Showing posts sorted by relevance for query hegel. Sort by date Show all posts
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Sunday, April 15, 2007

Commodity Fetish a Definition

I like to find short sharp clear (humorous) definitions of Marx's ideas to share with my readers. This is another one: Commodity Fetish. LOL this ones got that JimBobbySez kinda of style....

One of the most charming witticisms of Marx is the term "commodity fetishism". "Fetishism" spoofed Hegel, who had concocted a famous lengthy, crackpot, faux-learned justification for racialised subjection, imperialism and slavery in the Philosophy of History founded on the infantile, primitive nature of neeeegrows as evidenced by their relations to fetishes. Fetish=degradation. To Hegel's mystical ecstasy of yerupeen triumph over fetishes and fetishists, Marx replied; And who are you, my fine fellow, to sneer at fetishes? At least those guys utilise their fetishes and create them in moderation. Your fetishes proliferate like fungus, lord it over you like gods; you grovel before them in every minute of life.

I came across it after coming across a critique of Hegel's view of Africa showing the author knew where of he spoke.

Hegel’s Europe (Spirit) Hegel’s Africa (Nature)


For Hegel, Africans fail at achieving substantial notions of the universal. Hegel
says that, “in Negro life the characteristic point is the fact that consciousness has not yet
attained to the realization of any substantial objective existence—as for example, God, or
Law—in which the interest of man’s volition is involved and in which he realizes his
own being.”xxiv African religion is, for Hegel, actually magic and fetishism. Law is
nothing but unruly despotic control. African social organization is the slavery of Africans
by each other, resulting in cannibalism, violence, and chaos in the interior of Africa.
Specifically, in Africa, Hegel finds “the most reckless inhumanity and disgusting
barbarism” be displayed by the people of the continent.

In reference to the African, according to Hegel, “we must put aside all thought of
reverence and morality—all that we call feeling—if we would rightly comprehend him;
there is nothing harmonious with humanity to be found in this type of character.”xxvi For
Hegel, a sense of humanity, as cultivated from a conception of the universal, is lacking in
Africans. The African lacks the ability to see beyond himself, in the humanity of another,
or in the necessity of the community. The African tries to organize socially, but fails.
Hegel says, “the political bond can therefore not possess such a character as that free laws
should unite the community.”xxvii They try to express themselves religiously, but exist in
fetishism. Hegel refers to Africans as believers in “sorcery” in which they have no “idea
of a God, or a moral faith.”

For Hegel, it is impossible for the African to actualize concepts of religion, law,
or society due to their own sensuousness. Hegel manipulates the ways in which the text
displays the manner in which the African character expresses itself in terms of religion,
law, and social organization.”xxix For Bernasconi, “An examination of Hegel’s sources
shows that they were more accurate than he was and that he cannot be so readily excused
for using them as he did.”xxx Myth creation and African esoticization occur in Hegel.
Hegel is constructing an archetype of what and where the unhistorical would be in Space
and History. As the archetype of the unhistorical, Bernasconi says that in Hegel, “Africa
served as a null-point or base-point.”

Why would Hegel proceed to have these declarative statements about a people
that he claims he does not understand? Hegel says that Africa is unknown only to proceed
in explaining the intricacies of its identity. Is this a problem of inherent duplicity? Hegel
makes the African an incomprehensible element to compliment the comprehensible. In
Hegel, “awakening consciousness takes its rise surrounded by natural influences alone,
and every development of it is the reflection of Spirit back upon itself in opposition to the
immediate, unreflected character of mere nature. Nature is therefore one element in this
antithetic abstracting process.”

The development of Spirit out of Nature requires Nature to antithetically reflect
Spirit’s identity and see this reflection, and movement away, as an antithesis in all aspects
to its stagnated self. For this reason, Hegel must construct Africa as an incomprehensible,
irrational, unreasoned, and unhistorical entity. Hence, Europe blossoms historically out of
Africa as an opposite posed specifically for Europe’s ascension. This incomprehensibility
forces Africa to remain outside the realm of logical, historical development. The African
has no hopes of cohabiting the same conceptual space as the rest of humanity. They fail
to rise out of Nature for they lack the mechanism of the threshold and antithesis that they
exist as for Europe, against which this rising can occur. Rising above the threshold is
impossible when a culture is that threshold. Africa does not have the capability of rising
because this rising has to occur over and against Africa.
And here are a couple of more definitions of Commodity Fetish

A commodity, for Marx, is an object which is
1.)
the product of human, creative labor, that is, human labor manifested in an object and 2.) an object of human labor which is put in relation to other objects of human labor, that is, it is an object which is circulated.

