It’s possible that I shall make an ass of myself. But in that case one can always get out of it with a little dialectic. I have, of course, so worded my proposition as to be right either way (K.Marx, Letter to F.Engels on the Indian Mutiny)
Monday, September 23, 2024
India extends unprecedented invite to Myanmar's anti-junta forces, sources say
It was not immediately clear if Myanmar’s military government would also be invited to the event, which the sources said would be on the topic of “Constitutionalism and Federalism”.
Updated Sep 24, 2024
MYANMAR/INDIA - India has invited political and military opponents of Myanmar’s ruling junta to attend a seminar in New Delhi, sources said, a significant move by the South Asian power that has maintained ties with the top generals shunned by Western nations.
A civil war in Myanmar since its military unseated an elected civilian government in a February 2021 coup now risks destabilising India’s 1,650 km border with Myanmar, and some of its key infrastructure projects there.
A leader of an armed group and two sources with direct knowledge of the issue said the parallel National Unity Government (NUG) and ethnic minority rebels from the states of Chin, Rakhine and Kachin bordering India had been invited to a seminar in mid-November.
The event would be hosted by the government-funded Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA), whose council includes India’s Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar, said two other sources, who spoke on condition of anonymity as the matter was confidential.
It was not immediately clear if Myanmar’s military government would also be invited to the event, which the sources said would be on the topic of “Constitutionalism and Federalism”. They gave no further details.
Widespread protest in Myanmar over the 2021 coup turned into a nationwide rebellion, with an armed resistance movement combining with some established ethnic armies to seize control of wide swathes of territory from the military.
The junta has refused to enter into dialogue with the rebels, whom it describes as “terrorists”.
Speaking of the seminar, Mr Sui Khar, vice chairman of one the ethnic rebel groups, the Chin National Front, said, “We are going to send representatives.”
“This will be the first time, I think, formally, that India will engage with the non-state actors. This is a good, positive approach.”
A spokesperson for Myanmar’s military did not answer telephone calls to seek comment. The Indian government and the ICWA did not immediately respond to requests for comment.
The other armed groups invited include the Arakan Army, which controls significant reaches of territory in Rakhine bordering Bangladesh, and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), one of Myanmar’s most powerful rebel forces, the sources added.
A spokesperson for the president of the shadow NUG government declined to comment on the seminar. The Arakan Army and KIA did not immediately respond to requests for comment.
Motive unclear
Although the junta has been condemned by Western powers, with most of them having imposed sanctions, India has kept up engagement with the generals through visits to the capital, Naypyitaw, by its government and defence officials.
India has been reluctant to openly criticise the junta, which could push the generals closer to rival China. New Delhi has had no formal engagement with the junta’s opponents.
It was not immediately clear what the seminar would seek to achieve or why India has made the move.
In June, Foreign Minister Jaishankar voiced concern about border instability and the security risks to India’s projects in Myanmar. India was “open to engaging all stakeholders in addressing this situation,” he told his Myanmar counterpart.
India is involved in developing the US$400 million (S$515 million) Kaladan port and highway project in Myanmar’s west, as well as providing about US$250 million for another road project to link its landlocked northeastern states with Thailand, via Myanmar.
The seminar plan comes amid a peace effort by the Asean grouping of South-east Asian nations that has made scant progress since its unveiling in April 2021, as some Asean nations have been vexed by the junta’s refusal of talks.
Last year, former Asean chair Indonesia said it had received positive signals about preliminary dialogue from major parties in the conflict, but there have been no signs advancement yet.
The November meeting would represent New Delhi’s most serious effort to approach Myanmar’s “pro-democracy side” since the 2021 coup, said Mr Angshuman Choudhury, a Singapore-based researcher who closely tracks India-Myanmar affairs.
“We also need to see ... whether it is meant to achieve specific foreign policy outcomes or simply relay a signal to the Myanmar military to step back,” he said.
“India remains concerned about the security and stability of its borders.”
REUTERS
The Revolution in Myanmar
An American currently fighting for the revolution in Myanmar discusses the avoidance of ethnic and political schisms, the decentralisation of guerilla combat, the confusions generated by counter-insurrection, and the complex geopolitical dynamics at play
Ill Will: How did a civil protest movement using the tactics and strategies of the black bloc and rock throwing evolve to become a domestic insurgency? How does this process compare to the 1988 civil war which, at first glance, seemed to proceed along similar lines?
Azad: Before responding to the questions of the comrades, I would like to first address certain realities about the revolution in Myanmar that I believe are important for the full understanding of the situation. The current revolution, spurred from a nationwide rebuke of the sudden assumption of power by the military, has proceeded along many separate and contradictory lines. I think it is important to frame these developments in the language of diversity and flowering, rather than of fracturing or inconsistency.
Myanmar is a state formed within colonial boundaries. As a result, it is the common nation of a dozen-plus ethnicities in addition to the Burmese people. The progression from independence to ‘Burmese Socialism’ has long been complicated, and democratic rule here has always stood on shaky ground.
As I write this, the state is now confronted by over a hundred different armed groups. Some of them are as small as a township, while others rival the junta’s army in capability. I have spent 7 months in Chin State with two militias; the PDF Zoland and the Chin National Defense Force (CNDF). These two groups are members of the Chin Brotherhood alliance, itself one of two military blocs within Chin state. In this short 7 months, I have only just begun to understand the local dynamics and conditions of the revolution, to say nothing of regional and national differences. As such, I hope any inaccuracies can be forgiven, and that any insight I can give will be considered a fragment of a more complete analysis of the situation in Myanmar.
