Thursday, May 08, 2025


Strategic thinking

Revolutionary defeatism, yesterday and today

Thursday 8 May 2025, by Simon Hannah



The masses take a practical and not a theoretical view of things.”
—V. I. Lenin

The debate on the Left over the war in Ukraine has exposed serious disagreements on international questions, ones that have been brewing and deepening for over a decade. From 2001 to 2011, there was general unity on the socialist Left about the question of imperialism and the response to it. This was a period of explicit and obvious attacks on sovereign countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq by the United States, United Kingdom, and other imperialist forces. This naked imperialist aggression triggered global mass movements against the so-called “War on Terror.”


For socialists, the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan was as straightforward as the U.S. invasion of Vietnam: oppose the war and also support the right of the people of that country to resist being colonized. You didn’t defend a country (or not) based on the nature of its government or the leadership of its national resistance movement, any more than you rejected the national aspirations of the Palestinians because of the reactionary politics of Hamas. It is a basic point, not even a socialist one but a bourgeois democratic one, that a nation has a right to self-determination and another nation should not carry out regime change using missiles and tanks. These are all pretty clear and obvious examples, so obvious that most of the socialist Left was united on them at the time.

But there was the beginning of a divergence, and a fracturing of the general perspective, in Libya in 2011. During the Arab spring there was an armed uprising in Libya against Muammar Gaddafi by various ethnic groupings that was initially disorganized and chaotic. This was the first war in the twenty-first century in which the question of imperialist division and re-division became more complicated. This was initially because of the role played by democratic movements against ‘anti-imperialist’ dictatorships. Then, increasingly, some on the Left began minimizing the role of other imperialist powers that were not in Western Europe or North America, namely Russia and China.

Sensing an opportunity to overthrow a regime that had often been a thorn in the side of the West, NATO intervened in support of the uprising, providing air support to prevent their total annihilation by Gaddafi’s forces. This wasn’t a celebration of popular revolt by Western imperialism, but a pragmatic calculation that overthrowing Gaddafi was in the interests of the Western imperialists. It was also in the interests of Libyans as well, of course.

Then Syria followed. The initial movement for democratic rights was brutally suppressed by Bashar al-Assad’s regime, which plunged the country into a decade-long civil war. The Western imperialists were far less reluctant to intervene in this case, though Russian imperialism gladly assisted its ally Assad, sending materials, mercenaries, and military advisors, and financially propping up the government. Iran and Hezbollah also intervened to crush the popular uprising. The United States intervened into the north of Syria to assist the Kurdish YPG (People’s Defense Units) in targeting ISIS, though they drew the line at helping to destroy the Syrian government’s military. This conflict caused a huge split in the international Left, with people either siding with the uprising and the Kurds or with the Assad regime because it was “anti-imperialist”, though in reality dependent on Russian imperialism. Some on the Left were ambivalent about the Arab uprising against Assad, but were very sympathetic to the Kurds because they saw them as a genuine national liberation struggle with Left politics. In the end, the popular revolution was crushed and some of the Left cheered the fall of Aleppo—the same type of “leftist” who supported Russian tanks invading Hungary in 1956 to put down a workers uprising there.

Now the war in Ukraine has caused a raging argument over tactics and strategy—and a complete disagreement over the role of imperialism in the conflict. The essential disagreement is over the degree to which Ukraine has a right to defend itself from an invasion by an imperialist power. Some on the “Left” are cheerleading Russia and believe this is a war waged by Russia to denazify Ukraine. I won’t deal with that argument because it is so obviously ridiculous. But others conclude that because Ukraine is in the orbit of the West—for example, it has asked to join NATO— Volodymyr Zelensky and his government are proxy agents of Washington/London/Paris/Berlin. Therefore this is seen as an example of an inter-imperialist war between Russia and the West fighting through its surrogate in Kiev.

Socialists who deny Ukraine’s right to defend itself from an invasion by an imperialist power because of the policies of the Ukrainian government are junking any understanding of the national question and the way that the people of Ukraine are actually responding to Russia’s invasion. They are in practice denying the right to self-determination because they don’t like the government of Ukraine, which is irrelevant to the principle being discussed. By extension, no one would support the Tamil Tigers, Hamas fighters, or even Irish Republicans, all of which had (or still have) reactionary positions on a range of issues and were pro-capitalist. Or they use the excuse of Ukraine wanting to join NATO to suggest it was essentially an imperialist power itself.

Because Ukraine is seen as a proxy for the West and it is receiving anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles, some are drawing an equal sign between Russia and Ukraine, concluding that both sides should lose. How can both sides lose? In reality, that would be a long drawn out stalemate that lasts years, with countless dead.

Others try to be more nuanced, and say that the people of Ukraine should resist but they should overthrow their government first because their government backs Western imperialism. So, they argue, in the face of an actual invasion, with Russian tanks and armored vehicles making their way into major cities, the Ukrainian working class needs to magically form a class-conscious mass movement. Presumably, this would be revolutionary in nature, completely understand the reactionary role of NATO and Western imperialism, and successfully overthrow the government before declaring a Paris Commune–type government. Only then is it legitimate to wage a “socialist defense” of the country. How useful for the Ukrainian people for socialists in the West to wish that their political situation was totally different and much more favorable.

