NASA Names Artemis III Mission Crew Members

The Artemis III crew poses for an official portrait (from left: Andre Douglas, Luca Parmitano, Randy Bresnik, Frank Rubio). Credit: NASA/Bill Stafford

June 9, 2026 
By Eurasia Review


Taking another step toward one of the most complex human spaceflight missions in recent history, NASA on Tuesday provided new Artemis III details and announced the four prime crew members and a backup for the test flight. The mission will undertake a series of challenging tests in Earth orbit in 2027, essential for Artemis IV, the first planned crewed mission to the lunar South Pole in 2028.

During Artemis III, the agency’s SLS (Space Launch System) rocket will launch the Orion spacecraft and its crew from NASA’s Kennedy Space Center in Florida to low Earth orbit. After Orion systems checkouts, the spacecraft will, for the first time, demonstrate rendezvous and docking capabilities with test versions from one, or both, American commercial human landing systems in development by Blue Origin and SpaceX. This highly choreographed mission includes a dramatic multi-launch campaign of the world’s most powerful rockets, testing integrated hardware between Orion and the landers, including system interfaces, software, propulsion, and communications.

Crew assignments are as follows:
NASA astronaut Randy Bresnik, commander
ESA (European Space Agency) astronaut Luca Parmitano, pilot
NASA astronaut Andre Douglas, mission specialist
NASA astronaut Frank Rubio, mission specialist

As part of Tuesday’s event, NASA astronaut Bob Hines was named as a backup crew member. The crew will begin training immediately on Orion spacecraft systems, as well as assist in the development and operations of the test versions of Blue Origin and SpaceX landers.

“Today we take another bold step in humanity’s return to the Moon, building on the extraordinary foundation laid by the Artemis II astronauts,” said NASA Administrator Jared Isaacman. “Their achievements reignited global excitement for exploration, and now they pass the torch to the Artemis III team, Randy, Luca, Frank, and Andre. Artemis III will demonstrate the power of American innovation and international partnership as we test complex rendezvous and docking operations and advance the technologies that will one day carry us deeper into the solar system. This mission will require the most awe-inspiring coordination of heavy-lift rocket launches in history, drawing on the talent and capability of teams across government and the spaceflight community. The Artemis III astronauts, alongside ESA and our international partners, and the tens of thousands of the best and brightest across the agency and industry, are ushering in a new Golden Age of exploration carrying forward the hopes and dreams of the next generation just as the Apollo astronauts did for so many of us.”

This also is the first time an ESA astronaut has been assigned an Artemis mission.

“Artemis III will push the boundaries of spacecraft operations in orbit. Luca’s assignment as pilot reflects the depth of European expertise in human spaceflight and draws on his extensive operational experience in high-pressure situations,” said Josef Aschbacher, ESA’s director general. “At the same time, ESA’s European Service Module will once again provide the critical capabilities that power Orion, demonstrating Europe’s enduring role at the very heart of the Artemis program. The news out of Houston today is a powerful recognition of ESA’s role in enabling humanity’s return to the Moon – and a key advancement in our partnership with NASA. Europeans can take pride in being part of this exciting journey.”
Mission progress

NASA and its partners are making progress preparing for the test flight.

Engineers will connect the Orion crew module and service module this summer and integrate the spacecraft’s docking system, which will fly for the first time. Heat shield testing continues with individual blocks having undergone ultra-sonic inspections and installation onto the heat shield structure.

Rocket processing also is well underway. Technicians for SLS are integrating the engine section to the rest of the core stage ahead of installing the four RS-25 engines this summer. With all solid rocket booster segments now at NASA Kennedy and mobile launcher refurbishments on track, rocket stacking also is scheduled to begin this summer. NASA continues design and fabrication of a spacer that will replace the upper stage on Artemis III.

Blue Origin is developing a crewed lunar version of the company’s Blue Moon lander, while SpaceX is developing a crewed lunar lander version of the company’s Starship, with both companies building test articles for Artemis III. NASA is supporting both lander providers hands-on throughout design, development, testing, and evaluation, including sharing agency expertise and capabilities gained from previous missions.


In addition to status updates from NASA and both commercial partners, the agency discussed details during the event about the planned operations for Artemis III, which will support an increased mission cadence, ramp up production, and drive supply chain improvements for the Artemis program.

The Artemis III mission builds on the successful Artemis II flight completed in April and will help the agency prepare to send the first astronauts, Americans, to Mars.

Artemis III includes launching the world’s most powerful rockets in short order. Blue Origin’s lander pathfinder, which is able to stay in orbit for multiple weeks, will launch first and await the crew. NASA will send the astronauts aboard Orion by SLS to orbit Earth, before rendezvousing in space with the company’s lander test article and spending about two days docked together for tests and technology demonstrations, including entering the lander.

After completing docked operations with Blue Origin, Orion will detach and await Starship. SpaceX’s Starship pathfinder will launch and meet up with Orion to spend about a day connected for checkouts and testing. After that, Orion and its crew will undock and return home, splashing safely down in the Pacific Ocean where a team from the U.S. Navy and NASA will recover the astronauts.

In total, the crew is expected to remain in space for about two weeks, with exact mission length to be determined in real-time based on launch, rendezvous, and docked operations.

Will Sri Lanka Be Able To Use RCEP? – OpEd

June 9, 2026 
By P. K. Balachandran


Media reports say that Sri Lanka is set to join the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the world’s largest trading bloc, accounting for 30% of global GDP. The 15-member RCEP includes the ASEAN countries plus Australia, New Zealand, China, Japan and South Korea. Sri Lanka had sent its letter of intent to join the RCEP in 2023.

