SPACE

Boeing Starliner crew enters space station after docking

NASA astronauts Butch Wilmore and Suni Williams completed ingress onto the International Space Station shortly after docking on June 6, 2024.

Boeing Starliner's first astronaut crew welcomed aboard space station

By Joey Roulette and Steve Gorman

(Reuters) -Boeing's new Starliner capsule and an inaugural two-member NASA crew safely docked with the International Space Station on Thursday, meeting a key test in proving the vessel's flight-worthiness and sharpening Boeing's competition with Elon Musk's SpaceX.

The rendezvous was achieved despite an earlier loss of several guidance-control jet thrusters, some of them due to a helium propulsion leak, which NASA and Boeing said should not compromise the mission.

The CST-100 Starliner, with veteran astronauts Barry "Butch" Wilmore and Sunita "Suni" Williams aboard, arrived at the orbiting platform after a flight of nearly 27 hours following its launch from Cape Canaveral Space Force Station in Florida.

The reusable, gumdrop-shaped capsule, dubbed "Calypso" by its crew, was lofted into space on Wednesday atop an Atlas V rocket furnished and flown by Boeing-Lockheed Martin's United Launch Alliance joint venture.

It autonomously docked with the ISS while both were orbiting some 250 miles (400 km) over the southern Indian Ocean at 1:34 p.m. EDT (1734 GMT), as the two vehicles soared around the globe in tandem at about 17,500 miles (28,160 km) per hour.

The spacecraft's final approach to the ISS and docking, following a brief interval when Wilmore manually controlled the capsule, was shown on a NASA webcast.

"Nice to be attached to the big city in the sky," Wilmore radioed to mission control in Houston shortly after docking.

On arrival, Wilmore, 58, and Williams, 61, spent about two hours conducting a series of standard procedures, such as checking for airlock leaks and pressurizing the passage between the capsule and the ISS, before opening the entry hatches.

A live NASA video feed showed the smiling new arrivals, wearing their blue flight suits, weightlessly floating headfirst through the padded passageway, one after the other, into the station. Williams was first.

"We're just as happy as can be to be up in space," she said during a brief welcoming ceremony a short time later.

They were greeted warmly with hugs and handshakes by the outpost's current seven resident crew members: four fellow U.S. astronauts and three Russian cosmonauts.

Reuters
Boeing's new Starliner docks at the ISS

 

Astronauts welcome Starliner crew to the ISS
 Duration 0:44  View on Watch 

Plans call for Wilmore and Williams to remain aboard the station for about eight days, then depart on a return flight that will take Starliner on a fiery reentry back through Earth's atmosphere and end with a parachute and airbag-assisted landing in the U.S. Desert Southwest, a first for a crewed NASA mission.

Thursday was a busy day for the U.S. space program, as SpaceX's next-generation Starship rocket survived a fiery, hypersonic return from space and achieved a breakthrough landing demonstration in the Indian Ocean in its fourth test flight.

On Starliner's voyage to the ISS, helium leaks were detected in its propulsion system, knocking out some of the 28 thrusters used by the capsule to make precision maneuvers in space. However, the spacecraft still had enough functioning thrusters to compensate for the loss, according to NASA and Boeing. An additional thruster was disabled by mission control just before final approach.


YEARS OF TECHNICAL PROBLEMS

The Starliner launch on Wednesday followed years of technical problems, various delays and a first successful 2022 test mission to the orbital laboratory without astronauts aboard.

Last-minute glitches had nixed the Starliner's first two crewed launch attempts, including a helium leak found on the capsule's propulsion system that officials later determined was not serious enough to warrant a mechanical fix.

NASA and Boeing officials at the time pointed to a faulty seal on a thruster component that was failing to keep the helium inside.

Boeing built Starliner under contract with NASA to compete with SpaceX's Crew Dragon capsule, which since 2020 has been the U.S. space agency's only vehicle for sending ISS crew members to orbit from American soil. The current mission marks Starliner's first test flight with astronauts aboard, a requirement before NASA can certify the capsule for routine astronaut missions.

Selected as crew for the pivotal flight were two NASA veterans who have previously logged 500 days in space between them: Wilmore, 61, a retired Navy captain and fighter pilot, and Williams, 58, a former Navy helicopter test pilot with experience flying more than 30 different aircraft.

Getting Starliner to this point has been a fraught process for Boeing under its $4.2 billion, fixed-priced contract with NASA, which wants the redundancy of two different U.S. rides to the ISS.


The Starliner is several years behind schedule and more than $1.5 billion over budget. Meanwhile, Boeing's commercial airplane manufacturing operations have been rocked by a series of crises involving its 737 MAX jetliners.

(Reporting by Joey Roulette in Washington and Steve Gorman in Los Angeles; Editing by Will Dunham and Jonathan Oatis)

Boeing's astronaut capsule arrives at the space station after thruster trouble

Marcia Dunn
The Associated Press
Updated June 6, 2024 

CAPE CANAVERAL, FLA. -

Boeing’s new capsule arrived at the International Space Station on Thursday, delayed by last-minute thruster trouble that almost derailed the docking for this first test flight with astronauts.

The 260-mile-high (420-kilometre-high) linkup over the Indian Ocean culminated more than a day of continuing drama for Boeing’s astronaut flight debut carrying NASA test pilots Butch Wilmore and Suni Williams

Boeing plans to keep Starliner at the space station for at least eight days before guiding it to a landing in the western U.S.

