Thursday, August 22, 2024

Centuries ago, Ukrainian Cossack leader Ivan Mazepa founded multiple settlements in modern Russia’s Kursk region. Now they’re within miles of the front line.
































August 22, 2024
Source: Meduza

Ukraine’s incursion into Russia’s Kursk region is well into its third week. According to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, as of August 19, Ukrainian troops controlled 92 settlements across a territory of 1,250 square kilometers, or 483 square miles (though these figures haven’t been independently verified). Suddenly within close proximity of the conflict zone are the villages of Ivanovskoe, Stepanovka, and Mazepovka, all of which were built in the early 18th century and named after their founder: Hetman Ivan Stepanovych Mazepa, an influential Ukrainian statesman and military leader. Meduza tells the story of Mazepa’s estates.

The area where Russia’s Kursk region meets Ukraine’s Sumy region is an ancient frontier. To the north is the Bryansk Forest, the legendary home of the Russian folk poem character Nightingale the Robber. To the south is the steppe where nomadic and semi-nomadic Turkic peoples such as the Pechenegs and Polovtsy, and later the Crimean Tatars, lived for centuries.

To the northwest lies the Ukrainian city of Novhorod-Siverskyi, where Prince Igor Svyatoslavich began his 1185 campaign against the Polovtsy immortalized in the Old East Slavic epic poem The Tale of Igor's Campaign. The Muravsky Trail ran through this area, following the watershed between the Dnipro and Don rivers; it was along this path that Crimean Tatars launched raids on the Grand Duchy of Moscow and the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, capturing thousands of people to be sold in the slave market in Kaffa (modern-day Feodosia).

In the 16th–17th centuries, this area was the site of numerous wars between the Tsardom of Russia and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and later the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, with cities regularly coming under siege and frequently changing hands. In the early 17th century, during the Time of Troubles, it was here that False Dmitry I, pretender to the Russian throne, began his victorious march to Moscow.

In the second half of the 17th century, this region was where the Tsardom of Russia bordered the Cossack Hetmanate, a semi-autonomous state to which modern Ukraine can trace its lineage.

Ivan Mazepa became the hetman, or leader, of the Cossack Hetmanate in 1687. But Moscow dictated the Hetmanate’s foreign policy, senior personnel appointments, and land governance; Mazepa had good relations with Prince Vasily Golitsyn, who effectively ruled Russia, and later with Peter I (also known as Peter the Great).

While he was still a senior officer, Mazepa, like many other members of the Cossack military elite, acquired his own small estates within Moscow’s borders, and after becoming hetman, he purchased more land in the Rylsky, Putivlsky, and Sevsky districts. By 1708, his estates on the territory of modern Russia’s Kursk region encompassed about 40 square kilometers (15 square miles) and included more than 30 villages and settlements, which had a joint population of nearly 30,000 people. Mazepa’s rights to these extensive holdings were confirmed by several charters issued by Peter I.

In the late 19th century, Ukrainian historian Mykhailo Plokhynsky reconstructed the history of Mazepa’s Kursk estates in his article “Hetman Mazepa as a Great Russian landowner.” Many of the settlements named in Mazepa’s property listings appear in war reports from recent years: Korenevo, Snagost, Krupets, Oleshnya, Ivnitsa, Sheptukhovka. The Ukrainian Armed Forces (AFU) are currently fighting for control of Korenevo, while Oleshnya and part of Snagost are already under Ukrainian control.

The center of these estates was Ivanovskoe, where Mazepa built a manor. The village also contained three churches, two public bathhouses, 10 shops (trading was held every Sunday), seven taverns, and a school.
ate in Ivanovskoe today

Mazepa mainly bought undeveloped land and used various financial incentives to attract settlers, many of whom were serfs fleeing from nearby landowners and Old Believers escaping persecution in central Russia. Due to the runaway serfs, Mazepa often had conflicts with his neighbors, which sometimes led to mutual raids and bloodshed. Such incidents were common both in the Tsardom of Russia and in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

Administrative documents from the time separate Mazepa’s peasants into two groups: “Russian people” (Russkie lyudi, in Russian), referring to natives of the Tsardom of Russia, and “Cherkases,” a Russian word for Cossacks commonly used to refer to Ukrainians at the time. “Russian” and “Cherkas” households were mixed on Mazepa’s estates, with “Russian” ones predominating in the northern part and “Cherkas” ones in the southern part.

These lands remained in Mazepa’s possession for less than 10 years, but they began to thrive economically, with residents cultivating fields and opening orchards, mills, and apiaries. However, in the fall of 1709, Peter the Great learned that Mazepa had sided with the Swedish king, Charles XII, in the Great Northern War and immediately sent 25,000 troops led by Alexander Menshikov to the Hetmanate’s capital, Baturyn. The Russian forces stormed and burned the city, killing its entire population (between 10,000 and 15,000 people).

Mazepa and Menshikov had been at odds even before the hetman’s defection. There were rumors that Menshikov aspired to either become hetman himself or to rule over eastern Ukraine. This never came to pass, but he did take over Mazepa’s former estates, which remained in his possession until his own exile to Siberia in 1727.

After Sweden’s defeat in the Battle of Poltava in 1709, Mazepa and Charles XII fled to Bender (in modern-day Moldova), which was then under the control of the Ottoman sultan, and died soon after.


In the decades that followed, Mazepa’s former estates were repeatedly passed from one owner to another until the early 19th century, when they ended up in the hands of Prince Ivan Baryatinsky, who built a lavish new manor in Ivanovskoe called Maryino.

During the Soviet era, Maryino housed a sanatorium for the Communist Party’s Central Committee; today it serves as a sanatorium for members of Vladimir Putin’s administrative directorate. Mazepa’s residence in Ivanovskoe are officially designated as a federal architectural monument, but in reality, it lies in neglected ruins. As of August 21, 2024, Ukrainian troops were approximately 14 kilometers (less than nine miles) from the estate.


seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth century. One of them, written by an anonymous eyewitness (самовидець) expresses a sympathetic view of Mazepa ..





Ivan Mazepa and the Russian Empire

One of the famous European statesmen of the late 17th and early 18th century, Hetman Ivan Mazepa ruled the Ukrainian Hetman state from 1687 to 1709. Mazepa was a firm supporter of a pan-Ukrainian Cossack polity, and his main goal as hetman was to unite all Ukrainian territories in a unitary state that would be modeled on existing European states but would retain the features of the traditional Cossack order. Initially an ally of Tsar Peter I, Mazepa forged an anti-Muscovite alliance with Charles XII of Sweden, but the combined Swedish-Cossack army was defeated by the Muscovite army at the Battle of Poltava in 1709. Although there have been controversial assessments of Mazepa, he has remained a symbol of Ukrainian independence.