At a roundtable discussion on “Sri Lanka’s Pathway to RCEP and the Emerging Global Trading Order” organised by the Pathfinder Foundation in Colombo, Sri Lanka’s Trade Ministry Secretary K.A. Vimalenthirajah said that the government had submitted responses to the preliminary questionnaire from the RCEP in January, and that the Cabinet had established a high-level policy committee and a working committee to take the matter forward.

Welcoming Sri Lanka’s move, the Indonesian Ambassador to Sri Lanka, Dewi Gustina Tobing, cited Sri Lanka’s strategic location in the Indian Ocean, strong maritime connectivity potential, competitiveness in many products and potential as a regional logistics and service hub as good reasons for joining the RCEP. “Diversification of export market and investment opportunity is, of course, an important benefit that Sri Lanka will get by joining this organisation. Sri Lanka will be able to improve itself and its prospects as a destination of investment,” Tobing said.

Australian Ambassador Matthew Duckworth said that joining RCEP will enable Sri Lanka to undertake overdue reforms as the circumstances arising from its membership will push the island nation towards reform.

What RCEP Was Meant to Achieve

Tracing the history of RCEP, in the “The Diplomat”, Jesslene Lee said that the RCEP was thought of in 2019, at a time when the Asia-Pacific region found itself in the crosshairs of intensifying geoeconomic competition and strategic rivalry. There was a felt need for “plurilateral agreements” to provide safeguards and strategic opportunities to weather the volatility in the global economy.

Being the first and the only pan-Asian trade agreement, the RCEP presented a significant opportunity to enhance the Asia-Pacific’s position in global production networks.
Advantages

By eliminating tariffs on over 90% of goods trade within the bloc, the RCEP unlocked unprecedented preferential access among the member economies. Research done by the Asia Competitiveness Institute (ACI) at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, found that, in 2022, China’s merchandise trade within the RCEP amounted to US$ 714 billion in imports and US$ 944 billion in exports, representing nearly a third of its overall trade.

Japan followed with US$ 420 billion in imports and US$ 318 billion in exports, making intra-RCEP trade nearly half of its total trade. Comparable values and shares were observed in the case of South Korea also, Jesslene Lee says.

These linkages were reinforced by investment flows, with China, Japan, and South Korea collectively contributing over 40% of FDI inflows to ASEAN countries. An increase in manufacturing in China, Japan and South Korea complemented ASEAN’s growing role as a major production base.

High-value intermediates from these upstream economies flowed into countries like Cambodia, the Philippines, and Thailand, which served as final assembly hubs for regional consumer markets, Lee points out.

Rules of Origin – the Crown Jewel

RCEP’s unified Rules of Origin (RoO), treats all 15 members as a single market. The RCEP Rules of Origin allows inputs from any member country to count as “regional content” and requires only 40% of a product’s value to be added in order to qualify for preferential tariffs.

Firms whose products meet the above regional cumulation requirement gain preferential access to all 15 markets in the RCEP bloc, creating powerful incentives for firms to restructure supply chains within the region.

These incentives are amplified by the participation of China, Japan, and South Korea, which together account for 40% of global manufacturing, Lee points out.

Further, by locating production or sourcing key inputs from RCEP countries, firms based outside the bloc can qualify their products as “RCEP-originating” and gain zero-tariff access across all member markets.
Challenges Remain

However, there are significant challenges which members face. The real test lies in how effectively the Rules of Origin are implemented.

Elaborating on this, Lee says – Streamlining the RoO process is critical to encouraging firms to leverage RCEP. Harmonizing protocols on the “self-certification of origin” would substantially reduce the burden of time and compliance costs typically associated with complex RoO procedures – costs that often deter firms from using trade agreements.

“This means standardizing operational certification procedures, including origin documentation and self-certification authorization procedures. It means digitalizing customs management systems to enable direct and secure exchange of origin certification data between customs authorities, which will expedite clearance.”

“Also necessary, is creating a centralized portal to help firms navigate complicated regulations by offering guidance and resolving compliance issues.”

“This reality is further reinforced by the growing network of green and digital shipping corridors, which support supply chain integration by improving operational efficiency and interoperable maritime connectivity. Among RCEP members, Australia, China, Japan, South Korea, and Singapore are actively advancing such corridors.”

Slow And Limited Progress

However, RCEP has taken time to see some fruition. The bloc came into force in 2022, but little is heard about the RCEP even now, except for the eagerness of several countries to join the RCEP.

In 2025, RCEP leaders met for the first time since its signing. The 2025 Joint Leaders’ Statement reaffirmed the members’ commitment to the full and effective implementation of the Agreement, strengthening supply chain resilience, advancing digital trade cooperation, and supporting greater MSME participation across RCEP markets.

But studies by the Asia Competitive Institute (ACI) have indicated limited utilisation of the RCEP. The main beneficiaries are the three northeast Asian economies of China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea.

RCEP still faces practical constraints that limit its impact. Tariff liberalisation is uneven. Non-tariff measures continue to raise compliance costs. Technology collaboration, though improving, falls behind existing bilateral agreements in depth. Environmental provisions also remain underdeveloped, limiting progress in green trade.

But targeted, short-term reforms can deliver immediate gains. Accelerating tariff reductions and concluding full cumulation of Rules of Origin, which allows firms to combine inputs from multiple member countries, and still qualify for tariff preferences, will directly improve uptake.

Establishing a robust utilisation monitoring mechanism, supported by customs data, will help members track the actual use of the RCEP, identify border bottlenecks, and develop more targeted reforms.

Sustaining these reforms requires stronger institutions. Upgrading the RCEP Support Unit into a full Secretariat would strengthen implementation and provide a more effective institutional backbone for coordination and delivery.

