A plan for new submarines needed imminently
Author of the article: Jeffrey F. Collins,
Special to National Post
Publishing date: Nov 07, 2021
A Department of National Defence briefing note identifies the urgent need to “kick off without delay” a replacement project for the Royal Canadian Navy’s (RCN) four Victoria-class submarines. The British built vessels, acquired second hand in 1998 by the Chrétien government in a nearly $900 million lease-to-buy contract, are due to be retired or “paid off” 15 years from now, between 2036 and 2042 . At that point the submarines will be 50 years old.
Mirroring an assessment produced in a recent Macdonald-Laurier Institute report, the January 2021 note, obtained through an access-to-information request, makes clear that from start to finish it will take a “minimum” 15 years to deliver a new submarine. This estimate jumps to twenty-five years depending on which procurement model the DND adopts: 1) buy new from overseas; 2) build in Canada with a foreign design; 3) or build in Canada with a new design.
Should delays in deciding on a new submarine fleet emerge, both the note and the institute report state that Canada will encounter a capability gap. Simply put, with the vessels removed from service and the replacements not yet delivered, RCN crews would be without any operational submarines for a period of time.
Such a scenario is not mere conjecture. In 2015-16 , the RCN lost its two aging supply ships due to hull erosion and a fire, respectively, forcing Ottawa to rent sea days on Chilean and Spanish ships and lease a converted container ship as interim solutions given the delays in building new supply ships. Unfortunately, there are no surplus submarines available from any of Canada’s allies. Getting a new replacement, spending billions more on a total overhaul, or losing the RCN’s submarine force altogether are the only options.
Well publicized accidents and mishaps, like HMCS Corner Brook hitting the ocean floor in 2011 , have given Canada’s Victoria-class submarines a bad imagine (to say the least). Yet despite this narrative and the general secrecy surrounding undersea operations, submarines are a proven critical tool in Ottawa’s ability to monitor and patrol Canadian sovereignty.
Representing a quarter of the RCN’s advanced war-fighting fleet, Canada’s submarines are viewed as integral to deterring “potential adversaries or trespassers” in the country’s vast maritime domain — currently constituting the world’s longest coastline, second largest continental shelf and fifth largest exclusive economic zone. It is not for nothing that the RCN in its own 2016 strategy, Leadmark 2050 , regards submarines as its “ultimate warfighting capability.”
Given Canada’s continental defence alliance with the United States through NORAD, submarines are a “uniquely stealthy, persistent, and lethal capability set” that give Ottawa the ability to conduct surveillance and intelligence gathering operations at home and abroad. Although some parts of the note are “blacked out,” and no discernible references to China and Russia appear, it’s clear the Canadian military sees the prospects of more foreign submarines in the country’s maritime domain as a likely scenario. Submarines, the department advises, will probably “grow in significance.”
The purpose of the note — to formally establish a “Canadian patrol submarine project” office — corresponds with news reports this past summer of the DND examining its options on a submarine replacement. As the note admits, “significant analysis” is needed to determine the submarine design, fleet size, and procurement model.
Tellingly, the note does not exclude the option of nuclear power submarines, a subject last seriously considered in the Mulroney government’s 1987 defence white paper. Unlike Canada’s 2400 tonne diesel-electric Victoria class submarines, which need to periodically surface to recharge their batteries, nuclear-powered submarines like the 7400 tonne British Astute-class remain the only safe means to both travel under the Arctic ice and, given their larger displacement and hull designs, punch through it.
The RCN has been clear that it sees an Arctic ice capability as necessary for a future submarine replacement. But without significant advances in diesel-electric submarines or new air independent propulsion hybrids that can recharge batteries through fuel cells, nuclear remains the only game in town.
The previous attempt at nuclear partially failed over American reluctance to transfer nuclear submarine know-how to Canada. However, with the creation in September of the AUKUS defence pact, the US and UK are set to assist Australia in procuring nuclear-powered submarines. Of course, the cost of this acquisition will likely prove significant for Australia.
Irrespective, this deal indicates a willingness on Washington’s part to invest in partners that are willing to pull their weight in international affairs. The question for Ottawa is, are we?
National Post
Jeffrey F. Collins is author of the Macdonald-Laurier Institute paper “Deadline 2036,” and an assistant professor of political science at the University of Prince Edward Island.
