Evolution of fast-growing fish-eating herring in the Baltic Sea

Uppsala University

 

image: 

A comparison of the fast-growing fish-eating Baltic herring (Slåttersill in Swedish) and slow-growing plankton-eating spring- and autumn-spawning Baltic herring. Photo: Leif Andersson.

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Credit: Leif Andersson/Uppsala University

Atlantic and Baltic herring are typical plankton-eating fish of central importance for the northern Atlantic Ocean and Baltic Sea ecosystems. A new study published in Nature Communications led by scientists from Uppsala University (Sweden) documents the discovery of the evolution of genetically distinct, fish-eating herring in the Baltic Sea, a young water body that has only existed since the end of the last glaciation.

Atlantic and Baltic herring have a key role in the ecosystem, acting as a critical link between plankton production and other organisms, like predatory fish, sea birds, sea mammals, and humans. Previous research from the Uppsala group has documented that herring is subdivided into a number of ecotypes that show genetic adaptation related to, for instance, climate conditions, salinity, and preferred spawning season.

Larger than the common plankton-eating Baltic herring

Linnaeus, the founder of taxonomy and professor in Uppsala in the 18th century, defined the Baltic herring as a subspecies of the Atlantic herring adapted to the brackish water in the Baltic Sea. The Baltic herring is much smaller and has less fat than the Atlantic herring. The current project was initiated when the principal investigator was informed by a local fisherman at the coast northeast of Uppsala that there is a special type of herring “that always spawns just before midsummer and which is as big as the Atlantic herring,” thus much larger than the common plankton-eating Baltic herring.

“When I learned that the locals are aware of a specific population of very large Baltic herring that always spawns in the same area year after year, I decided to sample and explore their genetic constitution. Now we know that this is a genetically unique population that must have evolved over hundreds, if not thousands, of years in the Baltic Sea,” says Leif Andersson, Professor at the Department of Medical Biochemistry and Microbiology at Uppsala University, who led the study.

The researchers carried out a careful analysis of morphology, growth pattern, fat content, and presence of environmental pollutants. A striking finding was that the large herring exhibited damaged gill rakers. The plankton-eating Baltic herring uses the gill rakers to sieve plankton, while the observed gill damage in large herring likely reflects a switch to a fish diet, probably including the common stickleback, which has sharp spines for predation protection.

Another interesting finding was that the large herring had a significantly higher fat content and significantly reduced level of dioxin, a problematic chloro-organic pollutant in the Baltic Sea. Both these observations and the much faster growth rate are consistent with a switch to a fish diet. The relatively low dioxin content makes this fish-eating Baltic herring interesting for human consumption.

Two distinct subpopulations of fish-eating herring

After finding that the large fish-eating herring is genetically unique, the researchers decided to perform whole genome sequencing of the large herring together with previously collected large herring from different parts of the Baltic Sea. The stomach content of this second set of large herring showed that these individuals were feeding on small fish.

“Our genetic analysis demonstrates that there are at least two distinct subpopulations of fish-eating herring in the Baltic Sea; one occurs north of Stockholm, and the other occurs south of Stockholm,” says Jake Goodall, researcher at Uppsala University and first author on the publication.

One interesting question is why fish-eating herring have evolved in the Baltic Sea, when there is no evidence for such herring in the Atlantic Ocean. The Baltic Sea is a very young water body that has only existed for about 8,000 years, after the end of the last glaciation period. Only a limited number of marine fish have been able to colonise the brackish Baltic Sea, where salinity is in the range of 2-10‰ compared with about 35‰ in the Atlantic Ocean.

“We hypothesise that fish-eating Baltic herring have evolved due to a lack of competition from other predatory fish, for instance, mackerel and tuna, which do not occur where we find fish-eating herring. Thus, these herring take advantage of an underutilised food resource in the Baltic Sea,” says Leif Andersson.

Fast-growing, fish-eating herring caught off the coast northeast of Uppsala. Photo: Ulf Bergström

Credit

Ulf Bergström/SLU

Journal

Nature Communications

DOI

10.1038/s41467-024-55216-8 

Method of Research

Observational study

Subject of Research

Animals

Article Title

Evolution of fast-growing piscivorous herring in the young Baltic Sea

Article Publication Date

23-Dec-2024

MONOPOLY CAPITALI$M

Nissan, Honda announce merger, creating world’s third-largest carmaker

Plans, which include Mitsubishi, announced as Japan tries to gain foothold in electric vehicle market.