Tatiana Tairova-Yakovleva’s Ivan Mazepa and the Russian Empire is the first English-language biography of Ivan Mazepa in sixty years. A translation and revision of her 2007 Russian-language monograph, this book presents an updated perspective on the life of Mazepa, based on many new sources, including Mazepa’s archive, thought lost for centuries until it was rediscovered by Tairova in 2004. This engaging study also reveals an original picture of the Ukrainian Cossack Hetman state during a historical moment of critical importance for Ukraine and for the Russian Empire.

Ivan Mazepa and the Russian Empire has been published as volume 11 of the Peter Jacyk Centre for Ukrainian Historical Research Monograph Series at the CIUS. This book was co-published by McGill-Queen’s University Press and the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press.

'Absolute Fraud' RFK Jr. to Drop White House Bid and Endorse Trump: Report

"Just one disingenuous conspiracy theory-monger joining forces with another," said one prominent journalist.




Robert F. Kennedy Jr. announces his candidacy for President of the United States in a speech at Boston Park Plaza on April 19, 2023.
(Photo: David L. Ryan/The Boston Globe via Getty Images)

Brett Wilkins
Aug 21, 2024

Following months of increasingly obvious hints, Robert F. Kennedy Jr. will drop his longshot Independent presidential bid and endorse former U.S. President Donald Trump, the 2024 GOP nominee, according to a Wednesday report from NBC News.

The network cited "two sources familiar with the plan," including one who said the Kennedy and Trump campaigns are working out the details of a joint appearance. On Wednesday morning, Kennedy's campaign sent out an email stating that the candidate "will address the nation live on Friday about the present historical moment and his path forward."

Reacting to the news, Mother Jones Washington, D.C. bureau chief David Corn said on social media that "if RFK Jr. endorses Trump, it will demonstrate he doesn't care anything about climate change, clean air and water, women's freedom, democracy, and the rule of law."

"Just one disingenuous conspiracy theory-monger joining forces with another," Corn added.

According to NBC News:

Convincing Kennedy to back Trump has been an ongoing project of the nominee's eldest son, Donald Jr., former Fox News host Tucker Carlson, and wealthy donor Omeed Malik, according to a source familiar with the efforts who requested anonymity to divulge internal campaign deliberations. The three men have worked behind the scenes in meetings and calls with both principals to negotiate RFK's exit and endorsement, the source said.

Trump's running mate, Sen. JD Vance of Ohio, told NBC News in an interview Wednesday that "there's been a lot of communication back and forth" between Kennedy and his campaign.

The news comes a day after Nicole Shanahan—the billionaire who gave Kennedy millions of dollars before he chose her as his running mate—said during a podcast interview that the campaign was considering a move to "join forces with Trump."

Earlier in the year before she was fired, former Kennedy New York campaign director Rita Palma privately told supporters that her "No. 1 priority" was siphoning votes away from President Joe Biden, then the presumptive Democratic nominee. Palma called Biden the "mutual enemy" of Kennedy and Trump supporters. Some ultrawealthy Trump supporters also helped bankroll Kennedy's campaign.

It is not known what percentage of Kennedy supporters back Trump or the Democratic nominee, Vice President Kamala Harris, or how the anticipated suspension of Kennedy's campaign and his endorsement of Trump will affect the outcome of the tight presidential contest. According to a Pew Research Center poll published last week, Harris had a razor-thin 46%-45% edge over Trump nationwide, with Kennedy a distant—but potentially pivotal—7%.

Donald Trump gives speech shielded by bulletproof glass – but fails to stay behind it

By Iona Cleave
Daily Telegraph UK·
22 Aug, 2024 

Donald Trump was shielded by bulletproof glass during a rally on Wednesday but struggled to remain behind the screen.

The former President’s visit to North Carolina marked his first outdoor rally since he survived an assassination attempt in Pennsylvania last month.

Trump’s podium was covered by a panel of ballistic glass to repel bullets, while two more panels covered his rear – but he almost immediately moved out of the protection zone.

As he delivered his speech, hitting back at his rivals for “getting personal” in their speeches at the Democratic National Convention, Trump continuously shifted around on the stage rendering his new security measures ineffective.

At one point, the Republican presidential candidate went into the crowd to shake hands with and hug his supporters. Later, he slowly danced his way out from behind the glass and off stage.

The former President can be seen moving out from the ballistic glass panel.

Bulletproof glass is usually a measure reserved for sitting presidents, however the Secret Service made an exception in the wake of the shooting that grazed Trump’s ear and killed an audience member on July 13.

Trump’s security team has also reportedly been bolstered by the reassignment of agents from Joe Biden’s detail after the President’s travelling schedule was reduced, following his exit from the presidential race.

BALKAN BLOG: Is Bulgarian democracy a hostage to US presidential vote?


If former US president Donald Trump makes a comeback, Bulgarian politicians are expected to follow the example set by self-styled illiberal leader Viktor Orban in Hungary.Facebook
By Denitsa Koseva in Sofia August 22, 2024

Deep in a spiral of snap elections and dysfunctional parliaments, Bulgaria was supposed to hold its seventh general election since 2021 on October 20. However, that date has now been postponed indefinitely due to controversial decisions by key politicians.

Although this looks like a conflict between the main players within Bulgaria, there have been suggestions that most politicians are stalling the process intentionally, so that the next vote can be scheduled after the US presidential election. Its outcome, some say, will determine whether Bulgarian politicians will swing to a style of ruling modelled on Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s, with closer ties to Russia, or will if they will maintain Bulgaria’s broadly pro-Western course.

There are signs that Gerb leader Boyko Borissov is ready to take Orban’s course if Donald Trump wins the US vote. He said recently that the new values his party will pursue are traditions, moral and Christian values. 

Populist Gerb remains the largest party in the current parliament, although unlike in its earlier years it has been unable to form a stable government. Despite the party’s ostensible pro-Western orientation, the party is already prepared to back laws in a similar illiberal mould to those adopted in Orban’s Hungary. For example, Gerb MPs recently backed controversial legislation banning so-called ‘LGBT propaganda’ in schools. When Borissov commented on the decision to support the legislation, he said that if Western values would “turn me into a woman”, he will not follow them.

“Borissov is very good at stalling and making U-turns depending on his own interest and the global and local political moods,” a source close to the current political talks told bne IntelliNews.

Previously Borissov expressed a highly positive attitude towards Trump during his term as US president. In 2019, a delegation led by Borissov, at the time prime minister, visited the US and met with Trump and other officials, after which Borissov complimented Trump personally on his appearance and attitude.

