AFGHANISTAN

The lethal troika

The TTP intends to replicate in Pakistan what the Taliban did in Afghanistan.

Tariq Parvez 

DAWN

Published May 11, 2024

MANY factors were responsible for the defeat of the erstwhile Soviet Union and then the US in Afghanistan. A common factor was the existence of a combination of extremely resilient militant groups resisting both superpowers. This combination consisted of three categories of militants: local Afghan militants resisting foreign invaders; Pakistani militants crossing over to help their Afghan brethren; and thousands of mujahideen from various countries, particularly in the Middle East, participating in the Afghan jihad. With some variations in their composition, role and external supporters, they fought together against the US and USSR for 30 years, forcing them to withdraw. Alarmingly, after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, this Afghanistan-based lethal troika now targets Pakistan.

The situation necessitates a fundamental shift in the terrorist threat assessment in Pakistan — from focusing exclusively on the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan to broadening the threat calculus to the troika of the TTP, Afghan Taliban, and Al Qaeda.

Concerning the nexus between the Taliban and TTP, the latest UN report on Afghanistan states that the Afghan government was supplying weapons, training facilities and regular financial packages to the TTP. Al Qaeda’s primary goal, after lying low in the region for many years, is to revive itself without annoying its Afghan hosts or attracting the West’s adverse attention.

In view of this, it seems to have opted to carry out its activities in Pakistan through the TTP, while staying below the international radar. The importance Al Qaeda gives to the TTP is evident in that it selected 15 of its commanders to assist the group conduct terrorist attacks in Pakistan. It also supplied armed fighters to the TTP in its attack in Chitral in September 2023, which killed four security officials. Al Qaeda’s camp in Kunar, headed by Hakim ul Masri, is responsible for training suicide bombers for the TTP.

The TTP, which has been the most lethal terrorist group in Pakistan over the last three years, is on the same page with the Taliban and Al Qaeda not only because of an ideological affinity and a shared history of fighting foreign invaders in Afghanistan, but also due to similar goals of Sharia enforcement in Pakistan.

The TTP intends to replicate in Pakistan what the Taliban did in Afghanistan.

There were reports of the TTP helping the other two members of the troika by killing Taliban members defecting to the rival Islamic State-Khorasan Province in Afghanistan. The basic point is that while the troika is united on targeting Pakistan, the members play different roles. The Taliban are likely to help TTP discreetly in Afghanistan by providing sanctuary, with Al Qaeda supporting both openly in Afghanistan through mentoring and in Pakistan through its sympathisers. With its edge, the TTP is likely to carry out ground attacks in Pakistan and lead a campaign to build up its narrative of violent extremism.

As far as the strategy and tactics to be adopted by the troika go, the TTP intends to replicate in Pakistan what the Taliban did in Afghanistan. In a recent interview to Khorasan Diary, TTP ameer Noor Wali Mehsud stated, “our jihad in Pakistan … has entered a decisive phase”. He went on to say ominously: “Pakistani security agencies have unjustly occupied our homeland” and “our goal is to liberate our homeland and implement the divine law”. In a nutshell, the TTP seems to be falling back on the two-point narrative of resistance in Afghanistan, ie, ‘liberation of homeland’ and ‘enforcement of divine laws’.

This brings us to the likely impact of the troika on the terrorist threat landscape in Pakistan. Since 2021, the number of terrorist attacks in Pakistan has been consistently increasing every year. This is likely to continue in 2024, with three possible changes. One, the number of Afghan nationals taking part in terrorist attacks in Pakistan may increase — we recall here the suicide bombing against military personnel in 2023 in Bannu by Afghans. Two, given its penchant for high-profile attacks, Al Qaeda may train the TTP to carry out such attacks. Three, given that the top Al Qaeda and Taliban instructors will train TTP members, the quality and sophistication of the attacks in 2024 are likely to be enhanced.

Another area likely to be impacted by the troika is infiltration. Earlier, in the 1990s, Al Qaeda infiltrated educational institutions such as Karachi and Punjab universities to recruit educated youth. These recruitment cells in universities may be reactivated.

Also, to stay abreast of latest government planning in counterterrorism, the TTP, like the Taliban did in Afghanistan, may attempt to infiltrate government departments, including intel agencies.

The third and most important dimension of infiltration is that of the military, which was carried out by Al Qaeda in Pakistan in the late 1990s. It may be pertinent to mention that the last attempted terrorist attack by Al Qaeda was in 2014 in Karachi, when a group of naval officers tried to hijack a navy frigate and crash into a US ship in the open seas.

Al Qaeda worked somewhat openly in Pakistan from the 1980s to 2001, and built up an elaborate network of civilian volunteers in many cities of Pakistan, who assisted in collecting funds, recruiting volunteers, and providing hideouts for the group. These sleeper cells might again be contacted by it and reactivated. Similarly, there were some Pakistani militant organisations of the 1980s, like the Harkatul Mujahideen, Lashkar-e-Taiba, etc, sympathetic to Al Qaeda and lying low these days. Al Qaeda may re-establish contact with them and get their support for the TTP.

Finally, both the Taliban and Al Qaeda are known for their high-quality propaganda campaign. The TTP media wing lacks that finesse. In the light of guidance from the Taliban and Al Qaeda, we are likely to witness a significant improvement in the quality of propaganda.

As Sun Tsu stated, “if you know your enemy and you know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles”. Sadly, it seems that Pakistan is erring in assessing the collective capabilities of the TTP, supported by the Taliban and Al Qaeda.

The writer is a former police officer who was Nacta’s first national coordinator.

Published in Dawn, May 11th, 2024

 Balochistan *

Insurgency and social change

Muhammad Amir Rana 

DAWN

Published May 12, 2024 

THE recent killing of seven barbershop workers from Punjab in Gwadar is another indicator that the insurgency in Balochistan is evolving and intensifying demographic changes, which will impact the sociopolitical landscape of the province.

Although targeted killings of settlers in Balochistan are not a new trend, the emergence of the Balochistan Liberation Army as the primary insurgent group has significantly increased operational capacities and diversified targets.

While the BLA has not officially claimed responsibility for the Gwadar attack, it is likely the act of one of its wings or affiliate groups. Last month, the group carried out a significant attack, killing nine people from central Punjab who were planning on reaching Europe through Iran. Based on their ethnicity, BLA gunmen abducted them from a bus bound for Taftan and later dumped their bodies under a bridge in a hilly area of Noshki.

In a similar attack, possibly by the same gunmen, two people were killed when they tried to escape the assailants’ cordon on N-40, the Quetta-Noshki highway. Following the Noshki attack, the BLA issued a statement claiming that its special squad had killed ‘agents’ of Pakistan’s intelligence agencies who, they claimed, were travelling in plain clothes on the bus. However, media reports and investigations later revealed that the victims were using the Balochistan route to travel to Iran and onward to Europe.

Baloch militants view workers and travellers from Punjab as collaborators or agents of security forces or the federal government. Attacks targeting Punjabi workers and settlers have occurred in various parts of the province in the past.

It appears that the insurgents kill settlers because they are non-combatants and, as such, easy targets. Militant groups assign such tasks to their new recruits to test their conviction and draw them into the cycle of violence. While one can comprehend Baloch grievances against the state institutions and Punjab, it is also crucial to understand why they target non-combatants who have been serving them for years.

Whenever anger flares against the state’s flawed policies, settlers become the targets.

Traditionally, Baloch society has a few key professions. Hairdressing is one of the major ones they miss. Teaching comes next, with teachers from Punjab and the Urdu-speaking community making significant contributions to the education sector in the province. Like tribal codes in other parts of the country, the Baloch follow the tradition of hosting members of different ethnicities without integrating them into their tribal ethics. This is a common practice, as assimilation is a long process. The same applies to settlers from Punjab and urban Sindh, who have embraced the norms of Baloch society, while maintaining ties with their native towns and communities.

However, Punjabis constitute the largest ethnic group in the country and wield significant power and resources, leading to resentment not only among the Baloch, but also Pakhtuns and Sindhis. Whenever anger flares against the establishment and the state’s flawed policies, settlers become the targets of this animosity. Historically, barbers have been the first victims when such hatred triggers violence. It is worth noting that many of these barbers hail from southern Punjab, much of which identifies itself as Baloch, but their official domicile determines their identity and ethnicity.

Over the last two decades, Pakhtuns have captured market businesses in urban Balochistan, while Sindhis have gradually become prominent in the labour market. Despite issues of ethnic and tribal pride and sociocultural differences, there has been no hostility towards these communities. This is because both ethnicities are part of Balochistan and share some cultural commonalities.