Nissan President Makoto Uchida and his counterpart at Honda, Toshihiro Mibe, hold a joint news conference on their merger plans, in Tokyo, Japan, on December 23, 2024 

[Kim Kyung-Hoon/Reuters]

Published On 23 Dec 2024


Japan’s Honda and Nissan are planning a merger, which would create the world’s third-largest carmaker as the industry pivots away from fossil fuels.

The company’s two presidents, Toshihiro Mibe of Honda and Makoto Uchida of Nissan, signed a memorandum of understanding on Monday, projecting the establishment of a holding company by August 2026, which could potentially position them third in the market after Toyota and Volkswagen.

Honda, currently Japan’s second-largest carmaker, is widely viewed as the only national partner able to rescue Nissan, which has struggled since former chairman Carlos Ghosn was arrested on charges of fraud and misuse of company assets in 2018.

Ghosn, who denied the charges and fled to Lebanon after being released on bail, derided the planned merger as a “desperate move” in a video call to reporters on Monday.

Nissan, valued at about $10bn, said in November it was slashing 9,000 jobs, or 6 percent of its global workforce, and reducing its global production capacity by 20 percent after reporting a quarterly loss of 9.3 billion yen ($60m).
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But the merger, which would also include smaller Nissan alliance member Mitsubishi Motors, could result in a behemoth worth more than $50bn based on the market capitalisation of all three automakers.

Honda’s Mibe said the company, currently valued at more than $40bn, would initially lead the new management of the merged entity.
Next gen

Carmakers in Japan have lagged behind their big rivals in electric vehicles and are trying to cut costs and make up for lost time.

The three companies, which announced in August that they would share components for electric vehicles (EVs) like batteries and jointly research software for autonomous driving, would make about 8 million vehicles.

In 2023, Honda made 4 million and Nissan produced 3.4 million. Mitsubishi Motors made just more than 1 million.

Sam Fiorani, vice president of AutoForecast Solutions, a global automotive forecaster, said Nissan’s experience building batteries, electric vehicles and gas-electric hybrid powertrains could help Honda develop its own EVs and next-gen hybrids.

The integration of the two storied Japanese brands would mark the biggest reshaping in the global auto industry since Fiat Chrysler Automobiles and PSA merged in 2021 to create Stellantis in a $52bn deal.

Source: Al Jazeera and news agencies

“Monopoly is the natural opposite of competition... but as soon as competition is necessary, it implies the idea of monopoly, since monopoly is, as it were, the seat of each competing individuality.”

Karl Marx. The Poverty of Philosophy, Chapter 2.3

Marxists Internet Archive

https://www.marxists.org › archive › marx › works › po...

WWIII

Philippines says it will acquire U.S. Typhon missile system, sparking warnings from China

December 23, 2024 

A Chinese Coast Guard ship with hull number 4203 is seen closely shadowing the convoy of Filipino fishing boats and a Philippine Coast Guard ship, on May 16, 2024, less 80 Nautical Miles from the island of Luzon, in the Philippines.

The Philippines said Monday it planned to acquire the U.S. Typhon missile system as part of a push to secure its maritime interests, sparking warnings from China of a regional "arms race."

The U.S. Army deployed the mid-range missile system in the northern Philippines earlier this year for annual joint military exercises with its longtime ally and decided to leave it there despite criticism by Beijing that it was destabilizing to Asia.

Philippine Army Chief Lieutenant-General Roy Galido told a news conference on Monday that the missile system would be "acquired because we see its feasibility and its functionality in our concept of archipelagic defense implementation."

"I'm happy to report to our fellow countrymen that your army is developing this capability for the interest of protecting our sovereignty," he said, adding that the total cost of the acquisition would depend on "economics."

The presence of the U.S. missile launcher had angered Beijing, whose navy and coast guard forces have engaged in escalating confrontations in recent months with the Philippines over disputed reefs and waters in the South China Sea.


Beijing claims almost the entire South China Sea, a key global shipping route, despite an international ruling that its assertion has no legal basis.

Manila and Washington, longstanding treaty allies, have deepened their defense cooperation since Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos took office in 2022 and began pushing back on Beijing's claims to the South China Sea.

The U.S. lays no claims in the South China Sea but has warned that it is obligated to defend the Philippines if its forces come under attack there, and has declared that freedom of navigation is among its core national interests.

And on Monday, China swiftly condemned the decision to acquire the system as a "provocative and dangerous move" and warned it risked triggering an "arms race."


"It is an extremely irresponsible choice for the history of its own people and the people of Southeast Asia, as well as for regional security," China's foreign ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning said Monday.

"The region needs peace and prosperity, not missiles and confrontation," she added, urging Manila to "correct its wrong practices as soon as possible."

As a rule, it takes at least two or more years for the Philippine military to acquire a new weapons system from the planning stage, Galido said Monday, adding it was not yet budgeted for 2025.

