UK

These local council results suggest Tory decimation at the general election ahead

Published: May 3, 2024 


The local elections which took place on May 2 have provided an unusually rich set of results to pore over. Around 2,600 seats were up for election on 107 councils across the country. There were elections for 37 police and crime commissioners, and for 11 local mayors. And much as the government would have preferred us not to notice, there was a parliamentary by-election in Blackpool South.

It will be a couple days before we have the full results, but the big picture so far is that the Conservatives have lost about half the council seats they have been defending. According to election analyst Sir John Curtice, they could lose 500 seats by the time counting is finished over the weekend.

The party will, however, welcome the victory of their candidate, Ben Houchen, in the Tees Valley mayoral contest. He ran a campaign which focused on his achievements and played down his Conservative affiliations. But even that contest provides a mixed picture for the party, particularly given that Labour won control of Hartlepool council, one of the districts in the Tees Valley.

Labour has done well, gaining just over 40% of the council seats lost by the Conservatives. Labour won control of Thurrock in Essex, Redditch in Worcestershire and Rushmore in Hampshire in addition to Hartlepool. Redditch and Rushmore are both in the Conservative heartlands and so these wins have important implications for Labour support in the general election later this year.

A local man casts his vote and describes the experience as quite enjoyable. Alamy

That said, Labour lost control of Oldham council in Greater Manchester where independents did particularly well. The town has a high proportion of Muslim voters and it looks like many of them are deserting the party because of Keir Starmer’s position on Gaza.

A general election ahead

These results give us a good indication of what to expect in the general election expected this year. There is a lot of inertia in voting behaviour over time, with current general elections being strongly influenced both by voting in previous general elections and also by recent local elections. So when a local vote is as close to the general election as this, there’s a lot to be gleaned.

There is a strong relationship between the Labour vote share in the 20 general elections from 1950 to 2019, for example, and the Labour vote share in the election that came before each of these contests. Meanwhile, polls showed far greater volatility.

Labour vote shares in general elections:
One good election leads to another, and vice versa. P Whiteley, CC BY-ND

The chart shows that when Labour does well in a general election, it tends to do well in a subsequent election. The relationship also works in reverse since a poor result in one election is often followed by a poor result in the subsequent election.

The correlation between the two is very strong (0.70) over this period of nearly three-quarters of a century. The 2019 result marked in the chart shows how much of a mountain the party still needs to climb to win next time.

The best guide to the next general election from these contests is what happened in the Blackpool South byelection. Local elections are always influenced by national politics, but byelections are even more focused on the national picture.

In Blackpool South, the Conservative vote share fell by 32% compared to the 2019 election, while Labour’s share increased by 21%. This produced a huge swing to Labour of 26%.

The largest swing to Labour in the post-war period was in 1997 – a swing of 8.8%. Swings in byelections can be much larger, but we are nonetheless in meltdown territory as far as the Conservatives are concerned.

Meanwhile, it’s quite disturbing from the Tories’ point of view that the Reform candidate nearly pushed them into third place in Blackpool South. Reform received 3,101 votes or nearly 11% of the total. They were only 117 votes behind the Conservatives. Richard Tice, the Reform party leader, was very upbeat when he was interviewed on LBC about the contest, saying that it was the best byelection result the party had ever achieved.

This will have the Tories concerned about whether such a result can be improved on in the general election. Reform could become a serious rival to the Conservatives, particularly in the red wall seats, in the general election.

The local elections of 1996 were the worst for 50 years for the Conservatives. Back then, they took just under 19% of the seats. They were eclipsed by Labour with 49% and by the Liberal Democrats with 22%.

The following year, Tony Blair won a landslide victory in the general election. Counting continues, but Rishi Sunak will no doubt be wondering if a new low is about to be hit.

Author

Paul Whiteley
Paul Whiteley is a Friend of The Conversation.
Professor, Department of Government, University of Essex
Disclosure statement
Paul Whiteley has received funding from the British Academy and the ESRC.
Partners

Boris Johnson: if even the prime minister who introduced voter ID can forget his, do we need a rethink?

Published: May 3, 2024
THE CONVERSATION

Former prime minister Boris Johnson was reportedly turned away on election day after arriving at his polling station to vote with only “an envelope with his name and address on it”. He was informed that under the new rules, brought about by his government, he could not vote.

Johnson did eventually return to the polling station with the right form of ID and was able to vote, but the debacle presents more than just difficult optics for British democracy. The UK has a general election on the very near horizon. If even a former prime minister is having difficulty casting a ballot in a local election, is it time for a rethink of the rules?

Another case playing out as Johnson was presumably looking for his driver’s licence was that of Adam Diver, who had spent 27 years serving his country in the army. He said on Twitter that he had arrived at his local polling station to be told that he did not have an accepted form of identification. His veteran ID card was not on the list of acceptable forms of ID and he would not be able to exercise his democratic right to vote.