Moreover, both communities have faced major hostility, apart from minor issues related to ethnic and tribal pride and sociocultural differences. The reasons are that both ethnicities are part of Balochistan and share few other cultural commonalities, but both are also seen as deprived communities and, in the past, have remained part of the political struggle for rights.

Insurgencies have no room for neutrality or ambiguity, as insurgents seek clear distinctions between friends and foes. In places like Myanmar and India, ethnic insurgents target civilians from minority ethnic groups, as well as engage in property destruction and other abuses. While small ethnic groups may strive to maintain a neutral stance, they often find themselves between insurgents and counterinsurgents in grey areas. This dynamic is evident among Pakhtuns and Sindhis, who have been targeted by insurgents while working on government projects. The contractors had hired them as an alternative to Punjabi labour, but they were not spared despite a sense of affinity with them.

Sociopolitical transformation is a complex phenomenon, which is influenced not only by insurgents but also by internal societal changes. Baloch society is transforming due to rural-to-urban migration, increasing literacy rates, and improved connectivity. Similar to Karachi’s experience, urbanisation in Quetta is making other major urban centres multi-ethnic too.

Despite ethnic bonds with Sindhis, coexistence with Pakhtuns and Sindhis may face occasional challenges. Additionally, religion presents a growing challenge, as religious fervour increases alongside literacy rates among the Baloch. While this may appear advantageous for state institutions seeking cohesion through religion, religiosity has not weakened Balochistan’s nationalistic sentiments.

The promotion of religious organisations and madressahs by state institutions has failed to make a significant impact, mainly due to the vast disparities within Baloch society’s tribal, rural, and urban composition, which foster diverse political interests. The very forces undermining peace are now major power players.

At the national level, the province’s poor human development and governance indicators leave ample space for resistance politics. Sociopolitical changes often trigger paradoxical sentiments, with simultaneous pro-development and anti-development attitudes emerging.

When the sense of deprivation intensifies, and resource distribution becomes contentious, it creates a conducive environment for militants to recruit, expand, and diversify their targets and tactics. Targeting non-combatants of the majority group reflects a deepening societal anger at this level. This is the most crucial level, as the state has to rethink and correct its approach towards Balochistan.

The writer is a security analyst.

Published in Dawn, May 12th, 2024

*BALOCHISTAN IS A STATE BETWEEN THREE COUNTRIES, IRAN, AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN. IT HAS OIL, MINERALS, AND A PORT!

PAKISTAN
Guns and guards

Editorial 

Published May 14, 2024

THERE are some flawed aspects to our society that we must start to fix at the grassroots level. One of these is the psychological impulse ingrained in certain segments to make themselves known in public through vulgar displays of force. Recently, local police arrested five private security guards from Karachi’s Defence Housing Authority for violating a ban on the public display of arms. These men, dressed in civilian clothes, were carrying three rifles, one Kalashnikov and one pistol between them, which were seized during the arrest. A case was subsequently registered against them. This development may seem inconsequential in the larger scheme of things, but it should be appreciated. 

The sight of heavily armed men, often in civvies, zooming around in pickup trucks and pushing ordinary citizens out of the way to make space for the rich and powerful has unfortunately become quite common in our cities. It is a shameful practice that has no space in the civilised world.

While some citizens and their families understandably face greater risks than others owing to their work or personal background, acquiring a posse of intimidating-looking private guards has also become a status symbol for the nouveau-riche. This has to be strongly discouraged, and Karachi’s DHA is right in attempting to disincentivise it by banning public displays of arms within its jurisdiction. It is unseemly for private guards openly wielding weapons to be lounging outside restaurants, shopping malls and educational institutes, where their presence can cause various inconveniences and also make people feel unsafe, especially as there have been many incidents involving private security acting irresponsibly with their weapons, thereby jeopardising the lives of others. The provincial governments also have an important role to play in this regard. They must strengthen the police and focus on eradicating violent elements from society so that everyone can feel safe without being surrounded by guns.

Published in Dawn, May 14th, 2024

AJK protests

FREE KASHMIR FROM PAKISTAN & INDIA

Editorial

DAWN

Published May 14, 2024 

SINCE last week, Azad Jammu & Kashmir has been roiled by protests, fuelled principally by a disconnect between locals and their administration, as well as the government of Pakistan. Strikes and marches have been held in different parts of the territory, led by the Jammu Kashmir Joint Awami Action Committee, with the situation turning ugly on Saturday when a police officer lost his life during the protests. On Monday, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif attempted to quell the discontent by announcing the transfer of Rs23bn to AJK on Monday, along with meeting many of the protesters’ demands, such as increasing the wheat flour subsidy and revising power rates. AJK’s people had taken to the streets mainly due to inflation, as well as wheat flour and power rate issues. Moreover, many protesters feel that the AJK government is oversized, and that the small territory does not require an army of ministers and bureaucrats to run its affairs. They are of the view that very few funds are left for development after costs of running the AJK government are subtracted. Meanwhile, there is also criticism of local lawmakers, many of whom, observers say, rarely visit their constituencies after being elected. It remains to be seen whether the government’s steps satisfy the people in the long term.

At the heart of the protests appears to be lack of service delivery on the part of the AJK administration, as well as Islamabad’s apparent indifference to the local people’s plaints. The centre and the government in Muzaffarabad should have addressed these long-festering issues before the people’s anger led them to the streets. Sadly, it is the norm across the country to address issues only when they have ballooned into a full-blown crisis. In Gilgit-Baltistan, only a few months ago, the local population had staged protests along similar lines. The AJK prime minister said the changes made on Monday regarding wheat flour and power rates are “permanent” arrangements. Similarly, the AJK administration should trim its expenditures and focus only on essentials, while allocating enough funds for the people’s welfare. Lawmakers and ministers also need to make themselves available to constituents to resolve outstanding problems. Good governance demands that the administrations in both Islamabad and Muzaffarabad keep an ear to the ground and address AJK’s legitimate issues in a democratic manner.

Published in Dawn, May 14th, 2024

Climate justice

Jamil Ahmad 

DAWN

Published May 14, 2024 

IN the face of rising riks from climate change, calls for climate action and climate justice have grown stronger. The creation of the Loss and Damage Fund under the UN climate convention is considered an important step towards action. A request is pending before the ICJ for an opinion on states’ obligations towards people on climate change.

Civil society has sought judicial assistance to compel national authorities to take swift climate action. Governments and companies have been taken to courts for inaction or failure to implement environmental agreements.

The number of cases on climate and the environment has grown over the years as the dangers associated with climate change became more ominous, with efforts to control global warming falling short of expected targets. Vulnerable communities took the lead in seeking redressal through the courts.

Two landmark cases in Asia are illustrative. In Pakistan, Asghar Leghari, a farmer, took the government to court in 2015 for not acting to combat climate change, arguing that the inaction of the authorities was against the constitutional right to life, because climate change posed a serious threat to water, food, and energy security. In the Philippines, a group of schoolchildren went to court in the 1990s pleading that deforestation harmed their fundamental rights. In both cases, the courts ruled in favour of the litigants.

The rise in climate litigation is propelled also by developments in international environmental governance and breakthroughs in the global environmental policy domain such as the Paris climate accord and other agreements. Once ratified, their legal injunctions and policy directions are incorporated into national legal frameworks. Failure of the parties to multilateral environmental agreements to abide by their pledges and implement measures to address climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution give justified grounds for lawsuits against the authorities, industry, and the corporate sector. A report Global Trends in Climate Change Litigation, 2023 by the London School of Economics, citing figures from databases, notes that around two-thirds of climate-centred lawsuits have been filed since 2015, when the Paris Agreement was signed.


Lawsuits on climate inaction are increasing.

Meanwhile, the codification of the concept of a rights-based approach to the environment has taken place in parallel. Historically, environmentalists have advocated a rights-based approach. They challenged governments in the courts and in most cases, obtained favourable decisions. Last year, Brazil’s supreme court declared that the Paris Agreement was a human rights treaty, which enjoyed ‘supranational’ status. Lately, a group of Swiss women obtained a verdict from the European Court of Human Rights that inadequate efforts by their government to control climate change was violating human rights — a ruling that can prompt similar lawsuits elsewhere.

The recognition by the UN General Assembly in July 2022 of a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment as a human right further strengthened a bottom-up, rights-based approach to the environment and climate change. It catalysed legal actions against governments for their failure to implement climate policies and actions which exacerbated the negative impact of climate change.