“Nice to be attached to the big city in the sky,” Wilmore said once the hooks between the two spacecraft were tight.

Williams entered the space station first, dancing on the way in to music. Wilmore followed, snapping his fingers. They embraced the seven space station residents.

“It was such a great welcome, a little dance party,” said Williams. “That’s the way to get things going.”

The Starliner capsule already had one small helium leak when it rocketed into orbit with two NASA astronauts Wednesday. Boeing and NASA managers were confident they could manage the propulsion system despite the problem and that more leaks were unlikely. But just hours into the flight, two more leaks cropped up and another was discovered after docking.

Later, five of the capsule's 28 thrusters went down. The astronauts managed to restart four of them, providing enough safety margin to proceed. By then, Starliner had passed up the first docking opportunity and circled the world for an extra hour alongside the station before moving in.

The thrusters problems were unrelated to the helium leaks, NASA’s commercial crew program manager Steve Stich said after the docking.

Going forward in the flight, “we have some tools in our tool kit to manage this,” Stich said.

Earlier in the day, before the thrusters malfunctioned, officials stressed that the helium leaks posed no safety issues for the astronauts or the mission.

Boeing's Starliner capsule atop an Atlas V rocket lifts off from Space Launch Complex 41 at the Cape Canaveral Space Force Station on a mission to the International Space Station, Wednesday, June 5, 2024, in Cape Canaveral, Fla. (AP Photo/John Raoux)

Helium is used to pressurize the fuel lines of Starliner’s thrusters, which are essential for maneuvering. Before liftoff, engineers devised a plan to work around any additional leaks in the system. A faulty rubber seal, no bigger than a shirt button, is believed responsible for the original leak.

Boeing program manager Mark Nappi said there should be plenty of helium in reserve for the trip home.

After the space shuttles retired, NASA hired Boeing and SpaceX to ferry astronauts to and from the space station. SpaceX’s taxi service began in 2020. Boeing was supposed to start around the same time, but was held up for years by safety concerns and other troubles.

Stich said none of the problems so far would require a repeat of an astronaut test flight before certifying the capsule for regular use.

Starliner spacecraft in holding pattern before docking with ISS due to helium leaks

Four of the reaction control system thrusters failed on the service module, but they were able to get two of the thrusters firing again.

UPDATED

The Financial Destruction of Palestine

RONALDO SCHEMIDT/AFP via Getty Images


Jun 7, 2024

RAJA KHALIDI

While the United States recently warned that Palestine is facing fiscal collapse, few informed observers are surprised that the Gaza war’s economic fallout has spread to the West Bank. The G7 and the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee must help the Palestinian economy tap international financial assistance like any other developing country.

RAMALLAH – Ahead of the recent G7 summit, US Treasury Secretary Janet L. Yellen, in a rare rebuke of Israel, warned that its plans to cut off Palestinian financial institutions from the global banking system would threaten the West Bank’s economic stability. But her warning may have come too late to stop Israel’s far-right finance minister, Bezalel Smotrich, who seems bent on undermining the last vestiges of the Palestinian Authority’s (PA) already-limited self-governance in the West Bank.

The sanctions that Smotrich wants to impose – specifically, revoking the waiver that allows Israeli banks to facilitate transactions with Palestinians without fear of legal action – are in response to Ireland, Norway, and Spain formally recognizing a Palestinian state. Ironically, the PA is on the verge of collapse, owing to Israel’s actions and the world’s inaction.

Yellen seems to understand that Smotrich’s plan to sanction the PA cannot be attributed solely to the ideological underpinnings of the most annexationist government in Israel’s history. They are also indicative of an isolated Israel doubling down on its offensive in Gaza even as global pressure to end the war intensifies. But perhaps Yellen should bring her legitimate concerns about the PA’s financial solvency to US President Joe Biden, given his staunch support for Israel, before expecting other countries to take up the cause.

While the international community has recently expressed concern about the West Bank’s looming economic catastrophe, the Palestinians living there (and elsewhere) remain fixated on the war in Gaza – already a catastrophe in every way. In fact, few informed observers have been surprised at the scale, intensity, and speed with which the war’s economic fallout has hit the West Bank and the PA, given their deep dependence on Israel for jobs, trade, and currency. This asymmetrical relationship has been forged over decades of occupation, characterized by a constant struggle for land, resources, and rights, and increasing violence by extremist Israeli settlers, who have long enjoyed impunity.

Part of the dependency dynamic involves Israel collecting and clearing customs and import taxes on behalf of the PA. So, when faced with European efforts to build momentum toward a political settlement of the crisis, Smotrich decided to seize these tax revenues, in addition to threatening new financial sanctions. Prior to the war, the PA was entitled to an average of $270 million per month in total clearance revenues – enough to cover the salaries of 147,000 civil servants, its most essential current expenditure.

But for many years, Israel has made unilateral deductions, starting with unpaid utility and health bills owed to Israeli providers (based on government calculations). Since 2018, it has also deducted payments made to families of people whom the PA deems martyrs and to families of people imprisoned in Israel. By the end of 2023, these additional deductions amounted to around $1.2 billion. This does not include deductions for unpaid utilities, health bills, and other deductions called “net lending,” which totaled $662 million in 2023 alone.

After the October 7 attack on Israel by Hamas, Smotrich began deducting the amount that the PA spends on staff and pensioners in Gaza. By April 2024, these deductions, coupled with a steep decline in private consumption and imports, left the PA with under $100 million per month in “eligible” revenues, around a quarter of its monthly budget.

