Balochistan train operations likely to resume next week
Khalid Hasnain Published March 16, 2025DAWN
FRONTIER Corps personnel inspect the siege site on Saturday after the recent ambush on Jaffar Express in the remote Pehro Kunri area of Balochistan. Railway officials say tracks repair will complete within days, but the resumption of train services is linked to ‘security clearance’.—AFP
• Railway officials link resumption of service to ‘security clearance’ after repairs within days
• Rs5.2m compensation announced for victims’ families
LAHORE: Train services to and from Balochistan, which were suspended after the attack on Jaffar Express, are likely to be resumed by next weekend, according to senior officials of Pakistan Railways.
The engineers of Pakistan Railways have been asked to complete the repair and maintenance work on the track within the next three days. The railway authorities in Quetta have decided to send passenger coaches and locomotives damaged in the attack to Lahore for repair work.
The terrorists used explosives to stop the train and also sprayed bullets from both sides, breaking window glasses and causing other damages as well, Dawn has learnt.
“The Jaffar Express had nine coaches and a locomotive. Three of them were derailed by the terrorists through blasts while bullet holes pierced the body of the remaining coaches,” a senior railway official explained while talking to Dawn on Saturday.
Bullet marks are also visible on the locomotive as well as all coaches, said the officials who wished not to be named.
“The train’s rake (set of coaches), including those damaged due to derailment, would be sent to the Mughalpura workshop in Lahore for repair,” they disclosed.
Asked about damages to the track and other infrastructure, the officer said a 600m stretch of railway track was damaged due to blasts and derailment.
According to him, the cost of damage to the infrastructure is being assessed.
He said engineers had started the repair and maintenance work of the track after removing the rolling stock. Work would take two to three days to complete, he added.
“Hopefully, we will make the track ready for operations within the next three days.”
The official said that after the repairs, the train operation will be resumed “if security agencies give us clearance”.
On Saturday, the authorities cancelled the departure of Business Express and Karachi Express from Lahore due to the meagre number of passengers. Those having bookings on these trains were accommodated on other trains.
Likewise, the authorities also cancelled the departure of Jaffar Express from Lahore as train operations to and from Balochistan remained suspended. The passengers having booking in Jaffar Express have been asked to get a refund from the reservation offices.
Compensation announced
While addressing a presser at Pakistan Railways headquarters on Saturday, Federal Minister for Railways Hanif Abbasi announced a compensation package of Rs5.2 million for the families of the victims of the recent Jaffar Express train attack in Balochistan, along with jobs for their children in his ministry.
He said the train tragedy left the government and security agencies with no option but to launch a massive operation.
He regretted, “Our own people in Balochistan and KP in a bid to earn money have become facilitators of the terrorists protected by our enemy countries.”
“So keeping in view this, it has been decided whosoever involved in terrorism in Pakistan will be eliminated,” he asserted.
“Why India is operating nearly 22 missions / consulates in Afghanistan alone along the Durand line. They are sponsoring terrorism in Pakistan through their local facilitators,” he maintained.
Published in Dawn, March 16th, 2025
• Railway officials link resumption of service to ‘security clearance’ after repairs within days
• Rs5.2m compensation announced for victims’ families
LAHORE: Train services to and from Balochistan, which were suspended after the attack on Jaffar Express, are likely to be resumed by next weekend, according to senior officials of Pakistan Railways.
The engineers of Pakistan Railways have been asked to complete the repair and maintenance work on the track within the next three days. The railway authorities in Quetta have decided to send passenger coaches and locomotives damaged in the attack to Lahore for repair work.
The terrorists used explosives to stop the train and also sprayed bullets from both sides, breaking window glasses and causing other damages as well, Dawn has learnt.
“The Jaffar Express had nine coaches and a locomotive. Three of them were derailed by the terrorists through blasts while bullet holes pierced the body of the remaining coaches,” a senior railway official explained while talking to Dawn on Saturday.
Bullet marks are also visible on the locomotive as well as all coaches, said the officials who wished not to be named.
“The train’s rake (set of coaches), including those damaged due to derailment, would be sent to the Mughalpura workshop in Lahore for repair,” they disclosed.
Asked about damages to the track and other infrastructure, the officer said a 600m stretch of railway track was damaged due to blasts and derailment.
According to him, the cost of damage to the infrastructure is being assessed.
He said engineers had started the repair and maintenance work of the track after removing the rolling stock. Work would take two to three days to complete, he added.
“Hopefully, we will make the track ready for operations within the next three days.”
The official said that after the repairs, the train operation will be resumed “if security agencies give us clearance”.
On Saturday, the authorities cancelled the departure of Business Express and Karachi Express from Lahore due to the meagre number of passengers. Those having bookings on these trains were accommodated on other trains.
Likewise, the authorities also cancelled the departure of Jaffar Express from Lahore as train operations to and from Balochistan remained suspended. The passengers having booking in Jaffar Express have been asked to get a refund from the reservation offices.
Compensation announced
While addressing a presser at Pakistan Railways headquarters on Saturday, Federal Minister for Railways Hanif Abbasi announced a compensation package of Rs5.2 million for the families of the victims of the recent Jaffar Express train attack in Balochistan, along with jobs for their children in his ministry.
He said the train tragedy left the government and security agencies with no option but to launch a massive operation.
He regretted, “Our own people in Balochistan and KP in a bid to earn money have become facilitators of the terrorists protected by our enemy countries.”
“So keeping in view this, it has been decided whosoever involved in terrorism in Pakistan will be eliminated,” he asserted.
“Why India is operating nearly 22 missions / consulates in Afghanistan alone along the Durand line. They are sponsoring terrorism in Pakistan through their local facilitators,” he maintained.
