ECFR
By Anthony Dworkin
In their responses to the war in Iran, many European leaders appear concerned to adjust to the unabashed international power politics unleashed by President Donald Trump. But their apparent discarding of the principle of non-aggression may only store up trouble for the future.
As America and Israel launched their war of choice, not only was Europe sidelined but its leaders’ responses have proved confused and divided. They have largely declined to make clear that the UN Charter’s rules on the use of force still provide an essential foundation for international peace and security—a fundamental question raised by the military campaign.
European differences over policy towards Israel are nothing new. But, in this case, the divergences and ambiguities in the positions of European leaders seem to reveal a more profound uncertainty. They testify to a loss of faith in a principle of international order that Europeans have traditionally seen as fundamental. And this has come at precisely the moment when the likely harms to European interests of an unnecessary war are most obvious.
There is little question that the US and Israeli war against Iran is an unlawful act of aggression. The UN Charter prohibits the use of force except when authorised by the Security Council or in cases of self-defence against an armed attack. There is overwhelming agreementamong legal scholars that neither of those applies in this case. No European leader has argued the war is lawful, and the implausibility of Trump’s statements about the risk of imminent attack by Iran suggest he launched it as a response to Iranian defiance rather than any immediate threat. But many European statements have glossed over American and Israeli responsibility for a prohibited use of force. The statement issued by high representative Kaja Kallas on behalf of the EU’s member states called for “full respect of international law, including the principles of the United Nations Charter”. It does not acknowledge the overwhelming consensus in Europe that the attack contravened the charter. In this way, and by focusing its criticism on Iran, the statement failed to uphold the principles it purported to endorse.
Even more worryingly, several European leaders have implied that a realistic view of global politics requires a move away from fully supporting the prohibition on the use of force except for genuine self-defence. Most prominently, German chancellor Friedrich Merz has backed the idea that international law should not be allowed to stand in the way of necessary and justified action against Iran. After America and Israel began their attacks in February, Merz said it was inappropriate to lecture partners and allies when “we share many of their goals without actually being able to achieve them ourselves”. In a television interview, he said it was necessary to ask “what should we do when international law clearly reaches its limits” in respect of an Iranian regime that did not respect international law itself.
In her speech to the EU ambassadors conference, European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen coupled a call to “see the world as it actually is today” with the statement that there should be no tears shed for the Iranian regime and that the people of Iran deserved freedom, dignity and self-determination. In slightly coded language, such comments give weight to the idea that the erosion of the rules-based order means legal technicalities can be at odds with justified goals. Going further, Dutch foreign minister Tom Berendsen said that “international law isn’t the only framework you can apply to this situation. You also have to be realistic, given the murderous nature of the Iranian regime.” Belgian foreign secretary Maxime Prévot suggested that the extra-legal nature of the war needed to be “weighed against the principle of reality” and that the attack on Iran was justified for global security. In a more nuanced way, French president Emmanuel Macron said that Iran bore primary responsibility for the war but that the US-Israeli action took place outside international law. This framing nevertheless suggested the prohibition on the use of force was a constraint that stood in the way of an operation that was at least understandable, if not justified.
At the other end of the spectrum, Spanish prime minister Pedro Sánchez has forthrightly argued the attack on Iran undermines a core principle of the international system that remains important and valuable. He saidSpain rejected “the unilateral military action by the United States and Israel, which represents an escalation and contributes to a more uncertain and hostile international order.” Norway’s government has also emphasised the illegality of the war, and British prime minister Keir Starmer initially refused to allow the use of British bases for offensive action (though he has since modified his position to allow strikes in defence of regional partners). He linked his stance to the lack of a thought-through plan for the campaign and the impossibility of effecting regime change from the air. But Starmer has been fiercely attacked by the opposition Conservative Party, whose leader, Kemi Badenoch, argued that “international law will have failed” if it protected a despotic regime.
Of course, some European positioning on the war is likely to reflect a desire to avoid antagonising Trump to influence his policies on Russia’s war in Ukraine. But there is little to suggest that Europe’s courting of Trump has led to any long-term or sustainable change in his position on Ukraine, which seems to continually default back to the idea that Ukraine must make concessions that will win Russia’s approval. Moreover, Europe’s downplaying of international law in relation to Iran undermines any principled stance about the illegality of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. And the language that Europeans have used—implying that restrictions on the use of force are in tension with the realities of today’s world—goes further than merely muted criticism of US and Israeli policies.
There are legitimate questions about how far Europe’s traditional support for a rules-based international system should be modified for an age of geopolitical and geoeconomic competition. But this does not mean that Europe should lose faith in the core principle of non-aggression. Indeed, the first two weeks of the war have shown how damaging this unnecessary conflict is likely to be for European interests—from the spike in energy prices, and disruption to global trade more widely, to the danger to European citizens and territory and the risk of a wave of migration if disorder spreads within Iran. The harms, escalating costs and unintended consequences that war brings are evident.
Indeed, it is notable that some of the political figures who were most outspoken in suggesting a realistic view of national or European interests should take precedence over international law, such as Merz and Badenoch, have subsequently voiced greater reservations about the conflict. Rather than projecting a loss of faith in their values that can only weaken Europe’s standing, European leaders should reaffirm the need to end the conflict as quickly as possible. In the future, rejecting wars of choice as a tool of great power politics will place them in stronger stead for protecting the full range of European interests.About the author: Anthony Dworkin is senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. He leads the organisation’s work in the areas of human rights, democracy, and justice.
By Anthony Dworkin
In their responses to the war in Iran, many European leaders appear concerned to adjust to the unabashed international power politics unleashed by President Donald Trump. But their apparent discarding of the principle of non-aggression may only store up trouble for the future.
