Showing posts sorted by relevance for query social capital. Sort by date Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by relevance for query social capital. Sort by date Show all posts

Monday, November 01, 2021

World Bank report recognises importance of measurement beyond GDP

Reports and Proceedings

UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE

The World Bank’s flagship report, The Changing Wealth of Nations, for the first time emphasises the importance of social capital to sustainability. By including the role of trust, social norms and community cohesiveness in securing a sustainable future, it represents a major advance in the international effort to go beyond GDP for the measurement of progress.

Cambridge economists Matthew Agarwala and Dimitri Zenghelis make the case in the report that social capital is an essential asset with the capacity to improve productivity and growth, and help address the challenges faced by modern society.

“Our ability to promote wellbeing in the community and to prosper economically revolves around trust, dignity, and respect. It hinges on our connection with others and with the institutional resources that support us,” says Zenghelis, Bennett Institute for Public Policy, University of Cambridge.

“The Bennett Institute’s Wealth Economy project demonstrates that social capital statistics can reveal important insights into economic performance, resilience to shocks (including war and pandemics), and where to target funds for levelling-up. The aim is to establish guidelines for standardised comparative measures for use in economic research and crucially, to hold governments’ feet to the fire. Such an effort is long overdue and the potential returns for society are hard to overstate.

“The inclusion of our research in the world’s longest running series on wealth accounting brings us one step closer to recognising social capital as an economic asset that underpins national and global wealth.”

Chapter 15 on Social Capital and the Changing Wealth of Nations by Agarwala and Zenghelis outlines several priorities for policymakers to recognise:

First, trust, networks, social interactions, and the ability to achieve outcomes requiring collective action are important determinants of social, health, and economic outcomes.

Second, the lack of a precise and universally accepted definition has undermined its measurement, valuation, and integration into mainstream economic analyses, but the UK and United States are pioneering new approaches.

Third, the fact that social capital is not directly measured in monetary terms in no way reduces its importance to economic performance. Just as it did for natural capital, the evolution from theoretical concept to consistent accounting will take decades of development and refinement.

Fourth, progress in survey penetration and the use of higher frequency data offer great potential for social capital research.

Finally, it recommends the Changing Wealth of Nations continues to examine how social capital relates to, and interacts with, wealth accounting.

“A better understanding of measuring wealth – including human, social, natural and physical capital – is important for a green, resilient, and prosperous future,” says Agarwala, Project leader for the Wealth Economy, Bennett Institute. “It’s crucial for all assets to be measured with equal importance for governments to get policies right for sustainable development.”

The World Bank’s Changing Wealth of Nations 2021 report provides data for a more comprehensive view of economic growth and sustainability. Published in late October 2021, it finds that the share of total global wealth in renewable natural capital is decreasing and threatened by climate change. Also that global wealth has grown overall but at the expense of future prosperity and by exacerbating inequalities.

Countries that deplete natural resources in favour of short-term gains are putting their economies on an unsustainable development path. While indicators such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) are traditionally used to measure economic growth, the report argues measuring changes in natural, human, social and produced capital offers deeper insight into the extent to which growth is sustainable.

The report tracks the wealth of 146 countries between 1995 and 2018, by measuring the economic value of renewable natural capital (such as forests, cropland, and ocean resources), non-renewable natural capital (such as minerals and fossil fuels), human capital (earnings over a person’s lifetime), produced capital (such as buildings and infrastructure), and net foreign assets. As well as social capital, the report accounts for blue natural capital—in the form of mangroves and ocean fisheries— for the first time.

Download the Changing Wealth of Nations 2021 to read Chapter 15Social Capital and the Changing Wealth of Nations by Dr Matthew Agarwala and Dimitri Zenghelis.

Join Matthew Agarwala, Dimitri Zenghelis, Diane Coyle and Saite Lu for the Wealth Economy Foundation Workshop to learn more about how to account for different assets – including social capital – for a more prosperous, resilient and green future.

Disclaimer: AAAS and E

Sunday, August 18, 2024

Marxism and the Capitalist State: Towards a New Debate




Rob Hunter, Rafael Khachaturian and Eva Nanopoulos (eds)
Palgrave MacMillan, Cham, Switzerland, 2023. 279 pp., $129.99 hb
ISBN 9783031361661

Reviewed by Tony Smith

About the reviewer
Tony Smith is Professor of Philosophy and Political Science (emeritus) at Iowa State Universi



Marx’s presented his critique of political economy as a systematic ordering of the essential determinations of the capitalist mode of production. The first part of the original project, a ‘Book on Capital’, eventually became the three volumes of Capital we know today. The projected ‘Book on the State’ remained unwritten, although valuable clues to its content are scattered in Marx’s drafts and publications. Marx also critically assessed concrete state forms and activities in his political essays and newspaper articles.

Subsequent Marxian state theorists have attempted to interpret, revise or extend Marx’s legacy in their writings. Marxism and the Capitalist State ranks with the best of these works, clearly illustrating the great strengths of Marxian critique compared to mainstream and non-Marxian heterodox state theories. Main themes include: 1) Marx’s own perspective on the capitalist state, 2) the contributions made by subsequent theorists, 3) distinguishing features of contemporary states and 4) the implications of Marxian state theory for political practice, each outlined below.

In their introductory overview (‘Reopening the State Debate’), the editors provide an extremely helpful summary of Marx’s writings on the state. Important details of Marx’s position are examined in the other contributions. The authors in this collection broadly agree on the content of his crucial claims and on their continuing validity.

Firstly, the capitalist state is not merely a variant of a transhistorical form of political organization existing for millennia. As Rob Hunter expresses forcefully, the state form today must be comprehended in its historically specificity as a capitalist state (‘The Capitalist State as a Historically Specific Social Form’).

Additionally, the capitalist state, however, is not an instrument used by capitalists to further their interests. The owners and controllers of capital are in a ceaseless competitive war preventing any of them from being able to establish and maintain the general preconditions for the reproduction of capitalist society (Nate Holdren, ‘Social Murder: Capitalism’s Systematic and State-Organized Killing’, 190; Michael McCarthy, ‘Beyond Abstractionism: Notes on Conjunctural State Theory’, 217). The reproduction of capitalist society, then, requires an institutional agency not limited by the particular interests of particular capitalists. It requires a capitalist state. This does not mean that the capitalist state is ‘neutral’, capable of furthering any social end equally well. It is not merely a state in capitalist society. It is the state of capitalist society, an essential point emphasized throughout the book. More precisely, it is the ‘political’ form taken by the social relations defining capitalist society.

Capitalist production and exchange is a profit-driven system, devoted to the transformation (valorisation) of money value (M) initially invested in the production of commodities (C) into a return of greater monetary value (M′) from their sale, with M′ forming the basis for a new M, and so on without limit. ‘Capital’ refers to this valorisation process M-C-M′ as a whole, maintaining its identity from one completed circuit to the next. Since society as a whole is subjected to the impersonal valorisation imperative (‘M must become M′!’), we can speak of capital’s impersonal domination of society, with capital’s end, valorisation, having systematic priority over human ends (Chris O’Kane, ‘The Marx Revival and State Theory: Towards a Negative-Dialectical Critical Social Theory of the State’, 241).

Marx explains the valorisation process in terms of the difference between the monetary value workers receive (the wage) for selling their labour power for a period of time to those who own and control investment capital, on the one hand, and the monetary value the collective workforce creates during that period, on the other. This makes capitalism, no less than feudalism or slavery, a system of class exploitation. (Jasmine Chorley-Schulz interestingly extends Marx’s discussion of the exploitation of living labour to an account of the class position of soldiers in ‘Soldiers and the State’. Just as the social relationship of exploitation results in the combined power of cooperating workers appearing in the fetish form of a power of capital, the combined power of soldiers appears in the alien form of a coercive power of the capitalist state (126-129).