Published in Dawn, March 16th, 2025
Missing in Baloch conundrum
Abbas NasirDAWN March 16, 2025
The writer is a former editor of Dawn.
THE hijacking of a train by BLA militants in Balochistan and the reprehensible murder of innocent, unarmed hostages was a step up the escalatory ladder by the banned group and was followed by the Pakistani military’s response that the attack would dictate a change in the rules of engagement.
This change was spelt out at a media briefing by the military’s top spokesman who said BLA members, supporters and facilitators would be targeted wherever they are; inside and outside Pakistan. The decision to respond to fire with fire was made clear.
The Pakistani position was reiterated: Balochistan’s insurgency is backed by India. On camera statements of Indian spy Kulbhushan Jadhav, who has been in Pakistani custody for some nine years, and footage of India’s national security adviser, Ajit Doval, speaking at a university in his country some years ago, were also played at the media briefing to substantiate the assertion.
Some security experts believe that Balochistan is being destabilised as vast swathes of land in the province and its strategically important coastline, where China is making investments as a vital element of its Belt & Road Initiative, are being fought over by foreign powers, from India to a ‘brotherly’ Gulf State to even the US — all those united in wanting to contain China.
Anything that allows the militant ranks to swell needs to be addressed.
There is also the added element of powers hostile to Iran trying to promote unrest in Balochistan (and Sistan-Baluchestan) that straddles Pakistan’s border with Iran in order to create a soft south-eastern underbelly so Iran is engaged on another front.
Under the changed rules of engagement, Pakistan may now target the BLA, as it has the TTP in recent months, by attacking their bases and safe havens in Afghanistan through air strikes and other ‘kinetic operations’. Pakistan says it would be well within its rights to take all measures to defend itself.
There can be no doubt that the country is under attack. Its soldiers and unarmed civilians alike are being killed and the outlines of a more sinister game, which appears to be focused on bringing the country to its knees by crippling its economy via rampant terrorism, can be seen.
The only disagreement, with great respect to the Balochistan chief minister whose passionate defence of the military’s policies in the province seems to have raised his stock with the establishment, despite his struggle to find credibility in his home province, is on ‘non-kinetic’ measures.
The visibly irritated chief minister lamented at the briefing that the media (one can be sure he was referring to a few nearly barren islands because the rest have now fallen in line) tends to be sympathetic to the Baloch rights cause and this, he seemed to suggest, was unpatriotic.
No, sir, it is not. Patriotism isn’t about advocating a uni-directional approach — even in flawless English and chaste Urdu — and merely parroting establishment-approved views; that has not worked. You can label those in the country who don’t endorse this view anyway you like, it wouldn’t matter to them, and more tragically, neither would it change the ground reality.
Militancy and terrorism, which target innocent civilians are wrong, and need to be tackled head-on and rooted out by force. Equally, anything that allows the militant ranks to swell by the recruiters exploiting state-created circumstances also needs to be addressed. Your own ‘mini-census’ shows the Baloch who have crossed over to the militants’ side in scary numbers.
Enforced disappearances, the ‘missing’, remain a major issue that many Baloch I have talked to see as a major provocation. It alienates them because they see their lives as being of far less value than others’ in the federation. Brushing aside this matter won’t make it go away.
For example, if Sardar Akhtar Mengal said he has a list of 5,000 missing Baloch on the floor of the National Assembly, someone should have approached him and asked for the list and investigated its contents on merit. It is not enough to cite the ‘performance’ of the commission on the disappeared headed by an individual with arguably zero cred.
Let alone the affected Baloch, any fair-minded Pakistani won’t be satisfied with the dismissive manner in which the state chooses to address this matter. Even if it does not wish to answer, in the battle of perceptions, empathy and compassion would be far more effective than a hammer-and-nail approach.
Again in the battle for hearts and minds, economic rights are important and even more important are political rights, which can only come through a semblance of representative rule. The last election in Balochistan saw politicians who have held their constituencies since the 1977 elections, lose.
Some of these candidates were not even nationalists and were largely-seen as pro-establishment. But since their political survival hinged on their constituency politics, they felt compelled to articulate the concerns of their electorate. They were made examples of.
Sanity demands that even as individuals and organisations that have chosen the path of an armed struggle are being pursued militarily, the ‘reconcilable’ elements are approached, even if it means making them part of a power-sharing arrangement at the cost of the establishment poster boys, who’d struggle to win an election, but have been placed in the highest offices in the land.
I say this because just about the time of the train hijacking, I saw what I found was a very disturbing video on social media. It showed a few insurgents, who were operating freely in Mastung, being filmed by some fascinated young men.
Alienation and apathy from the state often leads to the harmful romanticisation (or whatever name you wish to give it) of those who don’t shy away from targeting innocent civilians. This can’t only be dealt with ‘kinetic operations’. I wish those at the helm would agree.
abbas.nasir@hotmail.com
Published in Dawn, March 16th, 2025
Abbas Nasir
THE hijacking of a train by BLA militants in Balochistan and the reprehensible murder of innocent, unarmed hostages was a step up the escalatory ladder by the banned group and was followed by the Pakistani military’s response that the attack would dictate a change in the rules of engagement.
This change was spelt out at a media briefing by the military’s top spokesman who said BLA members, supporters and facilitators would be targeted wherever they are; inside and outside Pakistan. The decision to respond to fire with fire was made clear.
The Pakistani position was reiterated: Balochistan’s insurgency is backed by India. On camera statements of Indian spy Kulbhushan Jadhav, who has been in Pakistani custody for some nine years, and footage of India’s national security adviser, Ajit Doval, speaking at a university in his country some years ago, were also played at the media briefing to substantiate the assertion.
