CUBA

Sherritt rejects bid for early board vote amid Trump ally talks

Bloomberg News | July 31, 2026 | 

US new sanctions revive a decades-old clash with Sherritt, rooted in the 1990s. (Image courtesy of Sherritt International.)

Sherritt International Corp. rebuffed its largest investor’s request for a special meeting to let shareholders vote on replacing its chairman and another board director, as the company faces scrutiny over its discussions with an ally of US President Donald Trump.

The Toronto-based miner said Friday the request was ineffective under Canadian law because it had already called its annual meeting. Even so, Sherritt said it will put Kyma Capital Ltd.’s proposals to shareholders at its Dec. 15 annual meeting.

Kyma, which owns about one-third of Sherritt’s outstanding notes and about 15% of its shares, last week said it would requisition a special shareholder meeting to seek the removal of chairman Peter Hancock and another director, arguing the company needs new leadership. The London-based investor said it would propose its own nominees upon delivery of the requisition, according to the statement.

Sherritt last month entered into an exclusivity agreement with Gillon Capital LLC to consider a proposal that would give the Texas-based family office of former Trump adviser Ray Washburne a controlling stake in the Canadian miner.

Kyma said the company deliberately scheduled its annual meeting for December, preventing shareholders from ousting directors before exclusive talks with Gillon Capital are due to expire on Oct. 12.

“A meeting scheduled after exclusivity expires is not accountability. It is choreography,” Kyma’s chief investment officer Akshay Shah said in last week’s statement. “Well-governed and well-advised boards that are seeking to act in the best interests of all stakeholders do not behave in this way.”

One of Cuba’s largest foreign investors, Sherritt said it was in talks with Gillon Capital just days after announcing in May it would seek to dissolve its nickel mining joint venture on the island due to the US administration’s expanded sanctions against the communist state.

Sherritt had already been under pressure for months after the US imposed a near-total fuel blockade on Cuba in January. Facing a fuel shortage, Sherritt halted production at its nickel and cobalt mine in eastern Cuba in February.

The troubled miner’s talks with Gillon Capital have drawn scrutiny from a group of bondholders, which earlier this month proposed an alternative recapitalization plan.

Last month, the company warned its ability to continue as a going concern was in doubt because of Trump’s sanctions order, saying it wouldn’t have enough cash to repay debt if lenders declared a default and demanded early repayment.

(By Sybilla Gross)

 

How Trump’s Cuba grudge threw a 99-year-old mining company into turmoil

Bloomberg News | May 22, 2026 | 

Old Havana. (Stock image by kmiragaya.)

The Trump administration’s hard line against Cuba pushed Sherritt International Corp. to the brink. Now, an ex-adviser to the US president may be the Canadian mining company’s salvation.

The nearly 99-year-old company, whose former chief executive was once known as Fidel Castro’s favorite capitalist, has staked its business on a bet few Western companies would touch. After entering Cuba in the 1990s, Sherritt developed a nickel-and-cobalt mine through a joint venture with the state before expanding into energy. The result was a sprawling business that’s survived commodity busts, US political pressure and economic instability on the island.

That wager abruptly unraveled this month, plunging Sherritt into turmoil. After President Donald Trump expanded sanctions on the communist country, Sherritt initially announced plans to dissolve its mining venture in Cuba. On Wednesday the US charged former Cuban President Raúl Castro with murder, sharply escalating a standoff with Havana as the Trump administration attempts to reshape the island’s political order.

But just days after Sherritt announced its retreat from Cuba, a potential rescuer emerged in the form of a Dallas family office linked to Ray Washburne, a real estate executive appointed by Trump in 2017 to lead the Overseas Private Investment Corp. Washburne’s Gillon Capital LLC signed a non-binding preliminary agreement on Wednesday that would hand the family office a controlling stake in Sherritt.

“It came out of nowhere,” Peter Hancock, Sherritt’s interim chief executive officer, said in an interview. “I would like to tell you that I’m a business genius and that I knew an American entity would see that it could create value in the situation that Sherritt was in. But no, I didn’t foresee that.”