The capitalist state must establish and maintain the general preconditions for the reproduction of both the impersonal domination of capital and class exploitation. Holdren draws out a profound implication: the capitalist state is complicit in what Engels termed ‘social murder’. Occupational injury and illness, famine, poverty, addiction, unsafe consumer products, public health shortcomings, ecological devastation and so on, are not accidental occurrences due simply to evil capitalists or negligent state officials. They are systematic in a social world where what is good for capital has priority over what is good for human beings. The stark but unavoidable conclusion is that ‘all versions of capitalism will tend to generate depoliticised mass killing of working-class people’ (186).

Finally, Marx’s theory of the state culminates in the thesis that no political reform or set of reforms can free a capitalist society from impersonal domination and class exploitation. A revolutionary rupture from capitalism – and the capitalist state – is required. (Hunter’s essay, a superb analysis of the implications of Marx’s theory of social forms for state theory, makes a truly compelling case for this conclusion.)

The introduction also offers a concise summary of the work of major Marxian state theorists since Marx’s day (7-11). Alyssa Battistoni presents a succinct summary of the views on the state of Marxian environmental theorists such as James O’Connor and John Bellamy Foster (‘State, Capital, Nature: State Theory for the Capitalocene’). Kristin Munro (‘Socially Reproductive Workers, ‘Life-Making’, and State Repression’) and Chris O’Kane forcefully reaffirm the main claims about the state in Adorno’s Negative Dialectics, avoiding the notorious obscurity of Adorno’s own writing. Stephen Maher and Scott Aquanno (‘From Economic to Political Crisis: Trump and the Neoliberal State’) summarize the core of Poulantzas’ influential theory of the state. Michael McCarthy examines the evolution of Poulantzas thought in detail, arguing that his later work fails to escape from the functionalist perspective of early writings. Numerous authors explicitly acknowledge the influence of the immediately previous generation of Marxian theorists, highlighting especially the important contributions of Moise Postone, Simon Clarke and Werner Bonefeld.

The summaries provided in the collection are, of course, no substitute for reading the works summarized. But they do convey the intellectual richness of the Marxian tradition and are a helpful guide to further study.

Throughout the collection, a wide range of features of the contemporary capitalist state are considered. Alyssa Battistoni examines the contemporary capitalist state’s capability of responding to the environmental crises. Her typology of different Marxian positions on this issue greatly illuminates on-going debates and deserves to be widely known (41-44).

Rafael Khachaturian’s ‘Crisis, Social Reproduction, and the Capitalist State: Notes on an Uncertain Conjuncture’ explores state policies in the response to the Covid pandemic. Priority was quite obviously given to the restoration of capital accumulation over social care. Systematic bias in access to care on the basis of race, gender and geography was no less obvious. Khachaturian’s paper also explores the rise of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’, a ‘crisis regime of permanent exception’, showing how the decreased importance of political parties and legislative bodies relative to bureaucratic administration and executive powers erodes the state’s legitimacy (86).

Maher and Aquanno examine a particular case of bureaucratic administration in ‘From Economic to Political Crisis: Trump and the Neoliberal State’. They describe how the U.S. Federal Reserve is both integrated with the capitalist economy and insulated from democratic pressures. The Fed proved to be insulated from executive state power as well as when the Trump administration proved unable to assert presidential authority over it. Another theme of this chapter is how the increasing power of the financial sector and Central Banks is not in tension with industrial capital, pace the view of many heterodox economists. The allocations of the financial sector have intensified disciplinary power over the working class to the benefit of industrial capital. (This theme is developed further in their important recent book, The Fall and Rise of American Finance).

The actions by the Fed and other Central Banks in response to the Great Financial Crisis and the Covid pandemic are instances of the ‘war-emergency paradigm’ examined in Eva Nanopoulos’ essay (‘To Embrace or To Reject: Marxism and the “War-Emergency Paradigm”’). She argues that the war-emergency paradigm is ‘a prevalent, if not the de facto, mode of governing of the capitalist state’, even if financial crises and epidemics make it also ‘an expression of our current age of capitalist catastrophe’ (159).

In ‘“Bursting Asunder the Integument”: Democracy, Digitalization, and the State’, Dimitrios Kivotidis discusses how the digital revolution has enhanced the reactionary powers of the bourgeois state to monitor citizens and manipulate public opinion. He argues convincingly that targeted advertising, misinformation and digital echo chambers all contribute to the political disorganization of workers by promoting a ‘fragmented, empiricist understanding of social and political phenomena […] incompatible with the comprehensive and holistic viewpoint that is the prerequisite for a conscious critique of capitalism and pursuit of a radical alternative’ (63-64).

Kristin Munro’s essay (‘Socially Reproductive Workers, “Life-Making,” and State Repression’) considers the role of state workers in social services such as health care and education. She presents a powerful Marxian response to social reproduction theorists who fail to adequately appreciate how these services contribute to the reproduction of the capitalist economy.

As noted above, all authors in this collection accept the practical imperative to move to a new stage of world history where the impersonal domination of capital and the exploitation of the capital/wage labour relationship are overcome. All agree that this involves overcoming the capitalist state. Nonetheless, some affirm that it is possible, in the meantime, for progressive movements to successfully struggle for laws and public policies furthering the interests of workers, the poor, those facing environmental risks and so on, even if these laws and policies are bound to remain profoundly limited, distorted and subject to reversal in capitalism. The most vehement defence of this ‘class struggle’ perspective is presented by Michael McCarthy. He grants the strong tendency for the capitalist state to put the needs of capital accumulation before other concerns. He insists, however, that a tendency is not a certainty (224). Starting from Poultanzas’s description of the state as a strategic field, McCarthy argues for a greater scope of political contingencies than the functionalist residues of Poultanzas’s own state theory allow. Despite the limits of capitalist democracy, successful struggles within these political institutions can restructure power relations in society in ways that benefit workers and the oppressed (227). Khachaturian agrees: ‘It is quite likely that the state will play a role within the transition to any emancipatory political project (no matter how remote this possibility seems today)’ (94). Alyssa Battistoni similarly insists that the ‘urgency of climate change renders it imperative to engage with institutions as they presently exist’ (32).

In the contrasting ‘structuralist’ position, the salient fact is simply that the capitalist state is never not a manifestation of capitalist social relations. Apparently progressive state laws and policies that are adopted do not offer an escape from those social relations. Kivotidis, for example, writes that ‘the adverse effects of digital capitalism on social consciousness cannot be ameliorated within the confines of bourgeois institutions through regulation and “radical reforms”’ (54). If adverse effects cannot be ameliorated, social actions aiming at reforms have no point. O’Kane similarly asserts without qualification that ‘anti-capitalist political movements that enter the political sphere of capitalism are absorbed and depoliticized’ (245). If that is their inevitable fate, Marxists should not support them. While Munro acknowledges that the role of state workers in health care and education is contradictory, their primary role in her account is to ‘perpetuate the antagonism and social misery inherent to capitalism’ (178). Why should Marxists join political struggles to improve access to quality health care and education if it means perpetuating antagonism and misery? Praxis needs instead to be revolutionary, ‘smashing’, rather than working within, the capitalist state (Kivotidis 55, 69). If revolution is impossible in the given context, the only acceptable alternative is an unrelenting critique of capitalism as a negative totality and the capitalist state’s role in reproducing that totality.