If you sat down and build a bird-house for yourself, you have produced an object, but not a commodity. If you sit down and build a bird-house and sell it to someone else, you have produced both an object and a commodity. Marx's central argument here is that the world of commodities, of objects which circulate in an economy, takes on a life of its own. When you go to the store and see a bird-house for sale on a shelf, you see only the object, not the labor that went into it.

The commodity seems to you to have magically appeared on the shelf for you consumption. That sense that commodities have a life of their own, that they magically appear for people to purchase or exchange, is what Marx means by the fetishism of commodities.


The Reality behind Commodity Fetishism

After having clarified Marx’s methodological point of departure I shall now carefully discuss his laying out of what the "mystical character", the "metaphysical subtleties", "the sensory supernatural character” and the "theological manners" of the commodity specifically consist in.

The term fetish or to fetishize which originally derives from religious discourse means to invest something with powers it does not intrinsically possess. But while the religious fetish, if my picture of the world is not totally mistaken, does not through an act of being thought about or believed in acquire powers which previously were foreign to it, the situation is different in the case of the kind of fetish Marx is concerned with. ( The commodity fetish is being realized, not created by the minds of the individual actors and thus needs to be sharply distinguished from allusions to hallucinations, false illusions and the like. The kind of fetishism Marx is describing, can neither be understood as a mere individual misrepresentation nor as an abstract phenomenon of social consciousness. It has to be seen in light of the society as a whole. Fetishism is not merely an ideological category. While ideology in Marx understanding of it as "necessary false consciousness" is not confined to capitalist societies, but is closely linked to all societies that are divided into classes, the notion of commodity fetishism is a historical distinct phenomenon of capitalism. Marx goes as far as claiming that commodity fetishism is inseparably linked to Capitalist modes of production. He writes:

[In capitalist societies] it is o­nly the definite social relationships of men themselves, which in their eyes takes o­n the phantasmagorial form of a relation between things. In order, therefore, to find an analogy, we must have recourse to the mist-enveloped regions of the religious world. In that world, the products of the human mind appear as independent beings endowed with life, as entering into independent relations both with o­ne another and the human race. The same way are in the world of commodities the products of men’s hands. This I call the fetishism which is attached to the products of labor, as soon as they are produced as commodities, and which therefore is inseparable from the production of commodities.

And a more sinister meaning of it as an aspect of Gothic Capitalism.


The Ends of the Body--Commodity Fetishism and the Global Traffic in Organs

SAIS Review - Volume 22, Number 1, Winter-Spring 2002, pp. 61-80

Amidst the neoliberal readjustments of the new global economy, there has been a rapid growth of "medical tourism" for transplant surgery and other advanced biomedical and surgical procedures. A grotesque niche market for sold organs, tissues, and other body parts has exacerbated older divisions between North and South, haves and have-nots, organ donors and organ recipients. Indeed, a kind of medical apartheid has also emerged that has separated the world into two populations--organ givers and organ receivers. Over the past 30 years, organ transplantation--especially kidney transplantation--has become a common procedure in hospitals and clinics throughout the world. The spread of transplant technologies has created a global scarcity of viable organs. At the same time the spirit of a triumphant global and "democratic" capitalism has released a voracious appetite for "fresh" bodies from which organs can be procured. The confluence in the flows of immigrant workers and itinerant kidney sellers who fall prey to sophisticated but unscrupulous transnational organ brokers is a subtext in the recent history of globalization. Today's organ procurement transactions are a blend of altruism and commerce; of science and superstition; of gifting, barter, and theft; and of voluntarism and coercion. International Organ Markets, Bioethics, and Social Justice The problem with markets is that they reduce everything--including human beings, their labor, and their reproductive capacity--to the status of commodities that can be bought, sold, traded, and stolen.

