The analysis evaluates the presidency of Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO), examining key changes made during his administration as well as the constraints AMLO faced. Ultimately, it explores the question of whether his presidency resulted in genuine transformation or merely incremental changes.
October 18, 2024
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Claudia Scheinbaum with AMLO
The term transform originates from the Latin transformare, meaning to modify or reshape something. Change, on the other hand, comes from cambiare, which signifies the replacement of one thing with another. In socio-political terms, changes are processes that produce limited variations within specific areas of reality and can be initiated by individuals or groups. In contrast, transformations are profound, systemic alterations to the social order that require the participation of the majority to be realized. Historically, for this reason, processes of transformation have been far less frequent than those of mere change.
Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) embarked on a mission to bring about a profound transformation of public life in Mexico during his six-year presidency. As he explains on page 231 of his book Gracias (Thanks), the Fourth Transformation (4T)—following the country’s three previous major upheavals: the War of Independence (1810–1821), the Reform Era (1857–1861), and the Mexican Revolution (1910–1920)— is built around “…four fundamental pillars: rescuing the state’s political institutions, reforming the economic model, promoting moral governance, and cultivating a new national consciousness.” These four objectives defined the ambitious political program of Mexico’s first 4T government.
AMLO’s presidency witnessed several significant changes. Among them were a reduction in poverty by 5.2 million people, a partial recovery of national sovereignty from multinational mining and agribusiness corporations, historic increases in the minimum wage, the construction of large-scale infrastructure projects, and notable economic growth, particularly in the southeastern region of the country.
However, there remains a critical gap between intention and action—a reality that cannot be overlooked. The challenges inherent in reconfiguring Mexican society are numerous and deeply entrenched. Transforming reality is far from straightforward; it is the result of long-standing socio-historical forces. Neither political charisma nor governing experience is sufficient to alter these dynamics. Achieving meaningful transformation requires, as a conditio sine qua non, the active political mobilization of the masses.
Moreover, any profound transformation of social reality is constrained by Mexico’s position within the international system. First, Mexico’s economy is deeply integrated into the global capitalist framework. In 2023 alone, the country’s international trade totaled $588 billion in exports and $594 billion in imports, with foreign direct investment over the six-year period exceeding $140 billion.
Additionally, Mexico occupies a relevant position as a vital zone of influence of the United States, one of the most powerful and interventionist nations in modern history[i]. The political and economic interests of the U.S. elite in Mexico are so deeply entrenched that even a purely domestic issue, such as judicial reform, sparked a political-diplomatic dispute between the Mexican Presidency and the U. S. ambassador Ken Salazar[ii]. These are but a few of the external forces that resist any substantial political change in Mexico.
Given this context, it is worth asking whether a genuine transformation of Mexican society took place during AMLO’s presidency, or if his term was characterized more by incremental changes. How profound were these changes, and to what extent did they benefit the majority? To explore these questions, we will now evaluate the president’s four main political objectives and assess their impact on social welfare and justice.
Rescuing the State
For López Obrador, rescuing state institutions meant that his party Morena (Movimiento de Regeneración Nacional/National Regeneration Movement) gaining control of the government apparatus to advance his reform agenda. In this regard, a notable shift did occur, as it marked the first time in modern political history that a center-left government came to power in Mexico.
In the liberal interpretation of Mexico’s institutional democratization—a prevailing paradigm[iii]—this process began with the 1977 Political Reform and culminated in 2000 with the right-wing National Action Party (PAN) assuming power under Vicente Fox Quesada. According to this view, democracy is narrowly defined by laws, political parties, and institutions. Thus, the narrative concludes neatly with the arrival of the right, a political shift that altered the balance of power but failed to meaningfully change the political system or deliver substantial benefits to the majority.
This is not the forum to fully deconstruct or counter this interpretation, but it is important to note that such a legalistic and institutional approach overlooks a crucial element in Mexico’s democratization: the cycles of social mobilization. The latest of these cycles began in 1968 with the middle-class student movement and found expression in Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas’ 1988 candidacy, followed by AMLO’s campaigns in 2006, 2012, and ultimately his victorious 2018 campaign—an election that signified a true alternation in political power.
From this broader perspective, AMLO’s ascent is the outcome of a long-standing, plural process of struggle, reform, and popular demands. Throughout his career, AMLO skillfully capitalized on widespread social discontent fueled by decades of extreme inequality, elite exploitation, and a steady decline in the quality of life for most Mexicans. His 2018 electoral victory—backed by 30 million votes—can thus be seen not so much as a catalyst for systemic change, but as a mechanism for the system’s self-preservation; a means to tame the “tiger”[iv].
Some of AMLO’s most notable governance achievements include the elimination of presidential immunity, the strengthening of social policy with an investment of $151.69 million, reducing fuel theft (huachicol) by over 94%, and increasing tax revenue to a record $196.63 million. He also passed constitutional reforms to restructure the judiciary, enshrine certain social programs in the Constitution, and prevent tax waivers for large corporations.
Nevertheless, these changes have not fundamentally altered the political landscape. While the system has experienced intense shifts, the core power structures remain largely intact. The political alternation allowed Morena officials to occupy high and mid-level positions within the executive branch, yet the vast bureaucratic machinery—acting as a restorative force—has stayed in place.
Furthermore, Mexico’s elite and power groups continue to exert significant influence over the government. Although Morena has established itself as the dominant political force in the federal Congress, state legislatures, and several states and municipalities, business elites and organized crime, though weakened in some regions, retain enough power to safeguard their interests. Examples include figures like Francisco Cabeza de Vaca, a politician with a criminal background who moves freely from one position of power to another, evading prosecution. Similarly, oligarchs such as Salinas Pliego and Germán Larrea continue to amass enormous fortunes without facing accountability.