Under this structure, ECOTECH initiatives – programs for economic and technical cooperation – can be expanded to build capacity and support commitments. A dedicated data-sharing platform would enhance transparency, monitoring, and policy alignment.

Strengthening supply chain resilience through interoperable customs systems and faster cross-border processing of trade documents will be critical.

Regulatory cooperation should focus on reducing behind-the-border non-tariff barriers. The RCEP must expand its digital economy scope and strengthen environmental cooperation.

National Security Clauses- A Major Obstacle

The “National Security Exception” clause may impose substantive constraints on the free flow of data. Cross-border data flow is a prerequisite for conducting digital trade, yet the regulatory divergences among countries regarding cross-border data flows are difficult to reconcile.

On the one hand, RCEP advocates the free flow of data to unleash its economic potential. But on the other hand, its text incorporates exception clauses such as “essential security interests” and “legitimate public policy objectives,” providing legal space for member States to implement restrictive measures like data localization and security assessments for data exports.

These restrictive measures may also increase corporate compliance costs, create de facto digital trade barriers, and potentially offset the anticipated trade creation effects of RCEP.

Sense of Urgency Lacking

The global trading system is under growing strain. Multilateral rules are weakening, aggressive unilateral trade measures are expanding, and tariff uncertainty is rising. Concerns over excess industrial capacity are also creating new tensions in global markets.

And yet, the RCEP has been slow in responding says the website “Science Direct”. Evidence from the ASEAN Business Barometer Survey shows that around 70% of firms are aware of RCEP, yet utilisation stood at only 48%. Many firms report uncertainty about how to begin using the agreement or they face a lack of demand from buyers for preferential sourcing, the website says.

RCEP involves a diverse group of economies with different priorities. This again is a challenge to effective governance.

Issues for Sri Lanka

While the RCEP offers great scope for Sri Lanka to expand production and trade, it also requires the adoption of a totally different system which might not be easy.

Writing on Sri Lanka’s prospects in “The Morning” Dr. Dayaratna Silva says that Sri Lanka’s successful accession to the RCEP will require a carefully sequenced, two-track strategy combining sustained political and diplomatic engagement with the development of a coherent and forward-looking trade policy framework.

“On the external front, continuous high-level dialogue with all 15 RCEP Member States will be essential to build confidence, secure support, and navigate the evolving accession process. In parallel, on the domestic front, Sri Lanka must undertake a comprehensive review of its trade, investment, and regulatory regimes to align with RCEP disciplines, while identifying priority sectors for competitive integration into regional value chains.”

“To ensure coherence and continuity, a dedicated national task force – bringing together key Government agencies and private-sector stakeholders – should be established to steer the accession process, formulate negotiating positions, and manage implementation.””

“Given the breadth and complexity of the agreement, covering areas from goods and services to e-commerce, intellectual property, and dispute settlement, Sri Lanka’s approach must be both technically rigorous and strategically calibrated.”

“Ultimately, accession to the RCEP should not be viewed merely as a trade policy objective, but as a transformative step towards embedding Sri Lanka more deeply within the dynamic economic architecture of Asia.”


About P. K. Balachandran

P. K. Balachandran is a senior Indian journalist working in Sri Lanka for local and international media and has been writing on South Asian issues for the past 21 years.

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Okinotori Batanes Maritime Dispute Tests UNCLOS Order – OpEd


Location of the Batanes archipelago. Credit: Benar News

June 9, 2026 
By Simon Hutagalung

The area in which Japan’s maritime claims around Okinotori and the northern EEZ projection from Batanes of the Philippines overlap is strategically located on the edge of a very important corridor close to Taiwan and the Bashi Channel. The area is therefore more than a simple border dispute, as it will test the ability of maritime law to control the rivalry of actors in one of the most contested areas of the Indo-Pacific. The fact that under UNCLOS, an island generates maritime zones, but a rock that is unable to sustain human presence or economic life activity does not generate an EEZ or a continental shelf, is the root of the problem with Okinotori.

Japan claims that Okinotori has an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and a Continental Shelf (CS) of 350,000 square miles, which overlaps with the Philippines’ northern projection of 220,000 square miles from the EEZ and CS from Batanes. In fact, the EEZ and CS generated by rocks that cannot sustain human habitation or economic life on the rock itself have no maritime zone. In reality, Okinotori is best described as a rock that cannot generate any maritime entitlements. Japan claims that it is an island and therefore generates 200 nautical miles of EEZ and 350 nautical miles of CS. Japan and the Philippines have recently begun formal talks on delimiting their boundaries for the EEZ and CS. The Chinese have already begun to send coast guard ships to the waters east of Taiwan and have described the Japan/Philippines talks as ‘illegal’.

The greatest political challenge to an arrangement is that it is outside of waters around Taiwan and therefore does not include Taiwan. Even if such an arrangement is styled as being purely bilateral and is explicitly stated to be non-binding on third states, there are huge problems of inclusion. An agreement about contested waters is hard enough to get to be agreed and to be to gain to be to have credibility when it does not include a party who is currently exercising maritime governance in the very same waters and whose interests in the region are huge, is to create a huge credibility gap. That is to say, such an agreement will not be seen to be to be as to have as much value as it would if all parties who have a huge stake in the region’s waters were included.