But not to anticipate, we will content ourselves with yet another
example relating to the commodity-form.
Could commodities themselves
speak, they would say: Our use-value may be a thing that interests men.
It is no part of us as objects. What, however, does belong to us as
objects, is our value. Our natural intercourse as commodities proves it.
In the eyes of each other we are nothing but exchange-values. Now listen
how those commodities speak through the mouth of the economist. "Value"
(i.e., exchange-value) "is a property of things, riches" (i.e., use-
value) "of man. Value, in this sense, necessarily implies exchanges,
riches do not."(35) "Riches" (use-value) "are the attribute of men,
value is the attribute of commodities. A man or a community is rich, a
pearl or a diamond is valuable... A pearl or a diamond is valuable" as a
pearl or a diamond.(36) So far no chemist has ever discovered
exchange-value either in a pearl or a diamond. The economic discoverers
of this chemical element, who by-the-by lay special claim to critical
acumen, find however that the use-value of objects belongs to them
independently of their material properties, while their value, on the
other hand, forms a part of them as objects. What confirms them in this
view, is the peculiar circumstance that the use-value of objects is
realised without exchange, by means of a direct relation between the
objects and man, while, on the other hand, their value is realised only
by exchange, that is, by means of a social process. Who fails here to
call to mind our good friend, Dogberry, who informs neighbour Seacoal,
that, "To be a well-favoured man is the gift of fortune; but reading and
writing comes by Nature."



The Fetish Speaks

Fredy Perlman's graphic rendition of Karl Marx's "Commodity Fetishism"

Rather, fetishism or animism is a set of ritual practices, stances, and attunements to the world, constituting the way we participate in capitalist existence. Commodities actually are alive: more alive, perhaps, than we ourselves are. They “appear,” or stand forth, or “shine” (the word Marx uses is scheinen) as autonomous beings. Commodities don’t just “believe” for us; much more, they usurp our day-to-day lives, and act pragmatically in our place. The “naive” consumer, who sees commodities as animate beings, endowed with magical properties, is therefore not mystified or deluded. He or she is accurately perceiving the way that capitalism works, how it endows material things with an inner life. Under the reign of commodities, we live — as William Burroughs said we did — in a “magical universe.”

And so, our encounter with commodities and brands is an affective experience, before it is a cognitive one. It’s not belief that is at stake here, but attraction and revulsion, euphoria and disgust, a warm sense of belonging, nostalgia, panic, and loss….



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Monday, February 10, 2020


Theorizing Queer Before Queer Theory
Before Queer Theory

Victorian Aestheticism and the Self



Published 11.03.2019
Johns Hopkins University Press
248 Pages
 



JANUARY 22, 2020

WHAT DO WE LOOK FOR when we look back in time? Do we look for ourselves, and the historical echo of our identities and concerns; or do we look for something else — for other ways of thinking and living that might reframe our understanding of who we are and who we could be? Dustin Friedman’s study of a group of late-19th-century British writers and aesthetes insists on the latter. Before Queer Theory: Victorian Aestheticism and the Self is timely and clear-sighted in its intervention in both content and method — an engaging study that enriches our understanding of the aesthetic movement and also enables new perspectives on our own moment.

The aim of the study is to carve out a distinctive approach to the historical study of queer identity formation. Rather than uncovering previously undiscovered historical narratives that reflect back to us our own contemporary understandings of non-normative erotic identity, the book chooses another method. It seeks to explore what queer might look like if we attend to it through the conceptual resources of another age. It attempts, in other words, to trace a theory of queer identity before “queer theory.” For this reason, “queer” is defined here as non-normative sexuality rather than as a predetermined synonym for gay and/or lesbian. The book, then, is focused not so much on the genealogy of current categories of sexuality, but what might be seen more as a moment of pushback against a process central to the formation of those categories at the time when the study of human sexuality through a new science (known as “sexology”) was in the ascendant (and when, therefore, the distinction between what is “normal” and what is not was coming into particular focus). While sexology sought to define and identify, by offering new classificatory and diagnostic criteria, the aesthetes in Friedman’s book sought instead to evade this taxonomical effort in favor of crafting an identity that was often outside of, or beyond, or between, categories.

