It’s possible that I shall make an ass of myself. But in that case one can always get out of it with a little dialectic. I have, of course, so worded my proposition as to be right either way (K.Marx, Letter to F.Engels on the Indian Mutiny)
Posidonia 2024: once more, the global maritime community gathered in Athens to celebrate the shipping industry’s achievements and discuss its outlook (and party incessantly) amid extremely healthy markets across all segments. Smiling faces dominated all events, though there was a clear understanding that the colossal liquidity amassed during the last few years - even after the significant debt prepayments - should stay largely intact within each respective company’s balance sheet.
But the industry is also perplexed: Where should all this liquidity be invested? Granted, it is better to be perplexed when the Clarksea index hovers around $27,000 rather than when it is stuck at $7,000, but the reasons to worry about the day after are very good indeed.
Simply put, the investment strategy seems largely dominated by the decarbonization process. But the path to 2050 net-zero level is not only extremely narrow, but also needs to be coordinated holistically. No single industry, shipping included, is an island, and no single industry can become a net-zero contributor on its own. Progress in shipping depends on advances in other sectors, with shipping being on the receiving end rather than on the controlling one.
And here lies the first challenge: global decarbonization is progressing dramatically slower than people may think. For every Denmark-like success, energy consumers elsewhere manage to more than counter it by increasing their fossil fuel consumption. IEA’s forecast for coal consumption in 2050, based on current policy settings (below), barely brings it back to about 2000 levels. In this projection, natural gas and oil consumption remain at about today’s levels for decades to come.
If we want to stick to the 2050 zero carbon goal, we need annual investment in clean energy of about $10 trillion a year. Every year [1]. Until 2050. This represents about 10% of the current global GDP, maybe 7.5% if growth is taken into consideration. This is a colossal amount of money to be spent in an internationally coordinated way. One can see why one could be sceptical of the chances of the world getting there within schedule.
The second problem lies with the financiers: there is certainly enough capital around to finance all decent shipping projects (though it is still important to pick the right financing counterparty). But despite some modest initiatives, financiers do not seem overly keen to finance the excess cost of new technology, or to offer materially more competitive terms to the shipping companies that are brave enough to be at the sharp end of the technological spectrum, unless there are significant and tangible benefits from the expected cashflows.
Which leads to the third problem: the market has neither universally recognized the value of most new technologies nor -even more critically - decided how to split it between the charterers and the owners (not to mention that no one has asked the end consumers how much they are willing to contribute).
These three challenges significantly affect the pace of change both at a global level and at the microcosm of shipping, leaving investors in a trilemma:
Do they “bite the bullet” and order some expensive newbuild vessels (adopting technically and commercially untested technologies), deliverable just in time for the Los Angeles Olympic Games?
Do they focus on currently available vessels and use the healthy markets’ revenues to finance either the acquisition of more modern ones or the enhancement of the ones they already own, to keep abreast of the current regulations?
Do they simply keep milking their existing vessels and wait for a regulatory arbitrage, expecting that “something’s got to give” and hoping that that “something” will be the pace of implementation of these regulations?
Most people are aware of - and agreeable to - the strategy of the guy who wore running shoes for a savannah trip (“I don’t need to outrun the lion; I just have to outrun you!”). I am not sure whether everyone agrees on what the “running shoes” in this case are. In fact, different shipping companies may come to different conclusions, each one relevant in their case. What is for sure is that different pairs of running shoes will lead to significantly different outcomes, especially since no one knows yet what kind of terrain the shipping industry will need to run on. Or even if it will have to run, jog or simply walk.
Dimitri G. Vassilacos is a Partner at Ship Finance Solutions (SFS), a boutique financial consulting firm specializing in the shipping sector. Prior to that, he held a variety of positions during a 20-year-long career in the banking sector, including Managing Director & Head of Greek Shipping at Citibank and Manager of the Shipping Division at National Bank of Greece.
[1] McKinsey and Company (2022). The Net Zero Transition: What It Would Cost, What It Could Bring.
The opinions expressed herein are the author's and not necessarily those of The Maritime Executive.
U.S. Court Refuses Request to Auction Off Seized Russian Yacht
A federal district court has refused a request from the U.S. Justice Department to allow the sale of the seized Russian megayacht Amadea. The decision means that the U.S. government will continue to pay millions of dollars a year for the vessel's upkeep until the case is concluded.
The vessel at the center of the case is the Amadea, a 350-foot megayacht valued at an estimated $300 million. U.S. authorities believe that her true owner is Suleiman Kerimov, a sanctioned Russian billionaire with connections to Russian President Vladimir Putin.
According to the U.S. Marshals Service, the vessel costs about $600,000 a month in upkeep, including $360,000 for the crew, $75,000 for fuel for the generators, and about $165,000 for maintenance and miscellaneous expenses. Insurance adds another $140,000 a month, and the next drydocking will cost more than $5 million. Taken altogether, the federal government could spend about $14 million on the vessel this year alone.
This may seem like a large sum, but to meet the legal standard for a forced sale of the vessel, the government would have to prove that the amount is "excessive." Last week, the U.S. District Court of the Southern District of New York ruled that the Justice Department had not met this bar.
