Why is North Korea helping Russia’s war on Ukraine?

By Won Youngsu

Published 29 December, 2024

North Korea is an enigma in many senses of the word, but leader Kim Jong Un’s decision to send troops to fight in Russia’s war on Ukraine shocked many in South Korea and internationally. Many are asking why Kim chose to take North Korea down this disastrous and dead-end path? The answer lies in the various dynamics at play in crisis-prone Northeast Asia.

Russia-North Korea treaty

In June, Kim signed a comprehensive strategic partnership treaty with Russian President Vladimir Putin that was subsequently approved by Russia’s Duma on October 24 and North Korea’s Senate on November 6.

But the troop deployment preceded its ratification: 1500 troops were dispatched on October 8, with a similar-sized contingent sent a week later. It is estimated that by the end of the year up to 12,000 troops — including three generals and 500 officers — will be fighting for Russia. The elite troops belong to four Special Operation Forces brigades of the Korean People’s Army. Though well-trained, they have no combat experience. Russia and North Korea continue to deny their presence, but various reports indicate they are fighting on the Kursk front, inside Russia.

South Korean military intelligence believes North Korea proposed the military deployment and that, in desperate need of a reliable ally, Putin accepted the offer. Speculations abound as to what North Korea might obtain in return, from inter-continental ballistic missile technology, cutting-edge fighter planes and other military hardware through to economic aid. But nothing has been confirmed.

A knife in China’s back?

These developments, which also allows Russian troops to set foot in North Korea, has left China extremely upset. Taken without consultation, they have been received as a huge insult by China, which views North Korea as strategic to its military defence.

At the same time, North Korea has been increasingly upset with China in recent decades, particularly after reports emerged that China had developed plans to deal with a possible abrupt collapse of the North Korean regime. Chinese military pundits and internet analysts have claimed that should this occur, China’s North Army would cross into North Korea in order to block similar moves by South Korea and the United States. Though not official government policy, such speculation has angered Kim.

This only increases the potential for the uneasy relationship to turn sour at any moment. According to a widely-circulated rumour, Kim once stated that while Japan has been an enemy of Korea for 100 years, China has been an enemy for 1000 years. Whether true or not, such sentiments reflect the attitude of North Korean leaders’ toward China: officially a brother state with whom a special friendship was forged through the Korean War, China remains an unreliable neighbour viewed with suspicion.

A regime in crisis

At the end of 2023, Kim announced North Korea was officially discarding its national reunification policy, declaring the relationship with South Korea as one between two antagonistic states. This shift was largely motivated by internal factors, with voluntary isolation seen as the only way to save the regime.

Steps in this direction had already been taken, with the ruling Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) introducing a series of laws designed to strengthen its control over youth since 2020. These included the “law for rebuffing reactionary thought and culture” (2020), the “law to guarantee youth culture” (2021), the “law to protect Pyongyang cultural language” (2023), and the “law to protect state secrets” (2023). In January, BBC Korea reported that two boys had been sentenced to 12 years in a labour camp for watching and distributing South Korean dramas — an extremely harsh sentence intended to send a clear message to other young people. Reports of similar punishments have appeared from time to time. None of this succeeded in halting South Korea’s growing influence, so Kim decided to discard his father’s and grandfather’s reunification policy for good.

Though he cannot publicly state it, Kim knows that South Korea has won out over North Korea: South Korea’s population is twice as big, its economy 50 times larger and its military is far superior. Today, South Korea is among the top 10 advanced economies of the world while North Korea remains a rogue state relegated to the bottom rung.

Given this, North Korea’s regime views absorption by South Korea as highly probable. Therefore, even with its nuclear weapons, it constantly seeks ways to guarantee its survival. Cutting ties with the outside world and blocking the “evil” influence of the capitalist South is one such means.

Coming to power after his father’s death in 2011, Kim consolidated his position through purges, assassinations and executions. Most notoriously, he brutally executed his uncle and kingmaker, Jang Sung-taek, and assassinated his brother, Kim Jung Nam. But though internal rivals and enemies have been eliminated, Kim’s power is not secure as popular support cannot be bought through threats and bribery. Without any carrots to offer his people, Kim’s only option is more sticks.

The market generation

Despite being an extremely closed society controlled from above, North Korea has undergone significant changes.