Johnny Mercer MP, a Conservative party minister whose government introduced the new voter identification law, quickly apologised to Diver. The list of acceptable forms of identification was published before veterans ID cards started coming out in January this year, so before this election, he said. “I will do all I can to change it before the next one”. Small consolation for Diver.

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What are the voter ID rules?

The Elections Act 2022, which came into force during Johnson’s tenure, introduced new requirements for citizens to present ID at UK general elections and some local elections. Prior to this, no form of identification was required in England, Wales and Scotland.

Accepted forms of identification include passports and driving licences but also a range of other options. If citizens don’t have identification, then they can apply for a free voter authority certificate, provided that they do so before the deadline (which was April 25 for these local elections).

The proposals first came from a 2016 report on “electoral fraud”, written by former Conservative party chairman Eric Pickles. The stated aim of the new laws was to reduce the chance of people impersonating others to steal their vote. But the reality is that impersonation in polling stations, the problem which voter identification is proposed to fix, is very rare.

Data from the Electoral Commission shows that in 2019, a general election year, there were two convictions or cautions for someone voting by pretending to be someone else. Research on the nature of problems in polling stations finds that the more significant problem is that many voters arrive to find that their name is not on the electoral register on polling day.

Many citizens are often already turned away because they miss the registration deadline or misunderstand the registration voting process. These, it might be argued, are more pressing problems to address than impersonation.
It’s not just former prime ministers

The evidence is also clear that voter identification requirements cause many eligible citizens to not vote on election day. My study with Alistair Clark at Newcastle University from the 2023 local elections found that 70% of poll workers turned away at least one voter because they did not have an acceptable form of identification.

The government’s own research showed that 9% of the public do not have in-date and recognisable identification. The availability of identification is lower amongst those with a severely limiting disability, the unemployed and those without educational qualifications.

Voters were reminded to bring ID in an information campaign. Alamy/Maureen McLean

The experience of not being able to vote can be distressing, as can having to block someone from voting. As one poll worker described in one of our studies: “Women were turned away because they got married and changed their names, then their ID and register names were different”. The worker said they felt this was gender discrimination and added: “I’m quite upset that I’ve turned voters away and particularly discriminating against women.”

Voter identification could be made to work with minimal effect on turnout if sufficient safeguards are introduced to still ensure that eligible electors could vote. As I said in evidence I gave to parliament while these laws were being put together, compromise is possible.

Citizens without voter ID on the day could, for example, be allowed a provisional vote, casting a ballot into a separate box which could be included in the total later on if they come back with ID later on. This is a common practice in the US and ensures citizens have an opportunity to still vote. That said, it does cause delays in counting and doesn’t solve the problem for people without ID.

A second option would involve being flexible about the form of voter identification. Voter identification requirements comes in many forms around the globe.

Some countries are strict about having a photo, while others, such as Canada, accept dozens of different forms of ID. Even the Pickles report, which the government was heavily leaning on, suggests that utility bills could be included.

The UK can learn a lot from Canada, including by borrowing from their “vouching” approach. This system allows one citizen who has ID to vouch for another who doesn’t by signing an affidavit confirming their identity.

This provides a clear paper trail linked to registered voters so that any suspicions of irregularities can be investigated. It also ensures that many citizens without identification, or those who feel uncomfortable providing it, can still cast their vote. Family, friends and neighbours can help one another to participate.

Roughly 1% of the population use this as a way to ensure they can still vote. If vouching was allowed at a UK general election, it could therefore enable roughly half a million people to vote.

The reasons for not having voter identification can be varied. They range from just forgetting on election day to having the wrong idea about what’s acceptable, as in the case of the former prime minister. Some reasons, such as people not having the right ID, reflect underlying inequalities in society.

With a general election on the way, millions of people will be headed to the polls. Relatively easy reforms, such as “vouching”, are needed to make sure that everyone can cast their vote, including Boris Johnson.

Author

Toby James
Professor of Politics and Public Policy, University of East Anglia
Disclosure statement
Toby James has previously received funding from the AHRC, ESRC, Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust, British Academy, Leverhulme Trust, Electoral Commission, Nuffield Foundation, the McDougall Trust and Unlock Democracy. His current research is funded by the Canadian SSHRC.

 

UN declares 2026 'International Year of Women Farmers'

3 May 2024 18:35 

By Nazrin Abdul, AZERNEWS

The UN General Assembly unanimously passed a resolution designating 2026 as the "International Year of Women Farmers," highlighting the challenges encountered by women in agricultural systems worldwide, Azernews reports.

The resolution underscores the importance of addressing these obstacles and emphasizes initiatives aimed at promoting awareness, implementing effective policies, and adopting measures to support women in agriculture.

The resolution emphasizes that achieving gender equality and empowering women in agriculture requires addressing these challenges comprehensively.