As America and Israel launched their war of choice, not only was Europe sidelined but its leaders’ responses have proved confused and divided. They have largely declined to make clear that the UN Charter’s rules on the use of force still provide an essential foundation for international peace and security—a fundamental question raised by the military campaign.
European differences over policy towards Israel are nothing new. But, in this case, the divergences and ambiguities in the positions of European leaders seem to reveal a more profound uncertainty. They testify to a loss of faith in a principle of international order that Europeans have traditionally seen as fundamental. And this has come at precisely the moment when the likely harms to European interests of an unnecessary war are most obvious.
There is little question that the US and Israeli war against Iran is an unlawful act of aggression. The UN Charter prohibits the use of force except when authorised by the Security Council or in cases of self-defence against an armed attack. There is overwhelming agreementamong legal scholars that neither of those applies in this case. No European leader has argued the war is lawful, and the implausibility of Trump’s statements about the risk of imminent attack by Iran suggest he launched it as a response to Iranian defiance rather than any immediate threat. But many European statements have glossed over American and Israeli responsibility for a prohibited use of force. The statement issued by high representative Kaja Kallas on behalf of the EU’s member states called for “full respect of international law, including the principles of the United Nations Charter”. It does not acknowledge the overwhelming consensus in Europe that the attack contravened the charter. In this way, and by focusing its criticism on Iran, the statement failed to uphold the principles it purported to endorse.
Even more worryingly, several European leaders have implied that a realistic view of global politics requires a move away from fully supporting the prohibition on the use of force except for genuine self-defence. Most prominently, German chancellor Friedrich Merz has backed the idea that international law should not be allowed to stand in the way of necessary and justified action against Iran. After America and Israel began their attacks in February, Merz said it was inappropriate to lecture partners and allies when “we share many of their goals without actually being able to achieve them ourselves”. In a television interview, he said it was necessary to ask “what should we do when international law clearly reaches its limits” in respect of an Iranian regime that did not respect international law itself.
In her speech to the EU ambassadors conference, European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen coupled a call to “see the world as it actually is today” with the statement that there should be no tears shed for the Iranian regime and that the people of Iran deserved freedom, dignity and self-determination. In slightly coded language, such comments give weight to the idea that the erosion of the rules-based order means legal technicalities can be at odds with justified goals. Going further, Dutch foreign minister Tom Berendsen said that “international law isn’t the only framework you can apply to this situation. You also have to be realistic, given the murderous nature of the Iranian regime.” Belgian foreign secretary Maxime Prévot suggested that the extra-legal nature of the war needed to be “weighed against the principle of reality” and that the attack on Iran was justified for global security. In a more nuanced way, French president Emmanuel Macron said that Iran bore primary responsibility for the war but that the US-Israeli action took place outside international law. This framing nevertheless suggested the prohibition on the use of force was a constraint that stood in the way of an operation that was at least understandable, if not justified.
At the other end of the spectrum, Spanish prime minister Pedro Sánchez has forthrightly argued the attack on Iran undermines a core principle of the international system that remains important and valuable. He saidSpain rejected “the unilateral military action by the United States and Israel, which represents an escalation and contributes to a more uncertain and hostile international order.” Norway’s government has also emphasised the illegality of the war, and British prime minister Keir Starmer initially refused to allow the use of British bases for offensive action (though he has since modified his position to allow strikes in defence of regional partners). He linked his stance to the lack of a thought-through plan for the campaign and the impossibility of effecting regime change from the air. But Starmer has been fiercely attacked by the opposition Conservative Party, whose leader, Kemi Badenoch, argued that “international law will have failed” if it protected a despotic regime.
Of course, some European positioning on the war is likely to reflect a desire to avoid antagonising Trump to influence his policies on Russia’s war in Ukraine. But there is little to suggest that Europe’s courting of Trump has led to any long-term or sustainable change in his position on Ukraine, which seems to continually default back to the idea that Ukraine must make concessions that will win Russia’s approval. Moreover, Europe’s downplaying of international law in relation to Iran undermines any principled stance about the illegality of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. And the language that Europeans have used—implying that restrictions on the use of force are in tension with the realities of today’s world—goes further than merely muted criticism of US and Israeli policies.
There are legitimate questions about how far Europe’s traditional support for a rules-based international system should be modified for an age of geopolitical and geoeconomic competition. But this does not mean that Europe should lose faith in the core principle of non-aggression. Indeed, the first two weeks of the war have shown how damaging this unnecessary conflict is likely to be for European interests—from the spike in energy prices, and disruption to global trade more widely, to the danger to European citizens and territory and the risk of a wave of migration if disorder spreads within Iran. The harms, escalating costs and unintended consequences that war brings are evident.
Indeed, it is notable that some of the political figures who were most outspoken in suggesting a realistic view of national or European interests should take precedence over international law, such as Merz and Badenoch, have subsequently voiced greater reservations about the conflict. Rather than projecting a loss of faith in their values that can only weaken Europe’s standing, European leaders should reaffirm the need to end the conflict as quickly as possible. In the future, rejecting wars of choice as a tool of great power politics will place them in stronger stead for protecting the full range of European interests.About the author: Anthony Dworkin is senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. He leads the organisation’s work in the areas of human rights, democracy, and justice.
Source: This article was published by ECFR
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The European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) is an award-winning international think-tank that aims to conduct cutting-edge independent research on European foreign and security policy and to provide a safe meeting space for decision-makers, activists and influencers to share ideas. We build coalitions for change at the European level and promote informed debate about Europe’s role in the world.
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