Saturday, June 08, 2024

REWRITING ASIAN AMERICAN HISTORY: THE ANTI-IMPERIAL STRUGGLES OF TAIWANESE AND HONG KONG DIASPORAS

Written by Alex Yong Kang Chow. 

Image credit: The 70’s Biweekly and People’s Theatre by Mr. Mok Chiu-yu Augustine, Dr. Jessica Wai Yee Yeung and Hong Kong Baptist University Library / License: CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 DEED.

Wendy Cheng’s book, Island X: Taiwanese Student Migrants, Campus Spies, and Cold War Activism, highlights the intricate and often fraught connections between the exiled diaspora, Asian Americans, Leftist politics, and the geopolitical forces shaping the lives of individuals in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and China. This work prompts an exploration of how Taiwanese Americans and the Hong Kong diaspora navigate and struggle with the cognitive and ideological complexities faced by Asian Americans and anti-imperial activists, who often conflate imperialism, colonialism, and nationalism within the contexts of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Republic of China (ROC), and the United States. 

During the Cold War, Hong Kongers in the US intersected with Taiwanese students who opposed the Kuomintang (KMT) regime, albeit for different political reasons. While the pro-independence Taiwanese students criticised the KMT regime for white terror, political censorship, and a one-party dictatorship, the nationalistic Hong Kong students also criticised the KMT for its hypocrisy in framing itself as a promoter of democracy against the authoritarian Chinese Communist regime. 

Since the late 1980s, Hong Kongers and Taiwanese have embarked on parallel paths in their quests for democratisation and decolonisation. When Taiwan transitioned into an independent nation-state, Hong Kong moved from a British colony to a special administrative region under the PRC regime. The youth of the two regions came together during significant historical events such as the 2014 Occupy movements in Hong Kong and Taiwan. 

Since 2019, the Taiwanese have undertaken new efforts to reaffirm their sovereignty, defend their territory against the People’s Liberation Army, and secure their critical economic role in semiconductor production. Concurrently, many Hong Kongers have faced exile, finding themselves in unfamiliar environments that resonate with the diaspora experiences depicted in Cheng’s book. This shared history underscores these communities’ ongoing struggles and solidarity as they confront the overlapping and often confusing narratives of imperialism, colonialism, and nationalism. 

Activism and Left-leaning Politics  

As Cheng outlined in the introduction, the objective of Island X is to expose historical processes and reveal alternative possibilities. “By exposing the process—history in motion—by revealing what might have been, and by centring those who dreamed otherwise, who were erased, ignored, or relegated to the margins and footnotes of history, we restore more capacious genealogies and broader horizons of aspiration and struggle” (9). 

In chapter two, Cheng uncovered three figures who struggled to address left-leaning politics and aimed to bridge the left-right divide within the movement. For example, Lin Shiaw-shin, a Baodiao activist from a bensheng family, maintained and acted on “broadly left, non-identitarian alliances” (66) to support Taiwan’s democratic movement. Despite many of these alliances falling short of their more radical or revolutionary goals, Lin’s efforts were significant.  

Kao Cheng-yan, who later became a computer science professor at National Taiwan University, took a left-leaning, pro-Taiwan independence stance that eventually led to the founding of the Green Party. This party identifies as internationalist, supports Taiwan’s independence, and focuses on environmental politics (67-72). 

Dissatisfied with the goals and operations of World United Formosans for Independence, Cary Hung co-founded the Taiwan Revolution Party, which advocated for a mass-based, working-class revolution (73-76). 

Similarly, in the 1970s, a distinct faction of anti-imperial anarchists emerged in Hong Kong, navigating a complex political landscape influenced by global and local dynamics. This group, often in tension with other political factions, sought to challenge the British colonial and PRC regimes. 

For example, Augustine Mok, a young activist and founder of the 70s Biweekly, an influential magazine among left-leaning circles in Hong Kong during the 1970s, criticised the PRC regime and proposed an internationalist path that exemplified his anarchist beliefs.  

When the anti-imperial Baodiao movement emerged in the U.S., Mok participated in rallies in Hong Kong, advocating for an anti-imperial stance that the island belonged to no one—neither the PRC, ROC, nor Japan. This position contrasted with many other nationalist Baodiao activists or students in Hong Kong.  