The strategic significance of the overlapping maritime claims between Japan’s Okinotori and the Philippines’ northern EEZ projection from Batanes in the Luzon island group cannot be emphasised enough. The area is located at the edge of a very strategically located corridor of sea lanes between Taiwan and the Bashi Channel, a strait linking the South China Sea to the western Pacific. If not managed properly, the boundary dispute between Japan and the Philippines could become a matter of a wider US-China rivalry for control of sea lanes in the Indo-Pacific region. Recent U.S. military exercises conducted in the northern Philippines were reported by Reuters in late 2025 to be part of a larger plan to prevent Chinese warships from entering the Pacific Ocean in the event of a conflict over Taiwan. Viewed from this perspective, the issue of the maritime boundary between Japan and the Philippines could become a war-gaming ground for a wider conflict between the two major powers in the region.


The implications of this small patch of the world’s surface are in fact far-reaching. The maritime boundary dispute between Japan and the Philippines is a test case for whether the laws of the sea can or cannot restrain the growing rivalry between two of the world’s greatest powers. It is a small area, but it is a test case of whether the laws of the sea, designed to govern the use of the world’s oceans in times of peace, can or cannot be changed in times of war. If Japan extends the legal status of Okinotori too far, Japan will lose credibility as a champion of the rules-based order of the world’s oceans. If the Philippines treats this issue purely as a matter of sovereignty, then it will turn a legal issue into a security competition with China. The Philippines should instead treat this as an issue of delimitation to be worked out in consultation with all affected parties, and at the same time, as an opportunity to work out several confidence-building measures with Japan, such as coast guard communication, joint management of resources, and rules for dealing with incidents at sea. Multilateral dialogue is key, because legal clarity is not enough; political inclusion is also required.

There is no gain in continuing to claim the maximum in terms of maritime space. Rather, the claims should be based on the narrowest defensible interpretation of the provisions of UNCLOS, i.e. those related to islands capable of sustaining human life and economic activities. For the Philippines, it is also important that the dispute does not get drawn into a competition of deterrence with China. Each new patrol by either side could be used as a sovereignty performance, which would only invite counterpressure from China. In the meantime, the U.S. and other regional actors can support transparency, promote rapid communication between relevant parties, and encourage rules of the road for all encounters at sea in the region. In the end, all of these steps may not resolve the current overlap of claims in the waters around Okinotori overnight, but by taking them, the parties can reduce the likelihood that a seemingly innocuous legal dispute turns into a strategic incident in a region where mistrust already runs high.

The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own.

ReferencesBlanchard, B. (2026, June 8). Taiwan says China Coast Guard patrols to its east are a “provocative act”. Reuters.

 
Corrales, N. (2026, May 6). Japan fires missile in joint drill with US and allies in northern Philippines, facing South China Sea. Reuters


About Simon Hutagalung

Simon Hutagalung is a retired diplomat from the Indonesian Foreign Ministry and received his master's degree in political science and comparative politics from the City University of New York. The opinions expressed in his articles are his own.
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The Iran Conflict And The Potential Collapse Of The ‘Greater Israel’ Vision – OpEd

June 9, 2026 
By Murray Hunter


In the wake of Iran’s recent missile barrages and the intense exchanges of 2025–2026, a striking development has emerged: the United States appeared to step back from fully committing to Israel’s defense in ways that once defined their alliance. While Washington has provided intelligence, defensive support, and conducted its own strikes on Iranian nuclear sites, reports and statements suggested limits on direct involvement during certain phases of Iranian retaliation. This perceived distancing amid other domestic U.S. priorities and war fatigue with the mid-term elections coming up has left Israel more exposed than in previous confrontations.

This moment arrives as global public opinion has soured dramatically on Israel’s military campaigns in Gaza, Lebanon, and against so-called Iranian proxies. Polls across many countries show unfavorable views of Israel reaching historic highs. Protests, boycotts, and diplomatic isolation have intensified. Even within Israel, Netanyahu faces deep polarization, with approval ratings hovering around 40% and significant segments of the public questioning prolonged conflicts.

These pressures in a nation with competing narratives raise a pivotal question: Could the Iran war mark the beginning of the end for the so-called “Greater Israel Project”?

What Is “Greater Israel”?

The concept of Eretz Yisrael HaShlema (“the Whole Land of Israel”) has biblical, historical, and political layers. It is not a single, universally agreed-upon policy but a spectrum of aspirations often invoked by religious Zionists, revisionist thinkers, and right-wing politicians.

Biblically, it draws from passages like Genesis 15:18–21, describing a covenant with Abraham promising land “from the river of Egypt to the great river, the Euphrates.” Interpretations vary: some see it as a maximalist vision encompassing parts or all of modern Egypt ( the Nile to Brook of Egypt/Sinai), Israel/Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and into Iraq. Others limit it to the area “between the Sea and the Jordan River” as essentially Israel proper plus the West Bank (Judea and Samaria), Gaza, and sometimes the Golan Heights.

From Israel’s Formation:

Pre-1948 Zionism: Theodor Herzl, founder of modern Zionism, focused primarily on establishing a Jewish homeland in Palestine amid European antisemitism. Some early discussions referenced broader areas “from the Brook of Egypt to the Euphrates” in brainstorming sessions, but these were not core platforms. Revisionists like Ze’ev Jabotinsky advocated for a Jewish state on both banks of the Jordan, influencing groups like Betar. The 1919 Paris Peace Conference saw Zionist proposals for expanded borders, but the 1922 Mandate for Palestine already separated Transjordan.

1948 War and Statehood: Israel declared independence within UN-partitioned borders. The 1948 Arab-Israeli War expanded its control. Armistice lines (Green Line) left the West Bank under Jordanian control and Gaza under Egypt.

1967 Six-Day War: A turning point. Israel captured the Sinai, Gaza, West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Golan Heights. This fueled the modern Greater Israel movement (Movement for Greater Israel), which opposed territorial concessions and promoted settlement. Sinai was returned to Egypt in 1982 for peace. Israel withdrew unilaterally from Gaza in 2005.