Within Morena itself, there are growing concerns over cases of nepotism, corruption, and cronyism. Figures like Alfonso Romo, Scherer Ibarra, and Ricardo Monreal have expanded their influence, reflecting a trend of the party being gradually co-opted by elements of the old political class, who now wear the party’s maroon colors while remaining closely tied to political power.
In essence, the capitalist state, under a reformist, presidential regime, remains operational. It administers a mass policy centered on social reforms and rights aimed at improving the living conditions of the majority and mitigating social discontent.
The Economic Model
In terms of transforming the economic model, López Obrador’s administration aimed to address the needs of the most vulnerable sectors and implement significant labor reforms. Through the Secretariat of Welfare, cash transfer programs were promoted to support key population groups: seniors over 65, primary school students, and single mothers. Additionally, labor reforms were enacted to regulate outsourcing, strengthen union organization, and increase the minimum wage to levels not seen in decades.
The government’s slogan, “For the good of all, the poor come first,” resulted in a significant reduction of poverty. According to Coneval, between 2018 and 2022, 5.1 million people rose out of poverty. This improvement can be largely attributed to wage increases (65.7%) and cash transfers (17.2%)[v].
However, it is important to note that a third of the population—nearly 47 million people—remains in poverty. Moreover, the reduction occurred mainly in moderate poverty, while the number of people in extreme poverty rose by 407,000. At the same time, the percentage of people without access to healthcare services increased by 250%. These statistics suggest that social programs are not reaching those in deepest need—the poorest of the poor.
Another critical point is that Coneval’s category of monetary transfers includes not only social programs but also remittances. In 2022, remittances accounted for around 4% of Mexico’s GDP and represented at least 35% of average per capita household income[vi]. This implies that a portion of the income used to reduce poverty came not from the government, but from the labor of Mexican workers abroad —many of whom were compelled to migrate due to poverty.
Labor income presents additional complexities. Increases in the minimum wage led to a historic real wage growth of around 110%. Wages were also regionalized and supported by a fiscal policy that, for the first time in decades, enhanced the purchasing power of working families in municipalities along the northern and southern borders. In these regions, the value-added tax (IVA) on goods and services was reduced from 16% to 8%, and the minimum wage was set at $21.06 per day, compared to $13.98 in the rest of the country.
This shift addressed a long-standing debt to the working class that neoliberal governments had neglected for decades. Over the last 40 years, wage policy was designed to make Mexico attractive to foreign capital at the expense of workers’ purchasing power. According to UNAM’s Center for Multidisciplinary Analysis, by 2016, the cumulative purchasing power of the minimum wage had fallen by 79.55% compared to 1987[vii].
Therefore, the recent minimum wage increase is historic not just for its real growth, but because it begins to reverse a decline that persisted for over 30 years. Nevertheless, this increase remains insufficient to restore the purchasing power of previous decades, enable social mobility, or eliminate wage poverty among workers.
As of now, in a household of four members where two adults work full-time at the minimum wage, the combined income of $839.09 per month is not enough to cover both the basic food and non-food baskets, which cost $934.46 according to Coneval’s Poverty Line by Income. In other words, two full-time minimum-wage workers still cannot adequately support a family with two children. To live with dignity, one adult would need to work approximately 18 hours a day, or the minimum wage would need to rise to at least $31.15, 2.2 times its current level.
What this reveals is that, while positive changes have been made, the economic system remains largely untransformed, continuing to rely on inequality and exploitation. The starkest evidence of this is that, while the minimum wage still fails to cover the extended basic basket and a third of the population remains in poverty, the combined wealth of Mexico’s five richest families grew by an average of 226% during this administration[viii].
Moralizing the Government Apparatus
Moralizing the government has been one of the most complex challenges for AMLO. His primary proposal was to eradicate corruption from the state apparatus, famously encapsulated in his metaphor of “sweeping the stairs from top to bottom.”
To this end, López Obrador promoted the Republican Austerity Law, classified corruption as a serious crime, and restructured the National Anti-Corruption System. Oversight, investigation, and enforcement duties were enhanced through institutions like the Secretariat of Public Function, the Financial Intelligence Unit, and the Attorney General’s Office. Key actions included freezing some 20,000 bank accounts tied to organized crime, eliminating high-level officials’ major health insurance policies, canceling tax amnesties for large taxpayers, and terminating the exorbitant pensions of former presidents.
These efforts are undeniably significant. However, the results the government had anticipated were not fully realized, as corruption persists within the system. For example, none of the major corruption scandals from previous administrations have been resolved. Key figures implicated in cases like the $393.26 million Estafa Maestra scheme or the $200 million Agronitrogenados-PEMEX fraud remain unpunished[ix].
Moreover, nepotism, embezzlement, and cronyism continue to plague various levels of government. In 2022, it was reported that 196,000 public works contracts were awarded directly by municipalities without competitive bidding. The SEGALMEX case, involving the embezzlement of at least $842.70 million, illustrates the persistence of high- and mid-level officials defrauding the public coffers within the federal government.
More troubling is the lack of progress in federal investigations involving high-ranking officials, military commanders, or members of the political elite. A notable example is the obstruction of the investigation, starting in 2022, into the disappearance of the 43 Ayotzinapa students, which demonstrates that mechanisms of impunity within the government remain intact.
A Shift in Mindset
The creation of a new school of thought refers to fostering critical thinking, historical awareness, and a collective consciousness within the population. In this regard, it can be argued that AMLO’s presidency sparked a process of politicization, particularly among the working class, youth, rural communities, and Mexican migrants in the United States. While this is not a full-fledged revolution of consciousness, it does signify a shift in the mindset of a significant portion of the population. For the first time in this century, it has become more common for people to discuss politics and take an interest in their rights.
