It’s possible that I shall make an ass of myself. But in that case one can always get out of it with a little dialectic. I have, of course, so worded my proposition as to be right either way (K.Marx, Letter to F.Engels on the Indian Mutiny)
Friday, July 28, 2023
Investigators Raise the Bow Ramp of the Long-Lost Ferry Estonia
The ferry Estonia, seen here in her original livery as the Viking Sally
A joint Estonian, Swedish and Finnish salvage team has raised the bow loading ramp of the ill-fated ro/pax ferry Estonia, which went down nearly 30 years ago in a storm in the Baltic Sea. The tragedy was one of the most deadly maritime casualties in decades, claiming the lives of 852 people, and investigators hope to lay to rest a longstanding debate over the cause of her loss.
Working from the deck of the Eidesvik research vessel Viking Reach, the salvage team used ROVs to explore the wreck site in detail and obtain video footage from multiple angles. After several days of survey work, they used the robotic vehicles to dredge out sediment from around the damaged bow ramp and rig the piece for hoisting. The 12-tonne ramp was brought to the surface and swung onto deck on Tuesday morning.
The ramp is a key piece of evidence for the investigation. The sinking was initially blamed on the failure of the ship's bow shield, the hinged visor that protected the ramp and gave access to the wide ro/ro decks on the interior. The ship's designer had used the load calculations for typical non-opening bows for its construction, and called for mild steel construction throughout - even for the attachment mechanisms, which were subject to high loads. During the initial site dives in the 1990s, the bow visor was found torn off the ship at a distance from the rest of the wreck; it was recovered and photographed shortly after the accident, but it was scrapped and is no longer available to investigators.
In the years after the sinking, the accident was shrouded in official secrecy: authorities forbade any dive visits to the wreck site and even made plans to cover it in concrete. Victims' families and independent researchers have long maintained that something else might have been to blame, like an explosion or a collision with a submarine.
In a past independent report by news outlet Fokus Estonia, demolition experts suggested that photographs of the (now-scrapped) bow visor showed complex tearing and folding patterns that would only be consistent with explosion damage. Private ROV explorations in 2020 also revealed that the wreck had large openings in its hull, perhaps indicative of damage sustained before the sinking.
A joint Estonian, Finnish and Swedish report released earlier this year pushed back on these controversial claims and endorsed the original conclusion - bow visor failure. The recovery of the ramp will contribute to this debate, as it figures prominently in the official sequence of events: government investigators believe that the flailing bow visor crushed a compartment down onto the top of the ramp, causing the ramp's failure and the subsequent flooding.
The recovered ramp will be brought back to shore, and the authorities intend to undertake a thorough investigation including metal analysis, laser scanning, and chemical analysis. Their hope is that the results will affirm the finding that the disaster was the result of design and construction flaws, not a collision or explosion.
"Naturally, this is a very difficult moment emotionally, because it was certainly a major disaster and a very difficult moment for many people, but I hope that our investigation will provide answers and finally obtain some closure on this matter," chief of the Estonian Safety Investigation Bureau Märt Ots told outlet ERR.
Investigators have also obtained sediment samples from the seabed in the area near the tear in Estonia's hull, which may help confirm their belief that this element of the damage occurred when the wrecked vessel struck the bottom.
Indian Coast Guard Rescues Scientists When Research Ship Breaks Down
Research vessel Sindhu Sadhna was towed to port after breaking down off the Indian coast (ICG)
The Indian Coast Guard ports it rescued the country’s only ocean-going research vessel after the vessel broke down on July 27 while sailing in the Arabian Sea near the state of Goa on the West Coast of India.
The RV Sindhu Sadhna (4,154 gross tons) is operated by the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research of the National Institute of Oceanography (CSIR-NIO). It was placed in service a decade ago and used for scientific exploration and oceanographic research activities primarily in the Arabian Sea, Bay of Bengal, and the Indian Ocean.