"The court must not look solely at the total dollar amount of the maintenance costs, but must principally consider whether those amounts are more than what is usual as compared to the maintenance costs for other similar yachts," wrote District Judge Dale Ho. "The court is wary of relying solely on maintenance costs to justify sale, when those costs represent a small fraction of the value of the [yacht] and do not appear to be atypical for property of this type."
Ho's decision is the latest twist in a long-running legal saga, which began in Fiji two years ago. In April 2022, the Amadea sailed into Lautoka, Fiji, where U.S. authorities were waiting with a court order to detain and search her. (Among other things, they found what may or may not be a real Faberge egg on board.)
Amadea in Fiji (U.S. Department of Justice)
The vessel's holding company filed a suit in Fijian courts to block the seizure, arguing that the true owner is not Kerimov, but a different wealthy Russian - former Rosneft executive Eduard Khudainatov, who is not under sanctions.
The FBI and the Department of Justice were able to convince Fijian courts that Khudainatov was a "straw owner," without real ties to the vessel. With permission to seize the yacht secured, FBI agents boarded Amadea in Lautoka and set sail for San Diego. The yacht has been berthed on the U.S. West Coast ever since, and the Justice Department and the vessel holding company continue to battle over the yacht's future in federal court.
ECOCIDE
Report: Control Transfer Error Sent a Trawler Into the Side of a Tug
Red diesel spills into the water from the tug Shovette as another tug works to stabilize it (MAIB)
The UK's Marine Accident Investigation Bureau (MAIB) has released its report into an allision between a trawler and a moored tug at the port of Hull in 2022. The accident was caused by a mismatch between the controllable pitch propeller's control levers when transferring control from the bridge to the engine room, according to the agency.
On June 24, 2022, the Kirkella returned from a fishing voyage and transited up the Humber to her usual berth at King George Dock in Hull. The master took the helm control at the starboard wing station for berthing. At about 0531, the master berthed the vessel alongside the pier in the southeastern corner of the terminal, without incident. The crew passed lines over to the dock, and the vessel was securely tied up by 0606, with two head lines, two stern lines and four spring lines. The crew began running out the gangway.
At 0611, with the voyage fully over, the master began the sequence for shutting down the ship's engines. He transferred helm control to the center console, and then transferred control to the engine room. The first engineer was on duty in the engine control room and pressed a touchscreen button to accept control of propulsion. The engine control room's pitch control lever was set at 85 percent, and the propeller shifted to match this (unintended and unwanted) "ahead" setting.
Seconds later, the Kirkella began to move ahead. The first officer was on the bridge and noticed almost immediately, and raised the alarm, just in time to watch the stern lines part. The master called the engine room to order an engine shutdown, and he hit the emergency stop button on the center console to declutch the engine.
The ship's momentum continued to carry her forward, parting two more mooring lines and dragging the gangway off the dock. Within 10 seconds, the bow of Kirkella hit the moored harbor tug Shovette amidships, below the waterline. The tug began spilling diesel into the harbor and taking on water, but the swift response of another local tug prevented it from capsizing and sinking.
Illustration courtesy MAIB
The MAIB's investigation homed in on the vessel's propulsion control system, a sophisticated Rolls-Royce Helicon-X3 installed during outfitting in Norway in 2018. The Helicon-X3 is an advanced design typically used for complex DP vessels that require digital control of multiple thrusters.
SOLAS rules and IACS universal rules require an interlock to prevent sudden propulsion control changes when transferring control between consoles. According to the system's operating manual, it did not have an interlock to prevent control switching between the bridge and engine room consoles when the propulsion pitch control lever positions differed between the sending end and the receiving end. The Rolls-Royce design was approved by class in 2016, and the vessel's specific unit passed factory acceptance testing.
The bridge officers were used to the lack of an interlock, and they always set the controls to "stop" before switching consoles in order to prevent an abrupt change; this was an informal practice and was not documented in procedures. On the day of the casualty, the first engineer was busy with administrative work and accepted the transfer of control from the bridge to his station without noticing that the pitch control setting on his console was at 85 percent - a predictable human error, made more likely by a long 12-hour shift and by a lack of formal procedure, according to MAIB.
"As fitted to Kirkella, the Rolls-Royce Helicon-X3 propulsion control system did not align to the standard of [IACS] UR M43.12, which required a means to prevent significant alteration of the propelling thrust when transferring control," MAIB concluded. "The Rolls-Royce Helicon-X3 propulsion control system had been fitted to other vessels with remote control stations in the engine control room. Those systems might also not align with the requirement of UR M43.12."
The MAIB has issued a notice to industry operators about this potential issue, and the shipowner has asked the OEM to change Kirkella's propulsion controls to retrofit an interlock.
WWIII
Report: China Coast Guard Stole Two Philippine Boats, Dumped Cargo
China Coast Guard boats intercept Philippine Navy rubber launches at Second Thomas Shoal in a previous incident, June 2024 (AFP file image)
The altercation between Chinese and Philippine forces at Second Thomas Shoal earlier this week was much more serious than previously reported, officials in Manila acknowledged on Tuesday.