Similar to the ideological split between pro-PRC and pro-ROC factions before the fall of the Gang of Four in 1976, anti-colonial activists in Hong Kong also divided into pro-PRC and anti-PRC clusters. Youth on both sides criticised the British colonial regime, but they debated whether the PRC regime was a liberator or another form of authoritarianism under Mao’s leadership. 

Despite the political crackdown against the 1967 riot instigated by Chinese Communist activists under the influence of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, young activists in Hong Kong found room for resistance. They navigated a highly censored environment yet managed to create spaces for political expression and activism. 

However, the student activists at the time were also aware that their phones installed in the student union on campus were wiretapped by the political branch of the British colonial police. This situation underscored the constant surveillance and repression they faced, similar to their Taiwanese counterparts, as they sought to push boundaries and advocate for change. 

The legacy of these anti-imperial anarchists, particularly those like Augustine Mok, underscores the complexity and diversity of political activism in Hong Kong. Their efforts to foster critical discourse and challenge dominant narratives continue to resonate in contemporary discussions on democracy, sovereignty, and resistance in the region. 

Cold War Geopolitics and Positioning Diaspora Identity: Historical Context and Challenges 

One of the challenges facing Taiwanese Americans is positioning the group within Asian American studies, which often focus on left-leaning, working-class subjects, and resistance narratives: “Within Asian American studies in particular, a scholarly field born of leftist social movements that has tended to privilege working-class subjects and narratives of resistance, these characteristics may render diasporic Taiwanese communities difficult, unappealing, or uninteresting as objects of inquiry” (14). 

In the 1960s and 70s, the romanticisation of PRC socialism within US leftist circles was not uncommon, leading to assumptions about pro-Taiwan political stances as “conservative or retrograde” (15). Furthermore, as racialised non-US nationals campaigning against their government—a US ally—”Taiwanese student migrants were neither fully legible to nor protected by dominant rights-based moral and political” (8). 

Because of the impact of Cold War geopolitics on global comprehension of Taiwan’s existence, the fact that the United States served as both geopolitical “benefactor and protector” of Taiwan may confuse, if not irk, many pro-PRC factions in the US. Additionally, the left-leaning, anti-imperial US activists who criticised the US regime as imperialist over Latin America, Vietnam, and the Middle East may also find this situation confusing or frustrating. 

How could an independent-seeking country that sought US support be progressive, anti-capitalist, and anti-imperial enough? How could an authoritarian regime governed by the KMT be a faithful, democratic ally for those left-leaning US activists? 

Similarly, since 2019, the Hong Kong diaspora has found the assumptions underlying some Western leftists’ ideological simplifications funny, if not ridiculous. How can a capitalist-driven city and secessionist movement not be seen as an imperial puppet against a Chinese socialist regime? How can diaspora Hong Kongers, who mostly lobby Western governments against the PRC regime, counteract an imperial US regime? 

Rather than exaggerating or dismissing these questions emerging from a Western-leftist perspective, countering the inward-looking leftist knowledge production that fails to grapple with the Chinese questions may be productive. This can be done by disseminating the thoughts, theories, and praxis of pro-Taiwan-independence Taiwanese Americans or pro-Hong Kong-independence Hong Kong leftists, as Cheng’s book has done. 

Urging or educating the dogmatic Western left to adopt an anti-PRC stance is an uphill battle. Many Western leftists sympathetic to the PRC do not read Chinese, lack access to nuanced anti-PRC Chinese thoughts in English translation, or have limited lived experience in Hong Kong and Taiwan. This challenge extends even to second or third-generation Asian Americans who might share heritage with the diaspora. 

Colonisation, colonialism, and internal settler colonisers do not just describe the imperial process of European-American expansion but are also applicable and have an Asian origin, demonstrated by the PRC and KMT regimes born out of the 20th-century revolutionary period. Recent studies have attempted to reconstruct Chinese intellectuals’ struggles to navigate a third path beyond KMT and CCP domination. 