The research vessel is 262 feet long and designed to remain at sea for up to 45 days. It has a normal speed of 13.4 knots. It is outfitted with a broad array of sensors and equipment for oceanographic research. Among the research it is capable of conducting is deep water and sea bed sediment samplings that help deep-water explorations to locate new minerals, hydrocarbon resources, flora and fauna.
The vessel’s AIS signal appears to show the vessel went to sea on July 24 from its base in the Indian city of Mormugao in Goa. The Coast Guard reports it received a call for assistance on July 27 while the vessel was approximately 20 nautical miles offshore. According to the report, the was adrift moving at speeds of up to 3 knots raising the danger of it grounding near the ecologically sensitive Karwar coastline. Eight scientists and a total crew of 36 were aboard.
The Coast Guard sent one of its vessels to assist. Despite challenging weather conditions, they decided to tow the vessel back to Goa. They were able to safely return to port protecting the valuable vessel with its scientific equipment and research data.
Tanker Rescues Woman Suffering From Heat Stroke off Louisiana
As the heat dome over the American South continues into its fourth week, heat-related illness is a serious concern in the region - on the water as well as on land. On Friday, a good samaritan merchant ship helped rescue a boater who had developed symptoms of heat stroke off the coast of Louisiana.
At about 1500 hours on Friday afternoon, Coast Guard Sector Houston-Galveston received a VHF distress call from a man aboard a small pleasure boat. His wife was displaying symptoms of heat stroke and he was concerned for her welfare.
Houston-Galveston issued an urgent marine information broadcast to request help from nearby marine traffic. A product tanker, Stolt Perseverance, received the request and came alongside the pleasure craft to rescue the passenger. The crew brought the victim aboard and gave her medical attention while awaiting a Coast Guard medevac.
Shortly after, a U.S. Coast Guard helicopter aircrew out of Air Station Houston flew out to the tanker and hoisted the victim from the ship. The aircrew flew her back to shore and transferred her to a local EMS team, which delivered her to a nearby hospital. She was reported to be in stable condition.
Stolt Perseverance has resumed her commercial voyage, headed southeast out of the Gulf of Mexico.
Rescue at sea is one of the oldest maritime traditions, and Stolt's tankers have provided this service many times over the years. In 2022, Stolt Sea rescued passengers from a sinking boat in the Florida Straits, and in 2012, Stolt Invention rescued two sailors in the Atlantic after their vessel was damaged by a whale.
Hulk of OS 35 Departs Gibraltar for Recycling
Hulk of the OS 35 loaded aboard heavy lift ship Fjord (photos courtesy of Koole Contractors)
Eleven months after striking a vessel at anchor, the hulk of the bulker OS 35 departed the Port of Gibraltar this morning, July 28, bound for Amsterdam. It brings to a close a difficult salvage operation that had drawn broad attention as the wreck lay close to the shore and a popular beach in Gibraltar.
“I’m delighted to confirm that the long and challenging operation to remove the wreck of the OS 35 from Gibraltar has been brought to a safe conclusion,” said John Ghio, the Captain of the Port of Gibraltar in a statement thanking everyone for their hard work. He confirmed that the vessel Fjord, carrying the wreck of the OS 35, departed British Gibraltar Territorial Waters in the early hours of this morning
The AIS signal for the heavy lift vessels shows it arriving in The Netherlands on August 7. The two sections of the vessel will be handed over for a recycling operation.
Koole Contracts which undertook the project highlighted that it went as planned and engineering. The 584-foot bulker first had to be offloaded of its cargo of steel rods. During the operation weather caused the vessel to break into two sections despite the decision early in the salvage effort to sink the stern to rest on the seabed.
In the last phase of the salvage operation, they were able to restore buoyancy to the stern and refloat it. It was anchored nearby with a crew working to maintain its buoyancy while the team focused on the more challenging part of lifting the bow section of the bulker. The lift began in late June and was completed in early July.