According to the UNEP’s Global Climate Litigation Report: 2023 Status Review, “the total number of climate change court cases has more than doubled since 2017” and is growing worldwide. The report found that the “cases mostly fell under one or more of six categories; cases relying on human rights enshrined in international law and national constitutions; challenges to domestic non-enforcement of climate-related laws and policies; litigants seeking to keep fossil fuels in the ground; advocates for greater climate disclosures and an end to greenwashing; claims addressing corporate liability and responsibility for climate harms; and claims addressing failures to adapt to the impacts of climate change”.

Increased climate litigation will help climate action and ultimately climate justice. However, the extent of following up on court judgements remains limited in developing countries like Pakistan, where adjudicating on environmental issues is complex and confronts structural obstacles in the way of implementing court orders. Prompt enforcement of statutes, regulations and judicial pronouncements on climate and environment, will be enabled by incorporating the environmental dimension in all aspects of legal actions. All segments of the legal community must be equipped with the appropriate tools and information about environmental matters. A revamping of the legal architecture is a ‘sine qua non’ for coping with surging litigation on the environment and climate.

The writer is director of intergovernmental affairs, United Nations Environment Programme.

Published in Dawn, May 14th, 2024

PAKISTAN ECONOMY & IMF

Political capitalism

Umair Javed

DAWN

Published May 13, 2024

THE last couple of years have witnessed a series of changes to decision-making structures of Pakistan’s economy. These include the creation of the SIFC, the centralisation of economic governance, and greater economic proximity to the Gulf monarchies, particularly Saudi Arabia. The latter is notable because it appears to have shifted (in rhetoric at least) the bilateral relationship from one of aid and security towards economic investments.

These changes were precipitated by a basic symptom afflicting Pakistan’s economy — an inability to earn sufficient foreign exchange to sustain growth, which in turn leads to recurring balance-of-payment crises and enforced slowdowns. It is important to call this a symptom because the actual problem is one of capital and labour productivity, which prevents the economy from producing what it needs to efficiently produce for either the domestic or the international market. However, no one seems to be very interested in solving that particular issue.

In their quest for foreign exchange, civil-military decision-makers are keen on opening up several sectors and industries to foreign investment. However, the chosen mechanism is not through market-based competition, but through state-to-state deals midwifed by the SIFC. The terms at which these deals are being negotiated are unclear at the moment, but, if the country’s bargaining position and its past record is anything to go by, they will likely be lucrative.

Alongside the Saudi deals, increased attention is also being devoted to privatisation processes. Here as well, the government is closely involved in setting up deal structures and providing incentives to various interested parties. Another lesson from the past is that while these government-sponsored deals will help resolve short-term forex liquidity constraints, they may pose payment problems in the future and are unlikely to lift the economy out of its productivity slump.

The current hybrid regime is incapable of undercutting an entrenched, unproductive elite.

Government involvement of such form is not the state-directed development seen in the mid-20th century, when socialist states took on the task of production or when developmental states coordinated private sector activity. Rather, these vaguely correspond to a new type that’s emerged over the last few decades, which Branko Milanovic labels “political capitalism”.

Milanovic, echoing Max Weber, defines political capitalism as “the use of political power to achieve economic gains”. Magnified at the level of the state, political capitalism means that the state will use its ability to exercise discretion, such as in offering sweeteners and incentives, bypassing existing regulations, and creating new regulations and structures, to fulfil certain economic objectives. Private entities will still control the economy (through ownership of the means of production), but the state will use its power to intervene on behalf of favoured interests that help it achieve its desired objectives. In other words, the use of discretion is central to this model.

The exemplar practitioner of political capitalism in today’s world is China. The Chinese economy now largely exists in private hands, but the Chinese state continues to intervene in a discretionary manner, favouring some entities over others to achieve economic or social objectives. In that sense, there is an absence of a uniform ‘rule of law’ in China, in so far that regulations may be applied selectively or not at all depending on the objectives set by the Chinese state.

According to Milanovic, if regulations are applied uniformly (ie, rule of law is practised), then over time the state loses its relative power over the private sector. This is the case we see in most liberal capitalist states across the world. However, if the state becomes too discretionary (and corrupt), it will stifle economic productivity and lead to economic stagnation. The Chinese state is remarkable in that it has struck a balance in using selective discretion to generate high rates of economic growth, though with accompanying inequality. Other countries that have managed this model well include Vietnam and Singapore, both of which have used state involvement to create prosperity. Increasingly, Cambodia, Bangladesh and Rwanda are following a similar trajectory.

There are two key reasons why political capitalism of this sort is less likely to be successful in the Pakistani context. A key ingredient in all successful cases listed is the presence of a technocratic, highly skilled, and motivated bureaucracy. Pakistan’s federal and provincial bureaucracies fail on all three counts: staffed with generalists in commanding positions, with low levels of average competence, and an incentive structure that prioritises self-reward over some larger public service motivation.

Secondly, all successful examples of political capitalism have been highly centralised, one-party states usually created in the aftermath of some major political upheaval, like a socialist revolution that wipes out an entrenched elite and creates an autonomous state, or a major ethnic secession that creates a strong attachment of the population with the state. Pakistani decision-makers salivate at the prospect of a one-party state but without paying attention to those additional ingredients.

Neither is the current hybrid regime capable of undercutting an entrenched, unproductive elite (since the civilian part is drawn from the same elite), nor has it managed to incorporate large swathes of the population through shared national or ideational attachment. If anything, it has managed to do the exact opposite of the latter by marginalising the most popular party and repressing its members and supporters.

These structural weaknesses of low, self-serving competence and weak autonomy and legitimacy are precisely why previous attempts at state-directed interventions in the economy created rent-seeking opportunities for local and foreign investors, rather than helped the economy out of its multi-decade slump. While the actual challenge lies in generating productive human capability through health and education, chasing temporary dollars continues to command most of the state’s attention.

The writer teaches sociology at Lums.

X: @umairjav
Published in Dawn, May 13th, 2024

For a better deal

Dr Niaz Murtaza 

DAWN

Published May 14, 2024 

AS the IMF’s most habitual client globally, we often get a dose of the Fund’s harsh medicine. Each time, business, civil society and other groups rightly object to an IMF deal’s harsh terms, but mostly after it has been struck. As an IMF team will arrive soon for a new deal, they must coordinate to influence deal talks.

Some blame our leaders but others the IMF for harsh deals. The problem starts with our governments — from Musharraf to the PTI. In their zeal to get high GDP growth, they take the faulty path of high fiscal and external deficits and money supply growth, instead of high investment, productivity and exports that require politically costly reforms. That path soon leads to high inflation and falling dollar reserves, and finally to the Fund’s door. But just as doctors often mistreat serious diseases caused by bad patient habits, so does the IMF often misdiagnose and mistreat economic ills caused by state policies.

The immediate patient symptoms before the IMF are usually high inflation and falling reserves due to high twin deficits and money supply growth. To stabilise the patient, the IMF usually prescribes higher interest rates, rupee depreciation, higher taxes and cuts in state expenses. All these put a brake on GDP growth, albeit fake, and cause a huge loss of jobs and state services that hurt poor and small businesses more.

In our recent deals from 2000 to 2019, the IMF has also included issues that affect the twin deficits and money supply growth indirectly — State Bank autonomy; state units, circular debt and power sector reform; exchange rate and tax policy; etc. Even though we were at the peak of economic crises each time and needed major stabilisation, many IMF demands were rightly criticised for their sequence, extent and precise focus.

But things now differ. Economic policy targets macroeconomic stability, growth, equity and sustainability. We already have some stabilisation from the last stand-by IMF deal. Inflation and fiscal deficit are falling; reserves are up and the rupee has been climbing for months. Thus, we need an unorthodox IMF programme. We must not raise interest rates but cut them.

The IMF wants high interest rates to treat both inflation and falling currency and reserves. True, a stable rupee has been achieved via stringent controls on dollar demand for imports, profit repatriation, etc. which are slowing GDP growth. Once these controls are ended to raise GDP growth, reserves and the rupee may fall. But this pressure must be fixed via front-loading about half of IMF flows (and back-loading the rest to ensure compliance) and dollar flows expected from multilateral and bilateral donors rather than high interest rates. This will reduce fiscal deficit and create room for GDP and job growth.


The Fund often misdiagnoses economic ills.

Instead of indirect taxes and development and social spending cuts, the Fund must demand non-essential defence and civilian outlays cuts and increased direct taxes on non-taxed sectors and elites. If it signs a deal without this, it would be equally culpable in burdening the poor.