Tracing the creation of myths, misconceptions, and knowledge production about Chinese politics in the US requires more collective effort. This effort must bridge the revolutionary continuity and discontinuity before and after the 1949 KMT-CCP civil war that shattered the fate of Hong Kong, Taiwan, and mainland China. 

One invisible historical connection is that Hong Kong was removed from the United Nations’ non-self-governing territories list upon the PRC’s entrance into the UN. The PRC replaced the ROC to serve on the permanent seat of the UN Security Council. As a result, Hong Kongers’ international rights of self-determination within the UN mechanism were deprived because the US administration decided to side with Maoist China over Chiang’s ROC due to Cold War calculations against the Soviet Union. 

The Unique Contribution of Cheng’s Book: Rewriting Asian American History 

The most substantial contribution of Cheng’s book is to enrich the diversity and complexity of Asian Americans in scholarly knowledge production. It aims to 1) rethink and rewrite the diverse history of Asian Americans; 2) delink Asian Americans from the PRC regime; 3) respect the similarities and differences among and between Asian Americans and Asians that may stand at odds with each other; and finally, 4) reconnect Taiwanese Americans to Asian American history. 

Cheng’s book, likely one of its kind, explores the possible reconcilability and irreconcilability of intersectional politics among Asians, Asian Americans, Leftist politics, geopolitics, and democratic aspirations at the Cold War historical juncture. 

Rewriting the history of Asian Americans by tracing and reconstructing the sociological and intellectual development of anti-PRC and anti-KMT Taiwanese Americans provides an excellent example for other scholarly, literary, and intellectual endeavours. This approach extends the mapping to other broadly speaking Sinophone populations, such as Hong Kongers, Tibetans, Uyghurs, and exiled mainland Chinese. This broader framework fosters a more nuanced understanding of the complex and multifaceted identities within the Asian American community and will hopefully encourage more productive work that enriches our definition of Asia American history. 

Alex Yong Kang Chow is pursuing a PhD in Geography at UC Berkeley, studying decolonial praxis in Hong Kong, with a focus on capitalism, nationalism, and colonialism. He graduated with a BA from the University of Hong Kong and an MSc from the London School of Economics. Alex was the former Secretary-General of the Hong Kong Federation of Students during the 2014 Umbrella Movement and was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize in 2018. He co-founded Flow magazine and is a board member of the Hong Kong Democracy Council, dedicated to advocating for human rights and democracy. 

This article was published as part of a special issue on ‘Student Migrants, Campus Spies and Island X‘.


 

ISLAND X: AN INTERNATIONALIST EXAMINATION OF TAIWANESE AMERICAN HISTORY DURING THE COLD WAR

Written by Wen Liu.

Image credit: 07.02 副總統出席「陳文成博士紀念晚會」 – 50068877552.jpg by 總統府 / Flickr, license: CC BY 2.0 DEED.

Wendy Cheng’s Island X is a new classic study on Taiwanese American lives that bridges between Taiwan Studies and Asian American Studies. In this essay, I want to highlight three major contributions that the book has made, including 1) The importance of understanding Taiwan through the US-China-Taiwan as well as an internationalist stance, 2) the need for Asian American Studies to incorporate diasporic perspectives and geopolitical analysis, and 3) situating Taiwan as a critical epistemological site in Asian American Studies. 

An Internationalist Perspective 

Since the end of the martial law period, more and more archives have been open to the public. More books have discussed the Cold War period in Taiwan through the triangulated relations between the US, China, and Taiwan. For instance, Hsian-ting Lin’s Accidental State: Chiang Kai-shek, the United States, and the Making of Taiwan uses the US’s recently declassified archives to describe the dictator’s internal turmoil in making modern Taiwan in contested geopolitical time. Chen Tsui-lien’s Revisiting the Political History of Post-WarTaiwan: The Triangulated Tug-of-War between the United States, the Kuomintang Government, and Taiwanese Civil Society also took the comparative approach. All these books on Taiwanese history—along with Wendy’s Island X—disputed the myth that the possibility of a modern democratic Taiwan was neither made magically through one leader’s hand (e.g., the common depiction of Chiang Ching-kuo as “the Father of Democracy” rather than an authoritarian leader who executed many tangwai movement leaders) nor simply through the Cold War US imperialist influences that manipulated Taiwan as its subaltern proxy state (as often articulated by Anglophone or American Studies). Instead, it is a result of the triangulation of forces between the US, the Kuomintang (KMT), the tangwai movement in Taiwanese civil society, and the diasporic Taiwanese students’ movement, which is the central focus of this book. 