The UN General Assembly urges the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) to collaborate with regional agencies to effectively implement the resolution and advance the rights and opportunities of women farmers globally.

United Nations Proclaims 2024 as 'Year of the Camel' to Spotlight Camel Conservation and Welfare Efforts

KURDISTAN

Kobani’s real estate market stagnates as demand for migration rises

In northern Syria’s Kobani, a border city facing Turkish shelling and continuous threats of a ground assault, many residents are trying to sell their property to pay for a way out. With the city’s future uncertain, there are few buyers.

By Salam Ali
3 May 2024

Al-Talal market in the center of Kobani (Ain al-Arab), a city in northern Aleppo near the border with Turkey, 8/4/2024 (Syria Direct)


ERBIL — For eight months, Bozan Sheikho, 44, has been trying to sell his property in Kobani to fund migration to Europe. His asking price is low, but he has not found a buyer in the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)-controlled northern Syrian city, also known as Ain al-Arab. Sheikho worries that, in the end, he will be forced to sell for “dirt cheap.”

Sheikho owns two shops in Kobani. For one, located on a main street, he is asking for $10,000—less than half of its $20,000 value in 2019, just before United States (US) forces nearby pulled out at the order of former President Donald Trump and the city came under near-constant Turkish threats. Sheikho’s other shop is larger, but on a side street. He is charging the same price for it, though it is worth around $15,000, he told Syria Direct.

Alongside the shops, Sheikho owns a hectare (10 dunums) of land in the Kobani countryside that he is looking to sell for $5,000. This, too, is below its estimated $9,000 value before 2019.

Outside Syria, Kobani is perhaps best known as the target of a four-month siege by the Islamic State (IS), a hard-won battle that ended with Kurdish forces driving the extremist group from the city with the support of US-led coalition airstrikes. After IS was expelled in 2015, newfound stability saw the city’s real estate market improve.

Then, in October 2019, Turkey and the Ankara-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) launched Operation Peace Spring. The military offensive against the SDF ended with the attacking forces taking control of Ras al-Ain (Serekaniye) in Hasakah province and Tal Abyad in Raqqa province, towns on the Syrian-Turkish border east of Kobani. Property sales in the city, its future increasingly uncertain, declined once more.

Turkey continues to threaten and repeatedly shell Kobani, as recently as last month. In late 2022, when Ankara launched its Operation Claw-Sword and struck targets across northern Syria and Iraq in retaliation for a bombing in Istanbul, it also threatened areas including Kobani with a ground assault.

Facing insecurity and an uncertain future in Kobani, many of the city’s residents now dream of leaving it behind and migrating to Europe.

Many residents like Sheikho have put their properties up for sale, Berkel Mustafa, who owns a real estate office in Kobani, said. The list of properties he currently has for sale includes around 10 houses, 25 residential plots of land, 15 residential apartments and three shops. All belong to people who are looking to raise money for migration “in search of a more stable and safe life,” he said. But while many properties are on the market, there is “a decline in real estate sales. I haven’t bought or sold any property in two months,” he added.

The sound of an explosion rang out as Mustafa spoke to Syria Direct last month, prompting the real estate dealer to disconnect the call and rush home. It was caused by a Turkish drone, it later turned out, targeting a vehicle in the city center. The same day, Turkish artillery struck the village of Dekemdash west of Kobani, damaging a number of houses.

Speaking the day after the bombing, Mustafa was upset with the state of his city. He attributed its faltering real estate market to “Turkish threats, and the withdrawal of US forces in 2019.”

Half price

“Turkish threats and shelling create a state of fear among the population,” so “nobody gambles on buying a property in Kobani, because its fate is uncertain, even while offers for sale from people looking to migrate increase,” Mustafa said. Commercially, this is known as “oversupply and falling demand, which pushes prices down,” he added.

“As soon as Kobani is subjected to Turkish bombardment, buying and selling completely stops for at least three months,” he added.

Kobani real estate has lost around 50 percent of its value since 2019, while buildings affected by the February 2023 earthquake in northern Syria and southern Turkey have lost between 65 and 70 percent of their value, he estimated.

Before 2019, the price per square meter of residential real estate on some streets reached $200, while it currently goes for $75 or less—a difference that is not related to the decline of the Syrian pound. Outside the city limits, the going price for land once ranged from $25 to $60 per square meter, but currently varies from $5 to $20. “Even so, there is little demand,” Mustafa said. In Kobani, real estate is “dead.”

Downtown, the price per square meter ranged between $700 and $800 in 2019, but has fallen to $350 per square meter, even though these properties are “excellent, in terms of location,” he added.

Mustafa, like other Kobani real estate dealers, once sold land and properties within days of buying them, “for good profits,” he recalled. Today, he cannot find anyone who wants land he bought to trade several months ago. If he does find a client, he “will lose on [the sale], because the prices have fallen.”