Following the Juntas usurpation of power, protests from all sections of society began immediately: not only in the Burmese heartland, but in the urban centers of the ethnic regions as well. In Instagram and Facebook story collections of those who resisted, you can find a progression of the protests reminiscent of a slideshow: at first, reactions of disbelief and outrage at the coup; then, of horror at the use of violence and massacres to repress dissent, followed finally by calls for armed resistance. While initially peaceful, favoring mass marches and general strikes, the dissident movement underwent rapid evolution when faced with bullets and massacres in the streets. Realizing they were confronting an enemy that recognized only violence, armed resistance began in the first month with homemade air-cannons, slingshots, and traditional muzzle-loading hunting rifles. It soon became clear that there were only two choices: between revolution, or surrender to dictatorship. At this point, thousands flocked to the countryside, either joining existing “Ethnic Armed Organizations” (EAOs) that had already been resisting the central Burmese government for decades, or forming their own new resistance organizations.
As resistance swelled in the streets, the now-deposed elected government worked to retain its legitimacy. Only days after the coup, legislators from the National League for Democracy (NLD) — the political party that secured majority control of both houses of the legislature, with help from politicians from other ousted parties, — formed the CRPH, or “Committee representing [the legislature].” The CRPH refused to recognize the authority of the military coup. One month later, the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) was formed, a coalition that gathered elements from the nationwide protest movement, the opposition government, and — significantly — eight ethnic armed organizations. The NUCC went on to form the National Unity Government (NUG), widely recognized as the legitimate de jure government of Myanmar.
To return to your question, I think it is a mistake to see this as “1988 but different.” The current moment is the result of a historical current that cannot be explained without the 1988 uprising. The NLD, for example, had its roots in this uprising. Since its inception as a state, there has always been a “pro-democracy” element of Burmese politics and ethnic armed organizations vying for independence or autonomy. However, never have these two elements joined forces like we are seeing today. The 1988 uprising was catalyzed in urban centers and failed to evolve into a national resistance, while today almost all liberated territory is held by the EAOs. Symbolized in the inclusion of EAO representatives in the NUCC and later NUG, the alliance between ethnic fighters seeking autonomy and pro-democracy Burmese society marks a major point of departure from previous cycles of struggle.
It seems like the tables have turned in favor of the revolution? To what do you attribute this? What would winning look like militarily and politically?
For the first time in the revolutionary history of Myanmar, the military is indeed on the backfoot. The Tatmadaw (the armed forces of Myanmar) was historically organized exclusively for the purposes of counter-insurgency, modeled after the brutal colonial repression strategy of the British empire. Through the clever use of ceasefires and autonomy agreements, it has pursued a divide and conquer strategy, isolating EAOs one at a time and destroying them with concentrated force. Before the outbreak of the “Spring revolution” against the dictatorship, the government of Myanmar was party to the NCA or “National Ceasefire Agreement” alongside signatories from ten EAOs.
Now, the situation has changed. Following the overwhelming popular opposition to the Junta and the collaboration of the NUG with the EAOs, almost every organization either withdrew from the ceasefire agreement or was otherwise attacked by the Tatmadaw (in violation of the ceasefire). Instead of having the freedom to amass forces in one section of the country, with no complaints from a largely apathetic Burmese public, the Tatmadaw was now forced to fight everywhere at once against an enemy with virtually unlimited popular support. While clashes began almost immediately following the coup, the junta suffered its first major defeat as a result of Operation 1027, which took its name from the coordinated strike on October 27 2023 by the Three Brotherhood Alliance, an alliance of three major EAOs. In just the first month of the offensive, over 220 junta positions were overrun, triggering a shockwave across the country. This was the first signal that the military regime was too overstretched to defend itself, and gave many around the country the confidence needed to begin their own offensives. As operation 1027 continues, so too do the many regional campaigns that it inspired. Since then, as you have seen, the junta has suffered defeat after defeat.
It seems that the trend will continue. Militarily, each EAO is nearing the liberation of their home states, and as PDF militias under the ostensible command of the NUG fight alongside them, slowly the Tatmadaw is losing its footing in the ethnic regions, all the while facing a guerrilla campaign around the outskirts of cities in the Bamar regions. Plain and simple, the military is losing. The ethnic areas will soon be liberated, the only remaining question being how much of that momentum will carry over into Bamar-majority regions. Many EAOs have stated plainly that in addition to their demands for autonomy, they will continue fighting until the unconditional defeat of the military dictatorship.
At a political level the goal is a bit less defined. Whoever you ask will tell you that we are all fighting for a “Federal Democracy.” What that means in practice has yet to be clearly defined and universally agreed upon, but this is understandable given the nature of the conflict and doesn’t necessarily detract from its validity as a goal.
Have you had support from other countries or international forces? Have the fighters drawn upon connections with insurgents elsewhere?
So far, support from foreign governments has been mostly marginal: recognition of the NUG as the legitimate representative of Myanmar, as well as economic sanctions against those affiliated with the junta. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been largely non-committal, and the efforts of neighboring nations to mediate the conflict have been mostly ignored. India and China have been incredibly calculating in their relationship to the regime and rebels, overtly continuing their support of the regime while turning a blind eye to the activities of resistance groups conducting business in their own countries. This is especially true when we consider the rate at which the junta has been suffering defeats — it seems many are waiting to see how the conflict will develop before fully committing to a position.
In December 2022, the United States Congress passed the “BURMA Act,” which recognizes the NUG as the legitimate representative of Myanmar and authorizes the use of funds to support “democratic elements.” So far, this is all going through humanitarian avenues. While it isn’t guns and ammo, armed groups who are now ousting the junta from their towns are having to foot the bill for the services provided. NGOs such as USAID are able to cover a portion of that cost, which understandably reduces administrative burden significantly.
