The Samson Option: Israel’s Plan to Nuke Its Opponents

What’s ambiguous about Israel’s nuclear policy is not whether the country has these weapons, but how it plans to use them.

ISRAEL IS REPORTED TO HAVE 300 NUKES

By Arvind Dilawar

June 26, 2024

Source: The Progressive





On September 22, 1979, U.S. surveillance satellite “Vela 6911” detected a double flash of light in the Indian Ocean midway between Africa and Antarctica that appeared to be consistent with the detonation of a nuclear weapon. As researchers with the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) note in their paper, “Israeli Nuclear Weapons, 2021,” U.S. intelligence at the time of “the Vela incident” believed the double flash to be an Israeli nuclear test, conducted with logistical support from the Apartheid-era South African government. A panel assembled by President Jimmy Carter, however, rejected this conclusion based on a premise that the Administration knew to be false, but did not want to challenge politically—that Israel did not possess nuclear weapons.

Israeli “nuclear ambiguity,” its lack of official confirmation or denial that it possesses nuclear weapons, persists to this day. Nevertheless, as of 2021, researchers estimate that the country possesses ninety nuclear warheads, capable of being delivered by aircraft, land-based ballistic missiles, and sea-based cruise missiles. Israel is reserving these weapons for “the Samson Option”: an all-out assault on the civilian population centers of its opponents.

Researchers have been able to reconstruct the history and current status of Israel’s nuclear program through declassified materials, as well as statements by Israeli politicians and officers themselves.

“Israeli officials do not explicitly discuss the country’s nuclear doctrine, but the country still needs to implicitly signal the circumstances under which it would use nuclear weapons for deterrence purposes,” says Kelsey Davenport, director of nonproliferation policy at the Arms Control Association, which advocates for nuclear disarmament. “Reading between the lines of statements from former and current officials and military planners provides insights into how the country may use its nuclear weapons, such as the Samson Option.”

In 1999, Israeli-American historian Avner Cohen published Israel and the Bomb, which relied on recently declassified documents from archives in Israel and the United States to piece together the process by which the government of Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion colluded with or deceived U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, French Prime Minister Guy Mollet, and Norwegian Prime Minister Einar Gerhardsen to begin construction of a nuclear reactor in the late 1950s. Ben-Gurion’s government first denied the reactor’s existence, then insisted on its peaceful purposes in scientific research and energy production—all while intending to produce weapons-grade plutonium. Israel may have assembled its first nuclear weapon as early as 1967. It remains the only country in the Middle East with nuclear weapons.

The ambiguity around Israel’s nuclear arsenal also extends to its nuclear doctrine, or the circumstances under which it would choose to deploy nuclear weapons. A previous report from the FAS describes a key component of Israel’s nuclear doctrine as “the Samson Option,” a reference to the biblical figure Samson, who killed himself and his enemies by collapsing the pillars of the temple in which they all stood. The Samson Option similarly invokes murder-suicide, threatening any force that successfully defeats Israel’s conventional military with nuclear retaliation.

“Israel’s policy of never formally acknowledging its nuclear arsenal makes its doctrine ambiguous, but the Samson Option is believed to refer to Israel’s plans for overwhelming nuclear retaliation against non-nuclear adversaries if the country faces an imminent, existential threat,” says Davenport. “It would likely include deliberate, disproportionate nuclear strikes against non-military targets, such as cities, despite the clear violation of international humanitarian law.”

The Samson Option stands in contrast to doctrines embraced by other nuclear powers, such as “Mutually Assured Destruction” (MAD). Developed during the Cold War, MAD posits that nuclear powers like the United States and the Soviet Union could deter each other from ever using nuclear weapons through the threat of retaliatory strikes—that is, if one nuked the other, the other would nuke back, meaning neither would survive. Unlike MAD, Israel’s Samson Option specifically threatens its non-nuclear opponents.

“MAD is designed to deter war or prevent war from escalating to nuclear use,” explains Davenport. “The Samson Option is not designed to deter a nuclear adversary from a first strike or counter strike—Israel is the only nuclear-armed state in the region. Rather, its purported purpose is to ensure Israel’s survival. Under the Samson Option, nuclear weapons would be deliberately used against a non-nuclear adversary as a last resort to prevent an Israeli defeat.”

The events of October 7, as well as the ongoing Israeli genocide in Gaza, reveal the dangers of Israel’s nuclear doctrine. On October 7, conventionally armed Palestinian militants were able to successfully overwhelm defenses at multiple points of the militarized border wall constructed by Israel around Gaza. The Palestinian militants advanced under a barrage of rockets fired from Gaza into Israel—one of which struck an Israeli military base housing nuclear-capable missiles, according to an analysis by The New York Times.

Even after the Israeli military managed to repel the Palestinian militants, at least one Israeli politician called for the use of nuclear weapons against Gaza, as reported by the Associated Press and others. Therefore, the true ambiguity that now remains is not whether Israel possesses nuclear weapons, but how those weapons might be used.

“Israel’s nuclear arsenal does not protect the state against conventional strikes, particularly from non-state actors,” says Davenport. “Furthermore, the irresponsible rhetoric of Israeli politicians threatening to use nuclear weapons against Gaza erodes the taboo against nuclear use and underscores the critical importance of redoubling efforts to reduce nuclear risk and work toward disarmament.”

How Israel Became a Nuclear Power

BYEMMA CLAIRE FOLEY

JACOBIN
06.23.2024

Israel’s nuclear program is its worst-kept secret. It was made possible through the support of Western nations like France and has thrived due to a cynical attitude toward nonproliferation that has made the world more dangerous.

An Israeli soldier rides in a tank near the border with Gaza on October 14, 2023, near Sderot, Israel. (Amir Levy / Getty Images)


Israel’s nuclear weapons program has been an open secret for over fifty years. Declassified documents and the wider availability of satellite imagery has largely been responsible for revealing the extent of the nation’s nuclear program. So too has the courage of whistleblowers such as Mordechai Vanunu, an Israeli nuclear technician who exposed his country’s covert program and was subsequently drugged and kidnapped by Mossad agents in Italy before being secretly tried and sentenced to eighteen years in prison in 1986.

Yet the United States and other nuclear-armed states, as well as a broad range of bodies responsible for monitoring arms proliferation, continue to maintain a policy of not publicly acknowledging the existence of Israel’s nuclear weapons.

These norms of institutional secrecy are surprisingly powerful and far-reaching. US government employees have been fired for referring to Israeli nuclear weapons. Even Wikipedia’s page on the subject uses circuitous language to refer to their existence. (The page is locked to edits from almost all contributors.) This approach is effective: a 2021 poll suggested that more Americans believed that Iran has nuclear weapons than that Israel does, when the reality is the opposite.