Smotrich has threatened to freeze the transfer of that amount and any clearance funds, while also pushing legislation to expropriate the deducted funds – which have been held in escrow accounts – to finance Israel’s war deficit. In yet another Israeli twist of the financial screws, the Bank of Israel has yet to accept the periodic exchange of accumulated stocks of Israeli shekels with Palestinian correspondent banks for foreign currency as stipulated under the Oslo Accords. This has led to panic among clients unable to deposit Israeli shekels. Meanwhile, the PA’s salary arrears have reached at least six months. And that is only part of its $8 billion public debt, which is around 60% of West Bank GDP. Hence, the PA is facing imminent fiscal collapse, with the West Bank “on the brink, risking an explosion any time,” as the normally cautious Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammad Mustafa recently put it.

The G7 leaders and the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, an international donor group for Palestine that met last week, must heed this warning as they consider making far-reaching decisions that could be as momentous as the war’s outcome. Moreover, policymakers should be clear-eyed on what can and cannot be done. It is absurd to demand that the PA implement reforms, build state institutions, reconstruct Gaza, and police its people while Israel simultaneously withholds its main source of finance.

In the early days of Biden’s presidency, some Palestinians, still reeling from the hostility of the Trump era and without a viable path to independence, hoped that he might push for Palestinian rights. In 2021, I proposed a US-sponsored financial New Deal for Palestine, which would reinforce the PA fiscal position, without requiring US diplomatic recognition of Palestinian statehood. The idea would be to grant Palestine formal status or reach an ad hoc arrangement at the International Monetary Fund so that it can tap international financial assistance like any other developing country, a small step towards sovereignty.

Implementing this plan is more important than ever. If the countries that have recognized Palestinian statehood – either recently or in the past – want their declaration to be more than a symbolic gesture, they must start treating Palestine as the state it will eventually become. And if the United States wants to prove that it is more than an accessory to Israel’s war, it must lift its veto on Palestine’s bid to become the state it deserves to be. The march toward Palestinian fiscal sovereignty is inevitable, but it must happen sooner rather than later.




RAJA KHALID
Writing for PS since 2021
3 Commentaries
Raja Khalidi is Director-General of the Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS).

Gaza war crushes Palestinian private sector, with $19m daily losses in first four months

Total unemployment in the enclave and the occupied West Bank is expected to rise to 668,000 in 2024, ILO says

The gross domestic product of Palestinian territories is projected to decline by 16.1 per cent this year, compared with 2023, according to the International Labour Organisation. EPA


John Benny
Fareed Rahman

Jun 07,2024

The war on Gaza has dealt a major blow to the Palestinian private sector with production facing its most significant decline along with unprecedented levels of unemployment expected this year, a report has shown.

Between October 2023 and January 2024, about half of the private sector establishments in Palestinian territories – 29 per cent in the occupied West Bank and 100 per cent in the Gaza Strip – experienced either complete cessation or reduced production, the joint report by the International Labour Organisation and Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics said on Friday.

Overall, Gaza and the West Bank incurred an estimated loss of $2.3 billion in private sector production value during the first four months of the war, or about $19 million a day, excluding losses in properties and fixed assets, the report added.

“The private sector production witnessed its most significant decline in construction, followed by industry and services and other branches,” the report said.

“The Gaza Strip experienced notably more severe deterioration compared to the West Bank, with the construction and industry in the strip nearly collapsing,” the report said.

The extensive damage caused by the Israel-Gaza conflict, now in its ninth month, and the continuing destruction of infrastructure in the narrow strip of land means it is likely to take several years for Gaza and the broader Palestinian economy to regain stability and recover.

The private sector, which makes up 66 per cent of total employment in the Palestinian territories, consists mainly of small to medium family-owned enterprises that are highly reliant on Israel for either inputs or as a market.

“Looking at the current status between the Palestinian Authority and Israel, there are a lot of worries that blockades and large-scale restrictions of movement will be out for months,” Cyril Widdershoven, an analyst at Hilltower Resource Advisors, told The National.

“Without any direct access to Israel's economy or infrastructure, the future looks very bleak.”

READ MORE

War has brought ‘complete collapse’ of Gaza’s economy

Nearly half a million jobs lost in Palestine as financing gap nears $1.2bn

Economic forecast

Based on the assumption that the war will continue until the end of August 2024, the gross domestic product in Palestinian territories is projected to decline by 16.1 per cent this year, compared with 2023, alongside an 18 per cent drop in per capita income, the ILO-PCBS report said.

If the war continues for three more months, the unemployment rate in the territories is expected to rise substantially, reaching 47.1 per cent this year, the report added.

Total unemployment is expected to hit 668,000 in 2024, an increase of 222,000 from 2023.

“The projected unemployment rates … show that the unemployment rate for the year 2024 under the new scenario is unprecedented, exceeding by far the unemployment rate registered in the Palestinian territories at the height of the Second Intifada in 2002,” the report said.

In a recent report, the World Bank also highlighted the level of unemployment in Palestine amid the continuing war.

The multilateral lender said an estimated 200,000 jobs have been lost in the Gaza Strip, while 144,000 people are no longer employed in the occupied West Bank as a result of the escalating violence.

About 148,000 cross-border commuters from the West Bank were also denied access to the Israeli labour market due to the continuing war, pushing unemployment levels higher in the Palestinian territory, it added.