“[W]hat I have seen on TV and the way they have presented Trump – they always show him with distorted face, with holes in the cheeks. And in fact, he is a very nice, healthy and flexible person. Two hours passed very pleasantly. I could not believe that this was the person I had looked at so many times and wondered how he could even be in this position. He is unique. He was very prepared on all topics,” Borissov said after the visit in an interview with bTV.

Interim government delayed 

Another potential sign that the delay of Bulgaria’s snap vote until the US presidential election could be intentional is President Rumen Radev’s decision not to sign a decree appointing a new caretaker government. Radev, who has taken a pro-Russian stance since the invasion of Ukraine, raised objections to the proposed interior minister Kalin Stoyanov, despite Stoyanov holding the post in both the current caretaker government under Dimitar Glavchev and in the previous regular government led by Nikolai Denkov.

There were calls for Stoyanov to resign from Denkov’s government after excessive police violence during a football match. At the time, Denkov demanded his resignation, but Gerb, a partner of Denkov’s Change Continues-Democratic Bulgaria (CC-DB) coalition in previous parliament, fiercely opposed this.

Another key player – Delyan Peevski, the Magnitsky-sanctioned co-leader of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS) – also seems willing to delay the process, to find out whether the White House would lift its sanctions on him. If Trump wins, this seems more likely than if Kamala Harris takes office. In case of a Harris presidency, Peevski would have to actively play a pro-Western role if he is to have a hope of the sanctions being lifted.

Cultivated apathy brings crippled democracy

While key Bulgarian politicians appear to be making complicated calculations regarding the date of the upcoming general election, there is another phenomenon hampering the country’s democratic processes. Voters are becoming more and more apathetic, and turnout is falling gradually from one election to the next. It was below 35% in the last snap vote, on June 9, and might fall further in the next election.

Analysts suggest this is the result of years of intentionally cultivated mistrust in state institutions, which has resulted in Bulgarians no longer seeing any point in voting or participating in any way in the process.

However, the low turnout affects some parties more than others. Radical pro-Russian parties like Vazrazdenie have benefitted from the avid support of their voters, while Gerb and the DPS have a high degree of control over their voter bases. 

report by the OSCE's ODIHR mission ahead of the previous general election, on June 9, suggested that the share of controlled voting remains significant in Bulgaria.

Two years earlier, the Bulgarian Anti-Corruption Fund NGO published its own investigation showing that brokers had been buying votes for the main political parties – Gerb, the DPS and the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) – with one broker often buying for several political parties at the same time.

By contrast, reform-minded, pro-Western voters tend to be highly critical of the parties representing them, or to see no meaningful alternative. That has led to a falling off of support for CC-DB, once seen as a bright hope for less corrupt, EU-oriented Bulgaria. 

The lower the turnout, the higher the chance of populist and pro-Russian formations entering parliament and being able to form coalitions that would drag Bulgaria away from its pro-Western path and back to the Russian orbit.

This creates a paradox, as a recent survey by Alpha Research showed that the majority of Bulgarians are pro-Western and do not trust Russia or its President Vladimir Putin. Bulgaria, once a loyal ally to Russia, has cooled towards Putin and the Kremlin since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Meanwhile, the country also managed to end its complete energy dependency on Moscow.

However, the rejection of Russia has done little to change the outcome of recent elections, with voters continuing to turn away from pro-Western parties. A victory for Trump in November would further embolden the populists, the far right and the pro Russians to put Bulgaria on a new, illiberal course. Only a strong pro-Western campaign ahead of the next vote can prevent that outcome.

 Post-Transition Bangladesh Part 1: An Interview with Professor Ali Riaz on Enhancing Governance through Foreign Policies

Post-Transition Bangladesh Part 1: An Interview with Professor Ali Riaz on Enhancing Governance through Foreign Policies


Ali Riaz is a political scientist with research interests in South Asian politics, democratization, violent extremism, and Bangladeshi politics. He is a Distinguished Professor of political science at Illinois State University, a Nonresident Senior Fellow of the Atlantic Council, and the President of the American Institute of Bangladesh Studies (AIBS). His recent publications include “Pathways for Autocratization: The Tumultuous Journey of Bangladeshi Politics” (Routledge, 2024), “The Charade: Bangladesh’s 2024 Election” (Prothoma, 2024), and the co-authored “How Autocrats Rise: Sequences of Democratic Backsliding” (Palgrave Macmillan, 2024).

In this first part of JURIST’s exclusive post-transition Bangladesh interview series, Senior Editor Tarazi Mohammed Sheikh discussed with Professor Riaz strategies for enhancing Bangladesh’s governance, including maintaining strong relations with neighboring countries, holding free and fair elections, and developing capabilities to deal with past human rights violations and build a more just future.

The interview, originally conducted on August 19, 2024, has been condensed from a more extensive discussion.

JURIST: Dr. Muhammad Yunus, as the leader of the interim government of Bangladesh, brings with him not only his identity as a Bangladeshi citizen but also his global stature as a Nobel laureate with personal connections to many international leaders. In your view, how might Bangladesh leverage these unique attributes to enhance its foreign policy and diplomatic relations during his leadership in the interim government?

Professor Riaz: The global standing of Professor Yunus needs no elaboration. We know who he is. Of course, his connections and his acquaintance with global leaders are important. But I think those are bonuses. Those are not pivotal issues. At this point, what I see as his major strength is that he is an inspirational leader at a very critical juncture for the nation. In the past 15 years, a culture of fear permeated society, and despair was setting in because, despite all kinds of efforts, apparently the regime seemed invincible. Now Hasina’s downfall has made people hopeful, the nation needs a leader who can inspire and uplift.

When this regime fell, what did we find? We have been witnessing for the past 15 years that piece-by-piece institutions were being decimated, but now we see the extent of the damage. Now, these institutions need to be rebuilt. To do so, someone needs to be at the helm who can bring people, who want to make that change, together. Professor Yunus has that capacity, in my judgment.

He’s not a perfect person. Nobody is. And of course, he has never been in civil service. He has always been in the private sector, but most importantly, he has been doing things his way. Rebuilding the state is not an individual endeavor; he will have to build a strong team who are committed to the change. Having Yunus at the top will help in this regard. His global standing would help Bangladesh to be known in the global arena, to see what the challenges this government is facing. As the world would follow him, they would also see what he is up to, what challenges he is facing. That’s why he can leverage his global standing. But we must understand that he has put his reputation earned over decades and his lifetime accomplishments on the line; it is a challenge for him at the personal level too. He needs to succeed.

JURIST: There have been calls for India to assist Bangladesh in holding elections within a specified timeframe, while both the US and Pakistan have quickly expressed their support for the interim government. Some argue that if India continues to support the previous ruling party and does not back the democratization process, it risks further alienation in South Asia. What is your perspective on this? What role can and should India play in this context?