Such steps will help achieve both stability and growth. But durable growth will require more creative strategies to raise savings, investments, exports and outputs. Our savings must rise, being among the lowest regionally. This means that even for investment for domestic outputs, we often use foreign investment which creates profit repatriation liabilities without export earnings, thus raising our external deficit.

We must ideally use foreign investment for sectors that give export revenues and/ or help obtain high-end technical capacities. In­­creased ex­­­ports require state-ca­p­­ital col­l­aborat­ion to ent­er the high-end export sectors. But gro­wth policies are beyond the IMF’s remit, the wrong neoliberal take being that stabilisation will automatically give growth. This raises questions. The IMF must not overdo stabilisation now, to let us follow growth policies. It must ensure equity by requiring big outlays for the poor suffering from years of stagflation.

Beyond specific IMF terms, austerity-linked Fund deals imposed since 1980s don’t make sense, unlike earlier condition-free ones. Policy conditions encourage reform-averse states to adopt good policies, but they can’t afford them during economic crises when IMF aid must allow counter-cyclical growth policies. Donors must proactively apply policy conditions linked to bigger aid from bilateral and multilateral donors in normal times when the roots of crises are being laid via faulty state policies. Rich states must also change their unfair global policies that choke growth in poor states. Only then can recipient states achieve stability and equitable growth.

The writer is a political economist with a PhD from the University of California, Berkeley.
murtazaniaz@yahoo.com
X: @NiazMurtaza2

Published in Dawn, May 14th, 2024

Privatisation divide

Editorial 

DAWN

Published May 14, 2024

WITH Deputy Prime Minister Ishaq Dar having clawed his way back to the centre of economic policymaking, a tussle between two competing viewpoints — one represented by him, the other by Finance Minister Muhammad Aurangzeb — was inevitable.

Mr Aurangzeb believes that Pakistan’s economy can no longer bear the burden of state-owned enterprises, which need to be privatised as early as possible. On the other hand, Mr Dar, who is foreign minister and a confidant of Nawaz Sharif, fears that all-out privatisation could deplete his party’s already dwindling political capital. Hobbled by high inflation, recent blunders in wheat procurement and rising energy costs, the party can ill-afford any agitation against privatisation.

Hence, no matter what the finance minister says, the two are not on the same page as evident in his outright rejection of Mr Dar’s concept of “strategic and essential SOEs”. “There is no such thing as strategic SOEs,” Mr Aurangzeb told a pre-budget conference. All SOEs, regardless of their categorisation, he asserted, would be handed over to the private sector. His stance on the ‘strategic’ SOEs is the opposite of what Mr Dar, who was previously finance minister and heads the important Cabinet Committee on Privatisation, had stated recently. Removing seven profitable public companies at the disposal of the Pakistan Sovereign Wealth Fund from the privatisation list, Mr Dar reportedly said that the government would restrict its concerns to “strategic and essential SOEs”, whose number — 40 — would be decreased after scrutiny.

The final decision on which the entities are to be categorised as strategic or essential is to be made by the Cabinet Committee on SOEs headed by Mr Aurangzeb. It might not be easy for him to have his way on their privatisation, despite support from the powerful circles that signed him up for implementing taxation, energy, and SOE reforms along with privatisation under the IMF’s tutelage. Mr Dar’s economic ideas are acceptable neither to the IMF nor to these circles. Under these circumstances, his transfer to the foreign ministry and later his elevation as deputy prime minister were perceived as major concessions from PM Shehbaz Sharif, although under pressure from Nawaz Sharif.

Put simply, the differences between Mr Aurangzeb and Mr Dar reflect the tensions within the ruling party as well as the compulsions of an economy that cannot pick up momentum until it has undergone drastic and politically unpopular changes. The disagreement between the current and former finance minister on privatisation has emerged at a time when the government is all set to start talks for another IMF bailout facility in order to revive the economy. How this disagreement within the government will sit with the lender, which is already wary of the risks attached to the execution of the economic stabilisation policies, is anybody’s guess.

Published in Dawn, May 14th, 2024

Let optimism and grit prevail

Mohiuddin Aazim

Published May 13, 2024 

DAWN 

Pakistan’s external economy is plagued primarily with two structural problems. First, a high level of public external debt and second, overreliance on further external borrowings that not only increase the external debt stocks but also push the future cost of debt servicing. All other issues are ramifications of these two conundrums.

Our fragile and malleable democracy makes it too difficult for politicians to take the nation on board and find sustainable solutions to these problems of the external economy. A focus on short-term solutions prevail, and the government of the day, with varying levels of support from the military establishment, try to fix the balance of payments problems, often with the help of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and friendly countries.

The role of the IMF has always remained a subject of intense debate revolving around the desirability for and efficacy of its prescriptions for the ailing economy. According to the State Bank of Pakistan, our public external debt and total external debt stood at $99.7 billion and $131.6bn, respectively, at the end of December last year.

The irony is that the IMF continues to prescribe reforms that provide temporary relief from the balance of payments problems, but do not enable Pakistan to ensure sustainable cuts in external debts in the medium to long term. The Fund’s programmes also do not put Pakistan’s economy on a high-growth trajectory for the medium to long term.

Focusing on IMF-enabled short-term respite remains top-priority instead of long-term, sustainable solutions

This, coupled with all kinds of weaknesses in our political/judicial systems, including the intervention of ‘the establishment’ has been hampering sustainable, strong economic growth for many years. In the absence of this growth, our reliance on external borrowing remains intact and the IMF’s requirements take centre stage in economic policymaking.

Keeping this in mind, it doesn’t come as a surprise for most Pakistanis that the IMF now wants to peruse Pakistan’s budget strategy before its approval from the federal cabinet. This was inevitable and, according to credible media reports, the inevitable has happened now.

During this fiscal year, ending on June 30, Pakistan has apparently overcome the balance of payments crisis thanks to a $3bn IMF loan augmented by crucial rollovers of previous loans of Saudi Arabia and China. For the next fiscal year, the IMF’s initial projection of the external financing gap is $22bn. Closing this gap isn’t easy if Pakistan doesn’t remain under the IMF’s umbrella reforms programme.

Exactly why the country is desperately seeking $6bn-$8bn IMF funding for three years, and that’s why the government’s priority is to maintain a good relationship with the Fund. If that means discussing the budget strategy with the IMF, so be it.

Pakistan has four major demands on its foreign exchange: Imports, external debt servicing, repatriation of profits and dividends earned by foreign companies and foreign investors in Pakistan — and financing of foreign education, health and travel expenses of Pakistanis.

The country also has four major sources of forex inflows, ie exports, remittances, foreign direct and portfolio investments, and funding from international financial institutions and friendly countries.

Being under the umbrella of the Fund programme signals to global investors the perceived safety of their capital

Being under the umbrella of the IMF programme signals to global investors the perceived safety of their capital and helps us attract foreign investment and even state funding from friendly countries. It also helps our exporters reach out to foreign markets with relative ease. So, securing IMF funding as soon as possible is a must, and that’s what the government is trying to do.

But exports and remittances, being non-debt creating forex inflows, have primacy and that too is being respected. The problem, however, is that with back-breaking cost-push inflation still above 17pc the corporate sector finds it too hard to boost exports of goods within a year or two.

But taking services exports, particularly information technology (IT) and IT-enabled services (ITeS) exports, to higher levels rapidly is possible. That is where Pakistani policymakers should continue doubling up their present efforts. Similarly, tapping the full potential of remittances is important. On both fronts, the government is making some efforts but those are too small to make a big change in near future. So far, the situation is less promising and outright is bleak.

During nine months of this fiscal year (July 2023 to March 2024), exports of services fetched $5.8bn — showing a year-on-year increase of less than 1pc, according to the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics. During the same period, imports of services consumed $7.5bn, leaving a services trade deficit of $1.7bn.

Experience has shown time and again boosting services exports without allowing enough rise in imports is just not possible, at least for the time being. A drastic policy overhaul is in order. During these nine months, remittances also grew from less than 1pc to $21bn, according to the State Bank of Pakistan.

On the other hand, Pakistan’s goods trade deficit during 10 months (July 2023-April 2024) totalled $19.5bn despite all import restrictions, many of which may go after the IMF offers a new loan. Then, the goods trade deficit would be equal to remittances, leaving the services trade deficit to be financed from borrowed foreign funds.

Pakistan can avoid this situation by promoting services exports, particularly IT and ITeS exports if it collaborates meaningfully with global IT giants like Google with the stated objective that IT and ITeS exports’ growth must overtake imports growth within a year or so.