“In Gaza, the whole economy has been decimated. I don't think there's anything left standing. The Gazan economy will have to be recreated from scratch … rebuilt from the ground up literally,” Raja Khalidi, director general of the Ramallah-based Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute, told The National in an interview.

“The physical devastation, which just makes it impossible for businesses to reopen, especially the productive sector, or the services and trade … stores and supermarkets and simple services. ”

The occupied West Bank’s economy is “grinding to halt”, Mr Khalidi said, as he noted that its economy is powered by two sources of income – government salaries and Palestine workers earning in Israel.

“About 40 per cent of West Bank’s income was coming from those two sources. So, those two sources no longer exist and what can the rest of the 60 per cent of the economy do?”

Business impact

Surveys conducted jointly by the ILO and Palestinian industry bodies revealed that 98.8 per cent of enterprises in the West Bank acknowledged that they had been negatively affected by the conflict.

The businesses have encountered myriad challenges, ranging from reduced monthly sales and the loss of customers or suppliers, to decreased production capacity, supply chain disruptions and heightened transportation costs, the survey found.

“To mitigate the adverse impacts of the war, businesses implemented different measures, including reducing workforce size, hours of work and wages,” the report said.

Small and medium enterprises involved in food and trade will be under pressure from “all sides”, Mr Widdershoven said.

Future economy

The ILO-PCBS report said that Palestine’s economy needs immediate and long-term support, including financial assistance for reconstruction, business recovery support, social protection measures and income-generation initiatives.

Structural reforms are essential to reduce dependence on external factors, foster a diversified economy and ensure fair and decent wages, the report added.

A “Marshall Plan” supported by Arab countries, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank could pave the way for Palestine’s battered economy, Mr Widdershoven said.

“Maybe something could even come out of it that is much better [such as] an emerging future-proof economy, based on technology, IT, artificial intelligence or other sectors,” he said.

However, even Arab countries are not willing to take the risk of putting in cash without guarantees of a positive change, the analyst added.

In February, the UN Conference on Trade and Development estimated that tens of billions of dollars would be needed to rebuild Gaza when Israel's war against Hamas is over.

The Marshall Plan, which was officially called the European Recovery Programme, was a US programme passed in 1948 to help western Europe rebuild its economies after the devastation of the Second World War.

The plan provided billions of dollars in grants, loans and technical assistance.

Russia’s invasion has also stirred calls to muster a similar plan for Ukraine, whose economy recorded a 30 per cent decline in 2022 due to the war's disruption of businesses, infrastructure damage and a decrease in exports.

Updated: June 07, 2024,

Gaza unemployment since start of Israel’s war soars to nearly 80%: ILO

International Labour Organization says joblessness in occupied West Bank stands at almost 32 percent, resulting in a combined total of more than 50 percent.

A young Palestinian pushes a bicycle past a rubbish site at al-Maghazi refugee camp in the central Gaza Strip on June 5 [Eyad Baba/AFP]

Published On 7 Jun 2024

Unemployment in the Gaza Strip has hit a “staggering” 79.1 percent since Israel launched its military onslaught on the besieged and bombarded territory in October last year, according to the United Nations labour agency.

In its latest assessment of the impact of the war on employment, the International Labour Organization (ILO) also said on Friday that joblessness in the occupied West Bank, which has also been hit by the crisis, had also reached nearly 32 percent.

This brings the average unemployment rate across the occupied Palestinian territory to 50.8 percent.

The figures, however, do not include those who have exited the labour force altogether amid worsening job prospects, the ILO said, warning that the actual numbers were higher.

“This excludes Palestinians who have given up on finding a job,” said Ruba Jaradat, ILO regional director for Arab States. “The situation is much worse”.

Israeli attacks on Gaza since the start of the war have killed at least 36,654 people and wounded 83,309, with thousands more missing under the rubble and presumed dead, according to Palestinian health officials.

Israel launched its assault after Palestinian group Hamas led an attack in southern Israel on October 7 that killed about 1,140 people, according to Israeli tallies.

In the West Bank, meanwhile, the Palestinian toll in Israeli attacks over the same period includes more than 530 killed and some 5,200 wounded.
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In terms of the economy, the real gross domestic product (GDP) has contracted by nearly 33 percent in the Palestinian territory since the start of the war, with an estimated contraction of 83.5 percent in the Gaza Strip, where about half of its 2.3 million people lived below the poverty line even before the war.

“Imagine with this very high level of unemployment, people will not be able to secure food for themselves and for their families,” Jaradat said.

“This is also impacting their health … Even if they have money, there are no hospitals that can accommodate the catastrophic situation there.”

In the West Bank, the GDP drop was 22.7 percent, the ILO data showed.

“In the occupied Palestinian territory and particularly in the West Bank, the reduction in incomes has pushed many families into severe poverty,” Jaradat said.
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SOURCE: AL JAZEERA AND NEWS AGENCIES

OPINION

The battle is lost, but not the revolution. Georgian protesters gear up for a rematch in October

LONG READ

7 June 2024
Vadim Dubnov
Radio Liberty observer, Echo of the Caucasus correspondent


High Representative of the European Union Josep Borrell has called on Georgian officials to heed the recommendation of the Venice Commission and withdraw Tbilisi’s infamous new “foreign agent law.” In response, parliamentarian Salome Kurasbediani, a member of the ruling selfsame Georgian Dream party that pushed through the “Russian” bill, dismissed the commission's judgment as biased. Still, according to political columnist Vadim Dubnov, Georgian Dream’s lack of visible concern over the backlash the law has inspired — along with its demonstrative confrontation with the West — signal that hope remains for Tbilisi to reverse course. Even if its opposition has so far failed to expand its traditional constituency, time remains before the final confrontation takes place during the parliamentary elections this fall.