López Obrador has successfully responded to criticism from the right, its commentators, and intellectuals by positioning a public debate agenda, largely through his daily press conference, the Mañanera. This platform has allowed the government not only to defend its policies but also to promote alternative narratives that strengthen its position. It has provided the public with tools to understand power dynamics and foster a critical perspective.
The media landscape has also been reshaped by the rise of independent outlets. With the growth of digital platforms and greater internet access, information sources have diversified, challenging the monopoly once held by major media outlets over public opinion.
However, these changes should not be overstated. Only 68% of households have internet access, and most users are concentrated in urban areas, limiting the reach of independent media. Additionally, the politicization of the population remains uneven. While more people are informed and willing to express political opinions, their capacity to develop independent and nuanced perspectives is limited. In many cases, the need to defend perceived government successes overshadows critical thinking.
A further issue arises from the president’s pragmatism and the confusion caused by some of his more deterministic statements. By focusing on corruption as the nation’s primary problem, López Obrador often overlooks other systemic issues, such as the exploitation of the working class, the lack of opportunities for young people to pursue education or dignified employment, the mechanisms of oppression and violence faced by women (particularly the most disadvantaged), and the dispossession of land from communities by large extractive companies.
One of the most troubling examples of this is the case of Samir Flores, an indigenous activist who opposed the Morelos Integral Plan’s energy megaprojects. Samir was murdered one month after the president referred to him and his fellow activists as “radical conservatives.” While AMLO’s words did not directly cause the murder, they contributed to the atmosphere in which it occurred. The lack of an apology and the fact that nearly six years later the crime remains unsolved only exacerbate the problem.
The president’s ideological interpretation of Mexico’s political reality is also problematic. He divides the entire political spectrum into liberals and conservatives, equating the left with liberalism and the right with conservatism. This binary reductionism extends to his view of Morena, which he divides into “monks” and “politicians.” According to AMLO, the “monks” defend principles, values, and ideas, while the “politicians” focus on practical effectiveness, negotiating and compromising to get things done.
It is revealing to analyze how positions of power have been distributed in the government under this framework. None of the so-called “monks” were appointed to key ministries such as Interior, Foreign Affairs, Economy, or Hacienda and Public Credit (tax collection). Instead, prominent Morena intellectuals were sidelined from decision-making circles. For instance, Paco Taibo II was relegated to the government’s editorial Project (Fondo de Cultura Económica), and Armando Bartra and Rafael Barajas were given roles at Morena’s National Institute of Political Formation, which never received the resources AMLO had promised. Only Elvira Concheiro served in a key position as National Treasurer, and her brother Luciano was appointed a deputy minister in the Ministry of Public Education.
In contrast, high-ranking positions were awarded to opportunistic allies and figures less committed to the party’s ideals. Marcelo Ebrard, a capable but opportunistic politician, served as Foreign Minister throughout AMLO’s term, while businessman Alfonso Romo, involved in influence peddling, acted as Chief of Staff at the Presidency. Similarly, Senate and congressional seats were given to individuals hostile to the Fourth Transformation. One particularly contentious case was that of Sergio Mayer, who received a proportional representation seat in the Senate despite opposing several key Morena initiatives, provoking intense debate within party’s social base[x].
In summary, the allocation of power within the government and Morena reveals that the leadership has often sacrificed principles for perceived efficacy, though the latter has rarely been achieved. These compromises have slowed the progress of the Fourth Transformation’s political project.
Final Assessment
What is the balance of AMLO’s six-year term? It seems that the idea of a profound transformation of reality was, in practice, reduced to the achievable changes —some significant, others minimal— that the government was able to implement through reforms that avoided confronting the major interests of the dominant classes. This reflects the primary political limitation of Obrador’s progressivism.
This does not make the president a bad leader, nor does it make his administration the worst in history. AMLO’s government stands in sharp contrast to those of Ernesto Zedillo, Vicente Fox, Felipe Calderón, and Enrique Peña Nieto. Despite its many limitations, Obrador’s populist mass politics have led to verifiable improvements for millions of people.
In many households, wage increases and state welfare programs allow families to put more food on the table. Millions of senior citizens can now afford their medications thanks to the pensions they receive every two months. Thousands of students no longer have to choose between paying for transportation or buying a sandwich at school. These changes, though far from delivering comprehensive social welfare or dignified living conditions, are perceived as positive steps by millions. From the left, we should acknowledge these gains.
A similar shift has occurred in the mindset of broad social sectors regarding access to information and critical engagement. While this cannot be called a revolution of consciousness, there is a growing process of politicization across wide segments of society. Critical capacities must now be developed to recognize failures, address persisting problems, and propose solutions. But this is a starting point.
However, recognizing these achievements should not blind us to the errors and limitations of mexican progressivism. Mexico remains a country where, ten years later, the disappearance of the 43 Ayotzinapa students remains unresolved. Where 3 out of 10 people are trapped in poverty, regardless of their efforts. Where young people often find it easier to join organized crime than to access quality education or decent jobs. Ultimately, Mexico is a place where the majority of workers face some of the longest workweeks in the world, yet their wages remain insufficient to lift them out of poverty.
We must reflect on what it truly means to transform such a reality. The recent six-year term demonstrates that changing the social order is not a brief process, nor can it be the work of a single individual. While supporting progressive candidates, engaging in occasional protests, and criticizing neoliberalism are important steps in building collective consciousness, these actions alone are insufficient to achieve social welfare and justice. For this, the organized and independent participation of the popular majority is essential.