Koole has reactivated its semi-submersible barge the Fjord which had been idle and required more than two months of outfitting and classification certification before joining the project. The “sternless” design of the lift vessel meant she could accommodate an overhang on the stern so that both sections of the OS 35 could be positioned aboard using the 6,000 square meters of deck area on the Fjord. She has a deadweight capacity of 24,500 tons.
“I’d like to commend and congratulate the Captain of the Port on this final milestone in what has been a long and often challenging, but overall safe and successful salvage of the OS 35 wreck,” said Vijay Daryanani, Gibraltar’s Minister for the Port.
Officials said after the salvage operation was completed, they would continue to review the entire incident looking for lessons to be learned. The Port Captain has questioned some of the decisions and the communication between the OS 35 and the authorities after it struck an anchored gas carrier as the bulker was departing the port on August 30, 2022. The vessel as it was outbound was not required to have a pilot aboard. An analysis showed it hit the anchor chain of the Adam LNG tanker pulling her into the forward portion of the bulker.
Taking on water the bulker was ultimately directed to the position where she settled at the bow to the sea bed. The captain of the OS 35 recently pleaded guilty to charges related to the handling of the vessel and was given a suspended sentence in Gibraltar.
NTSB: Excessive Speed and Handling Issues Led to MSC Boxship-Tug Collision
MSC Aquarius was traveling beyond the recommended speed for the tug's maneuvering capabilities (Osvaldo Traversaro/NTSB)
Excessive speed during a containership maneuvering in the Houston Ship Channel as it proceeded toward its dock along with hydrodynamic forces and handling of the tugboat led to a collision that resulted in nearly $1 million of damages. A newly released report from the National Transportation Safety Board highlights these issues during the preparation to dock the MSC Aquarius (6,500 TEU) in Houston on April 14, 2022, using the information to highlight the importance of communication and following guidelines for speed during maneuvering.
The 983-foot containership registered in Cyprus arrived in Galveston Bay and shortly after midnight on April 14 boarded a pilot from the Houston Pilots to proceed to the Barbour’s Cut Container Terminal at the north end of Upper Galveston Bay. The containership was traveling at a speed of 11 to 12 knots as it was inbound.
Two tugboats were assigned to assist the containership in docking. The maneuver called for the vessel to be turned in the main channel before backing into Barbour’s Cut. The pilot determined that two tugs would be sufficient for the operation with one at a forward position and the other aft.
The George M, owned by Bay-Houston Towing Co. and operated by G & H Towing Company, was assigned the forward position for the maneuver. The tug, built in 2021, was reported to have a top speed of 13 knots and 11 to 12 knots astern. At the time of this maneuver, the George M was under the command of its mate, an individual with 15 years of experience but working his first rotation on the vessel. He had been aboard for 24 hours and on the prior day the vessel assisted three vessels’ movements before being assigned to the MSC Aquarius. The captain of the tug was not on watch and was asleep when the assignment came for the containership.
The George M and the other tug met the MSC Aquarius at 0330 south of Morgan’s Point and were traveling at just under 10 knots as they made their way to the vessel’s berth. Assigned the forward position in the docking maneuver, the George M was required to come into a position bow-to-bow with the cargo ship to secure the hawser.
During this operation, the NTSB reports the tug began to move off centerline from the containership’s bow. The mate at the controls of the tug increased engine speed but found the tug was “a little slower” to get propulsion engine power than what he expected so he added more engine power attempting to regain position. When the power kicked in the tug veered across the bow of the containership and its starboard bow struck the starboard bow of the containership. The mate attempted to work the tug back toward the centerline and reported that the tug’s speed slowed despite being put to full power.
The George M collided a second time with the containership damaging the tug’s port propulsion unit. It then slid alongside the port side of the MSC Aquarius becoming lodged in the flair of the containership’s bow. The master of the George M had come to the bridge and was able to dislodge the tug. The tug sustained a collapsed mast, damaged railings, and an indention of the deck above the wheelhouse. There was a small breach in the area of the bulbous bow of the containership. Repairs to the tug cost approximately $750,000 while the containership sustained more than $180,000 in damages.