I have yet to see serious indications of meaningful connections or examples drawn from other insurgent groups. In the span of a few years, entire armies have been made out of students, teachers, workers, and the former professional class, so the focus has been on the rapid emergency armament of a people and less on the strategic analysis of methods. Many ethnicities in Myanmar have a significant diaspora in the West, and especially in the United States, where participation in the military is more common. As a result, I have seen multiple ethnic Chin from the US with a military background give trainings, and anecdotally I’m told this has happened in other regions as well.
I am aware of various communist and Maoist groups such as the Burmese Communist Party, but am not knowledgeable enough about them to comment as to their inspirations.
What lessons can be taken from the sequence of insurgency, then civil war with guerilla features? How portable is the model that has been adopted? What limits are there to translating the situation to elsewhere?
I don’t think there actually is a model that has been adopted, but rather a progression of developments that are still very much unfolding. The lessons from these are nevertheless tangible. One of the most striking is that unorganized popular resistance can only be so effective in the face of bullets. As we saw in Syria in 2011, unrest can provide the inertia necessary to begin revolution, but it cannot become the revolution in and of itself. In the case of Rojava, it was the People’s Democratic Union (PYD), dormant but organized since 2003, which was able to put the spear into the heart of the Syrian occupation, and subsequently to defend the revolution from attacks by Al-Nusra and ISIS, as well as the fascist Turkish state. Here in Burma, it was the ethnic organizations that have been resisting in the mountains for decades which were able to fight with renewed spirit and support of the people, alongside a shadow government which still holds serious claims to legitimacy.
Still, there is something to be said for the newer groups formed after the coup. These organizations and armies — hewn from nothing but the moral fiber of refusal to live under dictatorship — catalyzed around pre-existing organizational structures that later solidified during the post-coup civil disobedience movement, mostly along regional or ethnic lines.
This is not to say that the role of “the people” isn’t critical, or to imply that the revolution is made by armed vanguards alone. Rather, as revolutionaries of all nations, we should understand the critical role that organization plays. When the moment of intensity and inertia arrives, a prepared revolutionary organization must seize it. If there is no such organization at the time, one must be formed. If one is not formed, the revolution will die.
What is the culture of the fighters? What ties like with locals or other above ground elements of the struggle? Are the guerillas in the jungle isolated, or is there a lot of exchange with civilian elements?
Every ethnic organization has a political and an armed wing. Perhaps in previous times these were of a much more traditional clandestine and “guerilla” nature, but given the current inability of the central government to maintain its grasp on remote areas, these have increasingly become above-ground organizations in and of themselves. The legitimacy gained from affiliation or official relationship with the NUG helps in this regard. While the NUG has a ministry of defense that is doing its best to rally support and raise funds to support the PDFs and various EAOs with whom it has partnered, the fact that it is an exiled government means that local militias are largely responsible for funding their own operations.
This is done through a very organic relationship with the civil population, combined with a well-organized support element in the diaspora. Although the specific numbers vary group by group, roughly 50% of operational funds come from local donations and taxes, and the other 50% from the diaspora. While taxes are levied primarily on commerce vehicles passing through resistance checkpoints, the overwhelming majority of income of these groups is generated via donations from supporters. This is in part due to the nature from which these groups arose. As mentioned earlier, the civil disobedience movement following the coup commanded huge amounts of social power and organizational capital. Professionals and government workers from villages and entire cities walked off the job to join the resistance. It would be imprecise to say that the relationship with the people is “good”; more accurate would be to say that the various defense forces are themselves the people, and likewise that the people see themselves represented in the guerilla.
As to the culture of the fighters, truth be told there is still much to be desired. Imagine you have given a liberal a gun and now they are fighting fascism. They are ready to fight, but there is still a lack of a deep revolutionary perspective in many of the rank and file, and much adherence to the trappings of civil life. In a way, this is to be expected — after all, this is the story of a people in arms, who had their hopes for a peaceful transition to democratic rule snatched from them after the military coup. They had never dreamed of holding a rifle and yet, forced by circumstance and the dignity of the human spirit, they have become revolutionaries. This lack of depth should be understood but criticized; above all, it must be taken into account as a necessary feature of any successful mobilization of a people towards radical ends.
It cannot be said that every group is revolutionary. Indeed, many opportunists, especially in the border regions, have taken advantage of the chaos and formed “militias” which are little more than crime organizations in order to participate in lucrative smuggling, drug trade, or scamming markets. Groups of this nature are, as a rule, either functionally neutral to the conflict, or are tacitly supporting the junta in exchange for taking up space that the rebels cannot operate in. It should be said that these groups make up a very tiny minority, instead representing the unsavory element on the edges of any revolution.
What is the relationship between the various armed groups? Is there a coordinated command? Does this relation reflect any political distinctions, and if so, of what sort?
In Burma there are over a hundred armed groups. If we were to consider only the most significant, this number can be reduced to about a dozen, falling into one of two blocs — EAO or PDF/Bamar militia. Between these there is a complicated web of relationships, some much more collaborative than others. At scale, most groups fundamentally agree on a set of basic principles: first, that the military regime is the common enemy; second, that the fight should continue until the total defeat of the regime; third, among EAOs, that their shared goals of autonomy are working towards more or less the same end; and finally, among all groups, that the establishment of a federal system which removes the historic power of the military from government, and grants autonomous regions an equal footing in a new union, is the ultimate goal.
With this in mind, there is no “national alliance” with a coordinated strategy and logistical pipeline. This is not to say that higher-level cooperation doesn’t exist. Between EAOs especially, there is a high degree of material cooperation in the form of soldiers, training, weapons, and ammo. Sometimes entire units pack up and move across the country to take part in a strategic flashpoint which would help another group, and ultimately the progression of the revolution as a whole. In its own way, this collaboration between groups across religious and ethnic lines is itself a shining example of internationalist solidarity.