In response to the invasion of an army that is under the command of the people who oversaw the slaughter of the Syrian revolution and the flattening of Grozny, it is understandable that the Ukrainian people—even those that do not like and have actively opposed Zelensky and his policies—will defend their country and their communities from Russian occupation. As V. I. Lenin put it, “When the worker says he wants to defend his country, it is the instinct of an oppressed man that speaks in him.”

Now it is clear that the Zelensky government needs to be overthrown, just as Vladimir Putin’s does, just as Joe Biden’s, Boris Johnson’s, Viktor Orbán’s, and any other bourgeois government does. And the war in Ukraine offers a chance for a revolutionary explosion against the existing order. But in order to get from “the Russians have invaded, we need to defend our homes” to “all power to the Ukrainian Soviet” requires serious united front work alongside the great mass of the Ukrainian people mobilized into the popular defense units by the government. It means being one step ahead of the masses, not ten miles ahead.

The creation of the popular defense units means that there is now a militia in Ukraine that is armed and has incredibly rudimentary training in weapons. Socialists that are advocating boycotting these units are effectively pacifists, even if they quote Lenin to justify their position. In fact, Lenin argued that the “militarization” of society during a war was one of the few positive aspects of it:


“Today the imperialist bourgeoisie militarizes the youth as well as the adults; tomorrow, it may begin militarizing the women. Our attitude should be: All the better! Full speed ahead! For the faster we move, the nearer shall we be to the armed uprising against capitalism. How can Social-Democrats give way to fear of the militarization of the youth, etc., if they have not forgotten the example of the Paris Commune?”

Here Lenin is writing about an imperialist nation, not even a semi-colony or a colony, arming itself.

Some socialists have defended the Ukrainians right to resist occupation but argued that the Western imperialist nations should not provide any material or weaponry for the fight. Their view is that consignments of anti-tank weapons from London change the class character of the national resistance fundamentally, and therefore it is not permissible to send weapons to the Ukrainians. Others state that weapons should only be sent to working-class organizations in Ukraine, but unless people identify such organizations and make that a practical reality, it is only an excuse not to support the wider arming of the country. When faced with the Russian army, the call to disarm the Ukrainian resistance is essentially a call for Russia to win with ease.

Again, who provides weapons to a national liberation movement or a country resisting imperialist invasion is a secondary question to the fact of the legitimate struggle itself. It was right for the Kosovars to get weapons from the West in the 1990s. It was right for the Syrian resistance and the Kurds to get weapons during the Syrian revolution. Do these weapons come with strings attached? Sometimes, but we cannot ignore the autonomy of people fighting a legitimate struggle for freedom because of imperialist machinations.

Some on the Left have apparently concluded that, in the modern world system of imperialism, every poorer semi-colony is in some other imperialist country’s orbit, so the national question is redundant. This is not a new idea. In the Junius pamphlet, Rosa Luxemburg argued that the world had already been divided up by imperialism, so all conflicts are to some degree or other imperialist conflicts. Therefore the national question is relegated to the past, and now only socialism is the order of the day. The problem with this is that it completely ignores any genuine national questions that might exist—for instance when your country is invaded by a much more powerful nation right next door whose leader has been publishing essays saying your country was a mistake and shouldn’t exist any more.

Writing in 1916, partly in response to these types of arguments, Lenin argued:


“The fact that the struggle for national liberation against one imperialist power may, under certain circumstances, be utilized by another ‘Great’ Power in its equally imperialist interests should have no more weight in inducing Social Democracy to renounce its recognition of the right of nations to self-determination than the numerous case of the bourgeoisie utilising republican slogans for the purpose of political deception and financial robbery, for example, in the Latin countries, have had in inducing them to renounce republicanism.”

These matters are crucial because we are entering a multi-polar world in which an analysis based on the Cold War won’t do. As Russia and China flex their growing imperialist might, there will be more conflicts in which a poorer country or ethnic group might look to the West for assistance, and if socialists use an overly simplistic view of international relations to guide their thinking, then the socialist Left will be wrong-footed. We cannot put a minus simply where the Western bourgeois class puts a plus. We must use theory to illuminate and explain, not set up barriers to reality.

The conflict in Ukraine has also seen some socialists call for the defeat of both sides in the conflict, basing their position on a policy Lenin advocated in 1914 to 1916. The rest of this article will examine what this policy meant—and did not mean—in practice and its usefulness to developing a coherent socialist policy around Ukraine today.
What does ‘revolutionary defeatism’ mean

Lenin’s view on inter-imperialist war appears simple:


“The bourgeoisie of all the imperialist Great Powers—England, France, Germany, Austria, Russia, Japan, the United States—has become so reactionary and so intent on world domination, that any war waged by the bourgeoisie of those countries is bound to be reactionary. The proletariat must not only oppose all such wars, but must also wish for the defeat of its ‘own’ government in such wars and utilise its defeat for revolutionary insurrection, if an insurrection to prevent the war proves unsuccessful.”

