Saturday, February 17, 2024

The White House says it's tracking a new Russian space weapon that violates a nuclear arms treaty

Matthew Loh
Feb 15, 2024, 
White House National Security Communications Advisor John Kirby speaks during a daily news briefing at the James S. Brady Press Briefing Room of the White House on February 15, 2024 in Washington, DC.
Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images


The White House has confirmed that Russia is building a new weapon to be put in space.
The weapon is thought to be nuclear-related, with the White House saying it would violate the Outer Space Treaty.
But it's also believed to target satellites instead of human beings on Earth.

The White House confirmed on Thursday that it is monitoring Russia's development of a new weapon to be stationed in space.

The weapon is believed to be nuclear-related, multiple media outlets reported on Wednesday after lawmakers in Congress were briefed on its nature. It's still unclear if it would be nuclear-armed or nuclear-powered.

It's also unlikely to be a "space nuke" in a conventional sense. It's thought to be designed to attack satellites, not targets on Earth — a detail that White House national security spokesperson John Kirby confirmed in a Thursday press briefing.

"We are not talking about a weapon that can be used to attack human beings or cause physical destruction here on Earth," Kirby said. "That said, we've been closely monitoring this Russian activity, and we will continue to take it very seriously."

Kirby added that the weapon is not an "active capability" and hasn't been deployed, aligning with reports from The New York Times and CNN that it is still in development. Both outlets cited US officials who were not named.

"And though Russia's pursuit of this particular capability is troubling, there is no immediate threat to anyone's safety," Kirby said.

Kirby didn't specify what nuclear capabilities the new weapon might possess.

"So nuclear energy can be used for propulsion in an engineering sense. It can also be used as a weapon," he said.

He declined to elaborate when pressed by reporters. "It's just not prudent to do that," Kirby said.

But the spokesperson also said the weapon would violate the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, of which Russia is still a participant.

The treaty specifically bans the stationing of weapons of mass destruction in space, including nuclear arms.

Notably, Russia has, in the last decade, been pulling out of its past agreed-upon nuclear treaties, sparking concerns that it may usher in a new Cold War era.

Kirby said that if Russia ends its involvement in the Outer Space Treaty, the US doesn't intend to follow suit and violate the agreement.

"We are a signatory to that treaty. We take our obligations under that treaty very seriously," he said.

An April 2023 report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies assessed that Russia is developing anti-satellite weapons but has not deployed them in its war against Ukraine.

Ukraine relies heavily on Starlink satellites for its communications. The US also uses an extensive network of satellites to maintain military communications and control over its nuclear arsenal.

Intelligence on the new weapon became the subject of alarm in Capitol Hill on Wednesday when GOP House Intelligence Chairman Mike Turner issued an urgent statement calling lawmakers to hear about a "national security threat."

But House representatives later released statements saying that the intel was no cause for panic and that it did not discuss an urgent threat.

US House Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries arrives for an intelligence briefing by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan in the US Capitol in Washington, DC, on February 15, 2024. MANDEL NGAN/AFP via Getty Images

"It's not going to ruin your Thursday," Democratic Rep. Jim Himes of Connecticut, who sits on the House Intelligence Committee, told reporters.


Experts react: What to know about Russia’s apparent plans for a space-based nuclear weapon


By Atlantic Council experts

Experts react February 15, 2024

Is this a Sputnuke moment? Russia is reportedly developing a space-based nuclear anti-satellite weapon. The news broke on Wednesday after House Intelligence Committee Chair Mike Turner released a cryptic statement on social media urging US President Joe Biden to declassify information about a “serious national security threat.” A White House spokesperson said on Thursday that the Russian system, which is not yet in orbit, does not pose a direct threat of “physical destruction” on Earth. However, it has raised new fears about the possibility of Russia destroying critical US satellites and an arms race in space. Atlantic Council experts will share their insights on the developments in three . . . two . . . one . . .

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Clementine G. Starling: Russia can already detonate nuclear weapons in space from Earth

Robert M. Soofer: The US needs to modernize its nuclear and space forces

Mark J. Massa: Russia has been experimenting with “exotic” nuclear weapons

Thomas Warrick: Three possible reasons why Turner drew attention to this threat

Jacob Mezey: Russia’s nuclear recklessness in space might spur China and the US to work together


Russia can already detonate nuclear weapons in space from Earth

A nuclear-powered Russian satellite is potentially less alarming than a nuclear-armed satellite, since it would neither be norm-shattering nor give Russia the ability to degrade a large swath of all satellites on orbit in one fell swoop.

Because Russia can already detonate nuclear weapons in space from Earth, a new nuclear-armed anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) likely would not give Moscow significant new military capability, even though it remains concerning. While a nuclear-armed ASAT would advance Russian counterspace capabilities, challenge US space strategy, undermine norms, and alarm allies, it does not appear to add a qualitatively different capability to the Russian arsenal.

Clementine G. Starling is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Forward Defense program and a resident fellow within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Read more from Starling on this issue here.


The US needs to modernize its nuclear and space forces

This report, if true, should come as no surprise to the US government, which has been tracking Russian and Chinese anti-satellite capabilities for some years now, including ground- or space-based high-powered lasers. Presumably, armed with this awareness, the Department of Defense is taking appropriate measures to counter this threat. The key to successful nuclear deterrence is a survivable nuclear retaliatory force, including nuclear command and control—these are priorities for the US Department of Defense.