Post-1967 to Today: Likud platforms emphasized sovereignty “between the Sea and the Jordan.” Settlement expansion in the West Bank has been a priority for right-wing governments. Netanyahu has referenced connections to broader visions, drawing condemnation.

The most expansive “Nile to Euphrates” map is often cited in criticism as evidence of expansionism, though many analysts call it a conspiracy theory or fringe interpretation rather than official policy. Israel has no formal annexation plans beyond the West Bank debate.

A Clarifying Map:

The classic visual shows a shaded region covering Israel, the Palestinian territories, Jordan, Lebanon, much of Syria, parts of Egypt’s Sinai and beyond, and western Iraq. This is vastly larger than current Israel, about 20,770 km² vs. millions in the maximalist view. In practice, Israeli policy has focused on security buffers, settlements, and control of key areas rather than outright conquest of distant capitals.

Isolation, Failed Accords, and Internal Rejection

The Abraham Accords of 2020 under the previous Trump administration contained normalization deals with the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan. To many Zionists, this symbolized a new era of pragmatic Arab-Israeli ties bypassing the Palestinian issue. Economic and security cooperation grew. However, the Gaza war and subsequent conflicts have chilled momentum. Public opinion in Arab states turned sharply negative; new deals stalled, notably with Saudi Arabia. While formal ties have not fully collapsed, practical engagement has cooled significantly.

A prolonged or costly war with Iran risks further erosion. Arab states prioritizing stability may view an emboldened, expansionist Israel as a greater threat than Iran’s weakened position. Israel could face a future as a smaller, more isolated state, which may remain militarily strong but diplomatically constrained, economically strained by boycotts and regional hostility.

Inside Israel, divisions are stark. While annexation sentiment exists on the right, especially for the West Bank. Broader public support for endless conflict or maximalist goals is limited. Many Israelis prioritize security, economy, and normalcy over ideological expansion. Netanyahu’s coalition has relied on far-right partners, but polls show fatigue, polarization, and questions about leadership.

Israel as a Path to Prosperity Without Expansion

Critics argue Israel has been the primary obstacle to regional peace through settlement expansion, occupation policies, and rejection of comprehensive deals addressing Palestinian statehood. Supporters counter that Palestinian rejectionism, terrorism (Hamas, Hezbollah), and Iranian-backed rejection of Israel’s existence are the real barriers. Wars in 1948, 1967, 1973, intifadas, and ongoing rocket attacks shaped a security-first doctrine.

The thesis here is that clinging to Greater Israel designs perpetuates a cycle: perpetual conflict, isolation, and opportunity costs. An Israel that formally or de facto abandons maximalist territorial ambitions, focusing on defensible borders, technological/economic strength, and genuine two-state or confederation compromises could thrive. Normalized relations with a broader Arab world including Saudi Arabia, and the broader Sunni states could unlock trade, tourism, and security pacts against shared threats. A smaller, secure, prosperous Israel integrated regionally would likely enjoy greater long-term viability than one pursuing biblical maximalism amid demographic, diplomatic, and military strain.

The Iran conflicts of 2025–2026 may accelerate this reckoning. With U.S. support not unlimited, global opinion adverse, Arab normalization stalled, and internal Israeli debates intensifying, the vision of Greater Israel faces formidable headwinds. Whether it fails outright depends on Israeli choices, either to double down amid isolation, or pivot toward pragmatic security and integration.

A post-expansionist Israel need not be diminished. It could model success as a high-tech, culturally vibrant nation at peace with neighbors, proving that true strength lies in prosperity and acceptance rather than contested land. The coming years will test which path prevails.


About Murray Hunter

Murray Hunter has been involved in Asia-Pacific business for the last 30 years as an entrepreneur, consultant, academic, and researcher. As an entrepreneur he was involved in numerous start-ups, developing a lot of patented technology, where one of his enterprises was listed in 1992 as the 5th fastest going company on the BRW/Price Waterhouse Fast100 list in Australia. Murray is now an associate professor at the University Malaysia Perlis, spending a lot of time consulting to Asian governments on community development and village biotechnology, both at the strategic level and “on the ground”. He is also a visiting professor at a number of universities and regular speaker at conferences and workshops in the region. Murray is the author of a number of books, numerous research and conceptual papers in referred journals, and commentator on the issues of entrepreneurship, development, and politics in a number of magazines and online news sites around the world. Murray takes a trans-disciplinary view of issues and events, trying to relate this to the enrichment and empowerment of people in the region.

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The Strategic Logic Driving Russia’s Taliban Engagement – Analysis

GENDER APARTHEID IS NOT PART OF IT

Taliban Defense Minister Mawlawi Mohammad Yaqoob Mujahid shakes hands with Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu during the signing of a military-technical cooperation agreement in Moscow region, May 27, 2026. (Photo: Taliban Defense Ministry)

June 9, 2026 

Observer Research Foundation
By Rajoli Siddharth Jayaprakash and Shivam Shekhawat

On 21 May, Russia’s Security Council Secretary, Sergey Shoigu, reiterated Moscow’s concerns vis-à-vis Afghanistan and the potential sources of destabilisation in the region. Speaking at a Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) security meeting, he highlighted the presence of 18,000 to 23,000 militants from more than 20 groups within Afghanistan, the gradual return of militants from Syria to the country, and the production and trade of synthetic drugs in and around Afghanistan’s neighbouring countries. Even as he acknowledged the Taliban-led Islamic Emirate’s efforts in countering these challenges — particularly the presence of militants — he also underscored the limits on the group’s ability to address these threats effectively, necessitating cooperation with the regime.