In his Essay on a Headless Proletariat, José Revueltas -a prolific socialist intellectual and militant- argued that despite the Mexican working class’s deep traditions of struggle and strong conviction in action, it has not built an independent organizational structure and developed its own political project. These deficiencies have prevented the working class from pushing for a transformation that truly benefits them. As a result, since the Revolution, the dominant classes have relegated popular sectors to the role of a social and electoral base for their own projects. This situation of subjugation largely persists today.
A key lesson for the second government of the Fourth Transformation, now led by Claudia Sheinbaum, is that the organized and independent action of the working class is crucial to transcend its role as an electoral army and support base. To achieve this, the politicization of the lower classes must be nourished by critical thinking. This will help the masses set limits on the somewhat naïve and occasionally fanatical attitudes that can emerge. The free and informed exchange of ideas on key issues is fundamental. The Mañanera conferences and the media can serve as useful tools for information, but they must be filtered through thoughtful reflection and analysis.
Additionally, urgent discussions need to take place on the following issues: What rights, reforms, and laws should be demanded from the new Sheinbaum administration? How can mobilization be used as a tool for autonomous pressure and defense, rather than as a top-down call to action? Why do Morena’s grassroots and supporters, who win elections, lack decision-making power on fundamental party issues? What are the government’s limits, and how can they be overcome? These reflections are essential to hold the new government accountable, push for necessary changes, and halt any harmful policies.
To advance in this direction, assembly-based committees could be formed in neighborhoods, communities, schools, and workplaces. These spaces would allow people to deliberate on collective needs and agree on actions to address them. Self-management and demands on the government could serve as complementary tactics to achieve social welfare from the ground up.
This could determine whether the “progressive cycle” in Mexico concludes with the return of the right and the reversal of the positive changes achieved. We must remember that reforms, laws, and programs are merely words on paper, which can be altered or dismantled, if necessary through the use of force. The experiences of the Southern Cone in past decades remind us that whenever the working class failed to transcend the reformism of progressive governments, right-wing counter-movements arose to undo their gains.
The dominant classes always seek to reclaim power when progressivism enters a phase of wear or crisis. Whether through attrition, conflict, and systematic attacks, as in Bolivia and Venezuela. Or through soft or hard coups, as seen in Ecuador, El Salvador, and Nicaragua. In their most reactionary forms, such as in Argentina and Brazil. Right-wing movements dismantled the gains of previous governments in all thar cases. These lessons should not be forgotten. The government of Andrés Manuel López Obrador contributed to creating a context of greater politicization and implemented reforms that led to improvements. However, his tendency toward class conciliation limited the scope of these changes. The new government under Claudia Sheinbaum—though it deserves the benefit of the doubt—has already shown signs of following the same path, as evidenced by the announcement that there will be no push for a tax reform targeting great fortunes[xi]. Therefore, it is up to the working class to organize and use the gains made as stepping stones toward achieving true justice and welfare for the majority. Only then can we genuinely speak of a transformation in Mexico.
[i] Sebastián Olvera, “Ken Salazar, la reforma judicial y los intereses estadounidenses en México (II).” En un 2×3, September 2024. https://enun2x3.info/2024/09/ken-salazar-la-reforma-judicial-y-los-intereses-estadounidenses-en-mexico-ii/
[ii] Sebastián Olvera, “Ken Salazar, la reforma judicial y los intereses estadounidenses en México (I).” En un 2×3, August 2024. https://enun2x3.info/2024/08/ken-salazar-la-reforma-judicial-y-los-intereses-estadounidenses-en-mexico-i/
[iii] José Woldenberg, Historia mínima de la transición democrática en México. Mexico City: Colegio de México, 2012.
[iv] “Tiger” was the metaphor used by AMLO during a 2018 meeting with bankers and businessmen to describe the Mexican people. He warned that if the de facto powers intervened in the elections, as they did in 2006 and 2012, and he lost, he would not step in to control the anger of the majority. He concluded with the now-iconic phrase: “I want to know who will tame the tiger”.
[v] CONEVAL, “Medición de la pobreza en México”: https://www.coneval.org.mx/Medicion/Paginas/PobrezaInicio.aspx
[vi] CONEVAL, “Documento de análisis sobre la medición multidimensional de la pobreza 2022”: https://www.coneval.org.mx/Medicion/MP/Documents/MMP_2022/
[vii] Centro de Análisis Multidisciplinario, “Reporte de Investigación 126. El salario mínimo: un crimen contra el pueblo mexicano”, UNAM: https://cam.economia.unam.mx/reporte-investigacion-126-salario-minimo-crimen-pueblo-mexicano-cae-11-11-poder-adquisitivo-sexenio-pena-nieto/
[viii] Dora Villanueva, “Los 5 hombres más ricos multiplicaron su fortuna con AMLO”, La Jornada (México: 23/07/2024).
[ix] Transaparencia Mexicana, “Corrupción seguirá siendo reto para el próximo gobierno: Transparencia Mexicana”, 29/01/2024: https://www.tm.org.mx/corrupcion-seguira-siendo-reto-para-el-proximo-gobierno-transparencia-mexicana/
[x] Sebastián Olvera, “Morena y la crítica: Argumentos y contraargumentos.” En un 2×3, July 2024. https://enun2x3.info/2024/07/morena-y-la-critica-argumentos-y-contraargumentos/
[xi] Sebastián Olvera, “Sheinbaum frente al poder económico.” En un 2×3, June 2024. https://enun2x3.info/2024/06/sheinbaum-frente-al-poder-economico/
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Sebastián Olvera
Sebastián Olvera is a socialist activist who combines precarious work with sociopolitical research and analysis. He writes about national and international political dynamics, with a focus on labor movements, and the impact of neoliberalism on Latin America. You can follow him on Twitter at @SebOlve.