Any class-conscious worker will be suspicious of the actions of their government and their capitalist class in a war, regardless of whether the nation is imperialist or not. In an imperialist war, a class-conscious worker will be scornful of the war mongering politicians and the calls by the bosses for “unity in the war effort,” to work longer hours, speed up production, work for free at the weekend, forbid strikes and public meetings, and so on. You don’t want your government to be victorious because you know that the result will be unbridled nationalism, patriotism, and jingoism—the enemies of socialism. It will bind the masses to their bourgeoisie through the glorification of the successes of the nation, something that undermines and mitigates against class consciousness.

There is truth in the notion that an imperialist war going badly contributes to a growing mood of radicalization against the government. The Russian revolution in 1917 was possible largely because the war was going so disastrously for Russia that it was causing untold misery back home and the peasants sent to fight and die in the war were fed-up and wanted peace. If the war was going well and Russia was advancing into other countries to seize new territories, all under the brilliant leadership of the tsar, then it would have only caused a much greater feeling of nationalism among the people. The February and October revolutions likely would not have happened.

Likewise when the Vietnam war was going badly for the U.S., the sense of growing national crisis exacerbated and deepened other social contradictions in the United States, connecting with and radicalizing other issues, especially the fight against racism. The feeling that the government is in crisis and that its imperial power is failing helps give a sense of strength and purpose to the working class and oppressed to organize and fight back on other fronts—though it also makes the ruling class even more vicious and violent on the home front in order to maintain order.
Photo of V.I. Lenin, Red Square, Moscow, March 3, 1919.

The problem with taking every slogan issued at every point of the war as a practical and immediate call for action is that this collapses different levels of analysis and activity. Lenin’s position on defeatism was largely a propagandistic reaction to the betrayal of socialism that was defensism, namely when Social Democrats across Europe suddenly started supporting their own government war aims because they accepted that they were all “defensive” conflicts. The slogan “defense of the fatherland” was objectionable because it was clearly a lie to promote an aggressive war of expansion. A big part of the imperialist propaganda around World War I was that the war was always started by someone else, and every belligerent country was only reacting defensively to the actions of their belligerent neighbors. It was the capitulation of the socialists to the imperialist war aims of their ruling class that Lenin countered with his policy of defeatism.

There is a hard and a soft reading of what the logical practical conclusions of revolutionary defeatism might mean. The softer meaning is that in an imperialist war you don’t cheer on your own government’s war aims and you raise principled slogans like “not a penny nor a person for the war machine.” Any military defeats you use in your agitation to point out that the war is futile, is causing unnecessary bloodshed, and that the government should be overthrown for getting us all into this mess on behalf of the big industrialists. You continue the class struggle— and even intensify it where you can—regardless of pleas for national unity from trade union leaders and bourgeois politicians.

There is a harder reading, which Lenin sometimes pointed to and which has become a kind of orthodoxy for some socialists, largely as a result of a faction fight in the Russian Communist Party in the 1920s. In this interpretation, you not only desire the defeat of your own government, you should actively work for the military defeat of the war effort through sabotage, “shoot your officers,” and so on. Indeed, Lenin argued that the defeat of Russia by the German army was a “lesser evil” than the victory of tsarism, which Lenin argued was the most barbaric and reactionary government in Europe.

The problem with this view—as the socialist Hal Draper has pointed out—is it doesn’t really match what the Bolsheviks were saying in Russia or the practical consequences of the defeatism slogan. First, there was no real unity among the Bolsheviks on the question of defeatism because it meant different things at different times in Lenin’s writings. Most went with the softer reading, over which there was little disagreement from other anti-war socialists. But the defeatism slogan in its hardest form was not an operative policy for agitation among the masses of soldiers but a polemical reaction to the collapse of so many socialists into “defense of the fatherland” politics. (Imagine handing out leaflets to nineteen-year-old conscripted soldiers saying that your policy was for them to “come home in a body bag.”)

Look at the practical positions that the Bolsheviks argued for at international antiwar conferences, particularly the crucial one at Zimmerwald, where there was not a mention of “revolutionary defeatism” but instead a focus on prosecuting the class war at home and politicizing any industrial struggles into more general fights against capitalism and imperialism.


“The prelude to this struggle [for socialism] is the struggle against the world war and for a quick end to the slaughter of the peoples. This struggle demands rejection of war credits, an exit from government ministries, and denunciation of the war’s capitalist and anti-socialist character—in the parliamentary arena, in the pages of legal and, when necessary, illegal publications, along with a forthright struggle against social-patriotism. Every popular movement arising from the consequences of war (impoverishment, heavy casualties, and so on) must be utilized to organize street demonstrations against the governments, propaganda for international solidarity in the trenches, demands for economic strikes, and the effort to transform such strikes, where conditions are favorable, into political struggles. The slogan is ‘civil war, not civil peace.’”