As Trump’s foreign policy during his second term turns markedly more aggressive, Sherritt is still at risk of losing its Havana gamble. The saga underscores the dangers facing companies and investors from shifting geopolitics amid a rapidly changing world order. While major multinational firms have not been immune to conflict-driven losses, the threat is particularly acute for companies with assets concentrated in a single country outside of the US.

It’s not clear whether Sherritt’s preliminary pact with Gillon signals a potential shift in Trump’s Cuba strategy. On Wednesday, he played down the need to further ratchet up pressure on the Cuban government after the charges against Raúl Castro. Representatives for Gillon and the State Department didn’t immediately respond to requests for comment.

But for Hancock, the sudden backing from Gillon helped “bridge the huge gap” between Sherritt and the administration.

“This deal happened because an actor in the United States was able to make a case to the US State Department,” he said. “We were collateral damage in a larger policy objective for the United States.”

Sherritt was founded in 1927 and named after Carl Sherritt, a trapper who staked copper prospects in Manitoba. The company’s first foray into Cuba was steered by Ian Delaney, who became CEO after a proxy fight in 1990 and secured a deal with the Castro government one year later. The state agreed to sell Sherritt unprocessed nickel from Moa, a mine in eastern Cuba that was nationalized after the country’s 1959 revolution.

It was a milestone deal for the Canadian firm, which needed raw material to feed its key asset: a refinery in Alberta. The company entered into a joint venture agreement in 1994 with the state to operate Moa, which produces cobalt and nickel, both key metals for the energy transition and providing power to data centers.

For years, Sherritt was enormously successful in Cuba. Its market capitalization jumped to almost C$5 billion ($3.6 billion) in 2008, while the stock traded as high as C$18. Sherritt, by that time, had poured significant investment into the country, including stakes in electricity, oil and natural gas ventures alongside state companies.

Sherritt executives became the first people barred from entering the US under the Helms-Burton Act, a law passed in 1996 to target firms doing business in Cuba. But Canada and several European nations opposed the law and maintained diplomatic ties with Havana, allowing Sherritt to keep selling most of its nickel and cobalt into those markets as well as Asia.

Yet at the height of Sherritt’s rise following its success in Cuba, the company made costly bet on a nickel project in Madagascar. The decision would ultimately shred its balance sheet, driving debt to almost C$2.5 billion at its peak in 2013. Then came a prolonged slump in nickel prices, leaving the company periodically teetering on the brink of insolvency.

Saddled with a heavy debt load and years of weak cash flow, the company became even more reliant on Cuba, exiting other assets including its Canadian coal business to fund loan repayments and eventually writing off its Madagascar venture. Today, Cuba accounts more than 70% of the company’s asset base on a book value basis.

“They had an ample opportunity to eliminate their indebtedness entirely,” Jeffrey Gavarkovs, a managing partner at Northstream Capital Inc., said in an interview. But “the combination of Cuba and a debt load that was a little bit too heavy was their poison pill.”

While Sherritt continued receiving distributions from its power and nickel operations, the company spent more than C$100 million on an offshore well, a higher-risk category of oil exploration, Gavarkovs said. The effort yielded a well that was ultimately written off as uneconomic.

But according to Gavarkovs, who owns Sherritt bonds, the company’s biggest flaw was its bloated corporate overhead for what had effectively become a single-asset mining company. Directors on the board, rather than ensuring that unsecured note-holders received cash interest payments as required by the debt covenants, prioritized vesting cash-settled stock options, he said.

The company also spent millions trying to fend off several activist campaigns against it, he added. Last year investment firm Pala Assets Holdings won its battle against Sherritt, resulting in the resignation of CEO Leon Binedell and a shakeup of the board.

When US forces captured Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro in January, investors began speculating that Cuba could be the Trump administration’s next target. In Venezuela’s case, US oil majors and Western mining companies swarmed into the country after Maduro’s arrest, with Chevron Corp. emerging as one of the clearest winners.

But unlike Chevron, which has a diversified asset base, Sherritt was facing a worsening a fuel shortage as the US blocked Venezuelan exports to Cuba. The company announced plans to pause mining at Moa in February after receiving notice that planned fuel deliveries could not be fulfilled.

