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Sunday, April 28, 2024

 

Neocon Realists and Global Neoliberals Dead on Arrival

A Theoretical Autopsy

Orientation

Who are Neocons and Neoliberals today?

In the collapsing Mordor society of today we have two contending foreign policy theoretical tendencies, the Neocon realists and the Neoliberal globalists. The Neocon realists are represented by people like Robert Kagan, Victoria Nuland, Steve Bannon and other war hawks who go back to the Bush Years (Rumsfeld, Cheney, Wolfowitz) and back even further to Michael Ledeen, Irving Krystal and  Leo Strauss. The Neocons never found a war they didn’t like. Political domination is the name of their game. While they support capitalism, trade relations are seen as subordinate to political power.

The forces of Neoliberal globalism are best represented by people like George Soros, the Rockefeller brothers and Henry Kissinger. Going further back in time, Neoliberals can be dated with the founding of the Austrian school of Von Hayek, Ludwig von Mises, later on by Milton Friedman followed by Paul Volcker and the Chicago boys economists made notorious by Naomi Klein in her book The Shock Doctrine. For the Neoliberals, opening up of free trade around the world is more important than defending their home state. Neoliberal globalists will go to war in reaction to free trade being threatened by a national government with protectionist policies, but they don’t go looking for war. However, Neoliberals are fine with a military capitalism that knows no boundaries, while arming the whole world whether or not its home country is at war.

The purpose of this article

There is no international policy that is not grounded in theory. In the discipline of politics, this field is called “international relations theory”. The aim of this article is to:

  • show why neither of these Neocon or Neoliberal theories and their policies are working and how they are complicit in Mordor’s economic and political collapse;
  • to show theoretically the bankruptcy of both Neoconservative and Neoliberal theories;
  • to probe three other theories of international relations – liberal institutional liberalism, constructivism and world systems – to see how well they can explain or predict world events;
  • to ask whether any of these theories could move Yankeedom away from collapsing;
  • to inquire whether any of these theories can help us understand the rise of the multipolar world.

My sources for this article are International Relations Theory: A Primer by Elizabeth Matthews and Rhonda Callaway; International Relations Theory: A Critical Introduction by Cynthia Weber, and The Political Discourse of Anarchy: A Disciplinary History of International Relations by Brian Schmidt.

Old vs Neoconservatives

Old conservatives

The word “neo” means new. But how can we understand what a Neoconservative stands for if we don’t know how to contrast it to the kind conservative that came before? Therefore, in this section I will make that comparison. Old conservatives go all the way back to Edmund’s Burke’s criticism of the French Revolution. Other old conservatives are Joseph de Maistre, Louis de Bonald and Michael Oakeshott. What these folks share in common is their criteria for solving social problems. This involves looking to the past, to history, to solve problems. Since they believe human beings are flawed with original sin, what has happened historically by trial-and-error that has continuity should not be tampered with. This is embodied in both law and especially custom.

Old conservatives are champions of moderation and caution and perceive change as dangerous. They prefer the familiar to the unknown; the tried, compared to that which must be experimented with. When solving problems, they stuck close to the facts and were suspicious of anything mysterious. In political policy, they preferred the actual to the possible, the limited to the unbounded, and the messy present rather than wasting time striving for the ideal. There was a romantic side to some conservatives who preferred poetry to the prosaic or stoic.

The lower classes constituted a “mob” and old conservatives hated both democracy and liberalism. The only good culture was the upper-class culture of aristocrats. The culture of peasants was perceived as gross and backward. Still aristocrats owed their inferiors something in return for their hard work, this was called “noblesse oblige.” Old conservatives believe in order and structure. The ideal society for old conservatives is feudalism where the structure takes the form of hierarchies with the king and aristocrats in charge. Obedience of the lower classes is highly valued. Some people found themselves in the lower classes due to accident or bad luck, yet old conservatives still felt that inequality was mostly inherited and based on the talents people were born with.

When feudalism reigned in Europe, old conservatives were skeptical of capitalism because it disrupted the class and status hierarchies they were used to. They felt that Adam Smith’s doctrine of the invisible hand was barbaric, not because it appealed to selfishness in individuals, but because it based itself on selfishness as an economic principle for society as whole.  Because many of the money lenders involved in trade in the Middle Ages were Jewish, conservatives did their best to exclude Jews from their social institutions.

Conservatives were dead-set against the engineering and experimenting with society through the use of reason. There was a place for reason in calculating the pros and cons of individual behavior, but not reason as it applied to nature. These conservatives were patriotic, not nationalists. Their patriotism was reactive, committing itself to defending a country against foreign aggression. It follows that they were isolationist in their foreign policy.

Neocons

The Neocons are far more militant than the old conservatives. They are nationalist and expansive, seeking national greatness. They want a strong patriarchal state with a strong military, law enforcement and prisons. They resist any matriarchal functions of the state such as pensions, welfare or childcare provisions and clearly have imperialist ambitions. Neocons come out of World War II swinging with the Cold War on their minds. They include Daniel Bell, Jeanne Kirkpatrick, Nathan Glazer and Samuel Huntington. Unlike the old conservatives, Neocons embrace corporate capitalism. They started out as isolationists economically in the 50s and 60s when out of power, but then were won over to neoliberalism economics beginning with Reagan.

Whereas old conservatives rely on a messy accumulation of wisdom over the years, Neocons believe in the Great Man Theory of history à la Leo Strauss. They look to great philosophers rather than traditions coming from below to help them. Whereas old conservatives are cautious and prudent, Neocons are fundamentalists and assume they have the right answers. They interpret opposition as hostility and need boogeymen like Russia and China to be paranoid about internationally, or they see the “counterculture” as enemies domestically. They are not afraid to spend militarily and use demagoguery in their political speeches. Their speeches include dualities like “friend or foe” as exemplified by Bush’s “you are with the terrorists or with us”.

While it seems fair to say there was a streak of antisemitism in old conservatives, many Neocons are Jewish and support both Zionism abroad and Christian fundamentalism domestically. Like Neoliberals, Neoconservatives also use a kind of “social rationality” in their use of game theory to make decisions about the likelihood of military invasions (Rationalizing Capitalist Democracy by  S.M. Amadae). There is nothing romantic in their examining the past nor is there anything poetic about them. They are hard-headed and prosaic. Domestically, for Neocons, social hierarchies are the result of an aristocracy of talent and these aristocrats don’t owe the lower classes anything “noblesse oblige”). Their enemies at home are upper-middle class liberals. Unlike old conservatives, Neocons don’t hate the masses. They try to manipulate them through populism against effete relativist liberals.

Who Are the Neocon Realists?

Cold war origins

Early Neocon realists just before and just after World War II were E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau and George Kennan. The hard-ball drive of Neoconservative realism is inseparable from the Cold War. After two world wars, their realism was an attempt to bring “realpolitiks” into international relations following the naïve illusions of institutional liberals and typified by Woodrow Wilson.

Roots in Thomas Hobbes

Neo Conservative Realism is the application of Hobbesian theory of the political actions of the domestic state into the international arena. Instead of individual monads crashing against each other in a society, we have states as mindless monads crashing against each other internationally. States are inherently hostile to each other and in international relations states act as instrumental rationalists and utility maximizers. The priority of states are security and defense. States are like Hobbes’ billiard balls obeying the same laws of geometry and physics except at a macro level. Strategically Neoconservative realists draw inspiration from Machiavelli and even further back to Thucydides.

Roots in social Darwinism

It is not far-fetched to imagine Realists as Social Darwinists in which nation-states are like individual organisms struggling to survive. Ideas matter only in so far as states weigh the cost-benefits of past, present and future political actions. The use of reason or appeals to morality are dismissed as naïve pie-in-the sky schemes. It follows that human nature is competitive, aggressive and suspicious. Power is an end in itself, not a means to something higher or better. Just as the human nature of individuals is flawed, so too the political behavior of nation-states is flawed and myopic. The interactions between states is a zero sum game with winners and losers. There is no room for unintended consequences. While Neocons might be skeptical of pooled ideas when it comes to improving society, they are not opposed to the pooling of ideas among heads of state to develop think tanks, and foundations for combatting communist ideas.