If Lenin’s position on revolutionary defeatism carries a certain clarity, what did it mean on the ground? Lenin cautioned “this does not mean ‘blowing up bridges,’ organizing unsuccessful strikes in the war industries, and in general helping the government defeat the revolutionaries.” But what about agitation in the army? It is a popular view from some socialists that Bolshevik agitation in the army focused on radical actions, including calls for soldiers to shoot their officers and for whole regiments to rise up and fight the government loyalist troops and not the foreign power.

The slogan “Turn the imperialist war into a civil war” is understood to be an immediate demand for soldiers and workers to open up a second front at home, fighting to overthrow the government while your country is being invaded. It is a call that modern day socialists rarely think about tactically, however. They throw the slogan around as a principle as if, from day one, the immediate demand was for soldiers to turn their guns on their own government. But to transform this general revolutionary slogan into a tactical demand in the immediate outbreak of war is just ultra-left posturing. The actual consequences of attempting to launch a civil war when working-class consciousness is overwhelmingly focused on the desire to defend their national rights means isolation and death for the Left.

Instead the practical policy of the Bolsheviks in the army was to focus on general agitation against the class character of the war, educating workers and soldiers in what imperialism meant and denouncing the war aims of the government. After late 1916 through to summer 1917, the Bolshevik’s demands increasingly centered on the rights of soldiers.

The key turning point for the Bolsheviks in Russia was after February 1917 when tsarism was overthrown by a popular revolution and a liberal democratic regime headed by Alexander Kerensky replaced it, and said it would continue the war. Some people on the Left fell into line after February, arguing that the task was to defend a more liberal and democratic Russia against the German Kaiser now that the character of the government had changed. Lenin and his comrades doubled down on opposition, however, and when the war continued to go badly under Kerensky, it was this principled course that allowed them to eventually wrestle power from the capitalists in October 1917.

What was the material that the Bolsheviks were handing out on the eve the All-Russia Congress of the Soviets in April 1917?


“All power to the soviet of workers’ and soldiers deputies! This does not mean that we must immediately overthrow the present government or disobey it. So long as the majority of the people support it… we cannot afford to fritter away our forces on desultory uprisings. Never! Husband your strength! Get together at meetings! Pass motions!”

It is clear that the revolutionary strategy did not come from an immediate mutiny, refusing to fight, opening up a revolutionary fight against the bourgeois government, but from slow patient work in building up support for antiwar and revolutionary ideas.

Ultimately, the working class led by revolutionary forces came to power in October not on a policy of “shoot your officers” or actively agitating for the military defeat of the army, but on a policy of “bread, peace, and land.” These demands were only achievable by taking power from the Russian capitalists and their liberal politicians to secure peace for a country exhausted and destroyed by war. The Bolsheviks immediately sued for peace with Germany, signing the very unfavorable Brest-Litovsk treaty to take Russia out of the war, conceding a great deal of territory as the price for peace. It was during the debates on ratifying the Brest-Litovsk treaty that Lenin remarked,


“Boris [Kamkov, of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries] heard that we were defeatists, and he reminded himself of this when we have ceased to be defeatists…. We were defeatists under the tsar, but under Tseretelli and Chernov [ministers in the the Kerensky government] we were not defeatists.”

So after the February revolution, Lenin argues that the Bolsheviks dropped the defeatism slogan, though in practice it existed mainly at the level of propaganda between 1914 and 1916 and was shelved by 1917. It was replaced by a more concrete and specific call for democratic rights for soldiers and a push for dual power in the military as the revolutionary upsurge radicalized more and more regiments.

By September 1917, even Lenin was making statements that were no longer based on revolutionary defeatism but essentially advocated a revolutionary war of defense, couching it in the language of how to successfully defend the country from invasion:


“It is impossible to render the country capable of defending itself without the greatest heroism on the part of the people in courageously and decisively carrying out great economic transformations. And it is impossible to appeal to the heroism of the masses without breaking with imperialism, without offering to all the peoples a democratic peace, without thus transforming the war from a war of conquest, a predatory, criminal war, into a just, defensive, revolutionary war.”

This further demonstrates that Lenin was primarily using the revolutionary defeatism slogan in relation to tsarism and the idea that a defeat of the tsar’s army would create the conditions for a more radical democratic regime to replace it. And on this point, he was right.

Things move fast in war. When Lenin returns from exile and begins to actually talk to Russian workers and soldiers, he detected another mood, that it is entirely reasonable not to want your country to be invaded and occupied, and it is this sentiment that he now expressed, even using the language of a revolutionary defensist war that he had rejected in April 1917. The key point was to oppose the expansionist, imperialist war aims of the bourgeois class.
Practical conclusions

When an imperialist country is invading a poorer nation to try to carve up the world, advocating the latter’s right to resist and defending its right to self-determination is a basic democratic demand. Even saying you are in favor of the smaller nation winning is a principled and correct position.

Even if you are in an imperialist nation and you are being invaded by another imperialist nation, then it is inevitable that people will not want to be invaded and occupied by a foreign power.

In either situation, socialists should put forward general anti-war agitation and propaganda, draw out the class contradictions between what the imperialists want and working people being sent to slaughter each other for it. We should make links with socialists in the invading country, organize rank-and-file committees in the military and in trade unions, and make links between workers and soldiers, clearly saying that the government doesn’t speak for the people, that this barbarous war needs to stop, and only a socialist government can bring it to an end.