Some security experts believe that Balochistan is being destabilised as vast swathes of land in the province and its strategically important coastline, where China is making investments as a vital element of its Belt & Road Initiative, are being fought over by foreign powers, from India to a ‘brotherly’ Gulf State to even the US — all those united in wanting to contain China.
Anything that allows the militant ranks to swell needs to be addressed.
There is also the added element of powers hostile to Iran trying to promote unrest in Balochistan (and Sistan-Baluchestan) that straddles Pakistan’s border with Iran in order to create a soft south-eastern underbelly so Iran is engaged on another front.
Under the changed rules of engagement, Pakistan may now target the BLA, as it has the TTP in recent months, by attacking their bases and safe havens in Afghanistan through air strikes and other ‘kinetic operations’. Pakistan says it would be well within its rights to take all measures to defend itself.
There can be no doubt that the country is under attack. Its soldiers and unarmed civilians alike are being killed and the outlines of a more sinister game, which appears to be focused on bringing the country to its knees by crippling its economy via rampant terrorism, can be seen.
The only disagreement, with great respect to the Balochistan chief minister whose passionate defence of the military’s policies in the province seems to have raised his stock with the establishment, despite his struggle to find credibility in his home province, is on ‘non-kinetic’ measures.
The visibly irritated chief minister lamented at the briefing that the media (one can be sure he was referring to a few nearly barren islands because the rest have now fallen in line) tends to be sympathetic to the Baloch rights cause and this, he seemed to suggest, was unpatriotic.
No, sir, it is not. Patriotism isn’t about advocating a uni-directional approach — even in flawless English and chaste Urdu — and merely parroting establishment-approved views; that has not worked. You can label those in the country who don’t endorse this view anyway you like, it wouldn’t matter to them, and more tragically, neither would it change the ground reality.
Militancy and terrorism, which target innocent civilians are wrong, and need to be tackled head-on and rooted out by force. Equally, anything that allows the militant ranks to swell by the recruiters exploiting state-created circumstances also needs to be addressed. Your own ‘mini-census’ shows the Baloch who have crossed over to the militants’ side in scary numbers.
Enforced disappearances, the ‘missing’, remain a major issue that many Baloch I have talked to see as a major provocation. It alienates them because they see their lives as being of far less value than others’ in the federation. Brushing aside this matter won’t make it go away.
For example, if Sardar Akhtar Mengal said he has a list of 5,000 missing Baloch on the floor of the National Assembly, someone should have approached him and asked for the list and investigated its contents on merit. It is not enough to cite the ‘performance’ of the commission on the disappeared headed by an individual with arguably zero cred.
Let alone the affected Baloch, any fair-minded Pakistani won’t be satisfied with the dismissive manner in which the state chooses to address this matter. Even if it does not wish to answer, in the battle of perceptions, empathy and compassion would be far more effective than a hammer-and-nail approach.
Again in the battle for hearts and minds, economic rights are important and even more important are political rights, which can only come through a semblance of representative rule. The last election in Balochistan saw politicians who have held their constituencies since the 1977 elections, lose.
Some of these candidates were not even nationalists and were largely-seen as pro-establishment. But since their political survival hinged on their constituency politics, they felt compelled to articulate the concerns of their electorate. They were made examples of.
Sanity demands that even as individuals and organisations that have chosen the path of an armed struggle are being pursued militarily, the ‘reconcilable’ elements are approached, even if it means making them part of a power-sharing arrangement at the cost of the establishment poster boys, who’d struggle to win an election, but have been placed in the highest offices in the land.
I say this because just about the time of the train hijacking, I saw what I found was a very disturbing video on social media. It showed a few insurgents, who were operating freely in Mastung, being filmed by some fascinated young men.
Alienation and apathy from the state often leads to the harmful romanticisation (or whatever name you wish to give it) of those who don’t shy away from targeting innocent civilians. This can’t only be dealt with ‘kinetic operations’. I wish those at the helm would agree.
abbas.nasir@hotmail.com
Published in Dawn, March 16th, 2025
Sino-Pak cooperation
Muhammad Amir Rana Published March 16, 2025DAWN
The writer is a security analyst.
IT is expected that the train hijacking incident in Balochistan will trigger a robust response from the state — quite likely in the form of military action on several fronts. Nevertheless, discussions focusing on the political aspects of the crisis in the province, and how to address it, particularly regarding the initiation of dialogue, will persist, even if in subdued tones.
The debate will feature another significant element, ie, the role of external support for any military operation against the insurgents, focusing explicitly on securing diplomatic backing and logistical assistance. Three contexts will be particularly relevant. First, the recent warning issued by Baloch insurgents against China during their strategic realignment meeting a few weeks ago raises essential questions about how Beijing will respond, especially in terms of providing financial and logistical support to Pakistan’s counterinsurgency operations.
Second, Pakistan is unlikely to expect substantial material support from the US and its Western allies, not only due to political issues and the Ukraine conflict, but also because the West tends to sympathise with separatist movements, while adopting a different approach towards religiously motivated terrorism and extremism. Consequently, Islamabad will instead prioritise diplomatic backing to counter international lobbying by India, which seeks to promote the Baloch separatist narrative and restrict both the financial and political support provided by the Baloch diaspora to insurgents.
Third, there are historical precedents that suggest that external military support is pivotal. Pakistan previously received notable military assistance from the Shah of Iran during its counterinsurgency operations in the 1970s. Analysts are debating whether China will offer comparable support to Pakistan in its contemporary counterinsurgency operations, mirroring Iran’s role several decades ago.