The death of Chen Wen-chen is particularly illuminating in the book. Professor Cheng argues that far from being neutral or benevolent, the instances of Taiwanese students spied on by other Taiwanese on US campuses illustrate the role of US educational institutions as critical sites of Cold War battles. We often understood his death as a critical event that drove the US to take seriously the issues of authoritarian surveillance since Chen was a US citizen, and the Taiwanese American communities took the chance to challenge the KMT surveillance on US campuses. This event not only pushes policy changes in the US but also adds additional pressure on the already heated democratization demands from the Taiwan side.  

Chen Wen-chen’s case—along with many other historical examples and live narratives in the book—complicates the political biography of Taiwanese student activism in the US at the time. Usually, the overseas Taiwanese movement is often portrayed as singularly pro-independence and, thus, conservative and anti-Communist. The book shows a much more complicated picture. For instance, as Wendy writes, while in Pittsburgh, Chen Wen-chen became particularly interested in the ideas of the left pro-independence group, Taiwan Era, which took a Marxist-Leninist line and elaborated more profoundly and in a more explicitly internationalist stance, along with an earlier diasporic left publication headquartered in Toronto, Taiwan Revolution. These diasporic groups are not without their internal intellectual and ideological debates, reflecting the US activist political spectrum in the 1970s and 1980s. 

An Asian Americanist Perspective 

This brings me to my second point; another significant intervention of the book is how it takes on an Asian Americanist approach that also centres on Taiwanese history and voice. One of the reasons that Taiwan and Taiwanese Americans are often erased from Asian American Studies or history is that the field of Asian American Studies emerged in the 1960s at the peak of internationalists’ left politics. Up to today, it continues to skew toward a specific working-class and left politics that is more concerned with US hegemony and the critiques of racial politics domestically. Yet under what Wendy calls the “infrastructure of surveillance,” Taiwanese immigrants were often framed as the “good” and “middle class” immigrants who are also ideologically seen as blinded pro-US. The lack of differentiation between the nation-state, the KMT party, the US influences, and the civil society in Taiwan results in the fact that Taiwan is merely understood as KMT’s “Republic of China” in the Cold War binary framework. It misses the opportunity to see how this group of Taiwanese immigrants calls the present nation-state, the ROC, in question and organizes creatively to achieve human rights and democratization.  

Moreover, the centrality of race in Asian American Studies is often eager to create racial politics against assimilation yet neglects how racial politics can also be produced globally, out of the US. In fact, both Japan and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have been the hegemonic forces in East Asia to create different ideologies of racial superiority or racial victimhood to counter US influences. By focusing on the US empire and the US only, the field misses the opportunities to engage with the complexity of inter-Asia dynamics on how ethnonationalist forces are forged. And how the Taiwanese subject is, in fact, caught between white assimilationism, Chinese ethnonationalism, and Han settler-colonialism, where some of the key players in the book attempt to rearticulate a new kind of national imagination.  

Taiwan as a Critical Epistemological Site in Asian American Studies 

Lastly, the book argues how Taiwan can serve as a critical epistemological position in Asian American Studies. As Shu-mei Shih stated provocatively in the 2018 North American Taiwan Studies Association conference, “Taiwan Studies is American Studies,” the book shows how American Studies is also a part of Taiwan Studies. By examining Taiwanese American politics in relation to global politics, multiple state regimes, and Cold War conditions, we can see a fuller picture of how political changes occurred during this period. It is never just the influences of Western abstract liberalism of human rights of democracy, nor one great leader who gave authoritarian rule, but the complex debates and struggles over difficult material conditions across the transpacific that allowed movements to happen. As Wendy states in the concluding chapter, while Taiwanese Americans are often essentialized as the “model minorities,” the state-centric logics observe the historical conditions and hierarchies of power that “deny Taiwanese Americans our full historical subjectivity and complex subjecthood.” 