19 May 2022

Source Tempest.


Attached documentsrevolutionary-defeatism-yesterday-and-today_a8982.pdf (PDF - 946.5 KiB)
Extraction PDF [->article8982]


Simon Hannah
Simon Hannah is a member of Anti*Capitalist Resistance and author of several books on political activism in Britain.


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Vietnam, 30 April 1975 - 50 years ago 

East Asia: War and revolution

Monday 5 May 2025, by Pierre Rousset

Once France had been defeated after the Vietnamese victory at Dien Bien Phu (1954), the great powers imposed the Geneva Accords, which were highly unfavourable to the Vietminh, temporarily dividing the country into two military regrouping zones.

At the end of the Second World War, the Vietminh took advantage of a window of opportunity to declare independence. The Japanese occupiers had destroyed the French administration, before being themselves defeated in the Pacific theatre of operations. They had the political initiative, but in a fragile situation. Their military capabilities were weak and their authority contested, especially by religious sects and anti-communist nationalist movements.

Social revolution and land reform

With the agreement of Chiang Kai-shek’s China, the French expeditionary corps bombed the port of Haiphong in northern Vietnam in 1946. The first Vietnam War had begun. Hô Chi Minh’s offers of negotiations were rejected. Given the military balance of power, the war took the form of a protracted revolutionary war, mobilizing the peasantry. Patriotism was not enough. A call for agrarian reform was essential. From now on, national liberation and social revolution were intertwined. This would be the foundation on which to build a long-term resistance.

We also have to take into account the specificities of Vietnam, in relation to China (Beijing sent aid and advisors), which was able to take advantage of the vastness of the country and its population. At every stage, it was necessary to take into account the reactions of enemy forces and adapt strategy accordingly. There is a Vietnamese way of thinking about war.

The perspective of social and democratic emancipation

Deciding to resume the armed struggle in the second half of the 1950s could not have been an easy decision. The alternative was to confront the United States, or at least accept the division of the country ad vitam æternam, as in Korea. And leave the militant networks and social bases of the liberation movement in the South unsupported, in the face of an unscrupulous dictatorship.

People’s war (potentially) opens up a dynamic of social emancipation, which however runs the risk of running out of steam if it lasts too long. In Asia, the question is not only historical. Armed conflict, for example, has never ceased in Mindanao (in the south of the Philippine archipelago). Concrete answers must constantly be found to a double question: how to prevent armed groups from degenerating (which does happen), and how to concretely defend, in concrete conditions, the democratic freedom of decision-making and the rights of popular or mountain communities. In Burma, when the military junta seized power four years ago, it could be said that the whole country (almost) went into non-violent civic disobedience. The junta could have been overthrown, if only the “international community” had lent its support. Once again, this was not to be. And the repression ended up forcing the resistance to join the armed struggle, led in particular by ethnic minorities.

24 April 2025

Translated by International Viewpoint from L’Anticapitaliste.

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Vietnam, 30 April 1975 - 50 years ago, a historic victory, but at what price?


Tuesday 29 April 2025, by Pierre Rousset

Vietnam’s independence was first proclaimed in August 1945, and we could soon be celebrating its 80th anniversary. De Gaulle decided otherwise, sending an expeditionary force to reconquer his lost colony. Indochina had to endure two devastating successive imperial wars, first French, then American. Washington mobilised all the means at its disposal to crush the Vietnamese revolution, certain that it would prevail - and was defeated. The image has gone down in history: the staff of the US embassy in Saigon exfiltrated by helicopter. On 30 April 1975.

When the Geneva Accords were signed in 1954 with the French government of Pierre Mendès-France, the Viet Minh was in a winning strategic position, the French forces having been decisively defeated. Nevertheless, these armistice agreements were particularly unfavourable to the Viet Minh. It was the ‘big brothers’, Russia and China, who forced the Vietminh to abandon many of its demands. It had to withdraw its troops to a ‘temporary regroupment zone’ in the north of the country, while the Saigon regime was free to redeploy its army in the south.

An election was to be held throughout the country, which would have seen the triumph of the Ho Chi Minh government. Of course, it did not take place. The United States and the Saigon regime had not even signed the agreements, ostensibly keeping their hands free. In their eyes, the division of the country had to become permanent, or even allow a military counter-offensive to overthrow the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRVN). The Mendès-France government knowingly passed the baton to Washington.

The Geneva agreements are one of the classic examples of armistices that lead to a permanent territorial division fraught with festering tensions (see the case of the Korean peninsula, which has become a nuclear ‘hot spot’) or to a new war, even worse than the previous one (in the case of Vietnam, precisely).

In the immediate term, the Saigon regime took advantage of the retreat of the revolutionary armed forces to launch a campaign to eliminate the cadres of the liberation movement in the South and attack their mass base, particularly among the peasantry and hill tribes of the high lands.