Holdren’s essay reminds us that the questions at issue here were already posed in Capital. Nineteenth-century struggles in England to limit the length of the working day were successful. Did this reform benefit workers? Marx’s answer is ‘yes’ in many profound respects. Having the time to recover from work, nurture children, deepen other relationships, become informed about community issues and so on, is better than having to work 16-hour days! In other equally profound respects, however, the answer must be an emphatic ‘no’. After state legislation imposed limits on the production and appropriation of absolute surplus value from extensions of the working day, representatives of capital introduced new technologies and forms of labour organization enabling relative surplus value to be produced and appropriated. As a result, capital’s impersonal domination and the class exploitation of wage labour were renewed and reinforced. Those who see the capitalist state as a site of struggle can appeal to the former aspect of Marx’s writing, while adherents of the ‘structuralist’ position find ample textual support in the latter.

There is, I think, considerable truth on both sides. When workers struggle for higher wages and better working conditions, they remain within a capital/wage labour relationship of domination and exploitation. When these and other progressive struggles are successful to some degree, the illusion that the shortcomings of capitalism can be overcome in some new variant is likely to strengthen. What is not illusionary is capital’s amorphousness. In response to successful progressive reforms, it will mutate to pursue new opportunities for commodification, monetarisation and valorisation opened up by the reforms. As Holdren writes, ‘[a]cting within state institutional channels tends to encourage social struggles to express themselves in ways that do not disrupt the operation of the valorisation imperative, let alone threaten to end capitalism’ (203).

On the other hand, however, the revolutionary change called for opponents of ‘radical reformism’ requires a mass revolutionary consciousness that simply does not exist at present. Insisting on revolution nonetheless also ‘do[es] not disrupt the operation of the valorisation imperative, let alone threaten to end capitalism’. Hoping as O’Kane does that a sufficiently compelling negative dialectic will illuminate how ‘objective and subjective dimensions of negative totality rel[y] on each other’, and thereby ‘break “the spell” of identification and awaken a global subject that would negate negative totality’ also does not seem adequate (237). Why would even the most powerful account of how the objective structures of capital and the subjective dispositions of those trapped within them reinforce each other awaken a global subject dedicated to negate such an all-powerful negative totality? Wouldn’t a compelling description of being trapped in a closed totality foster accommodation, cynical opportunism, stoic resignation or despair? If pursuit of even the most radical reforms risks reinforcing the reign of capital, doesn’t renouncing progressive social movements in the name of a critique of negative totality run precisely the same risk?

In my view, the salient theoretical point here concerns the distinction between ‘totality’ and ‘totalizing’. A totality incorporates everything apparently ‘other’, reducing it to no more than a moment of itself. When Marx refers to capital as a ‘dominant subject’, this might suggest that he sees capital as a totality fully subjecting the social world to its imperatives (Commodify! Monetarize! Valorise!). This would make the development and mobilization of human capabilities either a form of capital (‘variable capital’) or a ‘free gift’ to capital. But this is only one component of Marx’s concept of capital. It is also the case that capital is a mere empty form, completely lacking powers of its own. What appear as the powers of capital are nothing but the collective creative powers of social individuals (and the mobilized powers of nature, science, our shared cultural heritage and so on) in an alien form:


In exchange for his labour capacity as a given magnitude [that is, a wage] he [the worker] surrenders its creative power, like Esau who gave up his birthright for a mess of pottage […] [T]he creative power of his labour establishes itself as the power of capital and confronts him as an alien power’ (Marx 1986: 233).

Capital’s immanent drive to be a totality is always frustrated by this dependence on ‘the creative power of labour’. From an ontological standpoint, then, capital cannot be the totality it wants to be, so to speak. It parasitically depends on an ‘other’ that is ‘inside’ it. Capital is an objective contradiction, at once an Absolute Power and an Absolute Nothing.

But while capital cannot be adequately conceptualized as a closed totality, it is very much a totalizing power, capable of forcing the surrender of workers’ creative powers. As Hunter notes, we know what compels this surrender: separation from the objective preconditions of human life, the means of production and means of subsistence (261, 268). This core theoretical claim of the critique of political economy has an important practical implication: challenges to this separation are at least implicitly challenges to capitalist society.

From this perspective, social movements struggling to direct investments in means of production towards social ends, to expand access to means of subsistence (in the broadest sense of the term, including education and health care) on the basis of social needs, and to create a social space to advocate for both can in principle be affirmed from a Marxian standpoint. Marx defended freedom of the press and freedom of assembly and representative bodies on these grounds, as Nanopoulos notes (153-4). Marx’s defence of child labour laws is worth quoting in this context:


They [the working class] know that, before everything else, the children and juvenile workers must be saved from the crushing effects of the present system. This can only be effected by converting social reason into social force, and, under given circumstances, there exists no other method of doing so, than through general laws, enforced by the power of the state. In enforcing such laws, the working class do not fortify governmental power. On the contrary, they transform that power, now used against them, into their own agency. They effect by a general act what they would vainly attempt by a multitude of isolated individual efforts. (Marx 1985: 189)

Other considerations support this conclusion. When collective struggles for reforms are successful, confidence in the collective power of people to change the social world may grow. When these successes prove limited and distorted, as they invariably will, new social movements aiming at less limited and less distorted results may arise. When those struggles fail or lead to only severely limited and distorted successes themselves, those engaged might conclude (correctly!) that the root problem lies with the property and production relationships of capitalism. In the right circumstances, a revolutionary political consciousness could possibly develop on the requisite mass scale.

There are, of course, no guarantees that will occur. Even worse, the pursuit of reforms may well foster the illusions of reformism and rejuvenate capital by opening up new paths of accumulation. Nonetheless, mass revolutionary consciousness is surely a necessary condition for radical social change. There are strong practical reasons for Marxists to be wary of theories of the state that in effect rule out the possibility of that condition being met by assuming from the start that capital’s power is all-encompassing. It is, I think, preferable to agree with Nanopoulos that pursing a specific political reform in a particular time and place is a pragmatic matter (152).

The editors honestly note that many important topics are not considered adequately in this collection, including race, ethnicity, nationality, sexuality and gender, the interstate system, migration and statelessness, constitutional democracy, alternative political forms taken by the capitalist state and violence and conflict in geopolitical relations (4). State funding of research and development that private capitals find too risky or too long-term to fund themselves can be added to this list, along with that state-bestowed intellectual property rights that enabling immense private profits to be appropriated on the basis of publicly funded R&D. But no single collection of essays should be expected to cover the full range of theoretical and practical issues regarding the capitalist state. What can be found in this book is more than enough to make it an immensely valuable contribution to Marxian theory. And more than enough to confirm Hunter’s assertion in the book’s final sentences:


The abolition of capitalism does not consist in the affirmation of fetishized conceptions of law or the state. Instead the abolition of capitalism is the creation of an alternative society – one in which collective decision-making, production validated through planning rather than exchange, and the freedom of each premised on the freedom of all will obtain in social forms wholly unlike those that presently constitute our misery (269-270).

24 June 2024

ReferencesKarl Marx 1985 Instructions for the Delegates of the Provisional General Council Marx and Engels Collected Works, Volume 20 (New York: International Publishers).
Karl Marx 1986 Outlines of the Critique of Political Economy [Grundrisse] Marx and Engels Collected Works, Volume 28 (New York: International Publishers).