George M after the collision (USCG photo)
The NTSB in its analysis of the collision finds that there was a blind sector from the bridge of the containership preventing the pilot and bridge crew from seeing what was going on with the tug. The pilot said their first indication of a problem was when they got a frantic radio call from the containership’s bow crew. The pilot then began to slow the containership and when they did not get a response from the George M ultimately slowed and ordered the stern tug to pull.
The NTSB concludes the collision was due to speed and operating beyond the safety parameters and reserve power recommendations. The speed of the containership was 2.7 knots above the towing-company-directed limit and 3.7 to 6 knots above the limit preferred by pilots, tugboat captains, and ship masters surveyed by an international tug masters association. The mate commanding the tug did not communicate with the pilot on the containership and did not request that they slow the vessel before beginning the maneuver.
Hydrodynamic forces created during the maneuver also impacted the ability of the tug to maneuver. The NTSB highlights that even a few knots of speed would have a significant effect on the forces acting on the tugboat in the center lead position.
After the incident, the tug company developed new performance assessment records and recommendations. The NTSB also recommended that tugboat operators in general should determine and communicate pre-determined speed limits to ship masters or pilots commanding vessels they are assisting before engaging in maneuvers.
How to Establish U.S.-Australian Trade in Strategic Minerals
Most of the world's suppliers of critical minerals ship their production to China, but U.S. investment could change this pattern
In May, the United States and Australia signed a climate, critical minerals and clean energy transformation compact that establishes a framework for collaboration on climate issues, clean-energy technology and critical-mineral supply chains. It mainly discusses critical minerals in the context of their necessity in manufacturing clean-energy technologies.
The intent of the framework is to ‘coordinate policies and investments to support the expansion and diversification of responsible clean energy and critical minerals supply chains’. In this case, diversification basically equates to reducing dependence on China, in which various links in the critical-mineral supply chain are heavily concentrated. While the compact establishes a new ministerial dialogue, the Forum on Clean Energy Industrial Transformation, and an Australia–US taskforce on critical minerals, the most vital component of strengthening critical-mineral supply chains is investment in critical-mineral projects.
The critical minerals industry often cites a lack of capital as a barrier to stronger and more diverse supply chains. Mines are capital-intensive projects that can cost tens of billions of dollars. Therefore, any compact that seeks ‘an unprecedented expansion’ in critical mineral supplies must provide capital for mines. The need for government capital is further heightened given the lack of private-sector funding for mining.
The compact commits to using ‘domestic financial instruments and incentives to foster greater integration of responsible clean energy supply chains’, which includes critical-mineral supply chains. It also says the US and Australia will seek industry input on financial incentives, and it lists the US Export–Import Bank as a possible financing agency. Notably, in a joint statement with Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, US President Joe Biden said that he would ask Congress to add Australia as a ‘domestic source’ under Title III of the Defense Production Act, enabling Australian projects to access significant US government funds.
Beyond those measures, the compact doesn’t offer funding specifics—but that was always going to come next, with industry input. To ensure the compact’s success, the US should consider a range of policies for funding mines in Australia.
First, the US should fund Australian mines under the compact, not refineries, which it should invest in domestically to diversify the critical-mineral supply chain. Mining is geographically constrained by the location of mineral deposits, but refining is largely determined by capital and regulations. For example, China has only 3% of global cobalt reserves and produces just 1% of global cobalt ore, yet it controls 77% of global cobalt refining capacity. Similarly, the US could fund enough refining capacity to satisfy domestic demand even without comparably large mineral reserves—especially with Australia on board. By funding Australian mines and the minimum level of crude refining required to economically ship critical minerals to the US to be refined, the US could effectively diversify the critical-mineral supply chain.