Professor Riaz: There are several things. The first thing is, even before we talk about the election, what we need to understand is what has happened in 15 years. I’ve been saying for years that what was happening, this personalistic autocracy was decimating every single institution that Bangladesh had. These institutions were weak; they were fragile. I’m not saying that they were perfect, but these institutions have been decimated by Sheikh Hasina to create a personalistic autocracy. Without rebuilding these institutions, without putting them in place, an election will not usher in an ear of democratization.

Is an election necessary for democratization? Yes—but not sufficient. Why? Because, until and unless you address the fundamental problems, another hurriedly organized election is just not going to return Bangladesh to the democratic path. Rather, it may create a pathway for another autocracy.

In the past years, during the Hasina regime, I have been insisting that there should be a free, fair, and inclusive election on a level playing field.  But without reforming the state institutions, there won’t be a level playing field. It is imperative that everyone feels comfortable, everyone feels that they have a stake in it, and everyone feels that the institutions are serving them. These state institutions need to be rebuilt. That’s the first thing to do regarding the election.

With respect to the role of India, for the past 15 years, has India ever asked about fair elections? When there were three transparently fraudulent elections, why didn’t India ask how the elections were being held? Rather, in 2014, India’s Foreign Secretary Sujatha Singh went to Dhaka, intervened in the domestic political process, and skewed the election in favor of the regime. Suddenly, India has become concerned about the Bangladesh election, whether it should be democratic or not. Let us ask the intent of it.

There was no word about human rights violations. As of now, at least 650 people have been killed within a span of two to three weeks. Nobody in New Delhi had spared a single word about it. Where were they? They are Bangladesh’s neighbors; international media was covering; they knew everything. Even if you forget the last 14 years of extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearance, persecution of opposition, weaponization of judiciary, and the abject failure to uphold human rights–India didn’t say anything about the Hasina regime when a massacre was taking place.

Now suddenly some of the Indian media is talking of elections when India is harboring someone, who for all intents and purposes, has committed crimes against humanity. And I say with certainty that she has committed crimes against humanity, because Article 7 of the Rome Statute says that enforced disappearance and torture are considered crimes against humanity. Under Sheikh Hasina’s regime, more than 650 people have been subjected to enforced disappearance. So I say that India at this point is harboring someone who has committed crimes against humanity.

Interestingly, [former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s] son Sajeeb Wazed has asked India to intervene, but previously, when his mother was in power, if any country had asked for free and fair elections, they would describe this as foreign intervention. Ahead of the 2024 election, when the international community, including the United States, raised concern about the fairness of the process, they said foreign intervention in domestic politics won’t be tolerated. Now an open call for India to intervene is nothing short of a challenge to the sovereignty of Bangladesh.

Instead of listening to and amplifying the call of the deposed regime’s spokesperson, India should use this moment for retrospection. This is the moment for India to understand that over the past 15 years, their policies have not only decimated the institution but also created a personalistic autocracy. In doing so, it has destabilized the region. India will be better served if its leaders and establishment do soul-searching. India has benefited from the last regime. The relationship was unequal. This unequal relationship needs to end. India needs to look at Bangladesh as an independent, sovereign country, which requires it to be treated with dignity, with equality. India’s policymakers should revisit its myopic policy and recalibrate its policy; it is necessary for their own interest as well.

JURIST: A follow-up, Professor Riaz—in terms of India, you mentioned that India now has an opportunity to reconcile its actions over the past 15 years and show greater respect for Bangladesh in this new situation. Do you think one way India could demonstrate this would be by attempting to extradite Sheikh Hasina to Bangladesh, given the numerous cases against her? Would this be a meaningful step in that direction?

Professor Riaz: In terms of extradition, an official request needs to come from the Bangladesh government. But what India can do is they can make sure that whoever they are harboring at this point, she should not be treated as a political leader but someone who has been deposed by the people. She may soon face justice. Hasina should not be allowed to make those statements and speak in a manner that is detrimental to the India-Bangladesh relationship and stability in Bangladesh.

That being said, there have been many instances of autocrats fleeing their own country. We have seen many in the past 50 years. You know, Ben Ali left Tunisia, and the Shah left Iran. As I have studied the rise of the autocrats and published a book with my coauthor Md. Sohel Rana titled “How Autocrats Rise: Sequences of Democratic Backsliding,” we also explored the downfall of dictators as well. During our research, I haven’t found any instance where an autocrat who has been deposed through a popular uprising or in a military coup has been received by government officials when they reached a country seeking refuge. But Hasina was treated differently. One of India’s very high-ranking officials, security adviser to the Prime Minister, Ajit Doval came to the airport to receive her and had a meeting. This is a signal. India needs to understand that these signals are not going unnoticed. On the other hand, the message was loud and clear, Indian media picked up the cue and started a concerted effort to destabilize Bangladesh with misinformation and disinformation. So what can India do? The first step, when it has provided refuge to Hasina, it should be cautious in its comments and restrain its guest from making comments. Then, if Bangladesh, under the extradition agreement signed in 2016, asks for India to extradite Hasina, it should do so. Bangladesh has extradited Indians previously.

JURIST: How do you see China’s potential role in assisting Bangladesh with the Rohingya issue, especially considering the recent political unrest in Dhaka and across Bangladesh, which allowed the Rohingya situation to escalate without much attention? Do you believe this is an opportune moment for the Bangladeshi government, in collaboration with India and possibly the upcoming administration, to strengthen defense cooperation with China? Additionally, should Bangladesh seek India’s support in facilitating Rohingya repatriation or initiating talks with Myanmar, potentially even taking the matter to international courts?

Professor Riaz: China’s tripartite mediation process to repatriate for years has not succeeded. Whether China really was sincere in repatriation is an open question. China has significant leverage on Myanmar. If China wanted, it could use it. Instead, China wanted a symbolic repatriation with the pilot project. Although Chief Advisor Professor Yunus has said that Bangladesh will continue to support Rohingya refugees, the issue of repatriation will be pushed to the back burner. The interim government has much more important, pressing issues to address, reforming state institutions, making sure the internal law and our situation are under control—especially given that the remnants of the last regime are trying to destabilize—then making sure that those who have been killed over the years, particularly since mid-July, receive justice and those who have perpetrated these crimes are held accountable. These are pressing issues, immediate issues. I don’t think that the interim government will engage in any negotiation with the Myanmar government about repatriation because the Myanmar government is reluctant.

I hope the international community will continue to support them. I don’t think there is any other reason for them to discontinue. So the status quo will be maintained.

With respect to China’s defense cooperation, I don’t think this government should get into any kind of long-term commitment with India or China, given that these two governments, China and India, have been very supportive of the previous regime. These countries, especially China, have provided funds that can be described as corrosive capital. China’s funding for this infrastructural development on the one hand made Bangladesh deeply indebted while they have been used for legitimation of the regime.