States are static zero-sum games between Atlantic states

Neoconservative Realists have no sense of there being an evolution to the history of states. In a dog-eat-dog world, states rise and fall without any sense of an accumulation of things getting better or worse. For Realism the focus is on the relationship between the great powers, north-north relations. The global south is looked upon as backward and there is no expectation of support for it. It accepts imperialism as a fact of life. There is no effort to help industrialize the global south if they are possessed as colonies.

The place of geography

There is a field of international relations which deals with geography called geopolitics whose closest affinity is with Neoconservative Realism. But whether the theories are of Ratzel’s political geography, Alfred Thayer Mahan’s Sea Power, Mackinder’s Heartland Theory and the geopolitical pivot of history, Spykman’s Rimland, Kennan’s and Kissinger’s containment theory or Brzezinski’s Grand Chessboard, all these theories are Anglo-American or German, with imperialism as their goal.  The ideological nature of this field can be seen as  geopolitics of Russia with Aleksandr Dugin or China are not even included in the field.

Support of economic mercantilism

While neoconservative realists certainly support capitalism against communism, they are wary of international trade growing out of the control of the state. In its pure form Neoconservative Realists are mercantilists imagining that real wealth consists of positive balance of payments. Their economic policy is more protectionist rather than free trade. When it comes to scientific disciplines, it accepts the separation between politics and economics. It imagines state-state relations are driven by politics and it treats economics in a social schizophrenic way, as a separate discipline.

The place of socialism

Neoconservative Realists consider socialism as a completely separate system and it cannot easily explain the nature of trade relations between the two. It imagines all socialism as Stalinism and it is insensitive to the differences between Trotskyists, Stalinists, anarchists and social democrats. One size fits all! It is insensitive to the macro conflicts within socialism.

Relative criticisms of Neoconservative Realists from within International Relations Theory

The first criticism is that there is a mixing of descriptive and proscriptive statements which makes scientific testability difficult. In other words, its ideology of power politics gets in the way. Secondly, because it is wedded to conservative ideology it has no theory of how social movements arise to challenge the great powers. Further, because socialism is seen as flat and lacking in innovation it could not explain the fall of the Soviet Union or the rise of China.  Lastly because it pays little attention to the evolution of capitalism it failed to predict the rise of collaborative multi-lateral institutions that support capitalism such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund or the SWIFT balance of payments system.

Who Are the Neoliberal Globalists?

Origins of Neoliberal globalism

While Neoliberalism began just after War World II with the Austrian school of Von Hayek and Von Mises, it had to wait a good thirty years for New Deal liberalism to have its “golden age” between 1948 and 1970. It really came into its own after the Keynesianism economic policy ran into trouble. It also was triggered by the oil crisis in 1973, along with the new competition from Germany and Japan that had recovered from World War II. Neoliberalism has always been inseparable from:

  • The declining standard of living in the United States;
  • The arrival of credit cards to soften the blow of the decline;
  • The increasing power of banks and finance capital.

Theorists of Neoliberal globalism today include Francis Fukuyama in his claim to the “end of history” and the triumph of Neoliberalism all over the world when the Soviet Union collapsed. Also, Samuel Huntington in his books the Clash of Civilizations and the Soldier and the State which supported Neoliberalism.

Capitalist international institutions promote austerity for non-core countries

With the help of the World Bank and the IMF, Neoliberal neo-imperialism promoted austerity programs on the periphery of the world economy, placing those countries in an impossible debt-trap. Unlike Neoconservative realists, Neoliberal globalists emphasize the international nature of the capitalist societies and they use the state militarily to support the reign of Anglo-American foreign capital in semi-peripheral and especially peripheral countries. The globalization of communication, transport, along with immigrant and refugee movements weakens the power of the nation-state to regulate all these transnational movements.

The state is subordinate to global capitalism

For Neoconservative Realists, the state is sovereign. For neoliberal globalists, the state is simply an aggregate of private interests. Neoliberal globalists have more confidence that wars can be controlled by multilateral efforts. At the same time Neoliberal globalists have no problem with military capitalism, where the military not only supports its home nation-states but it arms the whole world. To the horror of Realists, global Neoliberals are short on patriotism and long on making profits no matter where they come from.

Growing interdependence of states

Though in actually existing nation-states have been more interdependent than Realists like to imagine, with alliances prominent during both world wars, this interdependence has grown with the founding of NATO and the division of countries into capitalist and socialist blocs after the war. While geopolitical theory is mostly Realist in outlook, the work of Kennan, Kissinger and Brzezinski showed that Neoliberal globalists were just as anti-communist and coveted their potential markets of socialist states. These states had to form blocs and could no longer afford to be isolationist.

Think tanks and game theory

More than Realists, Neoliberals put a high preference on ideas. The first think-tanks came out of the Rand Foundation and global capitalists such as the Rockefeller brothers who set up not just think-tanks but foundations and organizations such as the Council of Foreign Relations and the Trilateral Commission, all in the service of opposing communism. New Deal liberal gatekeepers acted as “controlled opposition” such as the Ford Foundation. The Neoliberal notions about human nature are not as bleak as Neoconservative Realists. Under certain conditions, state actors can cooperate. Game theory is a neoliberal attempt to understand the conditions that are likely to promote competition or cooperation among states.

Free trade

Unlike Neoclassical Realism, Neoliberal globalism contends that state-state engagements can result in a positive sum game. It believes in free trade and David Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage. It holds out hope for peripheral countries if they play by the rules of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. If Neoconservative Realists think that power politics is what is the most important determining factor in international relations, Neoliberals imagine that the field of economics determines the basis of state action. Like Neocon Realists, Neoliberal globalists imagine that economics is a separate discipline whose laws have nothing to do with politics. This way of thinking can be seen in theories of free market fundamentalists like Milton Freidman. Naomi Klein blew the roof off of this ideology when she exposed how the Chicago Boys muscled their way into Russia, Argentina and many other countries and turned their nation-states against institutional liberal FDR policies.

Failure to explain inequalities between the West and the rest

Neoliberal globalists are not much better than Neocon Realists in explaining the difference in wealth between core, periphery and semi-periphery countries. They imagine that peripheral countries face the same conditions as core countries did when they first developed capitalism. Like Neorealists, they imagine that nation-states are still internally driven and peripheral countries are poor because either their rulers are dictatorial or the population is uneducated and holding on to superstitious beliefs.

Attitude towards socialism

Neoliberal Globalists assume that centralized state socialism has no redeeming value. It sees these countries as poor and run by dictators. However, there is some recognition that social democratic states have some value, but in practice it is in the business of undermining them while demanding that their foreign policy allow for transnational corporations to make profits in their countries and leave with no strings attached.

Relative criticisms of Neoliberal globalism from within international relations theory

Like Neoconservative Realists, Neoliberal globalists have no theory of how social movements arise to challenge the great powers. While Huntington and Fukuyama celebrate the triumph of capitalism they have no theory to explain the failure of Neoliberalism, not only in other parts of the world but in the deterioration of their own home countries between 1990 and today. Neither can it explain the return of Russian nationalism nor the productiveness of the Chinese economy despite its leading industries being Communist state controlled.

Absolute Criticism of Neoconservative Realists

Failure to face the world economy is centered in the East

The fundamental reality that Neoconservative Realists fail to face is that world economy is undergoing tectonic shift, moving from West to East. For the first time since the 16th century, the center of the world economy is settling in China, Russia and Iran. Because realist theory is relatively shallow historically, it traces the history of the world  system back a couple of hundred centuries at best, when the Western world was the center of world power. The wars the Neocons want to start today are not powers of imperial expansion. Instead they are fighting to keep from losing control over its former colonies (like in Africa) who are placing their hopes with the multipolarists.

Cold War containment has backfired

While China claims to be a communist country it has not insisted that its allies like Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia or Brazil become communist. China’s attraction for these counties is China’s willingness to harness energy, build railroads within these countries while internationally constructing their vast Belt-Road Initiative. Realists sense the United States allies are dwindling and so it increases pressure on European countries in the EU to do its imperial dirty-work.

Bye-bye mercantilism

World politics today is hardly Hobbesian nation-states clashing in a war of all against all. Today nation states have allies and blocs. In this sense. Neorealist theories are more sensitive to the relativeness of states than Realist theories are. To the extent that Realist theory is mercantilist, its capitalist economy hasn’t been protectionist for close to 100 years. When Neoliberal globalists uprooted the manufacturing industries in the mid 1970s and shipped their jobs overseas, it undermined its industrial economy from competing with other economies. These days, there are no infrastructural companies that can seriously compete with the countries in the multipolar world.