The Philippine armed forces have confirmed that a Filipino soldier had been severely injured when a China Coast Guard boat carried out an "intentional high-speed ramming" at Second Thomas Shoal early Monday morning. In an update Tuesday, two Philippine officials quietly acknowledged that at least eight soldiers were injured, including one who was seriously injured - and that the China Coast Guard towed off two Philippine Navy rubber boats.
According to the AP, two Philippine Navy boats were ferrying supplies to the outpost aboard the grounded landing ship BRP Sierra Madre when they were intercepted by several China Coast Guard speedboats. An altercation ensued, involving a "scuffle" and several collisions. In the fray, a Philippine servicemember lost a thumb, two officials told AP on condition of anonymity.
Contrary to previous formal statements, the officials said that the Philippine Coast Guard was present at the scene and moved in to rescue the injured personnel.
After the encounter, the China Coast Guard towed off the two rubber boats, dumped the contents over the side - including firearms - and abandoned them. Philippine Navy forces later recovered the boats, but not all of the cargo.
If the new account is accurate, the run-in is by far the most serious incident yet at Second Thomas Shoal, a contested flashpoint claimed by China and occupied by the Philippines (with international diplomatic and legal recognition). China has accused the Philippines of starting Monday's confrontation, alleging that Philippine vessels "dangerously approached a Chinese vessel in normal navigation in an unprofessional manner, resulting in a collision."
The AFP blamed the China Coast Guard for the incident and demanded de-escalation from the Chinese side.
"The CCG’s continued aggressive behavior and unprofessional conduct towards a legitimate humanitarian mission is unacceptable. They must restrain themselves to avoid escalating tensions," the Armed Forces of the Philippines said in a statement Tuesday evening.
The U.S. Department of State affirmed America's continued support of Philippine sovereignty and security, as guaranteed by the U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty. Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell reiterated that the treaty covers "armed attacks on Philippine armed forces . . . anywhere in the South China Sea."
Fears of Chinese activity off Luzon
Separately, local fishermen on the west coast of Luzon told Philippine outlet GMA that they spotted a suspected Chinese vessel within 20 nautical miles of the nation's main island - far closer in than Chinese forces normally venture.
"Last week we really saw [them] - they also disappeared so fast but it was scary," one fisherman told GMA.
Local residents are aware of the China Coast Guard's newly-enacted rules of engagement, which allow the CCG to arrest anyone suspected of breaking Chinese law in the Philippine exclusive economic zone. The measure allows the CCG to detain suspects for up to 60 days without charges. As a precaution, some fishermen are staying away from their traditional fishing grounds at Scarborough Shoal, a reef off Luzon that has been occupied by Chinese forces for 10 years.
"Maybe we will be caught and taken to China, so we will just be patient," Jeffrey Elad, President of the Tropical Fish Gatherer Association, told GMA.
U.S. Marine Corps carries out shore battery exercises on Luzon
On Monday, I Marine Expeditionary Force announced that a joint U.S. and Philippine force carried out a live-fire event off the coast of Cape Bojeador, on the northeast corner of Luzon. U.S. Marine Corps units provided coordination, and the Philippine Marine Corps (PMC) carried out artillery strikes on "staged maritime targets" about four miles offshore.
In an area just to the south, four U.S. Marine Corps F-35 fighters out of Clark Air Force Base conducted strikes on practice targets about three miles offshore. "The areas utilized for the littoral live-fire events were within Philippine territorial waters and stringent safety precautions were taken to ensure safe and responsible training execution," the Marine Corps said in a statement.
China's Coast Guard is Deliberately Creating Legal Ambiguity
A China Coast Guard servicemember threatens a Philippine soldier with an axe, June 17 (AFP)
While laws should provide clarity and transparency, China’s recent orders regarding maritime jurisdiction appear to be deliberately based on ambiguity and uncertainty. This has become very evident in the past day after the latest clash with the Philippines in the South China Sea.
In seeking to gradually expand China’s maritime jurisdiction, the Chinese Communist Party last month announced the “Provisions on Administrative Enforcement Procedures for Coast Guard Agencies 2024”, known as CCG Order #3. This order gives China Coast Guard commanders significant new powers under Chinese domestic legislation, following the 2021 “Coast Guard Law of the People’s Republic of China” (CCG Law).
Ostensibly an effort to put a legal framework around China Coast Guard operations, the new law notably does not use accepted terms defined under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, such as “Territorial Sea” or “Exclusive Economic Zone”. To do so would have imposed clearly articulated rights and responsibilities, clarifying how China sees the maritime zones it claims. Instead, the CCG Law uses vague and uncertain language such as “sea areas under the jurisdiction of the People’s Republic of China” (Articles 3, 12) and participation “in major maritime rights protection” (Article 15), phrases which are not defined.
Adding to the uncertainty, it also allows for the use of force by coast guard vessels for acts that infringe on China’s national sovereignty or jurisdiction (Article 23).