URL: https://marxandphilosophy.org.uk/reviews/21552_marxism-and-the-capitalist-state-towards-a-new-debate-by-rob-hunter-rafael-khachaturian-and-eva-nanopoulos-eds-reviewed-by-tony-smith/

Friday, February 02, 2007

Capitalism Creates Global Warming

I don't often agree with the right wing flat earth society of climate change and global warming deniers, but in this case I will.

The
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), report issued today in Paris is a prime example of deliberate obfustication of the real source of global warming.

"Most of the observed increase in globally averaged temperatures since the mid-20th century is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic (human) greenhouse gas concentrations," it says.


Like the flat earthers I find it presumptious to blame humanity for a problem that is not created by people perse but by the political economy we have created.

For tens of thousands of years, humanity has existed, slowly changing our natural envrionment and ecology to meet our needs. However it is with the ascendancy of industrial based capitalism in the period of one hundred years that global warming has increased.

It is not people,"humanity", to blame for this, it is not a "man made" crisis , as if we as a society had consciously created this problem, it is the political economy of capitalism that has produced the climactic, environmental and ecological crisis we now face.

Headlines like this, and generalizations that say humanity is impacting the climate avoids laying the blames squarely where it belongs with the political economic system of capitalism.

Which is exactly what the flat earthers say, they too know that the science and politics of climate change expose capitalism as a zero sum game when it comes to the ecological and environmental crisis we face. Which is why they label all climate science as left wing.


But it is not what the scientists say. They still hide behind euphimisms like "man made", "human activities", than to say what we all know is true. The environmental crisis is the ultimate crisis of Capitalism. But unlike the previous economic crisises of Capitalism this is not one it can solve.

Thus the scientists give cover to the capitalists and their state claiming that we as individuals are to blame for the crisis. You can see it in the campaigns to make us all responsible for our part in helping solve this problem. By consuming of course. Green cars, enviornmentally friendly light bulbs, solar heating, blah, blah.

Global warming man-made, will continue

PARIS - International scientists and officials hailed a report Friday saying that global warming is "very likely" caused by man, and that hotter temperatures and rises in sea level "would continue for centuries" no matter how much humans control their pollution.

Smoke rises from a chemical company's stacks in Hamilton, approximately 50 km (31 miles) south of Toronto, February 1, 2007. Canada's Prime Minister Stephen Harper moved yesterday to mend his government's frayed international reputation on climate change by dispatching his Environment Minister to Paris for a key conference and promising to join an emergency UN summit on the issue.
Smoke rises from a chemical company's stacks in Hamilton, approximately 50 km (31 miles) south of Toronto, February 1, 2007. Canada's Prime Minister Stephen Harper moved yesterday to mend his government's frayed international reputation on climate change by dispatching his Environment Minister to Paris for a key conference and promising to join an emergency UN summit on the issue. [Reuters]

The head of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Rajendra Pachauri, called it a "very impressive document that goes several steps beyond previous research."

A top US government scientist, Susan Solomon, said "there can be no question that the increase in greenhouse gases are dominated by human activities."

The reality is those human acitivities are very specific, they are not the tribal or communal village life we once led. Indeed they are not even the result of hundreds of years of coal burning or thousands of years of slash and burn agriculture.

They are the direct result of coal based steam technology that saw the creation of the industrial revolution and mass manufacturing. The capitalist Fordist production model of the 20th Century and its current expansion in the newly capitalist economies in Asia are resulting in mass climactic, environmental and ecological crisis.

Amadeo Bordiga outlined this crisis of capitalism fifty years ago in his book Murdering The Dead, Capitalism and Other Disasters. Bordiga's Left Wing Communism was not like those of the rest of the left, whether Lennist or the Council Communists, his was a communism that viewed a future society as the administration of things, of processes as Adam Buick writes;

The aim of socialism was to abolish property, not to change its form. Socialism was therefore to be defined not in terms of property in the means of production but in terms of social arrangements for using them:

When the socialist formulas are correct the word property is not to be found but possession, taking possession of the means of production, more precisely exercise of the control or management of the means of production, of which we still have to determine the precise subject. [1958]10

Bordiga went on to identify 'society' as this subject, so that he was in effect offering the following definition of socialism: a system of society based on the social control of the means of production.

Bordiga was adamant that socialism did not mean handing over control of the use - and thus effective ownership - of individual factories and other places of work either to the people working in them or to the people living in the area where those factories or places of work were situated. Commenting on a text by Marx, he wrote that socialist society was opposed:

to the attribution of the means of production (the land in our case) to particular social groups: fractions or particular classes of national society, local groups or enterprise groups, professional or trade union categories. [1958]11

Furthermore:

The socialist programme insists that no branch of production should remain in the hands of one class only, even if it is that of the producers. Thus the land will not go to peasant associations, nor to the class of peasants, but to the whole of society. [1958]12

Demands such as 'the factories for the workers', 'the mines for the miners' and other such schemes for 'workers' control' were not socialist demands, since a society in which they were realised would still be a property society in the sense that parts of the productive apparatus would be controlled by sections only of society to the exclusion of other sections. Socialism, Bordiga always insisted, meant the end of all sectional control over separate parts of the productive apparatus and the establishment of central social control over all the means of production.

So, for Bordiga, in a socialist society there would be no property whatsoever in the means of production, not just of individuals or of groups of individuals, but also not of groups of producers nor of local or national communities either. The means of production would not be owned at all, but would simply be there to be used by the human race for its survival and continuation in the best possible conditions.

Scientific Administration of Social Affairs

The abolition of property meant at the same time the abolition of social classes and of the state. With the abolition of property there would no longer be any group of people in a privileged position as a result of controlling land or instruments of production as their 'property', and there would be no need for any social organ of coercion to protect the property of the property holders and to uphold their rule in society. Social classes and the political state would eventually, in the course of a more or less long transition period, give way to 'the rational administration of human activities'. Thus Bordiga was able to write that 'if one wants to give a definition of the socialist economy, it is a stateless economy' [1956-7]. 13 He also wrote that, with the establishment of socialism, social organisation would have changed 'from a social system of constraint on men (which it has been since prehistory) into a unitary and scientifically constructed administration of things and natural forces' [1951].14

Bordiga saw the relationship between the party and the working class under capitalism as analogous with that of the brain to the other parts of a biological organism. Similarly, he envisaged the relationship between the scientifically organised central administration and the rest of socialist society in much the same terms. Indeed, Bordiga saw the administrative organ of socialist society as the direct descendant of the party in capitalist society:

When the international class war has been won and when states have died out, the party, which is born with the proletarian class and its doctrine, will not die out. In this distant time perhaps it will no longer be called a party, but it will live as the single organ, the 'brain' of a society freed from class forces. [1956-7]15

In the higher stage of communism, which will no longer know commodity production, nor money, nor nations, and which will also see the death of the state. . . the party. . . will still keep the role of depository and propagator of the social doctrine giving a general vision of the development of the relations between human society and material nature. [1951]16

Thus the scientifically organised central administration in socialism would be, in a very real sense for Bordiga - who was a firm partisan of the view that human society is best understood as being a kind of organism - the 'social brain', a specialised social organ charged with managing the general affairs of society. Though it would be acting in the interest of the social organism as a whole, it would not be elected by the individual members of socialist society, any more than the human brain is elected by the individual cells of the human body.

Quite apart from accepting this biological metaphor, Bordiga took the view that it would not be appropriate in socialism to have recourse to elections to fill administrative posts, nor to take social decisions by 'the counting of heads'. For him, administrative posts were best filled by those most capable of doing the job, not by the most popular; similarly, what was the best solution to a particular problem was something to be determined scientifically by experts in the field and not a matter of majority opinion to be settled by a vote.