Stopping the revolutionary momentum in South-East Asia

The stakes went beyond the Indochinese peninsula. Washington wanted to stop the revolutionary momentum in South-East Asia. It was targeting China from the west, which had already been threatened in the east during the Korean War (1950-1953), and was seeking to consolidate the global supremacy of US imperialism. The second Vietnam War was intended to exemplify US omnipotence. The confrontation in Vietnam thus became the nodal point in the world situation where the balance of power between revolution and counter-revolution on the one hand, and between the so-called Western bloc (United States, Western Europe, Japan, etc.) and the Eastern bloc (China-USSR) on the other, was being shaped.

Although it benefited from a social base provided in particular by Catholics from the North, the (corrupt and dictatorial) regime in Saigon disappointed Washington’s expectations and it was forced to become ever more involved in the conflict, leading to an all-out war on all fronts, on an unprecedented scale: sending in hundreds of thousands of soldiers (the GIs, up to 550,000 men on the ground), carpet bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, counter-agrarian reform in the South, massive spraying of defoliants (the toxic Agent Orange) on wooded areas, development of military technologies to flush out fighters hiding in tunnels or spot night-time troop movements...

During the Second Indochina War, all the economic and technological power of the United States was mobilised and poured into Vietnam, a medium-sized Third World country. However, Moscow and Beijing knew that the US had its sights set on them, and Vietnam received substantial military aid via the Chinese border, even during the Cultural Revolution. This aid, important though it was, was nonetheless measured in terms of quality. The most sophisticated weapons, which would have made it possible to secure the skies over North Vietnam, were not supplied. The ‘big brothers’ did not want the DRVN to be defeated, which would have threatened them, but did they want victory or did they believe it was possible?

From the Tet offensive in 1968 to the fall of Saigon

The conflict took on a major international dimension, both in the so-called Third World and in the imperialist citadels. In the case of the Russian and Chinese revolutions, solidarity became fully relevant after victory. For the Vietnamese (and Algerian) revolutions, it was a key element of a constantly adapting strategy that eventually led to victory.

The Vietnamese leadership understood the importance of this new field of action and the national liberation movement invested a great deal in it, both diplomatically and in terms of militant solidarity. With a great deal of expertise, it called on the entire spectrum of political solidarity. This was one of the hallmarks of its overall strategy.

Solidarity was important in every part of the world, but of course the US anti-war movement had a special role to play.

Some have concluded that it was the anti-war movement that defeated Washington, in order to defend ‘pacifist’ theses on the uselessness of armed struggle. A misleading anachronism. For a long time, the American bourgeoisie supported the war effort, as did the majority of the scientists, researchers and engineers called upon to supply the army with the technologies it needed. The arms factories were running at full capacity. Resistance to the war certainly grew considerably in the second half of the 1960s, particularly among young people. However, for the protest to change dimension decisively, the military losses had to become too heavy, the economic cost of the conflict had to become too great, the ‘legitimacy’ of US imperialism in the world had to be too damaged, the veterans’ movements had to grow stronger and the political crisis erupted in 1972 with the Watergate scandal, forcing the resignation of Richard Nixon.

To force talks that would open up a political window of opportunity for victory, after the Tet offensive in 1968 (a military defeat but a political and diplomatic victory), the Vietnamese liberation movement imposed face-to-face negotiations: the RDVN (Democratic Republic of Vietnam) and the GRP (Provisional Revolutionary Government) in the south on one side, the United States and the Saigon regime on the other, this time excluding the presence of the ‘friendly’ major powers (Moscow, Beijing). The Paris negotiations opened but stalled. However, eager to gradually disengage in response to the domestic crisis, Washington began its policy of ‘Vietnamisation’, gradually withdrawing its armed forces while trying to consolidate the Saigon regime. The hard-fought signing of the Paris Agreements on 27 January 1973 sanctioned the withdrawal of the GIs. Two years later, in 1975, the final offensive was launched, with the Saigon army collapsing. The war finally came to an end, almost without fighting. Like a statement of fact.

Three decades of war

A historic victory of immense significance, but one for which the Vietnamese people and the liberation forces paid a terrible price. Three decades of war exhausted society, crushed political pluralism, decimated the cadres based in the south and left deep scars on the organisations that survived the ordeal (starting with the CPV). Vietnam was liberated and the revolution prevailed, but under an authoritarian regime. Because it was not sufficiently supported in time in 1945, 1954, 1968... ‘Soldier on the front line’, the Vietnamese people waged a struggle from which popular struggles around the world - those of my generation - have benefited enormously. They have paid a heavy price. They still deserve our support today, even when they are repressed by their own government.

Severely defeated, Washington never stopped seeking revenge. It imposed the isolation of Vietnam for a decade, this time with Chinese support. At a time of great schism between the USSR and China, Moscow was becoming ‘the main enemy’ in Beijing’s eyes. Even though Sino-Soviet aid had been of great importance to the Vietnamese war effort, Hanoi’s independence was little appreciated by the Beijing regime. In a new geopolitical context, Vietnam drew closer to Russia, before becoming the direct victim of reversals of international alliances, when the USA and China jointly supported the Khmer Rouge (!) in a new Indochina war in 1979. At that point, realpolitik reached a peak.