Neoconservative Realists are social schizophrenics. They concentrate on their political power overseas, but they fail to realize that the instability of their economic system both at home and abroad makes the power politics ineffective.

Failure to understand China

Neoconservative Realists know very little about what is going on in China. They fail to face that the Chinese Communist party knows how to make a profit. That 60% of its sources of profit come from state institutions. It imagines that the Chinese people, like the Russian people, are unhappy with their “authoritarian” states and are just waiting for a Western politician like Navalny to liberate them. While Neoconservative Realists mock the power of ideas in international relations, the Chinese Communist Party values the moral appeal of communism. Culturally, Neorealists imagine that the Chinese have a repressive culture that has little appreciation for the arts because of imagined repression. But the truth is the Chinese population is very interested in national and international culture. Recently Russian ballet, music, theatre and literature have sold out Chinese audiences for whom to perform.

War of all against all does not explain the multipolar world

Neoconservative theories of human nature can be compared to the dynamics of the novel Lord of the Flies. But when we look at the way the multipolar world is working, human nature is much closer to the movie Society in the Snow. This was about how rugby players on a flight to Chile survived 72 days in the Andes after their plane crashed because they cooperated. In the multi-polar world today Chinese and Russian policies of either debt reduction or even debt cancellation in Africa resemble human cooperation in practice. State-state interaction is not a zero-sum game. It is a positive sum game, at least in the multipolar world.

No sense that the world economy evolves

Neoconservative realists have no sense that states evolve, that there are a set of accumulating political, ecological and economic consequences that will affect its power politics. It treats them as accidently unexplained mishaps rather than the consequences of past myopic political actions.

Absolute Criticism of Neoliberal Globalists

Its failure to have a deep analysis of how capitalism works

One of the major problems for Neoliberal globalists is that they do not understand their own system of capitalism. They see no problem in investing in military capitalism which destroys the productive forces. They see no problem in investing in fictitious capital which produces no social wealth. Consequently, its domestic economies are falling apart because it fails to invest in industrial capital. Secondly, their economists cannot predict or explain when crises occur. Thirdly, they make no effort to understand the history of capitalism which might enable them to reform the system. These capitalists cannot think further down the line than three months. It pays little attention to the steepness in the gap between the very wealthy and the working class, except to occasionally moralize about it at conferences every six months. They make no attempt to study social movements so any rebellions against it coming from unions, nationalist groups or Occupy are treated as surprises driven by external causes.

Failure to understand that most countries are against free market capitalism

Since neoliberal globalists treat their own state as weak and something to be used by capitalists, it comes as a great shock to them when non-Western nation-states elect leaders who want to treat their economy as in need of a domestic plan. These are the conditions where Neoliberal globalists trade in their invisible hand for a visible fist. They turn to the CIA and the National Endowment of Democracy to give these elected officials their walking papers at best, or assassinations at worst, whether their state is socialistic or not. Neoliberal globalists understand that domestic populations are no longer in love with capitalism. So, like Neoconservatives, they develop economic propaganda centers through think tanks, foundations, and universities. These attempts are no longer working.

The failure of the comparative advantage ideology

Neoliberal theory of comparative advantage, which worked well as an ideology on peripheral countries in the middle to the last third of the 20th century, has worn thin. Periphery countries now see through this ideology, especially because of the presence of Russia and China to provide real alternatives. Neoliberal globalists like to present their economics as not political. However, this is easier to do domestically than it is internationally. The book Confessions of an Economic Hit Man is only the tip of the iceberg in showing how neoliberals play hard ball geopolitics whenever a peripheral country informs transnational capitalists that they will have to pay taxes.

Success against social democratic regimes

For Neoliberal globalists, communist parties are the devil incarnate with whom there is no compromising. However, they have shown a willingness to deal with countries that have elected social democrats. Between 1980 and the present Neoliberal globalists  have been very shrewd at isolating and weakening social democratic rulers, making them slide to the right on the political spectrum along with liberalism generally. The example of Norway, Denmark and Sweden is a case in point. These countries have slid to the right along with the overall rightward trend in the Western world and are currently supporting Mordor, sending troops against Russia in Ukraine.

With the exception of Chavez, to a lesser extent Maduro and Evo Morales, Neoliberal globalists have been able to stem the Pink Tide.

Other International Relations Theory:  Liberal Institutionalism, Constructivism and World Systems Theory

Liberal institutionalism

This is an older theory of liberalism applied to international politics after World War One. It was an attempt to bring reason, universal ethics and education into international affairs. At first glance, looking at today’s world, this view seems hopelessly naïve, but with the founding of the League of Nations at the end of World War I, there was an appeal to a higher human nature. They believed that the belligerence between states was not inevitable. International anarchy could be policed by international institutions. As opposed to Realism theory, liberal institutionalism understood states as semi-independent rather than Hobbesian billiard balls crashing into each other without rhyme or reason.

Following Grotius and later Immanuel Kant, the basis for international relations was understood to be international law. These laws could bring about an orderly, just and cooperative world. Human problems were the not the result of human nature but of flawed, irrational institutions. Liberal institutionalists were very different from Neoliberals as we have seen, and they expected capitalist institutions to be governed by reasonable international politics. Despite World War I, liberal institutionalists hung on to a belief in progress. They also believed that Western nation-states still were the model for any future society.

As you might imagine, this theory would be laughed out of court by Neoconservative Realists as being utopian and out of touch. Neoliberals might agree with institutional liberals about the importance of law but this was only on paper. Neoliberal globalists do not want transnational corporations hemmed in by any state, let alone any potential world government. Neoliberals now believe in an unregulated global capitalism and any state had to dance to the tune of the international capitalist band.

As paradoxical as it might seem, it is not the current Western transnational finance capitalists who might give institutional liberalism the time of day, but the multipolar countries of China and Russia. These so-called authoritarian states have made some surprisingly liberal international statements about the nature of the future multipolar world. It is they that hold out the claim for free and equal development of all multi-polar states, whether they be in BRICS or in the Shanghai Cooperative network. Of course, whether or not they put this into practice is another matter.

Constructivism

Constructivism is a theory that first developed in the field of sociology with the work of Berger and Luckman in their book The Social Construction of Reality. It was first applied to international relations in the work of John Ruggie, Nicholas Onuf, Kratochwil and later Alexander Wendt. Constructivists reject the rational self-interest of the Realists and they claim that Realists reify international relations and state policies as things rather than processes. International relations are constructed and reconstructed based on the interaction of diplomats. They seek a more sociological conception of international relations by introducing the dialectic between structure and agency. Neoconservatives Realists behave as if there was only structure and no agency. For constructionists, material interests are not transparent and uncontested. They grow and change based on interaction with other states. For constructionists, states are not unified actors, as realists claim, but that they are impacted by political pressures.

Constructionists are rightfully skeptical of modernization theories of progress, but cautiously hold out hope for improved international relations. Constructionists are critical of Neoconservative realist theories that treat periphery countries as backward political entities that need to “catch up.” They accept Dependency Theory that Western countries are wealthy in part because the wealth of peripheral countries has been stolen. Constructionists look at peripheral countries as having corrupt rulers in need of internal political reform. The main scientific problem with constructionism as a theory is sometimes not testable.

Neoconservative Realists would dismiss constructionism as some woolly-headed  academic discipline which muddles the waters, attempting to make processes out of things, and destabilizing hard facts with various interpretations. They are naïve in believing that diplomats rather than the forces of the deep state are responsible for public policy. Neoliberals might pay lip service to constructionist processes when it comes to law and politics, but they would hardly stand for constructionists mucking around with international market forces. Chances are likely they would be ignored.

Again, paradoxically it is the multipolar country of China that would be open to some of the process-orientation of the constructionists. Of course, as Marxists, China’s leaders would emphasize structure over agency, but they would agree with constructionist insistence of not reifying material interest and state policies and being open to international policies that are win-win.