The Soviet Union’s collapse and subsequent aftershocks were a historic turning point for the country. Amid a severe food crisis in the mid-’90s, the regime ended its rations system and allowed people to buy food on the market. Since then, the capitalist market has grown to play a greater role. Markets not only became spaces for economic activities and the rise of a rudimentary form of capitalism; they also emerged as places where South Korean songs, movies and dramas, imported via China, were widely distributed.

Through this process a new generation emerged that had never experienced the state’s ration system and was increasingly individualistic. This new generation has no trust in Kim, the KWP or the North Korean regime. Their personal experience has led them to prioritise their own survival. As a result, Kim’s support base today is extremely weak, with repression and coercion the only means left to maintain his rule.

North Korean refugees

Rising numbers of North Korean refugees has also contributed to this shift in societal values.

The first wave of North Korean refugees migrated to northern China in search of means to send money home. Most left without ever considering moving to South Korea. But once exposed to the outside world, many began to discover the realities of South Korea’s advanced capitalism.

The China-North Korea border is home to many South Korean spies, as well as many Christian evangelicals seeking avenues to attract converts inside North Korea. Initially suspicious of these missionaries offering material aid and religious indoctrination, some North Koreans eventually turned to them for help.

What started as individual cases of people escaping North Korea soon turned into an entire industry, systematically organised and coordinated by professional people smugglers. North Korean refugees have become a hot potato for China. Its alliance with North Korea means the Chinese government officially refuses to provide aid to refugees or cooperate with South Korea on this humanitarian issue. North Korean refugees are forced to embark on long and dangerous routes to South Korea via China’s southeast neighbours, such as Thailand, Laos and Cambodia.

As of September, 34,259 North Korean refugees have officially entered South Korea since 1998, where they have formed their own community, struggling to survive inside the capitalist south.

Fighting Russia’s war

North Korea’s troop deployment might look like an abrupt decision taken on the whims of a dictator. But placed within the complicated scenario facing the Korean peninsula, it is clearly part of a well-planned strategy for regime survival.

The economic benefits derived from compensation received for every soldier’s death cannot be ignored in a country that desperately needs hard currency due to international sanctions. The real aim, however, is minimising the dangers of any potential intervention by China in what it views as a necessary buffer state. For Kim, China was the biggest threat to his regime’s survival; he therefore acted accordingly. Winning people’s hearts and minds, however, remains an uphill battle.

News regarding the death of North Korean troops has occasionally appeared in the media since October, though exact numbers are unverified. Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky claims that as many as 3000 North Korean troops had been killed in battle, but South Korean military intelligence put the number at about 1000. Whatever the exact figure, the death toll will inevitably rise as these North Korean troops are not prepared for hyper-modern drone warfare or communicating with Russian troops.

Donald Trump’s return to the US presidency means the situation in Northeast Asia will become more precarious and unpredictable. It is too early to tell if we are entering a new Cold War or an era of multipolarity. But uncertainty about the future is growing. This will inevitably mean more instability and difficulties for the peoples of Northeast Asia.

Won Youngsu is an activist, Marxist and labour studies researcher. He is the Director of Pnyx – Institute of Marxist Studies in Korea.

AU CONTRAIRE

Friends With (Geopolitical) Benefits: How Russia and North Korea Are Changing the Game

by Joseph D. Terwilliger Posted onDecember 29, 2024

Recent reports suggest that North Korean (DPRK) troops may be assisting Russia in its war with Ukraine – a development that underscores their growing strategic partnership, formalized by a treaty pledging mutual military, economic, and cultural cooperation. This alliance, formalized through a recently enacted treaty, could bolster Vladimir Putin’s position ahead of Donald Trump’s inauguration in January, as Trump has pledged to end the war in the early days of his second administration. Any involvement of DPRK troops – whether logistical or kinetic – could help to expedite Russian operations. These developments, set against the backdrop of Russia and North Korea’s recently enacted comprehensive strategic partnership, highlight the deepening ties between the two nations, raising critical questions about the Ukraine war, DPRK-Russia relations, and US diplomacy in the region.

The Kremlin’s Pragmatic Gambit

The treaty, signed during Vladimir Putin’s state visit to the DPRK on June 18, 2024, ratified in November and taking full effect on December 4, 2024, marks a pivotal moment in DPRK-Russia relations. While Western media have focused on the defense-related aspects – such as alleged sales of DPRK ammunition to Russia and the rumored deployment of North Korean troops to the Russian Federation – the treaty encompasses far more than military cooperation.