The Chinese position is that the UN convention is only one tool in governing maritime affairs and that its scope is limited, allowing the CCP to claim “historical rights” that predate the convention. This claim was rejected by an international tribunal in 2016 – proceedings China refused to participate in – which also rejected the concept of the “nine-dash line” that underpins much of China’s maritime discussion.
Why is this important? CCG Order #3 entered force on 15 June 2024 and authorizes coast guard commanders to detain foreign vessels and persons in “waters under Chinese jurisdiction” for up to 30 days and 60 days if the issue is “complicated” (Article 257). In essence, this will allow the China Coast Guard to detain vessels on what the rest of the world views as high seas and in the EEZs of foreign countries where, under the UN convention, they enjoy high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight. Importantly, it also does not distinguish between state-owned and commercial vessels, leaving the option open for foreign coast guards or even naval vessels to be detained under the regulation.
CCP Order #3 is just the next step in the CCP’s drive to extend its control over the South China Sea. This effort has multiple prongs, including the re-writing of history, an increasingly assertive on-water presence, diplomatic and economic coercion, and the selective use of legal tools to seek advantage.
China has a history of using international law in ways that suit its interests. It cites the law to draw attention to others or facilitate its own actions when to its advantage, but claims the law is irrelevant when its actions violate those same laws. This is the very essence of “lawfare”. There are myriad examples of the CCP protesting the United States and other nations’ lawful naval activities (including Australian), yet they see no issue with their intelligence vessels monitoring major Western military exercises such as RIMPAC (from within the US EEZ) and Talisman Sabre (from within Australia’s EEZ). The United States and Australia do not protest these actions as they are lawful under the UN convention.
The timing of China’s announcement is also telling, coming just after a civilian-led “peace and solidarity resupply mission” to Scarborough Shoal and a massive Chinese drill designed to test People’s Liberation Army and China Coast Guard coordination in isolating Taiwan.
Indeed, just two days after CCG Order #3 went into effect, we saw more aggressive Chinese action against Philippine vessels attempting a re-supply mission, this time resulting in reported injuries to Philippine sailors. It is also worth noting that unlike the coast guards of most nations, which fall under civil authorities outside wartime, the China Coast Guard was transferred to the People’s Armed Police in 2018, reporting to the Central Military Commission, and is hence effectively under permanent military control.
CCG Order #3 is just another example of China’s attempts to exploit ambiguity whereby all aspects of national power – in the maritime sense, its navy, coast guard, People’s Armed Force Maritime Militia, fishing fleets and merchant marine – are coordinated in the pursuit of military objectives.
Some have called for the China Coast Guard to be formally declared a military service. But one way to reduce the power of CCP ambiguity while retaining the moral and legal distinction between civil and military affairs is for Western countries to collectively announce what types of behaviors will be treated as military activities, regardless of the vessels that undertake them. That way, much of the power of ambiguity upon which CCG Order #3 relies would be removed.
Peter Leavy retired from the Royal Australian Navy in 2024 after 40 years of service. He commanded HMAS Stuart and HMAS Sydney as well as the Australian Defence Force Academy. He also served as Australia’s naval attache to the United States and worked in the Navy’s strategic policy and futures area. He is a PhD candidate with the National Security College at the Australian National University, researching contemporary maritime strategies for medium powers and is the President of the Australian Naval Institute.
This article appears courtesy of The Lowy Interpreter and may be found in its original form here.
The opinions expressed herein are the author's and not necessarily those of The Maritime Executive.
MSC’s Investment in Hamburg Port Nears Final Vote in Parliament
Hamburg's Parliament needs to approve MSC's investment in the port (CC0 1.0)
The controversial plan for MSC Mediterranean Shipping Company to acquire approximately half of the Hamburg port operator Hamburger Hafen und Logistik AG (HHLA) cleared another hurdle although it still faces significant challenges before gaining government approval. While proponents hope to approve the deal before July 10 and the final session of Parliament before the summer recess, a right-wing political faction still looks to stall the approval.
Under the plan put forward in September 2023, MSC would acquire 49 percent of HHLA and form a new working relationship with the City of Hamburg for the strategy and management of the port company. Advocates cite the strong commitment from MSC to grow its volume in the port while citing that Hamburg faces stiff competition and has been losing market share in containers. The City would reduce its ownership position from approximately 70 percent to 51 percent. MSC has already acquired more than 20 percent of the shares through market purchases and a tender offer.
Critics had hoped to derail the approval process last week by pushing for a public hearing on the matter. The Budget Committee of Parliament held the hearing on Thursday with the presentations lasting for nearly six and a half hours. There were 35 speakers, mostly dockworkers, trade unionists, and from activist and environmental groups. Media reports are that none of the speakers were in favor of the transaction citing concerns over jobs, oversight of the operation, and security. There were also dockworkers protesting outside the building.
In a surprise move, the Budget Committee voted along party lines and approved the transaction at the end of the hearing. Opponents had hoped the requirement for the public meeting would delay the vote. Previously, the economic committee and the public enterprise committee also approved the sale of the HHLA.