Island X is a timely book articulating how Taiwanese American identity is deeply historically grounded and influenced by multiple transnational forces. The book opens doors for scholars to pursue this understudied subject. In the so-called “Golden Era” for Taiwan Studies, we need an interdisciplinary approach that expands the usual horizons of researching Taiwan through the superpower struggles between the US and China but focuses on the untold lives and stories that complicate the existing narratives.    

Wen Liu is an Assistant Research Fellow at the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica, Taiwan. She is the author of Feeling Asian American: Racial Flexibility between Assimilation and Oppression (University of Illinois Press, 2024), which investigates Asian American identity formation via its flexible racial status and the psychic narrative of racial injury. 

This article was published as part of a special issue on ‘Student Migrants, Campus Spies and Island X‘.

CHINA’S INFRASTRUCTURE WARFARE AGAINST KINMEN

onstruction in the background. (Murphy, 2022) 

Image depicting anti-landing spikes to deter a Chinese amphibious invasion in the foreground and the Kinmen-Lieyu Bridge under construction in the background. (Murphy, 2022) 


Written by Ian Murphy.

Image credit: author.

Geopolitical adversaries have increasingly focused on targeting critical infrastructure like energy, transportation, and communication networks to weaken a nation’s military capabilities. This form of hybrid warfare, known as infrastructure warfare, has garnered significant attention in recent years. However, its application to the China-Taiwan conflict, particularly concerning Kinmen County, remains under-examined. China’s development of the China-Kinmen water pipeline and the proposed Kinmen-Xiamen Bridge project raise concerns about its use of infrastructure as a tool of political coercion. While often overshadowed by broader cross-Strait tensions, this approach poses a significant threat to Taiwan’s security and autonomy.  

Defining Infrastructure Warfare 

Traditionally, infrastructure warfare targets critical infrastructure to weaken a nation’s military capability, readiness, and force projection. However, China’s approach in Kinmen utilizes infrastructure not just for a military advantage but also as a tool for cognitive warfare, subtly manipulating perceptions and dependencies to achieve political goals. The challenge with applying this definition of infrastructure warfare to China’s hybrid warfare strategy against Taiwan is that it does not fully account for non-military gains or motives. Instead, we should think of infrastructure warfare as a part of China’s cognitive warfare strategy.  

Cognitive warfare is a distinct form of conflict that targets the minds of populations rather than physical infrastructure that aims to manipulate perceptions, disrupt decision-making, and erode social cohesion. It represents a shift from traditional kinetic warfare, focusing instead on psychological and informational operations to achieve strategic objectives. Disinformation campaigns, social media manipulation, and economic pressure are common tools of cognitive warfare, exploiting vulnerabilities in human cognition. This approach is often employed alongside traditional military force, which allows actors to achieve their goals without overt escalation or direct confrontation.  

The Chinese Communist Party’s cognitive warfare strategy is part of a larger hybrid warfare model that aims to achieve state objectives more ambiguously, with its approach in Kinmen exemplifying this strategic shift. While its infrastructure projects in the region offer tangible benefits like improved water supply, they also serve a deeper purpose – to subtly shape perceptions and foster a sense of dependence on the mainland. This gradual integration into China’s economic and social sphere aims to create a favourable environment for eventual reunification, push pro-unification narratives, and influence the population not to fight in a wartime scenario.  

In the case of Kinmen County, China is not using infrastructure warfare to undermine Taiwan’s military readiness or force projection in the Taiwan Strait. Instead, they are using infrastructure investment to bring Kinmen closer to China, push pro-unification narratives, and influence the population not to fight.  

Kinmen is Becoming Dependent on China for Social Services 

China’s carrot-and-stick approach to Kinmen is a strategy that combines incentives (carrots) with punitive measures or threats (sticks) to influence to island’s political and economic ties to mainland China. Punitive measures have included the maintenance of a significant military presence near Kinmen, while China leverages its economic influence by restricting trade and tourism from Kinmen and Matsu by leveraging customs, military exercises, the control of maritime and air transportation routes, and even by conducting sand dredging operations around the islands. 