As Cuba’s economy continued to crumble, with mass blackouts sweeping the island as Trump tightened his squeeze on the nation of 10 million people, Sherritt faced a choice: keep operations going at a loss and at reduced capacity, or mothball the company’s most valuable asset. In late March, the company announced it was seeking an emergency cash injection of as much as C$50 million to support Moa.

After Trump’s expansion of Cuba sanctions on May 1, Sherritt abruptly decided to relinquish its joint venture stakes on the island. But soon after, the company reversed course.

Hancock was at home in Halifax on Monday, a public holiday in Canada, watching the Giro d’Italia cycling race on TV when the phone rang. On the other end was Washburne, calling with his offer for Sherritt.

Two days later, the Canadian company announced that it had signed a non-binding term sheet with Gillon. Sherritt said the US State Department had no objections to the discussions.

It’s far from certain that Ottawa will support a US investor taking majority ownership of Sherritt, however. Canada instituted a new policy in 2024 to make it more difficult for foreign companies to take control of Canadian critical minerals assets.

To Ben Rowswell, a former Canadian ambassador to Venezuela, the move by a Trump-friendly investor to take control of Sherritt in Cuba exemplifies what’s become known as the Donroe Doctrine, the US president’s take on Washington’s 19th-century push for hemispheric domination.

The latest move provides “further insight into the changing character of the US relationship with the region as it’s turning into an extractive predator” that uses its power over all countries, said Rowswell, now a consultant with strategic advisory firm Catalyze4.

The government of Prime Minister Mark Carney might be reluctant to attempt to block the takeover of Sherritt by a US investor to avoid complicating efforts to renew a free trade agreement with the US, Rowswell said, adding that he believes Carney’s administration should defend the company against US sanctions.

A spokesperson for Canada’s industry department said the government welcomes foreign investment that benefits Canada’s economy, but declined to comment on specific transactions.

Sherritt isn’t the only foreign company with mining operations in Cuba: Singapore-based commodities trading giant Trafigura has a lead-and-zinc mine there in a joint venture with the state. The company has said that it complies with all applicable sanctions and maintains a regular dialogue with relevant authorities.

Despite the potential deal with Gillon, Sherritt’s situation remains tenuous. Three board members have resigned from Sherritt, leaving just Hancock and one other director. Its chief financial officer and its auditor also departed earlier this month. The company now trades as a penny stock, with a market capitalization near C$80 million. Without essential nickel and cobalt supplies from Cuba, the available inventory at the company’s Alberta refinery will run out in mid-June, it said earlier this month.

“A lot of things will need to happen to get to the state where the full value is realized,” said Hancock, adding that sourcing key inputs such as fuel and sulfur would also be critical to unlocking Sherritt’s full potential. But, he added, “the posture of the US government with respect to this deal opens up a much wider world of financing.”

The Fort Saskatchewan refinery is one of just a few nickel processing facilities in North America. As governments and manufacturers race to build critical minerals supply chains outside of China, the facility carries growing strategic importance, according to Northstream’s Gavarkovs.

For Hancock, a former engineer with commodities trader Glencore Plc, there have been “a lot of very unexpected twists and turns” since he stepped in as interim CEO of Sherritt in December. If the Gillon proposal goes ahead, any easing of tensions between the Trump administration and Cuba would likely improve the payoff for the Washburne family office, he added.

Gillon is “very, very familiar with the business and the value that they see down the track,” he said. “This deal signals that they believe Sherritt has got a real bright future when things normalize in Cuba.”

(By Sybilla Gross, Paula Sambo and Stephen Wicary)

Cuba: Who will govern the market?

By Wilder Pérez Varona & Ariel Dacal Diaz

Published 30 July, 2026

First published at La Joven Cuba. Translation by LINKS International Journal of Socialist Renewal.

Despite consensus on Cuba’s economy needing reform, the measures announced on June 25 have raised more questions than answers. They come amid a crisis combining a drop in production, a collapsing energy sector and a migration exodus, worsened by the tightening US blockade. Under these circumstances, it is impossible not to ask who will be able to accumulate wealth, what will happen to workers in the least profitable sectors, how bureaucratic privileges will be stopped from mutating into oligarchic forms, and what role the market will play.

Can this package of reforms be viewed as a simple technical adjustment to get out of this distressing crisis?