That said, the US should only fund Australian mines that produce minerals that are lacking in the United States and Canada. US critical-mineral supply chains are most secure when they are in or near the US and under friendly control. US taxpayer dollars should not be expended on distant mines when nearby mines are available and can meet demand. Importantly, this provision could make the proposal for funding Australian mines more palatable to Congress.
Second, the US should allow companies to partner in a US-funded mine only if they are not owned in any way by foreign entities of concern, including all Chinese entities. The US should not fund Australian mines where Chinese entities can benefit financially or influence the project at the expense of US taxpayers. To protect US national security, if an Australian company is seeking to participate in a US-funded mine in Australia, it should have to first divest any shares held by entities of concern.
American companies should have a controlling interest in US-funded mines, so that the US government can enforce compliance with US regulations, such as blocking Chinese companies’ involvement or investment in the mine. Partnering with experienced Australian partners will also enable less experienced US companies to build valuable mining skills, effectuating two of the compact’s goals: ‘to encourage stronger industrial collaboration’ and ‘to support workforce development in critical minerals’.
Lastly, the US should require that mined materials from Australia be refined by American companies in the US because diversifying the critical mineral supply chain is the primary reason for funding mines in Australia. That requirement will grow the country’s refining capacity and downstream processing for applications like the production of alloys for permanent magnets and cathode material for electric vehicle batteries. The US should also require that the mined material have an end use in a strategic US sector like aerospace or transportation, not consumer electronics like televisions and mobile phones.
The US should also require all companies participating in the mine to stop operating in China and selling their products to Chinese entities. Nor should the US allow companies to use earnings from a US-funded mine to support their operations in China or sales to Chinese entities. The US should not effectively subsidise companies that operate in China or sell products to Chinese mineral companies, which are beholden to the Chinese government.
The compact is a satisfactory starting framework for strengthening critical-mineral supply chains between the US and Australia. How the two countries deploy capital to mineral projects will determine the compact’s success, and US funding for mines in Australia could help achieve the compact’s goals. The stipulations attached to such an arrangement would help to ensure that US–Australia supply chains are diversified, protected from Chinese influence, and forged by a workforce in both countries.
In exchange for its minerals, Australia would get investment and a diversified supply chain, and in exchange for its capital, the US would get access to those minerals and its own diversified supply chain. Such an arrangement would serve the needs of both countries and help achieve the compact’s goal of promoting a ‘responsible, sustainable, and stable supply of critical minerals.’
Shubham Dwivedi is a faculty fellow with Georgetown University’s program in science, technology, and international affairs. Gregory D. Wischer is a critical minerals analyst researching US–China supply-chain competition.
This article appears courtesy of The Strategist and may be found in its original form here.
The opinions expressed herein are the author's and not necessarily those of The Maritime Executive.
What Do IMO's New Climate Targets Mean for Shipping?
The world’s largest shipping companies are starting to update their fleets for a greener future. Maersk received the world’s first dual-fuel methanol container ship in July 2023, and dozens more container ships that can run on alternative fuels are currently on order.
The industry – responsible for about 3% of global greenhouse gas emissions, more than Canada and Ireland combined – has reasons to act and to have some confidence in its multimillion-dollar investments.
On July 7, the 175 member countries of the International Maritime Organization, a United Nations agency that regulates global shipping, agreed to a new climate strategy that includes reaching net-zero greenhouse gas emissions “by or around, i.e., close to, 2050.”
The strategy’s language is vague, obscure and almost noncommittal. But it points the industry toward a cleaner future. New European Union rules will also soon go into effect that will significantly raise costs for ships burning highly polluting sulfur fuel oil.
I spent several years working in the shipping industry and follow it as a researcher and analyst. Here’s what I see changing.
Setting their own direction
The new IMO strategy does not explicitly set a new fuel standard, but it seems to indicate that less reliance on cheap, environmentally harmful, heavy-sulfur fuel oil is the best direction, and possibly less use of low-sulfur fuel oil.
