through the flattening of neighborhoods, assassinations of Gaza’s security forces, and the killing of the political and military leadership of the resistance.

Hamas, for its part, is aiming to have a say in the day after while recognizing that any post-ceasefire arrangement will differ from previous aggressions in Gaza. For Hamas, harm-reduction to both the people of Gaza and the autonomy of resistance remains a central issue to which it cannot give up.

Recent developments underscore this dynamic. Abbas’s appointment of Rouhi Fattouh as interim president in the event of his departure signals the PA’s focus on maintaining its structure rather than addressing its legitimacy crisis. This continuity may reassure international donors, but it does little to inspire confidence among Palestinians.

As Gaza’s future hangs in the balance, so does the broader trajectory of Palestinian politics. The PA’s attempts to assert itself in Gaza are unlikely to rebuild trust or address the root causes of the Palestinian struggle. Instead, they risk deepening divisions and perpetuating a system that prioritizes power over liberation.

The time of monsters cannot last forever. But whether the PA’s eventual collapse will pave the way for a unified resistance or new challenges remains uncertain. What is clear is that the Palestinian people are yearning for leadership that genuinely reflects their aspirations for freedom and justice—a leadership that is unlikely to emerge from the PA’s halls in Ramallah.