To contribute to the debate, Ariel Dacal Díaz spoke with Cuban researcher Wilder Pérez Varona, a PhD in philosophy, writer and researcher, who has analysed the reshaping of the political imagination in Cuba, particularly within the digital ecosystem. He is a postdoctoral researcher at Argentina’s National Scientific and Technical Research Council (CONICET) from the National University of Quilmes.

Wilder examines how the reform will redefine power relations, the social structure starting to take shape behind the rhetoric of “perfecting socialism”, and whether this can be sustained without transforming the political system.

Cuba is facing the most comprehensive package of reforms in the past 30 years. Are these merely technical or economic measures?

The approved package of 176 measures contains highly technical provisions — exchange rates, joint-stock companies, bankruptcy procedures — but its nature is decidedly political. These measures will not merely change the economy, but who controls the country’s wealth for decades to come.

It is true they stem from an emergency. Cuba is facing an almost unprecedented productive, energy and demographic crisis, which has been worsened by the tightening US blockade. Today, Washington restricts trade, tries to block access to loans, discourages foreign investment and hinders fuel supply — it is a deliberate strategy to close off any scope for economic recovery.

But recognising the blockade’s impact does not mean assuming that the reforms are politically neutral. Any economic reform redistributes power. The problem is not merely how to produce more, but deciding who benefits from that wealth.

The most significant change is not more market, but the redefined relationship between ownership and power. A company can still call itself socialist while workers and citizens no longer have a real say in its affairs, thereby rendering social ownership a legal fiction.

GAESA [a Cuban conglomerate owned by the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces] is the clearest example. Beyond recent news regarding the release of assets, under these reforms it could retain its management forms and convert companies it already runs into shareholdings. On paper, ownership will remain with the people; in practice it will be the same people making decisions as before the reform.

There is consensus that the bureaucratic statist model has run its course. Cuba needs more dynamic companies, greater managerial autonomy and new scope for economic initiative. But autonomy for whom and under what controls?

The measures seek to strengthen enterprises and new economic actors, but say little about democratising decisions regarding the wealth they generate. We are decentralising enterprises, but not necessarily power.

This also alters the socialist project’s logic. For decades, despite many contradictions, equality was the model’s starting point. As [Cuban president Miguel] Díaz-Canel stated, this sequence is apparently being reversed: first accumulate, then redistribute. Growth is no longer subordinate to social justice; social justice now depends on growth.

This represents a shift in economic philosophy. The market can be a useful tool for developing a socialist economy, but it cannot substitute for politics. If new opportunities for accumulation are not accompanied by transparency, democratic regulation and social control, we risk replacing an inefficient bureaucracy with a new economic elite closely linked to state power. The National Asset Valuation Program, without an independent judiciary or transparency regarding who is buying what, could turn managers and military officials into legal shareholders of the very companies they currently manage on the state’s behalf. This is, albeit with some nuances, largely what happened in the post-Soviet transition.

That is why the debate should not be reduced to a choice between the state and market. The fundamental question is whether these reforms will further socialise economic power or pave the way for a new structure of privileges.

What impacts can we anticipate on the socio-class structure that has taken shape in recent years?

These reforms, if implemented, will transform society as a whole. Above all, they will alter class relations.

For decades, Cuban socialism built a society that was far more egalitarian than what existed before 1959. That relative equality began to erode from the 1990s onwards, with remittances, tourism and an expanding private sector. Now, that social differentiation has ceased to be a consequence of the crisis and is instead becoming a stable component of the model.

There will be more entrepreneurs, larger companies and greater wealth concentration. Of course, every economy needs actors capable of investing, innovating and taking risks. The question is who these entrepreneurs will be: will they emerge as a result of productive labour and innovation, or from converting bureaucratic privileges into private property? The risk is that the line between managing public resources and appropriating opportunities generated by the reform may become increasingly blurred. The removal of the 100-worker cap for micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (mipyes) and the possibility for individuals to own several companies lay the foundations for capital accumulation. The conversion of state-owned enterprises into joint-stock companies, with private individuals buying shares, is the specific mechanism driving this concentration. We do not know yet whether these shares will be bought by entrepreneurs willing to risk their own capital or by managers already running the company.