What the strategy does is set goals to reduce international shippings’ greenhouse gas emissions by at least 20% by 2030, compared with 2008 levels; by at least 70% by 2040; and to reach net-zero emissions around 2050. The IMO also commits to implement a greenhouse gas emissions-pricing mechanism – a carbon levy or tax – by 2027, and to develop a goal-based marine fuel standard. At this time, that’s the only direction the IMO has provided regarding the emissions-pricing mechanism.
While the new strategy may not have been as clear or restrictive as many people hoped, the IMO may be providing the maritime industry an opportunity to set the direction itself.
A number of large ship owners and operators have already built and placed orders for container ships with some sort of alternative fuel use, primarily methanol or liquefied natural gas, and there is some interest in hydrogen. LNG is still a fossil fuel, though it’s less polluting than traditional sulfur fuel oil. Methanol, however, can be made from either natural gas or renewable sources.
Maersk’s new dual-fuel vessel – to be powered in part by green methanol – is small and plans to operate in the Baltic Sea, but Maersk may be using this vessel as a prototype for larger alternative-fuel containerships expected to be delivered next year. Evergreen, also among the world’s larger shipping companies, has ordered 24 dual-fueled methanol ships.
Purchases like Maersk’s and Evergreen’s are an indication that the maritime industry will be moving in the direction of greener fuels. They also indicate that the industry is willing to follow the IMO’s focus on well-to-wake emissions, meaning not just emissions from ship operations but also from fuel production.
Building a supply chain
The other significant challenge faced by the maritime industry is having a sufficient supply chain available to support dual-fueled vessels, which can operate on alternative fuels.
There are currently a limited number of ports worldwide with the necessary infrastructure to provide alternative fuels. But, here again, simple economics suggests that if there is enough demand, supply should follow.
With Maersk, Evergreen and others preparing to operate more dual-fuel containerships, the industry is demonstrating demand so the green-methanol supply chain can develop, and hopefully soon. Japan recently launched its first dual-fueled LNG bunkering ship – essentially a floating gas station – to develop the supply of LNG fuel.
Not mandatory, but many countries will try
The new IMO strategy has some big caveats: The goals are nonbinding, and the strategy explicitly encourages compliance when “national circumstances allow.” In other words, no nation-state will be under any legal obligation to comply.
The statement seems to have been included as a means to appear focused on achieving goals while placating some countries that may not be able or willing to meet the goals by 2030 or beyond.
It’s also unclear whether the “national circumstance” pertains to a physical nation-state, to flag registry – meaning where the ship is registered – or both. Many ships are registered in countries with weaker regulations. Adding such language appears to say that the IMO is serious about emissions and understands that some countries may have significant challenges to meet the standards. It also gets around opposition to a carbon levy, or tax on emissions, which some delegates – China for example – adamantly opposed.
Many countries, such as the U.S., United Kingdom, Australia and those in the European Union, will work to meet the strategy, I believe. The EU is already launching its own carbon levy on shipping beginning in 2024.
Who pays for the higher costs?
One factor that the IMO, most analysts and environmentalists rarely discuss is the additional cost of using an alternative fuel.
By some estimates, green methanol costs three times as much as low-sulfur fuel oil. And low-sulfur fuel oil is more expensive than high-sulfur fuel oil. The maritime research company Drewry estimated that switching to methanol on a well-to-wake basis would increase fuel costs by 350%, or equal to approximately an additional $1,000 for each 40-foot-long shipping container aboard.
Shipping lines will soon also face higher costs from the European Union if they don’t clean up their emissions. Starting in 2024, the EU Emissions Trading System will cover all cargo and passenger ship voyages in EU waters and ports involving over 5,000 gross tons, regardless of where the ship is registered. The costs to those with high emissions are expected to significantly increase the operating costs for the global shipping fleet.