With real estate losing its value and the market declining, Mustafa has lost a huge margin of his profits, which used to reach 30 percent of the value of the property. Currently, his profit margin at the prevailing rate is no more than 10 percent.

The brokerage commission between the seller and buyer is one percent from the parties to the sale. Although commission is fixed and has not changed, the halving of real estate prices means that Mustafa’s cut has also been halved. Where he once received $200 from each party for selling a $20,000 apartment, if the property now sells for half that, he receives $100 instead.

What properties are selling in Kobani are being bought by people originally from the area who are living abroad in Europe and Turkey, Mustafa explained. The demand from these people is “low” despite a significant fall in prices.

Kobani’s real estate recession has also impacted the construction industry and suppliers, Fadel Shahin, a construction worker from the city, told Syria Direct.

Between 2016 and 2019—or between the expulsion of IS and the withdrawal of US forces—Kobani’s real estate and construction market flourished, and Shahin made a good living. After 2019, in the wake of Turkey’s attack on the cities of Ras al-Ain and Tal Abyad, work became scarce.

After the Turkish operation, Shahin’s work was limited to restoring and maintaining buildings. Kobani’s construction workshops operated at “the bare minimum,” and eventually “almost completely shut down in 2021, due to increasing Turkish threats” that prompted residents to “wait, and stop construction and restoration,” he said. With little work at home, Shahin decided to leave for Libya, where he is currently located.
Continuing threats

Following the late 2022 bombing of Istanbul’s Istiklal Avenue, Turkish authorities announced that the attack was carried out by a Syrian citizen working for the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) who received her instructions from Kobani. Turkey considers the SDF, which controls Kobani, to be a terrorist organization and an extension of the PKK. These statements were followed by airstrikes targeted border areas in northeastern Syria, the most violent of which were against Kobani.

Ankara has since continued its threats, in the form of both official statements and military operations against targets in northeastern Syria, including Kobani. On March 18, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said his forces would fully secure his country’s borders with Iraq, and “definitely complete our unfinished business in Syria.”

At the start of this year, Erdoğan said following a meeting with his government: “We will not stop until we have destroyed all of the terrorist nests established with insidious intentions in Syria, from destroy all the terrorist dens that have been set up with malicious intent in Syria, from Tal Rifaat to Ain al-Arab, Hasakah to Manbij.”

On April 7, SDF spokesperson Farhad al-Shami told Channel 8, a media organization based in Sulaymaniyah in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, that “the Turkish government plans to attack the area surrounding Kobani this summer,” and “carry out a ground assault in the areas between Girê Spîi [Tal Abyad] and Jarablus to approach Kobani.”

By taking control of Kobani, Ankara would connect territory it holds in the Euphrates Shield and Peace Spring areas, extending what the SDF calls “the Turkish occupation” within Syria.

The “fragile” security situation and risks facing Kobani pushed Adel Ramo, 55, to sell his 200 square meters of residential land in Kobani for $10,000, which before 2019 was worth $20,000, he told Syria Direct.

In July 2023, Ramo decided to part with his land to pay for his 19-year-old son to emigrate to Germany. Real estate is “the last card” many Syrians have to play to cover migration costs.

The southern entrance to Kobani (Ain al-Arab), a Kurdish-majority city on the border between Turkey and Syria’s northern Aleppo province, 

8/4/2024 (Syria Direct)

Months after selling his land, Ramo sold his car for $5,000, this time to finance his own migration. He made the decision because of “Turkey’s threats and repeated bombing of the area, in addition to the worsening living situation in Kobani.”

Ramo has made multiple attempts to cross the border with Turkey, aiming to continue onwards to Europe. Each time, Turkish security forces caught him and deported him back to Syria. “These attempts cost me $4,000 I paid to the smugglers,” he said.

Ramo knows that the journey he hopes to make is fraught with danger, particularly the Mediterranean Sea crossing from Turkey to Europe. Still, he remains determined to “find an appropriate opportunity—I won’t stop trying until I reach Europe.”

While Ramo has so far failed to emigrate, Shahin has come as far as Libya. He left Kobani at the start of 2024, illegally crossed the border to Lebanon and obtained a passport from the Syrian embassy in Beirut, which allowed him to travel to the north African country. From there, he ultimately hopes to cross the Mediterranean and reach Germany or Great Britain.

Worsening living conditions and the mass migration of “coworkers, friends and neighbors” were what finally drove Shahin to leave. To pay the costs, he sold his 160-square-meter house, located in Kobani’s western Boutan neighborhood, which cost him $20,000, at almost half its value. He also sold his car for $6,000, and his wife sold her jewelry to fund travel for himself, his wife and children.

When asked about his own motives for attempting to migrate, Sheikho responded with a question: “What doesn’t push to migrate? There’s no work. I have no confidence in the Autonomous Administration schools and curricula, and I have no financial ability to send my children to regime areas to attend its schools. We suffer from poor and declining services, especially electricity.”