This wall of silence has proven remarkably porous. During the early days of Israel’s war on Gaza, government officials openly entertained the possibility of using nuclear weapons on the battlefield, and figures within the US military think tank circuit have wondered whether Israel’s secrecy is doing it more harm than good.

Conventional wisdom about the strategic importance of possessing nuclear weapons is that there’s no reason to have one if you don’t tell anyone. Intimidation is as much a part of deterrence as use. If no one suspects you can respond to an attack with the overwhelming force of a nuclear counterattack, what’s to make them think twice?

But Hezbollah’s continued assault on northern Israel, which has thus far led to the evacuation of over ninety thousand people, gives lie to the notion that possession of nuclear weapons offers complete protection. In a recent speech, Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s secretary general, made it clear that if Israel were to cross what it considers to be red lines, there would be no target within the country safe from a retaliatory response. It is therefore not clear that Israel’s nuclear weapons are on their own preventing it from being attacked in a way that threatens its existence. Israel’s relationship with the United States has, however, afforded it a range of impressive offensive and defensive nonnuclear capabilities, backed up by the even larger looming threat of US military involvement, which it is actively using.

Were the US to enforce its own policies consistently, Israel’s status as a state in possession of nuclear weapons would directly threaten its access to aid. The Glenn Amendment to the US Arms Export Control Act explicitly prohibits arms assistance to and mandates sanctions on countries that have, as Israel did in 1979, tested a nuclear weapon after 1977. But the fact that its nuclear weapons program continues to command this kind of bizarre deference illuminates the forces driving nuclear proliferation around the world.
The Forces Behind Proliferation

Scrupulous nonacknowledgment of Israeli nuclear weapons in the present day is part of the United States’ general position of aiding Israeli military endeavors, regardless of the financial or strategic cost. But the reason Israel has nuclear weapons in the first place has less to do with its relationship with the United States and more to do with the geopolitical forces that have driven proliferation since America first dropped the bomb on Japan.


The program that produced Israel’s nuclear weapons is as old as the state itself. As Avner Cohen details in Israel and the Bomb, a nuclear program was discussed by Israel’s leaders practically from the establishment of the Israeli state in 1948. David Ben-Gurion, the country’s first prime minister, took an intense personal interest in nuclear technologies in particular and science and technology as foundations of modern state power in general.Hezbollah’s continued assault on northern Israel gives lie to the notion that possession of nuclear weapons offers complete protection.

Already in 1949, Israel was conducting exploratory research for potential uranium deposits in the Negev, a desert region in the country’s south. When these proved inadequate, it developed techniques for producing usable nuclear material from the relatively poor resources at its disposal, before turning to the United States as the potential source of the raw materials necessary to jump-start a nuclear program.

But in the immediate postwar years, the United States was unwilling to provide the necessary material without guarantees from Israel that the country’s leaders saw as undesirably inhibiting. Israel instead turned to other small countries with nuclear programs at different stages of development: France and Norway, two of only three European countries in the early 1950s operating nuclear reactors.

Israel and France shared a set of geopolitical interests. Both opposed the government of Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser. The French, motivated by neocolonial idealism, took issue with Nasser for nationalizing the Suez Canal, and Israel of course felt threatened by Nasser’s Arab nationalism.

Skepticism about the possibility that the US nuclear umbrella could actually offer security guarantees also motivated nations like France to advance a Gaullist policy of strategic autonomy. This meant encouraging nuclear proliferation where doing so would secure the broader geopolitical interests of declining powers.
Nonproliferation Amid Great-Power Rivalry

In the present, the United States actively works to shield the Israeli nuclear weapons program from criticism as well as public knowledge. As with France’s hostility to a Nasser-led anti-Western order, the Israeli-US alliance is strongly motivated by fear of Iran, or any other anti-American state, developing its own nuclear program. Yet Israel’s nuclear weapons, along with the substantial, long-term support among a certain segment of the US political class for war with Iran, are two very powerful factors driving Iran to develop its own nuclear weapon.

At present, Iran does not have nuclear weapons, though experts believe that it currently maintains the capability to quickly develop them. President Barack Obama’s 2015 Iran nuclear deal limited Iran’s ability to develop a nuclear weapon and imposed a regime of inspections and oversight which provided assurance to other countries that it was not developing nuclear weapons. But Israel opposed the deal on the grounds that it did not go far enough to preclude the possibility that Iran might one day develop a nuclear weapon — a similar kind of all-or-nothing approach to the one that informed the Donald Trump administration’s decision to exit the agreement in 2018.

As Israel’s war on Gaza continues and expands outward into the broader region, it seems it may only be a matter of time before Iran finally does develop a nuclear weapon. After its recent large-scale rocket attacks against Israel, Iran announced that it might reverse its current voluntary commitment to not developing nuclear weapons should Israel retaliate by hitting its nuclear facilities. It goes without saying that this would make the ongoing conflict between Israel and Iran much more dangerous, giving even low-level incidents the potential to escalate to dramatic and destructive new heights.The United States actively works to shield the Israeli nuclear weapons program from criticism as well as public knowledge.

In effect, unwillingness to commit to nuclear nonproliferation has led to nuclear proliferation. This explains why Saudi Arabia has in recent years betrayed nuclear ambitions. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has stated in US press outlets that Saudi Arabia would develop a nuclear weapon if Iran did so. Yet rather than treating this open disregard for stated US policy as a serious limit on US-Saudi relations, the United States has been pushing for a so-called “normalization” deal between Saudi Arabia and Israel — including a stipulation of a “credible path to a Palestinian state.” Saudi Arabia, in turn, wants the United States to provide it with nuclear technology — ostensibly, of course, for a power program.

The dilemma for America is that whatever interest it does have in nuclear nonproliferation must be balanced against its broader commitment to global hegemony. The latter would be undermined if China, which it now sees as its key competitor, stepped in to provide technical support to fledgling nuclear programs, as it has done with Saudi Arabia. Last year, China sent one of its engineering companies to conduct surveys of the Gulf monarchy’s uranium deposits, although it seems unlikely that these deposits could support a nuclear program of any size.

Nuclear weapons experts have called for safeguards that could prevent the development of a Saudi nuclear weapons program. Yet unlike in the case of Israel’s search for nuclear material, the threat of safeguards doesn’t seem to be a deterrent to the kingdom’s openly stated nuclear ambitions. It sometimes seems that U.S. nuclear weapons policy in 2024 is based on a tacit acceptance of its powerlessness over global nuclear weapons politics. Rather than trying to prevent proliferation, America has been forced to settle for the role of being the primary nuclear patron where it can.
Existential Threats

Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons has been largely irrelevant to the ongoing war in Gaza. The country’s overwhelming conventional capabilities have granted it superiority on the battlefield, at the cost of the lives of tens of thousands of civilians. But possession of nuclear weapons reinforces the worldview that underlies Israel’s political calculations (and to some extent, those of every nuclear-armed country): that its existence is constantly threatened, and it is only rational for it to possess the means of responding to such threats with unlimited force.