World-Systems Theory

Origin and founders

World-systems theory is by far the most radical of all international relations theory, an explicitly Marxist theory based on the four-volume work by Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System, whose first volume came out in 1974.  Along with Paul Baron, Sameer Amin and Andre Gunder Frank, system theorists were sensitive to the imperialism of the core states. Core countries exploited the peripheral countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America and this explains why they are poor, have growing debt and don’t seem to be able to catch up. The IMF and World Bank exploit peripheral countries in the service of core countries. It is these reasons they are poor  more than any internal state dynamic lack of economic willpower or superstition. Other family members of world-systems theory were Oliver Cox, George Modelski and Paul Kennedy (The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers). The roots of world-systems theory is not only in political economy, but history and sociology rather than the high politics of Neoconservative Realists.

Beyond politics and economics to political economy

Unlike either Neoconservative Realists or Neoliberal globalists world-systems theories do not accept the separation of politics (political science) from economics (neoclassical). There is only one field: political economy. This means all capitalist economics is partly political and there is no economics that is not also about power and politics. State diplomats do not make independent decisions but are mostly “talking shops of the bourgeoise” as Marx put it. Nation-states take their marching orders from transnational capitalists. The priority of states is to defend the world-capitalist ruling class.

Controversies within Marxism about actually existing socialism, imperialism and domestic class struggle

What makes world-systems theory controversial within Marxism is that world-systems theory claims that there are no real socialist states. All claimed socialist societies are really state-capitalist societies which are subject to the laws of capitalist world- economy. This directly challenges the claim made by Leninists that the former Soviet Union, China and Cuba really are socialist societies. For world systems theorists Stalinism has little to do with socialism. A second difference between world-systems theorists and Leninists is over the stages of imperialism. Lenin argued that imperialism was the last stage of capitalism, a new stage of the capitalist system. But Giovanni Arrighi, in his book The Long Twentieth Century claimed that there were four cycles of capitalism: a) merchant capital b) agricultural capitalism (slavery); c) industrial capital and d) finance capitalism, which includes imperialism. Over capitalism’s 500 year history, the Italians, the Dutch, the British and the United States each went through these four cycles. So, imperialism didn’t happen once, but four times, each time expanding wider and deeper into the capitalist world-system.

Please see my article for a more complete explanation of world systems theory: Tectonic Shifts in the World Economy: A World Systems Perspective. Lastly, Leninists insist that world-systems theory overemphasizes international dynamics between countries and understates the class struggle within nation-states.

Nation-states policy is determined by international core-peripheral relations and class struggle

For world-systems theorists, the material interests of states are determined on the one hand internationally by core-periphery relations and on the other hand domestically by class struggles. International relations are more powerful than state domestic relations. Like for Neoconservative Realists and Neoliberal globalists ideas are not very important in explaining international relations for world-systems theorists.

Human nature is fundamentally cooperative

While world-systems theorists agree with Neoliberal globalists that human nature is both cooperative and competitive, they believe that human nature is primarily cooperative. It becomes competitive due to social scarcity brought about by capitalism. Most human problems are due to flawed capitalist institutions. State-state relations are neither a zero-sum game claimed by Neoconservative Realists where one state wins and one loses. Nor are they a positive sum game where both states win as the Neoliberals claim. In world-systems theories state-state relations are negative sum gains where all states decline due to war, ecological disasters and international economic crises. Only socialist states are capable of positive sum games.

Socialism is too new to be judged a failure

All things considered, capitalism has had 300 years to develop after it overthrew the feudal system. Socialism has had about 160 years under which has never been free to develop autonomously. When we look at the state of the world today with the rise of China and the multipolar world, it is way too soon to judge the long-lastingness of socialism. On the other hand, if we look at the bleak landscape of the failure of Neoliberal capitalism over the last 30 years, it is more likely to say capitalism is the system that is on the way out.

Criticisms of World-Systems Theory

  • Dependency theory is weak in explaining why some peripheral states are not immiserated but relatively successful.
  • It is too hard on actually existing socialism and its achievements for middle-class and working-class people, especially given the backward nature of society before socialism came into being.
  • Given that world-systems theory is more sympathetic to the social democratic experiments in socialism, it doesn’t explain well its rightward turn in the last 40 years, especially the Scandinavian countries.
  • With the exception of work by Christopher Chase-Dunn, the late Terry Boswell and Charles Tilly, most world-systems theory does not make social movements within states and its global implications a very high priority, though it is better than any other theory.

How Useful is World-Systems Theory to Western Powers?

World-systems theory might be useful to the West if the West was able to elect a social democratic party which could put into practice some of its insights. But the entire Western world seems to be sinking and at best might occupy a peripheral position within a new multipolar world led by China, Russia and Iran. There is currently no place for world-systems insights to be applied in Mordor or any of its European satellites.

How Useful is World-Systems Theory to the Multipolar world?

World-systems theory would be very helpful in explaining a problem that has plagued classical Marxism. Why has socialism arisen in countries that were not industrialized? World-systems theory argues that in the history of capitalism, new leading hegemons arise from the capitalist semi-periphery. Russia, China, Iran and India all fit this bill. The multipolar world would be in complete agreement (at least China, Cuba and Venezuela) that political economy rather than politics or economics taken separately will explain international relations. The multipolar world would feel quite at home with world-systems theory claims that cooperation between states is natural and that the zero-sum games of the Neoconservative Realists are out of touch with the new world they are building. They agree with world-systems theorists that neoliberal globalist claims of a positive sum game between states are ideological window dressing to mask the exploitation by core countries of peripheral countries. Lastly, there is nothing I can see that is threatening to multi-polar socialist states to consider world-systems theories cycles of imperialism rather than a linear stage.

On the negative side, China, Cuba and Venezuela would be very upset that world-systems theory would argue they are not really socialist countries. They would claim that the standards world-systems theory holds for socialism, such as the levelling of classes, the absence of wage labor, the shortening the work week are too strident for a socialist world still surrounded by decaying and desperate capitalist states. In addition, world-systems theories would criticize socialist multipolar states for the continued existence of class struggles within socialist states, especially China. There are no unions and strikes by workers going on.

A Conclusion and Autopsy

In this conclusion, my aim is to pull together all the criticisms of both Neoconservative Realism on the one hand, and Neoliberal globalism on the other. For each one I will state relative criticisms from within International Relations Theory. That will be followed by criticism of these theories based on the current tectonic shift in the world economy from the Western world to the East.

Neoconservative Realism

Relative criticisms on International Relations Theory

  • The mixing of descriptive and proscriptive statements makes scientific testing difficult.
  • It has no theory of how social movements arise to test the great powers.
  • Because it sees socialism as flat Stalinism, it has no theory of why the Soviet Union fell or how China arose.
  • Because it pays little attention to the evolution of capitalism, it failed to predict the rise of collaborative multi-lateral institutions that support capitalism (World Bank or IMF, and the Swift method of balancing payments).

 Criticisms based on the current multipolar movement from West to East

  • Failure to explain or predict the tectonic shifts in the world-economy from West to East.
  • Failure to explain or predict the loss of former colonies.
  • Failure to explain why the Cold War containment policy of Kennan and the influence of Mackinder has failed.
  • The decline of protectionism and mercantilism. Realism has been forced by market fundamentalism to give up any hope of an insular, mercantile economic policy.
  • Failure to explain how finance capital has undermined its claim for power over resources. These days profits are counted based on stocks and bonds, not material resources.
  • Failure to explain inequalities between the West and the rest.
  • Failure to understand the Chinese source of power. If Neoconservative Realists were right, Realist war drums against China would be based on its military threat. But China’s superiority stems from its economic superiority in producing goods and services, and building infrastructures.
  • Failure to understand the popularity of the Chinese and Russian leadership among their populations. The picture of these states as dark totalitarian nightmares is out of touch with how people are actually living in these countries.
  • The Hobbesian war of all against all, does not explain the cooperative relations between members of the multipolar world (China, Russia and Iran) and their followers in BRICS as well as in the global south.
  • There is no sense that states break down, built up in the context of an irreversible, accumulating process that is not static and beyond the intentions of state actors or great men.

Neoliberal Globalists

Relative criticisms of International Relations Theory

  • They have no theory of how social movements arise to challenge the great powers.
  • It has no theory to explain the failure of Neoliberal capitalist economics around the world and the deterioration of its home countries such as Europe and the U.S.
  • It cannot explain the return of Russian nationalism under Putin.
  • The world’s most productive country, China, is successful despite its claim to be a communist country and its substantial profits derived from state-run institutions.