Allegations of DPRK troop deployments to Russia have dominated Western headlines, though neither Moscow nor Pyongyang has confirmed them, and much of the evidence was clearly fabricated. The Pentagon claims that several thousand DPRK troops likely traveled to Russia earlier this year, ostensibly for “training exercises,” and are now stationed in rear echelons behind the front lines in the Kursk region in response to a Ukrainian invasion that was launched in August 2024. Even if DPRK troops are confined to logistical and support roles, their presence could enable Russia to redeploy its troops to critical fronts, enhancing its operational capabilities.

This aligns with speculation that Putin hopes to drive all Ukrainian forces from Russian soil before Trump’s inauguration, preferring to negotiate an end to the war from an uncompromised position of strength.

The recently enacted treaty commits both nations to mutual military assistance, stating, “In case any one of the two sides is put in a state of war by an armed invasion from an individual state or several states, the other side shall provide military and other assistance with all means in its possession without delay in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter and the laws of the DPRK and the Russian Federation.”

What Does North Korea Get?

For Pyongyang, this alliance represents more than immediate utility; it’s an investment in long-term security. Should DPRK soldiers die in support of Russian objectives, their sacrifice would create a powerful moral and political obligation – cementing the alliance with a “blood debt” of sorts. This concept of a ‘blood debt’ not only strengthens the immediate alliance but also ensures that Pyongyang could call upon Russia in times of need, leveraging this shared sacrifice to secure military support in the face of putative future conflicts with South Korea or US-led efforts at regime change.

DPRK troops are unlikely to be deployed to Donbass. However, as such restraint would signal that Russia’s reciprocal commitment to the Korean peninsula would remain limited to defending against incursions across the DPRK’s recognized borders. Pyongyang’s recent constitutional changes, renouncing claims to South Korean territory, further support this cautious strategy that is aligned with both nations’ interests.

While claims about DPRK troops in Kursk – ranging from photos of supposed combat operations to absurd reports of soldiers falling prey to internet porn addictions – have been widely debunked, they underscore the prevalence of misinformation about the alliance. As the owner of several DPRK cell phones and tablets, I can confirm that these devices cannot connect to the internet outside of North Korea, rendering such allegations implausible.

As always in wartime, propaganda and misinformation are ubiquitous.  Especially in the age of artificial intelligence, the fog-of-war obscures the facts on the ground, leaving us no alternative to speculation. While the details of DPRK military operations in Russia remain unclear, what is undeniable is the broader scope of the DPRK-Russia partnership.  The treaty goes far beyond military cooperation, into economic, scientific, academic, and cultural domains, reflecting a deliberate effort to institutionalize their multifaceted engagement.

This treaty is a blend of Hobbesian power politics and Machiavellian strategy, with Russia securing short-term military gains and the DPRK solidifying long-term security guarantees.  However, like all pragmatic alliances, this one depends on circumstances that could shift quickly.

While Western partnerships often came with political preconditions – such as demands for denuclearization or human rights reforms – the Russian alliance is markedly pragmatic, emphasizing mutual benefits in military, technological, and economic spheres without imposing ideological constraints. Both sides understand the importance of survival, but neither is under delusions about the limits of the other’s loyalty.

Building a Strategic Partnership

The following list of delegations exchanged since the treaty was signed in July illustrates the depth of engagement between the two nations, ranging from academic exchange to military strategy, and highlights the deliberate effort to institutionalize this partnership across multiple sectors:

Korean Delegations to Russia:

1. Ministry of Energy: Discussed energy infrastructure development.
2. Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Negotiated agreements on international cooperation.
3. Ministry of Sports: Collaborated on joint training programs and sports diplomacy.
4. Korean Workers Party: Held discussions on political cooperation and trade agreements.