It is the states with the most nuclear weapons, Russia and the United States, that most assiduously cling to the logic that weapons of mass destruction are the only safeguard against existential threats. Both have consistently bypassed opportunities to deescalate the very real, immediate risks to human safety and civilization that the continued existence of nuclear weapons poses. In doing so, they’ve set a powerful precedent for every other country in the world to uphold nuclear weapons as the only real guarantor of security.

Without a real commitment to reducing the role of nuclear weapons in global politics by the states that can certainly afford it, this de facto policy encourages nuclear proliferation. Israel’s well-defended status as a nuclear power that need not even announce itself is not an exception, but an example to other states thinking of going nuclear.


CONTRIBUTOR
Emma Claire Foley is a writer and filmmaker based in New York. Her writing and commentary has appeared in Newsweek, NBC, the Guardian, and elsewhere.

Is the drumbeat of war on the Israel/Lebanon front a prelude to all-out war?

TUESDAY 25 JUNE 2024, BY GILBERT ACHCAR

Recent weeks have witnessed a sharp escalation of the exchange of fire between the Lebanese resistance and Israeli forces in South Lebanon/North of the Zionist state. This escalation has been accompanied by an escalation of statements and threats between the two sides, with increasing Israeli threats to launch an all-out war on all areas where Hezbollah is deployed and inflict on them a fate similar to that of the Gaza Strip in terms of the intensity of destruction.

However, while Israeli army sources assert that it is fully prepared to wage this war, these assertions are contradicted by the ongoing efforts to increase the number of mobilized reservists from 300,000 to 350,000 by raising the age of exit from the reserve (from 40 to 41 for soldiers, 45 to 46 for officers and 49 to 50 for specialists such as doctors and aircrew members).

Moreover, these efforts continue to clash with the insistence of the Zionist military command on the need to end the exemption from conscription for ultra-Orthodox yeshiva students, which would increase the number of soldiers without increasing the burden on the families and jobs of the current recruits and hence on the country’s economy. Thus, while efforts to increase mobilization certainly indicate the determination of the military leadership to complete preparations for an all-out war on Lebanon, they indicate at the same time that the escalation of threats from the Israeli side does not reflect a real intention to launch a full-scale war on Lebanon in the current circumstances, especially since everyone realizes that the cost of such a war for the Zionist state will be much higher than the cost of invading Gaza, both in terms of human cost (even if the Zionist army refrains from invading Lebanese territory and limit itself to intensive bombardment, as is likely, the number of bombing casualties inside the State of Israel will inevitably be greater than in the war on Gaza), military cost (the type of equipment the Zionist army will need to use against Hezbollah), or economic cost.

This reality creates a serious problem for Israel, as it cannot wage an all-out war on Lebanon without massive increase in aid from the United States compared to the already great aid provided by Washington in the genocidal war waged on Gaza. Moreover, since Hezbollah is organically linked to Tehran, an all-out war by Zionist forces against Lebanon could expand to include Iran, which could fire rockets and drones into the State of Israel, as it did last April. In light of this dependence of the Israeli attack on US aid, Netanyahu’s sudden escalation of rhetoric against the Biden administration in recent days is further evidence of the Zionist government’s unwillingness to launch an all-out war on Lebanon in the current circumstances, as Netanyahu’s behaviour towards Washington contradicts his army’s need for even more American support than it has received so far.

It has thus become clear that Netanyahu is betting on Donald Trump’s winning a second term in the US elections scheduled for early November. He is acting like a gambler who decided to throw everything he had on the table playing double or quits. Besides, Netanyahu is politically benefiting from the escalation of tensions between him and the Biden administration, which increases his popularity by portraying him as a Zionist ruler who stands up to external pressures even in the most difficult circumstances. He is preparing for a new round of this political game by showing the significant political support that he enjoys in the US Congress against the Biden administration when he goes to Washington to deliver his fourth speech to a joint session of the House of Representatives and the Senate on July 24.

If Trump wins the election, Netanyahu will be looking for a support free from the kind of limitation and pressure that the Biden administration has recently tried to impose on him. If Trump fails to win, Netanyahu is likely to negotiate with the Biden administration and the Zionist opposition to obtain guarantees enabling him to break his reliance on the Zionist far right in his government and form a “national unity” cabinet that he would head until the next elections in 2026. The opposition, for its part, will certainly try to get rid of him, by splitting the coalition on which his current government is based in the Knesset and forcing early elections.

Do not think however that the political struggle within the Zionist political elite is between hawks and doves: it is rather between hawks and vultures. Both sides, Netanyahu and the opposition, believe that there is no third option on their northern front but for Hezbollah to acquiesce and accept to withdraw north in implementation of Resolution 1701 adopted by the UN Security Council following the 33-day war in 2006, or for them to wage a fierce war against Hezbollah at a high cost, which they all see as necessary in order to reinforce their state’s deterrent capacity, significantly diminished on the Lebanese front since 7 October.

25 June 2024

Souce Gilbert Achcar’s blog.

P.S.

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ATTACHED DOCUMENTS

• is-the-drumbeat-of-war-on-the-israel-lebanon-front-a_a8570.pdf (PDF - 907.4 KIB)
  Extraction PDF [->article8570]

Palestine

• Truce in Gaza and the dilemmas faced by Netanyahu and Hamas
• Rafah and El Fasher: Genocidal War and Duty of Solidarity
• The “Antisemitism” Smear Weaponized
• Palestine Solidarity Student Movement in the USA: An Overview
• Palestine’s fate in light of the onslaught on Gaza

Israel

• "Tehran found itself backed into a corner by the attack on its consulate."
• “Germany Canceled Me for Supporting Palestine”
• Israeli Attack on World Central Kitchen: Biden Takes Harder Line, U.S. Support for Israel’s War Continues, So Do Protests
• For the right to self-determination of Palestinians, for the withdrawal of imperialist forces from the Middle East
• What Genocide Looks Like

Lebanon

• Impact of Israeli Genocidal War in Gaza on the Middle East
• Hezbollah is increasingly isolated in the Middle East
• A persistent political and economic crisis in Lebanon
• Continuous Crisis in Lebanon
• The Other Regional Counter-Revolution: Iran’s Role in the Shifting Political Landscape of the Middle East

• Gilbert Achcar

  Gilbert Achcar grew up in Lebanon. He is currently Professor of Development Studies and International Relations at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) in London. A regular and historical contributor to the press of the Fourth International, his books include The Clash of Barbarisms. The Making of the New World Disorder (2006), The Arabs and the Shoah. The Arab-Israeli War of Narrations (2012), The People Wants. A Radical Exploration of the Arab Uprising (2022). His most recent book – The New Cold War. United States, Russia and China, from Kosovo to Ukraine was published in 2023. He is a member of Anti*Capitalist Resistance in Britain.