What was important for Bordiga was not so much the personnel who would perform socialist administrative functions as the fact that there would need to be an administrative organ in socialism functioning as a social brain and that this organ would be organised on a 'scientific' rather than a 'democratic' basis.

Bordiga's conception of socialism was 'non-democratic' rather than 'undemocratic'. He was in effect defining socialism as not 'the democratic social control of the means of production by and in the interest of society as a whole', but simply as 'the social control of the means of production in the interest of society as a whole'.

It was a solution to the crisis of capitalism that, as Adam Buick correctly points out, had much in common with a North American Syndicalist idea; Technocracy.

" The technocratic aspects of Bordiga's 'description of communism' were ignored by most of those influenced by him, including to a large extent the members of the group with which he was associated (the International Communist Party)."

Technocracy evolved out of the post WWI crisis of the limitations of Fordist production, and influenced by Thorstien Veblen viewed the crisis as one of the domination of capitalism over efficient, effective use of resources, human, material and energy. They called it the crisis of the price system.

And like Bordiga their solution was a centralized administration of energy and material resources. The abolition of wages, prices, labour value, all exchange values and the rational distribution of resources based on their ultimate use value, that is of their worth as energy outputs.

And like Bordiga, Howard Scott the main proponent of Technocracy saw not a democratic structure for his Technate, the directorship of Technocracy in North America, but a scientific community responsible for the organization and distribution of scarce resources.

As Marx pointed out advanced Capitalism is all about the commodification of all relationships, and as such leads to the ultimate end of competing capitals into a centralized capital.

That production rests on the supreme rule of capital. The centralization of capital is essential to the existence of capital as an independent power. The destructive influence of that centralization upon the markets of the world does but reveal, in the most gigantic dimensions, the inherent organic laws of political economy now at work in every civilized town. Marx

It is this centralization of capitalism that allows for the centralization of administration and planning through the governance of a self managed society which is what socialism is. And only with the socialization of production and consumption can we solve this ultimate crisis of capitalism which is the challenge of living without producing waste and its resulting environmental and ecological imprint which is what global warming is.

Since the modern form of Capitalism is Fordism, mass machinery, the automation of production, which includes its modern forms such as computerization, mass communications, it also provides us with the technology to liberate ourselves from capitalist production. It allows us to use technology to centralize production in an ecologically sound manner. It is the centralization of automation, computerization, not of people.

This was the vision of Marx who identified automation as the final stage of capitalism and the machinery of its doom.
Like Veblen and Scott, the scientist Norbert Wiener showed this was possible with his work on cybernetics. And current studies in the organic nature of technology, that it functions as biological organism, was already predicted by Marx in his work the Grundrisse.



As long as the means of labour remains a means of labour in the proper sense of the term, such as it is directly, historically, adopted by capital and included in its realization process, it undergoes a merely formal modification, by appearing now as a means of labour not only in regard to its material side, but also at the same time as a particular mode of the presence of capital, determined by its total process -- as fixed capital.

But, once adopted into the production process of capital, the means of labour passes through different metamorphoses, whose culmination is the machine, or rather, an automatic system of machinery (system of machinery: the automatic one is merely its most complete, most adequate form, and alone transforms machinery into a system), set in motion by an automaton, a moving power that moves itself; this automaton consisting of numerous mechanical and intellectual organs, so that the workers themselves are cast merely as its conscious linkages. In the machine, and even more in machinery as an automatic system, the use value, i.e. the material quality of the means of labour, is transformed into an existence adequate to fixed capital and to capital as such; and the form in which it was adopted into the production process of capital, the direct means of labour, is superseded by a form posited by capital itself and corresponding to it. In no way does the machine appear as the individual worker's means of labour.

Its distinguishing characteristic is not in the least, as with the means of labour, to transmit the worker's activity to the object; this activity, rather, is posited in such a way that it merely transmits the machine's work, the machine's action, on to the raw material -- supervises it and guards against interruptions. Not as with the instrument, which the worker animates and makes into his organ with his skill and strength, and whose handling therefore depends on his virtuosity. Rather, it is the machine which possesses skill and strength in place of the worker, is itself the virtuoso, with a soul of its own in the mechanical laws acting through it; and it consumes coal, oil etc. (matières instrumentales), just as the worker consumes food, to keep up its perpetual motion. The worker's activity, reduced to a mere abstraction of activity, is determined and regulated on all sides by the movement of the machinery, and not the opposite.

The science which compels the inanimate limbs of the machinery, by their construction, to act purposefully, as an automaton, does not exist in the worker's consciousness, but rather acts upon him through the machine as an alien power, as the power of the machine itself. The appropriation of living labour by objectified labour -- of the power or activity which creates value by value existing for-itself -- which lies in the concept of capital, is posited, in production resting on machinery, as the character of the production process itself, including its material elements and its material motion.

The production process has ceased to be a labour process in the sense of a process dominated by labour as its governing unity. Labour appears, rather, merely as a conscious organ, scattered among the individual living workers at numerous points of the mechanical system; subsumed under the total process of the machinery itself, as itself only a link of the system, whose unity exists not in the living workers, but rather in the living (active) machinery, which confronts his individual, insignificant doings as a mighty organism. In machinery, objectified labour confronts living labour within the labour process itself as the power which rules it; a power which, as the appropriation of living labour, is the form of capital. The transformation of the means of labour into machinery, and of living labour into a mere living accessory of this machinery, as the means of its action, also posits the absorption of the labour process in its material character as a mere moment of the realization process of capital.

The increase of the productive force of labour and the greatest possible negation of necessary labour is the necessary tendency of capital, as we have seen. The transformation of the means of labour into machinery is the realization of this tendency. In machinery, objectified labour materially confronts living labour as a ruling power and as an active subsumption of the latter under itself, not only by appropriating it, but in the real production process itself; the relation of capital as value which appropriates value-creating activity is, in fixed capital existing as machinery, posited at the same time as the relation of the use value of capital to the use value of labour capacity; further, the value objectified in machinery appears as a presupposition against which the value-creating power of the individual labour capacity is an infinitesimal, vanishing magnitude; the production in enormous mass quantities which is posited with machinery destroys every connection of the product with the direct need of the producer, and hence with direct use value; it is already posited in the form of the product's production and in the relations in which it is produced that it is produced only as a conveyor of value, and its use value only as condition to that end. In machinery, objectified labour itself appears not only in the form of product or of the product employed as means of labour, but in the form of the force of production itself.

The development of the means of labour into machinery is not an accidental moment of capital, but is rather the historical reshaping of the traditional, inherited means of labour into a form adequate to capital. The accumulation of knowledge and of skill, of the general productive forces of the social brain, is thus absorbed into capital, as opposed to labour, and hence appears as an attribute of capital, and more specifically of fixed capital, in so far as it enters into the production process as a means of production proper.

Machinery appears, then, as the most adequate form of fixed capital, and fixed capital, in so far as capital's relations with itself are concerned, appears as the most adequate form of capital as such. In another respect, however, in so far as fixed capital is condemned to an existence within the confines of a specific use value, it does not correspond to the concept of capital, which, as value, is indifferent to every specific form of use value, and can adopt or shed any of them as equivalent incarnations. In this respect, as regards capital's external relations, it is circulating capital which appears as the adequate form of capital, and not fixed capital.