Late Victorian aestheticism refers to an “art for art’s sake” philosophy: crudely put, it values the aesthetic in its own right rather seeing it as a means to an end — for moral persuasion, for example, or conveying a narrative. The writers explored in this study were all central to the aesthetic movement, and all combine writing about art with an articulation of non-normative erotic identity. Walter Pater and Oscar Wilde might be the best-known queer scholars and writers Friedman considers here, but Vernon Lee (a.k.a. Violet Paget) and Michael Field (a.k.a. the aunt and niece couple, Katharine Bradley and Edith Cooper) are just as fascinating, and their work has been rapidly gaining ever more attention over the past couple of decades. These writers all knew each other and knew each other’s work, and collectively present a relevant and coherent focus for the book’s concerns.

The reception of Hegel’s philosophy is at the heart of Friedman’s attempt to recognize the conceptual resources of this late-19th-century theory of queerness. Hegel provides the catalyst or the method for a way of thinking about the potentiality of queer erotic energy that took hold within this community, and gave a way to articulate the value of non-normative perspectives. The argument starts from an understanding of Hegelian “negativity” in which consciousness is destroyed and remade in response to encountering an obstacle. When thinking about this in relation to the erotic (“Erotic negativity” as Friedman terms it), this enabled value to be found in non-normative sexuality, Friedman argues, by identifying a position of resistance to social norms that ultimately strengthened rather than broke the self. Crucially for this study of aestheticism, it is through art that this transformation can take place, and it is through engagement with art that a kind of self-determination can be found; art is a space where those outside of the dominant categories of identification can find a sense of self. This transformative potential, the book argues, is at the heart of late-19th-century aestheticism’s preoccupation with art and with aesthetic perception.

One of the key questions for the book, and for any reader of this book, is what counts as evidence for a theory of queer identity long before the rise of “queer theory” in the later 20th century, and how will we know when we’ve found it? The connections between Hegel’s work and the writers explored in this study range from the very direct, to the more distant. Walter Pater, the primary subject for the book, provides the tightest connection, and the book’s argument is anchored, in the first two chapters, in an analysis of his writing. The other figures explored here engaged with the Hegelian notion of erotic negativity in large part through Pater’s work, whether Oscar Wilde, Vernon Lee, or the two women who wrote jointly under the name Michael Field. Even in the case of Pater, the aesthete most directly influenced by Hegel, the move between the Hegelian conceptual infrastructure and the reading of Pater’s work is one made up of connective tissue rather than direct connection. This gives the book a flexibility and an agility that enables it to make bigger gestures and to operate in a broad conceptual field. As the book goes on, the connection with Hegel’s thought grows less direct, but a powerful case is made for the influence of the idea of erotic negativity through the uptake of Pater’s work. By the time we get to Michael Field, for example, the connection to Hegel is made through a letter from John Addington Symonds recommending Bradley and Cooper read Hegel, and reference to the education Cooper received while a student at University College, Bristol. Bradley and Cooper did, however, read Pater avidly, and that trail of influence is at the heart of the book’s argument.

Hegel’s work provides a contemporaneous language for the phenomenon the author (rightly, in my view) sees developing among the aesthetes as much as its source; how much is correlation and how much causation in a sense ceases to matter — the appeal to Hegel serves its purpose by anchoring and giving a voice to the dynamic central to the study. Indeed, one of the most pleasing aspects of the book is the way it treats creative writing and “poetic” texts as themselves the primary locus for the creation of a theory of queerness, rather than making an appeal to a separate contemporaneous discourse through which to read literature. While literary studies has now for a long time been invested in reading literature in relation to its historical context, this book helps to build up a fresh, and broader, perspective on what might “count” as historical evidence.