Seagrass Meadows are Rapidly Expanding Near Inhabited Islands in Maldives – Here’s Why

By Matthew Floyd

June 25, 2024
Source: The Conversation


Image by Matthew Floyd



Swimming through the crystal clear waters of the Maldives, a nation renowned for its marine life, it could be easy to forget that these delicate ecosystems stand on the frontline of climate change and that seagrass habitats are in crisis globally.

Now, my research, which combined hundreds of hours of fieldwork with thousands of satellite images, has uncovered something unexpected: Maldivian seagrasses have expanded three-fold over the last two decades – and island populations could be playing a part.

I also discovered that seagrass is surprisingly three times more likely to be found next to inhabited islands, rather than uninhabited. So this flowering plant seems to benefit from living in seas close to humans.

Seagrasses grow along coasts all around the world. They can help guard against climate change yet they are frequently underappreciated. In the Maldives, seagrass meadows are dug up to maintain the iconic white beaches that are a frequent feature of honeymoon photos.

Important marine habitats have declined in the Maldives. Amid this backdrop of environmental uncertainty, I have spent more than three years studying seagrasses here alongside a team of scientists. We found that seagrasses are faring remarkably well and one of the most plausible drivers could be the supply of nutrients from densely populated areas, such as tourist resorts.

Every day, human activities could provide valuable nutrients for seagrass habitats in an otherwise nutrient limited environment. Food waste is traditionally discarded into the sea from the beach and rain can wash excess fertilisers from farmland into the ocean. As human populations and fertiliser use have both increased, we suspect that seagrass meadows have started to thrive and expand as a result of this increased nutrient supply.

Additionally, building work around islands may create more suitable habitats for seagrass. Land reclamation is widespread across the country as the population has expanded by 474% since 1960.

During this development, sand is dug up from the seabed and some inevitably spills into the water. The structure of seagrass meadows can slow down local water currents, promoting suspended sand grains to sink and creating more sediment for future generations of seagrass to grow into.

Currently, nutrient inputs seem to be creating just the right conditions for seagrasses. But if nutrients continue to increase, there is a risk that the seagrasses will be outcompeted by seaweeds and smothered. Continued land reclamation works that disregard seagrass may also remove this important habitat. So the future of this Maldivian success story may therefore largely lie in our hands.
The ecotourism paradox

Although seagrass removal has done little to curb habitat expansion, it highlights a troubled relationship with the tourism industry upon which so many jobs in the Maldives depend. Because it can ultimately make water depths shallower, seagrass can limit boat access and mooring, and therefore interfere with daily life. The proliferation of seagrass in areas of domestic refuse has understandably damaged its image in the eyes of the public.

But, by making coastal waters shallower, seagrasses reinforce coastal protection. And by growing close to refuse sites, they absorb excess nutrients and clean the water of pathogens. Despite being a vital tool in the fight against climate change, seagrass clearly has an image problem on the islands.

As a marine ecologist, I firmly believe that conservation scientists – and ecotourists – have an important role to play in conveying the value of seagrasses. Conservationists must also fully appreciate the challenges that meadow expansion can bring to local communities, and understand how the needs of conservation and tourism may differ.

There is hope. A campaign called #ProtectMaldivesSeagrass, recently launched by Blue Marine Foundation and Maldives Underwater Initiative, led to 37 resorts (out of a total of 168) pledging to protect their seagrass meadows. Additionally, the data from my research can be used to protect seagrass habitats and quantify their value to people and nature.

Hopefully, the unexpected – yet welcome – success of seagrass in the Maldives is a cause for conservation optimism. And perhaps tourist resorts can learn to love their newly expanding neighbours.

Activist Diary #2: Life as an Activist

By Peter Bohmer

June 25, 2024

Source: Originally published by Z. Feel free to share widely.


Image by Peter Bohmer, in Greece



“If there is no struggle, there is no progress. Those who profess to favor freedom and yet deprecate agitation are men who want crops without plowing the ground. They want rain without thunder and lightning. They want the ocean without the roar of its mighty waters.” Frederick Douglass

I have been an activist for reform and revolutionary transformation since 1967. For me, being an activist has meant directly involving myself in activities groups, and organizations in order to change policies at a local and national level and to raise consciousness about the causes, consequences and solutions to poverty and the inequality of income and wealth, police brutality and repression, U.S. militarism and intervention in other countries, climate justice, for quality health care and housing for all, and for reproductive rights. This in addition to solidarity with liberation struggles and ending capitalism and ending capitalist alienation, exploitation, and oppression. Being anti-racist has also been central to my theory and practice since the 1960’s, strongly influenced by the Civil Rights and Black Freedom Movement and in the 1970’s, the Chicano and American Indian Movement (AIM).

Here are five key moments, examples from the 1960’s in furthering my lifelong commitment to activism for a better world.

Vietnam Summer, 1967

This was my first organizing experience although I had attended a few anti-Vietnam war and civil rights demonstrations and SDS meetings before. We first educated ourselves at the Vietnam Sumer office in Boston about the history of Vietnam and French and U.S. colonialism there. I remember then going door to door and asking people if they were willing to discuss the Vietnam War. In 1967, most people who answered the door supported the war and thought opposing the US war against Vietnam as being disloyal to US troops (this changed substantially after the 1968 Tet offensive in Vietnam). If people were interested in talking with us and possibly opposing the US role, we asked them to invite their neighbors and we presented a slide show about the war followed by a discussion. We then asked the people if they opposed the Vietnam war to actively show their opposition in a way that they decided on. Common was a visit with the assembled group to their Congressperson’s office to express their opposition to the US war against Vietnam. We stayed in touch with them.

I was shy at first and would only go door to door with a more experienced organizer, but I increasingly found my voice. It has never left. One of the key organizers, Mike Ferber, suggested I read two books, The Political Economy of Growth by Paul Baran and Monopoly Capital by Paul Sweezy and Paul Baran. These books changed my life as I was by this time although not earlier, ready to integrate their analysis into my very being. Both books showed the limits of reform, the irrationality of capitalism, and how much of the wealth in the U.S. and Western Europe came from extracting the surplus (wealth) from what we called the Third World and now call the Global South. Having a political economic analysis has been one reason for my continued activism. Anger at injustice and excitement are not enough. I also saw first-hand how people can change but we have to go out to meet them, not expect them to come to our events.