“The Autonomous Administration has no laws encouraging stability and work,” he added. Kobani is also suffering a fuel crisis, marked by the sight of “lines of cars at the fuel stations, and the price of a cylinder of household gas being raised from SYP 10,000 to $10 paid in Syrian pounds,” or approximately SYP 144,000 according to the current black market exchange rate of SYP 14,450 to the dollar.

“Every so often, some type of basic good goes missing from the markets, and its price goes up,” Sheikho said. “We want to be rid of this difficult living situation and migrate to Europe, for our children to live far from these hardships.”

Commenting on that, Adnan Bozan, the head of the Kurdish National Council (KNC)-affiliated local council in Kobani, also laid a portion of blame with the Autonomous Administration. While “Turkish threats cause security instability, it cannot be ignored that the practices of the de facto authorities—political harassment, failure to provide services, kidnapping minors, banning recognized education [curricula] and imposing unrecognized, ideological curricula” also contribute to the decision of Kobani’s residents to leave or not return to the city, he said.

“Stopping the deliberate starvation practices by the de facto authorities and involving all the political and social components in the area’s administration, not giving the Turks excuses to threaten and attack the area and providing services would stop the bleeding of migration from Kobani.”

“If Turkey uses the pretext of the presence of PKK cadres in Syrian Kurdistan, and that they are administering the region,” then raising PKK slogans and pictures of [Abdullah] Öcalan in northern Syria is “tantamount to providing the Turks with a free service, and strengthening their position before the international community,” Bozan said. “The Kurdish people have paid and continue to pay the bill for Turkey’s conflict with the PKK.”

Sheikho aims to leave the border city “before I’m forced to leave it against my will,” he said. He hopes to find somebody to buy his properties so he can migrate to Europe alone, then work to reunite with his family. “The price of what I am selling is not enough to cover travel costs for the whole family,” he said.

This report was originally published in Arabic and translated into English by Mateo Nelson.

GPS jamming is a ‘side effect’ of Russian military activity, Finnish transport agency says

Finnair has stopped flights to one Estonian city thanks to the signal interference.

MAY 3, 2024 
BY TOMMASO LECCA

Jamming GPS signals over the Baltic Sea is “most likely” a side effect of Russia's anti-drone activities, Traficom, the Finnish Transport and Communications Agency, said today.

“The interference intensified when Ukraine's drone attacks on Russia's energy infrastructure began in January 2024,” Traficom said in a press release.

Estonia also blames Russia for the signal jamming, but the Finnish agency doesn't agree with the Tallinn government in defining the interference as a hybrid attack.
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“It is possible that the interference observed in aviation currently are most likely a side effect of Russia's self-protection” that is used “to prevent the navigation and control of drones controlled by GNSS [Global Navigation Satellite System] or mobile frequencies,” Traficom said.

In any case, the Finnish agency says it is safe to fly to and from Finland thanks to inertia-based navigation and ground-based navigation alternatives — though GPS remains “the main source of navigation information in aviation.”

Finnair earlier this week suspended flights to Tartu, Estonia, for a month; the Estonian government announced its intention to discuss the issue with its EU and NATO partners.

“[The] North Atlantic Council addressed the recent malign activities on Allied territory yesterday [May 2] and stated that Russia’s hybrid operations such as cyber and electronic interference but also sabotage, acts of violence and disinformation campaigns have affected several NATO member states,” said an Estonian foreign ministry spokesperson, referring to a NATO statement issued Thursday.

Mysterious Spiral 'UFO' Sightings Reported Across US, Europe

Published May 03, 2024

 
By Isabel van Brugen
Reporter

Social media users have reported mysterious spiral UFO sightings across the United States and Europe this week, with one witness saying they saw an object in the night sky that was "omitting some sort of haze."

Sightings were reported in Ukraine and Finland, as well as in cities in Arizona and California.

Interest in unidentified aerial phenomena (UAP), also known as UFOs, peaked last year after several experts testified before a Congress committee in July 2023 that they could pose a threat to national security. A Gallup poll conducted in 2021 found that 41 percent of Americans believe alien spacecraft have visited Earth, up eight points from 33 percent in 2019.

Multiple users on X, formerly Twitter, published footage and images of what they saw.

"Somebody, please tell me this isn't a UFO...Completely clear skies, and I see a super blurry white light (no flashes like a plane), coming straight at me horizontally," one person wrote on Friday.

"It then goes straight up and FREAKING [DISAPPEARS]. Checked, and there we NO rocket launches or anything like that (either way a rocket would've emitted a different color light). I was able to get this much on camera. SOMEONE EXPLAIN PLZ," they added.

Another X user responded, saying that they "saw this very same thing" in Arizona.

"Came from the west, it hovered and looked like it is surrounded in a fog, then suddenly just disappeared into itself....JUST like this video... I'm SO GLAD others got it on camera!" they wrote.

One X user noted that there was "haze" around the object, despite the clear night skies.