Before Queer Theory identifies its own central achievement accurately: its innovation lies in its systematic analysis of the connection between art and sexuality that underpins aestheticism. In identifying specifically the transformation and freeing of the self that is possible through a combination of erotics and aesthetic perception, Friedman traces a mutually informing connection between aesthetics and sexuality. Yet, more than this, it is surely the legacy of sexology that enables us today to understand sexuality as something intrinsic to identity but yet potentially bracketed off from our understanding of aesthetic perception. It was through sexology’s taxonomization of queer desire that it became isolatable in a way that enabled it to become not just identified, but also regulated. The more that sensuality or the erotic is recognized to exist outside of this taxonomy — to be inherent in things as a dynamic force, or a mode of perception — the more difficult it is to police. The story of aestheticism is, then, in part, the story of a political pushback against a new reality that was in formation at the end of the century. Sexology rendered queerness visible in new ways, but in its mania for definition this scientific project also threatened, or ignored (depending on your perspective), all manner of erotic self-identification that had found its true place in more labile, and aesthetic, modes.

The story that Before Queer Theory tells has, then, particular importance for an age in which concerns around how we name, identify, and classify sexuality have become pressing in new ways and in new contexts. To inhabit vicariously a different way of thinking might give, perhaps, fresh perspectives on current concerns. If a previous theorization of the value of queerness lay in a refusal to commit to essentialist positions, a refusal to identify in relation to scientific categories, and a lability that finds happiness in an oscillation between being subject and object, what questions does that pose to our current discourses that frequently rail against objectification, that often find strength and power in categorical self-identification, and that are perhaps weighing afresh against one another the authorities of science and “poetry”? If the aesthete’s discourse of queerness was struggling with the dawn of an age of sexual categorization, are we perhaps currently working out how to deal with the decadence of that age?

¤

Wednesday, January 22, 2020

Raya Dunayevskaya Archive

1910–1987

Raya Dunayevskaya Archive
“ Ours is the age that can meet the challenge of the times when we work out so new a relationship of theory to practice that the proof of the unity is in the Subject’s own self-development. Philosophy and revolution will first then liberate the innate talents of men and women who will become whole. Whether or not we recognise that this is the task history has ‘assigned’, to our epoch, it is a task that remains to be done.” New Passions, 1973