Publishing date: Nov 07, 2021
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A Department of National Defence briefing note identifies the urgent need to “kick off without delay” a replacement project for the Royal Canadian Navy’s (RCN) four Victoria-class submarines. The British built vessels, acquired second hand in 1998 by the Chrétien government in a nearly $900 million lease-to-buy contract, are due to be retired or “paid off” 15 years from now, between 2036 and 2042 . At that point the submarines will be 50 years old.
Mirroring an assessment produced in a recent Macdonald-Laurier Institute report, the January 2021 note, obtained through an access-to-information request, makes clear that from start to finish it will take a “minimum” 15 years to deliver a new submarine. This estimate jumps to twenty-five years depending on which procurement model the DND adopts: 1) buy new from overseas; 2) build in Canada with a foreign design; 3) or build in Canada with a new design.
Should delays in deciding on a new submarine fleet emerge, both the note and the institute report state that Canada will encounter a capability gap. Simply put, with the vessels removed from service and the replacements not yet delivered, RCN crews would be without any operational submarines for a period of time.
Such a scenario is not mere conjecture. In 2015-16 , the RCN lost its two aging supply ships due to hull erosion and a fire, respectively, forcing Ottawa to rent sea days on Chilean and Spanish ships and lease a converted container ship as interim solutions given the delays in building new supply ships. Unfortunately, there are no surplus submarines available from any of Canada’s allies. Getting a new replacement, spending billions more on a total overhaul, or losing the RCN’s submarine force altogether are the only options.
Well publicized accidents and mishaps, like HMCS Corner Brook hitting the ocean floor in 2011 , have given Canada’s Victoria-class submarines a bad imagine (to say the least). Yet despite this narrative and the general secrecy surrounding undersea operations, submarines are a proven critical tool in Ottawa’s ability to monitor and patrol Canadian sovereignty.
Representing a quarter of the RCN’s advanced war-fighting fleet, Canada’s submarines are viewed as integral to deterring “potential adversaries or trespassers” in the country’s vast maritime domain — currently constituting the world’s longest coastline, second largest continental shelf and fifth largest exclusive economic zone. It is not for nothing that the RCN in its own 2016 strategy, Leadmark 2050 , regards submarines as its “ultimate warfighting capability.”
Given Canada’s continental defence alliance with the United States through NORAD, submarines are a “uniquely stealthy, persistent, and lethal capability set” that give Ottawa the ability to conduct surveillance and intelligence gathering operations at home and abroad. Although some parts of the note are “blacked out,” and no discernible references to China and Russia appear, it’s clear the Canadian military sees the prospects of more foreign submarines in the country’s maritime domain as a likely scenario. Submarines, the department advises, will probably “grow in significance.”
The purpose of the note — to formally establish a “Canadian patrol submarine project” office — corresponds with news reports this past summer of the DND examining its options on a submarine replacement. As the note admits, “significant analysis” is needed to determine the submarine design, fleet size, and procurement model.
Tellingly, the note does not exclude the option of nuclear power submarines, a subject last seriously considered in the Mulroney government’s 1987 defence white paper. Unlike Canada’s 2400 tonne diesel-electric Victoria class submarines, which need to periodically surface to recharge their batteries, nuclear-powered submarines like the 7400 tonne British Astute-class remain the only safe means to both travel under the Arctic ice and, given their larger displacement and hull designs, punch through it.
The RCN has been clear that it sees an Arctic ice capability as necessary for a future submarine replacement. But without significant advances in diesel-electric submarines or new air independent propulsion hybrids that can recharge batteries through fuel cells, nuclear remains the only game in town.
The previous attempt at nuclear partially failed over American reluctance to transfer nuclear submarine know-how to Canada. However, with the creation in September of the AUKUS defence pact, the US and UK are set to assist Australia in procuring nuclear-powered submarines. Of course, the cost of this acquisition will likely prove significant for Australia.
Irrespective, this deal indicates a willingness on Washington’s part to invest in partners that are willing to pull their weight in international affairs. The question for Ottawa is, are we?
National Post
Jeffrey F. Collins is author of the Macdonald-Laurier Institute paper “Deadline 2036,” and an assistant professor of political science at the University of Prince Edward Island.
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