"UFO sighting in Santa Barbara. Clear skies, you can even see the stars in the video but the light was omitting some sort of haze around it," they said.

Another person wrote, "UFO in Palm Springs tonight. Just recorded this on an iPhone 14 in Palm Springs with no cloud cover what so ever. Then it vanishes."

A similar looking object was sighted in Helsinki, Finland, according to footage posted to Reddit.



Meanwhile, in Ukraine, Alpha Centauri, a Ukrainian non-profit educational project, said on X that a mysterious white flash that was spotted over some regions of the country on Thursday evening was the exhaust spiral from a SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket launch from California's Vandenberg Space Force Base.

"Mysterious objects in Ukrainian skies again! Over some regions of the country, the second stage of the Falcon 9 vehicle could be seen launching two WorldView Legion satellites," Alpha Centauri wrote.

Newsweek reached out to SpaceX for comment by email.

CRIMINAL CAPITALI$M & FUNDRAISING
Trump Media's auditor charged with 'massive fraud' by SEC

Geoff Weiss May 3, 2024, 9:27 AM MDT
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Trump Media's auditor, BF Borgers, committed fraud in 1,500 filings, the SEC said.
The firm and its owner will pay $14 million in penalties and have been banned from accounting.
"Trump Media looks forward to working with new auditing partners," a spokesperson said.

The Securities and Exchange Commission on Friday charged accounting firm BF Borgers and its owner, Benjamin Borgers, with "massive fraud."

Borgers handled auditing for former President Donald Trump's media company, Trump Media & Technology Group (TMTG), during which Borgers spelled his own name 14 different ways in filings.

"Trump Media looks forward to working with new auditing partners in accordance with today's SEC order," a TMTG spokesperson told Business Insider.

The SEC said the fraud impacted "more than 1,500 SEC filings from January 2021 through June 2023," and included filings for more than 500 public companies.

The SEC says it reached a settlement with the firm. BF Borgers will pay a $12 million civil penalty and Borgers himself will pay $2 million.

Both have been permanently suspended from practicing accounting with public companies, the SEC said.


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Accounting firm ditched Truth Social after less than a year: report



Trump Media auditor misspelled his name 14 different ways: FT



Trump Media stock price tumbles as auditor faces 'massive fraud' charge

"Borgers and his sham audit mill have been permanently shut down," Gurbir S. Grewal, the director of the SEC's division of enforcement, said in a statement. He said that the fraud had put investors and markets at risk.

The firm changed dates on work papers to suggest labor it hadn't actually done, according to the SEC, and also documented meetings that never occurred.

Bloomberg reported in April that the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) had identified multiple deficiencies in every audit it had received from Borgers over the past two years.

In November, the firm was also removed from the peer-review program of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA).

BF Borgers did not immediately respond to a request for comment from Business Insider.

Trump Media is the company behind Truth Social, Donald Trump's Twitter clone that launched after he was booted off social media platforms following the January 6 riot.
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Despite losing money and being cagey about how its user base compares to its social media rivals, Trump Media is now valued at over $6.3 billion.

The meme stock's value has soared and plummeted since it went public, with investors trying to make quick cash selling shares off when they jump and Trump's fans boosting the price to cut out short positions.

Attacks Target Afghanistan’s Hazaras

Inadequate Protection Provided for Community Long at Risk

THEY ARE MINORITY IN PAKISTAN AS WELL

Fereshta Abbasi
Researcher, Asia Division

HRW

Click to expand Image
Afghans mourn at a burial ceremony for Shia Muslims killed by gunmen who attacked a mosque in Guzara district of Herat province, April 30, 2024. © 2024 MOHSEN KARIMI/AFP via Getty Images

For many Afghans, the country’s armed conflict has never ended.

The armed group Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP) attracted worldwide attention in March when it attacked the Crocus City Hall in Moscow, killing at least 143 people and injuring many others. Since emerging in Afghanistan in 2015, the group has carried out a bloody campaign mostly targeting Shia-Hazara mosques and schools and other facilities in predominantly Hazara neighborhoods.

In the most recent attack, on April 29, an armed member of the group opened fire on worshippers at a Shia-Hazara mosque in western Herat province, killing six, including a child. On April 20, a magnetic bomb attached to a bus whose passengers were primarily Hazara exploded, killing one and injuring 10. On January 6, a similar attack on a bus in Dasht-e Barchi, a predominantly Hazara neighborhood of Kabul, killed five people, including at least one child, and injured 14. Dasht-e Barchi has been the site of numerous ISKP attacks. When ISKP claimed responsibility for the January 6 attack, they said it was part of their “kill them wherever you find them” campaign against “infidels.”

Between 2015 and mid-2021, ISKP attacks killed and injured more than 2,000 civilians primarily in Kabul, Jalalabad, and Kandahar. Since the Taliban took over Afghanistan in August 2021, these attacks have continued – killing and injuring over 700.