Further, in so far as machinery develops with the accumulation of society's science, of productive force generally, general social labour presents itself not in labour but in capital. The productive force of society is measured in fixed capital, exists there in its objective form; and, inversely, the productive force of capital grows with this general progress, which capital appropriates free of charge. This is not the place to go into the development of machinery in detail; rather only in its general aspect; in so far as the means of labour, as a physical thing, loses its direct form, becomes fixed capital, and confronts the worker physically as capital. In machinery, knowledge appears as alien, external to him; and living labour [as] subsumed under self-activating objectified labour. The worker appears as superfluous to the extent that his action is not determined by [capital's] requirements.

The full development of capital, therefore, takes place -- or capital has posited the mode of production corresponding to it -- only when the means of labour has not only taken the economic form of fixed capital, but has also been suspended in its immediate form, and when fixed capital appears as a machine within the production process, opposite labour; and the entire production process appears as not subsumed under the direct skillfulness of the worker, but rather as the technological application of science. [It is,] hence, the tendency of capital to give production a scientific character; direct labour [is] reduced to a mere moment of this process. As with the transformation of value into capital, so does it appear in the further development of capital, that it presupposes a certain given historical development of the productive forces on one side -- science too [is] among these productive forces -- and, on the other, drives and forces them further onwards.

To the degree that labour time -- the mere quantity of labour -- is posited by capital as the sole determinant element, to that degree does direct labour and its quantity disappear as the determinant principle of production -- of the creation of use values -- and is reduced both quantitatively, to a smaller proportion, and qualitatively, as an, of course, indispensable but subordinate moment, compared to general scientific labour, technological application of natural sciences, on one side, and to the general productive force arising from social combination [Gliederung] in total production on the other side -- a combination which appears as a natural fruit of social labour (although it is a historic product). Capital thus works towards its own dissolution as the form dominating production.

Marx Grundrisse Ch. 13


To end our enslavement to the machines as alienated labour, hence the frustration and powerlessness we feel when confronting this current ecological crisis, by recognizing the limitations of their use by capitalism, can only be resolved through the transformation of capitalist society into a socialist society based on industrial ecology and social ecology.

This cannot be done by carbon credits, green policies, caps on industrial pollution, etc. etc., but by the end of capitalism and the liberation of the machinery of capitalism to be used to solve our ecological crisis. Green consiousness is not enough, we need a real Green Revolution, a socialist revolution.

It requires no great penetration to grasp that, where e.g. free labour or wage labour arising out of the dissolution of bondage is the point of departure, there machines can only arise in antithesis to living labour, as property alien to it, and as power hostile to it; i.e. that they must confront it as capital. But it is just as easy to perceive that machines will not cease to be agencies of social production when they become property of the associated workers. In the first case, however, their distribution, i.e. that they do not belong to the worker, is just as much a condition of the mode of production founded on wage labour. In the second case the changed distribution would start from a changed foundation of production, a new foundation first created by the process of history.
Marx Grundrisse Ch. 16


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Sunday, December 11, 2022

Social media engagement style may be linked with perceived social connectedness

Experiment involving mock social media site identifies key differences between passive, reactive and interactive styles of usage

Peer-Reviewed Publication

PLOS

An experimental task delineates among passive, reactive and interactive styles of behaviour on social networking sites 

IMAGE: THE AUTHORS FOUND THAT INDIVIDUALS DISPLAYING MORE INTERACTIVE STYLES OF USAGE REPORTED STRONGER FEELINGS OF SOCIAL CONNECTEDNESS AND SOCIAL CAPITAL. view more 

CREDIT: GERD ALTMANN, PIXABAY, CC0 (HTTPS://CREATIVECOMMONS.ORG/PUBLICDOMAIN/ZERO/1.0/)

A new experimental task, involving a mock social networking site, can group people into three distinct styles of social media use—passive, reactive and interactive. Moreover, data from a large online sample suggests that these styles of social media use may be related to psychological well-being, with more interactive users reporting greater feelings of social connectedness than passive or reactive users, according to a new study published this week in the open-access journal PLOS ONE by Daniel Shaw of Aston University, UK, and colleagues.

Despite the wealth of research into the psychological impact of social networking site (SNS) usage, inconsistent findings have prevented any firm conclusions from being drawn. While some studies have concluded that social media usage is associated with increased social connectedness and reduced loneliness, other report detriments to loneliness and well-being with greater use of such platforms. 

In the new work, the researchers developed a computerized task to measure styles of usage on a mock SNS platform. They administered the SNS Behavior Task (SNSBT) online to 526 individuals, who also completed questionnaires on their levels of loneliness, sense of belonging, social connectedness, online social capital, and who answered questions about their Facebook usage and friend network.

The SNSBT grouped users into three discrete groups depending on how often they clicked “Next,” “Like,” or “Share” on 90 images presented to them on the mock SNS. On average, passive users, about 39% of those in the study, clicked “Next” most often, on 85% of images. Reactive users, 35.4% of the study, most often clicked either “Next,” 59% of the time, or “Like,” 36% of the time. Interactive users, 25.7% of participants, mostly clicked “Like,” 51% of the time, or “Share” 20% of the time.

Analysis of the data revealed that interactive users had, on average, more Facebook friends, spent more time on Facebook, and reported greater feelings of social connectedness and social capital than passive or reactive SNS users. However, this study could not determine if any causative or directional link between these factors exists, and more work is needed to understand the effects of potential confounding factors on these relationships.

The authors conclude that the simple SNSBT tool they developed, now publicly available, can help researchers quantitatively differentiate between SNS usage styles, and overcome the limitations of self-report data, enhancing future research in the field of cyberpsychology.

Dr. Daniel Shaw adds: “This study introduces a new tool with which researchers can measure different styles of engagement on social networking platforms, and indicates that our style of engagement can be more important for our psychological wellbeing than the amount of time we spend on social media.”

Dr. Charlotte Pennington adds: “Individuals displaying more interactive styles of usage on our platform reported stronger feelings of social connectedness and social capital compared with those who showed more reactive or passive behavior. Our team has developed the first mock social networking site that can be used to measure natural styles of usage, free from the ethical concerns that arise when people log into their own phones.”

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In your coverage please use this URL to provide access to the freely available article in PLOS ONEhttps://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0276765

Citation: Shaw DJ, Kaye LK, Ngombe N, Kessler K, Pennington CR (2022) It’s not what you do, it’s the way that you do it: An experimental task delineates among passive, reactive and interactive styles of behaviour on social networking sites. PLoS ONE 17(12): e0276765. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0276765

Author Countries: UK, Germany, Ireland

Funding: This study was supported by an internal grant from Aston, awarded to DJS (PI), CP, KK and LK (Co-Is). The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.

Sunday, August 18, 2024

The Automatic Fetish: The Law of Value in Marx’s Capital




Beverley Best
Verso, New York, 2024. 358 pp., $29.95 pb
ISBN 9781804294802

Reviewed by Carlos Velasquez


Former Greek Finance minister, Yanis Varoufakis, recently adhered to the belief that we no longer live under capitalism. Bewildered by the contemporary forms that capitalist relations of production take, he argues that platforms have extinguished the labour-capital relation, and that we now inhabit a ‘techno-feudalist’ order. In overlooking what is continuous, what remains at the core of the two systems he identifies, Varoufakis misses the forest for the trees, or the base for the superstructure, contributing, thus, to the noise and turbulence of an already blurred reality. Beverley Best’s new book, The Automatic Fetish: The Law of Value in Marx’s Capital, is a beacon in this world. By advancing both a rigorous and original reading of Capital Vol. 3, Best illuminates the dynamics that govern and determine capital’s phenomenal forms, clarifying a muddled present and reminding us that, despite wishful thinking, we still live under capital.