The final approval now goes to the full Hamburg Parliament. As a city-state, Hamburg has a Parliament with more than 120 representatives elected by the citizens as well as the Senate. The Senate is in favor of the deal but the AfD political faction has thrown up a last-minute roadblock to the approval calling for a public referendum. Spokespeople for the right-wing political group contend something this significant requires the voice of the people. A two-thirds majority of the Parliament is required to call for a citizen’s referendum and if approved it can not take place for at least four months.
It is expected the deal will be presented to the Parliament ahead of the July 10 recess as the final approval step for MSC to proceed with the investment. Parliament will have to decide first if it should proceed to a public referendum. They have till July 10 to make their decision, or otherwise, the city Parliament will go into recess until September 4.
Former BVI Port Authority Director Sentenced in Drug Smuggling Scheme
Former director of the BVI Ports Authority was sentenced to jail for her role in a cocaine smuggling plot (BVI file photo)
A judge in a Miami, Florida court on Thursday, June 20, sentenced the former BVI Ports Authority Managing Director Oleanvine Pickering-Maynard to jail for her role in a drug smuggling and money laundering scheme that also involved the now convicted and former BVI Premier Andrew Fahie. Maynard had agreed to plead guilty along with her son Kadeem Maynard, and in exchange for her testifying against the former premier, received a reduced sentence.
They were all arrested in April 2022 after months of plotting a scheme that would have brought shipments of up to 3,000 kg of cocaine at a time into the port of Tortola. They believed they were speaking with a member of Mexico's notorious Sinaloa Cartel, who was offering them half a million dollars and 12 percent of the take in exchange for docking the ship to give it legitimacy before proceeding to the United States. The individual turned out to be a U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration informant who met Maynard. She later introduced the individual to Fahie.
Maynard had been named to the position of Managing Director of the BVI Ports Authority in 2021 with a charge to increase efficiencies through technology implementation and facility upgrades. The port is a popular cruise destination reporting more than 720,000 passengers annually as well as handling 180,000 ferry passengers each year. The cargo operation handles more than 300,000 tonnes annually. She took over at a time when the port and island were attempting to recover from the COVID-19 pandemic.
Maynard pleaded guilty to a single count of conspiracy to import more than five kilos of cocaine. The money laundering and racketeering charges were dropped. During the court case, she called the former premier “a little crook,” while he was caught on tape bragging about his role in smuggling cases. He had been a prominent politician since 1999 and served as premier between 2019 and 2022.
During the trial, his lawyers contended he was being politically framed. He said he had a minor role and that Maynard was the one responsible for getting the licenses for the ships smuggling the cocaine. The jury convicted Fahie and he is awaiting sentencing currently scheduled for August. He faces at least 10 years in jail.
Maynard, age 62, was sentenced to nine years and four months, below the recommendation to the court of 11 years, three months and 14 years. She will also have five years of supervised release. Her son Kadeem Maynard was sentenced in November 20223 to 57 months in jail.
A ship found far off Israel's coast could shed light on the navigation skills of ancient mariners
This photo released by Israel's Antiquities Authority (IAA) on Thursday, June 20, 2024 shows the control room of the Energean Star ship that mounted an operation to retrieve cargo that was carried on the world's oldest known deep-sea ship, as seen some 90 kilometres off of the Israeli coastline.
(Emil Aladjem/Israel Antiquities Authority via AP)
A company drilling for natural gas off the coast of northern Israel discovered a 3,300-year-old ship and its cargo, one of the oldest known examples of a ship sailing far from land, the Israel Antiquities Authority said Thursday.
The discovery of the late Bronze Age ship so far out at sea indicates that the navigation abilities of ancient seafarers were more advanced than previously thought because they could travel without a line of sight to land, the IAA said.
The great depth at which the ship was found means it has been left undisturbed by waves, currents or fishermen over the millennia, offering greater potential for research, it said.
"The discovery of this boat now changes our entire understanding of ancient mariner abilities. It is the very first to be found at such a great distance with no line of sight to any landmass," said Jacob Sharvit, head of the IAA marine unit, adding that two similar ships from the same era had been discovered previously, but only close to shore.
Sharvit said the assumption by researchers until now has been that trade during that era was conducted by boats sailing close to the shore, keeping an eye on land while moving from port to port. He said the newly discovered boat's sailors probably used the sun and the stars to find their way.
The wooden ship sank about 90 kilometers (55 miles) off Israel's Mediterranean coast and was discovered at a depth of 1,800 meters (1.1 miles) by Energean, a natural gas company which operates a number of deep-sea natural gas fields in Israel's territorial waters.
In its work, Energean said it uses a submersible robot to scour the sea floor. About a year ago, it came across the 12 to 14 meter (39 to 45 foot) -long ship buried under the muddy bottom, nestled under hundreds of jugs that were thousands of years old.
The boat and its cargo were fully intact, the IAA said, adding that the vessel appeared to have sunk either in a storm or after coming under attack by pirates.
The ship for now is not being retrieved.
Energean worked with the IAA to retrieve two of the jugs, which were likely used for carrying oil, wine or fruit, and bring them to the surface for research.