Hecla Emissions Management, a consulting arm set up by Wilhelmsen Ship Management and Affinity Shipping, analyzed the three-year phase-in period for just the EU change and expects it to cost the shipping industry nearly $19 billion.
Whether we like it or not, these additional costs will be born by the cargo owners, who will pass the costs along to their customers – and, ultimately, the consumer, meaning you and me.
Don Maier is an associate professor of practice in supply chain management at University of Tennessee. His professional career included roles in the logistics and supply chain management teams at FedEx, Office Depot, Penske Logistics, Monsanto and Merisant (a division of Monsanto). He has also served as dean for the Maine Maritime and Cal Maritime Academies.
This article appears courtesy of The Conversation and may be found in its original form here.
To Get to Zero by 2050, Regulatory Details May Matter More Than Targets
Action at the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to regulate emissions from fuel production, and to consider all types of greenhouse gases (GHGs) — not just CO2 — is moving slowly and not receiving much attention. But these regulatory details are probably more important than the headline-grabbing move to target net-zero GHG emissions by 2050. Here’s why.
A growing proportion of global GHG emissions — at 3% and climbing — come from the global shipping industry. The majority of those pollutants come from large ocean-going container ships, tankers and bulk carriers that move finished goods, raw materials, minerals, and food all over the globe. Measures to curb this rise in emissions are already being enacted but the details of how they come into effect are vitally important. In this article we investigate these details and why they matter.
Methanol and methane are currently winning the alternative fuels race – what are the consequences?
The lion’s share of new ships on order are now fueled by alternative fuels rather than traditional oil-based heavy fuel oil according to data obtained by DNV Alternative Fuels Insights. Methane (in the form of liquefied natural gas [LNG]) and methanol are the most popular choices. While this may sound like good news, zero-emission versions of these fuels are still a long way off – as Clear Seas explored in an earlier article.
Methanol and methane seem like attractive alternative fuels at first glance because they contain less carbon – the source of CO2 emissions – than conventional oil-based fuels and are relatively inexpensive. But this picture changes when all GHGs (not just CO2) are considered over the total lifecycle of fuel production and consumption.
When methanol is produced from fossil natural gas – the most common production method – vast quantities of CO2 are emitted. When these upstream CO2 emissions from the methanol manufacturing are added to the exhaust emissions from the ship’s engine, methanol turns out to be worse for the environment than conventional oil-based fuel – by approximately 20%.1 If regulations come into force that take into account the lifecycle emissions from production as well as consumption, ship operators who use methanol-powered ships will need to look for options outside of the widely available fossil-based methanol if they want to achieve GHG reductions — and these are currently limited.
A methanol production facility (Methanex)
Methane, in addition to being a clean-burning fuel, is itself a powerful GHG, and so when it leaks out during production or as unburnt fuel in the engine exhaust gas of ships, it counteracts the benefit of the reduction in carbon content of the fuel described above. Researchers at the University of British Columbia supported by Clear Seas found that although measures to control methane emissions are available both in the fuel production and delivery supply chain as well as on ships, there is currently little incentive to implement them.2
Methane emissions are not given high enough priority by ship owners and operators
The most common fuel choice for new cargo ships being ordered today is methane – in the form of LNG. Most ship operators are hoping to reduce emissions through a transition to bio-LNG and ultimately to zero-emissions by using e-methane3 in the same ships. However, decisions are being made now about which natural gas engines to install on the LNG-fueled ships being ordered and these ships will be in operation for decades. As the Clear Seas supported research has discovered, there is currently little incentive for them to install the more expensive high-pressure dual-fuel engines that cut methane emissions. Action now while ships are still on the drawing board is needed or else the technology will be locked-in at the shipyard with limited opportunity to retrofit.
A methane-fuelled container ship (CMA CGM)
These methane-fueled ships need to be refueled, so ship fuel suppliers are also investing in liquefaction plants and refueling equipment needed to deliver methane fuel in the form of LNG. LNG plants with low-emission, electric-drive compressors and refueling barges with re-liquefaction equipment to capture leaking methane are available, but they are more expensive.4 Suppliers need to have at least the prospect of being able to charge a premium for their products or of claiming low-carbon fuel standard carbon tax credits to justify the increased investment. The alternative is leaky high-emitting infrastructure – again, in place for decades.