The NUG, while officially being the vehicle through which the resistance is coordinated and facilitated, is in practice a power among powers. While the NUG does not officially control as much liberated land as the EAOs by volume, the fact that they retain international legitimacy and the support of the Burmese public is enough to make them a serious unifying element. This balance of power is likely to make itself felt in any federal formation that may occur after the defeat of the dictatorship.
Not to give the skeptics ammunition for their arguments, but of course the sheer number of different groups has given rise to conflict inside and between ethnic groups. This has yet to truly explode into something tragic, but it already has made the fight against the junta more difficult in areas plagued by factionalism. However, these tensions exist mostly along regional or tribal lines, and on the national scale do not pose a threat to the unity of the largest groups who are cooperating to bring down the dictatorship. In general, the political language of every group emphasizes and reinforces the solidarity and friendship between peoples.
We’d like to understand the struggle more historically: what kind of theory or thinkers, past and present, have contributed to the present strategy? Are people reading books or websites?
Among the new wave of groups formed after the 2021 coup — those with which I have the most experience — I cannot say that I have identified any particular tendency. While I have seen individuals in leadership positions reading and studying, this is not in pursuit of a particular line of study rather than a general search for information and solutions, including options that we might not consider to be revolutionary. Social democracy has a particularly strong pull, as the country’s problematic history with “socialism” — in practice, the most absurd dictatorships — has left many sour to the concept. At the same time, the glaring contradictions of dictatorship also causes unease when “capitalism” is mentioned. While there are groups that include a socialist union in their platform, this is not the common tendency of the resistance as a whole. “Federalism” is the only word we can go off of, which includes as varied sources of study as the US and European federal systems and the revolution in Rojava.
The level of political development among the rank and file is low. Especially in the EAOs, many are motivated first of all by feelings of national pride, and only secondarily by an ideological opposition to fascism and dictatorship (though this is not uncommon in even more developed revolutionary movements). Anecdotally, my experience with Bamar comrades has been slightly different: since many come from a student background, it is not uncommon for them to engage in an individual search for more radical methods. Still, I have not noticed any preference towards any particular revolutionary tendency.
Does the current struggle employ the Maoist concepts of a protracted people’s war and urban encirclement?
Many legacy EAOs subscribed in whole or in part to a Maoist theory of guerilla war. However, although the present revolution developed along lines that Mao had identified, it did not emerge through any actual study and application of this theory. The strongholds of the EAOs in remote and mountainous regions provided the perfect springboard that the newly insurgent population needed to rapidly train, organize, and develop. While some groups may still subscribe to Maoist political and military theory, I do not have enough experience with these groups to comment about them.
What is the relationship of the revolution to the Rohingya and other disenfranchised ethnic groups from before the coup?
While there is no monolithic “revolution,” in general all parties have condemned the genocide committed by the military against the Rohingya and called for greater co-operation between ethnic groups. Given the ongoing nature of a tragedy like this one, it is a touchy subject with many elements. Exacerbating existing religious and ethnic tensions, various Islamist Rohingya organizations have allied with the military which just committed genocide against them, and are fighting against the Arakha Army, one of the largest rebel organizations. Now, Junta disinformation mills are capitalizing on the international recognition of the Rohingya genocide, trying to paint the AA as continuing this persecution. Despite evidence being shaky at best, this narrative has even been picked up by mainstream media outlets, causing confusion as to the reality of the situation.
Each region is fighting its own micro-war, with limited strategic coordination between them. Sometimes it can seem like a battle in a neighboring state might as well be happening in another country. The news that you see is the same news everyone else here is reading, so you will learn about complicated events such as hotly contested battles or tragic massacres of civilians at the same time I do. Nobody in the country wants to see the mistreatment of the Rohingya continue, and as a group they are caught in the crossfire without adequate representation. The fact that several Rohingya groups, with foreign support from private individuals in countries like Turkey, are fighting for the Junta only further complicates the situation and adds salt to an already tense relationship.
As for the relationship of the revolution with “other ethnic groups,” I think its safe to say that the revolution is itself comprised of these ethnic groups and that relations are in general friendly.
What are the politics of the insurgency? Western media describe the rebels as “pro-democracy.” From our vantage point, capitalist democracy is not revolutionary. What do the people there want, and how do they speak of it?
I have encountered this sentiment in the majority of comrades with whom I have spoken at any depth about Myanmar. It is true, there exists no mainstream element of the revolution in Myanmar upon which we can project our hopes and aspirations for revolution against the liberal systems we are faced with in the West. Perhaps even out of the mainstream, you would be hard pressed to zoom in on any particular group and highlight them as the example of a revolutionary alternative. That doesn’t change the validity of the struggle the people here are waging against the dictatorship.
I think the question of what a transition to a democratic system would look like was up in the air even before the coup. In any case, the party spearheading the push for democracy, the NLD (itself born in the aftermath of the 1988 uprisings) commands the absolute popular support of the people of Myanmar, across all ethnic and religious lines. The intent was to bloodlessly remove the stranglehold of the military from the government. When the military seized power to stop these proposed changes, the only option left on the table was revolution. It can then be understood why there is not necessarily a universally accepted revolutionary platform, especially when many EAOs had already been resisting the government for decades under a variety of motives.
I cannot speak for the people of Burma, but with their near-unanimous support of the NLD (78% of seats in the lower house, 82% in the upper house), there was a clear base for the uprising against the dictatorship. In such a case, while the future may not be as clear as we’d like it to be, I cannot envision the struggle of an entire people against dictatorship and towards a democratic system described in any way except as revolution. Whether observers will support such a perspective depends largely on their moral facilities. The people certainly perceive themselves as revolutionaries.