After the lifting of martial law in Taiwan in the 1990s, Taiwan’s “Three Mini Links” (小三通) opened limited exchanges to create limited transportation, trade, and postal links between mainland China and Kinmen and Matsu. While these links were opened in 2001 with the aim of facilitating economic and cultural exchanges, the program opened Kinmen’s residents to an ever-intensifying Chinese cognitive warfare strategy and the promotion of China’s economic model as a competitor to Taiwan.  

The most successful case study of China’s infrastructure warfare strategy is the establishment of the China-Kinmen water pipeline in 2018, which now supplies over 70% of the island’s water usage. This infrastructure project addresses Kinmen’s historical water scarcity and also highlights the concerning trend of China’s potential to weaponize critical infrastructure against Taiwan. Prior to the pipeline’s establishment, Kinmen relied heavily on unsustainable groundwater extraction and limited rainfall, resulting in environmental degradation and inadequate water supply. The pipeline, while a practical policy solution, inadvertently created a strategic vulnerability.  

Chart depicting changes in Kinmen’s freshwater usage from 2012 (101) to 2022 (111). Since the completion of the China-Kinmen water pipeline in 2018, Kinmen’s reliance on water from China has increased to 70.9% (green), while its use of groundwater has dropped significantly to 16.7% (red).  

With Kinmen’s water supply now predominantly controlled by China, the potential for political manipulation and disruption is evident. China’s increasing assertiveness towards Taiwan, coupled with warnings from the Mainland Affairs Council, has raised alarms about the weaponization of newly built critical infrastructure. Taiwan has learned from this and is beginning to carefully assess future cross-Strait infrastructure projects, such as the proposed Kinmen-Xiamen Bridge, through a lens of strategic defence. For existing infrastructure like the water pipeline, Taiwan must now play defence by focusing on building resilience against potential disruptions. To prepare for disruptions, Taiwan will need to develop alternative water sources, enhance freshwater storage capacity, rehabilitation and reduction of salinification in existing reservoirs, and implement emergency response plans in Kinmen.  

Map published by Kinmen County Waterworks that depicts the China-Kinmen water pipeline that was built in 2018. 

China has also capitalized on the political fractures caused by the Kinmen-Lieyu bridge project by promoting its own bridge project to link Kinmen and neighbouring Xiamen City. The Kinmen-Lieyu bridge project was a Taiwanese infrastructure project that now links Kinmen’s main island with the smaller Lieyu Island. Lieyu Island was previously only connected to Kinmen through a ferry, which had limited capacity and availability. Taiwanese politicians promoted the bridge project to improve the lives of Lieyu residents by providing access to essential services, healthcare, economic opportunities, and boosting tourism. However, the bridge faced criticism for going over time, over budget, and for failing to bring access to needed social services due to limited social services within Kinmen County itself, with residents needing to go to Taiwan’s main island for adequate access to healthcare and job opportunities.  

The Chinese Communist Party has historically leveraged the development of cities like Shanghai and Xiamen as propaganda tools to showcase economic development and modernization, promote the Chinese Dream, and legitimize the CCP’s economic governance model that emphasizes the economic benefits of working with the CCP while discounting narratives of political control and national security concerns. So, when Taiwan’s bridge project failed to deliver the needed social services to Kinmen, Chinese media pushed narratives that preyed on Kinmen’s discontent with Taiwan’s governing model and investment in favour of a CCP economic and unification narrative.  

A chematic map of the planned route of the Ximen-Kinmen Bridge with a translation of the four scenarios provided by Chinese media (大公報, 2020) 

Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, responsible for evaluating proposals involving mainland China, has rejected the Kinmen-Xiamen Bridge Project as a legitimate development under the Three Mini Links program due to concerns over the bridge’s potential negative impact on Taiwan’s national security, noting that the policies of the Chinese Communist Party have shifted from mild to doctrine focused on maximizing intimidation and suppression of Kinmen and Matsu, with the Kinmen-Xiamen Bridge acting as a stepping stone towards integrating Kinmen into Fujian Province.  