March on the Pentagon, 1967

In October 1967, there was a large, well over a hundred thousand people protesting the Vietnam War in a march from Washington DC to the Pentagon. Just before 5 PM when our permit ended, civil rights activist and comedian Dick Gregory asked if we were going to be just 9-5 protesters and what was more important the law or justice. I was very moved. Since then, I have always prioritized justice over what is legal. Everyone I had come with, we were from Boston, returned to DC then where we were staying. I decided to stay at the Pentagon as did 10,000 others. It was the demonstration where protesters, mainly women, put flowers on the bayonets of the military police (MP) guarding the Pentagon and tried to talk to the soldiers; almost all refused. I was inspired by the community that formed among us resisters: welcoming, sharing food and stories. Many had driven east from the recently completed, “Stop the Draft Week” in Oakland, CA. Many of us burned our draft cards.

At about 9 PM, the last camera left, the British BBC. After that the military police turned violent, beating people with their bayonets on the grass by the Pentagon. A few of us, a small minority fought back. What also affected me was that James Reston, the major NY Times reporter and friend of the powerful and wealthy wrote, shortly thereafter on the front page of the NY Times that the demonstrators had turned violent. I had seen the opposite and when I found out that Reston had been in Denver the day of the march although his article implied, he was at the Pentagon. My belief in the objectivity of the New York Times was forever shattered. I continue to read the NEW York Times but since than always critically.

Noam Chomsky, 1968

In spring, 1968, I took a class at MIT where I was a graduate student in economics with Noam Chomsky and Louis Kampf, “Intellectuals and Social Change”. It furthered my transition to becoming a lifelong radical left activist. By radical I mean going to the root of then problem, which I consider to be capitalism, and seeing fundamental change coming primarily from the bottom up.

Noam Chomsky has been a big influence in my life. I have learned so much from Noam Chomsky, much more than in this paragraph. I learned that building strong and growing social movements and protests in the streets are more important in changing policy, such as ending the Vietnam war, than trying to convince politicians through arguments and lobbying, or electing liberal politicians. I also learned that claims of expertise and saying we should unquestionably accept the so-called experts are used to justify policies such as carrying out the Vietnam War in order to silence dissenting voices and to delegitimize grass roots movements. Similarly, the term, national interest, or the assertion, “this war serves the national interest” is usually used to disguise the interests of the capitalist class. The interests of working people diverge from those with economic power. Thank you, Noam!

Chicago, 1968

Another formative event was the 1968 Democratic Party Convention in Chicago. I had planned to go but was working with a group, Mothers for Adequate Welfare, a branch of the National Welfare Rights Organization. We were demanding a guaranteed income of $6500 for a family of four (about $40,000 in today’s prices). This was an early form of a Universal Basic Income (UBI). I hadn’t finished writing my report to the Boston City Council at the time the buses were leaving from Boston to Chicago so I couldn’t go. I remember watching the convention every night that August at a bar in Brattleboro, Vermont. I was enraged each night at the beatings of protesters by the Chicago Police under the orders of Mayor Richard Daley and of the nomination of Vice President Hubert Humphrey, a Democrat who had publicly supported the Vietnam war. This reinforced my perspective that ending the war was not going to come from within the Democratic Party even though the majority of the country now opposed it.

I realized that anger and rage at injustice are important and necessary fuel for long-term activism, although hopefully our anger is primarily directed at structures of oppression and those with economic and political power—and not at someone who has cut us off driving. Continuing anger at injustice is an important factor in my continuing activism up to and including the present. Today my central focus is directed towards ending U.S. support for Israel, and in solidarity with the Palestinian struggle against the Israeli War and Israeli Occupation. As I write this on May 11, 2024, the growing and inspiring student movement in solidarity with Palestine and against U.S. and university complicity with Israel and U.S support for Israel, reminds me of 1968, e.g., the Columbia University uprising, and the upcoming Democratic Party Convention in Chicago that plans to nominate another pro war President, Biden. I expect massive protests at the 2024 Chicago Democratic Party Convention this August although hope that US support for Israel stops by then and that there is a permanent cease fire. The global movement in support of Palestine although not yet sufficient to change U.S. and especially, Israeli policy is so important.

Anti-Imperialist Coalition in Boston, 1969

I was active in the fall of 1969 in an anti-imperialist coalition in Boston, The November Action Coalition (NAC) Our focus was ending the direct support of MIT for the US military in Vietnam, i.e., developing weapons systems for them. We blocked the entrance to one of the main MIT weapons labs, The Instrumentation Lab, until the police forced us away from the entrance, their clubs swinging.

One of the member groups of NAC was the Boston Black Panther Party (BPP) which I respected and learned from. Impressive to me was their free breakfast program in Roxbury and their organizing of low-income Black youth. The murder of 21-year-old leader of the Chicago BPP, Fred Hampton on December 4, 1969, affected me more than any of the many assassinations in the 1960’s. The willingness of the US government to kill revolutionaries especially Black leaders had become even more apparent. I remember being depressed and not being able to get out of bed for a few days after Fred Hampton’s brutal murder by the state and thinking because I was white, I was somewhat safer. I thought about the level of my commitment to transforming the U.S. Reflecting deeply on his assassination furthered my commitment to ending racial capitalism even if it meant serious risks.

It has made anti-racism and solidarity with people of color and movements, then called, Third World people, inside and outside of the United States, central to my theory and associated practice. So has solidarity with societies such as Cuba defending themselves from the U.S. war and blockade against them. Fred Hampton Presente!

Another group within the November Action Coalition (NAC), whose theory and practice have influenced me in a major way was Bread and Roses, a socialist women’s liberation organization. Bread and Roses differentiated itself from left organizations who claimed a women’s organization or women’s caucus was unnecessary or divisive, and from other women’s groups that claimed women could not work with men. Within NAC, Bread and Roses won their demands to be able to caucus at any time which would temporarily halt the meeting, and that all the leadership committees such as the steering, tactics, and media committees be at least one-half women. Bread and Roses challenged sexism within NAC and in the society. They were socialist and feminist, an anti-imperialist women’s group both within NAC and beyond. Bread and Roses was autonomous rather than separatist. The concept of autonomy together with principled unity, e.g., working against all forms of oppression in a group with the goal of unity, are a central part of my perspective and organizing.