At the same time, the world of labour will also change. State employees, which until a few years ago were relatively homogeneous, will be replaced by a workforce with vastly different conditions depending on the sector, access to foreign currency, remittances or links to private and foreign companies. The so-called “muro de la divisa” (foreign currency wall) may become entrenched as the main faultline in Cuban society, this time by design.

Inequality will also be defined by race, region and family background, because those with start-up capital, relatives abroad or better economic networks will have clear advantages over those depending exclusively on a salary paid in pesos. This is seen most starkly at the regional level, as decentralisation to municipalities lacking an industrial base or tourist appeal will mainly redistribute deficits rather than autonomy. Social differences will be reproduced from generation to generation if the state does not intervene to address them.

An equally important change is the often-announced shift from universal policies to targeted subsidies, altering the relationship between citizens and the state. A proposed new framework classifies people as “vulnerable” in order to decide who receives support. Workers in profitable companies will somehow be integrated into the new economic circuits; those in so-called “zombie” companies will be left exposed to bankruptcy or liquidation. Equality is no longer understood as a right, and “vulnerability” – that is, poverty – will be treated as a permanent reality. The risk is that the state will stop preventing inequality and instead confine itself to managing its consequences.

The problem is not merely growing inequality, but the kind of power this will generate. As is well known, when wealth becomes concentrated, the ability to influence public decisions also tends to become concentrated.

So, it is not enough to ask whether a new capitalist class will consolidate itself. The crucial question is whether Cuba will have sufficiently democratic institutions to prevent economic power from ultimately capturing political power. The reforms redistribute much more than just income; they redistribute power. This new distribution of power, rather than the economic measures themselves, will ultimately define Cuba’s future.

Why do you say that the proposed model presupposes inequality as a permanent condition of its functioning?

It is not because the government has decided inequality is an objective, but because the new model ultimately makes it a prerequisite for boosting the economy.

This is probably the most profound change these reforms introduce, which, whatever anyone says, departs from previously approved guiding documents.

We can trace, measure by measure, how the logic of organised production according to principles of egalitarian distribution is being reversed in the technical design. The setting of wages has now been decentralised and is subject to each company’s “economic and financial capacity”. This will condemn workers in less profitable sectors to precariousness while allowing for unregulated wages in the dynamic sector. Bankruptcy procedures, with severance pay of barely three to six months’ wages, will turn job insecurity into yet another mechanism of market discipline, even within the state sector. Partial dollarisation creates a stratified system of consumption, even for previously free services; those who can afford it are charged, while there is only a precarious level of protection for the rest. These mechanisms are parts of a single design that requires inequality to function, because inequality generates the market incentive that the state can no longer generate alone.

The risk that wealth may stem from privileged access to information, political connections or control over public resources exists because the reform expands opportunities for accumulation without proposing mechanisms for transparency and social control. This opening up may consolidate an oligarchy born from the state itself. Once that risk becomes real, it is very hard to return as this new capitalist class consolidates its assets — through the National Asset Valuation Program or share purchases. Reversing this concentration would entail a political cost that no actor with veto power will be willing to bear. Inequality, to put it another way, does not dissipate with growth; but tends to become entrenched.

That is why I am worried the debate is reduced to how much GDP grows or how much investment flows into the country. An economy can grow while also losing social cohesion. It can increase productivity while reducing society’s ability to exercise democratic control over the wealth produced.

The crucial question is not how much market an economy can accommodate, but who governs that market. If concentrating wealth ends up also concentrating political power, the problem will no longer be merely inequality, but the formation of a new dominant bloc.

If, in 10 years’ time, Cuba is a more prosperous country but also more oligarchic, we will have changed the economic model without resolving the historical problem of our ailing socialism.

Will these economic reforms be viable without adjustments to the political system?

I have serious doubts. Not because every economic reform automatically requires changing the political system, but because no transformation of this magnitude can be sustained without democratising power. By democratisation, I mean who controls the fundamental economic decisions and the institutions through which society oversees them.

The reform transfers enormous power to companies, banks, investors and new private actors. That may be needed to revive the economy. What is difficult to grasp is why this decentralisation is not accompanied by a corresponding expansion of public oversight.