It took five years for Manila to take delivery of the BrahMos cruise missile last year, he added.

The land-based "mid-range capability" Typhon missile launcher, developed by Lockheed Martin for the U.S. Army, has a range of 300 miles, though a longer-range version is in development.

Galido said the Typhon system would enable the army to "project force" outwards up to 200 nautical miles, which is the limit of the archipelago nation's maritime entitlements under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

"You have to take note of the fact that at 200 nautical miles, there is no land there and the army cannot go there," he said.


The Typhon platform "will protect our floating assets," he said, a reference to ships of the Philippine navy and coast guard and other vessels.

Chinese Defence Minister Dong Jun warned in June that the Typhon deployment was "severely damaging regional security and stability."

But Galido dismissed the criticism of the Typhon system in the Philippines.

"We should not be bothered by others' seeming insecurities because we don't have any plans to go outside of our country's interests," he said

Kremlin denies media reports about Bashar al-Assad's wife seeking divorce

"No, they do not correspond to reality," Kremlin spokesman Peskov tells reporters on media reports about UK-born Asma, who reportedly wants to file for divorce from ousted Syrian regime leader Bashar al-Assad

Burc Eruygur |23.12.2024 - TRT/AA



ISTANBUL

The Kremlin on Monday denied media reports that the British-born wife of ousted Syrian regime leader Bashar al-Assad is seeking divorce and planning to leave Russia.

“No, they do not correspond to reality,” Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters in the Russian capital of Moscow in response to a question on the matter.

On Sunday, multiple media reports said that Asma al-Assad, who was born in the UK, wanted to file for divorce in Russia, where the couple has been granted asylum by President Vladimir Putin after anti-regime forces took control of the Syrian capital of Damascus on Dec. 8.

According to reports, Asma al-Assad has expressed "discontent" with her life in Moscow and intends to relocate to London.

Assad, who was Syria’s leader for nearly 25 years, fled to Russia after anti-regime groups took control of Damascus, ending the 61-year Baath Party regime, which had been in power since 1963.

Putin’s meeting with Slovak premier

Commenting on Putin’s talks with Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico in Moscow late Sunday, Peskov said the Russian president conveyed his vision of the situation in Ukraine.

“It was possible to exchange opinions on Ukrainian affairs. President Putin conveyed to his interlocutor his vision of the current situation on the battlefield,” Peskov said.

The spokesman added that Putin and Fico also talked about bilateral relations, which he said “suffered significantly due to the actions of the previous authorities of Slovakia.”

Peskov said the two leaders also talked about energy issues, describing the situation around the supply of Russian gas to Europe as a “very complicated situation” that requires further attention.

“You (reporters) heard the statement from the Ukrainian side, and you know about the position of those European countries that continue to buy Russian gas and that consider this necessary for the normal operation of their economies,” he added.

On Jan. 1, 2025, a contract on the transit of Russian gas to Europe via Ukraine will expire. Kyiv has voiced that it will not be renewing the contract when it expires at the end of the year.

VIDEO: Explosive eruption at Sakurajima Volcano in Japan

TEHRAN, Dec. 23 (MNA) – An explosive eruption at Sakurajima Volcano in Kagoshima, Japan, sent a volcanic ash column soaring 3,400 meters above the crater this morning.

Feminist Approaches to International Relations: ‘Good Girls’ Only?

Dominika Remžová
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Dec 22 2024 •

This content was originally written for an undergraduate or Master's program. It is published as part of our mission to showcase peer-leading papers written by students during their studies. This work can be used for background reading and research, but should not be cited as an expert source or used in place of scholarly articles/books.

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LONG READ

Feminist approaches to international politics have only been allowed into the discipline of International Relations as ‘good girls.’ Several scholars have made an argument along these lines, with Weber’s (1994) response to Keohane’s (1989) article on contributions by different feminist theories to the study of International Relations (IR) being one of the most cited positions on the issue. Keohane evaluates feminist standpoint as having the greatest potential for supplementing the mainstream (including, but not limited to, neorealist and neoliberal) IR in the short run (hence Weber’s categorisation of Keohane’s representation of this theory as a ‘good girl’), feminist empiricism as having a promise of supplementation in the long run (hence a ‘little girl’) and feminist post-modernism as having no such promise at all (hence a ‘bad girl’). Weber (1994:338) argues that Keohane ‘mutilates’ the feminist body of literature threatening to overflow the established boundaries of IR; the result being not just a partial representation, but a complete transformation, of the three theories. This can be seen in Keohane’s identification of standpoint feminism with his own project of neoliberal institutionalism, despite the former’s ontological and epistemological assumptions, as epitomised by Hartsock’s (1983) historical materialist strand of the theory, being contrary to the latter’s.