Claudia Scheinbaum with AMLO
The term transform originates from the Latin transformare, meaning to modify or reshape something. Change, on the other hand, comes from cambiare, which signifies the replacement of one thing with another. In socio-political terms, changes are processes that produce limited variations within specific areas of reality and can be initiated by individuals or groups. In contrast, transformations are profound, systemic alterations to the social order that require the participation of the majority to be realized. Historically, for this reason, processes of transformation have been far less frequent than those of mere change.
Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) embarked on a mission to bring about a profound transformation of public life in Mexico during his six-year presidency. As he explains on page 231 of his book Gracias (Thanks), the Fourth Transformation (4T)—following the country’s three previous major upheavals: the War of Independence (1810–1821), the Reform Era (1857–1861), and the Mexican Revolution (1910–1920)— is built around “…four fundamental pillars: rescuing the state’s political institutions, reforming the economic model, promoting moral governance, and cultivating a new national consciousness.” These four objectives defined the ambitious political program of Mexico’s first 4T government.
AMLO’s presidency witnessed several significant changes. Among them were a reduction in poverty by 5.2 million people, a partial recovery of national sovereignty from multinational mining and agribusiness corporations, historic increases in the minimum wage, the construction of large-scale infrastructure projects, and notable economic growth, particularly in the southeastern region of the country.
However, there remains a critical gap between intention and action—a reality that cannot be overlooked. The challenges inherent in reconfiguring Mexican society are numerous and deeply entrenched. Transforming reality is far from straightforward; it is the result of long-standing socio-historical forces. Neither political charisma nor governing experience is sufficient to alter these dynamics. Achieving meaningful transformation requires, as a conditio sine qua non, the active political mobilization of the masses.
Moreover, any profound transformation of social reality is constrained by Mexico’s position within the international system. First, Mexico’s economy is deeply integrated into the global capitalist framework. In 2023 alone, the country’s international trade totaled $588 billion in exports and $594 billion in imports, with foreign direct investment over the six-year period exceeding $140 billion.
Additionally, Mexico occupies a relevant position as a vital zone of influence of the United States, one of the most powerful and interventionist nations in modern history[i]. The political and economic interests of the U.S. elite in Mexico are so deeply entrenched that even a purely domestic issue, such as judicial reform, sparked a political-diplomatic dispute between the Mexican Presidency and the U. S. ambassador Ken Salazar[ii]. These are but a few of the external forces that resist any substantial political change in Mexico.
Given this context, it is worth asking whether a genuine transformation of Mexican society took place during AMLO’s presidency, or if his term was characterized more by incremental changes. How profound were these changes, and to what extent did they benefit the majority? To explore these questions, we will now evaluate the president’s four main political objectives and assess their impact on social welfare and justice.
Rescuing the State
For López Obrador, rescuing state institutions meant that his party Morena (Movimiento de Regeneración Nacional/National Regeneration Movement) gaining control of the government apparatus to advance his reform agenda. In this regard, a notable shift did occur, as it marked the first time in modern political history that a center-left government came to power in Mexico.
In the liberal interpretation of Mexico’s institutional democratization—a prevailing paradigm[iii]—this process began with the 1977 Political Reform and culminated in 2000 with the right-wing National Action Party (PAN) assuming power under Vicente Fox Quesada. According to this view, democracy is narrowly defined by laws, political parties, and institutions. Thus, the narrative concludes neatly with the arrival of the right, a political shift that altered the balance of power but failed to meaningfully change the political system or deliver substantial benefits to the majority.
This is not the forum to fully deconstruct or counter this interpretation, but it is important to note that such a legalistic and institutional approach overlooks a crucial element in Mexico’s democratization: the cycles of social mobilization. The latest of these cycles began in 1968 with the middle-class student movement and found expression in Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas’ 1988 candidacy, followed by AMLO’s campaigns in 2006, 2012, and ultimately his victorious 2018 campaign—an election that signified a true alternation in political power.
From this broader perspective, AMLO’s ascent is the outcome of a long-standing, plural process of struggle, reform, and popular demands. Throughout his career, AMLO skillfully capitalized on widespread social discontent fueled by decades of extreme inequality, elite exploitation, and a steady decline in the quality of life for most Mexicans. His 2018 electoral victory—backed by 30 million votes—can thus be seen not so much as a catalyst for systemic change, but as a mechanism for the system’s self-preservation; a means to tame the “tiger”[iv].
Some of AMLO’s most notable governance achievements include the elimination of presidential immunity, the strengthening of social policy with an investment of $151.69 million, reducing fuel theft (huachicol) by over 94%, and increasing tax revenue to a record $196.63 million. He also passed constitutional reforms to restructure the judiciary, enshrine certain social programs in the Constitution, and prevent tax waivers for large corporations.
Nevertheless, these changes have not fundamentally altered the political landscape. While the system has experienced intense shifts, the core power structures remain largely intact. The political alternation allowed Morena officials to occupy high and mid-level positions within the executive branch, yet the vast bureaucratic machinery—acting as a restorative force—has stayed in place.
Furthermore, Mexico’s elite and power groups continue to exert significant influence over the government. Although Morena has established itself as the dominant political force in the federal Congress, state legislatures, and several states and municipalities, business elites and organized crime, though weakened in some regions, retain enough power to safeguard their interests. Examples include figures like Francisco Cabeza de Vaca, a politician with a criminal background who moves freely from one position of power to another, evading prosecution. Similarly, oligarchs such as Salinas Pliego and Germán Larrea continue to amass enormous fortunes without facing accountability.