It can also address the issue of goods export growth with the IMF with a clear request presented with enough rationale that the Fund should let Pakistan’s import curbs continue for some time. The task is easier said than done, but optimism and grit often make miracles.

Published in Dawn, The Business and Finance Weekly, May 13th, 2024

India’s illiberal election

BJP ARE ARYAN SUPREMACISTS

Maleeha Lodhi 

DAWN

Published May 13, 2024 

GENERAL elections are underway in India in a phased voting process that concludes on June 1. Prime Minister Narendra Modi is widely predicted to win a third term in office. The Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) goal is for its National Democratic Alliance to secure 400-plus seats in the 543-member Lok Sabha — a target encapsulated in the party slogan abki baar 400 paar. There are doubts this can be achieved, especially as voter turnout has been lower in the first three phases of the election compared to 2019. Election outcomes are never foregone conclusions.

In the 2019 election, the BJP won 303 seats. With its allies, its support in the Lower House swelled to 352 seats. This time, it hopes to win 370 seats on its own as it does not see the opposition as much of a challenge. Although the party secured comfortable parliamentary majorities in the previous two elections to enable it to rule unhindered in its decade in power, well over half the electorate did not vote for BJP. In 2019, BJP polled around 38 per cent of the popular national vote; in 2014 it was less than 31pc. This indicates its real support, even though the first-past-the-post electoral system gave it an outsized share of Lok Sabha seats.

The BJP has benefited from a weak, divided and regionally fragmented opposition. The Congress party looks jaded and bereft of new ideas. Leading an opposition alliance called ‘INDIA’ (Indian National Developmental Inclusive Alliance), Congress has been unable to capture the public imagination or offer a credible alternative to the BJP’s narrative. It has struggled to counter Modi’s extravagant claims about his government’s achievements. Positive developments on India’s economic front have not all resulted from the Modi government’s policies but are entirely attributed to him by the BJP’s vigorous social media and propaganda campaign.

Modi’s carefully cultivated strongman image has yielded significant political dividends. This rests on claims of providing firm and incorruptible leadership, achieving economic development, benefiting India’s poor, and ‘connecting’ to ordinary people. More importantly, the Hindutva agenda is woven into his cult of personality, with the party portraying Modi as the champion and saviour of Hindu nationalism. His anti-Muslim actions and rhetoric have served to burnish those credentials.


The outlook for India-Pakistan relations is troubled if Modi returns to power.

Modi has sought to mobilise electoral support on his economic record, welfare and infrastructure projects, as well as his Hindu supremacist ideology. Even though rising unemployment and the soaring cost of living will weigh on voters’ minds, Modi is seen by many Indians to be a better bet on the economy than his opponents. He enjoys the backing of big business, for which the opposition accuses Modi of pandering to India’s super rich. In campaign speeches, Modi has repeatedly stated he has enhanced India’s international standing and helped to attract more foreign investment. He has even cast the election to be about making India “a major world power”.

The opposition’s attack on Modi has principally focused on his authoritarian conduct and policies. Certainly, democratic backsliding during his 10 years in power has been substantial and far reaching. This, his critics say, has turned India into an illiberal democracy. Judicial independence and media freedom have been undermined and civil liberties eroded. Modi’s government has muffled dissent, intimidated the media, harassed and incarcerated journalists and mounted extraordinary pressure on the opposition. Two state leaders allied with Congress, Arvind Kejriwal and Hemant Soren, have been jailed on dubious corruption charges. In March, the Congress party’s main bank accounts were frozen. Opposition leader Rahul Gandhi was expelled from parliament last year on the charge of defamation for ridiculing Modi’s name. Later, his jail sentence was suspended by the supreme court.

Modi has pledged to push ahead with his Hindutva agenda, for which the party points to several actions taken by the government, including construction of the Ram temple, a citizenship law disadvantaging Muslims, and revocation of Article 370 of the constitution, which gave Jammu and Kashmir special status. Modi has used toxic anti-Muslim rhetoric throughout his election campaign. He has called Muslims “infiltrators” and said they “have too many children” in an effort to scare Hindu voters into believing Muslims will eventually outnumber them. He has repeatedly accused the Congress party of favouring Muslims and conspiring to transfer wealth “looted” from Hindus to Muslims. The BJP has also posted videos containing these allegations. This prompted the Congress party to petition the election commission to act against this violation of election laws.

But nothing has deterred Modi from using inflammatory, Islamophobic language to demonise Muslims. He has even said his target of winning 400 seats is to prevent Congress from reviving Article 370 and putting the “Babri lock” on the Ram temple. Declaring “India is at a crucial juncture in history”, he has said the choice is between ‘vote jihad’ or ‘Ram Rajya’. He went further to say, “In Pakistan, terrorists are threatening jihad against India, and here the Congress people have also declared to ‘vote jihad’ against Modi, asking people of a particular religion to unite and vote against Modi.”

Along with Muslim-bashing, Pakistan too has been targeted by Modi’s incendiary rhetoric. He has contrasted his muscular approach in dealing with terrorism allegedly emanating from Pakistan with the infirm response of his predecessors. “Earlier, weak governments used to send dossiers to Pakistan after terror attacks, but we hit terrorists in their homes” — a reference to India’s air strikes on Balakot in 2019. Describing his government’s “new India policy of looking an adversary in the eye and speaking the truth rather than resorting to stealth,” he has warned of launching cross-border strikes in response to terror attacks on India. He has also ridiculed Pakistan by saying “a supplier of terrorism is now struggling for flour”.

This makes the outlook for Pakistan-India relations a troubled one if Modi returns to power. Some may dismiss Modi’s Pakistan-bashing as election politics, but words have consequences. Moreover, anti-Pakistan and anti-Muslim themes are a part of his and the BJP’s deeply held beliefs. This may not preclude some form of post-election India-Pakistan re-engagement, but it is unlikely in the near term to lead to any significant movement toward normalisation of ties.

The writer is a former ambassador to the US, UK and UN.

Published in Dawn, May 13th, 2024

Modi won’t go down sans a fight

Jawed Naqvi 

DAWN

Published May 14, 2024 

MOST neutral observers are sanguine that Prime Minister Narendra Modi is winning a third term. Let’s put it this way, it isn’t a foregone conclusion that Mr Modi is losing the election, which crossed its fourth of seven phases on Monday, despite compelling pointers he could. The assumption of his defeat is based on broad headcounts computed by seasoned analysts.

On the other side is the unceasing clamour from ‘Modi channels’, amid communal dog-whistling by anchors, that he is winning 400-plus seats. That’s a two-thirds majority with which we are told he would change the constitution. Adding weight to the claim of a Modi victory is psephologist Prashant Kishore’s assessment that the BJP could become the single largest party in West Bengal and Odisha. He says the BJP could make inroads for the first time in Tamil Nadu or at least its vote share in the state would hit double digits. That’s good news for Modi, but Kishore does have a mixed reputation at predicting poll outcomes.

We can discuss both sides of the claim and draw our respective conclusions. The question is, would Mr Modi accept defeat if it does come calling. Or would he take the Donald Trump route on losing, whipping up a terrifying frenzy instead? There are many variables to say just what the verdict could be at the hustings, not least because publishing the findings of exit polls is officially banned until the last vote is cast. Exit polls would come on June1, although there can be no certainty about their veracity either. That’s what experience shows. Thus, we must wait for the outcome till June 4.

But let’s hear from Yogendra Yadav, veteran former psephologist who recently became a member of Rahul Gandhi’s cross-country unity march for democracy. He said in a TV analysis on Monday after visiting key battleground states and noting the relatively low voter turnout that Mr Modi was likely to lose. “Election karvat le raha hai,” he said. (The election is changing course.)

The phrase is commonly heard on YouTube channels watching the elections from the ground, a far cry from regular TV channels that have already declared a victory for Mr Modi. Bunching the states in the fray including those that scored the maximum for the BJP in 2019, Yadav estimated those where Modi could lose a few, not least because there was no way to increase the tally from 100 per cent wins as in Gujarat or Rajasthan and Haryana or Delhi. The bulk of Mr Modi’s losses are expected from Maharashtra and Bihar, he says. Maharashtra is where Modi ditched the Shiv Sena and split the former ally to form a state government with the BJP. Now Shiv Sena leader Udhav Thackeray and Sharad Pawar, both members of the INDIA opposition alliance, are campaigning with doubled energy on the plank of defeating the ‘ghaddaars’, or traitors.


Would Modi accept defeat if it does come calling? Or would he take the Donald Trump route, instead?