With respect to going forward, the interim government is likely to maintain good relationships with neighbors, subject to their intention too. If India doesn’t want to have a better relationship, Bangladesh alone cannot do it. But for a long-term relationship, it is better to wait until an elected government comes to power with a mandate from the people about Bangladesh’s foreign policy.

JURIST: The interim government has undertaken the challenging task of reforming the country, particularly in light of longstanding allegations against the previous government. Among these challenges are unresolved cases like the BDR massacre and the murder of the journalist couple. Given the complexities involved, what specific advice would you offer the interim government on utilizing foreign assistance to address these cases or at least establish a framework that could lead to their eventual resolution?

Professor Riaz: First of all, the one that you mentioned about the killing of the journalist couple, there are others like that. Those should have been dealt with as a criminal offense committed by individuals. If there was an independent judiciary, if there was an independent law enforcement, these cases would have been resolved years ago. But these were not resolved, presumably, because of the political connections of the perpetrators. Therefore, it is imperative that these cases are resolved in earnest. But it should not be a one-off case. The law enforcement and judiciary need to be rebuilt in such a manner that there is no repeat of such in the future.

With respect to the BDR rebellion, this is a deeply political issue and intrinsically connected to delivering justice to the families of the victims. This is about holding those who have committed crimes accountable. I hope that the interim government will be addressing the issue as soon as practically possible.

JURIST: Lastly, Prof Riaz, as a seasoned political scientist and analyst who has studied the history of Bangladesh extensively, a pressing issue we often encounter is the appropriate timeline for this interim government. In your view, how long should this government take to effectively reform institutions without overstaying its mandate? Do you have any insights on a potential time frame—whether in years, months or otherwise—that you think would be realistic or advisable?

Professor Riaz: I wish them to do it in seven days. But can this be done in seven days? I would love to see them do it in seven days and on the eighth day, Bangladesh is going to a poll which is free, fair and inclusive. If that is possible, good!

If you are asking me how much time it might take? It might take a year. It might take 18 months. It depends on the capacity of the interim government. It depends on the support of the international community. For example, I’m glad to see that the United Nations has acted quite quickly to go down to Dhaka to begin the investigation of the violence and killings between July 15 and August 5, perhaps beyond.

So let us wait. It has only been 10 days since the interim government assumed responsibility. It is facing some daunting tasks. Fifteen years of mess–corruption, abuse of power, crimes against humanity, you name it –these need to be cleaned up. A deliberate effort to bankrupt the country was conducted. The regime plundered the future of the nation.

So let us not talk of an election as a ritual but instead as a real opportunity for the people to express their will, a process which will be free and fair. The party, whichever comes to power, should have a popular mandate that is unquestionable so that they can govern with confidence and deal with the international community with strength.

Canada police investigate bomb threats targeting over 100 Jewish institutions and hospitals
Canada police investigate bomb threats targeting over 100 Jewish institutions and hospitals

On Wednesday, police forces across Canada responded to a series of identical bomb threats sent via email to over 100 Jewish organizations, including synagogues and hospitals, with the nature of the threats prompting a coordinated response by several law enforcement agencies.

The threats were disseminated via email around 5 am EST targeting a wide range of Jewish institutions and medical facilities. In response to the threats, police took precautionary measures to ensure public safety. In Toronto, several buildings were evacuated in North York as a precaution and in Ottawa, various precautionary measures were taken at several Ottawa hospitals while the investigation continued. The RCMP is leading the investigation and is trying to work with faith-based leaders to provide necessary information and support.

Making a bomb threat is a criminal offense in Canada as per the Criminal Code of CanadaSection 82.6 of the code makes it an offense to threaten to commit an offense relating to terrorism offenses provided under sections 82.3 to 82.5, with the penalty for threatening to commit such an offense including imprisonment for up to 14 years. Additionally, section 264.1 of the Criminal Code makes it an offense to convey or cause any person to receive a threat.

Friends of Simon Wiesenthal Center, President and CEO Michael Levitt called the threats ‘absolutely chilling’ and highlighted the fact that Canada’s Jewish Community has been raising alarm bells about the calls for violence and escalation of hatred towards Jews over the past couple of months. Mount Royal MP Anthony Housefather also condemned the incident.

Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau wrote in a statement on X (formerly Twitter):

I’m disgusted at reports that more than 100 Jewish institutions across Canada were targeted by threats today. This is blatant antisemitism. The RCMP is in contact with local law enforcement to investigate, and we’re working with them to keep Jewish Canadians safe.

This comes in the wake of a noted rise in antisemitism globally following the Oct. 7 Hamas attacks. In May, synagogues and a museum in New York received similar bomb threats. A November 2023 report found that antisemitism incidents had more than quadrupled in Germany since the start of the war in Gaza. Reports also showed a similar notable rise of such incidents in France and Belgium. Further, US University campuses have witnessed similar tensions and a formal investigation was opened into Penn, Harvard, and MIT’s response to antisemitism on their campuses in December 2023.

Haredi draft fight enthralls Arab media who offers them refuge

Outlets reporting on a 'severe manpower shortage in the Israeli military'—despite record-high enlistment figures for IDF combat roles



Lior Ben Ari
YNET NEWS
AUGUST 22, 2024

Arab media outlets have been closely monitoring the situation in Israel during the war, recently focusing on the ultra-Orthodox protests against conscription into the IDF. 

On Wednesday, Arab media reported that these protests were expanding, and videos of violent clashes between ultra-Orthodox protesters and police near the Jerusalem IDF draft office were widely circulated online.

Al Jazeera reported a "severe manpower shortage in the Israeli army" and noted that "a religious Jew called the police 'Nazis.'" They explained that the clashes stemmed from summons sent to ultra-Orthodox men for conscription and that several protests had taken place in recent weeks, although they neglected to say that the protesters were from extreme factions within the ultra-Orthodox community.

The report added that, despite thousands of summons being issued, only a few dozen ultra-Orthodox men actually showed up at the conscription centers. Similarly, the Lebanese network Al Mayadeen, which is affiliated with Hezbollah, emphasized reports that only seven ultra-Orthodox men showed up at the draft offices on Wednesday. The network included footage of the protests and confrontations, focusing on chants like "To prison, not to the army" and "We will die before we enlist."


(Photo: Alex Kolomoisky)

Despite Al Jazeera's report, the IDF released conscription data on Thursday for July-August, showing record motivation for combat roles among both men and women. "The overwhelming majority of units recorded very high enlistment rates, enabling rapid reinforcement of unit readiness for upcoming missions," the IDF stated. Notably, high enlistment figures were reported for men in border infantry units (130%), air defense (131%), and combat intelligence (120%), as well as for women in artillery units (159%), rescue and evacuation (133%), and combat intelligence (128%). Overall enlistment rates exceeded 100% across all branches.