The Raya Dunayevskaya Collection - overview and index to Dunayevskaya's works (2.7Mb)
Works:
On the Resolution of the National Youth Committee, March 1934
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a Capitalist Society, 1941
An Analysis of Russian Economy, 1942
A Letter on Rosa Luxemburg and Capital Accumulation, 1943
Marxism against pseudo-Marxism, 1943
Introduction to Lenin, Origin of Capitalism in Russia, October 1943
A Restatement of Some Fundamentals of Marxism against ‘pseudo-Marxism’, November 1943
Can the law of value be uprooted?, 1944
A New Revision of Marxian Economics, 1944
Negro Intellectuals in Dilemna, 1944
Roosevelt Whitewashed at FEPC Meeting but Audience Senses Need for More Effective Action, February 1944
Marxism and Black liberation, June 1944
Negroes in the Revolution, 1945
Revision or Reaffirmation of Marxism?, 1945
Marxism and Political Economy, 1945
Harlem and Bilbo’s Party, October 1945
Luxemburg’s Theory of Accumulation. How it Differed with Marx and Lenin, 1946
New Developments in Stalin’s Russia, 1946
The Nature of the Russian Economy, 1946
The Decline in the Rate of Profit and The Theory of Crises, 1947
The fatal defect of capitalist production, 1947
A Letter to Natalia Trotsky on the Theory of State Capitalism, 1947
On Luxemburg’s Theory of Accumulation, April 1947
The Russian Question – A Debate (with Max Shachtman), May 1947
Uprooting capitalism’s law of value, part I, 1948
Uprooting capitalism’s law of value, part II, September 1948
Industrialization of the Negro, 1948
Production Statistics and the Devaluation of the Ruble, 1948
Stalinists Falsify Marxism Anew. Teaching Marxism in the Soviet Union, 1948
Translation of and Introduction to Plekhanov’s The Meaning of Hegel, 1949
A Bureaucrat’s Fate, 1949
The Case of Eugene Varga, 1949
The despotic plan of capital vs. freely associated labor, 1950
The Cooperative Form of Labor Vs. Abstract Labor, 1951
On the economic roots of imperialism: Rudolf Hilferding and ‘the stability of capitalism𔆍, March 1951
The revolt of the workers and the plan of the intellectuals, Part I, June 1951
The revolt of the workers and the plan of the intellectuals, Part II, June 1951
The Beria Purge, 1953
The Evolution of a Social Type, 1953
German workers change face of Europe, 1953
Intellectuals and the Radical Workers, 1953
Malenkov Pledges H-Bomb and Caviar, 1953
Tensions Within The Soviet Union, 1953
The myth of the invincibility of totalitarianism, June 1953
Bert Cochran, Caucus Builder, 1954
The Gang Lawyer, 1954
On Both Sides of the Iron Curtain, 1954
Russia In Economic Crisis, 1954
Russia, More Than Ever Full of Revolutionaries ..., 1954
Russian Regime Cannot Afford a Beria Show Trial, 1954
Socialism or Barbarism, 1954
New Stage of Struggle Against Labor Bureaucracy, 1955
New Turn To The “Popular Front”, 1955
The Revolt In The Slave Labor Camps In Vorkuta, 1955
A response to [Cornelius] Castoriadis’s Socialism or Barbarism, August 1955
Marxism and the U.S. Civil War, November 1955
The Absence of a Mass Labor Party in the U.S., 1956
Death, Freedom and the Disintegration of Communism, 1956
Italian Communist Party Faces Revolt, December 8, 1956
Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Hungary, 1956
Where Is Russia Going?, 1956
Where to begin? Theory and practice in a new relationship, 1956
Without a Past And Without a Future, 1956
Djilas’ New Class, 1957
50 years after the revolution – Mao, Hegel, and dialectics in China, 1957
Mao Perverts Lenin, 1957
New Crisis in Russia, 1957
Russia’s Internal Crisis, 1957
Can humanity be free? The new Marxism and Freedom, May 1957
50 years after the revolution – Mao, Hegel, and dialectics in China, June 1957
The philosophic foundation of Marxism, June 1957
The American roots of Marxism, 1958
Colonial Revolts and the Creativity of People, 1958
Unemployment and Organizations to Fight It, 1958
Whither Paris?, 1958
Toward a new concept of organization, June 1958
The African Revolution, I, 1959
Eisenhower-Khrushchev Spectacular, 1959
Khrushchev Talks On And On, 1959
May 1 and the Shorter Work Day, 1959
The Cuban Revolution: The Year After, 1960
The Roots of Anti-Semitism, 1960
State Capitalism and the Bureaucrats, 1960
The World Crisis and the Theoretical Void, 1960
‘Philosophic foundations of the struggles for freedom’, October 1960
Notes on Hegel’s Logic, 1961
Revolutionary Dynamic of Hegel’s Thought (Written as a Letter to Olga Domanski), 1961
Rough Notes on Hegel’s Science of Logic, 1961
The New Russian Communist Manifesto, January 1961
African revolutions revisited, May 1961
Freedom Riders challenge homegrown totalitarianism, July 1961
Nuclear war and state-capitalism, July 1961
Spontaneity of Action and Organization of Thought, September 1961
Tito’s Turnabout, October 1961
If This Isn’t Madness, What Is It?, November 1961
1962 Cuban Missile Crisis tested anti-war Left, October 1962
Historic roots of conflict in South Asia, December 1962