Cambodia plunged into chaos

The ‘Ho Chi Minh trail’ that allowed arms to reach the fighters in the south passed partly through Laos and eastern Cambodia, which, under the aegis of Prince Norodom Sihanouk, had not been significantly involved in the first Indochina war. While asserting his neutrality, the prince tolerated the Vietnamese presence.

By bombing Cambodia on a massive scale and supporting Lon Nol’s bloody coup d’état (1969-1970), the United States plunged the kingdom into war and chaos. It was then was neither socially nor politically prepared for a real ‘people’s war’; but its created a vacuum from which the Khmer Rouge benefited. On 17 April 1975, they conquered the capital. They imediatly emptied the city of its entire population, in anticipation of US bombing raids, they said at the time. However, they sent hospitalised people who could not survive the ordeal into internal exile. The reality soon became clear. The deportees were scattered across the country, with no hope of returning. Phnom Penh became a Khmer Rouge city where a carefully administered torture centre operated, with every ‘interrogation’ being archived.

What was going on? It was at this point that we realised how little we knew about this composite movement. A wing of the Khmer Rouge had collaborated with the Vietnamese on both sides of the border during the war. It was the victim of secret purges that enabled the Pol Pot faction to consolidate its power. It was a violently ethno-nationalist, racist and particularly anti-Vietnamese movement. Its social base? Hill tribes in the north (Pol Pot’s praetorian guard) and... the army, which he took control of. The Khmer Rouge were described as radical communists (?) and Maoists, but they acted the opposite. Back in the urban centres, the CCP hastened to reconstitute a workers’ base (creating a special status for workers in state-owned enterprises). It carried out a genuine agrarian reform and took emblematic measures for the women from popular strata. All this, of course, while consolidating its monopoly of power and its political control over society.

A Cambodian revolution would obviously not have been a carbon copy of its Chinese or Vietnamese counterparts. But what kind of revolution are we talking about? A peasant revolution, when the Khmer Rouge put the peasantry to forced labour? A working class one, with no even semi-proletarian presence? Bourgeois, when they abolished all currency? And how to define this state? By default, it has been described in many left-wing circles as a workers’ state. For my part, in 1985, I put forward the formula of a ‘miscarriage’ of a workers’ state yet to be born. A very convoluted debate, to say the least.

And what kind of state were we talking about? To what extent did it exist? It was at best embryonic. Above all, it lacked the social base on which to build itself. An army of peasants had cut itself off from the peasantry. Faced with such a borderline case, it is best not to rush to brandish concepts. The ‘unequal and combined’ history of the Second Indochina War led to the emergence of a chronically unstable situation in Cambodia, where an army imposed forced labour on the population in order to restore the kingdom’s former grandeur, even if it meant digging an immense network of canals... without any engineers to plan it (intellectuals being particularly targeted by the new government, headed by a handful of intellectuals).

The Khmer Rouge order simply collapsed with the Vietnamese military intervention of December 1978-January 1979. One of the reasons why Hanoi decided to act was the fate of the Vietnamese population of Cambodia, threatened with genocide, like other minorities. However, this intervention was seen by the majority of the population as a liberation. All the deportees began to return home spontaneously. Vietnam withdrew its troops (the last ones left the country in 1989), after installing a ‘friendly’ government (but not a client one, as history would later show).

Khmer Rouge power was irremediably unstable. Would it have been able to consolidate in the west and gain social content with the help of the Thai army, traffickers and gangs? If so, it would have become bourgeois. Political fiction.

The perspective that would have given a Cambodian revolution a progressive chance would have been to include it in Indochinese solidarity, with Laos and Vietnam. A section of the Khmer Rouge movement was perhaps in favour of this. The risk of being dominated by Hanoi was real, but nothing could have been as terrible as what happened - hundreds of thousands of victims - which caused a deep historical trauma whose imprint still insidiously marks Cambodia today.

The Socialist Federation of Indochinese States never came into being. There were many who did not want it: Pol Pot, Beijing, Washington, the UN and Sihanouk, who allowed himself to be manipulated by China and the United States by giving a veneer of international legality to the dirty war of 1979.

The Sino-Vietnamese war

The Polpotian Khmer Rouge claimed historical rights to the Mekong Delta and had made a series of murderous incursions into Vietnamese territory, before Hanoi decided to invade in 1978.

In response to Hanoi’s overthrow of the Khmer Rouge regime, China decided on a ‘punitive expedition’ in February-March 1979. It lasted a month. The border, 750 kilometres long, is mostly mountainous. The Chinese army carried out a frontal assault on the passes, supported by an artillery barrage and tanks. It managed to penetrate Vietnamese territory, but the operation ended in a double failure.

Firstly, a military failure. The disorganisation of the Chinese army and its shortcomings (in intelligence and command coordination) came as a surprise. It was counting on the fact that a large proportion of the regular Vietnamese forces were in Cambodia, but the local militias proved capable of countering the offensive launched by Beijing. The exposure of these shortcomings led to a crisis within the CCP leadership. The in-depth modernisation of its concepts and its military apparatus remained to be done.