We are creating more autonomous enterprises, but not necessarily more democratic ones.

This has, precisely, been one of Cuban socialism’s major problems. For too long, we have confused state ownership with social ownership. But a company does not truly belong to society simply because a document says so. It belongs to society when those who produce its wealth and those who depend on it understand how it operates, participate in its decision making and hold its managers accountable.

Economic democratisation is not a luxury reserved for better times, but a prerequisite to remain socialist. This means more than just making enterprises efficient; it needs transparency over the use of public resources, accountability, institutions capable of preventing conflicts of interest, and genuine forums where workers and citizens can have a say in major economic decisions. Otherwise, company autonomy may simply mean autonomy from society.

There is another equally important aspect. If the reform creates new entrepreneurs, new labour relations and new forms of ownership, they must strengthen workers’ organising capacity. A country that profoundly transforms its economy without expanding labour’s participation risks further unbalancing the relationship between capital and society.

All this is even more important given the exceptional conditions imposed by the US blockade. Precisely because Cuba faces extraordinary external pressure, it needs to strengthen internal cohesion. Sherritt [a major Canadian mining and energy company], after more than three decades operating in Moa, withdrew due to sanctions that threatened to block its access to the international banking system. It ended up carrying out a forced sale, under liquidation terms, to a fund linked to a former Trump administration adviser. It is worth remembering that, while Cuba needs foreign currency for the private banking sector and the foreign exchange market to function, whoever controls that flow of capital makes any relief conditional on a political transformation that the government has declared off the table. The market can only be decoupled from the system in a rhetorical sense.

But that internal cohesion, which used to rest on the historical legitimacy of our social project, needs to be built on new forms of participation, transparency and public trust. The margin for error has become very narrow. If, when universal subsidies are phased out, there is no Social Protection Fund already operating, the gap between austerity and direct aid could fuel the same social unrest that erupted in July 2021.

The reform will only bring stability if the majority feels that they not only share in their benefits, but also in making the decisions.

Once again, the challenge lies in preventing the economy’s modernisation from leading to a renewed concentration of power, this time under market-based forms. If socialism remains the long-term goal — despite being virtually absent from the measures announced — then political and economic democratisation cannot come after the reform. They must be part of the reform from day one.

What models, formulas or concepts do you think should have been considered?

The debate has been framed incorrectly from the start. We have been led to believe that there are only two paths: either preserve a failed bureaucratic statism or move to an economy increasingly governed by the market. But the problem has never been a choice between the state and market; it is a question of deciding who exercises power over the economy.

If the Cuban experience has demonstrated anything, it is that state ownership, in itself, does not guarantee socialism. A company can be formally state-owned yet operate with its back turned to society. Similarly, allowing for markets does not necessarily mean abandoning a socialist vision. What matters is whether wealth is subject to democratic control or ends up becoming the property of a minority, whether bureaucratic or private.

For example, if state-owned enterprises are granted autonomy, they should also secure worker participation and effective mechanisms for accountability. If the private sector grows, the state must prevent economic success from turning into political power through progressive taxation, anti-monopoly regulations and strict rules against conflicts of interest. If foreign investment plays a greater role, society has the right to know which national priorities that investment intends to serve.

In other words, without democratic checks and balances, the market ceases to be a tool for the country’s development and becomes a mechanism for concentrating wealth and influence.

I would also have placed far greater emphasis on genuinely social forms of ownership, such as cooperatives, worker-managed enterprises, local development initiatives and spaces where communities have a say over the wealth they generate. I am thinking, specifically, of networks of cooperative banks and locally managed municipal development funds, capable of channeling remittances and reinvesting them in the community, rather than channeling them towards private wealth accumulated by a handful of actors. Not because these initiatives replace the state or market, but because they distribute power. Ultimately, that is what socialism is all about: stopping economic power being concentrated in a few hands.

There is also a lesson that Cuba should not lose sight of. All economic transitions give rise to new social classes. While this may be unavoidable, steps should be taken to prevent a new economic elite gradually taking over the state. That risk is even greater in a country where a significant part of the economy has historically been managed by highly concentrated state and corporate structures. Transparency, oversight of government institutions at all levels, a free media and citizen participation are mechanisms for safeguarding the public nature of the nation’s wealth.