Take the example of Palestine. In the current struggle against Israeli occupation, the actual politics of most of the organizations waging the resistance are unquestionably bad. Yet this doesn’t change the fact that their struggle against settler colonialism grants them a certain moral authority and legitimacy. This is what explains the tension many experience in supporting Islamic fascists against occupation, or receiving US support while defending oneself against Turkish imperialism in Rojava. A similar contradiction is at issue here, just as it was in Hong Kong five years ago, where we find would-be neoliberals fighting tooth and nail against dictatorship. In my view — and perhaps this is controversial, who knows — those doing so are deserving of our revolutionary solidarity.
We’re reminded of a text that comrades in France wrote in 2016, where their message to the liberals in the Nuit debout movement was something like, “okay so, how about instead of drafting constitutions now, what if we focus on achieving the insurrection first, then sort this out later?”
What is at stake geopolitically? How could we map the struggle in Myanmar to what is happening to places like Palestine, Ukraine, Haiti, Rojava, or Sudan? Has there been a circulation of ideas or practices between these places? How might a victory there resonate elsewhere?
China, Russia, and the US are all certainly keeping a very close eye on the developments in Burma. Most tangibly, Russia and the military regime have a two-way transfer of arms and munitions, and Russia forms a very serious component of Tatmadaw military capability in the form of training and equipment repair services. As China tries to improve its naval power, having Myanmar as a close ally allows it an important access point to the sea, avoiding strategic chokepoints. Conversely, the US is looking for any opportunity to create a friendly power on China’s doorstep.
Russia is the only power that will suffer from the defeat of the Junta. Ammunition manufactured in Myanmar is used on the frontlines in Ukraine. China is much more calculating, refusing to take steps necessary to cement the control of the Junta but without yet throwing its weight behind any resistance groups. It keeps its ties to the SAC warm, but turns a blind eye to cross-border resistance activity and mediates ceasefires to protect Chinese interests in areas under insurgent control.
The resistance, the diaspora, and the exiled government have strong roots in the West and especially in the US. However, the official position of the NUG has not been anti-China, and a controversial January 2024 statement pledged to safeguard Chinese interests, including recognizing Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan. While the NUG doesn’t represent every revolutionary group, this balancing act nevertheless gives context to the situation the rebels find themselves in.
Messages of support and solidarity are common both from armed resistance groups as well as civil protestors, especially in politically organized sections of the diaspora. The common throughlines run through Palestine, Rojava, Ukraine, Hong Kong, Taiwan, recently Bangladesh, and elsewhere in the similar vein. As is common in revolutionary movements with a strong diaspora component, there is lots of collaboration and intermingling in the diaspora, but I don’t have the impression that in-country there has been any serious exchange of lessons or practices yet.
A victory in Myanmar would be a victory for resisting peoples everywhere. It sends a simple yet powerful message: a rebellious people with a unified will can overthrow the systems that oppress them. In the first days of the uprising, the common analysis was that the Tatmadaw was so strong as to be militarily undefeatable; yet the people took up arms regardless, if for nothing else than a life lived with dignity. When they did rise up, they found that the giant was not as invulnerable as everyone assumed, and the façade began to crumble rapidly. Victory in Myanmar would be a victory for hope itself, for the idea that victory is possible but not inevitable, depending only on our commitment to struggle and the degree to which we are willing to organize and sacrifice for freedom.
Rohingya refugees detail worsening violence in Myanmar
Experts say that at least 2,000 Rohingya refugees have been forcibly recruited to fight for Myanmar's military - Copyright AFP/File Munir UZ ZAMAN Mohammad MAZED and Tanbirul Miraj RIPON
Rohingya refugee Syed fled Myanmar for a second time last month, after he was forced to fight alongside the military that drove his family out of their homeland years earlier.
Syed, whose name has been changed to protect him from reprisals, is one of thousands of young men from the stateless and persecuted Muslim minority rounded up to wage a war not of their own making.
Their conscription into the ranks of junta-run Myanmar’s military has prompted revenge attacks against civilians and pushed thousands more into Bangladesh, already host to around a million Rohingya refugees.
“The people there are suffering a lot. I saw that with my own eyes,” Syed told AFP, soon after his escape and return to the squalid Bangladeshi relief camp he has called home for the past seven years.
“Some are starving, they are dying of hunger,” the 23-year-old added. “Everyone else is busy trying to save their own lives.”
Syed said he was conscripted by a Rohingya armed group operating in the camps in June and sent to fight against the Arakan Army, a rebel group waging war against Myanmar’s junta to carve out its own autonomous homeland.
He and other Rohingya recruits were put to work as porters, digging ditches and fetching water for Myanmar troops as they bunkered in against advancing rebel troops.
“They didn’t give us any training,” he said. “The military stay in the police stations, they don’t go out.”
Sent on patrol to a Muslim village, Syed was able to give his captors the slip and cross back over into Bangladesh.
He is one of around 14,000 Rohingya to have made the crossing in recent months as the fighting near the border has escalated, according to figures given by the UN refugee agency to the Bangladeshi government.
– Dead bodies ‘lying everywhere’ –
Experts say that at least 2,000 Rohingya have been forcibly recruited from refugee camps in Bangldesh this year, along with many more Rohingya living in Myanmar who were also conscripted.
Those pressed into service in Bangladesh say they were forced to do so by armed groups, apparently in return for concessions by Myanmar’s junta that could allow them to return to their homelands.
Both the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army and the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation, the two armed groups operating in the camps, have denied conscripting refugees.
“We had never forcefully recruited anyone for us or others,” senior RSO leader Ko Ko Linn told AFP.
The UN Human Rights Office said it had information that the Myanmar military and the Arakan Army had both committed serious abuses against the Rohingya during the conflict.
Other rights groups say that the press-ganging of Rohingya into service alongside Myanmar troops has fuelled retaliatory attacks by the Arakan Army.
In the worst documented instance, watchdog Fortify Rights said last month that the rebel group had killed more than 100 Rohingya men, women and children in a drone and mortar bombardment on the border.