Russian Delegations to Korea:

1. Education Ministry of Primorskiy Kray: Focused on exchange programs for students and educators.
2. Security Council of the Russian Federation: Discussed joint security initiatives and intelligence sharing.
3. Ministry of Agriculture: Negotiated joint agricultural research and food security programs.
4. Ministry of Information Technology and Digital Development: Signed agreements on cybersecurity and technological innovation.
5. Intergovernmental Commission on Economic Cooperation: Discussed trade agreements and financial services partnerships.
6. Overseas Koreans of Russia: Explored cultural and diaspora relations between Russian-Koreans and the DPRK.
7. Military Academy: Examined training and knowledge-sharing opportunities.
8. Ministry of Natural Resources and Ecology: Discussed joint environmental protection programs.
9. Ministry of Sports: Formalized agreements on collaborative sporting events and competitions.
10. Ministry of Defense: Held high-level talks on strategic cooperation and mutual security interests.

These delegations illustrate a deliberate effort by both nations to build a robust, enduring relationship. By providing the support North Korea once sought from Western counterparts – without the political preconditions of denuclearization or human rights reforms – Russia has positioned itself as Pyongyang’s most reliable partner.

Having personally worked on several academic, sports, science and music exchange programs between the US and DPRK in the past, I witnessed firsthand their eagerness for international collaboration, especially with American scientists, athletes, artists and academics. Those efforts, like the basketball diplomacy efforts I helped to facilitate with Dennis Rodman, provided rare windows of engagement between the US and DPRK before they were abruptly terminated by political restrictions, most notably the Trump administration’s 2017 travel ban.

DPRK-Russia’s Difficult History

While the DPRK-Russia partnership marks a significant shift, its roots stretch back over 150 years, forged through a complex history of cooperation, mistrust, and survival. Their modern relationship began to the 1860s, when waves of Korean migrants sought refuge in the Russian Far East. Fleeing famines and floods in North Hamgyong Province, these settlers introduced agriculture to Russia’s Primorsky Krai region, solidifying Russian control of the territory annexed from China in 1858. By the early Soviet period, Koreans thrived under the new regime, playing key roles in the region’s development.

However, Stalin’s 1937 deportation of 200,000 Koreans to Kazakhstan and Central Asia – on suspicions of collusion with Japan – left a lasting scar. This mass displacement, driven by paranoia rather than evidence, shattered trust between Koreans and Moscow. The descendants of these deportees carry this legacy to this day. My own work on a research project examining the health of Koreans in Kazakhstan underscored the enduring psychological and cultural trauma of these events.

Despite this rupture, Soviet-Koreans played a pivotal role in the establishment of the DPRK and its government after Japan’s defeat in World War II. However, relations between Pyongyang and Moscow were fraught with tension. During the Korean War, while China contributed large numbers of troops, the USSR limited its involvement mostly to logistical and air support. By the late 1950s, Pyongyang purged many Soviet-aligned Koreans, accusing them of dual allegiances, and expelled them back to the USSR. These events deepened mutual suspicion and created a repeated pattern of transactional cooperation followed by estrangement.

The Cold War era brought further complexities. While Western narratives often depict the DPRK, the USSR, and China as close allies behind the Iron Curtain, the reality was far more fractured. Moscow and Beijing saw each other as rivals, and the DPRK adeptly exploited the Sino-Soviet split to extract aid and concessions from both sides. This strategic balancing act was emblematic of Pyongyang’s survivalist approach to foreign policy – a dynamic that persists today.

Russia’s Post-Soviet Balancing Act

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1992 marked a major turning point. Bereft of Soviet support, North Korea became increasingly isolated, with China emerging as its sole remaining “ally.” In the first years of the post-Soviet era, Russia prioritized stability on its borders and initially worked to catalyze US-DPRK engagement, hoping to prevent the emergence of a nuclear-armed DPRK. Russia sought closer relations with Washington and even joined NATO’s “Partnership for Peace,” reflecting hopes for integration into the European security framework.

Russia’s focus shifted toward developing economic ties with South (rather than North) Korea, viewing Seoul as a more lucrative partner for trade and investment. Moscow also aligned itself with US-led efforts to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula, including support for the 1994 US-DPRK Agreed Framework, for which they offered to provide Russian-built light water reactors as part of the deal, if the West footed the bill, though that never materialized. This involvement reflected Moscow’s desire for a stable, denuclearized DPRK and improved relations with the West.

By the early 2000s, Russia joined the Six-Party Talks, favoring a step-by-step approach to DPRK denuclearization. However, as North Korea began conducting successful nuclear and missile tests, Moscow backed a series of nine UN Security Council resolutions between 2006 and 2017, imposing harsh sanctions on Pyongyang.