When it comes to my own position on the issue (i.e., the kind of feminist approaches that have been allowed into the discipline of IR), I see IR as consisting of multiple functionally and/or geographically defined sub-disciplines (hereafter referred to as ‘camps,’ a term coined by Sylvester in Zalewski 2008). Following from this multifaceted understanding of IR, I argue that both ‘good girls’ and ‘bad girls’ exist in IR (albeit my definition of these categories differs from Weber’s), with some ‘camps’ being dominated by ‘good girls’ (alongside other positivist approaches) and others by ‘bad girls’ (alongside other interpretivist, hereafter referred to as post-positivist, approaches).

I focus on the ‘camp’ of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), which I see as more representative of the scholarship and practice of IR (hereafter referred to as global IR) than other ‘camps.’ I use the term global IR as a descriptive term for the multitude of IR scholarships and practices in/from countries across the Global North and the Global South, which should not be confused with the normative project of ‘Global IR’ proposed by Acharya (2014). When it comes to feminism, I argue that the Foreign Policy Analysis and practice are dominated by ‘good girls’ in both the Global North and the Global South. Although this essay focuses on the ‘camp’ of FPA and feminist theories, the core/peripheral positions of ‘good girls’ and ‘bad girls’ within FPA can be seen as representative of all positivist and post-positivist approaches within not just the ‘camp’ itself but global IR.

In terms of structure, the main body of this essay consists of two sections. The first section focuses on IR scholarship, providing details about my own understanding of IR (including its ‘camps’ and theories) against the background of its disciplinary development. The second section focuses on the practice of IR in relation to the scholarship. Here, I use examples of (both explicit and implicit) feminist foreign policies (FFPs) to illustrate the predominance of ‘good girls’ in not just foreign policy scholarship but also practice.

‘Camps’ in International Relations



My understanding of IR has been informed by several developments that have occurred since the early debates between mainstream and feminist IR scholars (see the exchanges between Keohane 1989 and Weber 1994 or Tickner 1997 and Keohane 1998), which had tended to position all mainstream theories on the positivist end of the IR spectrum (conceptualised as materialist, universalist and problem-solving) and all feminist theories on the post-positivist end (conceptualised as idealist, particularistic and critical). One such development concerns the proliferation of post-colonial and decolonial approaches that have not only criticised the ethnocentric presuppositions within both mainstream and feminist theories, thus transcending the binary oppositions between the two but have expanded the boundaries of IR scholarship whilst becoming dominant in certain ‘camps’ of the discipline.

IR now consists of several ‘camps’ (including, but not limited to, International Political Economy, Foreign Policy Analysis, Security Studies, and Area Studies), all of which employ a variety of positivist and post-positivist theories, albeit some are more inclined to employ the former and others the latter. It may thus be more useful to think of IR theories as being at the core/periphery within individual ‘camps,’ although this is not to deny that positivist theories prevail across the ‘camps’ (i.e., in global IR). Indeed, my decision to focus on the ‘camp’ of FPA is due to its representativeness of global IR, which, despite the increasing proliferation of post-positivist theories within certain ‘camps’ (e.g., Area Studies), continues to be dominated by positivist approaches (and so does the ‘camp’ of FPA). In fact, the ‘camps’ that can be seen as dominated by post-positivist (including ‘bad girl’) theories, remain at the periphery of global IR (Kaczmarska and Ortmann 2021). Foreign policy practice, which is discussed in the second section of this essay, is further demonstrative of the continued power differentials (re. knowledge production and dissemination) between positivist and post-positivist approaches.

When it comes to my categorisation of feminist IR theories, I see some as positivist on both ontological and epistemological fronts (e.g., feminist empiricism and liberal feminism), some as such only in terms of their ontologies (e.g., strands of standpoint and decolonial feminism) and others as post-positivist on both fronts (e.g., post-modern and post-colonial feminism). I refer to all feminist theories that adopt positivist ontologies as ‘good girls’ and those that adopt post-positivist ontologies as ‘bad girls,’ making the category of ‘little girls’ redundant. The distinction I keep is that between post-colonial and decolonial approaches. The former approaches define normative positions of the Global North that, based on a temporal divide between ‘colonial’ and ‘post-colonial,’ imply the end of colonisation, whereas the latter refers to normative projects of the Global South that aim to decolonise the ‘post-colonial’ and challenge the Western-centric knowledge production (Hiraide 2021). Decolonial theories thus not only criticise post-colonial theories for reproducing the existing power relations but are closer to the early anti-colonial approaches that aimed to decolonise the ‘colonial.’