Countering China’s Infrastructure Warfare 

The first challenge in countering China’s infrastructure warfare against Taiwan is understanding the strategy. By framing infrastructure warfare as part of a hybrid warfare model in service to cognitive warfare, we can see how infrastructure will be used against Taiwan in an invasion scenario. So far, the China-Kinmen water pipeline and the proposed Kinmen-Xiamen Bridge project have been used to offer economic incentives, promote CCP governance, and sow distrust in the Taiwan government. In wartime, this incentive structure will become punitive if Kinmen resist Chinese claims.  

China could potentially defeat Taiwan through a blockade by employing a combination of military and economic strategies aimed at isolating and weakening the island. Under such a blockade of Taiwan’s main island, Taiwan will be unable to continue flights and maritime transport to Kinmen. This strategy of anti-access area denial, combined with infrastructure integration, means that Kinmen’s only means of survival is found through an umbilical cord with China. With a new Taiwanese Presidential administration in power, the government will have to reexamine its current Kinmen defence strategy. Taiwan knows that it is unable to match China’s military and infrastructure modernization dollar-for-dollar, so it will need to find areas of comparative advantage to overcome its hybrid warfare strategy. 

Ian Murphy has a background in national security and international business. He earned an MA in National Security Studies at American Military University and received a Taiwan Scholarship to study at National Taiwan Normal University, where he completed an MBA with instruction in Chinese. Ian currently works as a China Subject Matter Expert at SecuriFense Inc., where he helps organizations understand developments in China’s economy and foreign policy.

His recently published article TAIDE: TAIWAN’S COMMITMENT TO INNOVATION, SECURITY, AND GLOBAL TECH LEADERSHIP can be read here.

 

ANC Plans A Government Of National Unity With IFP, EFF, DA, NFP And PA

Fri, 07 Jun 2024 




South Africa’s governing party, the African National Congress (ANC) says it will form a government of national unity (GNU) with all parties advancing South Africa, reported IOL.

Addressing journalists following a meeting of the party’s National Executive Committee (NEC) at Birchwood Hotel in Boksburg, Ekurhuleni, ANC President Cyril Ramaphosa said:

We have agreed that we will invite political parties to form a government of national unity as the best option to move our country forward.

The modalities of the government of national unity will take into account the conditions prevailing at this moment in our country’s history.

The purpose of this government of national unity must be first and foremost to tackle the pressing issues that South Africans want to be addressed.

According to Ramaphosa, the pressing issues included job creation and inclusive economic growth, the high cost of living, service delivery, crime and corruption.

He said the ANC has heard the concerns of the people of South Africa, adding that the party remained a pivotal partner in the country’s search for a way forward.

Ramaphosa said the ANC had already engaged Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), the Democratic Alliance (DA), National Freedom Party (NFP), and the Patriotic Alliance (PA).

He revealed that the NEC mandated its negotiating task team to proceed to engage parties on their proposal. He said:

They will also reach out to a broader range of parties to enrich the process and promote inclusiveness.

We have agreed as this NEC that it is both necessary and strategic that we act in a manner that seeks to unite the broadest range of social forces and isolate those that seek to cause chaos, instability and division.

As the ANC, we will be reaching out to formations across society to build a shared programme for social and economic change.

The ANC lost its Parliamentary majority for the first time in its 30 years of rule after the end of apartheid in 1994.

The ANC got 40.18% support, with the DA on 21.81% votes, the former president Jacob Zuma’s uMkhonto weSizwe Party (MK Party) got 14.58%, and EFF got 9.52% votes.

With South Africa’s proportional representation system, the ANC has to combine with one or more other parties to attain more than 50% of the vote to form a government.

More: Pindula News

Kangana Ranaut slapped at Chandigarh airport for ‘comments on Indian farmers’ protests’

The newly-elected MP raised concerns over 'rising terrorism' in India's Punjab.




Images Staff
Updated 07 Jun, 2024

Indian actor Kangana Ranaut, who was just elected as a member of parliament on a Bharatiya Janta Party (BJP) ticket, was slapped by a security guard at Chandigarh airport on Thursday, Dawn reported.