The IAA identified the jugs as Canaanite, a people who resided in the lands abutting the eastern Mediterranean.
Explainer: Deep-sea mining
With the future of mineral mining on the ocean floor remaining contested and murky, Dialogue Earth digs into the debates
The deep sea is an underwater world scientists are still trying to fathom. It is also a reserve of increasingly sought-after minerals that are critical for modern life, making it a site of major competition for resources. Some governments are gearing up to exploit the seabed, while others want such deep-sea mining halted until its risks to marine life and the environment are better understood.
As the debate escalates, Dialogue Earth breaks down what is known about the uncharted waters of deep-sea mining.
Mining the deep sea involves extracting mineral deposits from seabeds at more than 200 metres below the surface. This area covers around 65% of the planet and harbours a rich diversity of species, many still unknown to science. It encompasses geological features including mountain ranges, plateaus, volcanic peaks, canyons, vast abyssal plains and chasms including the Mariana Trench, which is home to the deepest point of the ocean, at 11,000 metres.
While commercial mining is still a prospect rather than a reality, experimental deep-sea mining has already taken place. The process usually involves deploying seafloor vehicles to dredge or sever seabed formations and scooping or suctioning up mineral-rich deposits to a support vessel, where they can be stored, processed and transported to shore. (Source: The Pew Charitable Trusts & New Zealand Environment Guide. Graphic: Ed Harrison / Dialogue Earth) What are deep-sea miners after?
Would-be miners are targeting nickel, copper, cobalt, manganese, zinc, silver and gold. These are so-called “critical minerals” – metals essential to modern technology and widely used in the manufacture of smartphones, laptops, solar panels, wind turbines and electric vehicles. Attention is focused on three types of marine mineral deposits: polymetallic nodules found lying on the seafloor; polymetallic sulphides known as “seafloor massive sulphide deposits” that form around active, high-temperature hydrothermal vents; and cobalt-rich ferromanganese crusts that cover underwater mountains known as seamounts. Graphic: Ed Harrison / Dialogue Earth
Advocates argue that the deep sea could be a reliable, clean and ethical alternative to terrestrial sources. Opponents have environmental concerns and say projections of the need for deep-sea minerals may be wildly optimistic, and that demand can be met by known terrestrial resources and more advanced recycling of metals. How might deep-sea mining affect the ocean?
Scraping the ocean floor to extract resources could destroy deep-sea homes of octopuses, sponges and other species. Mining hydrothermal vents would require removing entire vent structures, which can support thriving animal communities. Exploiting cobalt-rich crusts deposited on seamounts would potentially remove fauna found there and on the seafloor, which could do similar or even more damage to bottom trawling.
Secondary impacts are also possible. Mining would produce sediment plumes, some of which could be toxic and smother animals downstream. Noise and light pollution caused by mining could disrupt deep-sea communities uniquely adapted to high pressures and the lack of sunlight. Deep-sea animal communities are often slow growing and could take decades – even centuries – to recover from disturbance.
Is mining already taking place?
Shallow-water mining for sand, tin and diamonds is already happening around the world. Some deep-sea mining exploration has taken place to scope for mining potential and test equipment, both within areas under national control and in international waters. But mining has yet to be conducted commercially.
Countries have the rights to explore and exploit the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil within their territorial sea and exclusive economic zone (EEZ), which normally extends 200 nautical miles beyond a nation’s territorial sea. Nations can claim rights over even more seabed on the continental shelf under certain circumstances. Norway and the Cook Islands are among the nations actively pursuing mining in the waters under their control.
As for seabeds beyond national jurisdiction, the UN stipulates that they belong to no individual nation and are the “common heritage of mankind”; any activities carried out there must therefore be for “the benefit of mankind”. Full-scale mining in these areas cannot begin until the International Seabed Authority signs off a binding code on how it should be conducted.
What is the International Seabed Authority?
The International Seabed Authority (ISA) is an intergovernmental organisation based in Kingston, Jamaica, that has been tasked with developing a code to regulate the exploitation of minerals in international waters. It was established under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and counts all 168 signatories as member states, including the EU.
To date, it has issued 31 contracts for mining exploration in high seas areas totalling more than 1 million square kilometres. Over half of the exploration contracts are for polymetallic nodules in the area between Hawaii, Kiribati, and Mexico in the Pacific Ocean, known as the Clarion-Clipperton Zone (CCZ).
The ISA has since 2014 been working on a code for deep sea mining, and some nations and businesses are putting increasing pressure on the body to finalise these regulations. In 2021, the small Pacific island state of Nauru invoked a never-before-used ISA rule that compels the authority to allow mining to proceed within two years under whatever regulations are in place at the time. The regulations were still far from complete when the two-year rule expired.
Any exploitation license applications submitted under the two-year rule still have to be approved by the ISA, and it is very unlikely this will happen before the regulations are finalised. During the regulator’s meeting in July 2023, delegates agreed to a non-legal binding target of working “with a view” to completing the rules by July 2025.
Who wants to mine?