Of course, none of these discussions can take place while ignoring the US blockade. Cuba needs to grow under extraordinarily adverse conditions and has the right to seek the economic tools it needs to survive. But precisely because it faces this external pressure, it is even more important to preserve what historically distinguishes the socialist project: the idea that development should serve the majority and not a new privileged minority.

Ultimately, I believe that the real debate is not whether Cuba should resemble China, Vietnam or any other model. The task at hand is how to build an economy capable of generating wealth without abandoning the democratisation of power.

The future of Cuban socialism will not depend solely on how much the economy grows. It will depend on whether those who produce wealth also have a say in decisions about its use. If reforms merely modernise mechanisms of accumulation, but leave existing power relations intact or even reinforce them, they will have changed the economy without transforming what, from a socialist perspective, really matters: who governs the collective wealth and on whose behalf.

 

Sherritt warns of going-concern risk after Trump Cuba sanctions

Bloomberg News | June 26, 2026 

Image from Sherritt International.

A Canadian miner that is one of Cuba’s biggest foreign investors warned investors that its ability to carry on as a going concern is in doubt after Donald Trump expanded US sanctions on the Caribbean nation.

Sherritt International Corp. said its ability to meet or refinance its debt “remains uncertain.” The terms of its C$79.5 million ($56 million) credit facility allow lenders to declare a default and demand early repayment because of the US president’s executive order, which targeted foreign companies operating in the communist-run country.

Sherritt said in interim results published Thursday that it wouldn’t have enough cash to repay if lenders exercised that right, and it would need to seek alternative financing. And in that case, bondholders may also have the right to ask to be repaid early.

The Toronto-based company halted production at its nickel and cobalt mine in eastern Cuba in February because of a dire energy crisis on the island. In May, it delayed the release of its first quarter results after Trump issued his order, and the company’s chief financial officer and auditor resigned.

After initially moving to dissolve its joint venture with a Cuban state-owned company and exit the island, Sherritt announced it had struck a preliminary financing deal to sell a controlling stake to Gillon Capital LLC, the Texas-based family office of a former Trump adviser.

While the Canadian miner entered into exclusive talks with Gillon earlier this month, its operations in Cuba remain shuttered. This week, Sherritt announced it was idling its Alberta refinery — one of only three facilities that processes nickel in North America, and the only one that refines cobalt — because its supply of raw material from Cuba had dried up.

The company “has and will undertake numerous initiatives available to it to continue to strengthen its financial position and enhance liquidity,” Sherritt said. It cited cost and workforce reductions and capital spending cuts, as well as payment deferrals and a recent equity injection.

But the production halt and Trump’s expanded sanctions “result in material uncertainty which may cast significant doubt about the Corporation’s ability to continue as a going concern,” Sherritt said.

(By Stephen Wicary and Sybilla Gross)

 

US sanctions shut Canada’s only cobalt refinery

Staff Writer | June 23, 2026 |

Old Havana. (Stock image by kmiragaya.)

Sherritt International (TSX: S) has begun shutting down its Fort Saskatchewan refinery after expanded US sanctions on Cuba halted the feedstock supply needed to keep the Alberta, Canada facility running.

The Toronto-based nickel and cobalt producer said the transition follows previous guidance that refinery operations would continue only until mid-June based on available inventory. The company has implemented shutdown procedures and will retain the personnel and resources required to keep the facility in a safe and secure state while operations remain suspended.

Sherritt said it is preserving cash, managing costs and preparing the refinery for a potential restart while carrying out maintenance work during the shutdown.

The shutdown marks the latest fallout from Washington’s tougher stance on Cuba and highlights the vulnerability of supply chains that depend on the island’s mining sector. 

Sherritt mined nickel and cobalt at its Moa joint venture in eastern Cuba and processed the material at its refinery near Edmonton.

Impact

The refinery will remain idle until mining and processing activities at Moa resume and the feed pipeline is rebuilt. Sherritt said it cannot provide guidance on when that may occur and continues to suspend its direct participation in the Cuban joint venture.

The company continues to produce fertilizers and sulphuric acid for resale, providing a source of revenue while its core nickel and cobalt operations remain constrained.