RU

From the very moment — February 2023 — when Georgian authorities first announced their intention to adopt a law regarding “foreign agents,” the opposition's outrage has been rivaled only by its utter bewilderment: why was Tbilisi’s Moscow-friendly ruling party taking such a step? Before the introduction of the bill, Georgian Dream, the political brainchild of the country’s leading oligarch and informal ruler, Bidzina Ivanishvili, appeared well on its way to another victory in elections scheduled for October 2024. Sociologists, both those sympathetic to and opposed to the party, were unanimous in predicting its victory. But now, with five months left before the election, the authorities have actually brought into force the very law that has inspired massive anti-government demonstrations two years in a row. Why?

April Theses

Some believe that the law “On Transparency of Foreign Influence” (as the official title goes) is a ploy to weaken the opposition on the eve of the elections. Ivanishvili's staunch opponents insist that he was spooked by rumors of Washington allegedly plotting yet another “color revolution” — a reference to the popular uprisings that ensured legitimate democratic transitions in Georgia (2003) and Ukraine (2004) — and the Georgian government itself has occasionally raised such ideas as well. Others, however, argued that Ivanishvili's seemingly inexplicable stubbornness simply stems from resentment over last year's failure. Last but not least, a separate camp has theorized about the involvement of Vladimir Putin, who allegedly coerced Ivanishvili into pushing through the bill by threatening to expose the oligarch’s hidden past misdeeds — or even to physically eliminate him.

Remarkably, each of these various versions implies that, for one reason or another, Ivanishvili is acting irrationally — something his twelve years in power have not offered cause to suspect. On the rare occasions when Ivanishvili has made mistakes, he has been quick to correct them. And this time may not actually offer an exception to the rule.

As sources close to Georgian Dream admit, the authorities initially assumed that last year's turbulence would not repeat itself, as the country’s youth, which formed the backbone of the protests in 2023, had apparently changed their attitude. Not only bureaucrats and analysts, but also Ivanishvili himself possibly fell prey to this misconception.

Ivanishvili's appearance on the podium at a grandiose pro-government rally indirectly confirms that the scale of public discontent came as a surprise to those in power. The leader's speech can be boiled down to three key points: first, he spoke of a “global party of war” that seeks to destroy Georgia, just as it has allegedly already subverted European and Euro-Atlantic structures; second, the oligarch claimed that the “foreign agents” law was designed to save Georgia from this very adversary; third, he asserted that Georgia nevertheless will join the European Union in 2030.

The scale of public discontent came as a surprise to those in power


While many Georgian opposition members were quick to dismiss his “April theses” as an example of paranoia and inclination towards conspiracy theories, Ivanishvili’s address may have provided an exhaustive answer to the biggest question of all — “Why?”
So is the law indeed pro-Russian?

Ivanishvili's statement is consistent with his traditional, rather straightforward line of thinking.

While the “foreign agent law” was immediately labeled «Russian,” this accusation could not be further from reality, even from a technical perspective. If we were to draw parallels, it bears more resemblance to a Hungarian analog. Both the Georgian and the Hungarian versions differ from the Russian law in one fundamental detail: the lower financing threshold — 20% in Georgia’s case. Russia does not have one, meaning a “guilty” party can be labeled a “foreign agent” simply because someone sent along a couple of pesos from somewhere in Mexico.

Of course, there are examples of Ivanishvili acting to strengthen Tbilisi’s ties to Moscow. He has expanded air traffic with Russia, is yet to impose anti-Russian sanctions, and generally likes to keep his Moscow-based peers happy. However, none of his steps so far could be reliably interpreted as a sign of willingness to team up with the Kremlin.

Over his 12 years of effective control, Ivanishvili has been intently preserving the reform momentum set in progress during early years of pro-Western ex-president Mikheil Saakashvili’s time in office (2004-1013). As a result, the achievements of Saakashvili, whom Ivanishvili’s forces still hold in prison, may have become irreversible. Despite lacking unanimous support, Georgia’s Westernization has come to be an inherent element of the country’s identity, one that is unlikely to be subjected to any revolutionary revision.

Ivanishvili argues that Russia may not be Georgia’s friend, but it should not be regarded as the enemy Saakashvili painted it to be — and while Georgia wholeheartedly aspires to become part of Europe, regular direct flights to Moscow will do no harm in this regard.

Ivanishvili argues that Russia may not be Georgia’s friend, but it should not be regarded as the enemy


Before February 24, 2022, such understandings between Moscow and Tbilisi were reached on a case-by-case basis. But when Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began — and when, largely as a result, the European Union quickly offered Ukraine and Moldova a fast-track rapprochement — the Georgian opposition urged their own authorities to jump on the bandwagon. Such a move would have seemed to have been perfectly timed. After all, Georgian Dream had by then already found a certain equilibrium in its relations with Europe.