The Baloch Liberation Army and other smaller insurgent groups have continuously targeted China’s nationals and its commercial and diplomatic interests in Pakistan. These insurgent groups, as mentioned at a meeting, have devised a strategy that intensifies terrorist activities, especially with regard to targeting CPEC and Chinese interests in Balochistan. China has shown increasing concern about the security of Chinese citizens in this country. It wishes to invest further in Pakistan but only if there’s a secure environment. Terrorist attacks against Chinese nationals, notably the BLA attack in Karachi last year targeting Chinese nationals as they exited the airport, strained bilateral ties temporarily. The tensions were later eased through confidence-building measures.
It’s uncertain how deeply China might engage in CT cooperation against the insurgency.
The BLA considers China an adversary due to its significant investments in Balochistan and close alliance with Pakistan. Given China’s willingness to help Pakistan in its counterterrorism efforts, questions have arisen regarding the possibility of China offering material support to the Pakistani armed forces specifically to counter the BLA. Historically, China has urged Pakistan to address terrorism, although practical cooperation has remained limited effectively. For example, in 2007, the Lal Masjid operation in Islamabad was initiated following a call from the then Chinese president Hu Jintao to Gen Pervez Musharraf, triggered by the abduction of Chinese health workers by students of the Jamia Hafsa madressah.
There have been similar speculations that China influenced Pakistan’s decision to launch Operation Zarb-i-Azb in North Waziristan in 2014. After the Karachi attack on the Chinese nationals, Beijing again expressed its expectations of Pakistan to undertake decisive action against the Baloch insurgents. However, China is hesitant to get directly involved in countering terrorism operations through visible financial and logistical support.
Pakistan has established a comprehensive security mechanism to protect CPEC and Chinese interests, including the creation of a special security division. Nevertheless, China assesses risks through its zero-tolerance lens against threats and expects allies to adopt similar stances.
Pakistan wants to take decisive action against the insurgents but faces economic limitations. A full-scale military operation would mean significant costs, when the state is already engaged in campaigns like Azm-i-Istehkam against the separatist insurgency in Balochistan and religiously inspired militancy in KP. Clearly, the economic and political implications of extensive military operations are considerable. However, state institutions are not willing to start a political process that could loosen their grip on power, as they believe it will lead to deeper crises. The political leadership can take political risks. But, its leaders, especially those enjoying powers, do not have a deep understanding of the crisis in Balochistan. Neither is the political leadership willing to take any action, as they believe it does not fall within their turf and is determined by the establishment.
Without political initiative, a kinetic approach is a significant remedy to addressing only the security threats. Chinese scholars often debate how China can enhance support beyond the existing framework, including equipment supply, intelligence sharing and joint security exercises. Although China once proposed deeper cooperation, such as deploying private security consultants to Pakistan, progress has been minimal due to Pakistan’s reluctance.
Will China reconsider enhancing security cooperation by supplying surveillance equipment, military hardware, or even partially funding the costs of a comprehensive military operation? It’s uncertain how deeply China might engage in the counterterrorism cooperation, especially given the threats from the BLA, the TTP, and allied groups targeting Chinese interests and contributing to regional instability. China fears an unsafe neighbourhood increases transnational terrorism risks and diverts strategic and political energies, negatively impacting its geo-economic objectives.
Historically, China has been hesitant to extensively support military campaigns in neighbouring countries, with exceptions like Myanmar, where it supports the military junta and mediates reconciliation with some militant groups. But despite possible hesitation regarding cost-sharing for a Pakistani military campaign, the potential for enhanced bilateral security cooperation remains viable.
China and Pakistan can develop a mutual cooperation framework excluding the direct involvement of Chinese private security personnel. Such a framework might involve intelligence-sharing mechanisms, training, and equipping Pakistani law enforcement — particularly the police and counterterrorism departments in Balochistan and Sindh — effectively. It could also include mutual learning experiences and joint border management protocols covering land, sea and air. Cooperation could further extend to addressing non-traditional security threats and serious organised crimes.
Ultimately, Pakistan’s immediate challenge is stabilising Balochistan. In such testing times, countries naturally turn to their allies for support.
Published in Dawn, March 16th, 2025
Muhammad Amir Rana
IT is expected that the train hijacking incident in Balochistan will trigger a robust response from the state — quite likely in the form of military action on several fronts. Nevertheless, discussions focusing on the political aspects of the crisis in the province, and how to address it, particularly regarding the initiation of dialogue, will persist, even if in subdued tones.
The debate will feature another significant element, ie, the role of external support for any military operation against the insurgents, focusing explicitly on securing diplomatic backing and logistical assistance. Three contexts will be particularly relevant. First, the recent warning issued by Baloch insurgents against China during their strategic realignment meeting a few weeks ago raises essential questions about how Beijing will respond, especially in terms of providing financial and logistical support to Pakistan’s counterinsurgency operations.
Second, Pakistan is unlikely to expect substantial material support from the US and its Western allies, not only due to political issues and the Ukraine conflict, but also because the West tends to sympathise with separatist movements, while adopting a different approach towards religiously motivated terrorism and extremism. Consequently, Islamabad will instead prioritise diplomatic backing to counter international lobbying by India, which seeks to promote the Baloch separatist narrative and restrict both the financial and political support provided by the Baloch diaspora to insurgents.
Third, there are historical precedents that suggest that external military support is pivotal. Pakistan previously received notable military assistance from the Shah of Iran during its counterinsurgency operations in the 1970s. Analysts are debating whether China will offer comparable support to Pakistan in its contemporary counterinsurgency operations, mirroring Iran’s role several decades ago.
The Baloch Liberation Army and other smaller insurgent groups have continuously targeted China’s nationals and its commercial and diplomatic interests in Pakistan. These insurgent groups, as mentioned at a meeting, have devised a strategy that intensifies terrorist activities, especially with regard to targeting CPEC and Chinese interests in Balochistan. China has shown increasing concern about the security of Chinese citizens in this country. It wishes to invest further in Pakistan but only if there’s a secure environment. Terrorist attacks against Chinese nationals, notably the BLA attack in Karachi last year targeting Chinese nationals as they exited the airport, strained bilateral ties temporarily. The tensions were later eased through confidence-building measures.