Al Mayadeen correspondent Ali Mortada went further, inviting the ultra-Orthodox community to leave Israel and move to Lebanon. In a post on his personal account on X (formerly Twitter), he wrote, "Hello, my enemies. A message to the Jewish Haredim—keep going." Alongside this caption, he also shared a video, calling them to relocate to southern Lebanon.

Al Mayadeen correspondent Ali Mortada
(Video: X)

The Arabic channel Al-Rad also covered the events at the Jerusalem draft office, noting that "only 70 Haredim have shown up since the summonses began." They added that "the Israeli army intends to enlist 10,000 Haredim," and that "they refuse to join the Israeli army."

Arab media outlets, particularly those affiliated with terrorist organizations and the Shiite-Lebanese axis, are exploiting these reports of internal Israeli struggles to their advantage, using them to purportedly demonstrate Israel's "fragility." Even Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah has previously referenced the ultra-Orthodox issue, remarking in March that "after five months, the 'great' Israeli army is rotating officers and soldiers." He continued with a smile, saying, "In Israel, they want to enlist Haredim," explaining that "they sit in schools, receive state benefits, and only study—they don't enlist."

 

INTERVIEW: ‘Creative solutions’ needed to aid Rohingyas within embattled Myanmar

US State Department envoy Beth Van Schaack describes challenges providing aid and justice to the minority group.
By Ye K.M. Maung for RFA Burmese
2024.08.22

INTERVIEW: ‘Creative solutions’ needed to aid Rohingyas within embattled MyanmarBeth Van Schaack, U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for Global Criminal Justice, speaks during an interview on Aug. 21, 2024.

The U.S. and other countries are in need of “creative solutions” to assist tens of thousands of Muslim Rohingyas displaced by conflict in western Myanmar’s Rakhine state, where the ruling junta has restricted access to aid providers, according to a State Department envoy who monitors international crime.

In the meantime, U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for Global Criminal Justice Beth Van Schaack told RFA Burmese, Washington is working with authorities in neighboring Bangladesh to support the nearly 1 million Rohingyas sheltering across the border at camps in Cox’s Bazar and helping to document persecution of the group for potential referral to international criminal courts.

“Providing humanitarian assistance inside Myanmar is much more of a challenge,” said Van Schaack. “We don't necessarily have access to cross border points where that assistance can come in, so it's just much more difficult to do that work. But I want to acknowledge how dire the situation is, and we need to look for creative solutions.”

Van Schaack spoke to RFA as Rohingyas marked the seventh anniversary of a 2017 military crackdown on Rohingya militants in Rakhine state that triggered an exodus of some 740,000 people to Bangladesh.

Since then, the number of displaced Rohingyas in camps across the border has swelled to nearly 1 million, by United Nations estimates, with more attempting to cross daily. The group has found itself caught in the crossfire between the junta, which seized power in a 2021 coup d’etat and the ethnic Arakan Army, or AA, which is fighting for self-determination in Rakhine state.

Both sides have been accused of killing Rohingya, with the AA fighters blamed for attacking people accused of supporting junta forces.

On Aug. 5, dozens of Rohingya people were killed by fire from heavy weapons as they waited for boats to cross to Bangladesh, survivors told Radio Free Asia. Some survivors said the AA was responsible though the insurgents denied that.

Civilian minorities ‘ultimate sufferers’ in conflict

Van Schaack categorized the need for assistance for the Rohingya community within Myanmar as “enormous,” but said that with junta restrictions to access and the chaotic nature of the civil war, delivering it is impossible.

“There are a number of different groups that are ascendant, and they're having conversations amongst themselves about what a future, inclusive, democratic Myanmar looks like,” she said. “But because that's the case, we can't. There's only so much we can do with respect to the territory.”


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The Ambassador-at-Large said that with a new government in place in Bangladesh, after student-led protests earlier this month turned deadly and touched off a mass movement that forced Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to resign, the hope is that the U.S. can provide greater humanitarian assistance to the Rohingya in Cox’s Bazar, with the goal of allowing them to return home to Myanmar.

“But they cannot do so until it is safe, until they are returning home voluntarily and until there is a sustainable plan for them to restart their lives in their ancestral homelands,” she said.

Amid the fighting in Rakhine state, it’s difficult to determine the extent of the crimes against Rohingyas, Van Schaak said.

“We do know that atrocities are being committed and that because the violence has risen, it's inevitably the civilian population – civilian communities of multiple ethnic groups – that are the ultimate sufferers of this situation,” she said. 

“So we have called upon the parties to commit to more comprehensive efforts at a ceasefire,” she said. “But this government is unwilling to relinquish power at this point, and so we see these continual acts of violence and atrocities.”

‘Pages and pages of documentation’

Van Schaak said that in addition to providing humanitarian assistance to Rohingyas in Cox’s Bazar and other areas where they have sought refuge, the U.S. government is also helping to bring justice to their community, by conducting investigations and operating as a clearinghouse of evidence for courts around the world to bring cases.

In August 2022, the U.S. State Department determined that members of the Burmese military committed genocide and crimes against humanity against the Rohingya during the crackdown in 2017, but information gathering is still underway to classify the latest crimes against the ethnic minority.

She acknowledged that even with clear evidence to proceed to trial, some courts, like the International Criminal Court in The Hague, can do little more than issue an arrest warrant without the perpetrator in custody. So while senior members of the junta remain within Myanmar, it will be difficult for those cases to proceed.

“But those prosecutors and investigators are ready – they have dossiers on responsible individuals, they have pages and pages of documentation ... [not only] with respect to the genocide against the Rohingya, but also crimes committed since the since the coup in 2021,” she said.

While the conflict in Myanmar continues, Van Schaak urged ethnic armies such as the AA to “distinguish themselves from the Tatmadaw,” using the official name for the country’s military, which “throughout its history has been characterized by violence, war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.”

“The ethnic armed groups, if they want to build legitimacy in the eyes of the international community, if they want to be a part of the solution, they need to strictly adhere to the laws of war,” she said. 

“Treat civilian communities with respect and dignity, treat individuals in their custody humanely – even members of the Tatmadaw – and ultimately, work towards a democratic future for Myanmar.”

Edited by Joshua Lipes and Malcolm Foster.

Ukraine’s ban targeting Russian-linked faith groups raises religious freedom concerns

Even some supporters of Ukraine see the ban as an overstep in the name of national security, a violation of religious freedom and a potential risk to continued foreign
 military aid.