With Thackeray’s Shiv Sena, the BJP secured 41 of 48 seats in Maharashtra in 2019. Without Thackeray, Yadav sees a loss of 20 seats at least. Bihar is where Chief Minister Nitish Kumar quit an alliance with Lalu Yadav’s party to go back for a third or fourth time to the BJP. Kumar is lampooned widely as ‘dal badloo’, a party hopper. The BJP and Kumar had 39 of 40 seats in Bihar last time. Yadav says they could lose 15.

Mr Modi’s tally could shed 10 in today’s Congress-ruled Karnataka where BJP had 26 of 28 seats in 2019. In West Bengal and the northeastern states, estimates Yadav, the BJP could be losing 10, which is at variance with Kishore’s reading. In Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand where the BJP held 69 jointly, it could lose 15. The BJP could gain five seats from the cluster of Tamil Nadu, Kerala and Telangana, and 10 from Andhra where it has an alliance with a local party. All told, Modi and allies at current reading could land 268, four short of majority.

Let’s consider both scenarios, Modi winning or losing. Lending weight to Yadav’s estimates is Nilanjan Mukhopadhyay, author of best-selling biography of Modi at the start of his Delhi sojourn. In an article last week, he said what could hurt Modi. “Reduced turnout, near absence of the famed cadre of the Sangh Parivar, lacklustre campaign of Modi, and the need to resort to … divisive and communally polarising spiel — all suggest the Modi script of 2024 has gone awry.” Despite Yadav’s headcount, if Modi does go on to win cleanly then he has won a third term. What if he loses?

According to Parakala Prabhakar, author of a best-selling Modi critique and husband of Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman, the BJP could try to steal the elections. It has too many skeletons in the cupboard waiting to tumble out. Besides, 2025 is the centenary year of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh. They wouldn’t want not to be in power to celebrate. Yet, analysts also claim it is the RSS that may be dragging its feet on handing a great victory to Mr Modi. The dice, says Prabhakar, is loaded and potentially spiked. “The regime has eliminated the role of the supreme court in the selection and appointment of the election commissioners. Whether the government-appointed election commissioners will do the regime’s bidding is a matter of speculation or suspicion.”

Mr Modi moved to freeze the bank accounts of the Congress party, crippling its putative challenger. He put two chief ministers in prison. But for the supreme court giving interim bail to Delhi Chief Minister Arvind Kejriwal, the Modi regime had rendered the opposition’s onslaught that much weaker.

“There is every likelihood that the present dispensation would, therefore, try to do everything to steal this election. Unlike the earlier general elections, the present election is unlikely to conclude with the conclusion of polling on June 1 and declaration of results on June 4.”

The writer is Dawn’s correspondent in Delhi.
jawednaqvi@gmail.com

Published in Dawn, May 14th, 2024

Indian elections

Modi’s anti-Muslim rhetoric is raising concerns of violence.

Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry 

DAWN

Published May 12, 2024 

THE Islamophobic rhetoric being employed by Narendra Modi for this election campaign has become shrill. Pakistan has nearly always been an electoral issue in India.

However, this time, it is Indian Muslims who are bearing the brunt of the Indian prime minister’s hate speech. Speaking in Rajasthan last month, he called Muslims “infiltrators” and said they produce too many children. In Gujarat, where, as chief minister, he had overseen the massacre of Muslims in 2002, he accused the Congress of seeking to “loot” India’s wealth and redistribute it among Muslims, and of organising a ‘vote jihad’ against his leadership. Later, he accused the Congress and Muslims of stealing Hindu wealth and property.

Modi’s inflammatory rhetoric was followed by the BJP’s campaign video portraying Muslims as outsiders who plundered India’s wealth. As concerns grew about communal violence, the video was removed. These allegations are a sequel to Modi’s public referencing of earlier conspiracy theories of ‘love jihad’ (Muslims forcibly converting Hindu women and marrying them to increase the Muslim population) or ‘land jihad’ (capturing land to construct religious structures and gaining control of India’s territory). Concerns that his rhetoric might incite further violence against Indian Muslims are increasing.

Ordinarily, since Hindus are in a majority in India, it may be difficult to question the rationale of creating a Hindu state. However, two observations are in order. One, the expansionist designs of the cherished Hindu state seek the creation of an Akhand Bharat, a Hindu right fantasy, which would violate the territorial integrity of Nepal, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, as per a map displayed in the new parliament building. This is not acceptable to the aforementioned independent states.

Two, though the creation of a Hindu state should not translate into discrimination against minorities, regrettably this will be the case. The works of French political scientist Christophe Jaffrelot illustrate how Muslims, 14.5 per cent of India’s population, are grossly underrepresented in bureaucracy, the judiciary, police, and legislative organs. They are second-class citizens.

The Muslim-majority area of Indian-occupied Jammu and Kashmiri is also being subjected to demographic engineering. The destruction of the centuries-old Babri Masjid by Hindu zealots in 1992 and the construction of a temple in its place has set a precedent that might be followed for other historic mosques. This contrasts sharply with the UAE’s gesture of permitting a Hindu temple in Abu Dhabi.

Modi’s anti-Muslim rhetoric is raising concerns of violence.

Analysts are also pointing out the fascist tendencies of the BJP regime, a steep decline in democratic values, and a departure from the moorings of pluralism and secularism on which modern India was founded. In her book The Incarcerations, Alpa Shah contends that Modi’s India is using its national security apparatus to incarcerate ordinary citizens for their dissenting views. Commenting on the book, Arundhati Roy stated that this was about criminalisation and incarceration of dissent itself.

Strikingly, the Modi regime has also used art and culture to project the Hindutva philosophy. Kunal Purohit’s book H-Pop: The Secretive World of Hindutva Pop Stars shows how Hindutva pop stars and influencers are being used to spread the message of Hindu supremacy and create acceptance of Hindutva’s core beliefs.

Apart from this, Modi is playing on his government’s accomplishments: making India the world’s fifth largest economy; the construction of 50,000 kilometres of national highways; boosting India’s mi­­litary spending; bu­­ilding Vikrant, In­­dia’s first domes­ti­­cal­­ly built aircraft carrier; and the Chandrayaan-3 moon landing.

His prospects of winning a third term have been bolstered by a weak opposition. Despite the formation of the Congress-led 37-party INDIA coalition, there is no real challenge. What has bolstered his outreach is India’s enhanced global standing. In his book Why Bharat Matters, S. Jaishankar presents India as a leader of the global south and makes a case for the rejuvenation of India as a civilisational state.

There are some lessons that Pakistan could learn from India’s electoral process. One, despite the large scale of India’s elections (969 million registered voters; 1m polling stations) and the use of electronic voting machines, election results are largely accepted without much ado. Two, there is no caretaker government, as the incumbents become ‘caretakers’ in a way, and refrain from announcing major policy decisions or sanctioning expenditure for development schemes.

If Modi wins a third term, he is likely to maintain his pro-Hindutva, anti-Muslim, and hegemonic attitude towards regional countries, particularly Pakistan.

The write is a former foreign secretary and chairman of Sanober Institute Islamabad.

Published in Dawn, May 12th, 2024

PAKISTAN

Political merry-go-round

Arifa Noor 

DAWN

Published May 14, 2024 

THERE has been far too much discussion on May 9 in the past week, making the issue as repetitive as our talk show discussions. But then, I do claim to write on politics so it is perhaps fair to bore the readers as much as the poor viewers compelled to watch television talk shows.

So here goes.

The week, in a way, did begin with the press conference of the DG ISPR in which he made it clear that the trials of the ‘perpetrators’ of May 9 were essential, while also adding that the PTI had to apologise for its role and change its behaviour.

Parts of this message were picked up by key members of the government as well. For example, Khawaja Asif, the defence minister, spoke of the trials reaching their logical conclusion, while the prime minister also promised a similar commitment.

However, the DG, as well as some members of the cabinet, mentioned dialogue with the PTI and its importance. The former pointed out that a dialogue can only take place among political forces as it was “not appropriate for the military to be involved”, according to a story in this paper. Since then, Rana Sanaullah has spoken of a grand dialogue, as did Bilawal Bhutto-Zardari who emphasised the need for parties to talk to each other.

The past year has turned matters into a confrontation between the state and the people.

It would require courage far more than I possess to comment on the DG ISPR’s statement but little bravery is required to dissect whatever the politicians are uttering. So here goes.

While it seems the statements emanating from the ‘government’ side were harsh (as was the reaction from the PTI), they were also not very clear. To promise strict accountability, along with occasional hints about a crackdown on the PTI, and then asking the party to also talk to its political opponents in the larger context is a bit of a mixed message.