It’s uncertain how deeply China might engage in CT cooperation against the insurgency.
The BLA considers China an adversary due to its significant investments in Balochistan and close alliance with Pakistan. Given China’s willingness to help Pakistan in its counterterrorism efforts, questions have arisen regarding the possibility of China offering material support to the Pakistani armed forces specifically to counter the BLA. Historically, China has urged Pakistan to address terrorism, although practical cooperation has remained limited effectively. For example, in 2007, the Lal Masjid operation in Islamabad was initiated following a call from the then Chinese president Hu Jintao to Gen Pervez Musharraf, triggered by the abduction of Chinese health workers by students of the Jamia Hafsa madressah.
There have been similar speculations that China influenced Pakistan’s decision to launch Operation Zarb-i-Azb in North Waziristan in 2014. After the Karachi attack on the Chinese nationals, Beijing again expressed its expectations of Pakistan to undertake decisive action against the Baloch insurgents. However, China is hesitant to get directly involved in countering terrorism operations through visible financial and logistical support.
Pakistan has established a comprehensive security mechanism to protect CPEC and Chinese interests, including the creation of a special security division. Nevertheless, China assesses risks through its zero-tolerance lens against threats and expects allies to adopt similar stances.
Pakistan wants to take decisive action against the insurgents but faces economic limitations. A full-scale military operation would mean significant costs, when the state is already engaged in campaigns like Azm-i-Istehkam against the separatist insurgency in Balochistan and religiously inspired militancy in KP. Clearly, the economic and political implications of extensive military operations are considerable. However, state institutions are not willing to start a political process that could loosen their grip on power, as they believe it will lead to deeper crises. The political leadership can take political risks. But, its leaders, especially those enjoying powers, do not have a deep understanding of the crisis in Balochistan. Neither is the political leadership willing to take any action, as they believe it does not fall within their turf and is determined by the establishment.
Without political initiative, a kinetic approach is a significant remedy to addressing only the security threats. Chinese scholars often debate how China can enhance support beyond the existing framework, including equipment supply, intelligence sharing and joint security exercises. Although China once proposed deeper cooperation, such as deploying private security consultants to Pakistan, progress has been minimal due to Pakistan’s reluctance.
Will China reconsider enhancing security cooperation by supplying surveillance equipment, military hardware, or even partially funding the costs of a comprehensive military operation? It’s uncertain how deeply China might engage in the counterterrorism cooperation, especially given the threats from the BLA, the TTP, and allied groups targeting Chinese interests and contributing to regional instability. China fears an unsafe neighbourhood increases transnational terrorism risks and diverts strategic and political energies, negatively impacting its geo-economic objectives.
Historically, China has been hesitant to extensively support military campaigns in neighbouring countries, with exceptions like Myanmar, where it supports the military junta and mediates reconciliation with some militant groups. But despite possible hesitation regarding cost-sharing for a Pakistani military campaign, the potential for enhanced bilateral security cooperation remains viable.
China and Pakistan can develop a mutual cooperation framework excluding the direct involvement of Chinese private security personnel. Such a framework might involve intelligence-sharing mechanisms, training, and equipping Pakistani law enforcement — particularly the police and counterterrorism departments in Balochistan and Sindh — effectively. It could also include mutual learning experiences and joint border management protocols covering land, sea and air. Cooperation could further extend to addressing non-traditional security threats and serious organised crimes.
Ultimately, Pakistan’s immediate challenge is stabilising Balochistan. In such testing times, countries naturally turn to their allies for support.
Published in Dawn, March 16th, 2025
Pakistan Bogged Down By Growing Ferocity Of Balochistan Insurgency – Analysis
By Observer Research Foundation
By Sushant Sareen
The insurgency in Balochistan is becoming ominous and has been palpable for a couple of years. But the gravity of the situation in Pakistan’s biggest province failed to register in the Byzantine corridors of power in Islamabad. In Pakistan’s capital city, the only thing that mattered was controlling and manipulating the state’s institutions to ensure the survival of the hybrid regime controlled by the military junta of General Syed Asim Munir and fronted by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif.
The fires in Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Sindh, and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (POK) received cursory coverage in the media. The public discourse has predominantly revolved around Imran Khan and his trials and tribulations in prison, and the regime’s machinations in countering his narrative, and his popularity. Balochistan was too distant from Islamabad and even Lahore for anyone to bother about what was happening in the restive province.
Late last month, after Maulana Fazal-ur Rehman’s speech in the National Assembly where he said that “five to seven districts in Balochistan were in a position to announce independence” and the “United Nations (UN) would recognise them the next day,” Pakistani people and beyond started taking notice of the sharply deteriorating security situation in the province. Although Maulana may have gone a bit overboard over the UN recognising a declaration of independence in Balochistan, he has his ears and eyes on the ground in the province and has a very good understanding of how bad things are. Following the Maulana, the Leader of Opposition (LoP) in the National Assembly, Omar Ayub, said that the Pakistani state had virtually ceased to exist in more than half a dozen districts of Balochistan. According to Ayub, the Pakistani flag was not flying in these districts.
Nonetheless, it was not only political leaders opposed to the hybrid regime who were flagging the alarming situation in Balochistan. One of the closest advisors of PM Sharif, Rana Sanaullah, warned that armed groups could descend from the mountains and seize control of Balochistan. After initially trying to deny that things were spiraling out of control in the province, the Chief Minister, Sarfraz Bugti, finally admitted the situation was alarming.