Within Morena itself, there are growing concerns over cases of nepotism, corruption, and cronyism. Figures like Alfonso Romo, Scherer Ibarra, and Ricardo Monreal have expanded their influence, reflecting a trend of the party being gradually co-opted by elements of the old political class, who now wear the party’s maroon colors while remaining closely tied to political power.
In essence, the capitalist state, under a reformist, presidential regime, remains operational. It administers a mass policy centered on social reforms and rights aimed at improving the living conditions of the majority and mitigating social discontent.
The Economic Model
In terms of transforming the economic model, López Obrador’s administration aimed to address the needs of the most vulnerable sectors and implement significant labor reforms. Through the Secretariat of Welfare, cash transfer programs were promoted to support key population groups: seniors over 65, primary school students, and single mothers. Additionally, labor reforms were enacted to regulate outsourcing, strengthen union organization, and increase the minimum wage to levels not seen in decades.
The government’s slogan, “For the good of all, the poor come first,” resulted in a significant reduction of poverty. According to Coneval, between 2018 and 2022, 5.1 million people rose out of poverty. This improvement can be largely attributed to wage increases (65.7%) and cash transfers (17.2%)[v].
However, it is important to note that a third of the population—nearly 47 million people—remains in poverty. Moreover, the reduction occurred mainly in moderate poverty, while the number of people in extreme poverty rose by 407,000. At the same time, the percentage of people without access to healthcare services increased by 250%. These statistics suggest that social programs are not reaching those in deepest need—the poorest of the poor.
Another critical point is that Coneval’s category of monetary transfers includes not only social programs but also remittances. In 2022, remittances accounted for around 4% of Mexico’s GDP and represented at least 35% of average per capita household income[vi]. This implies that a portion of the income used to reduce poverty came not from the government, but from the labor of Mexican workers abroad —many of whom were compelled to migrate due to poverty.
Labor income presents additional complexities. Increases in the minimum wage led to a historic real wage growth of around 110%. Wages were also regionalized and supported by a fiscal policy that, for the first time in decades, enhanced the purchasing power of working families in municipalities along the northern and southern borders. In these regions, the value-added tax (IVA) on goods and services was reduced from 16% to 8%, and the minimum wage was set at $21.06 per day, compared to $13.98 in the rest of the country.
This shift addressed a long-standing debt to the working class that neoliberal governments had neglected for decades. Over the last 40 years, wage policy was designed to make Mexico attractive to foreign capital at the expense of workers’ purchasing power. According to UNAM’s Center for Multidisciplinary Analysis, by 2016, the cumulative purchasing power of the minimum wage had fallen by 79.55% compared to 1987[vii].
Therefore, the recent minimum wage increase is historic not just for its real growth, but because it begins to reverse a decline that persisted for over 30 years. Nevertheless, this increase remains insufficient to restore the purchasing power of previous decades, enable social mobility, or eliminate wage poverty among workers.
As of now, in a household of four members where two adults work full-time at the minimum wage, the combined income of $839.09 per month is not enough to cover both the basic food and non-food baskets, which cost $934.46 according to Coneval’s Poverty Line by Income. In other words, two full-time minimum-wage workers still cannot adequately support a family with two children. To live with dignity, one adult would need to work approximately 18 hours a day, or the minimum wage would need to rise to at least $31.15, 2.2 times its current level.
What this reveals is that, while positive changes have been made, the economic system remains largely untransformed, continuing to rely on inequality and exploitation. The starkest evidence of this is that, while the minimum wage still fails to cover the extended basic basket and a third of the population remains in poverty, the combined wealth of Mexico’s five richest families grew by an average of 226% during this administration[viii].
Moralizing the Government Apparatus
Moralizing the government has been one of the most complex challenges for AMLO. His primary proposal was to eradicate corruption from the state apparatus, famously encapsulated in his metaphor of “sweeping the stairs from top to bottom.”
To this end, López Obrador promoted the Republican Austerity Law, classified corruption as a serious crime, and restructured the National Anti-Corruption System. Oversight, investigation, and enforcement duties were enhanced through institutions like the Secretariat of Public Function, the Financial Intelligence Unit, and the Attorney General’s Office. Key actions included freezing some 20,000 bank accounts tied to organized crime, eliminating high-level officials’ major health insurance policies, canceling tax amnesties for large taxpayers, and terminating the exorbitant pensions of former presidents.
These efforts are undeniably significant. However, the results the government had anticipated were not fully realized, as corruption persists within the system. For example, none of the major corruption scandals from previous administrations have been resolved. Key figures implicated in cases like the $393.26 million Estafa Maestra scheme or the $200 million Agronitrogenados-PEMEX fraud remain unpunished[ix].
Moreover, nepotism, embezzlement, and cronyism continue to plague various levels of government. In 2022, it was reported that 196,000 public works contracts were awarded directly by municipalities without competitive bidding. The SEGALMEX case, involving the embezzlement of at least $842.70 million, illustrates the persistence of high- and mid-level officials defrauding the public coffers within the federal government.
More troubling is the lack of progress in federal investigations involving high-ranking officials, military commanders, or members of the political elite. A notable example is the obstruction of the investigation, starting in 2022, into the disappearance of the 43 Ayotzinapa students, which demonstrates that mechanisms of impunity within the government remain intact.
A Shift in Mindset
The creation of a new school of thought refers to fostering critical thinking, historical awareness, and a collective consciousness within the population. In this regard, it can be argued that AMLO’s presidency sparked a process of politicization, particularly among the working class, youth, rural communities, and Mexican migrants in the United States. While this is not a full-fledged revolution of consciousness, it does signify a shift in the mindset of a significant portion of the population. For the first time in this century, it has become more common for people to discuss politics and take an interest in their rights.