Conclusion

Our activism makes a difference; we usually win less than what we demand but nevertheless the gains matter. Those who concede will never admit that raising the social cost to them of continuing oppressive policies was the cause of their conceding, but this is often the case. By social cost, I mean that the cost, not mainly in dollars, but loss of legitimacy of the elites and the growth of anti-capitalist movements, causes them to concede, at least partially. This is because the social cost of not conceding begins to threaten their rule. An example is the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa from 1976 to the early 1990’s, where those in power in South Africa increasingly feared not only losing their political power but also their economic power if they didn’t release ANC leaders including Nelson Mandela from prison and concede to elections where the Black population could vote, i.e., universal suffrage. I was active in the anti-apartheid movement in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, and especially in Pittsburgh from 1984 to 1987 with a strong multi-racial group, Pittsburghers Against Apartheid. We contributed to the end of apartheid, an important victory led by the people and movements inside South Africa although structural racism continues there and whites still have most of the economic power in a very unequal capitalist economy.

I have continued to be active from 1967 to the present and will continue to be so. I advocate for a participatory socialist society. Check out the group Real Utopia, realutopia.org, that I am a member of. I am anti-capitalist but equally important for me and necessary and desirable is to be for a liberatory and ecological socialist alternative on a global level.

Although I have suffered some serious repression, it has not been a sacrifice to be an activist. Most of my closest friends are people I have been active in the struggle with. We have accomplished some real gains although they are never permanent as we can see in the current growth of authoritarian, racist, patriarchal, anti LGBT, anti-environmental and anti-immigrant movements, and political parties such as the Republican Party and similar authoritarian anti-immigrant parities globally. Being involved and active in the struggle for societal liberation has kept me young in spirit. I can look myself better in the mirror, and it has given my life more meaning.

Free Palestine!

Si se puede!

Peter Bohmer is a member of Real Utopia, Economics for Everyone (E4E), and Palestine Action of South Sound (PASS). He is Faculty Emeritus in Political Economy at The Evergreen State College.


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Peter BohmerWebsite

Peter Bohmer has been an activist in movements for radical social change since 1967, which have included anti-racist organizing and solidarity movements with the people of Vietnam, Southern Africa, Puerto Rico, Cuba, Palestine and Central America. For his activism and teaching, he was targeted by the FBI. He was a member of the faculty at the Evergreen State College in Olympia, WA from 1987 to 2021 where he taught political economy. He believes alternatives to capitalism are desirable and possible. Peter is the proud parent of a daughter and three sons.

Dynamics of the Polycrisis

By Jeremy Brecher
Senior Strategic Advisor, LNS Co-Founder

June 26, 202
Source: STRIKE!



Listen to the audio version >>

“Polycrisis” is a word that has recently come into use to characterize the way crises in many different spheres – ranging from geopolitics and economics to climate and pandemic – are aggravating each other and even converging. This commentary, the second in a series on “The Polycrisis and the Global Green New Deal,” gives an overview of polycrisis dynamics. Subsequent commentaries in this series will look at some of these dynamics in greater depth and at how the polycrisis can be addressed by the development of a global insurgency and a multi-level Green New Deal.




“Polycrisis” is a buzzword, but one that, like “globalization” a few decades ago, captures something important about what is going on in the world. Crises can no longer be understood as crises “in” international relations, economics, governance, or climate. Rather, the crises in these different spheres are increasingly aspects of the polycrisis.

The key concept for the polycrisis is interaction. It cannot be understood by simple cause-and-effect models within a single sector or even within the world order as a whole. The interaction of forces, acts, and events determines its patterns and its course.

There are many dynamics operating within the polycrisis; this commentary focuses on some of the most important ones. Obviously, others could be listed as well – and still others are likely to emerge as the polycrisis proceeds. However, these should be enough to show why no single aspect of the crisis in the world order can be understood, let alone addressed, without regard to the others.

There are contradictory tendencies both within and among these dynamics. For example, there is a fracturing of globalization but at the same time continued growth in world trade and the concentration of global economic power. Such contradictions make it of limited value to extrapolate these polycrisis dynamics into longer-term trends, other than the probability of increasing conflict and chaos.

I will sometimes use categories like geopolitics, deglobalization, governance, and climate. These are meant merely as categories of convenience. They are simply loose groupings of loosely related phenomena. They are not intended as analytical categories for understanding the polycrisis. On the contrary, the polycrisis is defined by the extent to which its dynamics cross all such categories.

Many topics will reemerge repeatedly both in this Commentary and throughout this series. That is a necessary consequence of the intertwined, interactive character of the polycrisis. Here is a synopsis of some of them.

Unleashed warfare: The past two years have seen more violent conflict than at any time since the end of World War II, according to the Uppsala conflict data program.[1] Great power rivalry has rapidly moved from a period of relative détente and unipolar US dominance, through the rising tensions of “the new cold war,” to direct military engagement with great power surrogates in Ukraine, the Asian Pacific, and the Middle East. The three great powers, China, Russia, and the US, are cajoling and bribing lesser countries to join their blocs. Lesser countries are resisting, trying to support each other in that resistance, playing off great powers against each other, and trying to make a cafeteria of alliances with different powers in different arenas. The whole dynamic has the eerie appearance of choosing up sides for World War III.

Vicious circles of conflict: While great powers may perceive their own actions, such as augmenting preparation for war, as defensive, they are often perceived by their opponents as aggressive and threatening. They may therefore be met with actions that further escalate conflict. The result is an interactive “vicious circle” of escalation. This process can often lead to results that are intended by nobody but that have devastating consequences for the protagonists as well as for bystanders – World War I is often held up as a classic example. The current arms race and expansion of weapons production is another obvious example. Threats to use nuclear weapons from officials in Russia and Israel, along with the termination of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty — the cornerstone of the transition from the Cold War to an international arms control regime – indicate where such uncontrolled escalating conflict is headed. The cycle of escalation can be seen in the threat by France that NATO troops might be sent to Ukraine, followed by Russia’s counter-threat that NATO troops in Ukraine would mean war with Russia with a high risk of nuclear war that would destroy Europe.

Breakdown of international cooperation: The world’s great problems can only be addressed through international cooperation. Such cooperation has never been strong but it has been real, operating through the various branches of the United Nations, through cooperation among governments, and through international organizations of many kinds. But even this weak cooperation has been undermined by the predominance of geopolitics and other aspects of the polycrisis. This is evident in the arena of security, where periodic attempts at international cooperation have been blocked by the ambitions of the great powers. It is obvious in the failure of international cooperation to protect the earth’s climate. It is apparent in the decline of economic cooperation and the rise of economic nationalism and rival blocs. It is clear in the failure of global public health cooperation in the face of the COVID pandemic and the weakness of subsequent cooperation to prevent or contain future pandemics. And it is revealed in the failure to control the widely recognized threats of new technologies, such as nanotechnology, drones, and Artificial Intelligence.