Criticisms based on the current multipolar movement from West to East

  • Failure to explain or predict the tectonic shifts in the world-economy from West to East.
  • Failure to explain or predict the loss of former colonies.
  • Failure to explain why the Cold War containment policy of Kennan and the influence of Mackinder has failed.
  • Failure to explain inequalities between the West and the rest.
  • Failure to understand the popularity of the Chinese and Russian leadership among its population. The picture of these states as dark totalitarian nightmares is out of touch with how people are actually living in these countries.
  • Failure to understand the necessity of expanded reproduction for capitalism to continue. It invests in non-productive forces like the military and finance capital.
  • Failure to explain when, where and why capitalist crises occur. There is no long-term planning to stop future crisis.
  • Failure to understand that free-market fundamentalism has more adversaries than friends either among multi-polar rulers nor their populations and this country despite their best propaganda techniques in think tanks, foundations and universities.
  • Failure of the comparative advantage ideology. The Global South has had roughly three generations to see how productive it is to specialize in the production of coffee, sugar and tobacco has been. They have had enough, especially now that Russia and China have offered to cancel their debt and build their industries, rather than “brain-drain” exported to core countries.
  • Neoliberal globalists have been successful in stemming the Pink Tide in South America, as the tide has become white domestically and become imperialist in its support of Mordor against the multipolar world.Facebook
Bruce Lerro has taught for 25 years as an adjunct college professor of psychology at Golden Gate University, Dominican University and Diablo Valley College in the San Francisco Bay Area. He has applied a Vygotskian socio-historical perspective to his three books found on Amazon. He is a co-founder, organizer and writer for Socialist Planning Beyond Capitalism. Read other articles by Bruce, or visit Bruce's website.

Saturday, March 16, 2024

As a rabbi, philosopher and physician, Maimonides wrestled with religion and reason – the book he wrote to reconcile them, ‘Guide to the Perplexed,’ has sparked debate ever since

Faith and reason are often treated as opposites. But some philosophers believe they can only strengthen each other, including the Jewish sage Maimonides, who wrote the famous ‘Guide to the Perplexed.’


February 20, 2024
By  Randy L. Friedman

(The Conversation) — I teach a philosophy of religion seminar titled “Faith and Reason.” Most students who register arrive with a mistaken assumption: that the course explores the differences between the two.

“Faith” is often defined as belief in a supernatural God that transcends reason – and belief that science can only go so far to explain the fundamental mysteries of life. Reason, meanwhile, means inquiry that draws on logic and deductive reasoning.

It seems like a stark choice, an either-or – until we read Maimonides. For Maimonides, a 12th century theologian, philosopher, rabbi and physician, there is no true faith without reason.

Maimonides’ full name was Rabbi Moses Ben Maimon, and he is often referred to by the abbreviation “Rambam.” His writings spurred centuries of conflict and were even banned in some Jewish communities. Yet he also penned one of the most famous guides to Jewish law and still stands as one of the most influential rabbis to have ever lived.

It is surprising for many students to learn that Maimonides, who lived in present-day Spain, Morocco and Egypt, embraced reason as the only way to make sense of faith. In this rabbi’s view, the idea of a battle between faith and reason sets boundaries where none need exist.

Faith must be grounded in reason, lest it become superstition. This synthesis is at the heart of Maimonides’ most famous philosophical work, “The Guide for the Perplexed.”
Jerusalem and Athens

Treating faith and reason as if they are at odds is nothing new. Some philosophers have described them as two different cities, as when University of Chicago professor Leo Strauss wrote of “Jerusalem and Athens.”

Both cities love wisdom, Strauss wrote, but attribute it to different things. In “Jerusalem,” where life is grounded by faith in God, “the beginning of wisdom is fear of the Lord,” Strauss wrote in 1967, quoting the biblical books of Proverbs and Job. In “Athens,” on the other hand, symbolized by the ancient Greek philosophers, “the beginning of wisdom is wonder” – the wonder of inquiry and reason.

Almost 800 years before, however, Maimonides was arguing that true religion, true wisdom, requires both.


A statue of Maimonides in Cordoba, Spain.
Education Images/Universal Images Group via Getty Images

Rambam was deeply steeped in Jewish learning. As a doctor, astronomer and philosopher, however, he was just as knowledgeable about the science of his day. He ostensibly wrote “The Guide to the Perplexed” to help his student Joseph Ibn Aknin navigate between the truths of philosophy, natural science and revelation.

Maimonides’ understanding of God and the universe mostly agreed with Aristotle’s . In Part II of his “Guide,” Maimonides credits Aristotle with helping to prove three key principles about God: God is incorporeal, without a physical body; God is one; and God transcends the material world. Yet God created the world and set it in motion, Maimonides asserts, and everything in it depends on God for its existence.
Science and scripture

Throughout these chapters, the rabbi does not turn to scripture to prove or disprove philosophical propositions, although he notes that Aristotle’s opinion may be “in accordance with the words of our prophets and our theologians or Sages.”

This does not mean that Maimonides does not care about sacred texts – far from it. Rather, he argues that the truths of science and philosophy must inform how people interpret the Bible.

Many people of faith have read the Book of Genesis’ story of creation literally. For them, God’s creation of humanity “in our image and likeness” means both that God must have a body and that humanity shares much in common with God.

For Maimonides, however, language like these passages in Genesis was allegorical. If reason teaches that God is incorporeal, this means that God has no body; God does not physically see, nor do people see God. God does not speak, sit on a throne, stretch out an arm, rest or become angry. Reading these passages literally misunderstands the nature of God.

It is hard to overstate the significance of this claim. In Maimonides’ view, saying that God has a body is not just incorrect but blasphemous and idolatrous. He sees God as unique and transcendent, irreducible to anything human or material. And if God does not literally speak, then the Bible cannot be the literal word of God.


A letter Maimonides wrote around 1172, discovered in the late 1800s
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Culture Club/Hulton Archive via Getty Images

Maimonides insists that the Bible be appreciated as an esoteric text. Any part of the revealed text that does not fit with a true understanding of God and the universe must be read allegorically.

Reason does not eliminate his faith in God, or the power of scripture. Instead, reason protects people from believing something incorrect about God’s nature. Maimonides insists that we have faith in reason and that reason ground our faith.

The palace of God

Maimonides’ philosophical writing is filled with debate and disagreement between him, fellow rabbis, Jewish philosophers and the Kalam, a medieval tradition of Islamic theology. Reason was the tool needed to make sense of sacred texts, and philosophical inquiry was the process needed to get it right. The goal was truth, not mere obedience.

Toward the end of his “Guide for the Perplexed,” Maimonides lays out what he believes are different levels of enlightenment. The allegory centers on a king’s palace: Only a select few, those who pursue truest wisdom grounded in philosophy and science, will reach the room where the king – God – resides. People guided by faith alone, who accept scripture literally and unquestioningly, and believe that faith transcends reason, on the other hand, “have their backs turned toward the king’s palace,” moving further and further away from God.

Maimonides is considered one of the greatest rabbinic authorities of all time. And his resolution to the debate between faith and reason could not have been clearer: There should be no true conflict. Both reason and revelation are our guides.

(Randy L. Friedman, Associate Professor of Judaic Studies, Binghamton University, State University of New York. The views expressed in this commentary do not necessarily reflect those of Religion News Service.)

Tuesday, December 19, 2023

The Straussian Character of Post-Soviet Russian Statecraft

The behaviour of post-Soviet Russian statecraft is poorly understood in the Western world. Long gone is the age of clever Kremlinologists.

BYJOSÉ MIGUEL ALONSO-TRABANCO
DECEMBER 19, 2023
Photo: Sergei Bobylev, TASS


The behaviour of post-Soviet Russian statecraft is poorly understood in the Western world. Long gone is the age of clever Kremlinologists —men like George Kennan— whose sober insights shaped Western strategies and policies in the second half of the twentieth century. In the post-Cold War era, it was expected that Russia would follow the path of Westernisation by embracing liberal democracy, free markets, human rights, the so-called “rules-based order” and even the most emblematic flagships of postmodernism. However, Russia has not become a post-historical state like much of North America and Western Europe. Instead, in the last couple of decades, it has acted as an increasingly assertive, revisionist and self-confident great power that does not seek to emulate Washington or Brussels or join the collective West as a junior partner. Since this course of action does not respond to the overzealous gospel of Western liberalism, Russia is often portrayed as a “rogue”, “backward”, “outdated”, “evil”, “un-European” or even “irrational” state. For those unable to transcend such narrow horizons, Russia will always remain a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.