The Arakan Army has repeatedly denied responsibility for the attack and accusations of targeting Rohingya civilians in general.
But many of the thousands of new refugees crossing into Bangladesh accuse the group of killings.
Mohammad Johar, 22, told AFP that his brother-in-law was killed in a drone attack he blamed on the Arakan Army while the pair were fleeing the border town of Maungdaw earlier this month.
“Dead bodies were lying everywhere, dead bodies were on the banks of the river,” he said.
“The Arakan Army is more powerful there. The Myanmar military can’t keep up with the Arakan Army. And they both bomb each other, but it’s the Muslims who are dying.” – ‘Beyond our capacity’ –
Bangladesh has struggled for years to accommodate its immense population of refugees, most of whom arrived after a 2017 military crackdown in Myanmar which is the subject of an ongoing UN genocide investigation.
Still reeling from the sudden overthrow of its previous government by a student-led revolution last month, Bangladesh says the new arrivals are not welcome.
“We are sorry to say this, but it’s beyond our capacity to give shelter to anyone else,” interim foreign minister Touhid Hossain said this month.
But after deadly attacks on some of the estimated 600,000 Rohingya still living in Myanmmar, the new arrivals said they had no choice but to seek safety across the border.
“After seeing dead bodies, we were scared that more attacks were coming,” 20-year-old Bibi Faiza told AFP after crossing the border with her young daughter.
“I don’t hear gunshots any more, and there is peace here.”
SOCIAL EUROPE
‘Better regulation’? Capital first, society second
EU policies on better law-making are tipping the scales in favour of businesses, marginalising social and environmental concerns.
Ursula von der Leyen with Mario Draghi at the launch of his report earlier this month, echoing her aim to reduce regulatory ‘burdens’ on businesses (Alexandros Michailidis / shutterstock.com)
Since the 1990s, the Europea Union has prioritised ‘better regulation’ and improved law-making. The European Commission has committed to making EU legislation clearer, simpler and more accessible to citizens.
My research—including a recent study commissioned by the Chamber of Labour Vienna—however shows that, under Ursula von der Leyen as commission president, the reduction of ‘burdens’ and ‘costs’ for businesses has taken centre stage. An analysis of all relevant EU official documents demonstrates a shift in the ‘better regulation’ agenda over time, favouring economic interests over social and environmental protection.
Deregulatory agenda
In the early 1990s, EU law was seen as overly technical and complex, prompting efforts to simplify and clarify it. By the late 1990s and early 2000s, however, EU legislation was increasingly viewed as a burden, especially for businesses, leading to a deregulatory agenda that often compromised societal standards.
Under von der Leyen’s predecessor, Jean-Claude Juncker (2014-19), while such concerns persisted policy solutions became more comprehensive. Tools such as REFIT (a regulatory-fitness and performance programme), the associated REFIT platform and the Regulatory Scrutiny Board were introduced, with a slightly more inclusive language than before.
Under von der Leyen’s leadership, however, the commission has undergone a significant shift, prioritising business interests almost exclusively over broader societal concerns while framing EU legislation as too burdensome and costly. The charts below highlight a sharp increase in the focus on costs and burdens in the commission’s official language under von der Leyen, compared with Juncker.
Word count and proportion (%) of burdens and costs mentioned in European Commission communications under the Juncker and von der Leyen presidencies
Specifically, small and medium-sized enterprises have gained favourable conditions. Yet the commission’s definition of SMEs is so broad that 99.8 per cent of all companies in Europe fall into this category, including large enterprises that benefit from reduced obligations.
Even the Signa Holding property empire in Austria was classified as an SME and benefited from the lesser oversight associated with this deregulatory agenda. Signa declared bankruptcy last year—the largest insolvency in European property development—underscoring the dangers of relaxed regulation.
‘One in, one out’
Von der Leyen’s increasing focus on reducing burdens and costs has reshaped the solutions presented to address policy challenges, notably through a strong emphasis on the ‘one-In, one-out’ (OIOO) principle. This aims to balance any new regulations by eliminating a predecessor in the same policy area. Yet this is to view regulation one-sidedly, focusing solely on the costs of new rules (to be offset by retiring old ones) while overlooking the positive purpose of regulations and their value to society.
This approach risks undermining essential social and environmental standards, contradicting the ambitious goals of the European Green Deal and the European Pillar of Social Rights. Yet, despite criticism from the European Parliament and civil-society organisations, von der Leyen has prioritised OIOO and cost reduction, creating favourable conditions for businesses and SMEs which are increasingly exempt from control and reporting obligations, particularly in environmental areas.
A clear example is found in the the 2022 Annual Burden Survey, where the commission referred to EU legislation protecting workers from asbestos as a ‘burden’ on businesses—ignoring the benefits of safeguarding workers’ health, ensuring continued employment and maintaining contributions to social-security systems. The commission also overlooks the costs of failing to regulate, despite the 2008 global financial crisis showing that the consequences of insufficient regulation can be immense.
Same trajectory
The anticipated second term for von der Leyen will maintain this perspective in the five years ahead. For instance, the commission has confirmed that it will enhance efforts to reduce reporting obligations. The Letta and Draghi reports have meanwhile outlined plans to enhance ‘competitiveness’ and reduce regulatory ‘burdens’, especially for SMEs, reflecting von der Leyen’s policy direction. This could lead to more marketisation and privatisation in sectors such as transport and health, risking welfare systems and favouring corporate interests while creating more precarious working conditions across the EU.
The EU Strategic Agenda 2024-2029, adopted by the European Council in June, follows the same trajectory by focusing on security, competitiveness, SMEs and the single market as drivers of integration, while promoting financial integration and the elimination of single-market barriers. The agenda also addresses climate change and the digital transition but it remains vague on specifics beyond climate neutrality. Public health is marginalised—despite the recent pandemic—with only brief mentions of health co-operation. The 2019-2024 agenda had placed greater emphasis on social and consumer protection and on access to healthcare.