For instance, had a similar message come last year in the aftermath of May 9, the PTI would perhaps have responded with eagerness. But after a year-long crackdown, which the party survived (it also contested and won an election) this offer may be a case of too little, too late.

And this is not simply because of its stubborn leader; there are two other factors to consider here: the party’s workers are now in an aggressive mood but also the broad-based nature of the crackdown in KP and Punjab means that beyond power politics, the past year has turned matters into a confrontation between the state and the people.

It is a point hard to explain or argue over and over again for it’s simply earned me the title of being a PTI apologist in the past year or so. But this old thought comes to mind when I come across Wusutullah Khan’s sound bite: he narrates what the rickshaw wallah said to him as he travelled to the airport after attending the Asma Jahangir Conference in Lahore.

The clip is easy to find online for those who have mastered the art of using VPN. Hence, there is little need to narrate his experience; suffice it to say that in the past six months, at least two other visitors to Lahore who hired cars or cabs recounted the same story. Or take the kind of reception Mahrang Baloch got at the conference. It wasn’t just about the ovation that she received when she spoke but also the dozens who kept coming up to her to get pictures taken with her. There is a sense of shared experience when a young Lahori man comes up to this Baloch woman and speaks of his sister who is a huge fan of Mahrang.

It is this gap that needs to be bridged, especially in the wake of a controversial election and the formation of a government seen to enjoy little legitimacy. And by this I mean the gap between the ordinary people, who have suffered due to a year-long crackdown on a party, and the state.

Has the process already begun? Will it help if some of the incarcerated are released? Or for the trials to be expedited? Or would it mean the PTI has to be given some relief, despite ‘May 9’? This is for the big brains running this government. A journalist is a journalist because it is easy to point out the problems without getting into the nitty-gritty of policymaking.

This may prove necessary because it is not enough to get the PTI into parliament and talking to other parties without also appeasing public opinion — if the people continue to be angry, they might just dump the PTI and find more radical options.

This is not simply an abstract suggestion from a bleeding-heart liberal — another label increasingly being thrown my way. Though as an aside, it is well worth pointing out a confrontational situation between the people and the state is not going to allow for a coherent and effective response to the militancy problem, which is not simply festering but growing.

The economy needs work, lots of work in the form of ‘reform’. But these reforms, despite what most suggest, are not technical decisions. They are inherently political. And among other factors, no unpopular government that is staring down a popular opposition is going to own difficult decisions such as taxing the traders or privatising SOEs. For both will carry the risk of further alienating yet another section of society. This may prove as true of the government as the establishment. And the latter will also have to consider the implications of similarly ‘difficult’ decisions such as a tax on real estate.

Mere talks in themselves will not prove enough. There will have to be concrete actions along the way too if some of the more difficult decisions are to be owned and carried out. And for this, it is not enough for the parties to cooperate in parliament; if it was, the extension given to Gen Qamar Bajwa would not be an orphan today.

The writer is a journalist.

Published in Dawn, May 14th, 2024

Who can rock the hybrid boat?

Abbas Nasir 

DAWN

Published May 12, 2024

A NUMBER of developments over the past week suggest that the establishment is keen to enforce/ maintain the status quo and the only impediment in its path may be an assertive superior judiciary that has been increasingly finding its feet in recent weeks.

If jailed PTI leader and former prime minister Imran Khan’s article in UK’s conservative right-wing Telegraph newspaper blaming the military leadership directly for all his woes the week before was not hint enough of the state of play, two public statements by the latter clarified issues rather unambiguously.

The first came in the DG ISPR’s press briefing, which was ostensibly called to discuss Afghanistan-based terrorist groups’ involvement in attacks on Chinese nationals working on development projects in the country. But in response to a couple of questions about the PTI and Imran Khan related to the events of May 9 last year, the DG ISPR stated unequivocally that the only path to rehabilitation for the political party and its leaders was to ‘seek forgiveness for attacking your own forces’.

Then, perhaps, talks could happen and that too with ‘political parties’ (ie, the government), as the military had ‘nothing to do with politics’. Imran Khan has been consistent in saying he wouldn’t talk to the ‘powerless political parties’ and that a meaningful dialogue is possible only with the military.

The DG ISPR also lamented the delay in the prosecution and sentencing of all those responsible for the May mayhem — including the ‘leaders and mastermind’ against whom ‘irrefutable evidence’ has been gathered and submitted — and, in doing so, appeared to hint at the establishment’s frustrations with what it perceives as roadblocks being erected by the judiciary.

The content of the live presser evoked an equally adamant response from the PTI, which went on the offensive, reiterating its stance that May 9 was a ‘false flag operation’, accusing the military’s spokesman of being economical with the truth, and saying it would be happy to live with the findings of an impartial judicial commission into the May 9 events and would even apologise if found to be at fault.

If the chief was able to weather that storm then, he appears far more secure now.

The military spokesman had pre-empted this demand in his briefing earlier by saying if a probe were to happen, as was being demanded, it ought to start with 2014, and not nine years later. The 2014 PTI sit-in in the federal capital was said to have been instigated and backed by the then ISI chief.

This was the first indication that the military was prepared to hold its own accountable for past follies, if it paved the way for the trials and sentencing of PTI leaders it says were responsible for the attacks on defence installations in a number of cities in Punjab and KP.

While the spokesman left nothing to the imagination, on the first anniversary of May 9, the army chief added his voice to his chief spokesman’s in terms of stressing the need for punishing the perpetrators of the violence a year earlier, also lashing out against what he called ‘digital terrorism’.

This indicates that harsher curbs on social media are planned. So far, the PTI has had overwhelming social media dominance and had been able to keep a step ahead of its adversaries, but we will find out soon whether it has what it takes to bypass software the Chinese have developed over the years (and Pakistan has reportedly acquired) and successfully used to block dissident content.

With this ever-widening gulf between the establishment and the party it once saw as a panacea for all that ails Pakistan, the one thing that many felt could force a rethink in the establishment would have been a public manifestation of the immense support enjoyed by the PTI, as evidenced in last February’s elections.

Many Pakistan watchers keenly waited all day for multitudes of PTI supporters to spill out onto the roads and streets of major urban conurbations on the party leader’s call to ‘break the shackles’ and protest on May 9. But the brutal crackdown of the past one year seems to have knocked the wind out of the party’s sails and worn down the workers’ will.

People may turn out to vote for it in droves, but did not appear prepared to risk life, limb and liberty in coming out for mass protests. Some small localised protests did happen, but had zero impact in the sense of influencing decision-making in the corridors of power. Going forward, a couple of factors will play a role in steering developments.

The first and foremost will be the confidence the army chief has in his control over his institution. His predecessor appointed a dozen major generals to three stars in his final six weeks in office and left the incumbent little room in terms of forming his own team.

Natural attrition and the more dramatic exit of a couple of three stars on disciplinary grounds recently has, 18 months down the line, given the chief an opportunity to place senior officers of his own choosing in key roles which will give him greater freedom of action both inside and outside the institution. The promotion of three officers this week, including the DG ISPR, to three stars was another step in that direction.

The military saw May 9 as a coup against the chief, a failed attempt to dislodge him from office. If the chief was able to weather that storm then, he appears far more secure now. With the PTI protests failing to gather momentum, the only impediment in his path seems to be an increasingly assertive superior judiciary.

It can and will, in all likelihood, challenge the establishment’s pre-eminence in decision-making. It isn’t clear how the latter plans to deal with that, especially because it believes that a direly needed economic revival is only possible under the umbrella of a hybrid set-up and in a relatively calm political environment. Only the judiciary can rock its boat now.

The writer is a former editor of Dawn.
abbas.nasir@hotmail.com

Published in Dawn, May 12th, 2024

An inclusive judiciary

Reema Omer

DAWN

Published May 11, 2024

ACCORDING to media reports, a recent meeting of the Judicial Commission of Pakistan (JCP) was adjourned without finalising changes in its rules. This was because the law minister informed the members that the federal government was considering amending the Constitution to revise the appointment process of high court and Supreme Court (SC) judges.

The government has thus far not revealed details of its proposed amendments. Some indication of possible reform can be found in the PML-N’s manifesto, which provides for an “inclusive procedure for appointment of Superior Court Judges on merit”. The PPP’s manifesto recognises the importance of diversity, and promises to increase representation for women, minorities, and underrepresented segments of society in the judiciary. The PTI’s manifesto makes similar commitments regarding making the judiciary more inclusive and the process of appointments more transparent.