The prevalence of such oversimplistic and Manichean views reveals an overall lack of a genuine intellectual effort. Without this element, uncovering the reasons and perceptions which have influenced Moscow’s political trajectories in the last couple of decades is an exceedingly arduous undertaking. Far from being only a cognitive shortcoming, these limited opinions have been directing policymaking in much of the collective West. The results —including the eastward expansion of NATO, the invasion of Ukraine, the unprecedented level of intense antagonism between Russia and the West and the strategic reproachment between Russia and China— speak for themselves. Needless to say, Russia can hardly be described as a charitable or altruistic state. In fact, Moscow does not even bother hiding its predatory ruthlessness in contested theatres of engagement. Yet, as an imperial great power that has played a key role in the Eurasian geopolitical Grossraum for centuries, the sources of its conduct deserve to be examined from a more accurate perspective.

Few Western intellectuals have tried to explain contemporary Russia in accordance with a more nuanced and unjudgmental viewpoint. American representatives of political realism —such as Professor John Mearsheimer, Kenneth Waltz and Henry Kissinger— have offered analytical assessments based on the logic of Realpolitik in order to understand Russian statecraft through the lens of national security, high politics and grand strategy. In turn, Canadian scholar Michael Millerman has highlighted the connection between Russian foreign policy and Russian philosophical thinking. Specifically, Millerman’s work has scrutinised the theories of Aleksander Dugin, the leading ideologue of Eurasianism as an alternative geopolitical project which intends to position Russia as civilisational and strategic counterweight to Atlanticism. These contributions represent valuable stepping-stones towards a better and deeper understanding. However, the development of a more in-depth scrutiny requires the integration of complementary perspectives. The purpose of this analysis is not to contradict the ideas of the aforementioned thinkers, but to offer additional elements than can sharpen, strengthen and calibrate the existing explanatory arsenal that is used to study the evolution of post-Soviet Russia. A more holistic guide for the perplexed is needed.

In this regard, this assessment holds that the teachings of German-American philosopher Leo Strausss provide an analytical framework that is helpful to interpret Russian statecraft. At first glance, Professor Strauss is an unlikely and maybe even counterintuitive candidate as a prophet of Kremlinology. First and foremost, Strauss was as a scholar of classical political philosophy. As such, his work seldom addressed the leading issues of the twentieth century. He had more to say about the lessons found in the writings of Plato, Aristotle, Thucydides, Xenophon, Maimonides, Al-Farabi and Machiavelli than about the Cold War’s geopolitical, strategic or ideological realities. Furthermore, his ideas are often maligned because of their supposed association with the militant neoconservative movement and its responsibility for disastrous endeavours like the Anglo-American of Iraq. However, said connection is inaccurate and, if anything, based on a distorted vision of his thought. Strauss believed in wisdom and moderation as cardinal virtues in statesmanship, not in a neo-Trotskyist permanent revolution inspired by a megalomaniac messianic fervour. In fact, his ideas were more influenced by the wisdom of the ancients and key authors who developed —directly or indirectly— the so-called ‘conservative revolution’ in Weimar Germany (Nietzsche, Hegel, Heidegger, Spengler and Schmitt) than by the Kantian acolytes of Wilsonian idealism. Leo Strauss was hardly the herald of people like Annalena Baerbock, Anne Applebaum or Victoria Nuland. Furthermore, he never endorsed a worldwide crusade to remake the world’s political systems. In fact, he supported a plurality of political models rather than uniformity. For Strauss, the prospect of global homogeneity literally represented the end of man and the ultimate death of philosophy, understood as intellectual contemplation.

This analysis constitutes an attempt to understand Russia through a perspective that does not respond to the commonplace views of conventional Westernist ‘democratism’. This pursuit is pertinent, not just as an intellectual quest, but as necessity of pragmatic expediency. Relations between Russia and the collective West are likely to remain adversarial for the foreseeable future because their geopolitical imperatives are incompatible under the current status quo. Even the end of the Ukraine War will not diminish strategic competition in Eastern Europe and several corners of the post-Soviet space. However, perhaps this rivalry can be managed so that strategic stability within the international system can be preserved. Hence, Straussian thinking can be instrumental for the rise of a new school of Kremlinology that brings more clarity for policymaking. Specifically, there are four theoretical principles found in Straussian teachings that can enlighten emerging generations of Western Kremlinologists: 1) the reassertion of traditionalism; 2) elite rule; 3) the rejection of unipolar cosmopolitanism and 4) the dangerous nature of the human condition. The ensuing contents discuss why and how each of them is relevant for a serious reading of post-Soviet Russian statecraft. In each case, a summary of key Straussian philosophical teachings is followed by observations that explain their empirical reflection in today’s Russia.

The Reassertion of Traditionalism

Leo Strauss was an outspoken opponent of liberal modernity and everything it stands for. According to Straussian thinking, modernity is the vulgar age in which frivolity, entertainment, degradation, comfort, triviality, emptiness, permissiveness, leisure, commercialism, pacifism and complacency have triumphed. Therefore, the Nietzschean ‘last man’ —the quintessential avatar of modernity— is a contemptible creature in whose nihilistic existence there is nothing worth fighting for. Rather than the fulfilment of a grandiose promise of ‘progress’, modernity represents a major crisis that has brought the fall of man and eclipsed the wisdom of the ancients. Therefore, abandoning the metaphorical caves of liberalism requires the rediscovery of pre-modern wisdom. Specifically, Straussian teachings emphasise that relearning the philosophical lessons from classical antiquity is the key source of inspiration for the restoration of vitality, resolve, morale and purposefulness. Yet, this is not only an intellectual journey. The chains of modernity must be broken so that the Promethean pursuit of human excellence can flourish. Moreover, Straussian teachings underscore that the weight of history —and the scrutiny of its instructive lessons— matters as a navigational compass for statesmanship.

Likewise, Strauss is an opponent of the so-called ‘open society’, one of modernity’s most worshipped totems. The values of an open society impoverish the seriousness of political life and embracing them can only lead to terminal decline. In contrast, Strauss holds that a closed society encourages exceptional qualities that raise the strength of the human spirit, including loyalty, virtue, wisdom, discipline, patriotism, the nobility of effort and honour. Rather than seeking wealth or prosperity, a closed society is focused on the collective pursuit of political outcomes, even if that quest leads to sacrifices for the sake of the greater good. As the concept suggests, the existential horizon of a closed society is confined to the substance of a particular national state whose cultural heritage, unique identity, traditional values and historical sources of inspiration are to be cherished. A polity whose closedness is extinguished is headed in the corrosive direction of decay, weakness, dissolution or even external predation. Only the martial virtues of a closed society can nurture the Spartan-like warrior ethos that a polity needs to ensure its greatness.

If is debatable if Russia is a modern national state. A long-range appraisal reveals ambivalent answers. Russia has experimented with recipes derived from two ideologies born in the cradle of modernity: socialism during the decades of the Soviet era and liberalism in the late 20th century. However, the results of experiments based on both models turned out to be counterproductive. First, the implosion of the Soviet Union was not just a tectonic “geopolitical catastrophe” for Russian national interests. It also represented the death knell of a declining and decrepit system —anchored to the ideological prism of Marxist-Leninist socialism— whose contradictions, failures and bankruptcies had become impossible to overcome. Second, the ensuing liberal era of ‘Weimar Russia’ exacerbated existing problems like political turmoil, economic stagnancy, corruption, interethnic tensions, falling birth rates, substance abuse, disarray, organised crime and prostitution. In contrast, post-Cold War Russian statecraft has had favourable experiences with non-liberal aspects of modernity. In fact, the complex nature of the Kremlin’s geopolitical strategies in this period can be described as exceedingly modern. In the increasingly confrontational chessboard of strategic competition, Moscow relies on sophisticated policies which embrace technological change, adaptation to the changing Zeitgeist of international politics, and the weaponisation of various vectors of complex interdependence (such as energy, social media platforms, migratory flows, finance and money).