An aerial photo shows the thousand-year-old Monastery of Caves, also known as Kiev Pechersk Lavra, the holiest site of Eastern Orthodox Christians, taken through morning fog during a sunrise in Kyiv, Ukraine, Nov. 10, 2018. (AP Photo/Evgeniy Maloletka, File)

August 21, 2024
By David I. Klein

(RNS) — On Tuesday (Aug. 20), the Ukrainian Parliament passed a long-anticipated bill that will ban the activities of churches deemed to be affiliated with the Russian Orthodox Church or supporting the Russian invasion.

The legislation, expected to be signed into law soon by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, explicitly bans religious institutions subordinate to leaders based in Russia and is seen even by some supporters of Ukraine as an overstep in the name of national security, a violation of religious freedom and a potential risk to continued foreign military aid.

The clear target of the law is the Ukrainian Orthodox Church with its historical ties to Moscow. The church declared itself independent of the Moscow Patriarchate three months after the full-scale Russian invasion in 2022 but many still suspect at least some of the church leadership has loyalties to Russia.

“The government in Kyiv wants to see the conduits of Russian influence in Ukrainian society totally minimized,” said Andreja Bogdanovski, an author, scholar and analyst of Orthodox Christianity.

Ahead of the vote, Zelenskyy said the law would “guarantee that there will be no manipulation of the Ukrainian Church from Moscow.”

“This draft law must work and must add to Ukraine the unity of the cathedral, our real spiritual unity,” he added.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy speaks during a news conference in Kyiv, Ukraine, July 15, 2024. (AP Photo/Efrem Lukatsky)

Historically, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church has been the largest faith group in Ukraine, but the country’s Orthodox Christians found themselves split in 2019, when a newer religious body, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, was recognized as canonical and fully independent of Moscow under the blessing of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople.

The OCU, which now represents the majority of Orthodox Christians in Ukraine, formed in part from parishes resisting Russian control during Ukraine’s independence movements at the beginning and end of the 20th century. In the wake of Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and support of separatist militias in the Donbas region, the OCU was bolstered by Ukrainian clergymen who felt that Ukrainian Orthodox Christians needed a religious body divorced from Moscow’s Patriarch Kirill, who has long been a close ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin and has justified Russia’s aggression in spiritual terms.

The law, once signed, would equip the Ukrainian government to set up a commission to investigate religious institutions across the country. The commission would then have nine months to provide a list of those deemed subordinate to Russian institutions.

Ukraine’s largest organization of religious bodies, the Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organizations, which represents Christian, Jewish and Muslim groups, endorsed the draft law in an Aug. 17 statement, praising the effort “to make it impossible for such organizations to operate in our country.”

Those that sever their ties to Russia during that period will be allowed to continue to function. What constitutes a tie and an appropriate level of separation have not yet been specified. These details are what in part delayed the legislation’s approval for more than a year and a half after Zelenskyy first endorsed its draft.

Iryna Herashchenko, the first deputy chairwoman of the Ukrainian Parliament, hailed the bill’s passing as a “historic vote.”

Parliament “has passed a bill banning the aggressor country’s branch in Ukraine. 265 MPs voted FOR! This is a matter of national security, not religion,” she announced on X.

Despite the broad support inside Ukraine, the bill has been strongly criticized by some Orthodox leaders, including those from populaces that support Ukraine against Russian aggression.

Bulgaria’s newly elected Patriarch Daniil sent a letter of support to Metropolitan Onufriy, the primate of the UOC. The Bulgarian church does not recognize the OCU as canonical, but the church and government have expressed support for Ukraine in the war.

“You have resisted and continue, with God’s help, to resist all attempts to create disunity, preserving the unity, integrity, and canonicity of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church,” Patriarch Daniill wrote.

A Ukrainian serviceman of the 72nd Separate Mechanized Brigade lights candles during a Christian Orthodox Easter religious service, in Donetsk region, Ukraine, May 4, 2024.
 (AP Photo/Francisco Seco)

Onufriy also received letters of support from the heads of the Antiochian and Georgian Orthodox churches. Both jurisdictions have issued statements shy of condemning Patriarch Kirill’s role in Russian aggression.

But the bill has also been blasted on religious freedom grounds by many observers and is expected to be challenged as Ukraine moves closer to joining the European Union.
RELATED: Ukrainian Orthodox churches purge vestiges of Russian influence

“It’s very hard diplomatically to reconcile this law with Ukraine’s European ambitions,” said Samuel Noble, a scholar of Orthodox Christianity at Aga Khan University in London. “This is the kind of thing that will wind up being brought to Strasbourg, that is, the European Court of Human Rights.”

“It’s not normally the kind of thing that one does in a country aspiring to join the European Union. On the other hand, Ukraine is not in a normal situation,” he added.

Smilen Markov, a Bulgarian scholar of Orthodox Christianity, put it more bluntly: “The Ukrainian state is violating religious freedom. It declares a religious community pro-Russian, which is legally problematic, divisive and ruinous.”

Regina Elsner, the chair of Eastern churches and ecumenism at the University of Muenster’s Ecumenical Institute, posted on Twitter that the legislation’s approval is “deeply disturbing.”

“This law opens a door to serious violations of religious freedom and new fragmentation within Ukraine,” she said. “The amendments of the last months did not improve anything. Hate and violence against UOC believers get public approval. Sad.”

Since the outbreak of full-scale war, Ukraine has jailed more than 100 UOC priests over charges of espionage and anti-Ukrainian speech, including posting opinions on social media and speaking from the pulpit.

The Russian Orthodox Church in particular has sought to use such religious freedom concerns to garner sympathy for the UOC and cast doubt on Western aid to Ukraine, which has been crucial for the Ukrainian defense.

“The Ukrainian Orthodox Church is being subjected to reprisals for its refusal to join the organization of schismatics and self-ordained peoples, created as a political project aimed at destroying the common spiritual heritage of Russian and Ukrainian peoples,” said Vladimir Lagoida, a spokesman for the Russian Orthodox Church, on Telegram. “There is no doubt that the persecution of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church will sooner or later receive a fair assessment, just as the godless regimes of the past received it, destroying the human right to faith and to belong to their Church.”


Patriarch Kirill, right, meets with Cardinal Matteo Zuppi at the Patriarchal Residence in Danilov Monastery, in Moscow, Russia, June 29, 2023. (Photo by Moscow Patriarchate)

The UOC has ceased to commemorate Patriarch Kirill in prayers and has said it is not bound by the decisions of the Holy Synod of the Moscow Patriarchate.

“In Orthodox Church logic, that’s effectively a declaration of independence,” Noble said. “Even from the Russians’ perspective, officially on paper, the UOC is autonomous in all things, except for Onufriy’s seat on the Synod of the Moscow Patriarchate, which he has more or less disowned.”