The Taliban have long battled the ISKP, which have also targeted Taliban personnel. A suicide bombing outside a Kandahar bank on March 21 killed at least 21 people and injured 50, many of them Taliban ministry employees who had lined up to collect their salaries.

Attacks on Hazara and other religious minorities and targeted attacks on civilians violate international humanitarian law, which still applies in Afghanistan. Deliberate attacks on civilians are war crimes. Beyond the immediate loss of life, such attacks incur lasting damage to physical and mental health, cause long-term economic hardship, and result in new barriers to education and public life.

Like the previous Afghan government, Taliban authorities have not taken adequate measures to protect Hazaras and other communities at risk or provide assistance to survivors of attacks, though they are responsible for ensuring the safety of all Afghan citizens.

 

CENUSA: (Geo)political polarisation in Georgia and Moldova and what is at stake for the EU and Russia

In both Georgia and Moldova, the voices of local political actors are subject to the geopolitical dilemma of choosing external allegiances. / bne IntelliNews

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By bne IntelliNews May 3, 2024

Under the influence of electoral calculations for the year 2024, the political processes in Georgia and Moldova have acquired a geopolitical component of significant proportions. In both cases, the voices of local political actors are subject to the geopolitical dilemma regarding external allegiances. Even if the pro-European lobby has the support of the majority of the population of the two countries (Georgia: 86%; Moldova: 48%-54%), and the fact that the EU granted them both candidate country status in 2023, the (geo)political polarisation exerts considerable pressure on their European agenda.

Any scenario of these two countries swinging towards Russia is unlikely under current conditions, but it is increasingly visible that the movement towards the EU will be marked by influential "hybrid" actors. While Georgia's European trajectory is being disrupted by elements of the local oligarchic regime (Bidzina Ivanishvili), in Moldova the destabilising players hail from the openly pro-Russian opposition (considered the central elements of the "fifth column"), led by the fugitive Ilan Șor. Political rivals to the European agenda in Georgia and Moldova appeal to the Eurosceptic narrative and fiercely promote national sovereignty at the expense of the pro-European ideals.

 

EU and Russia: different approaches

The approaches of the EU, on the one hand, and those of Russia, on the other, are diametrically opposed in relation to Georgia and Moldova. By offering unconditional political support to the current Moldovan government, Brussels risks damaging its reputation by overlooking various examples of deviations from European good practices. The missteps include problems in the area of good governance (failure of the competition to appoint the prosecutor general, etc.), deficiencies in the administration of public assets (suspicions about the orchestration of certain tenders), and other failings. Contrary to their tolerant attitude towards the situation in Moldova, the European institutions are very vocal about the political developments in Georgia, where the government intends to introduce legal provisions that could stigmatise civil society, whose activities depend on Western funding. Both the EU's diplomatic and legislative arms have warned Tbilisi that adopting restrictive rules against non-governmental organisations (NGOs) goes against the South Caucasus country's European prospects.

On the other hand, Russia is trying to take advantage of the situation in the two Eastern Partnership countries. Moscow supports the pro-Russian Moldovan forces through political, media and financial means (the idea of “subsidies” for pensioners in Gagauzia, etc.). Geopolitical polarisation in Moldova favours Russia ahead of the presidential elections and referendum in 2024. Russia also benefits from growing disagreement between the Georgian government and the civil society and opposition. The lack of political dialogue continues to erode cohesion within Georgia and slow down or even block the democratic transition and Europeanisation of the country.

 

Georgia: seen through Russian reflection on non-alignment with the EU

The Georgian government is promoting a law on "transparency of foreign influence", described as a "Russian law" by civil society and opposition voices. Neither the EU nor the US have been able to convince the government in Tbilisi (the "Georgian Dream") to abandon the bill.

It requires NGOs that receive more than 20% of funds from abroad to register as "organisations pursuing foreign influence interests" (Friedrich Naumann Foundation, April 2024). This can expose them to excessive controls and penalties of almost $9,000 for non-compliance. Although under the scope of this law virtually any NGO with externally funded activities can be targeted, the government's attention is primarily directed toward those entities that are tangential to political processes. These are the civil society organisations who monitor electoral exercises, the quality of governance (reforms, fight against corruption, European integration), foreign policy, etc. Furthermore, some of these NGOs, although active in Georgia, implement similar projects related to Armenia and Azerbaijan.