Importantly, the committee constituted in December 2023 to review the Judicial Commis­sion Rules, 2010, also listed “diversity” as one of the key areas that required consideration.


The major parties and courts agree there is need for reform in the appointments process.

It appears, therefore, that the major political parties and the courts agree there is need for reform in the appointments process to make it more inclusive and the judiciary more diverse.

Specifically, a number of reforms will be required to achieve this objective.

The first issue that needs to be addressed is that of framing. Often, inclusion and diversity are considered contrary to the idea of “merit”, and are reduced merely to tokenism and tick-box exercises. This perception must be strongly challenged. The inclusion of women as well as other marginalised groups in the administration of justice is a cross-cutting issue, with implications for the credibility and legitimacy of the justice system in larger society. It should be seen as an objective in itself as well as an essential pre-condition for the effective protection of human rights and substantive equality.

It is now recognised that diversity is not an optional ‘extra’ but a basic component of the judiciary’s ability to do its job. And that diversity and inclusion should be considered a part of ‘merit’ and not in opposition to it. This is why a number of constitutions recognise the importance of diversity in the judiciary — specifically, greater inclusion of women — but also consideration for religious, racial and other factors, depending on the context. Any amendments to the process of judicial appointments, therefore, should expressly provide for the equal representation of women, inclusion and diversity as objectives of the judicial appointments process.

Second, the composition of the JCP needs amendment. Currently, it comprises the chief justice of Pakistan, four most senior judges of the SC, one former judge of the SC, the federal law and justice minister, the attorney general of Pakistan, and a senior SC advocate. When the JCP is considering appointments for the high courts, it includes four additional members.

At present, all members of the JCP are men. This is not accidental, but a consequence of the larger exclusion of women from the top echelons of the legal profession in the country. Its composition also suffers from lack of diversity and inclusion of members who are not from the judiciary or the bar. This absence has an adverse impact on the JCP’s credibility and is not sustainable. Article 175A of the Constitution should, therefore, be amended to make the JCP more diverse, and also aim to ensure that its composition broadly reflects that of larger society in terms of gender, ethnicity, religious groups, and regional balance.

Third, there is currently an absence of any criteria for appointments to the SC and high courts. The Constitution only stipulates the requirement of age, citizenship, and minimum professional experience. The Judicial Commission Rules are also completely silent on the criteria on which the JCP nominates or assesses candidates. The lack of transparent and public criteria on which judicial appointments are made is incompatible with international standards and best practices on judicial appointments.

Changes in the judicial appointments process should, therefore, include criteria on which candidates are considered for recommendation, and give due consideration to the need for the progressive attainment of gender equity and the removal of other historic factors of discrimination and marginalisation.

The fourth issue that also has an impact on inclusion and diversity is how nominations are initiated. At present, chief justices have the sole power of ‘initiation’; ie, it is only the chief justice of the relevant court who can recommend names of candidates, who are then considered by the JCP for nominations to the parliamentary committee. This power has dubious roots, creates an unnecessary hierarchy within the JCP, and has led to the perception of misuse.

In a number of jurisdictions, including the UK and South Africa, the bodies empowered to make judicial appointments invite interested candidates to apply to be considered for appointment to the Supreme Court. This model opens up the judicial appointments process, allows a more diverse range of eligible candidates to apply, and eliminates any bias, real or perceived, in the ‘initiation’ stage. The government should, therefore, consider making provision for the JCP inviting applications for vacancies in the high courts and SC.

The fifth area that needs reform is lack of transparency. At present, the deliberations and proceedings of the JCP are secret and opaque. The public has no information about why certain candidates are chosen for consideration and on what basis candidates are selected for nomination. In the larger context of discriminatory practices and attitudes against women and other marginalised groups, such secrecy often works to their detriment and leads to the perception of bias in the appointments process.

While the detailed deliberations of the JCP need not be made public, the reasons for selecting certain candidates for nomination must be disclosed.

Most importantly, perhaps, the government’s reform package must take into consideration input from a broad range of stakeholders. Opaque and hasty attempts at such far-reaching legislation that are not consultative would defeat the very objectives of transparency, merit, and inclusion such reform claims to achieve.

The writer is a legal adviser for the International Commission of Jurists.
reema.omer@icj.org
X: reema_omer

Published in Dawn, May 11th, 2024

Africa: Wildlife Traffickers Carried On Their Illegal Trade During Covid Lockdown - What Legal Traders Can Learn From Their Resilience

13 MAY 2024
The Conversation Africa (Johannesburg)

ANALYSIS

By Annette Hübschle and Meredith Gore

The world literally stopped during the COVID-19 pandemic. But while countries locked down to keep coronavirus at bay, wildlife traffickers carried on their illegal activities. Global risk governance and criminology academics Annette Hübschle and Meredith Gore studied the traffickers' methods and share lessons from their resilience.

How did wildlife traffickers continue their trade?

Many wildlife traffickers adapted their operations. From mostly air cargo and commercial flights, they changed to transportation by foot, bicycle, motorcycles and, in some cases, government vehicles.

We learned of some instances where they used hearses and caskets of COVID-19 victims, exploiting the cover of funeral events to transport and distribute illegal wildlife products such as ivory and rhino horns.

They also shifted their activities online. They created new digital marketplaces that allowed direct interactions with buyers. Online platforms helped wildlife traffickers avoid intermediaries.

Finally, we heard multiple reports of stockpiling products which they then moved swiftly once restrictions were lifted.

What made them resilient?

Their adaptability was remarkable. They innovated by diversifying transport methods and routes. To evade detection, they used less monitored routes. And their swift adoption of online platforms enabled them to reach a wider audience and conduct discreet transactions despite lockdowns and travel restrictions.

Stockpiling products during the lockdown allowed them to resume trade quickly when conditions improved.

How did you find out about their illegal activities?

Many of our insights come from reviewing existing studies on resilience and illegal markets, and conducting extensive field research. We undertook detailed case studies in South Africa, Tanzania and Zambia. We focused on how responses to the pandemic affected people operating in the illegal wildlife trade.

Our methods included interviews with people directly involved in the trade and local community members. We also spoke with law enforcement officers and NGO workers. We employed participatory mapping to understand trade routes and methods, analysed documents and gathered statistical data.

Why are your findings important?

They provide deeper insights into how people operate in illegal economies. By examining how the illegal markets adapted to the challenges of the COVID-19 lockdown, we can learn how to improve the resilience of legal economies. This can help policymakers develop more effective strategies for managing environmental, social and economic challenges.

Our research emphasises the importance of considering diverse perspectives and unconventional sources of resilience in addressing complex environmental issues.

One of the most critical aspects of our research is the expansion of the Frictions and Flows framework. We originally designed it to analyse the dynamics of illegal wildlife trade. It was built on research about illegal rhino horn flows. Now it has evolved to take a broader perspective, helping us understand both legal and illegal wildlife trade.

By observing how these markets adapt, innovate and keep going, we gain insights into the underlying mechanisms. These can be applied to improve resilience in legal economies facing global challenges. For example, the framework could help legal economies to cope with other shocks such as extreme weather events or sea level rise.

The framework allows one to identify specific pain points. Supply chain disruptions during hurricanes or floods would be an example. Then it's possible to come up with strategies to manage the problem. That could involve, for example, diversifying supply sources or improving logistics networks to maintain trade flows.

This shift in thinking provides a roadmap through immediate impacts and can help prepare for long-term challenges.

The way traffickers adapted during the pandemic highlights the challenges that law enforcement and regulatory agencies face in disrupting wildlife trafficking. The approach to these challenges should combine:whole of society responses (diverse stakeholders)
strengthened international cooperation
targeted interventions to disrupt trafficking networks, in particular their sources of funding
addressing the factors driving demand for illegal wildlife products (for example, urbanisation, increased middle-income populations with dispensable income).

Strategies must consider the broader impacts of wildlife trafficking too, such as undermining sustainable development investments. This is particularly true for vulnerable members of society (like women and youth), local communities and Indigenous peoples who are often severely affected by crises but have developed complex coping mechanisms.

Efforts to stop wildlife trafficking must consider the links between environmental conservation, public health and socioeconomic factors. By recognising the connections between legal and illegal markets and integrating health, environmental and social policies, countries can develop more robust systems to protect wildlife and support communities against future crises.

Annette Hübschle, Chief research officer: Global Risk Governance Programme, Public Law Department, Faculty of Law, University of Cape Town, University of Cape Town

Meredith Gore, Professor, University of Maryland

This article is republished from The Conversation Africa under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.