A state that by all accounts appeared to have been usurped by a Kremlin-friendly oligarch could not join the league of Western darlings, of course. But the reputation Georgia had gained as the most successful South Caucasian democracy, multiplied by the weight of the 2008 war with Russia and the risks of losing Tbilisi to the gloomy east, enticed Brussels to be less scrupulous than usual. Besides, Georgia did not pester the European authorities with urgent pleas to join their ranks as soon as possible. Both sides realized that a real rapprochement would compel Europe to re-assess the Georgian reality in an entirely different way, and neither was in a hurry to obtain clarity.

Therefore, the opposition's plan looked realistic: it deprived the authorities of their usual comfort and forced Brussels to be more critical of Georgian Dream. However, Ivanishvili turned the war in Ukraine, which at first appeared to be working in favor of the opposition, to his own benefit. And he was not the only one.
The stakes are rising

With the start of the full-scale war, all empirical observations of the Georgian authorities gained the force of an ideological doctrine. The original thesis that if you live next to the Kremlin's Minotaur, it is desirable not to make it angry, has been transformed into a call to Georgian citizens who remember 2008: look at what has become of Ukraine, and see what horrors we have saved you from.

Back in 2022, Brussels could still afford to accommodate the powers-that-be in Tbilisi. After all, EU candidate status comes without any pressing obligations. Turkey, for one, has had it for decades. Despite the political turmoil in Tbilisi, European authorities may have considered granting Georgia this status as the lesser evil. For Georgian Dream, securing it was a domestic policy jackpot. Meanwhile, the opposition suffered another failure, all the more offensive because their chances had — albeit fleetingly — looked brighter than ever.

But this year, when the relationship between Tbilisi and Brussels was no longer a question of mere candidate status, but the start of actual accession talks, the stakes rose. And while the rules were the same, an entirely different game began.

The new schism in Georgian society is far less clean-cut than the old pro-Russian versus pro-Western dichotomy. Georgian Dream may still be moving the country it governs towards Europe, but it is doing so in the manner of Euro-skeptic Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, who like Ivanishvili has expressed concerns regarding the Western “party of war.” In fact, Hungary's international stance has allowed Georgian Dream to customize European integration to its domestic political needs.
The real purpose of the “foreign agent law”

A “foreign agent law” indicates that the authorities are incapable of controlling everything in the country. In some ways, it is a healthy sign: if the government wants to fight civil society, it means civil society is still alive and kicking. Even in Russia in 2012, no one could imagine how changed the atmosphere would be just a decade later. To compare, Azerbaijan does not need such a law — and it never did. As Azerbaijani journalists explain, no one prohibits receiving money from donors, including foreign ones. However, every beneficiary must first obtain permission from the Ministry of Justice, which determines whether the organization's activities align with the national mentality, national interests, and other relevant considerations. As a result, Azerbaijan has jailed dozens of journalists and NGO workers even without a “foreign agent law.”

As Venice Commission experts concluded, Georgia’s legislation already has enough mechanisms to control the transparency of foreign funding. Moreover, this law will do little good for the October elections, as the NGOs set to participate will not start filing their tax declarations until next year, thus making it all but impossible for them to be excluded from the process due to any supposed “foreignness.” More than that, however, there are significant areas of potential repression where Georgian Dream could easily exert its influence without the need for any new legislation.

Georgia’s legislation already has enough mechanisms to control the transparency of foreign funding


In other words, the Georgian law is not first and foremost a tool of domestic control, but an open challenge to Brussels — a provocation consistent with Georgian Dream’s plans and similar to Azerbaijan’s behavior on the eve of its presidential elections. In that case, Baku’s objectives extended beyond merely electing a leader — they sought to elevate Ilham Aliyev to the status of founding father, and the West had to be prevented from spoiling the festive occasion. Western leaders showed understanding, assuming that Azerbaijan’s delusion would fade into the background after the elections, and time proved them right.
No more bets

Georgian Dream's quarrel with the West is too demonstrative to end in a breakup. It goes along the lines of Azerbaijani leaders’ statements at PACE this past January, when the organization suspended Baku’s membership. However, for Georgian Dream, a breakup with the West is an unacceptable outcome for many reasons — primarily because it would hardly make Georgian voters happy.

Ivanishvili’s party sometimes leans towards slogans that could have been penned by Russian nationalists Alexander Dugin or Sergei Markov, targeting a very specific domestic audience — one that the authorities would hate to antagonize. Georgian Dream even employs a “task force” of utterly replaceable deputies for this purpose.

In parallel with the “foreign agent law,” the authorities are launching a separate proposal to combat those who propagandize “pseudo-liberal values” — in other words, a ban on “LGBT propaganda.” Aside from an attempt to identify opponents of the “foreign agent law” within the LGBT community, Georgian Dream might also be pushing voters toward the formula expressed by current Georgian Dream leader Irakli Garibashvili: “Georgia will join Europe while keeping its own traditions.”

Most importantly, actually replacing Georgia’s pro-Western course with a pro-Russian one is the potential step Ivanishvili fears taking most of all: he knows the Kremlin’s ways better than any Georgian and understands that the games he has been playing with Europe won’t last him a month if Moscow really were to be sitting across the table.

Replacing a pro-Western course with a pro-Russian one is something Ivanishvili fears most of all: he knows the Kremlin’s ways better than any Georgian


In short, as Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis remarked in May, characterizing the new “foreign agents” law as “Russian” is nothing but a catchphrase, a good slogan for mobilizing protest. However, the question about the goals of the protest remains unanswered — despite its importance for future developments.