Based on this distinction, decolonial feminism can be seen as a sub-type of feminist standpoint and post-colonial feminism as that of feminist post-modernism. This is supported by Mohanty (2003:511), a prominent scholar from the Global South (although Mohanty herself avoids the use of binary categories such as the Global North and the Global South), who bases her decolonial approach on the historical materialist strand of standpoint feminism. Moreover, in her criticism of liberal feminism (re. its ethnocentrism) and post-colonial feminism (re. its cultural relativism), Mohanty associates the former with modernism (Mohanty 1988) and the latter with post-modernism (Mohanty 2003). She sees both as hegemonic discourses uncritical of the neoliberal project of the Global North, which her anti-capitalist stance based on the standpoint of women from the Global South aims to challenge (Mohanty 2003:514).



In the next section I discuss the predominance of liberal and decolonial feminist (i.e., ‘good girl’) approaches over post-colonial (i.e., ‘bad girl’) approaches in foreign policy practices (as well as scholarships) of countries in both the Global North and the Global South. I argue that post-positivist (i.e., idealist) ontologies of the ‘bad girls’ prevail only in specific circles of foreign policy scholars in/from the Global North, with scholars and policymakers in/from the Global South seeming to prefer positivist (i.e., materialist) ontologies of the ‘good girls,’ albeit these are different from those preferred by policymakers in/from the Global North.

‘Good Girls’ in Foreign Policy Analysis and Practice

Not only has the ‘camp’ of FPA remained largely unaffected by the post-positivist turn in Social Sciences (including specific ‘camps’ of IR), but the foreign policy practice itself continues being based on positivist approaches (Achilleos-Sarll 2018:35). This can be seen in the prevalence of strategies such as gender mainstreaming, gender balancing and gender budgeting in the implementation of FFPs that have been adopted by an increasing number of countries across the world as part of their Women, Peace, and Security agendas. These strategies are based on adding sex (deemed synonymous with gender) as a variable into the mix of foreign policymaking. The goal is gender equality within the constraints of the existing (i.e., neoliberal) power structures, which makes such strategies representative of liberal feminist approaches that treat women as a homogenous category of analysis identifiable prior to any process of analysis (Mohanty 1988:65). This is epitomised by Swedish FFP based on ‘3Rs’ of rights, representation, and resources; Sweden being the first country in the world to adopt (and since abolish) an explicitly feminist foreign policy (Achilleos-Sarll 2018:41).

In an attempt to extend the Swedish formula to all marginalised groups, Germany has based its FFP on a ‘3R+D’ framework of rights, representation, resources, and diversity. The German formula was proposed by the party of the Greens as part of their 2021 election platform advocating for an explicitly ‘post-colonial and anti-racist’ foreign policy and subsequently adopted by the current government as part of its coalition agreement (Assad and Tausendfreund 2022). The potential for a post-positivist (i.e., ‘bad girl’) FFP that could transform the existing power structures, however, failed to materialise. Not only did the final FFP guidelines (FFO 2023a) downgrade the intersectional aspects of the proposed framework, privileging sex/gender over sexuality, race, class, and other social categories (Brechenmacher 2023), but the policy remained anchored within the neoliberal logic of the existing international order. This has effectively prevented any discussion (let alone transformation) of the structural causes behind the discriminatory conditions (e.g., sexism, heterosexism, racism, and classism) feminism is (in an emancipatory sense emphasised by Hartsock 1998) meant to tackle.

Feminism of the German FFP was thus conceptualised, in a Keohanean (1989) sense, as being in servitude to the overarching goals of neoliberalism, and nowhere is this more obvious than in Germany’s relations with China, which, contrary to the rhetoric of the foreign minister Annalena Baerbock, continues prioritising economic interests of German carmakers over the human rights of Uyghur women. Here, it is important to note that the final FFP guidelines were influenced not only by neoliberal but also neorealist assumptions about the increasingly competitive and violent international system (hence labelled as the ‘right kind’ of FFP by Tausendfreund 2021), which only reinforces the positivist nature of German FFP.

Whilst there are several differences between Western and non-Western IR, the ‘camp’ of Foreign Policy Analysis and practice is dominated by positivist theories across all regions of global IR. This can be explained by several factors, including (but not limited to) what Behera (2007) describes as ‘disciplinary gate-keeping practices’ of Western IR that hold a Gramscian hegemony over knowledge production and dissemination within global IR; the assumption being that Western IR is dominated by positivist theories. Although India has not adopted an explicitly feminist foreign policy, scholars have highlighted several tenets of Indian foreign policy that could be categorised as feminist. Here, the word ‘feminist’ is deemed synonymous with the word ‘anti-colonial,’ a development that Jain and Chacko (2009) trace back to the shared ideals (such as that of self-determination) between the Non-Aligned Movement and women’s movements. Besides anti-colonialism, these tenets were also framed by a Nehruvian vision of a sovereign Indian state based on a Westphalian model of a modern, liberal nation-state (Behera 2007:354), which further confirms their positivist nature.