The list of would-be deep-sea miners includes private businesses, state-owned companies and governments, including those of China, India, Japan, Russia and South Korea. Some nations have teamed up: the Interoceanmetal Joint Organization is a consortium formed of Bulgaria, Cuba, the Czech Republic, Poland, Russia and Slovakia. Small island states which control significant amounts of seabed are also keen to engage in mining, including the Cook Islands, Kiribati, Nauru, Singapore and Tonga.
Some nations are further ahead than others. The Cook Islands has already offered licences to three companies to study the feasibility of mining seabed minerals in its territorial waters. Norway’s parliament decided to open its extended continental shelf for deep-sea mining exploration earlier this year (this area goes beyond its territorial waters but falls under Norwegian control due to UN rules). The government says any extraction plans require approval from the energy ministry and the parliament, and only “sustainable and responsible” projects will be permitted.
Who is against mining?
An increasing number of nations are cautioning against starting commercial deep-sea mining without a better understanding of its impacts. To date, 25 countries have called for pauses or a full ban, including Brazil, Canada, Denmark, France, Fiji, Germany, Mexico and the UK.
Scientists concerned about potentially irreparable damage to ecosystems say not enough is known about deep-sea species and ecosystems to establish an adequate baseline against which to protect them or monitor the impact of mining. Conflicts between mining and other ocean activities could also occur as proposed mining areas overlap with shipping routes, fishing grounds, and areas bio-prospected for genetic resources. The increase in marine traffic and mining waste discharge could disrupt the primary productivity of the food web (the rate at which energy is converted to organic substances by organisms), and potentially affect fish populations.
Major companies, including Google, Samsung, Patagonia, BMW, Volvo and Volkswagen Group, have backed a call from the WWF for a temporary ban. These companies have pledged to ensure minerals extracted from the deep sea are not used in their products.
A sea star 2,500 meters beneath the central Pacific Ocean turns its stomach inside out to feed on Victorgorgia coral (Image: NOAA)
Where does China stand?
China holds five out of the 31 ISA exploration contracts, the most of any country. Several of its national research institutions, universities and state-owned companies have built up their technical capability for deep-sea exploitation, in part as a hedge against high reliance on imported strategic minerals. Recently, Qingdao and Shanghai’s municipal governments have also begun exploring opportunities to boost related research.
In 2016, the country adopted a Deep Sea Law to set regulations for deep-sea exploration and exploitation activities, including licensing, environmental impact assessments and monitoring requirements. China’s representatives at the ISA have been actively engaged in the mining regulation negotiations, pushing back on a discussion of a moratorium on mining during the ISA talks in July 2023. Beijing said the ISA was established to regulate seabed activities by setting out rules for mineral exploitation and protecting the deep sea environment
Some marine engineering researchers suggest more effort and investment is needed from the nation for it to catch up with progress in technological and equipment development achieved by Europe, Japan and South Korea.
When could commercial mining start?
For mining rights in international waters to be granted, contractors will have to conduct environmental impact assessments in line with ISA rules. They also need to demonstrate financial and technological capacity to actually undertake proposed mining activities. Nauru’s invocation of the ISA law means that contractors can now apply for mining licenses. But applications are unlikely to be approved by the authority before it finalises the rules, regulations and procedures. Member nations have agreed to work towards adopting the rules by July 2025, but many representatives have expressed doubt that the body will be able to meet a non-binding timeline.
To date, no party has submitted a mining licence to the ISA. But Nauru could be the first to start commercial exploitation. It is a sponsoring state for Nauru Ocean Resources Inc (NORI), a wholly owned subsidiary of The Metals Company. The company, based in Canada, says NORI intends to apply for an exploitation contract following the next ISA meeting in July 2024, and expects to be in production in late 2025.
This is an updated version of the explainer, which was first published in February 2019 and last updated in November 2021.
Regina Lam is an ocean and special projects assistant editor at Dialogue Earth, based in London. She joined in 2021 and has worked at major Hong Kong newspapers and has reported for the BBC World Service. She holds an MSc in global affairs from King’s College London. Regina is interested in global ocean governance, environmental justice and what makes compelling storytelling and robust investigation in environmental journalism. She speaks Cantonese, Mandarin and English. Jessica Aldred is former special projects (oceans) editor at Dialogue Earth
Lithuania at Leading Edge Building First Hydrogen-Electric Powered Ship
Lithuania started construction of a hydrogen-electric powered harbor craft (Klaipeda State Seaport Authority)
The Lithuanian shipping industry is joining the leading edge of the industry becoming one of the first to be building a hydrogen-electric powered ship. While the technology is viewed with great promise only a few ships have moved into construction using hydrogen fuel cells combined with batteries.
The construction of the country’s first hydrogen-electric ship began at Western Baltija Shipbuilding (WBS) with a keel laying ceremony. Commissioned by the Klaipeda State Seaport Authority, this ship is a harbor craft designed for waste management.
"I am glad that this modern vessel, which meets the highest environmental protection requirements, is being built in Klaipeda,” said Lithuanian Minister of Transport and Communications Marius Skuodis. “This is extremely relevant and significant not only for Lithuania but also on a global scale."