Faced with unexpected resistance, Georgian Dream must have experienced many unpleasant moments, all the more so considering that it could not afford a second retreat following its initial withdrawal of the bill last year. Initially, people with insider knowledge of Georgian Dream say the party considered the possibility of offering concessions if things did not go according to plan, as the text of the bill had been written in such a way as to include a “margin of safety.”

However, it appears that further proposals to discuss possible changes were no longer a search for compromise, but a trap to lure opponents into putting the law into force. The opposition and President Salome Zurabishvili saw through this maneuver, but by failing to achieve what they wanted with protests, the opposition lost much more.

The strategy of damage minimization earned Georgian Dream an advantage, as the protests essentially marked the start of the election campaign. Getting a grip on themselves, the officials reassessed the stakes and gamed out realistic scenarios. Meanwhile, opposition groups never made up their minds: was this a revolution, which had to play out here and now, or the start of elections — a game played in the long run? These two scenarios required two different approaches.

In itself, demands to change the country’s political direction were insufficient to bring about a massive revolutionary upheaval. Similarly, the phase of Ukraine's Euromaidan that began in November 2013 following the refusal of then-president Viktor Yanukovych to sign an association agreement with the European Union soon exhausted itself, and its political masterminds had always seen the demonstrations only as a warm-up for the upcoming presidential campaign. The story could have ended there had it not been for the inexplicable ferocity of the Ukrainian authorities, who beat protesters without giving them enough time to disperse. The Maidan was over, and the uprising began.

The Georgian government certainly kept that scenario in mind, and for all the ruthlessness of the Georgian police, their actions never crossed the fatal line, thereby remaining a far cry from the brutality of the Ukrainian Berkut troops.
The opposition's defeat

At the end of the day, the Georgian opposition lost on two main counts: they failed to prevent the passing of the law, and they did not derive any political capital from the crisis. Centering the protest around geopolitical considerations, the opposition could not come up with any idea for engaging new audiences, and in the current circumstances, even a draw counts as Georgian Dream’s victory.

Unable to thwart the government's plans even with such strong support in the streets, the opposition once again disappointed hesitant voters, and perhaps the West, which saw that it will still have to deal with Georgian Dream in any foreseeable future.

The opposition once again disappointed the West, which saw that it will still have to deal with Georgian Dream


Judging by the patience that the West has shown for years towards the Belarusian regime — formerly known colloquially as “Europe’s last dictatorship” — Ivanishvili remains a safe distance from any such red lines. Finally, even a crisis of such scale that some perceived it as a preamble to a revolution was not a powerful enough incentive for the opposition to unite. Calls voiced by Georgian opposition leaders, including Saakashvili, still resembled a contrived continuation of intraspecies political struggle more than a search for even a temporary, tactical compromise.

Meanwhile, Georgian Dream achieved its goal, if at a much greater political and emotional cost than expected. It also managed to minimize critical losses and risks. The law has been passed, and those who hoped for the weakness of the Dream will have to reckon with it. Moreover, the ruling party has accomplished a strategic goal at the cost of only a few hiccups, walking the fine line between satisfying the population’s expectations for European integration and maintaining their own political habits — even in the face of European shows of decency. For their part, the opposition slowed down Georgia’s progress towards Europe without stopping it completely.

Inside Georgia, the ruling party largely succeeded; even if on the international level, the game is more complicated. The red lines have become noticeably closer, and the West is threatening Georgia with sanctions and withdrawal of unconditional benefits, including visa liberalization and EU candidate status. However, from a technical or political standpoint, neither step appears likely to be taken.

For instance, changing the visa regime requires EU consensus, which could be problematic. As for EU candidate status, there is no formal procedure for revoking such an offer, and Brussels currently appears too busy to develop one. In short, these risks exist but not in the near future. And time is of the essence, judging by the rumored internal deliberations of Georgian Dream.

So far, the dynamics of the war in Ukraine appear to be playing into the Georgian authorities' hands. The ruling party awaits the European Parliamentary elections — and with them the arrival of new faces in the European Commission. The Georgian Dreamers are also waiting for Trump, believing they will have an easier time dealing with him. In any case, they still have time, at least until October. No one is going to seriously stress test the situation before then. And if something does go wrong, the authorities have been willing to haggle over the particulars of the law from the outset.

And if something goes wrong, the authorities have been willing to haggle over the particulars of the law from the outset


None of the credible recent polls have given Georgian Dream less than one-third of the votes — and this is even according to the results of studies done by opposition-minded sociologists. Pro-government services are even more bullish, assessing the ruling party’s support at 60%. According to the most optimistic (although not the most realistic) estimates, the two main opposition parties, the United National Movement and its affiliated Strategy Aghmashenebeli and Akhali, can count on slightly below 20%, and their peers are unlikely to improve the opposition's chances.

The opposition could well succeed at inspiring those young people who did not go to the polling stations before. But their current enthusiasm may subside before October, especially given that Georgian Dream has finally dotted the i’s on the law. Moreover, so far the opposition has failed to produce any opening other than claims that Georgian Dream has lost a majority and will therefore rig the election in October — which means betting on street protests once again.

This will provide the government with an opportunity to mobilize its supporters — which it invariably does whenever the opposition makes a move — and its success in such endeavors has repeatedly exceeded forecasts. The ruling party can also fight to maintain its level of support by using “administrative resources,” especially in rural areas. Finally, Georgian Dream’s main trump card is control over the European integration process, which can be unfrozen if the necessity arises. Thus the revolution continues. And as befits any revolution, it awaits its October.