Overall, ‘better regulation’ will remain a key principle of the commission under von der Leyen, as she stresses the need to support European businesses in the global market by reducing their regulatory ‘burdens’. With her commission nominees significantly tilted towards the right, the social and environmental policy acquis will be at risk.
Brigitte Pircher Brigitte Pircher is an associate professor at Södertörn University, Stockholm. Her research focuses on European Union institutions, policy-making and the implementation of EU policies in member states, with a particular emphasis on social policy and the internal market.
California passes law to ban smartphones in schools by 2026
California's bill, which passed 76-0 in the state assembly and 38-1 in the senate, requires school boards or other governing bodies to develop a policy to limit or prohibit student use of smartphones on campus by July 1, 2026.
California Governor Gavin Newsom. (Picture: Reuters)
California followed lead of its own Los Angeles County
New law effective by July 2026 for California schools
13 states have banned or restricted phones in schools
California Governor Gavin Newsom signed into law on Monday a bill that requires schools to limit or ban the use of smartphones, amid a growing consensus that excess usage can increase the risk of mental illness and impair learning.
Thirteen other states this year have banned or restricted cellphones in school or recommended local educators do so, after Florida led the way by banning phones in class in 2023, according to Education Week. advertisement
California, with nearly 5.9 million public school students, has followed the lead of its own Los Angeles County, whose school board banned smartphones for its 429,000 students in June.
That same month US Surgeon General Vivek Murthy called for a warning label, on social media platforms, akin to those on cigarette packages, likening the problem to a mental health emergency.
Murthy cited a study, in the medical journal JAMA showing adolescents who spend more than three hours a day on social media may be at heightened risk of mental illness, while referring to a Gallup poll, showing the average teen spends 4.8 hours per day on social media.
California's bill, which passed 76-0 in the state assembly and 38-1 in the senate, requires school boards or other governing bodies to develop a policy to limit or prohibit student use of smartphones on campus by July 1, 2026, and update the policy every five years.
"We know that excessive smartphone use increases anxiety, depression, and other mental health issues - but we have the power to intervene. This new law will help students focus on academics, social development, and the world in front of them, not their screens, when they're in school," Newsom said in a statement.
Kurdish woman works to revive abandoned hometown
September 23, 2024
By Snur Karim
In Iraqi Kurdistan, one woman is working to bring life back to her village that was abandoned 38 years ago. Speaking to VOA, Khuncha Omer explained how planting trees and taking care of the land has given her a bigger purpose to strive for.
Murders down 11.6% in US as crime remains key election issue
The drop is steeper than in years past, according to FBI statistics.
An FBI official said the drop in murders represents the "largest drop" since the agency has been collecting data, the agency said in a call with reporters on Monday.
"An estimated 1,218,467 violent crime offenses were committed in 2023, indicating a rate of 363.8 violent crimes per 100,000 inhabitants, down from the 2022 offense rate of 377.1 violent crimes per 100,000 inhabitants," the Uniform Crime Reporting Program report released on Monday said.
Jeff Asher, a former CIA data analyst told ABC News murder fell at it's fastest pace.
"Murder fell at the fastest pace ever recorded," Asher who is a co-founder of AH Datalytics said. "That eclipses 1996 when murder fell by 9.1%, which was previously the largest one year decline ever recorded."
Other crimes, like rape, decreased by 9.4%, aggravated assault decreased by 2.8%, and robbery decreased by 0.3%, according to the report.
Robberies also behaved differently during the pandemic and, unlike murders, went down during the shutdown and popped back up post-pandemic.
The number of law enforcement agencies who reported their data also increased from last year with 85.% of agencies actively enrolled in the FBI's UCR Program and cover a combined population of 315,761,680 (94.3%) inhabitants.
All 12 cities that have 1,000,000 or more people reported data, the FBI said.
A crime that increased in 2023 was motor vehicle theft, which increased 12.6%, the FBI said.
Overall, property crime decreased by 2.4%, burglary decreased by 7.6% and larceny theft decreased by 4.4%.
Hate crimes are up in the U.S. from 2022 to 2023, according to the FBI statistics - including the number of incidents, offenses and victims of hate crimes.
The FBI doesn't specify which group is the most targeted.
2:56 Murders down 11.6% in US as crime remains key election issue Murders in the United States are down 11.6%, according to statistics released by the FBI on Monday morning.
US students, faculty fight silencing of anti-genocide protests
Student and faculty are returning to their universities after the summer break amidst accelerating repression by administrations that are trying to silence support for Palestinian rights and protect their political and financial interests.
Already, at New York University, the administration has essentially placed a gag order on anyone who wishes to criticize Zionism, a political ideology, by categorizing it as a protected identity class.
At Barnard College, which is part of Columbia University, the administration adopted its so-called institutional neutrality policy and identified the word “Zionist” as a potential “code word” that may constitute prohibited discrimination or harassment against Jewish and Israeli students, the Columbia Spectator reported.
Palestine Legal says that Columbia University’s school year began with New York City police violently arresting student picketers demanding divestment from genocide on the first day of classes.
At the University of Michigan, four people were arrested and two were hospitalized after police slammed students into the ground for engaging in a peaceful die-in demonstration.
The Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression, a free speech watchdog group, “handed Columbia a score of zero in its 2025 College Free Speech Rankings, assessing the University as ‘abysmal’ for conditions of free speech and freedom of expression,” according to the Columbia Spectator.
Columbia tied with Harvard University for last place out of 251 evaluated colleges and universities.