Ranaut was travelling to New Delhi days after her Lok Sabha election win from Himachal Pradesh’s Mandi constituency. After the security check, Ranaut went to the boarding gate where she was slapped by the security guard.

The Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) constable, identified as Kulwinder Kaur, has been suspended and an FIR registered against her, reports said. A complaint has also been submitted by the CISF to the local police.

According to NDTV, Kaur was offended by an old remark the Queen actor made about the farmers’ protest. The publication quoted the CISF constable — who reportedly comes from a family of farmers — as having said, “She gave a statement… that farmers are sitting there for INR 100. Will she go and sit there? My mother was sitting there and protesting when she gave this statement”.






Kaur also accused Ranaut of “disrespecting farmers”.

In a social media post, the actor had tweeted about an elderly woman seen at one of the protests and said she was “available for INR 100” — she was forced to delete the tweet after public outrage, NDTV reported.

After the incident, Ranaut took to her Instagram account to detail what had happened. “I am safe, I am perfectly fine. The incident happened at the security check-in. The woman guard waited for me to cross. She then came and hit me and started throwing expletives. I asked [her] why she hit me. She said, ‘I support farmers protest’. I am safe but my concern is terrorism is rising in Punjab. How do we handle that?”




The farmers’ movement in India’s Punjab has been active since the Modi regime approved three controversial agricultural bills in 2020.

Ranaut has repeatedly spoken out against the movement, and in October 2021, the Karnataka Police filed a FIR against the actor for her calling farmers protesting the Indian government’s new agriculture laws “terrorists”, The Business Standard reported.

After the 2021 farmers protests, led by Sikh farmers from the wheat and rice-growing state of Punjab in India’s north, singer Rihanna shared a CNN article and questioned why people weren’t talking about it.

In a deleted tweet from 2021, Ranaut lashed out at Rihanna. “No one is talking about it because they are not farmers; they are terrorists who are trying to divide India, so that China can take over our vulnerable broken nation and make it a Chinese colony much like USA…” Ranaut said, adding: “Sit down you fool, we are not selling our nation like you dummies.”

After Thursday’s incident, military officer Gaurav Arya said on X (formerly Twitter) that Kaur “will be punished” and alleged that the occurrence was “planned all along” as a way for the CISF to enter politics. Ranaut took to her Instagram to voice her agreement.

“She strategically waited for me to cross her and in a signature Khalistani style quietly came behind and hit my face without saying a word when I asked why she did that, she looked away and started to speak into the phone cameras focused on her, hogging sudden public attention”.






Ranaut highlighted that the farming laws were repealed and didn’t concern anyone, claiming that Kaur’s move was “her way of joining [the] Khalistani bandwagon which is getting major political seats in Punjab”.

Khalistan refers to a separatist movement seeking to create a homeland for Sikhs by establishing an ethno-religious sovereign state called Khalistan in Punjab.

In a truly bizarre comparison, Ranaut also came after supporters of Palestine in her posts about the incident. “All eyes on Rafah gang, this can happen to you or your children as well… When you celebrate a terror attack on someone be ready for the day it comes back to you as well.”






In a since deleted Instagram story, the actor also called out the Bollywood fraternity for remaining silent about what happened to her. According to India Today, Ranaut said, “Dear film industry you all are either celebrating or are totally mum on the airport attack on me. Remember if tomorrow if you walking disarmingly on some street of your country or anywhere else in the world and some Israeli / Palestinian hits you or your children just because you tried to bring eyes to Rafah or stood up for Israeli hostage… then you will see I will be fighting for your rights of free speech, if someday you wonder why I am where I am remember you are not me.”

Devoleena Bhattacharjee, who played a second iteration of Gopi Bahu in the viral Indian drama Saath Nibhana Saathiya, was one of the few celebrities who spoke out about the incident. In a series of tweets, Bhattacharjee said, “It is not just a slap. It’s a matter of Indian security. It can be more dangerous than one can think of. Nothing less than a security threat, should be dealt like one.”






She added that the incident was “deeply troubling” and “such actions represent a severe breach of public trust and security protocols”.






Looks like things are going to get even more dramatic in the Indian political arena.