Still, many Ukrainians remain deeply suspicious of the UOC. In 2021, 18% of religious Ukrainians identified as members of the UOC, but months after Russia’s full-scale invasion, that dropped to just 4%, according to the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology. The same poll found OCU membership increased from 34% to 54%. In addition, hundreds of Orthodox congregations have switched allegiance from the UOC to the OCU, according to church records, but few monks, traditionally seen as sources of authority in the church, have followed.

“Of course, it is true that the hierarchy of the UOC is partly pro-Russian,” Markov noted. “The allegations about ties with Moscow are often factually correct.

“However, these perpetrations are personal and they should be proved case by case,” he added. “They cannot be blamed on a religious community of millions of Ukrainians.”



Opinion

Ukraine’s ban targeting Moscow-linked Orthodox Church risks US aid

Zelenskyy is about to test not only Ukraine’s carefully constructed global image but also its own path toward liberal democracy.


An aerial view of the Monastery of the Caves, also known as Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra, one of the holiest sites of Eastern Orthodox Christians, in Kyiv, Ukraine, April 13, 2020.
 (AP Photo/Efrem Lukatsky)

August 21, 2024
By Katherine Kelaidis

(RNS) — On Tuesday (Aug. 20), the Ukrainian Parliament passed long-threatened legislation meant to ban the country’s Moscow-linked Orthodox Church and any faith groups supporting Russia’s invasion. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has called the bill a “duty” to “guarantee Ukrainian spiritual independence” and is expected to sign it into law soon, launching state intervention into a largely ecclesiastical battle.

In doing so, Zelenskyy is risking Ukraine’s access to Western military aid, especially crucial U.S. aid. Signing the law will give ammunition to the worst slurs of anti-Ukrainian forces in American political life.

The Russian Orthodox Church traces its origins to ninth-century Kyiv, now Ukraine’s capital. The majority of Ukrainians are Orthodox Christians, divided between two church bodies: a newer church formed with Ukrainian nationalism and an older church tied to Moscow. The Orthodox Church of Ukraine was formed by churches that broke from Russian control during Ukraine’s independence. The jurisdiction was granted autocephaly or independence in 2019 by the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople, called “first among equals” among Eastern Orthodox leaders. The recognition dented centuries of Moscow’s religious dominance in Ukraine as parishes switched loyalties, and its legitimacy has been fiercely rejected by Russia’s Patriarch Kirill and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, sparking a deep conflict within global Orthodoxy.

RELATED: Ukrainian Orthodox churches purge vestiges of Russian influence

While the UOC declared itself independent from Moscow three months after Russia’s 2022 invasion, many believe the church remains canonically tied to the Russian Orthodox Church and still harbors loyalty to Russia. Ukraine has prosecuted more than 100 UOC clerics, with charges ranging from anti-Ukrainian speech to espionage.

Charging priests with spying might seem like a groundless attack on members of an unpopular religious group, but the Russian Orthodox Church has a history of weaponizing itself as soft power for the state. There is also evidence that the Russian Orthodox Church is frequently used as an outpost for Russian intelligence efforts. This has led Estonia to pass similar legislation against the church.

The problem is that Ukraine’s legislation skirts the line between addressing a legitimate national security interest and suppressing a religious minority merely for having the taint of the “foreign.” Anyone concerned with freedom of conscience and belief can find legitimate reasons to condemn criminal charges over opinions expressed on social media or from the pulpit, which has been the case of many UOC clerics jailed since the invasion.
RELATED: Ukraine’s Parliament approves ban on Moscow-linked religious groups

Ukraine’s Parliament passed the legislation with a wide margin despite the potential ramifications. The country’s defense efforts rely primarily on the large amounts of military aid it has received from Western nations, mostly from the U.S. In gathering this aid, Ukraine has leaned heavily into a self-image as a newly liberalized democracy, a bulwark against Russian aggression and authoritarianism. It is as a liberal, pluralist democracy that Ukraine has sought not-yet-granted membership in NATO and the European Union.

That this self-narrativizing on the international stage has not been entirely persuasive is never more evident than in how contentious the continuation of American aid to Ukraine remains. Republicans are largely opposed or indifferent to the Ukrainian cause. The Republican nominee for vice president, JD Vance, has even declared he doesn’t care what happens to Ukraine.

Many on the American right do not see Ukraine as a democracy, dedicated to safeguarding liberty at home and abroad, but instead see Ukraine as an authoritarian state in its own right. Before leaving Fox News, right-wing provocateur Tucker Carlson said Zelenskyy was not interested in “freedom or democracy.” Cato Institute fellow Ted Galen Carpenter has called Ukraine a “false democracy.” U.S. Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene has applauded Russia for “protecting Christianity” and described it approvingly in comparison with “secular Ukraine.”

Greene’s comments point to a larger point in the American anti-Ukraine view, built on a belief in Russia’s self-promotion as a protector of Christianity and traditional values. Russian President Vladmir Putin recently advanced the Kremlin’s narrative by simplifying the immigration process to attract foreigners who share Russia’s “traditional values.”

The result of these dueling self-descriptions of Slavic nations is that Russia and Ukraine have become proxies for each side of a divided America. Just as American progressives are perhaps too quick to attribute to Ukraine the pluralism and social progressivism they strive for in the U.S., American conservatives and traditionalists are quick to believe Russia — and in some cases specifically the Russian Orthodox Church — is a bastion of the same traditionalism they hope to defend in America. For them, it makes sense that Russia was forced to go to war with Ukraine to defend it against “pride parades.” They fear (however irrationally) they might be forced into the same war in America.

For these people, Ukrainian efforts to suppress the Moscow-linked UOC are seen as evidence for their belief not only that Ukraine is an anti-democratic, anti-Christian, anti-family state, but moreover that Americans who support Ukraine are these things as well. This is particularly true as Americans are notoriously bad at separating their own internal battles from those abroad. “Religious freedom” is a dog whistle among many American traditionalists. A Ukrainian attack on “religious freedom” will most certainly lose all nuance in their translation of it into the American political landscape.

The truth is that Ukraine finds itself in a nearly impossible situation with respect to the UOC. On paper, at least, the UOC is an independent and fully Ukrainian church. It is also the church of many ordinary Ukrainians, who for whatever reasons (including language, habit, canonical and traditional loyalties) remain part of the besieged jurisdiction. At the same time, nearly everyone knows that the UOC’s independence is shallow at best, perhaps merely window dressing, and that while the UOC has supported Ukrainian soldiers and refugees, at least some UOC clerics are involved in efforts to undermine the Ukrainian cause and promote Russian ideology.

Zelenskyy is about to test not only Ukraine’s carefully constructed global image but also its own path toward liberal democracy. Ukraine’s future remains even more unclear as a result.

(Katie Kelaidis is a research fellow at the Institute of Orthodox Christian Studies in Cambridge, England.)