Emissions from the production of methanol need to be factored into international shipping emissions regulations
Ship owners may be choosing methanol-fueled ships on the assumption they will be rewarded under the currently incomplete energy efficiency index emissions reduction measures that recently came into force. At the moment, these measures only take into account CO2 from the combustion of the fuel on the ship. Once more comprehensive regulations arrive that take account of upstream emissions from the production of methanol, shippers may have no choice but to return to burning carbon-intensive oil-based fuels.5
Fixing the problem with fossil methanol is costly. One option is to mix it with enough sustainably sourced bio-methanol to reduce the reliance on high-emissions fossil methanol. Another alternative is to capture and sequester some of the CO2 emitted during production. But these projects will take time to scale up and will require investment justified only if greener methanol can command a price premium in the market – a premium that will only be there if upstream emissions from methanol production are properly accounted for in regulations.
What is being done to properly regulate GHG emissions from ships?
In July 2023, the IMO adopted a revised GHG reduction strategy. IMO member states have discussed several proposals for the levels of ambition for 2030, 2040, and 2050 targets to phase out lifecycle GHG emissions, and the measures that will move the industry towards these targets. The majority of member states support the need for the international shipping sector to reach zero lifecycle GHG emissions by 2050, be aligned with the 1.5°C warming limit, and avoid any out-of-sector offsets while doing so. Measures to support the shipping industry in meeting these targets that have received support include a technical element such as a GHG fuel standard that starts low and increases over time and considers lifecycle GHG emissions along with an economic element such as GHG pricing.
However, targets and measures towards mitigating the climate impacts of shipping can only be successful if they are supported by appropriate metrics that capture the full range of GHGs and the full lifecycle of alternative fuels. The energy efficiency existing ship index (EEXI) and carbon intensity indicator (CII) indexes are energy efficiency measures that are currently only based on a CO2 intensity (CO2 emissions per transport work) metric to further contribute to the intensity targets of the initial IMO GHG Strategy. Although there have been discussions at the IMO on amending the indexes to a lifecycle metric taking into account all GHGs, not just CO2, no formal proposals on this issue were made in recent IMO sessions.
Amendment of the existing indexes to include lifecycle GHGs, especially CO2, methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O), is critical for the international shipping sector to meet its climate targets, align with the 1.5°C temperature limit goal, incentivize the “right” alternative fuel(s) and technology, and avoid the risks of stranded assets. Although these topics are actively being negotiated at the IMO, there is not yet a consensus.
This article appears here courtesy of Clear Seas. It was written in collaboration with the UBC research team working on decarbonizing marine shipping.
Authors:
Imranul Laskar is a PhD Researcher in Resource, Environment and Sustainability at UBC.
Amanda Giang is an Assistant Professor in the Institute for Resources, Environment and Sustainability at UBC.
Paul Blomerus is Executive Director and marine fuels decarbonization expert at Clear Seas.
3 e-methane is methane synthesized from hydrogen produced through electrolysis of water using renewable electricity.
4 Temporary infrastructure like truck-to-ship refueling or portable containerized solutions are sometimes promoted to prevent so-called fossil fuel lock-in of LNG. This is counterproductive. Short-term methane emissions resulting from venting of methane before, during and after refueling operations is a major hazard of the operation of this lower-cost mobile equipment. LNG refueling from properly equipped jetties and bunker vessels has a better likelihood of reducing or eliminating methane emissions.
5 Methanol-fueled ships are dual-fuel capable so can still use conventional heavy fuel oil or diesel fuel as an alternative to methanol when it is not available.
The opinions expressed herein are the author's and not necessarily those of The Maritime Executive.