The Taliban’s removal from Russia’s terrorist list, and its subsequent recognition in July 2025, was an inflexion point for strategic stability in Eurasia, reflecting regional actors’ growing receptiveness to engaging with the Taliban. While there is considerable impetus to progressively strengthen the partnership, Moscow has had to tread cautiously in announcing large-scale infrastructure development projects, owing to the security factors outlined above and the deteriorating relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan, which could potentially alter the threat calculus in the region.

Drivers of the Taliban-Russia Relationship

Moscow’s Taliban strategy is driven by a framework of pragmatic realism. The Taliban’s arrival in 2021 signalled an American retrenchment from the region, and Russia was quick to capitalise on this vacuum by establishing official contacts with the Taliban. Its embassy in Kabul remained operational, and it was the first country to open a business representative office in Kabul after the Taliban’s return. The Taliban’s swift consolidation of power reflected a new reality that states in the region would inevitably have to reckon with. The risk of proliferation of different terror groups inside Afghanistan — now that the US and its allies’ security umbrella had disappeared — raised the prospect of terror threats percolating into Central Asia and eventually making their way into Russia. The bombing of the Russian embassy in Kabul in 2022, for which the ISKP claimed responsibility, was the first sign of this fast-developing risk.


In 2024, the ISKP attacked Crocus City Hall, resulting in more than 140 fatalities. The attack highlighted the group’s ability to undertake transnational strikes. The perpetrators were from Central Asia, which further underscored Russia’s fears about the spillover. In the past year, there has been an uptick in armed incidentsat the Afghan-Tajikistan border, with more than 17 incidents reported in 2025 alone. At a security conference hosted by Moscow (26-29 May), the country’s security chief reiterated concerns about ISKP’s recruitment from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan, its preparation for attacks, and its attempts to destabilise Taliban rule within the country, particularly in the north. Furthermore, in 2025, around 2,742 kilograms of drugs were confiscated; the Taliban’s ban on poppy cultivation has led to an increase in the production and trafficking of synthetic drugs like methamphetamine, increasingly concentrated in Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Without the Taliban pursuing a proactive policy of eliminating the terror threat and demonstrating its ability to police its borders, the risks of instability percolating into Central Asia remain high.

Against this backdrop, removing the Taliban from Russia’s terror list emerged as a priority. In 2025, the Russian Supreme Court removed the Taliban from its terror list, suspending the ban on its activities. In the same year, Russian President Vladimir Putin called the Taliban an “ally” in the fight against terror. In July 2025, Russia became the first country to recognise the Taliban government and subsequently accepted the credentials of Afghanistan’s new ambassador to Russia, Gul Hassan Hassan. This pivot towards a “full-fledged partnership” indicated the solidification of Moscow’s policy shift vis-à-vis Afghanistan. While there were reports of Russia’s possible interest in supplying weapons to the Taliban in the fight against ISKP, the two sides recently signed a military-technical agreement on the sidelines of a conference in Moscow, reflecting a shared commitment to containing the potential spillover from the regional security situation.


Pakistan and Afghanistan have been engaged in a crisis since February 2026, with attacks on each other’s military and border infrastructure. The rift is a double-edged sword for Moscow. On one hand, the persisting hostilities have implications for the regional balance of power; on the other, any resolution of fundamental differences — contingent on the Taliban outlawing the TTP — could result in the further fragmentation of the Taliban and the creation of a “new Taliban”. Moreover, this situation would inevitably lead to Afghan and Pakistani cadres defecting to the Afghan branch of the Islamic State, which is banned in Russia. The possibility of this seems remote, as the Taliban have refrained from taking any major action against the group even under immense pressure. Amid Islamabad’s coercive attempts — reflected in strikes and sanctions — Moscow’s interest lies in the cessation of hostilities, and it has also offered to mediate in resolving the crisis. However, its leverage remains limited. The persisting instability across the Durand Line reduces the impetus for implementing transport corridors and critical connectivity linking Central Asia through Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Indian Ocean.

The Taliban’s Calculus

The Taliban’s Islamic Emirate will complete half a decade in power in 2026. In the past five years, Russia has been the only country to grant de jure recognition to the regime. Notwithstanding the absence of formal recognition, other regional countries, including India, China, the Central Asian Republics, and Iran, have opened channels of communication with the Taliban and expanded pragmatic cooperation.

The rationale for engagement hovers between concerns about the proliferation of militant groups within Afghanistan and doubts about the Taliban’s capability and willingness to control them. For the Islamic Emirate, a major source of legitimacy has been its engagement with other countries. Russia’s support thus lends a veneer of legitimacy to the Taliban, which uses Moscow’s position against sanctions as a counter to the persistence of Western sanctions. The Emirate emphasises the principles of a balanced and economy-oriented foreign policy, with a focus on developing practical cooperation in trade and transit infrastructure, and positions itself as a crucial vector in facilitating regional connectivity. While Moscow is advancing the relationship to fulfil its objectives of ensuring regional security and furthering economic development, Russia’s support lends credence to the Emirate’s legitimisation process.

Economic Engagement as a Pillar of Regional Stability

For Moscow, the rationale for engagement transcends the underlying security threats and carries a degree of urgency around integrating Afghanistan into Eurasian supply chains by strengthening regional connectivity. For the latter to be possible, a stable Afghanistan remains critical. In this context, Russia has called upon regional states to formally recognise the regime. Strategic stability in the region remains a critical discussion point in platforms such as the SCO and the Moscow Format talks. In November 2025, Gul Hassan Hassan met Russia’s representative to the SCO to discuss the prospect of granting Afghanistan observer status in the grouping, with the understanding that Afghanistan’s integration into institutional regional agreements could pave the way for a new regionalism in Eurasia.