Today’s symbolic keel laying ceremony is an integral part of the shipbuilding process. The first block of the vessel has been completed. They marked the occasion with a special plate decorated with three coins that was attached to the block.
The tanker will be 138 feet (42 meters) long and 33 feet (10 meters) wide with a capacity to collect 400 cubic meters of liquid waste. It will be equipped with two electric motors powered by batteries with a capacity of 2000 kWh and an installed on-board hydrogen fuel cell system. Depending on the intensity of work, the ship will be able to operate within the Port of Klaipeda for up to 36 hours on a single charge.
The hull, superstructure, and wheelhouse will be constructed at the Western Baltija Shipbuilding at the Port of Klaipeda, along with the installation of cargo systems and other works. The Estonian company, Baltic Workboats is responsible for the installation of the main and auxiliary machinery, and the harmonization and testing of all the ship systems. The hydrogen fuel cell system will also be installed in Estonia.
According to current regulations, all ships arriving at or departing from the Port of Klaipeda are required to dispose of all ship-generated waste at a port reception facility. The Port Authority provides a waste collection service. In addition to increasing the service, the new vessel will add a modern and environmentally friendly element to the operation.
The shipbuilders designed a ship for the collection of oily bilge water, sewage, sludge, and other waste. It needs to be equipped with waste collection tanks and an oily bilge water treatment plant that will treat the waste waters and transfer everything along with the sewage to the city’s onshore wastewater treatment plant.
The project has a total value of €12 million with the ship expected to enter service in the Port of Klaipeda at the end of next year. It is also part of a larger project that will see the Port Authority become one of the first companies in Lithuania to produce green hydrogen, as well as having a hydrogen-powered ship.
Gravesite in France offers evidence of steppe migrant integration with Late Neolithic Europeans
by Bob Yirka , Phys.org
Admixture waves between migrating peoples from the steppes and Neolithic European farmers leading to the establishment of the present-day Pan-European genome and the development of new technologies and ideologies leading to the transition between the Neolithic (left) and the Bell Beaker phenomenon (right), the first pan-European culture. Credit: Collective burial BRE445 at Bréviandes les Pointes Inrap; Late Neolithic pottery C. Gaumat, musée Bargoin, Clermont Auvergne Métropole (France); "All over corded" beaker from Ciry-Salsogne (France) S. Oboukhoff, CNRS; Pressignian Dagger from Bricqueville-la-Blouette (France) Hervé Paitier, Inrap; Bell Beaker burial with shale wrist-guard at Saint-Martin-la-Garenne "les Bretelles" (France) Nicolas Girault (Service archéologique interdépartemental Yvelines/Hauts-de-Seine SAI 78-92); Bell Beaker Luis García (licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported, 2.5 Generic, 2.0 Generic and 1.0 Generic license).
A team of geneticists and archaeologists affiliated with multiple institutions in France has uncovered skeletons in an ancient gravesite not far from Paris that show evidence of steppe migrant integration with Late Neolithic Europeans. The study is published in the journal Science Advances.
Prior research has shown that there was a slow migration of herding people from what is now Russia and Ukraine to Europe thousands of years ago. During the migrations, many of the migrants (who were mostly male) produced children with the local farmers they encountered.
In this new study, the research team reports evidence of such reproduction in remains found in an open grave in the Champagne region of France. Skeletons in the grave showed evidence of a native European woman who had produced a child with a steppe migrant.
The shallow grave contained the skeletons of seven people, all dated back to approximately 4,500 years ago. The skeletons were from three grown women, a grown man, two children and an infant. Hoping to learn more about their ancestry, the research team sequenced their genomes, hoping to find relationships.
They were surprised to find that, in addition to being related, some of the people in the grave had comingled with steppe migrants. They found that one of the adult women was the mother of the adult man. The mother had no steppe genes, but her son did, showing that she had carried at least one child with a male steppe migrant.
A collective burial in the Paris Basin. (A) Map showing geographical locations of samples analyzed in this study. Schematic representation of the collective burial at Bréviandes. (B) Estimated age of death and uniparental haplogroup information of the Bréviandes individuals. (C) Pedigree plots showing kin relationships between the Bréviandes individuals. (D) Pedigree plots showing the genomic component of steppe-related and Late Neolithic ancestries between the Bréviandes individuals. Credit: Science Advances (2024). DOI: 10.1126/sciadv.adl2468
The researchers also found that one of the children was the grandson of that woman and son of her offspring—the child also carried genes from the same steppe migrant. Upon further analysis, the research team made an estimate of the steppe ancestry of the missing grandfather—he had approximately 70% steppe ancestry. None of the other people in the grave were related to any of their interred cohort.
The research team notes that their find was unique—an example of a steppe migrant having a child with a Late Neolithic European woman, representing the process of comingling in progress.
More information: Oğuzhan Parasayan et al, Late Neolithic collective burial reveals admixture dynamics during the third millennium BCE and the shaping of the European genome, Science Advances (2024). DOI: 10.1126/sciadv.adl2468
Illustration courtesy MAIB