On the other hand, Russian policy no longer intends to remake the national character in accordance with the liberal ideological tenets preached by the high priests of modernity in Washington, Davos and Brussels. In fact, the Russian state is rejecting Western trends like secularism, technocratic policymaking, open borders, feminism, the LGBT movement and militant “wokeness”. Some of these are even regarded as instruments of political, propagandistic and ideological subversion ran by Western powers. From the Russian perspective, the Western world is akin to a fallen angel that —driven by intellectual pride— has forsaken its heritage, identity, traditions and religion, all of which have been sacrificed at the altar of ‘progress’. Russia is not interested in sharing the post-historical fate of Western ‘open societies’. In opposition to such creed, Russia has embraced a return to older traditions as sources of guidance, authority, inspiration, symbols and referential frameworks that can fuel the revitalisation of the Russian national state.

This emerging neo-traditionalist Weltanschauung —which seeks to emphasise the uniqueness of the country— encompasses a series of overlapping identitarian underpinnings. Russia is evoking its legacy as the heir to the Byzantine Empire, which outlived the Western Roman Empire for a millennium. With Moscow as the ‘third Rome’, the Russian Federation intends to position itself as an Eastern great power, bulwark of Orthodox Christianity and multi-ethnic empire. In addition, the doctrine of Eurasianism states that Russia is more than a national state. According to this vision, Russia is a natural conservative tellurocracy which operates as an organic civilisational pole whose historical development has blended European and Asian components. Likewise, Russia is also harnessing the strength of nationalism to encourage pride and morale. Such course of action includes the heroic portrayal of Russian historic achievements —such as military victories and acts of conquest— and the celebration of figures like Peter the Great.

Needless to say, these views are not merely ideological. They are consistent with the Kremlin’s foreign policy in the ‘near abroad’, the projection of Russian ‘soft power’ and its strategic opposition to the league of liberal Atlanticist thalassocracies. Ultimately, Russia aspires to emulate the triumph of Sparta —a militaristic and aristocratic monarchy— against Athenian cosmopolitan democracy in the Peloponnesian War. Therefore, a neo-traditionalist revival must be pragmatically read as an attempt to restore the status of Russia as a key player in international politics and to revert the strategic setbacks provoked by the dissolution of the USSR, but also to counter pressing societal problems such as an impeding demographic contraction. Furthermore, the worldview of Russian neo-traditionalism is also reflected in the implementation of domestic policies. In fact, the Russian state officially supports religiosity, family values and traditional gender roles.

Elite Rule

For Professor Leo Strauss, the distinction between democratic and authoritarian political mores is often a cartoonish oversimplification. According to Straussian thinking, everything that overzealous liberal democrats disapprove of is portrayed as ‘authoritarian’. Much like Plato, Leo Strauss revers the figure of philosopher kings as ruling elites. Their position is determined not by their privileged upbringing, heritage or wealth. Instead, philosopher kings are exceptional men who embody the traditional archetypes of both the warrior (action) and the ascetic (intellectual contemplation). As such, they are enlightened by their superior knowledge of greater truths that the vulgar are unable to grasp. Their profound understanding of complex matters, hidden realities, dangerous affairs, and harsh revelations that the uninitiated are not aware of gives them a worldly wisdom for the masterful practice of statesmanship. These rulers are able to gaze into the depth of abyss without losing their unperturbed stoic temper and to still perform diligently. Their rule does not seek to please the fluctuating whims of public opinion, but to do what is needed to satisfy the national interest of the state.

During the 90s, Russia tried to reform its system of political governance and the structure of its economy in accordance with Western standards. However, said experiment failed to deliver essential public goods like order and prosperity. Judging by their disappointing outcomes, such efforts were largely discredited. For all intents and purposes, Russia rejected liberal democracy as a model worth replicating because it was utterly dysfunctional for its geopolitical, historical, societal, idiosyncratic and strategic conditions. Russian scepticism about the universalisation of Western liberal political dogmas is unapologetic. Actually, it seems that, from the Kremlin’s perspective, the march towards ‘the end of history’ —championed by the so-called ‘Davos men’— is a sanctimonious “cocktail of ignorance, arrogance, vanity and hypocrisy”.

In this regard, the regime built by President Vladimir Putin and the Siloviki clan can be described as a neo-Caesarist securocracy. This hermetic ruling elite is integrated by former KGB spooks involved in foreign intelligence activities during the Cold War. The rise of these cadres to power in a moment of deep crisis is not surprising if once considers that they represented —by far— the most competent and better trained personnel of the Soviet regime. Unlike Commissars and Party apparatchiks, KGB operatives were pragmatists whose fierce performance responded to the necessities of raison d’état rather than to ideological abstractions or preferences. Their word-class expertise was also forged by fire in some of the world’s most challenging flashpoints. Accordingly, the esoteric tradecraft of these people includes the arcane arts of espionage, covert action (‘active measures’), duplicity, conspiratorial intrigues, unconventional warfare and psychological operations. In fact, their fateful takeover of the Russian government at the dawn of the 21st century can likely be explained not just as the result of impersonal forces, but as a political masterstroke orchestrated thanks to the clandestine operational dexterity of these men.

Moreover, an exegesis of the policies implemented by this ruling elite indicates a worldview shaped by the principles of hardcore political realism. The members of the Russian ‘deep state’ live in a Machiavellian intellectual universe in which malice, secrecy, ruthlessness, threats, Faustian pacts, amoral calculations, deception, skullduggery and all sorts of ‘dark arts’ are necessary ingredients of politics and statecraft. In contrast, self-righteousness is a recipe for disaster in such cloak-and-dagger world. Hence, the authority of this elite has not been justified through democratic processes or by political popularity. In fact, the willingness and ability of doing what it takes to secure order, retain control, pursue the national interest and confront enemies is perhaps the strongest source of legitimacy for the Siloviki cabal. As the spectre of Leo Strauss is haunting Moscow, the rule of the Russian spy kings is seemingly here to stay.

Rejection of Unipolar Cosmopolitanism

Contrary to what is commonly believed, Leo Strauss was not a supporter of Quixotic quests for global imperial domination by any regime. He never endorsed any crusade to remake all political systems in accordance with a homogeneous blueprint. In fact, he was fiercely opposed to the prospect of a supranational state populated by ‘citizens of the world’ that have been detached from any connections to particular polities. For Strauss, the hypothetical fulfilment of liberal or socialist cosmopolitanism as a model of world order would represent a dystopian tyrannical threat that could only exist under the ironclad control of a Soviet-like bureaucratic dictatorship. Even worse, according to Straussian thinking, such nightmare —seen as unnatural because it neglects key traits which define the human condition— would lead to the ultimate death of philosophy. Under such conditions, the pursuit of intellectual contemplation, the proliferation of inquiry and the discovery of greater truths would never be possible. In short, Straussian teachings are antithetical to the ideas pushed by the likes of Immanuel Kant, Karl Popper, George Soros, Klaus Shwab or Yuval Noah Harari.

Far from preserving diversity, the globalisation of the ‘open society’ would bring an enforced uniformity that abolishes distinctions, plurality, contrasts, the need for noble deeds and identities, as well as both history and politics. Once history has been buried by the tempting promise of everlasting universal happiness, there would be no need for political struggles under the grey rule of a global tyranny presenting itself as ‘benevolent’. However, Leo Strauss prophesises that plans fuelled by globalist aspirations will invariably elicit the backlash of those that refuse to submit. In fact, he anticipates the prospect that growing opposition to universalist schemes and their sophistry will eventually ensure their demise. Even if this project were to be launched by a democracy, that would not make it any better or sugarcoat its undesirability. Strauss himself acknowledged that even democracies can give birth to imperialistic projects. Together, these arguments convincingly show that Straussian teachings reject the convenience and feasibility of a unipolar hegemonic configuration.