However, the insurgents could not hold any area for longer than a few hours. That the insurgents could strike at will and seize control of major highways and small towns for even a few hours was hardly something that any responsible administrator could be sanguine about. If anything, the rising frequency of high-profile, high-impact strikes by the Baloch insurgents has completely undermined the authority of the state. Worse, it has fuelled so much uncertainty that it has put paid to ambitious plans to attract foreign investment in infrastructure and mining projects.
It was against this backdrop that the Baloch Raaji Aajoi Sangar (BRAS), an umbrella group of four militant insurgent groups namely Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF), Balochistan Republic Guard (BRG) and Sindhudesh Revolutionary Army (SRA) announced the formation of a Baloch National Army with a unified command structure and a shift of focus from “Scattered operations to an organised, coordinated and decisive force”. BRAS declared its intent to intensify the war against both Pakistan and its main patron, China and bring greater lethality in its guerilla operations. To hit Pakistan and China where it hurts, the BRAS decided to ‘intensify the blockade on all important highways of Balochistan to disrupt the logistical, economic, and military interests of the occupying state.’
Within days of the BRAS announcement of ramping up its operations, the guerillas hit the strategic Coastal Highway and set six gas tankers and police vehicles on fire. There was also a sudden uptick in Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and suicide attacks on Pakistani security forces and Baloch collaborators. The sheer expanse of geography where these attacks took place was particularly notable–a suicide attack in Kalat city, an IED blast in Quetta, another IED in Khuzdar against a pro-regime tribal leader, targeted killings of two clerics in Zehri, the same town that was stormed and occupied for a few hours by nearly a 100 insurgents in January last. According to data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal, in just the first nine weeks of 2025, there have already been 70 incidents, in which around 135 Pakistani security forces personnel have been killed as against 66 insurgents/extremists–a ratio of 2:1 which reflects the enormity of the problem.
Some of these insurgent attacks caused serious damage in men and material to the Pakistani security forces. In early February last, insurgents ambushed a van carrying troops, killing 17 Pakistani soldiers in the Kalat district. Two weeks later, in attacks on a Pakistan army checkpoint and a convoy in the Mand area, another 17 Pakistani soldiers were killed. The insurgents also attacked a bus carrying mine workers in Harnai, killing 11. Although the Pakistani media presented this as an extortion racket run by the insurgents, the fact that it was an attack on an economic target–the insurgents call it exploitation of Balochistan’s resources by Punjab–made it a legitimate target in their view. Similarly, the targeting of Punjabi businessmen and settlers the Baloch call them spies and collaborators–is also a part of the strategy of the Baloch fighters against the Pakistani state.
Perhaps the most devastating attack was carried out in August 2024 when the Baloch insurgents launched Operation Herof, in which they carried out coordinated attacks across the length and breadth of the province. In 2024 alone, over 900 attacks were carried out by the insurgent groups, the bulk of them by BLA, BLF and under the label of BRAS. Except for the Pashtun-dominated districts of Northern Balochistan, the Baloch insurgents have been active in every district of Balochistan. This is a qualitative change from past insurgencies when the fighting was restricted to a few districts and tribes. Now, it is pan-Balochistan and cutting across tribal, linguistic, and gender divide.
While the Baloch insurgents have upped their game, not just in terms of the ferocity, intensity, and organisational capability, the Pakistani state—which is a euphemism for the Pakistan Army—has not been able to evolve to respond effectively. Its playbook is the same decades-old one: increase brutality, offer blandishments to tribal chieftains, bribe influential politicians, browbeat the people, stifle all dissent, keep a very tight leash over the media, install puppets and Quislings to run the province under the garb of democracy. But it is proving counterproductive, and the more the Pakistan Army doubles down on its repressive rule, the more it alienates the Baloch people and swells the ranks of the insurgent groups with recruits, including women and young people from educated middle-class.
Finding itself losing the narrative war, the Pakistan Army has responded predictably. It has started raiding universities and abducting Baloch students, keeping them in illegal custody and, in some cases, killing them and dumping their bodies on the roadsides or in the wilds. In just the first few weeks of this calendar year, over 250 students have forcibly disappeared. This enforced disappearances issue has only fuelled disgust and alienation against the Pakistani state, arguably becoming one of the central pillars around which Baloch public opinion has been mobilised. Apart from the brutal repression that has been unleashed, the Pakistan Army is trying to play catch up in the narrative game by using tactics which are now anachronistic.
For instance, authorities often parade a ‘surrendered militant’ who recites a predictable narrative – accusing commanders of greed, claiming India funds them, and asserting they work against Baloch interests. The Pakistani media then plays up these stories to amplify them. But no one except perhaps people in Punjab are buying what the Pakistan Army’s disinformation wing is selling. Similarly, exaggerated and often utterly fictitious claims of the Pakistan Army’s operations either to repel an attack or to raid insurgent hideouts are not impressing anyone. In most cases, the Pakistan Army conjures up an imaginary number of insurgents killed just to show that it is fighting back, and hard.
The BRAS declaration to restructure its organisation and intensify its operations makes it clear– the insurgents believe the struggle in Balochistan has entered a decisive phase. The political narrative is dominated by young leaders of the Baloch Yakjheti Council, such as the indomitable Mahrang Baloch, Sami Deen Baloch and other members spearheading massive protests across the province. Members of the legislative assembly and the ‘elected’ government in the province have become political pigmies who are in power only because they have been foisted on the people of Balochistan by the Pakistan Army. The political and democratic processes in Balochistan have become redundant because they have been completely compromised and rigged by the Pakistan Army, all of which feeds into the narrative of pro-independence voices.