It was also a strategic failure. Hanoi did not withdraw troops from Cambodia to reinforce its defences in North Vietnam. There was no truce for Beijing’s Khmer Rouge protégés.

The Sino-Soviet conflict

The Sino-Khmero-Vietnamese crisis represented one of the high points of the Sino-Soviet conflict, and also sanctioned a spectacular reversal of international alliances.

Relations between Beijing and Moscow have always been fraught with suspicion and tension. The Chinese revolution (as in Vietnam) had imposed itself against the division of zones of influence negotiated between the United States and the USSR at the end of the Second World War. Stalin had urged Mao not to overthrow Chiang Kai-sheck’s regime. He wanted to preserve his undivided control over the international communist movement. Finally, on a particularly contentious issue, he refused to allow China to acquire nuclear weapons.

China paid the price for the policy of peaceful coexistence advocated by Nikita Khrushchev, who supported India during the Sino-Indian conflict in the Himalayas in 1962. He also abruptly put an end to the technical assistance provided to the Chinese economy. The rapprochement between Moscow and Washington was clearly at the expense of the Chinese. The break was definitively consummated in 1969, with the Sino-Soviet border wars.

The schism in the ‘socialist camp’ gave Washington a free hand to play one side against the other. In 1971, Henry Kissinger secretly travelled to China to prepare for Richard Nixon’s visit to Beijing in 1972, which was followed by another visit to Moscow.

The deleterious consequences of the Sino-Soviet inter-bureaucratic conflict were felt throughout the world. The Vietnamese victory in 1975 nevertheless opened up a window of opportunity, as Washington was no longer in a position to intervene militarily on a massive scale abroad. The Sino-Indochinese crisis of 1978-1979, for its part, heralded the change of period in the 1980s, which saw my militant generation defeated in the ‘three sectors of the world revolution’ (Third World, Eastern European countries, imperialist countries).


War and revolution (brief additional notes)

At the end of the Second World War, the Japanese occupiers destroyed the French administration, before being themselves defeated in the Pacific theatre of operations. The Vietminh took advantage of this brief ‘favourable moment’, which it had anticipated, to declare independence. It acted very quickly and retained the political initiative, but in a fragile situation. Its military capabilities were weak and his authority contested, especially by religious sects and anti-communist nationalist movements.

Social revolution and land reform

With the agreement of Chiang Kai-shek’s China, the French expeditionary corps bombed the port of Haiphong in northern Vietnam in 1946. Thus began the first Vietnam War. Ho Chi Minh’s offers of negotiations were rejected. As a speech by Vo Nguyen Giap on his return from Paris shows, this possibility had been taken into account by the leadership of the Vietnamese Communist Party.

Given the balance of military forces, this war took the form of a protracted revolutionary war. It mobilised the peasantry. Patriotism was not enough. The call for agrarian reform was essential. From then on, national liberation and social revolution were intertwined. This would be the foundation on which resistance would be built over the long term.

There are strategic ‘models’. However, a strategy must take into account the evolution of the situation, the reactions of the enemy force, the results of previous phases of the struggle... In reality, a concrete strategy evolves and often combines elements that belong to different ‘models’. The Vietnamese never stopped adapting their strategy.

A strategy combines different forms of struggle. Strategic adaptability also means knowing how to stop armed struggle when it is no longer necessary.

A difficult decision

After 1954, the revival of armed resistance against the Saigon regime was delayed. The decision to resume the armed struggle, which was gradually implemented in the second half of the 1950s, could not have been an easy one to take, knowing that this time it would be the United States that would enter the fray. But what was the alternative? At the very least, accept the division of the country ad vitam æternam, as in Korea. To abandon without support the militant networks and social bases of the liberation movement in the South, in the face of an unscrupulous dictatorship. Leaving the initiative to Washington, should it decide to attack the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

The prospect of social and democratic emancipation

When significant social sectors enter into armed resistance, it is because the violence of the established powers is unbearable. People’s warfare (potentially) opens up a dynamic of social emancipation, which nevertheless runs the risk of running out of steam when it lasts for a long time. In Asia, where conflicts have never ceased, the question posed is not just a historical one. Concrete responses must constantly be found to a twofold problem: how to prevent armed groups from degenerating (it happens...)? How to defend, in practical terms, the democratic freedom of decision-making and the rights of the grassroots or mountain communities that the combatants are supposed to be protecting? We have a wealth of experience in this area, particularly with our comrades in Mindanao, in the south of the Philippine archipelago.

In Burma, when the military junta seized all the power four years ago, you could say that (almost) the whole country went into non-violent civic disobedience. The junta could have been overthrown, if only the ‘international community’ had lent its support in time. Once again, this was not the case. And the repression ended up forcing the resistance in the central plain to join the armed struggle, led in particular by ethnic minorities. Once again, this was not a matter of a priori choice, but of obligation.

26 April 2025

Source: ESSF

P.S.

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Pierre Rousset
Pierre Rousset is a member of the leadership of the Fourth International particularly involved in solidarity with Asia. He is a member of the NPA in France.


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