López Obrador has successfully responded to criticism from the right, its commentators, and intellectuals by positioning a public debate agenda, largely through his daily press conference, the Mañanera. This platform has allowed the government not only to defend its policies but also to promote alternative narratives that strengthen its position. It has provided the public with tools to understand power dynamics and foster a critical perspective.
The media landscape has also been reshaped by the rise of independent outlets. With the growth of digital platforms and greater internet access, information sources have diversified, challenging the monopoly once held by major media outlets over public opinion.
However, these changes should not be overstated. Only 68% of households have internet access, and most users are concentrated in urban areas, limiting the reach of independent media. Additionally, the politicization of the population remains uneven. While more people are informed and willing to express political opinions, their capacity to develop independent and nuanced perspectives is limited. In many cases, the need to defend perceived government successes overshadows critical thinking.
A further issue arises from the president’s pragmatism and the confusion caused by some of his more deterministic statements. By focusing on corruption as the nation’s primary problem, López Obrador often overlooks other systemic issues, such as the exploitation of the working class, the lack of opportunities for young people to pursue education or dignified employment, the mechanisms of oppression and violence faced by women (particularly the most disadvantaged), and the dispossession of land from communities by large extractive companies.
One of the most troubling examples of this is the case of Samir Flores, an indigenous activist who opposed the Morelos Integral Plan’s energy megaprojects. Samir was murdered one month after the president referred to him and his fellow activists as “radical conservatives.” While AMLO’s words did not directly cause the murder, they contributed to the atmosphere in which it occurred. The lack of an apology and the fact that nearly six years later the crime remains unsolved only exacerbate the problem.
The president’s ideological interpretation of Mexico’s political reality is also problematic. He divides the entire political spectrum into liberals and conservatives, equating the left with liberalism and the right with conservatism. This binary reductionism extends to his view of Morena, which he divides into “monks” and “politicians.” According to AMLO, the “monks” defend principles, values, and ideas, while the “politicians” focus on practical effectiveness, negotiating and compromising to get things done.
It is revealing to analyze how positions of power have been distributed in the government under this framework. None of the so-called “monks” were appointed to key ministries such as Interior, Foreign Affairs, Economy, or Hacienda and Public Credit (tax collection). Instead, prominent Morena intellectuals were sidelined from decision-making circles. For instance, Paco Taibo II was relegated to the government’s editorial Project (Fondo de Cultura Económica), and Armando Bartra and Rafael Barajas were given roles at Morena’s National Institute of Political Formation, which never received the resources AMLO had promised. Only Elvira Concheiro served in a key position as National Treasurer, and her brother Luciano was appointed a deputy minister in the Ministry of Public Education.
In contrast, high-ranking positions were awarded to opportunistic allies and figures less committed to the party’s ideals. Marcelo Ebrard, a capable but opportunistic politician, served as Foreign Minister throughout AMLO’s term, while businessman Alfonso Romo, involved in influence peddling, acted as Chief of Staff at the Presidency. Similarly, Senate and congressional seats were given to individuals hostile to the Fourth Transformation. One particularly contentious case was that of Sergio Mayer, who received a proportional representation seat in the Senate despite opposing several key Morena initiatives, provoking intense debate within party’s social base[x].
In summary, the allocation of power within the government and Morena reveals that the leadership has often sacrificed principles for perceived efficacy, though the latter has rarely been achieved. These compromises have slowed the progress of the Fourth Transformation’s political project.
Final Assessment
What is the balance of AMLO’s six-year term? It seems that the idea of a profound transformation of reality was, in practice, reduced to the achievable changes —some significant, others minimal— that the government was able to implement through reforms that avoided confronting the major interests of the dominant classes. This reflects the primary political limitation of Obrador’s progressivism.
This does not make the president a bad leader, nor does it make his administration the worst in history. AMLO’s government stands in sharp contrast to those of Ernesto Zedillo, Vicente Fox, Felipe Calderón, and Enrique Peña Nieto. Despite its many limitations, Obrador’s populist mass politics have led to verifiable improvements for millions of people.
In many households, wage increases and state welfare programs allow families to put more food on the table. Millions of senior citizens can now afford their medications thanks to the pensions they receive every two months. Thousands of students no longer have to choose between paying for transportation or buying a sandwich at school. These changes, though far from delivering comprehensive social welfare or dignified living conditions, are perceived as positive steps by millions. From the left, we should acknowledge these gains.
A similar shift has occurred in the mindset of broad social sectors regarding access to information and critical engagement. While this cannot be called a revolution of consciousness, there is a growing process of politicization across wide segments of society. Critical capacities must now be developed to recognize failures, address persisting problems, and propose solutions. But this is a starting point.
However, recognizing these achievements should not blind us to the errors and limitations of mexican progressivism. Mexico remains a country where, ten years later, the disappearance of the 43 Ayotzinapa students remains unresolved. Where 3 out of 10 people are trapped in poverty, regardless of their efforts. Where young people often find it easier to join organized crime than to access quality education or decent jobs. Ultimately, Mexico is a place where the majority of workers face some of the longest workweeks in the world, yet their wages remain insufficient to lift them out of poverty.
We must reflect on what it truly means to transform such a reality. The recent six-year term demonstrates that changing the social order is not a brief process, nor can it be the work of a single individual. While supporting progressive candidates, engaging in occasional protests, and criticizing neoliberalism are important steps in building collective consciousness, these actions alone are insufficient to achieve social welfare and justice. For this, the organized and independent participation of the popular majority is essential.