China sends glacial water from Tibet to the Maldives, raising concerns

Tibetans meanwhile are being told to save water as Beijing engages in water diplomacy.

By Lobsang, Tenzin Pema and Tenzin Dickyi for RFA Tibetan
2024.06.05

Maldives residents carry jugs of water distributed by Red Crescent and security personnel after a fire at a desalination plant affected water supplies in Malé, capital of the Maldives, Dec. 5, 2014.

 Haveeru/AFP

China gifted 3,000 metric tons of Tibet’s glacial water to the island nation of the Maldives in two separate batches in March and May — the same months it unveiled and implemented water conservation regulations at home.

The Water Conservation Regulations set limits on water usage within administrative regions and prioritizes water conversation work in Tibet and other parts of China. 

They were issued by China’s State Council on March 20, a week before it sent the first delivery of 1,500 metric tons of water in jugs to the Maldives, which is experiencing a scarcity of fresh water. 

The regulations then went into effect on May 1, weeks before China donated the second batch of water jugs. 

China finalized the deal with the Maldives during a November 2023 visit by Yan Jinhai, chairman of the Tibet Autonomous Region, to the low-lying archipelago threatened by rising sea levels.

The Maldives has forged strong bilateral relations with China and is a beneficiary of the Belt and Road Initiative, under which it has borrowed more than US$1 billion from Chinese banks in the past decade, according to Western think tanks. 

Maldivian President Mohamed Muizzu signed 20 agreements, including one for financial and military assistance, with Beijing during his inaugural state visit to China in January 2024.  

The Maldives thanked the people of Tibet for their “generous donation,” which it expects will greatly support its island communities. Its freshwater resources are affected by erratic rainfall patterns and rising sea levels.

Water shortages in Tibet

But Tibetans inside Tibet said they face water shortages themselves because Chinese authorities have implemented systematic water conservation and management campaigns across various Tibetan villages and towns for over a decade.

This has occurred while authorities have restricted the availability of water and set limits on water usage at the local level.

Maldivian security personnel load a water tank onto a military vehicle to fill it with treated water in Malé, capital of the Maldives, Dec. 5, 2014. The capital is located on a low-lying island in the Indian Ocean that has no natural water source and depends entirely on treated seawater. (Sinan Hussain/AP)

“I have heard that China is donating bottled water from Tibet to other parts of the world for free for political gain,” said one source from the Tibet Autonomous Region, where Chinese authorities have carried out water conservation campaigns for over a decade. 

“However, in Tibet, the local Tibetans do not have enough drinking water,” he said. “At times there isn’t enough water to even brush our teeth.”

On March 27, the same day the Maldives said it received the first batch of water, the Water Conservancy Bureau of Ngari Prefecture, or Ali in Chinese, the birthplace of key South Asian rivers, began a series of year-long events for the general public to promote water conservation.

In Nyingtri city, or Linzhi in Chinese, authorities have implemented the strictest water resources management system over the past several years and boast of its effectiveness. 

“The water used to wash rice and vegetables can be used to mop the floor and water the flowers. ... Nowadays, water-saving behaviors like this have become a conscious action of many citizens,” said a 2023 announcement by the city government.

Meanwhile, Tibetans who have grown up on their ancestral land in Gangkar township in Dingri county, called Tingri in Chinese, are being forced to relocate to make way for the expansion of China’s water bottling facilities and industry, two sources said. 

“Gangkar is known for its fertile pastureland and significant water resources from glaciers with 15 water springs in the region, which the local Tibetans have always relied on for their livelihoods,” said the first source. 

Chinese authorities plan to move about 430 residents to take control of the water resources from the land, he said.

Weaponizing water

China’s move signals it is engaging in “water politics” and playing the long game for geopolitical gains in South Asia, experts said. 

The Chinese government has projects underway to extract clean, clear and mineral-rich water to support the expansion of its premium mineral bottled water industry, they said.

H.E. Yan Jinhai (L), chairman of China's Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, pays a courtesy call to Maldives President Mohamed Muizzu in Malé, capital of the Maldives, Nov. 21, 2023. (President’s Office/Republic of Maldives)

Beijing also wants to control water flows to lower riparian states such as India, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, to further its own aspiration of regional dominance, experts said.

“The imperative to address the threat of China weaponizing water in Tibet cannot be overstated,” wrote scholars Neeraj Singh Manhas and Rahul Lad in a March report titled "China's Weaponization of Water in Tibet A Lesson for the Lower Riparian States" in the Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs.

With approximately 87,000 dams built, China poses a historic threat, having already dammed most internal rivers, they add, while calling for proactive measures to implement enduring policies to protect these vital Tibet’s water resources.

Tibet is at the forefront of China’s “water wars” in the region, said Anushka Saxena, a research analyst at the Takshashila Institution, a public policy think tank in India. 

Tibet’s eight major transboundary river systems have the capacity to turn China into “Asia’s water hegemon,” given that their water can be used for both domestic economic and foreign policy-related interests, as well as can be weaponized to cause harm to lower riparian states, she said.

“In that light, China’s moves vis-à-vis export of water to Maldives cannot be isolated from the larger approach China is adopting to using Tibet’s water resources,” she added.

Additional reporting by Dorjee Damdul for RFA Tibetan. Edited by Roseanne Gerin and Malcolm Foster.