In this regard, the Soviet Union was a superpower interested in the pursuit of global hegemony. In contrast, the Russian Federation does not intend to achieve world domination or even to recreate the USSR. However, Russia is trying to reassert itself as the leading power of the post-Soviet space, especially throughout the so-called “Russian world”. Although it is nowhere near the US and China in many fields of national power, Moscow has the strength, assets and influence to operate as a major player in the global geopolitical chessboard. As such, Russian statecraft has been incrementally challenging Washington’s attempts to establish a hegemonic unipolar order and to remake the world in its image and likeness. Russia does not seek to overtake the US, only to advance a multipolar correlation of forces under which it can act as one of the key epicentres. Interestingly, the Kremlin is willing to partner with anybody —including state and nonstate actors— interested in undercutting US power, regardless of their civilisational, ideological or religious affiliations. In this Schmittian rejection of Western Atlanticism and everything it stands for, the beliefs held by the regimes of states like Brazil, China, Cuba, India, Iran, North Korea, Serbia, South Africa, Syria, Turkey or Venezuela are inconsequential as long as they oppose unipolarity and its pretensions to freeze history. This course of action reveals not just the pragmatic calculations of traditional Realpolitik, but also a resolved struggle to rollback the influence of a project focused on the universal expansion of the ‘open society’.

Considering the bilateral balance of power, Moscow’s response to American hegemonic pretensions is asymmetric, but its intensity has grown. This is reflected in the reliance of the Kremlin’s revisionist schemes on an arsenal which includes covert means, a myriad of unconventional power projection vectors, military force and even nuclear sabre-rattling. In short, Russia is aggressively contesting the vision of a unipolar world order undergirded by cosmopolitan liberalism as its official missionary ideology. Accordingly, rather than adopting post-historical Western models as a follower, Russia’s ‘heretical’ attitude seems determined to overturn them. Yet, there is an important nuance that deserves to be highlighted. For Russia, this rivalry is no Apocalyptic crusade or kamikaze mission. Actually, Moscow has hinted that perhaps a deal for the redistribution of spheres of influence can be negotiated in order to achieve a reasonable accommodation with the West. Thus, from the Kremlin’s perspective, it would be preferable to deal with pragmatic Western nationalist forces rather than with the uncompromising apostles and inquisitors trying to convert barbarians to the “one true faith” of universalist liberalism.

The Dangerous Nature of the Human Condition

Leo Strauss was no scholar of contemporary international relations or geopolitics, let alone Kremlinology. Nevertheless, as a student of political philosophy, the exegesis of his teachings reveals a mindset that is close to what the so-called realist school has to say. Not unlike hardcore classical realists, Strauss acknowledges the existence of hierarchies, the subordination of the weak by the strong, the amoral character of statecraft, human baseness and the propensity for conflict as permanent features of politics. As a crypto-realist with a Nietzschean twist, Strauss supported the views of Thrasymachus, Thucydides and Machiavelli about the rule of the powerful as the natural order of things in the political sphere. In accordance with this logic, justice is little more than the advantage of the mighty. Under such conditions, political lifeforms have no choice but to fight in order to pursue their interests, enhance their preparedness, preserve their vitality and uphold what they believe is right. In other words, polities can either embrace danger or perish as a consequence of their folly and/or cowardice. As a result, the practice of statesmanship responds to the particular priorities and preferences of a polity, but not to universalistic expectations. Nevertheless, Strauss never glorified warmongering. He simply recognised politics as an intrinsically confrontational realm whose circumstances often require the decisive ability to overcome risk-aversion in matters of life and death. These perspectives are fully compatible with the philosophical underpinnings of what classical realist thinking is all about. Yet, unlike most realists, Strauss emphasised the importance of ideological motivation to strengthen national morale in engagements which demand a substantial mobilisation of effort.

Interestingly, there are other revealing connections between Straussian teachings and realism as a school of thought. Leo Strauss was an avid student of Thucydides’ writings about the Peloponnesian War. For the German-American philosopher, the work of Thucydides was more than a foundational treatise of realist theory. In his view, such source of ancient wisdom imparted timeless lessons about statecraft, history, human nature and the virtues of the warrior spirit, as well as the importance of attributes like prowess, resolve, and courage in the quest for greatness. In addition, Hans Morgenthau thanked Leo Strauss for his contribution to the introduction of Politics Among Nations, a seminal text which presents the theoretical principles of classical realism. The intellectual cornerstone which underwrites this specific branch of realism is an anthropologically pessimistic conception of human nature due the sinfulness of man and his quintessential condition as a political creature. As Carl Schmitt observed, “all serious political theories presuppose man to be evil”. Moreover, the quasi-Nietzschean concept of the ‘Animus Dominandi’ —put forward by Morgenthau and understood as the natural inclination of humans to subordinate their peers— is fully aligned with the spirit of Straussian teachings.

Post-Cold War Russian statecraft is a textbook example of Darwinian Realpolitik. This inclination is the natural consequence of Russian history, shaped by imperial traditions, intense geopolitical rivalries and the constant threat of invasions. Moscow’s foreign policy, national security and grand strategy are driven by the need to prepare for confrontation against hostile forces and to prevent an eventual encirclement of the motherland. As an assertive and self-confident player in the arena of high politics, the Kremlin believes that being feared is a wise course of action that will deter potential enemies. In turn, Russia intends to subordinate neighbouring weaker states by integrating them into its orbit in one way or another and, at the same time, it refuses to capitulate before stronger counterparts like the US. When Moscow’s arm-twisting tactics do not produce the expected outcomes, the Russians are willing to flirt with danger by embracing war as an instrument of statecraft. From Moscow’s perspective, it is preferable to fight in a vicious jungle as a predator than to assume a subservient role in a neo-Edenic garden in which rules made by others are selectively implemented. Better to reign in its own hell than to serve in the Westernist heaven. Unsurprisingly, the proportion of Russian citizens willing to fight for the country is way higher than in many Western European states. Rather than following the path of the ‘last man’, Russian wants to be amongst the last men standing.

In some cases —including Chechnya, Georgia, Kazakhstan and Syria— Russian military interventions have been successful. Concerning the invasion of Ukraine and its fallout, President Putin and his ruling elite made a risky gamble, but they are convinced that the conflict is worth fighting. The war offers a window of opportunity to remake the global balance of power and to achieve beneficial facts on the ground even if that comes with the risks and costs of challenging NATO. However, the Russians are not suicidal or megalomaniac. Moscow’s pragmatic aims are rather limited. The idea of Russian tanks overrunning Warsaw or even Lviv is out of touch with reality. Russians lack the appetite for an ominous conflict which might directly spark a nuclear Armageddon. Nonetheless, if necessary, they are prepared to fight to make sure their national interests prevail, especially in the so-called ‘near abroad’. As a neo-Spartan polity, Russia expects to prevail against Athen’s spiritual heirs in the West because the balance of resolve and its pool of resources favour the commitment of its war effort. Still, as is often the case in the art of war, only time will tell if this aggressive bid leads to glory or to ruin. If the war effort backfires or in the case of a pyrrhic victory, Vladimir Putin will have a lot to answer for, both politically and historically. But if Russia eventually manages to prevail in any meaningful way, he will be seen by posterity as a successful —and implacable— statesman that performed proficiently.

Conclusions

Understanding post-Cold War Russian statecraft under the Vladimir Putin is a challenging intellectual task whose complexity requires transgressing the myopic and self-righteous horizon of liberalism. In fact, an in-depth examination reveals that contemporary Russia has followed an increasingly Straussian trajectory in more than one respect. Certainly, that does not mean that Leo Strauss is somehow the posthumous sinister mastermind of Moscow’s behaviour. Strauss passed away nearly three decades before the collapse of the Soviet Union. Likewise, President Putin and his court of spy kings may not even be remotely familiar with Strauss’ obscure writings, especially considering his undeserved reputation as the patriarch of neoconservatism. Yet, there is a substantial degree of uncanny resemblance between key Straussian principles and the behaviour of the Russian state. Accordingly, the instructive insights found in the philosophical teachings of the German-American Professor offer a sharp referential framework whose interpretative merits can help decipher the underlying logic and qualities of the Kremlin’s strategic playbook. The Straussian philosophical worldview has turned out to be a powerful key which can unlock some of the cryptic matters of contemporary Kremlinology and perhaps also to recalibrate the examination of other illiberal states, including China and Iran. This usefulness highlights the relevance of the far-sighted lessons of Straussian thinking not just for scholars, but also for practitioners involved in foreign policy, intelligence analysis and national security. An increasingly illiberal world in which illiberal states are acting in accordance with illiberal rationales requires a profound knowledge of illiberal political science for analytical, predictive and prescriptive purposes.