And last month, the University of California and Cal State systems, which constitute more than 30 campuses across the state, prohibited both Gaza solidarity encampments and the use of masks to “conceal identity.” Universities willing to engage in repression
Two return guests, Bryce Greene and Mohamed Abdou, joined us on The Electronic Intifada Podcast to assess the current climate for Palestine solidarity on US campuses and talk about the way forward.
Greene is a graduate student at Indiana University and is a freelance writer with Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting, and he’s also contributed to The Electronic Intifada.
He was part of the mass Gaza solidarity student encampment last spring, and faced extreme repression by the administration and the police. The university allowed a sniper to be positioned on the roof of a campus building, directly aiming at students, including Greene.
Greene joined a complaintfiled recently by the American Civil Liberties Union alleging that the university’s ban on expressive activity outside the hours of 11pm to 6am is overly broad and violates constitutional free speech rights.
“It does demonstrate the level of repression that universities are willing to engage in when students are threatening the status quo, when faculty, the university community as a whole is threatening the status quo,” Greene says of the restrictions on free speech rights.
“The climate here on this campus is pretty dire. But as usual, whenever you have repression like this, you get the reaction of people rising up and saying no. So each of these protests, they’ve doubled in size every single time, and we hope to continue those kinds of protests in the future,” he explains.
Abdou, an author and scholar, was a visiting assistant professor at Columbia University’s Middle East Institute for the spring 2024 semester. He was at the Gaza solidarity encampment with his students when he learned that he was being fired by the university’s then-president Minouche Shafik.
Shafik was testifying before a congressional committee and engaged in an attack on Abdou, joining hardline pro-Israel lawmakers in distorting his words and vowing that he would never teach at Columbia again.
Abdou filed a wrongful termination suit against the university, citing prejudice surrounding his anti-colonial academic discourse and vocal support of Palestine.
A grassroots campaign, WeAreMohamed, has been launched not only to raise support for his case, but also to build solidarity with others who have been silenced or threatened over their vocal support of Palestinian rights.
“What they tried to kill is a story, the story of my scholarship and the story of my voice,” he says.
The lawsuit, he adds, addresses “the defamation, and hence the loss of opportunity to teach, to learn and work alongside my students – and students in general – who I feel in this moment in time, actually, particularly those on Turtle Island [North America], let alone globally, are the most honorable, valiant, courageous and whole-hearted students that anybody would have the honor of actually teaching.”
Watch the entire episode above, or listen via Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or the SoundCloud player below
Production by Tamara Nassar
CLIMATE CRISIS
Hottest US city Phoenix breaks own record with 38°C for 113 days
The thermometer keeps climbing higher and higher these days. — AFP pic Join us on our WhatsApp Channel, follow us on Instagram, and receive browser alerts for the latest news you need to know.
Tuesday, 24 Sep 2024
PHOENIX, Sept 24 — The desert city of Phoenix, Arizona, suffered a record 113 straight days with temperatures over 100 degrees Fahrenheit (38 degrees Celsius) this year, leading to hundreds of heat-related deaths and more acres burned by wildfire across the state, officials said.
The city of 1.6 million residents, the largest in the Sonoran desert, had its hottest-ever summer, breaking the previous 2023 record by nearly two degrees, according to the National Weather Service.
The 113-day streak reached last week smashed Phoenix’s previous record of 76 days over 100 F set in 1993.
“It’s very rare that we see, especially...two record breaking summers like we just experienced,” said Matt Salerno, meteorologist at the National Weather Service Phoenix office.
Heat has killed 256 people so far this year in Phoenix’s Maricopa County and is the suspected cause of 393 other deaths, according to official data. The county had a record 645 heat deaths last year.
“It is too early to project how totals in 2024 will compare with 2023,” said Nailea Leon, a spokesperson for Maricopa County’s public health department, adding that year-to-date 2024 heat deaths and suspected deaths were below 2023 levels but the summer was not yet over.
Around half of deaths are of unsheltered people, the county’s most vulnerable group.
Deaths peaked in July when Phoenix had regular highs of 118 F, a trend climate scientists attribute to global warming from fossil fuel pollution.
Over the last five years,the city has averaged 40 days of 110 degrees or higher compared with about five days at the beginning of the last century, according to the Arizona State Climate Office.
The extreme heat has led to a statewide increase in acreage burned by wildfire in 2024 compared with last year, according to the office’s director Erinanne Saffell.
A climate-related combination of record winter precipitation and summer heat fueled wildfires around Los Angeles in recent weeks. — Reuters
Iranian diplomat holds 'constructive' talks in US on JCPOA
TEHRAN, Sep. 23 (MNA) – Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister for Political Affairs Majid Takht Ravanchi says that he had 'constructive' talks in the United States regarding the JCPOA revival negotiations.
"On the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, I had a frank and constructive conversation with [European Union's deputy foreign policy chief Enrique Mora] Enrique Mora," Takht Ravanchi wrote on X.
The senior Iranian diplomat added that their conversation was mainly focused on the issues related to negotiations on lifting sanctions and reviving the 2015 nuclear deal.
Iran is ready to do its share with good faith and address concerns and mutual interests through honorable diplomacy, he added.
The JCPOA was signed in 2015 between Iran and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany. Former US President Donald Trump illegally pulled out of the deal in 2018 while the current US President, Joe Biden, has signaled that he is ready to resurrect the agreement.
Russia, the UK, Germany, China, the US, and France have been in talks with Iran since April 2021 to reinstate the deal.
The talks to salvage the JCPOA kicked off in the Austrian capital of Vienna in April 2021, with the intention of examining Washington’s seriousness in rejoining the deal and removing anti-Iran sanctions.
The negotiations have been at a standstill since August due to Washington’s insistence on its hard-nosed position of not removing all the sanctions that were slapped on the Islamic Republic by the previous US administration. Iran maintains it is necessary for the other side to offer some guarantees that it will remain committed to any agreement that is reached.