The elucidation of the contemporary moment in The Automatic Fetish, as well as the proposal for the interpretation of the third volume of Marx’s Capital, is grounded on a straightforward premise: that the ‘determinism of the base/superstructure metaphor orients and coheres the analysis in Capital III’ (2). As Best explains, base determines superstructure, not the converse. The social relations that constitute capital’s base must always take a concrete form in the world as it actually is. Yet the ‘capitalist base disappears into the superstructure’ (4) while remaining the force of gravity that determines the form’s movement. On that account, Best proposes that ‘Capital III is a book about ideology’ (336). It is a work that looks to demonstrate how the movement of capital mystifies the ‘the essential character of capital’s movement’ (8). In other words, through the analysis of its different social forms and transformations – from surplus-value to profit, from profit to interest and rent – we find that these expressions, in their concrete manifestation, are mystified and reified. They appear as automatic subjects or essential conditions, burying, thus, the living-labour that constitutes them. Best defines this dynamic of obfuscation as capital’s ‘perceptual physics’ (9).

Through development of this notion, of the concept of ‘perceptual physics’, Best advances a fundamental contribution to the development of a Marxian conception of ideology. She does so by articulating both a concept of ideology as a process of subject formation, alongside consideration of ideology as a modality of capital’s reproduction, as inversion. By defining capital’s movement, its mandate to abstract and mystify as ‘perceptual physics’, Best is able to convey ideology not as something restricted to the superstructure or a false interpretation of reality, but on the contrary, as the consequence of capital’s dynamic, that subjectivity is constituted through participation in economic relations, by encountering the forms that value takes, for ‘capital, in its reproduction as both a system of exploitation and a mode of domination, is a dynamic of social content and social form that is also a mode of representation – the production of particular distorted appearances that stabilize into a generalized “common sense”’ (84).

As a companion to Capital Vol. 3, The Automatic Fetish follows the structure of Marx’s work as it emphasizes the dynamic of capital’s ‘perceptual physics’, what we could consider as a retracing of the steps for conveying a process of continuous separation of the forms of appearance from the source of new value. The first part of the book addresses this problem of estrangement and of the mystification of surplus-value more directly by explicating its transformation into profit and then, its further development by which profits are reified and converted into autonomous objects in the evaluation of their rate. In describing Marx’s critique of this process, Best underlines the dynamic unity or coherence of this tendency. Through her reading of Marx, we see how the collapsing of the organic composition of capital into cost price, and the consequential reification of the latter as the natural requirement for profit, are all part of a chain of obfuscation that is set in motion through the initial process of introducing value into the concrete world. It is from this very first instance, the capitalist social relation, that the dynamic of repeated and continuous inversion of subject and object, the fetishization of capital’s social forms as value-creators, is ignited (29).

In her description of this movement towards the reification of social relations, Best focuses on Marx’s critique of capital’s tendency towards crisis, the fact that ‘[c]apital carries on by breaking down’ (45). However, she adds to the comprehension of this tendency by first underlining the fact that while capital generates the production of surplus, it also ‘negates the actualization of abundance in the absolute development of production and consumption’ (131). She therefore proposes to think of capital precisely as the negation of abundance, not as the hinderance of the means of achieving it, but in terms of the constriction that production and circulation for the sake of capital imposes upon the satisfaction of human needs. Then, following this initial argument on the cause of crisis, Best proposes an innovative interpretation of Marx’s critique by arguing that in his evaluation of the development of an associated mode of production, Marx ‘scatters’ a series of speculative deductions which look to show how the advancements in production and circulation imposed by capital, if disengaged from the capital’s gravitational pull, could provide the means for a future of generalized abundance. Best therefore argues that the transition into post-capitalism ‘will be a matter of developing through, as opposed to against, capital’s inbuilt portals to another “non-existent but non-fictional”, higher because intentional, form of social modality’ (130). Hence, Best characterizes the dialectical manner of Marx’s critique as utopian, as a form of ‘speculative materialism’ (193).

In reviewing the transformation of profit into merchant profit, interest and rent, Best interestingly qualifies these changes as ‘decompositions’. Such a characterization has to do with the fact that with the movement to any of these subspecies of profit, we reach the instance of ‘pure form’ and ‘pure fetish’. The initially mystified object, profit, is then itself obfuscated as it is forced to take the shape of commercial profit, interest or rent. We arrive, thus, at the instance where money makes money, where ‘what is hidden is not simply the role of living labour in production but, the mediation by the entire production process itself in capital’s expansion’ (177). The pinnacle of this dynamic of fetishization is then achieved with the form of interest-bearing capital, the ‘automatic fetish’ (184), under which interest, as a sort of natural, independent and absolute object, appears to inherently produce profits. Here again, Best foregrounds the utopian dimension of Marx’s analysis, since the absolute form of abstraction represented by interest-bearing capital is also considered as a portal towards a world beyond capitalist production. The conception of profits as completely separated from the process of production allows us to think of manufacturing decoupled from production price. Furthermore, this form of absolute decoupling overturns notions of the requirement of capitalist management and strengthens Best’s idea that ‘for Marx, the social form of interest-bearing capital and its socialization in the credit system signal, on an immediate level, nothing less than the real (but unrealized) abolition of the capitalist and, on a deeper level, that of the capitalist mode of production’ (186).

It is then, in the analysis and untangling of the section on ground-rent where Best clearly traces and manifests the methodological operation of of value critique. While threading and clarifying Marx’s complicated arguments towards the demystification of land as a value producing entity, the author explains and displays the dynamic of Marxian critique as one that operates in terms of ‘representation and exposition’ (287). Value, just like gravity, can only be measured and mapped in relation to the force it applies upon other objects. To understand that this force exists, we cannot speak of it only in the abstract or focusing exclusively on the immediate object. The process of unveiling the invisible pull effected by value can only be achieved through demonstration, by mapping how value’s continuous disappearance into its surface expressions is not a marginal outcome of its action, but the central premise of its operation.

Because Best manages to both advance a coherent and original interpretation of Marx’s Capital Vol. 3, while at the same time using Marxian methodology as a process of unveiling to make sense of value’s contemporary forms of superficial manifestation, The Automatic Fetish ought to be considered not just as a companion to Capital Vol. 3, but as guide to the dialectical formulation that constitutes Marx’s critique. Therefore, just like Fredric Jameson’s characterization of Capital Vol. 1 as a book about unemployment allowed for a reconsideration of the work, Beverley Best’s claim that Capital Vol. 3 is a book about ideology constitutes the emergence of a new and comprehensive understanding or Marx’s critique of capital.

12 July 2024


URL: https://marxandphilosophy.org.uk/reviews/21578_the-automatic-fetish-the-law-of-value-in-marxs-capital-by-beverley-best-reviewed-by-carlos-velasquez/



The Automatic Fetish: The Law of Value in Marx’s Capital


Reviewed by Jacob Spenser Wilson

About the reviewer
Jacob Spenser Wilson is a PhD candidate at the University of Washington. 


Capitalist crises cannot only be measured by its catastrophic effects on society, but also by the reception of their most staunchest critique: Karl Marx’s Capital. Many have pointed out that the rising interest in Marx’s magnum opus seemingly coincides with capitalism’s deepest moments of crisis, as if it suggests discontent with the present system. With much attention given to volume one or the many drafts to which it culminated, until recently there has remained little attention to the subsequent volumes of Capital. Beverly Best’s new book, The Automatic Fetish: The Law of Value in Marx’s Capital, contributes to this growing resurgence and gap by taking Marx’s value theory and using it to read volume three. This work is nothing short of a masterful reading of Marx’s form-analysis and defends the continued relevance of Marx’s work in the twenty-first century.