Under Vladimir Putin’s leadership, Russia began pivoting toward the promotion of a multipolar world order to counter US hegemony. This shift was reflected in the 2000 “Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness, and Cooperation” with DPRK. Although the treaty lacked military assistance provisions, it underscored Moscow’s interest in maintaining strategic ties with Pyongyang without provoking broader tensions.

The geopolitical calculus changed dramatically by 2024, as Russia’s international isolation due to the Ukraine war aligned its strategic interests with those of Pyongyang, marking the beginning of a new era in their relationship. Facing its own international isolation and economic sanctions due to the Ukraine war, Russia vetoed a UN resolution to continue sanctions enforcement on DPRK through the UN Panel of Experts. This marked the beginning of a thaw in relations between Moscow and Pyongyang. The newly ratified DPRK-Russia treaty now represents a partnership born of mutual necessity: for Russia, DPRK provides ammunition, manpower, and political support against the West; for DPRK, Russia offers technological expertise, economic opportunities, and a powerful security guarantor.

Echoes of History: Navigating the New Great Game

Russia’s evolving relationship with the DPRK signals a definitive end to its role as a mediator in US-DPRK relations and a pivot toward a deeper strategic alignment with Pyongyang.  Historically, Russia sought to stabilize the Korean Peninsula to minimize the risk of conflict along its border. Its involvement in the 1994 Agreed Framework and the Six-Party Talks reflected these priorities. However, its current reliance on DPRK military support and its focus on promoting a multipolar world makes cooperation with US overtures unlikely, as such efforts could weaken its alliance with Pyongyang. This transformation from mediator to strategic ally highlights the profound changes in Russia’s foreign policy priorities as it continues to confront the West.

In 2017, I co-led an academic exchange program funded by Columbia University to collaborate with Kim Il Sung University in Pyongyang. When Trump’s travel ban rendered the initiative moot, the DPRK proposed relocating the program to China or Russia, where we could teach their scientists to use internet resources for medical research. Despite enthusiastic support from Russian academics and government officials, a collaborative workshop planned for Vladivostok in 2019 was ultimately derailed by US government opposition. This missed opportunity reflects broader failures in US-DPRK engagement, leaving a void that Russia has since filled.  The DPRK-Russia alliance delivers what Pyongyang once sought from the West, leaving the US in a weakened negotiating position.

If Trump resumes negotiations with the DPRK, he will face a far more challenging landscape. Despite his personal rapport with Kim Jong Un, the DPRK’s strengthened position and closer integration with Russia will surely complicate US efforts. Moscow now views US-DPRK engagement as a threat to its interests and will likely resist any attempts to drive a wedge between Pyongyang and Moscow.

Nevertheless, the DPRK’s historical pragmatism leaves the door open for negotiations. Pyongyang has long leveraged rivalries between major powers to its advantage. However, any renewed engagement must acknowledge the DPRK’s strengthened position since 2019.  As I have written elsewhere, progress will require the US to offer more substantial incentives such as a treaty to end the Korean War, the exchange of liaison offices, recognition of the DPRK as a nuclear state (a reality that must be acknowledged), removal of the travel ban on US citizens visiting the DPRK, and substantial changes to the never-ending UN sanctions regime.

The DPRK-Russia partnership has immediate implications for the Ukraine war and East Asian security. By providing Pyongyang with the support it once sought from the West, Moscow has weakened the US negotiating position. However, the DPRK’s history of juggling rival powers suggests that future engagement is still possible.

Ultimately, the success of any US strategy depends on its ability to navigate the new dynamics created by the recently expanded DPRK-Russia alliance. As Trump considers renewed diplomacy with Kim Jong Un, he must contend with a North Korea that is more emboldened and less reliant on Western engagement than ever before. To avoid irrelevance in East Asia and beyond, the US must recognize the changed dynamics and recalibrate its approach before the window of opportunity closes entirely.

Joseph D. Terwilliger is Professor of Neurobiology at Columbia University Irving Medical Center, where his research focuses on natural experiments in human genetic epidemiology.  He is also active in science and sports diplomacy, having taught genetics at the Pyongyang University of Science and Technology, and accompanied Dennis Rodman on six “basketball diplomacy” trips to Asia since 2013.

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