While Ukrainians may be overwhelmed by the Russian military, this is not the contest that will determine the outcome of this conflict, argues John Raine. It is whether the Russians can be made to pay a visible and material cost for territorial expansion through effective, armed resistance.
25th February 2022
Speculation on the course of the conflict in Ukraine may not be as valuable as an acknowledgement of what has happened so far. In short, the campaign about which the United States, the United Kingdom and others long warned has unfolded; and as predicted. It is on a known trajectory. To stall and reverse that trajectory, more will be required than sanctions. Ukrainian resistance will be vital.
Undeterred and on trackSo far, Putin has proved susceptible neither to deterrence nor to the strategic logic that many hoped would prevent him from embarking on such a flagrant act of aggression. But more importantly, he has situated his move against Ukraine within a menacing narrative of ‘rolling back NATO’. He has acted aggressively against a neighbouring nation as the first step in a strategy of expansion and restoration of the Soviet dominium. That raises the stakes beyond the fate of Ukraine’s sovereignty.
Putin has had reasons to be confident. He has spent decades modernising the Russian armed forces, redesigning and reconfiguring them for this type of campaign, then testing and tempering systems, men and equipment in combat in Syria. Moreover, he faces in Ukraine a country whose military capabilities are both far weaker than his own, and based largely on familiar and easily countered Russian equipment. He has also, and crucially, received a clear indication from Western nations that they will not deploy militarily inside Ukraine. He has been constantly reminded that the West will be bound, for political reasons, to sanctions as its vector of response. Having abandoned ambitions for inclusion and influence from within since 2008, sanctions and exclusion have no purchase on Putin’s strategic calculus. While he is free to choose his weapons, his opponents have only one that does not, in his eyes, represent a risk, let alone a deterrent.
But Putin has risks and vulnerabilitiesPutin’s biggest risk is that he has miscalculated Ukrainian ability to inflict material harm on his armed forces through resistance. In the echo-chamber of the Russian security community, it is likely he has been briefed that a strategy of strike, fix and retire, such as that executed in Georgia, can be applied in Ukraine. In this plan, Ukraine can be broken and subordinated by an overwhelming but brief invasion sufficient to set up a puppet regime. It will not have to be occupied. But a resistance that mauls Russian forces would be deeply damaging to Putin and oblige him to adapt. He may intend to withdraw his forces before this can happen, but an effective, early resistance will force him to leave forces in country to protect a puppet regime. Those forces will in turn present targets. Sustained resistance will draw them into conflicts, low-intensity asymmetric street-to-street fighting, which Putin will be keen to avoid. His superior firepower is less of an advantage unless he is prepared to be dragged into another Grozny. Human casualties are one of the few consequences that he will find difficult to manage at home.
His second risk is that a coalition materialises against Russia that squeezes it ‘de tous azimuts’. The coalition currently hinges around unprecedented levels of unity within the two key multilateral organisations, NATO and the European Union, and support from nations of less or no strategic value to Russia. China holds a large key. Putin will be banking on Xi Jinping to remain neutral if not complicit. While this may be holding Xi will, as the conflict develops, not necessarily remain easy with what Putin does inside Ukraine. His priorities are elsewhere. He will do nothing to damage his preparations for the 20th Communist Party National Congress coming up this year in which he will seek his third term as chairman. Too close an association with an ostracised Russian leader will bring unnecessary risk. The diplomatic task is to convert any Chinese unease into pressure from the East. It is the very large valve that Putin is banking on staying open.
A third risk for Putin is that he loses the initiative in all aspects of his campaign. So far he has succeeded in retaining the initiative militarily, stepping up deployments incrementally according to his own timeline. He has felt neither shock nor awe, nor material cost so far. The signalling ahead of likely consequences, which was intended to deter, has instead appeared to him to leave him free to make the next move when he chooses. It has also reassured him that the consequences are manageable. An exception has perhaps been in the narrative where the muscular use of intelligence by Washington and allies has won them escalation dominance, at least outside Russia, and forced Moscow on to the back foot. The lesson from this may be that a sudden, sharp and unheralded move against him in other domains, and one not within the familiar repertoire, would place him in the uncomfortable and unfamiliar position of having lost the initiative. He will be forced to adapt, a strength neither he nor his armed forces have cultivated, and he will be denied the strategic momentum he currently enjoys.
In the immediate future, however, it is likely that the current momentum will be sufficient to carry him through the next phases of his plan politically, the seizure of power, and to the geographical limits of his incursion. Neither international opposition nor Ukrainian resistance will mobilise with sufficient speed and effect now to arrest the momentum.
The significance of armed resistance, and the challengesBut while the Ukrainians may be overwhelmed by the Russian military, this is not the contest that will determine this conflict. It is whether the Russians can be made to pay a visible and material cost for territorial expansion through effective, armed resistance. Given NATO’s refusal to deploy force inside Ukraine, only an effective Ukrainian resistance will be able to do this. Supporting and enabling resistance will become critical, but that is not as easy as the rhetoric of support and solidarity that has come from Western leaders. Delivering material support will be a test of political appetites, legal parameters and the specialist capabilities required for fighting through third parties. This is a test that the broad anti-Assad coalition, featuring key NATO players, failed in Syria. Among the lessons to be learned from Syria are the vital importance of supplying weapons systems and of sustained and dedicated effort over time. That will require investing effort and political capital in creating the necessary legal and political frameworks. It will be damaging for Ukraine’s allies to signal support they prove unable to deliver, or to deliver and not stay the course. The US-led coalition walked away from partners in Syria and Kurdistan. It now has an opportunity to restore its global credibility as a partner to allies fighting asymmetric wars.
There is more at stake in Ukraine than there was in Syria. If Ukrainian resistance is successful, it could turn what Putin hopes to be his opening move in the restoration of the wider Soviet dominion, into his last throw as a rogue dictator. It is worth investing in its success.
Author
John Raine
Senior Adviser for Geopolitical Due Diligence
John Raine CMG OBE is researching current and emergent themes that cross geographic boundaries, namely the use of proxies, the use of non-kinetic force as a means of projecting power, and the potential of alternative approaches to conflict resolution. In addition, he is looking at how an understanding of these themes can help governments, armed forces and multinational businesses to mitigate risk.
Background
John joined the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office in 1984, where he served for 33 years. His overseas postings included Kuwait, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Baghdad and Islamabad. In addition to bilateral and multilateral diplomatic work, he worked extensively with UK Armed Forces on deployed operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and, in the UK, on strategy and future capabilities. As a senior member of the national security community he contributed to the design and implementation of UK defence and security strategy, and managed relationships with a wide range of international security partners.
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