Not only did neither of the aforementioned countries (i.e., Sweden, Germany, and India) adopt a post-colonial FFP, but several scholars from the Global South have questioned the emancipatory potential (and thus desirability) of post-colonial FFPs as well as the intersectional approaches associated with them. On one hand, Mohanty (1988:79) criticises the totalising tendencies of liberal (equated with colonial) feminist approaches that emphasise commonality by creating a master narrative based on the image of Western women that subsumes images of ‘others,’ conceptualised in binary and hierarchical terms to the privileged referent, within it (i.e., an image of a marginalised non-Western woman as an ahistorical object becomes subsumed within that of a privileged Western woman as a subject of feminist counter-history). On the other hand, Mohanty (2003:520) also criticises post-colonial approaches, namely their emphasis on differences that prohibit any connections between cultures and thus a common basis for analysis. According to Mohanty (2003:522-523), the focus should not be on just describing the intersections of gender, sexuality, race, class, and other social categories, but on analysing ‘common differences’ (referred to as ‘relationality’ by Shohat 2001:1271) that can facilitate ‘feminist solidarity across borders’ (Mohanty 2003:503).

Further criticising the emancipatory limits of post-colonial intersectionality, Rivera Chávez (2022) refers to Mexico as the first country from the Global South to adopt an explicitly feminist foreign policy, when arguing that intersectionality has itself become a tool of neoliberal ideology that reproduces (rather than challenges) binary and hierarchical categories of difference. The suggestion is to reformulate FFPs in a decolonial (rather than post-colonial) manner (i.e., basing them on materialist ontologies as envisioned by Mohanty 2003:511), which further supports this essay’s argument about the ‘good girl’ nature of current FFPs. Some scholars, such as Narlikar (2022), go as far as advocating for what they term ‘inclusive’ (rather than feminist) foreign policies that would be neither ethnocentric nor culturally relativist, implying intersectionality based on decolonial (rather than liberal or post-colonial) approaches.

Concluding remarks

The purpose of this essay has been to answer what kind of feminist approaches have been allowed into the discipline of International Relations. Reconceptualising Weber’s categories of feminist approaches within a broad understanding of IR as a multifaced discipline consisting of several sub-disciplines (referred to as ‘camps’), this essay argues that both ‘good girls’ (reconceptualised as feminist approaches with positivist ontologies) and ‘bad girls’ (reconceptualised as feminist approaches with post-positivist ontologies) exist in IR, with some ‘camps’ dominated by the former and others by the latter. At the same time, the essay contends that both the scholarship and practice of IR as a whole (referred to as global IR) are dominated by ‘good girl’ (and other positivist) approaches, which has been demonstrated by the ‘camp’ of Foreign Policy Analysis selected due to its representativeness of global IR.

Particular attention has been paid to the criticism of post-colonial and post-modern (i.e., ‘bad girl’) feminist approaches, which have seen increasing proliferation within some ‘camps’ of IR scholarship in/from the Global North (e.g., Area Studies), by scholars in/from the Global South who seem to prefer decolonial and standpoint approaches, at least as far as foreign policies are concerned. Both decolonial and standpoint approaches have been reconceptualised (based on their materialist ontologies) as ‘good girls,’ which, added to the prevalence of liberal feminism (i.e., another ‘good girl’) in practice, supports the essay’s argument about the predominance of ‘good girls’ within but also outside the ‘camp’ of FPA.

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Further Reading on E-International Relations

Human vs. Feminist Security Approaches to Human Trafficking in the Mediterranean

Why Are Feminist Theorists in International Relations so Critical of UNSCR 1325?

The Limits of the Scientific Method in International Relations

Constraints On Rape As a Weapon of War: A Feminist and Post-Colonial Revision

Buy Good, Do Good, Be Good? Ethical Consumption as Neoliberal Governmentality

Is Nomothetic Knowledge Possible Within International Relations?

Characters in Disney’s ‘Moana’ use the stars just like real Polynesian explorers. An astronomer explains how

By — Christopher Palma, The Conversation

Science Dec 22, 2024 2:22 PM EST


If you have visited an island like one of the Hawaiian Islands, Tahiti or Easter Island, also known as Rapa Nui, you may have noticed how small these land masses appear against the vast Pacific Ocean. If you’re on Hawaii, the nearest island to you is more than 1,000 miles (1,600 kilometers) away, and the coast of the continental United States is more than 2,000 miles (3,200 kilometers) away. To say these islands are secluded is an understatement.