Militarily, the Baloch insurgents have demonstrated their reach, capability and ability to coordinate complex attacks. While there is some skepticism about how much the Baloch can achieve because they constitute less than 5 percent of Pakistan’s 250 million population, the insurgents believe that they have the critical mass required to win against the Pakistani state. What they lack in sheer numbers, they make up because of the raging Taliban insurgency in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province and the Pashtun belt of Balochistan, which is bogging down and bleeding the Pakistan Army. Add to this the sharp deterioration in relations between the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Taliban appear to be giving space to the Baloch as it gives them a certain leverage over Pakistan, which they suspect of flirting with Islamic State Khorasan (ISK) to undermine the Islamic Emirate. The situation in Sistan-Balochistan province of Iran is also proving conducive for the Baloch insurgents in Pakistan.
Faced with the audacity and ferocity of attacks being carried out by the Baloch freedom fighters, and given that Pakistan’s antediluvian approach to tackling the restiveness in the province is not working, there are limited options available to the Pakistan Army. It can continue doing what it has been over the last 25 years since this fifth insurgency has been raging in Balochistan, perhaps intensify what it has been doing. But the result is unlikely to be any different.
The Pakistan Army could also decide to carry out a scorched earth steamroller operation in Balochistan. Managing the operation’s political, military and diplomatic consequences could prove disastrous. A third option is to try reconciliation. This is, however, a long and difficult path to take and beyond the intellectual ability of Pakistan’s Punjabi military elite because it militates against the colonial control fetish of Pakistan’s ruling class. But regardless of what policy Pakistan adopts, the situation in Balochistan will continue to be fraught for the foreseeable future. And while intimations of Balochistan shaking off the ‘shackles of slavery’ (to use the evocative phrase of Imran Khan) might be highly premature and overly optimistic, Balochistan will remain the bone stuck in Pakistan’s throat—one it cannot expel, yet one it struggles to swallow.
- About the author: Sushant Sareen is a Senior Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation.
- Source: This article was published at the Observer Research Foundation'
Observer Research Foundation
ORF was established on 5 September 1990 as a private, not for profit, ’think tank’ to influence public policy formulation. The Foundation brought together, for the first time, leading Indian economists and policymakers to present An Agenda for Economic Reforms in India. The idea was to help develop a consensus in favour of economic reforms.
Pakistan’s Hostage-Rescue Failures Exposed As BLA Siege Ends In Heavy Casualties – Analysis
Militants from the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) hijack Pakistan's Jaffar Express. Photo Credit: Mehr News Agency
Conflicting narratives and military missteps emerge from the Jaffar Express crisis in Balochistan.
The recent hijacking of Pakistan’s Jaffar Express by militants from the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) has ended in tragedy, exposing serious flaws in Pakistan’s military preparedness and counterterrorism capabilities. While Pakistani authorities quickly declared success in ending the siege, conflicting reports from militants and independent sources have cast serious doubts on the official version, indicating higher casualties and continuing insurgent resistance.
On March 11, 2025, militants belonging to the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), a separatist insurgent group seeking independence for Pakistan’s Balochistan province, seized control of the Jaffar Express near the Mashkaf region in Balochistan. The attackers blew up railway tracks, derailing the train, which was carrying around 440 passengers from Quetta to Peshawar, and held hundreds hostage, including Pakistani security personnel.
Initially, the BLA issued a demand for a prisoner exchange, threatening to execute hostages if Pakistani authorities failed to comply within 48 hours. In response, the Pakistani military launched a large-scale operation, employing both ground forces and airstrikes. By March 12, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), the military’s media wing, declared the operation successfully concluded, stating all 33 insurgents had been killed, 21 passengers and four Pakistani Army personnel had died, and all hostages had been rescued.
Yet, the BLA swiftly disputed this victory declaration. The insurgent group categorically rejected ISPR’s claims, labelling them “propaganda.” In an official statement, BLA spokesperson Jeeyand Baloch said, “The claims made by the Pakistani army spokesperson are a failed attempt to cover up lies and defeat. The ground reality is that the battle continues on multiple fronts, and the enemy is suffering heavy casualties and military losses.”
Independent media reports further exposed these contradictions. Reuters, citing security sources, reported only 155 hostages were rescued initially, leaving many passengers unaccounted for. Al Jazeera corroborated that several dozen hostages remained trapped even after the Pakistani military’s claimed completion of operations. Reports emerging from Quetta, the capital of Balochistan, provided an even grimmer picture. Local sources indicated at least 200 coffins being prepared for Pakistani soldiers, sharply contradicting the official military casualty figures. Additionally, the BLA publicly stated that it executed 50 hostages after Pakistani authorities refused to negotiate a prisoner exchange—highlighting the tragic cost of the military’s refusal to engage diplomatically with insurgents.
Security experts have pointed out that Pakistan’s premature declaration of victory has damaged its credibility despite unclear ground realities. Military analysts noted the complexity of this particular hostage situation, mainly due to the insurgents reportedly having suicide bombers among their ranks, posing significant challenges for rescue operations. Islamabad, known for projecting its omnipotent intelligence apparatus and substantial counterterrorism experience, was expected to conduct a swift and precise operation. However, operational delays of approximately 30 hours suggest hesitations and logistical gaps, raising doubts about the military’s preparedness for such high-stakes missions.
Notably, Pakistan’s approach stands in contrast to global best practices in hostage rescue operations. For instance, India’s National Security Guard (NSG), internationally recognised for its counterterrorism capabilities, emphasises rapid deployment, real-time intelligence integration, and precision tactics. During the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks, the NSG successfully rescued over 600 hostages in a heavily contested urban environment. Even India’s Railway Protection Special Force, Commando for Railway Security (CORAS), specialises in handling hostage situations involving trains, highlighting operational deficiencies within Pakistan’s elite Special Services Group (SSG).