Thucydides trap: At the end of the Cold War the US had its “unipolar moment” of global hegemony, but now faces economic, political, and military challenges from countries around the world. While no power currently seeks to replace the US as global hegemon, many countries and regions are resisting the efforts of the US to control them. In a pattern well-known in history and often characterized as the “Thucydides trap,” the rising wealth and power of China is coming into conflict with the desire of a hegemonic United States to maintain its global dominance. The polycrisis is greatly aggravated by the US belief that the loss of US domination is the cause of the polycrisis and that restoring unipolarity and global domination is both feasible and the key to overcoming the polycrisis. In reality, no increase in US geopolitical and military power is likely to contain let alone reverse the polycrisis. Conversely, there is little reason to believe the polycrisis can be resolved simply by weakening US power and replacing it with a polycentric world order of less great but still self-aggrandizing states.

War crime wave: Mass atrocity violence has grown rapidly, due to the proliferation of wars, the support by the geopolitically motivated great powers for their own and their allies’ war crimes, and the abandonment of UN and other international implementations of the “duty to protect.” The killing of 1,200 Israelis, followed by the killing of more than 36,000 (and counting) Palestinians. These war crimes followed the mass killing of civilians in Syria and Ukraine, the internment of one million Uyghurs and other Muslims in China, war crimes in Ethiopia, ethnic cleansing in Sudan’s Darfur province, and the displacement of two million Rohingya and other Muslims in Myanmar. Kate Ferguson of the NGO Protection Approaches says, “We face the likelihood that this violence is going to characterize the next political era. In fact, I wonder if we’re not already in that era.”[2]

Fragmented globalization: For the four decades after 1980 a process of economic globalization increasingly integrated the global economy. Soviet, Chinese, and US trade blocs largely dissolved. Companies moved production around the globe to wherever labor, environmental, and other costs were lowest. Production developed into a transnational “global assembly line.” Huge financial flows raced around the globe – often producing global financial crises. International trade agreements and institutions like NAFTA and the World Trade Organization moved the world toward a single little-regulated market. But, largely as a result of growing economic nationalism and burgeoning great power conflict, economic warfare has broken out among the great powers. The US is trying to hobble Chinese economic development, for example by its “chip war” intended to prevent China from accessing advanced computer chip technology. In the context of the Ukraine war, the EU and Russia have battled over energy trade. US industrial policy to subsidize “green” production in the US has been seen in Europe as the opening of a trade war to make European clean energy goods uncompetitive in the US market. While this process is sometimes described as “deglobalization,” in fact transnational economic activity continues to grow, but in the form of a struggle to control fragmented transnational economic networks.




“Deglobalization” is not, however, leading to a restoration of the integrated national economies that preceded the era of globalization; in 2023 goods traded across borders reached an all-time high.[3] Rather, deglobalization is leading to bullying designed to line up countries in support of one or another superpower. For example, US semiconductor companies, at the instigation of the US government, recently coerced a Persian Gulf technology company to break off cooperation with Chinese manufacturers. While such coercive “friendshoring” could potentially lead to the re-emergence of trade blocs, at present it is creating more of an economic war of all against all. Lesser countries and businesses seek to “mix and match” their allegiances, but they meet heavy pressure to choose up sides.

Geopolitics trumps all: Deglobalization is part of a broader trend: the subsumption of the economic and indeed all else to the geopolitical conflict of the great powers. The slogan of the Clinton era, “It’s the economy, stupid!” is being reversed to read “It’s the enemy, stupid!” Whether in trade, health, energy, or political alliances, geopolitical “necessities” are increasingly overriding all other public, and even private, interests.

Inequality: The dynamics of plutocratic policymaking, crony capitalism, deregulation, detaxation, and subsidy of fossil fuels and the wealthy are driving more extreme inequality. Despite the fragmentation of globalization, global concentration and centralization of capital continue apace; consider, for example, Nippon’s pending purchase of U.S. Steel. Since 1995, the share of global wealth possessed by billionaires has tripled, from 1% to over 3%; 2020 marked the steepest increase in global billionaires’ share of wealth on record. The share of wealth of the global top 0.01% rose from 7% in 1995 to 11% in 2021. Over the past two decades the gap between the average incomes of the top 10% and the bottom 50% of individuals within countries has almost doubled. The share of income presently captured by the poorest half of the world’s people is about half what it was 200 years ago. The poorest half of the world’s people own just 2% of total wealth, while the richest 10% of the global population own 76%.[4]

Democracy deficit: Ostensibly most of the world’s governments are in some sense democracies. The great majority of them hold some kind of elections that purportedly select their national leaders. Historically the extent to which ordinary people have been able to influence the actions of their governments has varied from country to country and from time to time. However, everywhere at all times it has been quite limited, even in the most “democratic” countries. The ability of ordinary people to make governments serve their interests and wishes has sharply diminished throughout the world. The dominance of neoliberal practice has delegitimated action by government to serve public purposes. The capacity of governments to shape social realities has declined in tandem. With the worldwide concentration of wealth and the power it provides, most governments have moved closer to what can be described without exaggeration as plutocracies, in which actual power resides with a tiny minority of wealthy individuals and organizations. The inability of government to provide benefits for ordinary people has led to deep popular alienation from the institutions of government and politics. At the supranational level, there is little if any institutionalized opportunity for ordinary people to affect global governance and the world order.

Rise of fascist and para-fascist movements: Extreme right and fascist movements have arisen in many places around the world and have won governing authority or participation in governing coalitions in Argentina, Italy, Poland, Sweden, Finland, Russia, India, and Israel – not to mention the once and perhaps future President Donald Trump in the US. While these movements vary somewhat from country to country, they have strong common themes, including fear of and hostility toward immigrants; anti-feminism, homophobia and transphobia; and a backlash against perceived progressive social change, such as the now worldwide “war on woke.”[5] All scorn democratic principles; encourage violence; scapegoat disempowered social groups; follow charismatic leaders; and whip up a mass base.[6] These movements are linking up through international organizations and networks and are providing each other support.


Climate crisis: The last months of 2023 were the hottest in 125,000 years. Global warming is causing heat waves, disease outbreaks, floods, droughts, and melting of Arctic and Antarctic ice caps. The longer-term business-as-usual structure of the world order, with its nation-state rivalry, great power dominance, drive for unlimited capital accumulation, domination of governments by fossil fuel interests and the wealthy, and pathetically inadequate capacity to represent global human interests, has been more than adequate to promote the continuation and expansion of fossil fuel extraction and burning. But the polycrisis is aggravating the climate crisis and making it more intractable. For example, after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, government financing for fossil fuels increased sharply and subsidies almost doubled from 2020 rates.[7] Meanwhile, the climate crisis is aggravating other aspects of the polycrisis. Drought in Panama, for example, has cut the number of ships that can go through the Panama Canal by half, aggravating supply chain pressures and therefore inflation.[8] Desertification has forced mass migration, which in turn has provided fodder for anti-immigrant fascist and para-fascist movements in the US, Europe, and elsewhere. The earth has recently passed a number of irreversible climate “tipping points” that will guarantee additional global warming even if fossil fuel burning is reduced.