In a critical and methodological reading, Best uproots ‘capital’s hidden, inner movement and the identification of its historical conditions of emergence’ to study what she calls ‘capital’s perceptual physics’(9). Her work responds immediately to critics of value-form theory who conceive of it as a narrowed reading of the first few chapters of Capital, demonstrating how Marx’s initial investigation of value and its forms undergird the whole of Capital. Her argument hinges on the centrality of volume three for the critique of political economy, which she argues is ‘a theory of a particular movement that generates new percepts – a movement arising from collective uncoordinated activity that, over a couple of centuries of objectification through repetition, produces a particular appearance of things that launches a specific world history’ (326). In short, she takes the concept of fetish and asks what economic forms it distorts once capital is moving through its M-C-M’ circuit.

As Best shows, it is one thing to analyze the fetish-character of capital in the ideal-average scenario that Marx constructs at the beginning of volume one, but quite another to analyze fetishism in volume three where there ‘is both a broadening and a focusing of the concept’ (48). In building this analysis, Best gives one of the most detailed accounts of the consequences of capital’s fetishized forms inherent in its movement for the study of political economy. By placing value-theory at the center of volume three, Best is able to draw radical conclusions for the study and critique of economics and how the law of value maintains the coherent core of Marx’s project.

The book is organized as a companion to volume three and is made up of two sections which trace out the internal dynamics of capital’s ‘perpetual physics.’ The first section deals with the rate of profit, the fetish of the rate of surplus-value, to showcase how production, competition and finally crisis distort and contort the misery of the production process into a blind pursuit of M-M’. Best begins with the category of cost price to show how it ‘is the initial category from which all others will derive’ (23). Cost price, ‘a disciplining objective appearance’, is essentially the cost incurred by the capitalist to produce a commodity (18-19). It becomes the basis for competition since as long as a commodity is sold above the cost price, it can be sold below its value allowing for competitors to undersell and take a bigger share of the market. From this initial obfuscation, Best demonstrates how capital’s movement obscures the source of surplus-value, the subsumption of labor-power to ever increasing productivity, which as a result makes capitalist’s pursuit of profit a rational outcome in a commodity producing society. As she says, ‘[f]rom the standpoint of the capitalist, the only calculation of concern is rate of profit – the immediate form of appearance that today dictates global production and commerce across the world market’ (36). In short, Best demonstrates how the creation of surplus-value is obscured by the machinations of the economy as capitalists pursue profit as if money can magically double itself.

The second section deals with the metamorphosis of profit, following ‘Marx’s exposition of the decomposition of profit into the surface forms of industrial profit, commercial profit, interest, and ground rent’ (137). It is ultimately an examination of the forms of profit that obscure the ‘hidden abode of production’ across the M-C-M’ circuit, concealing the costs incurred on the lives and bodies of workers. Best unravels the deep irrationality that drives the capitalist pursuit of profit across industries, from agriculture and industrial production, finance and commerce in this theoretically dense yet prescient analysis. Part of the charm of the book is following Best’s excavation of these fetish forms and how they distort perceptions to pursue appearances, while the essence of the matter is driven by the subjugation of the working class to the few. The consequences of the movement of capital are vast, and to preserve people’s own experience, following Best’s exposition, I will highlight two key parts of the book: Marx’s theory of crisis and the analysis of ground-rent.

The chapter on crisis foregrounds capitalism’s dialectical identity as creative destruction. In recent years, this idea of crisis as an internal mechanism to ensure its reproduction has gained a lot of traction. What Best offers, in reading volume three, is an interpretation of crisis as an internal dynamic of capitalism itself, instead of an aberration of equilibrium. In Best’s own words, crisis is ‘the means by which capital displaces the obstacles it erects between itself and its singular objective’ (123). Yet it is not simply a negation of an obstacle that characterizes capitalist crisis; it is a negation of a contradiction by way of a contradiction: the universality of separation. This contradiction, expressed through crisis, is one of capitalism’s oldest conditions, and Best highlights how separation undergirds capitalism’s crisis tendency to render certain sectors superfluous in order to grow other sectors of the economy, to increase its flexibility to build regimes of accumulation. In this light, crisis at once tears down its own boundaries to erect new ones that it will eventually be forced to confront down the road of history. What lies behind this creative destruction, as Best describes, ‘entails precarity, unemployment, poverty, illness, gendered and racialized violence, and social exclusion’ of proletarians the world over (130). The movement of capital invokes a complicated question about the crisis tendency of capitalism into a simple one: why must capitalists instrumentalize humanity as a means to an end, that is, money that begets more money?

Ground-rent, the fetish form of landed property, occupies a significant chapter in the book and for good reason. The Financial Times recently published an article noting the significant increase in market value of arable land in the United States, causing private-equity to lead the charge in adding this asset to their portfolios. This phenomenon stands in stark contradiction to the many experiences of family-run or small farmers and ranchers in the US who, in many cases, are facing the heightened competitive pressures of an increasingly industrialized agricultural production, thus going out of business, paying more taxes and rent, as well as producing commodities for the market rather than for need. Marx, according to Best, provides the key to understanding this situation with the idea that ground-rent obscures the productivity of living labor as the source of surplus-value (250-251). The consequence is that ground-rent can increase even as the productivity of labor decreases, the prices of agricultural commodities goes up and the rate of profit demonstrably declines for agricultural production on a global scale. These tendencies arise from the movement of capital and, as Best says, ‘the virtually infinite ways in which human beings can be in metabolism with land are subordinated to the exigencies of the capital-labour relation – that is, to the law of value’ (243). Ground-rent shows itself as a form of social domination that subordinates land to the control of landowners for the sole purpose of making money from money. It renders land into a means for a ridiculous end, when agricultural products like food are produced not to satisfy hunger but again, to generate profit for landowners.

It is hard to disagree with Best’s work given its thorough reading, careful argument and clarity in demonstrating Marx’s internal coherence. Yet we might doubt Best’s assertion that Capital is, among many other things, ‘not a study of capitalist society, it is a book about how to think the material conditions of what might come after’ (341). While the task of critique is to comprehend the present in order to build a meaningful alternative to human society, uncertainty as a necessary mediation for its construction could be defended. While it is appealing to posit a latent kernel to be excavated for a future society, particularly after forty years of capitalist counterrevolution, we might nevertheless wonder what possibilities would be closed off if this were the case. Certainly, we need to understand and critique capitalist society in order to draw a path forward from its retched depths, and in so doing theorize alternatives. But we should also recognize the limits of our own imagination as it is determined by this base.

Despite this very minor point, The Automatic Fetish makes a strong case for why people should grapple with Marx’s work in its entirety and as an incomplete work that requires its application to the current political conjuncture. Best illuminates how the movement of capital produces dizzying heights and hidden surfaces that make capital’s reproduction possible. While the book gives focus to volume three, it draws much needed attention to all three volumes, which needs to be done if we are to adequately understand the value of Marx’s work. Best’s work recovers Marx’s essential critique of political economy, which revolves around its subordination of humanity to mere means for the ultimate end of making more money. Readers ought to sit with the book and work through it alongside Marx’s Capital. Its difficulty will reward the careful reader who applies its findings in the analysis of our present conjuncture, bringing economic science down to earth to show why another world is and must be possible.

17 June 2024


URL: https://marxandphilosophy.org.uk/reviews/21544_the-automatic-fetish-the-law-of-value-in-marxs-capital-by-beverley-best-reviewed-by-jacob-spenser-wilson/