Moreover, the Pakistani authorities’ swift declaration of victory, without independent verification, has undermined public trust and credibility domestically and internationally. Reports of ongoing clashes and accusations by insurgents suggest that the military’s narrative was an attempt at controlling the information landscape rather than accurately depicting operational realities.
The broader context of the Baloch insurgency highlights that the hijacking was not an isolated incident. Balochistan remains Pakistan’s poorest yet most resource-rich province, with a long history of grievances over economic marginalisation, political suppression, and human rights abuses by state forces. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a multibillion-dollar infrastructure initiative, further intensified these grievances by excluding local Baloch populations from economic benefits, leading insurgent groups to increasingly target both Pakistani and Chinese personnel and assets.
Since its formation in 2000, the BLA has evolved into a more potent threat. Notable attacks include the 2019 assault on Gwadar’s Pearl Continental Hotel and the 2022 Karachi University suicide bombing targeting Chinese nationals. The group recently formed a unified structure under Baloch Raji Aajoi Sangar (BRAS), aiming to launch even more coordinated offensives against Pakistani forces.
This crisis has prompted renewed attention to the underlying political issues in Balochistan. Former Balochistan chief minister Akhtar Mengal recently stated, “There is not a single inch of Balochistan left where the government can claim authority. They have lost this war—completely and irreversibly.” Mengal’s statement suggests the insurgency is evolving beyond the state’s control.
Human rights groups and analysts have urged Pakistan to adopt a political solution alongside military operations. History shows that purely military strategies in Balochistan have only exacerbated local resentments, fostering further insurgency. The international community, which has remained largely silent, is also urged to reassess its stance and advocate for peaceful political solutions rather than tacitly supporting a purely militaristic approach.
As the immediate crisis surrounding the Jaffar Express siege concludes amid confusion and controversy, deeper questions linger about Pakistan’s broader counterinsurgency strategy and its repeated reliance on military solutions. The government’s unwillingness to negotiate, combined with the military’s mishandling of the operation and conflicting public claims, reveals a troubling lack of transparency and readiness to protect its citizens effectively.
If the Pakistani state continues to prioritise military force over political dialogue, experts warn that the violence will escalate further, perpetuating instability and putting civilians at even greater risk. The recent siege stresses the critical need for Pakistan to rethink its approach to counterinsurgency—balancing security measures with genuine political reconciliation and respect for human rights. Unless such reforms are implemented promptly, Balochistan is likely to remain a flashpoint of conflict where both civilians and soldiers continue to pay the ultimate price.
Aritra Banerjee is a Defence, Foreign Affairs & Aerospace Journalist, Co-Author of the book 'The Indian Navy @75: Reminiscing the Voyage' and was the Co-Founder of Mission Victory India (MVI), a new-age military reforms think-tank. He has worked in TV, Print and Digital media, and has been a columnist writing on strategic affairs for national and international publications. His reporting career has seen him covering major Security and Aviation events in Europe and travelling across Kashmir conflict zones. Twitter: @Aritrabanned
The Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), a separatist militant group, attacked and held hostage the Jaffar Express, a passenger train traveling from Quetta to Peshawar in Pakistan between March 11 and 12.
According to a report by AFP, at the start of the attack, the militants detonated explosives on the tracks in the Bolan district of Balochistan province, immobilising the train and taking over 450 passengers hostage, including security personnel. The hijacking and the unprecedented media spectacle which saw the BLA releasing several statements, video clips and audio recordings documenting the crisis underscores the escalating insurgency and separatist movement in Balochistan and poses significant challenges to Pakistan's internal security.
The BLA's operation was likely meticulously planned as indicated from the length of time the militants were able to hold off highly capable ‘tip of the spear’ Pakistani security forces. According to a report in the Times of India citing Pakistani officials, after halting the train militants armed with suicide vests positioned themselves among the hostages, complicating rescue efforts. However, according to testimony of released hostages, the BLA released nearly 190 of the hostages on the first day including women, children and the elderly. The Pakistani military responded with a limited ground assault to rescue the remaining hostages.
However after suffering 27 casualties, aerial military assets including at least one Unmanned Aerial Vehicle(UAV) was used to engage the BLA. Over two days of intense combat, 33 militants were killed and 21 hostages too lost their lives during the operation. The militants demanded the release of imprisoned Baloch political activists and threatened to execute hostages if their demands were not met - however there is no evidence that any hostage executions actually took place before all the militants were eliminated by Pakistani security forces.
The group not only managed to paint a sympathetic picture through its engagement in the information sphere but also tactically humiliated the Pakistani security establishment in more tangible terms. The BLA's insurgency is rooted in longstanding grievances over political autonomy and resource distribution. Balochistan, rich in natural resources, remains Pakistan's poorest province, fueling resentment among the Baloch population. The BLA's demands for greater control over these resources and political self-determination have led to a protracted conflict with the Pakistani state. This attack represents a significant escalation in the BLA's tactics.
Historically, the group has targeted security forces and infrastructure but has also attacked state representatives it saw as collaborationists, including Chinese nationals involved in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The hijacking of a passenger train marks a bold and alarming development in their operational strategy - which represents a blend of modern hybrid warfare tactics and conventional activities associated with organised crime in the Indian subcontinent in the previous centuries.
The BLA's insurgency has persisted for decades, with cycles of violence and relative calm. Previous attempts at political solutions have faltered, often due to mutual distrust and unmet promises. However, if the familiar pattern of insurgencies and security forces's response to it in Pakistan’s other unstable Pakthunwala province bordering Afghanistan is anything to go by, it offers little hope that Balochistan could either separate or stabilise in the near future.
No comments:
Post a Comment