Incoherence: In the complex, contradictory, chaotic world of the polycrisis, apparent trends and tendencies conflict. In that context, policies of nation states and other actors are likely to be incoherent and even self-contradictory, producing unintended side effects far different from their intent. For example, US interest in a two-state solution in Palestine has been combined with unwavering support for an Israel that has said it will oppose a two-state solution under all conditions. A purported commitment to reducing greenhouse gas emissions has been combined with a licensing of huge fossil fuel extraction projects in Alaska and the Gulf South.

Unpredictability: The polycrisis as a whole and the interaction of its different elements make rational anticipation of future developments extremely difficult. Consider the unanticipated eruption of the COVID pandemic; the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war; and the war and genocide in Gaza. The subsidies and trade barriers the US erected to block import of “green” goods from China also caused disruption in the economies of its European allies. European restrictions on Russian fossil fuel exports led to a boom in Russian energy sales in the rest of the world. US support for Israeli genocide in Gaza led to unanticipated attacks in the Red Sea by the Houthi.

While all these examples could to some extent have been predicted, they were no more certain than many other events that were just as reasonably predicted, but that did not in fact transpire. In 2023 escalating conflict between the US and China over Taiwan and massive currency defaults were both widely predicted, for example, but did not transpire. The policies of Donald Trump during his presidency were so self-contradictory and erratic that efforts at predicting them would have been absurd; the same applies to a possible future Trump presidency. (Such wild shifts and inexplicabilities have been normal in past fascist regimes.) Perhaps the only thing that can be confidently predicted in the polycrisis is the likelihood of intensified unpredictability.

Decline of social learning: Governments and societies can learn from the feedback from their actions. After the devastation of the Great Depression, countries around the world adopted financial regulation and Keynesian budgetary policies to stabilize the growth of their economies. After coming to the verge of nuclear holocaust in the Cuban Missile Crisis, US President John Kennedy backed away from Cold War belligerence and moved toward advocating a form of common security; the US and the Soviet Union began moving toward détente and arms control. After the string of financial crises that culminated in the Great Recession, many developing countries began accumulating financial reserves to protect against currency crises. But so far there is scant evidence of any social learning regarding the dynamics of the polycrisis. Military build-ups and aggression seem to be met with arms races and further aggression. The cascading evidence of climate catastrophe is met by doubling down on fossil fuel extraction and burning. No feedback loops seem to connect these actual results to the actors and actions that could correct their causes.

The folly factor: Perhaps the most pervasive dynamic of the polycrisis is folly. Rational pursuit of self-interest has become increasingly scarce in the polycrisis. This is evident in the incoherent, self-contradictory, foolish behavior of powerful institutions. Governments and corporations pursue expansion of fossil fuel extraction and burning even though they have every reason to know that it will lead to their own destruction. Countries engage in military build-ups, even though they have every reason to know that they will only provoke reciprocal build-ups among their opponents, leading to augmented mutual threat. Corporations fight to dismantle financial regulation, even though experience has shown that such deregulation will lead to greater financial crashes. But it is also folly for the people of the world to acquiesce or even participate in the destruction of our world. To engage in actions every day that may be intended to provide a better life, but that in practice are destroying the very basis of wellbeing for ourselves and our progeny. To allow ourselves to be sucked along by the blandishments of the powerful.

While folly has been an abiding feature of human life, today’s polycrisis grows out of and also augments the fundamental folly that, in today’s world, self-preservation can be attained without common preservation.[9]

Fixing one or another aspects of the polycrisis is unlikely to establish stability, let alone sustainability or justice. Nor is change – even revolutionary change — in one or another nation likely to long resist the dynamics of the polycrisis. There is little reason to think that the disordering of the world order will automatically lead to socialism or some other possibly more positive alternative. But the polycrisis does foreclose some old and open some new possibilities for collective action. We will explore these in later commentaries in this series.


[1] Uppsala conflict data program, Uppsala conflict data program. See also Paul Post, “Not a World War, But a World at War,” The Atlantic, November 17, 2023 https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2023/11/conflicts-around-the-world-peak/676029/#

[2] Julian Borger. “World Faces ‘Heightened Risk’ of Mass Atrocities due to Global Inaction.” The Guardian, December 8, 2023, sec. Law. https://www.theguardian.com/law/2023/dec/08/un-and-us-efforts-to-stop-mass-atrocities-have-waned-activists-warn.

[3] Tim Sahay. “A Year in Crises.” Phenomenal World. December 21, 2023. https://www.phenomenalworld.org/analysis/a-year-in-crises/.

[4] World Inequality Report. “The World #InequalityReport 2022 Presents the Most Up-To-Date & Complete Data on Inequality Worldwide”: World Inequality Report 2022. October 9, 2021. https://wir2022.wid.world/executive-summary/.

[5] Walden Bello, “Fascism 101: Why We Need to Spell It out ” 2023. Portside.org. December 22, 2023. https://portside.org/2023-12-22/fascism-101-why-we-need-spell-it-out?utm_source=portside-general&utm_medium=email

[6] Alberto Toscano, “The Rise of the Far Right Is a Global Phenomenon.” In These Times, November 21, 2023. https://inthesetimes.com/article/global-far-right-meloni-milei-putin-bannon-orban?link_id=5&can_id=1058857240102273c369153e44c89a13&source=email-escalating-settler-violence-in-the-west-bank-dont-pave-paradise-your-neighbor-the-nuke-maker&email_referrer=email_2139925&email_subject=donald-trump-makes-a-mockery-of-populism-why-workers-are-dying-from-heat.

[7] Fiona Harvey, “World behind on almost every policy required to cut carbon emissions, research finds.” The Guardian, November 14, 2023. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/nov/14/world-behind-on-almost-every-policy-required-to-cut-carbon-emissions-research-finds.

[8] Jonathan Yerushalmy. “Changing Climate Casts a Shadow over the Future of the Panama Canal – and Global Trade.” The Guardian, December 22, 2023. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/dec/22/changing-climate-casts-a-shadow-over-the-future-of-the-panama-canal-and-global-trade.

[9] Jeremy Brecher, Common Preservation in a Time of Mutual Destruction (Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2021). Many of the systems concepts that underlie the interpretation in this commentary are developed further in this book.

Jeremy Brecher is a historian, author, and co-founder of the Labor Network for Sustainability. He has been active in peace, labor, environmental, and other social movements for more than half a century. Brecher is the author of more than a dozen books on labor and social movements, including Strike! and Global Village or Global Pillage and the winner of five regional Emmy awards for his documentary movie work.