This situation is reminiscent of Russia’s development of transcontinental underwater nuclear torpedoes and nuclear-powered/nuclear-armed cruise missiles; these “novel” nuclear systems do not add appreciably to Russia’s existing capabilities to threaten the United States. Then why does Russian President Vladimir Putin field them? Perhaps it’s to shore up his domestic base or divert global attention from a failing state. Regardless, the US response must be to continue to modernize its nuclear—and space—forces to ensure that no combination of adversaries could ever contemplate a successful disarming first strike against the United States. It’s a good sign that Congress is concerned about these matters—it will have an opportunity to understand the US response as the congressional hearing season unfolds.

Robert M. Soofer is a senior fellow in the Forward Defense practice of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, where he leads its Nuclear Strategy Project. He was deputy assistant secretary of defense for nuclear and missile defense policy from April 2017 to January 2021. 


Russia has been experimenting with “exotic” nuclear weapons

In recent years, Russia has announced the development of several new so-called “exotic” nuclear weapons—including a nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed cruise missile and submarine drone—which Western analysts have found challenging to understand. While there are plausible ways in which a nuclear-armed ASAT could be more effective than a nuclear detonation in space delivered by an intercontinental ballistic missile, such a development may be more similar in practical effect to the rest of this class of exotic nuclear weapons.

Mark J. Massa is a deputy director in the Forward Defense practice of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. Read more from Massa on this issue here.

New Atlanticist

Feb 15, 2024

Russian nuclear anti-satellite weapons would require a firm US response, not hysteria

By Clementine G. StarlingMark J. Massa

If fielded, such weapons would directly challenge norms of responsible behavior in space and present a serious risk to all nations’ satellites.


Three possible reasons why Turner drew attention to this threat

House Intelligence Committee Chair Mike Turner’s request to declassify intelligence on a new Russian capability was striking because of Turner’s reputation for being serious about national security and the protection of intelligence sources and methods. I think that Turner was trying to win a trifecta—and he deserves the win.

First, national security Democrats and Republicans have been trying for months to get Congress to renew a crucial legal authority for foreign intelligence collection under section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). Jon Darby and I have described section 702  as “the most timely, impactful, and cost-effective authority to obtain foreign intelligence on terrorists, spies, weapons proliferators, cyber attackers, and nation-states that pose threats to the United States and our allies.” Reasonable reforms of the current law are entirely justified, but an unlikely alliance of progressive Democrats and pro-Donald Trump Republicans have tried to restrict the US intelligence community’s ability to use information collected under 702. A crucial vote scheduled for this week looked to go sideways, causing House leadership to pause the vote. Turner’s disclosure that this important new threat was revealed by intelligence collected under section 702’s authority should warn hesitant House members that the country’s security absolutely depends on renewing section 702.

The second potential motive for declassification has a good, if unorthodox, reason behind it. Normally, interested House members read and are briefed on threats by coming to the Intelligence Committee’s special rooms for reviewing highly classified intelligence—which, for security reasons, are a little out of the way of the routes most House members walk during their workday. Not all House members take this responsibility seriously enough. Declassifying this information will force all House members to confront the reality of this threat and may motivate them to go read the full, classified intelligence and vote accordingly.

The third reason—getting House members to realize that Russia is a threat to our national security and that they should support our allies and partners, including Ukraine—is an obvious reason, as well.

I think Turner is three for three. The Biden administration should support his request and declassify as much of the information as it can.

Thomas S. Warrick is the director of the Future of DHS project at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Forward Defense practice and a nonresident senior fellow and the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council.


Russia’s nuclear recklessness in space might spur China and the US to work together

National security wonks in Washington are buzzing after reports that Russia is developing a nuclear system in space for anti-satellite purposes. It is currently unclear whether the system is armed with a nuclear warhead to directly destroy satellites or if it is instead powered by a nuclear reactor for electronic warfare purposes. However, if the system is nuclear-armed, it is worth understanding what the physical effects of such a nuclear explosion in space would be and how the world might respond. If Russia detonated such a weapon, it could damage the vast majority of commercial and military satellites in orbit. Upon detonation, high-energy x-rays would destroy the electronics of all satellites not obscured by the Earth, likely knocking out the Global Positioning System (GPS). In the following weeks, charged particles generated by the blast would be trapped by the Earth’s natural radiation belts and spread around the globe, damaging all satellites except those with a high degree of radiation shielding. When the United States detonated a nuclear weapon at high-altitude in the Starfish Prime test of 1962 every single satellite in orbit was eventually destroyed by this effect. In 1962, there were just seven satellites in orbit. Today there are more than six thousand.

Given the potential crippling outcome to the global economy and to militaries, this issue should be of utmost priority to the entire world. The United States should clarify whether the weapon is, in fact, nuclear-armed. If so, international pressure, especially from China, would be critical to preventing Russia from deploying the system in space. China operates the second-most satellites of any country and might find common ground with the United States in stopping this threat. If Russia deployed the weapon in space, deterring its use in a major crisis would be difficult since the United States could not threaten to respond in-kind. Therefore, the only alternative would be planning to shoot down the system before it detonated. 

While the United States does not officially possess or have plans to develop an anti-satellite capability, it has demonstrated the ability of an SM-3 missile to target satellites in low-Earth orbit. Such an event could spark an unlikely alliance, since China has tested anti-satellite capabilities and might be willing to cooperate given the threat to its ambitions in space. Regardless of whether this Russian system is indeed a nuclear weapon, this revelation could be good for US-China relations at a time when officials are attempting to jump-start arms control talks. Preserving peaceful access to space could help pave the way for broader discussions on strategic stability.

Jacob Mezey is a program assistant in the Forward Defense practice of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He contributes to the program’s research on nuclear security, space security, defense innovation and modernization, and gray zone conflict.


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