In his Essay on a Headless Proletariat, José Revueltas -a prolific socialist intellectual and militant- argued that despite the Mexican working class’s deep traditions of struggle and strong conviction in action, it has not built an independent organizational structure and developed its own political project. These deficiencies have prevented the working class from pushing for a transformation that truly benefits them. As a result, since the Revolution, the dominant classes have relegated popular sectors to the role of a social and electoral base for their own projects. This situation of subjugation largely persists today.
A key lesson for the second government of the Fourth Transformation, now led by Claudia Sheinbaum, is that the organized and independent action of the working class is crucial to transcend its role as an electoral army and support base. To achieve this, the politicization of the lower classes must be nourished by critical thinking. This will help the masses set limits on the somewhat naïve and occasionally fanatical attitudes that can emerge. The free and informed exchange of ideas on key issues is fundamental. The Mañanera conferences and the media can serve as useful tools for information, but they must be filtered through thoughtful reflection and analysis.
Additionally, urgent discussions need to take place on the following issues: What rights, reforms, and laws should be demanded from the new Sheinbaum administration? How can mobilization be used as a tool for autonomous pressure and defense, rather than as a top-down call to action? Why do Morena’s grassroots and supporters, who win elections, lack decision-making power on fundamental party issues? What are the government’s limits, and how can they be overcome? These reflections are essential to hold the new government accountable, push for necessary changes, and halt any harmful policies.
To advance in this direction, assembly-based committees could be formed in neighborhoods, communities, schools, and workplaces. These spaces would allow people to deliberate on collective needs and agree on actions to address them. Self-management and demands on the government could serve as complementary tactics to achieve social welfare from the ground up.
This could determine whether the “progressive cycle” in Mexico concludes with the return of the right and the reversal of the positive changes achieved. We must remember that reforms, laws, and programs are merely words on paper, which can be altered or dismantled, if necessary through the use of force. The experiences of the Southern Cone in past decades remind us that whenever the working class failed to transcend the reformism of progressive governments, right-wing counter-movements arose to undo their gains.
The dominant classes always seek to reclaim power when progressivism enters a phase of wear or crisis. Whether through attrition, conflict, and systematic attacks, as in Bolivia and Venezuela. Or through soft or hard coups, as seen in Ecuador, El Salvador, and Nicaragua. In their most reactionary forms, such as in Argentina and Brazil. Right-wing movements dismantled the gains of previous governments in all thar cases. These lessons should not be forgotten. The government of Andrés Manuel López Obrador contributed to creating a context of greater politicization and implemented reforms that led to improvements. However, his tendency toward class conciliation limited the scope of these changes. The new government under Claudia Sheinbaum—though it deserves the benefit of the doubt—has already shown signs of following the same path, as evidenced by the announcement that there will be no push for a tax reform targeting great fortunes[xi]. Therefore, it is up to the working class to organize and use the gains made as stepping stones toward achieving true justice and welfare for the majority. Only then can we genuinely speak of a transformation in Mexico.
[i] Sebastián Olvera, “Ken Salazar, la reforma judicial y los intereses estadounidenses en México (II).” En un 2×3, September 2024. https://enun2x3.info/2024/09/ken-salazar-la-reforma-judicial-y-los-intereses-estadounidenses-en-mexico-ii/
[ii] Sebastián Olvera, “Ken Salazar, la reforma judicial y los intereses estadounidenses en México (I).” En un 2×3, August 2024. https://enun2x3.info/2024/08/ken-salazar-la-reforma-judicial-y-los-intereses-estadounidenses-en-mexico-i/
[iii] José Woldenberg, Historia mínima de la transición democrática en México. Mexico City: Colegio de México, 2012.
[iv] “Tiger” was the metaphor used by AMLO during a 2018 meeting with bankers and businessmen to describe the Mexican people. He warned that if the de facto powers intervened in the elections, as they did in 2006 and 2012, and he lost, he would not step in to control the anger of the majority. He concluded with the now-iconic phrase: “I want to know who will tame the tiger”.
[v] CONEVAL, “Medición de la pobreza en México”: https://www.coneval.org.mx/Medicion/Paginas/PobrezaInicio.aspx
[vi] CONEVAL, “Documento de análisis sobre la medición multidimensional de la pobreza 2022”: https://www.coneval.org.mx/Medicion/MP/Documents/MMP_2022/
[vii] Centro de Análisis Multidisciplinario, “Reporte de Investigación 126. El salario mínimo: un crimen contra el pueblo mexicano”, UNAM: https://cam.economia.unam.mx/reporte-investigacion-126-salario-minimo-crimen-pueblo-mexicano-cae-11-11-poder-adquisitivo-sexenio-pena-nieto/
[viii] Dora Villanueva, “Los 5 hombres más ricos multiplicaron su fortuna con AMLO”, La Jornada (México: 23/07/2024).
[ix] Transaparencia Mexicana, “Corrupción seguirá siendo reto para el próximo gobierno: Transparencia Mexicana”, 29/01/2024: https://www.tm.org.mx/corrupcion-seguira-siendo-reto-para-el-proximo-gobierno-transparencia-mexicana/
[x] Sebastián Olvera, “Morena y la crítica: Argumentos y contraargumentos.” En un 2×3, July 2024. https://enun2x3.info/2024/07/morena-y-la-critica-argumentos-y-contraargumentos/
[xi] Sebastián Olvera, “Sheinbaum frente al poder económico.” En un 2×3, June 2024. https://enun2x3.info/2024/06/sheinbaum-frente-al-poder-economico/
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Sebastián Olvera
Sebastián Olvera is a socialist activist who combines precarious work with sociopolitical research and analysis. He writes about national and international political dynamics, with a focus on labor movements, and the impact of neoliberalism on Latin America. You can follow him on Twitter at @SebOlve.
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