For me, watching the movie “Moana” in 2016 was eye-opening. I knew that Polynesian people traveled between a number of Pacific islands, but seeing Moana set sail on a canoe made me realize exactly how small those boats are compared with what must have seemed like an endless ocean. Yet our fictional hero went on this journey anyway, like the countless real-life Polynesian voyagers upon which she is based.



Islands in Polynesia can be thousands of miles apart. Photo via NASA.

As an astronomer, I have been teaching college students and visitors to our planetarium how to find stars in our sky for more than 20 years. As part of teaching appreciation for the beauty of the sky and the stars, I want to help people understand that if you know the stars well, you can never get lost.

WATCH: Māori poet Tayi Tibble draws on guidance of Polynesian ancestors in ‘Rangikura’

U.S. Navy veterans learned the stars in their navigation courses, and European cultures used the stars to navigate, but the techniques of Polynesian wayfinding shown in Moana brought these ideas to a very wide audience.

The movie Moana gave me a new hook – pun not intended – for my planetarium shows and lessons on how to locate objects in the night sky. With “Moana 2” out now, I am excited to see even more astronomy on the big screen and to figure out how I can build new lessons using the ideas in the movie.
The North Star

Have you ever found the North Star, Polaris, in your sky? I try to spot it every time I am out observing, and I teach visitors at my shows to use the “pointer stars” in the bowl of the Big Dipper to find it. These two stars in the Big Dipper point you directly to Polaris.

If you are facing Polaris, then you know you are facing north. Polaris is special because it is almost directly above Earth’s North Pole, and so everyone north of the equator can see it year-round in exactly the same spot in their sky.

READ MORE: Native Hawaiians gain more authority over future of sacred mountain, astronomy site

It’s a key star for navigation because if you measure its height above your horizon, that tells you how far you are north of Earth’s equator. For the large number of people who live near 40 degrees north of the equator, you will see Polaris about 40 degrees above your horizon.

If you live in northern Canada, Polaris will appear higher in your sky, and if you live closer to the equator, Polaris will appear closer to the horizon. The other stars and constellations come and go with the seasons, though, so what you see opposite Polaris in the sky will change every month.

Look for the Big Dipper to find the North Star, Polaris.

You can use all of the stars to navigate, but to do that you need to know where to find them on every night of the year and at every hour of the night. So, navigating with stars other than Polaris is more complicated to learn.
Maui’s fishhook

At the end of June, around 11 p.m., a bright red star might catch your eye if you look directly opposite from Polaris. This is the star Antares, and it is the brightest star in the constellation Scorpius, the Scorpion.

If you are a “Moana” fan like me and the others in my family, though, you may know this group of stars by a different name – Maui’s fishhook.

WATCH: Samoan Islands: Shifting Tides

 

If you are in the Northern Hemisphere, Scorpius may not fully appear above your horizon, but if you are on a Polynesian island, you should see all of the constellation rising in the southeast, hitting its highest point in the sky when it is due south, and setting in the southwest.

Astronomers and navigators can measure latitude using the height of the stars, which Maui and Moana did in the movie using their hands as measuring tools.

The easiest way to do this is to figure out how high Polaris is above your horizon. If you can’t see it at all, you must be south of the equator, but if you see Polaris 5 degrees (the width of three fingers at arm’s length) or 10 degrees above your horizon (the width of your full fist held at arm’s length), then you are 5 degrees or 10 degrees north of the equator.

The other stars, like those in Maui’s fishhook, will appear to rise, set and hit their highest point at different locations in the sky depending on where you are on the Earth.

Polynesian navigators memorized where these stars would appear in the sky from the different islands they sailed between, and so by looking for those stars in the sky at night, they could determine which direction to sail and for how long to travel across the ocean.

WATCH: 360 video: Visiting the ‘island of seabirds,’ an uninhabited remote wildlife refuge in American Samoa

Today, most people just pull out their phones and use the built-in GPS as a guide. Ever since “Moana” was in theaters, I see a completely different reaction to my planetarium talks about using the stars for navigation. By accurately showing how Polynesian navigators used the stars to sail across the ocean, Moana helps even those of us who have never sailed at night to understand the methods of celestial navigation.

The first “Moana” movie came out when my son was 3 years old, and he took an instant liking to the songs, the story and the scenery. There are many jokes about parents who dread having to watch a child’s favorite over and over again, but in my case, I fell in love with the movie too.