During the Russia-Afghanistan business forum last year, five MoUs were concluded in the areas of trade, transportation, and energy exploration, indicative of an appetite for enhanced engagement with the Islamic Emirate. Trade between the two countries currently stands at somewhere between US$300-400 million. Between April and May 2026, delegations from both sides held multiple engagements at the ministerial, ambassadorial, and business-to-business levels. Talks on expanding banking and economic cooperation are also underway.

Much of Russia’s economic engagement with Afghanistan has been routed through Tatarstan, with the region’s trade with Afghanistan reaching US$51 million in the first eleven months of 2025, accounting for ten percent of overall trade between the two countries. Investors from Tatarstan have shown interest in Afghanistan, while the Russian Chamber of Commerce has been exploring opportunities for cooperation in the agriculture, fertilisers, and oil extraction sectors. Projects such as the Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan railway (connecting Termez to the Arabian Sea), the Torgundi-Herat-Spin Boldak railway network, the Khaf-Herat railway network, and the Wakhan Corridor highways offer an alternative to Central Asian states’ dependence on Iranian ports for maritime transit.

With growing exasperation over the slow progress on China’s Mes Aynak mine, the Emirate is also looking to diversify its investments. The Taliban’s Minister of Mines and Petroleum has invited Russian firms to invest in Afghanistan’s hydrocarbon projects, with talks of Russian investment in water transfer projects as well. However, despite growing interest, no large-scale projects have been concluded between the two countries.

The Way Forward

The Taliban’s official position refuses to acknowledge the presence of any terror group within the country, with the Emirate’s leaders doubling down on their claimed success in eviscerating the ISKP’s presence inside Afghanistan — asserting that this has compelled the group to regroup in neighbouring Pakistan. While the ISKP has expanded its presence in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan provinces, it continues to remain active within Afghanistan. The attack on a Chinese restaurant in Kabul in January this year is a case in point. Russia’s posture towards the Taliban has shifted in light of the evolving regional security environment, prompting a strategic recalibration across Eurasia. As the Taliban’s consolidation of power exacerbated security risks in the region — with the threat of terror percolating into Central Asia and Russia — a stable Afghanistan came to be seen as being in the interest of all regional actors, as reflected in Moscow’s recent actions. Moving forward, while the two countries will continue to cooperate economically at a moderate level, the focus of the relationship will be on counterterrorism and security-related cooperation, keeping in mind the broader regional security situation.

About the authors:

Rajoli Siddharth Jayaprakash is a Junior Fellow with the Observer Research Foundation.
Shivam Shekhawat is a Junior Fellow with the Observer Research Foundation.

Source: This article was published by the Observer Research Foundation.


About Observer Research Foundation
ORF was established on 5 September 1990 as a private, not for profit, ’think tank’ to influence public policy formulation. The Foundation brought together, for the first time, leading Indian economists and policymakers to present An Agenda for Economic Reforms in India. The idea was to help develop a consensus in favour of economic reforms.
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Iraq At The Crossroads: Strategic Ties With Iran, Turkey, And The Arab World – Analysis

Map and location of Iraq. Credit: VOA

June 9, 2026 

The Congressional Research Service (CRS)
By Christopher M. Blanchard

The Republic of Iraq sits at a crossroad in the Middle East region, with ties to Iran, Turkey, the Levant, and the Arabian Peninsula that shape Iraqi interests, create constraints and opportunities, and attract intervention. In May 2026, Shia Arab businessman Ali Al Zaydi was sworn in as Prime Minister after Iraq’s parliament approved his government program and 14 of 23 cabinet nominees. A newcomer to government, Al Zaydi was the nominee of the Coordination Framework, a Shia coalition whose members won the most seats in Iraq’s November 2025 election.

After a post-election government formation process complicated by regional tensions and the spillover of the U.S./Israel-Iran conflict, Al Zaydi’s government faces questions about its strategic orientation, commitment to asserting state control over armed groups, and plans for averting conflict-amplified fiscal and energy crises. Under U.S.-Iraqi agreements, U.S. military forces have mostly withdrawn from central Iraq and consolidated in Iraq’s Kurdistan region. U.S.-Iraq security cooperation continues, including on efforts to secure more than 5,700 Islamic State (IS/ISIS) prisoners transferred to Iraq from Syria in 2026.

Since February 2026, Iran-backed Shia Iraqi armed groups have carried out hundreds of attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq and on civilian targets in the Kurdistan region and neighboring countries, drawing counterstrikes and intensifying pressure on Iraq to rein in Iran-backed militias. Al Zaydi’s ability to do so may be limited and contingent; the CF coalition that nominated him includes parties with ties to Iran-backed armed groups. Like his predecessors, Al Zaydi may be challenged in asserting Iraqi sovereignty while maintaining Iraq’s internal cohesion and balanced relations with competing neighbors and the United States.

Since 2014, Congress has appropriated more than $8.4 billion for counter-IS train and equip programs for Iraqis. The 119th Congress may consider developments in Iraq and Iraq’s relationships with its neighbors as Members review the Trump Administration’s FY2027 requests for security assistance, as well as proposals related to foreign aid, security, and Iraqi religious and ethnic minorities.