In its resolution of April 25, the European Parliament warned the Georgian government that, if the law is passed, individual sanctions will be applied against Ivanishvili. Furthermore, in addition to compromising the country's status as an EU candidate, the controversial law could affect the liberalised visa regime with the EU. NGO representatives, together with youth, but also the opposition (in the background), understand the risks that the bill poses for the proper functioning of civil society (financial stability and political independence) and for the continuation of the European direction of the country. That is why the protest movement against the bill is massive. The entry into force of such a law could bring Georgia closer to the authoritarian practices of Russia and Azerbaijan. The indirect beneficiaries of this law will be the respective regimes of Vladimir Putin and Ilham Aliyev. The "autocratisation" of Georgia will distance it from the West, both the EU and Nato (US), which would represent a strategic gain for Moscow without any direct intervention. Ultimately, imposing a strict regime on civil society within Georgia will lead to its exile (to Europe instead of Armenia). Georgia's traditional role as the democratisation centre of the Caucasus will be severely inhibited.

 

Moldova: the tactics of pro-Russian forces

The risk that the presidential elections and the autumn referendum will become the target of Russian provocations is imminent. On the one hand, Moscow sees an attractive geopolitical opportunity, since the government's mediocre socioeconomic performance has reduced its degree of legitimacy in society. Adding to this vulnerability is the government's intention to combine the presidential elections with the constitutional referendum to facilitate the re-election of President Maia Sandu. Although this electoral process could give the upper hand to the Action and Solidarity Party (PAS), combining the elections with the referendum could mobilise both the anti-Sandu and the Eurosceptic (and pro-Eurasian) vote, through the mutual contagion.

On the other hand, Russia has managed to considerably diversify its political influence in Moldova. In parallel, in addition to the moderate pro-Russian forces, represented by the Socialists and Igor Dodon, Moscow is radicalising political groups linked to Ilan Şor, which have been outlawed or excluded from the 2023 local elections. The "radical" elements led by Şor allow Moscow to destabilise the government in Chisinau, which is then forced to take disproportionate measures to ensure national security. At the same time, certain measures adopted by the authorities that do not correspond to current legislation can multiply the number of dissatisfied social categories. An example of this is the confiscation of money brought from Moscow by Moldovan citizens associated with Şor, which does not exceed the legal limit (about €10,000 per person). In this context, the "moderate" political elements associated with Igor Dodon are being normalised by public opinion that seeks tolerable alternatives, which oppose the objective pursued by the government: the renewal of Maia Sandu's mandate.

The pressures that will be exerted through the Șor group will most likely gain a greater degree of sophistication. The high level of involvement of citizens in relations with Șor’s group in exchange for remuneration ("political bribery") will be maintained due to the high level of poverty and high public acceptance of such corruption. At the same time, in Moldova, in anticipation of hybrid actions, law enforcement agencies will inevitably become more repressive and aggressive. This may generate unwanted political costs for the government, which will have negative effects on the popularity of the European vector in the run-up to the referendum.

In conclusion, the establishment of legal mechanisms to inhibit civil society in Georgia or the disproportionate reactions of the Chisinau government against vulnerable social categories, recruited in political games by pro-Russian forces, could be detrimental to the European agenda. Finally, political and social disunity in these countries serves Russia's interests and could further complicate the EU's eastward expansion.

DOPPLEGANGER

Its Tesla v Tesla in India: US carmaker sues Indian namesake

Elon Musk's Tesla says an Indian battery-maker's branding misleads consumers, while the Indian company argues it has separate operations and predates Tesla in India.




Musk's Tesla is incorporated in Delaware, and it has accused the Indian company of using trade names "Tesla Power" and "Tesla Power USA".

Elon Musk's carmaker Tesla has sued an Indian battery maker for infringing its trademark by using the brand name "Tesla Power" to promote its products, seeking damages and a permanent injunction against the company from a New Delhi judge.

Tesla in a hearing at the Delhi High Court this week said the Indian company had continued advertising its products with the "Tesla Power" brand despite a cease-and-desist notice sent in April 2022, according to details of the proceedings posted on the court website on Friday.

During the hearing, the Indian company, Tesla Power India Pvt Ltd, argued its main business is to make "lead acid batteries" and it has no intention of making electric vehicles.

The judge allowed the Indian firm three weeks to submit written responses after it handed over a set of documents in support of its defence, the court record shows.

Musk's Tesla is incorporated in Delaware, and it has accused the Indian company of using trade names "Tesla Power" and "Tesla Power USA".

The court record included screenshots of a website that showed that Tesla Power USA LLC was also headquartered in Delaware and had been "acknowledged for being a pioneer and leader in introducing affordable batteries" with "a very strong presence in India".

Tesla Power: Not 'related' to Tesla

A Tesla Power representative told Reuters it had been present in India much before Musk's Tesla and had all government approvals.

"We have never claimed to be related to Elon Musk's Tesla," Tesla Power's Manoj Pahwa said.

Tesla told the judge it discovered the Indian company was using its brand name in 2022 and has unsuccessfully tried to stop it from doing so, forcing it to file the lawsuit.

The case comes after Musk cancelled his planned visit to India on April 21 to meet Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

Days later, Musk made a surprise visit to China and made progress towards rolling out its advanced driver assistance package, a move that many Indian commentators called a snub.

The Tesla India trademark case will next be heard on May 22.