Sherritt has faced mounting operational and financial challenges since the US expanded sanctions against Cuba in May. The measures have disrupted the company’s primary source of refinery feed and forced it to focus on preserving cash while preparing for an eventual restart.

 

Cobalt users warn EU health rules threaten minerals supply push

Bloomberg News | June 22, 2026

H.C. Starck tungsten powders. Credit: H.C. Starck Tungsten GmbH

Some of the European Union’s top cobalt users warn that planned rules to protect workers’ health will instead threaten the bloc’s push to bolster its mineral supply chains and industries like energy and defense.

The European Commission will on Tuesday decide whether to approve legislation to reduce workers’ exposure to cobalt dust and particles to safeguard against cancers and other respiratory illnesses. But companies involved in the supply chain say the proposed limits are too strict, costly and challenging to meet, and risk closing businesses and diverting investments away from the EU.

Cobalt is a key metal in electric-vehicle batteries, and is also used in space and defense applications, construction tools, magnets and even animal feed as a vitamin source. The planned health rules come as the EU in 2024 adopted the Critical Raw Materials Act to secure supplies of such metals and reduce dependence on China, which dominates processing.

“The risk is creating a self-defeating mechanism, reducing Europe’s own recycling, refining and processing capacity, while continuing to rely on imported cobalt produced under higher exposure limits elsewhere in the world,” said Mike Blakeney, head of government and public affairs at the Cobalt Institute, an industry group.

Germany’s H.C. Starck Tungsten GmbH, which extracts tungsten from recycled products like carbide tools that often contain cobalt, is among firms concerned that the new rules could undermine the EU’s plan to support its industries. It called the planned legislation “overkill.”

“On the one hand they are trying to support the industry, on the other hand they make sure that you cannot operate any more competitively,” chief executive officer Hady Seyeda said. “The level of safety we have is best in class globally, and to increase that further doesn’t help anybody, because the money and the production will go to areas where it’s less safe.”

The proposed rules will limit workers’ inhalable exposure of cobalt from 20 micrograms per cubic meter to 10 micrograms after a six-year transition period. Similar regulations in China allow 50 micrograms, while US federal law permits 100 micrograms.

The European Chemicals Agency, which provided the scientific basis for the new rules, originally suggested even stronger restrictions. The ECHA told Bloomberg that it makes recommendations based on “hazards and risks, not on possible societal impacts and costs.”

The commission said in an impact assessment last year that 113,000 people are exposed to cobalt dust in the workplace at more than 15,300 companies. About 12 people a year will get lung cancer linked to the exposure and another 100 will get restrictive lung disease, it said. Around 19,000 workers will become ill over the next 40 years if the rules don’t change, according to the assessment.

The proposal “followed a balanced approach to prevent industry closures or major economic setbacks while ensuring adequate protection of workers’ health and safety,” the commission said in an emailed statement on Monday.

The proposed six-year transition is meant to “give the industry more time to adapt to the new occupational exposure limits,” it said, adding that it can revise its directives based on operational realities.

Supporters of the planned law include the European Respiratory Society and the European Cancer Organisation, according to feedback published on the commission’s website in October.

Other users

Finland is the largest cobalt refiner outside of China, where a unit of Jervois Global and Belgium’s Umicore SA have operations.

“There are no established industrial technologies today that operate at that level” of cobalt dust proposed by the rules, said Wouter Ghyoot, vice president of government affairs at Umicore. “Our preference is clearly to continue investing and operating in Europe, the question is ensuring the regulatory framework remains workable in practice.”

Jervois employees use protective equipment when cobalt dust is present and are regularly monitored, said Sami Kallioinen, Jervois Finland’s president and managing director. When test results exceed the set limits, it’s most usually due to human behavior, such as when workers don’t change clothes or smoke with gloves that contain traces of cobalt dust, he said.

Opponents of the planned rules also included Catalysts Europe, the Federation of European Producers of Abrasives, and major German defense company Rheinmetall AG.

“It is clear that the defence supply chain in general will be negatively impacted from stricter rules,” Rheinmetall said in the published feedback.

(By Michael J. Kavanagh and Annie Lee)