Since then, I have wanted to thank the storytellers who made this movie for being so careful to show the astronomy of navigation correctly. I also appreciated that they showed how Polynesian voyagers used the stars and other clues, such as ocean currents, to sail across the huge Pacific Ocean and land safely on a very small island thousands of miles from their home.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Common bacterium protects Brazilian city from dengue storm

ByDr. Tim Sandle
December 22, 2024
DIGITAL JOURNAL

Aedes aegypti, a common vector of dengue fever and yellow fever. Image by Muhammad Mahdi Karim. — GNU License, V1.2

With climate change acting as an accelerant fuelling dengue’s surge, new findings presented at the American Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene (ASTMH) Annual Meeting provide evidence that releasing mosquitoes (Aedes aegypti) carrying a common bacterium of the family Wolbachia offers a tool to fend off intense outbreaks of the viral disease.

The study was conducted by researchers from the World Mosquito Program and it found that in 2024, as Brazil battled its largest dengue outbreak on record, there was only a small rise in Niterói, a city of half a million people close to Rio de Janeiro.

The study credits the fact that five years ago, a partnership between the World Mosquito Program and Brazil’s Ministry of Health blanketed three-quarters of Niterói with mosquitoes infected with Wolbachia, a naturally occurring bacteria that has been shown to inhibit a mosquito’s ability to transmit dengue and other viruses.

Deployments into the remaining areas were completed in May 2023.

According to lead researcher Katie Anders: “We already saw infections essentially flatline in Niterói after the Wolbachia deployment, and while there was a small increase in 2024, the caseload was still 90 percent lower than before the deployment — and nothing like what was happening in the rest of Brazil.”

Anders adds: “The fact that Wolbachia has sustained itself in the mosquito population for years now and remained effective during a record year for dengue outbreaks shows that Wolbachia can provide long-term protection for communities against the increasingly frequent surges in dengue that we’re seeing globally.”

Anders explains that since Wolbachia has been rolled out across Niterói, dengue incidence has dropped to an average of 84 cases per 100,000 people per year, compared to an average rate of 913 cases per 100,000 people per year in the 10 years pre-Wolbachia.

The 1,736 dengue cases reported in Niterói from January to June 2024 represent a rate of 336 per 100,000 in 2024. This is compared to a rate of 3,121 nationwide and 1,816 in Rio de Janeiro state during the same period. Overall, in 2024, Brazil has recorded 9.6 million dengue cases — more than twice as many as in 2023 — and 5,300 dengue-related deaths.

Other trials spearheaded by the World Mosquito Program, including large-scale releases in urban areas of Colombia and Indonesia, have reported significant reductions in dengue. They also have shown that Wolbachia is safe for humans, animals and the surrounding environment. But Anders said the protective effect documented in Niterói stands out for occurring amid such an intense wave of disease.

Anders noted that the production facility in Brazil is a significant step because one the biggest barriers to using Wolbachia on a large scale is that it requires releasing a large number of infected mosquitoes to spread the bacteria into the local mosquito population.

 

Pictures from automatic camera provide first look at uncontacted Amazon community

By Stuff

8:56am Dec 23, 2024

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Pictures taken by an automatic camera have provided the world with the first look at an uncontacted Amazon community that is thought to be growing, despite pressure from agribusiness, miners, loggers and drug traffickers.

The pictures, taken in February, have been made public by Brazilian government agency the National Indigenous Peoples Foundation (Funai).

One picture shows a group of men from the community, referred to as the Massaco after the river that runs through the area where they live, collecting machetes and axes left behind by Funai agents.

READ MORE: Australia makes fewer and fewer coins. So what next for our Royal Mint?

This picture taken in February shows members of the isolated Amazon community, referred to as the Massaco people, collecting machetes and axes left behind by Brazilian government Funai agency. (Funai)

The cameras were placed at the spot where Funai leaves metal implements as gifts, with the aim of dissuading the community from venturing into logging camps or farms to get tools, The Guardian reported.

It was thought the number of people in the Massaco community has at least doubled since the early 1990s, to an estimated 200 to 250 people.

Previous indirect observation had revealed the Massaco hunted with three-metre long bows, and to move their villages around within the forest, depending on the season.

They discouraged outsiders by planting thousands of foot and tyre-piercing wooden spikes in the ground.

Massaco people deter visitors by leaving thousands of wooden spikes that can pierce feet and tyres in the ground. (Funai)

Population growth among isolated communities was a trend across the Amazon, after the implementing of government policies - started by Brazil in 1987 - of not initiating contact.

Video released earlier this year showed a rare glimpse of the world's largest uncontacted tribe emerging from the Peruvian Amazon.