American Civilization on Trial: Black Masses as Vanguard, 1963
Racism and the birth of imperialism, 100 years after the Spanish-American war, 1963
The uniqueness of Marxist-Humanism, 1963
To Fromm on the Dialectic, November 1963
The Theory of Alienation: Marx’s Debt to Hegel, 1964
The Free Speech Movement and the Negro Revolution, 1965
Marx’s Humanism Today, 1965
Ramifications of Watts revolt, September 1965
Marx’s humanism and the mass struggles since World War II, December 1965
Recollections of Leon Trotsky, December 1965
Hegel’s summons: Grasp revolutionary spirit of the age, January 1966
Revisiting ‘Black Power,’ Race and Class, September 1966
Tragedy of China’s Cultural Revolution, October 1966
The double tragedy of Che Guevara, 1967
Revisiting ‘Black Power,’ Race and Class, 1967
Economic reality and dialectics of liberation, 1968
The near-revolution of France, 1968: Why did it fail?, 1968
Murder and war in the uncivilized U.S., May 1968
Practicing Philosophy and Revolution, May 1968
Recollecting the legacy of ‘Socialism with a human face’, August 1968
From Marx to Marxist-Humanism, 1969
From the Black-Red Conference: Dialectics of the freedom movements, January 1969
Marxist-Humanism’s concept of ‘Subject’, 1971
Women’s liberation, then and now, 1971
Praxis and the responsibility of intellectuals, July 1971
On C.L.R. James’ Notes on Dialectics, 1972
The dialectic of Marx’s Grundrisse, 1973
Dialectics and the Black dimension, 1973
A Letter on Marxist-Humanism’s concept of ‘Subject’, 1973
Philosophy & Revolution, 1973
Remembering Allende, 1973, September 1973
Today’s Epigones Who Try to Truncate Marx’s Capital, 1974
Marx’s Grundrisse and women’s liberation, March 1974
Black dimension in women’s liberation, 1975
Practicing Proletarian Reason. On seniority and labor’s emancipation, 1975
Remembering the 1974–75 Portuguese Revolution and its relation to Africa, 1976
Marxist-Humanism’s original contribution, April 1976
Marx’s concept of ‘labor’, May 1976
Dialectics: The Algebra of Revolution, 1978
Global capital’s structural crisis and the need to return to Marx’s Capital, 1978
The philosophic legacy of Karel Kosík, 1978
Grave contradictions of 1979 Iranian Revolution, 1979
Outline of Marx’s Capital, Volume I, 1979
Rosa Luxemburg: revolutionary, feminist, 1979
In celebration of Women’s History Month – Lessons of the Iranian revolution, March 1979
International Women’s Day and Iran, March 1979
The Two Russian Revolutions, and Once Again, on the Theory of Permanent Revolution, October 1979
What is philosophy? What is revolution? What is anti-imperialism?, December 1979
Marxism and ‘the party’, 1980
On the anniversary of the birth of Erich Fromm, 1980
Women and revolution in Iran, 1980
May Day as a birthtime of history, April 1980
Historic Roots of Israel-Palestine conflict, September 1980
Women and revolution in Iran, September 1980
What has happened to the Iranian revolution?, 1981
Revolution and counter-revolution in Iran, June 1981
Marxist-Humanism’s relation to Marx’s Humanism, September 1981
East European revolt and the re-creation of Marx’s Marxism, February 1982
Stop the slaughter of the Palestinians!, September 1982
Marx and the Black World, 1983
Marx’s Unchaining of the Dialectic, 1983
Marx’s unchaining of the dialectic, January 1983
American Civilization on Trial (4th Edition), August 1983
Lévi-Strauss and the battle of ideas, August 1983
Foundations of Marxist-Humanism, August 1983
Lesson of Grenada for today, November 1983
Counter-revolution from within revolution: the problem of our times, April 1984
Dialectics of revolution: American roots and world Humanist concepts, part I, March 1985
Dialectics of revolution: American roots and world Humanist concepts, part II, March 1985
When News & Letters was born, March 1985
Marx’s new moments and those in our age, April 1986
Another look at Hegel’s Phenomenology of Mind, June 1986
The Philosophic Moment Marxist-Humanism, January 1987
‘On political divides and philosophic new beginnings’, June 1987
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Aug 10, 2017 - Revolution to "The Raya Dunayevskaya Collection: Retrospective and ... The analysis of Russian state-capitalism had led, in 1941, to her association with ... link to PDF file: http://rayadunayevskaya.org/ArchivePDFs/49.pdf.



of the Age. - to Section II Revolution and Counter-Revolution: Where do we go from here? ... Volume XIV: The Writing of Raya Dunayevskaya's “Trilogy of Revolution”. 1953-1983- The ... showed that Russia was a. state-capitalist society. The seminal ... t~.on on the relation of fascisiU to the possibility bf proletarian reyolution.


by N Gibson - ‎1988
Consciousness, Marcuse's Reason and Revolution, Korsch's Marxism ... as a "bacillus" for the proletarian revolution. ... Stalinist counter-revolution had destroyed the Russian revolution and transformed it into its opposite-state capitalism. Furthermore, this state capitalism (Dunayevskaya's original analysis of Russia as a.