Background

Iraqis have persevered through intermittent wars, internal conflicts, sanctions, displacements, terrorism, and political unrest since the 1980s. The legacies of the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq continue to shape U.S.-Iraq relations: the invasion ended the decades-long, dictatorial rule of Saddam Hussein and the Baath Party but ushered in a long period of chaos, violence, and political transition. U.S. forces withdrew in 2011, but conflict in neighboring Syria and divisive sectarianism in Iraq enabled IS insurgents to seize and exploit much of northwestern Iraq from 2014 to 2018. U.S. military forces and coalition partners returned to Iraq in 2014 at the government of Iraq’s invitation to help defeat the Islamic State group. Iran’s influence in Iraq also grew during this period as several Iran-backed Shia militia groups mobilized. Some of these militias were later legally consolidated into Iraq’s security sector under the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), a state force with an estimated 238,000 personnel and a 2024 budget of about $3.4 billion.

Compared to earlier decades marred by conflict, relative stability and prosperity prevailed in Iraq from 2022 through 2025 under then-prime minister Mohammed Shia Al Sudani. Joint U.S.-Iraqi operations targeted IS remnants in remote areas, and IS threats diminished. As conflict inside Iraq receded, new economic opportunities emerged, but regional conflict and unresolved domestic issues threatened to undermine Iraq’s gains. The Sudani government rested on an uneasy partnership between most Shia Arab parties and major Sunni Arab and Kurdish parties that enacted expansive public spending laws. Political rivalry and national officials’ disputes with Kurdish leaders over security, energy, and revenue sharing limited government effectiveness. Intra-Kurdish divides have enabled national government efforts to re-centralize decisions and processes.

Sudani’s challenges now fall to Ali Al Zaydi. Unilateral foreign military operations in Iraq and Iraqi airspace by Israel, Iran, Turkey, and the United States have prompted nationalist demands to assert Iraq’s sovereignty. Iran-aligned Iraqi armed groups’ attacks contravene Iraqi law, invite retaliation, and jeopardize Iraq’s stated desire to cooperate with foreign partners. Iraq’s young, growing population creates economic promise and employment pressure. Fiscal dependence on oil export revenue persists and public sector hiring has grown, while regional conflict and domestic disputes have limited trade and energy output.

 
U.S.-Iran Conflict and U.S.-Iraq Ties

Conflicts involving Iran since 2023 have shaken Iraq’s security and have placed a spotlight on the future of Iran-backed armed groups in Iraq. Some of these groups have been integrated into the PMF, whose origins lie in the 2014-2018 war against the Islamic State. Others have remained outside the PMF, working alongside some PMF-integrated forces to oppose the continued presence in Iraq of U.S. and coalition forces and to occasionally or repeatedly attack U.S. forces in Iraq, national and Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) forces, and Iraq’s neighbors.


Following armed group attacks and U.S. counterstrikes during the 2023-2024 Israel-Hamas war, U.S. officials and the Sudani government agreed to end the presence in Iraq of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS during 2026, while U.S. forces relocated within and outside Iraq and refocused toward a bilateral security cooperation mission. While these plans were underway, the onset of Operation Epic Fury against Iran in February 2026 and the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Syria prompted an “accelerated transition and force realignment” by U.S. forces in Iraq and a sharp uptick in armed group attacks and U.S. counterstrikes, including some U.S. strikes that killed Iraqi security personnel. Clandestine military operations in Iraq’s deserts attributed to Israel and Iranian attacks on Iraq-based Iranian Kurdish groups both contribute to Iraqi sovereignty concerns.

The United States has demanded that Iraq take action to dismantle Iraqi armed groups that have attacked U.S. targets and civilian targets and infrastructure in Iraq and neighboring countries. Iraqi officials and legislators may consider proposals to alter the status of the PMF and its personnel or address PMF ties to specific armed groups. Prime Minister Al Zaydi may face political and diplomatic dilemmas, as the coalition that nominated him includes parties that have been tied to the PMF and armed groups and as Iraq’s security sector has sought continued U.S. support. Al Zaydi has welcomed decisions by some groups to disengage from the PMF and/or accede to state control of all arms. According to U.S. defense officials, U.S. plans for long term security cooperation with Iraq envision “counterterrorism-focused training, intelligence sharing, and episodic presence without permanent basing.” U.S. forces in Iraq now operate at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad and from the Kurdistan region.

Views from the Kurdistan Region

Iraqi Kurdish self-government developed after the 1991 Gulf War. In 1992, Iraqi Kurds established a joint administration between two main political movements—the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)—in areas under their control. Iraq’s constitution recognizes KRG federal authority in areas that were under Kurdish control as of March 2003. After a 2017 KRG referendum favoring independence, national forces reasserted control of some disputed territories.

The Erbil-based KDP and the Suleimaniyah-based PUK won the most seats in the October 2024 KRG regional election and are the largest Kurdish parties in Iraq’s parliament. Historic KDP-PUK tensions have resurged, delaying formation of a new KRG cabinet since the 2024 regional election. KDP leader and former KRG president Masoud Barzani remains influential; his nephew, Nechirvan, is KRG president, and his son, Masrour, is KRG prime minister. The KDP and PUK retain separate aligned militia and security units, despite U.S. efforts to help unify and depoliticize the KRG security sector.

The United States has cooperated with the KRG and has supported the resolution of long-standing KRG-Baghdad disputes over oil production, the budget, territory, and security. In September 2025, a KRG-Baghdad agreement conditionally resolved disputes that had delayed transfers of funds and contributed to serious KRG fiscal strains. Since 2022, Iraqi court rulings have reduced KRG autonomy, including rulings that have found the KRG oil and gas sector law unconstitutional, invalidated KRG electoral arrangements, and required the transfer of KRG revenue to national authorities for payment of KRG employees.

Iraq opposes Turkey’s unilateral military presence and operations in the Kurdistan region, where Turkish forces have targeted the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization. The PKK’s 2025 decision to disarm and steps taken to implement this decision could prompt future changes in Turkey’s posture.

U.S. Partnership and the 119th Congress

The U.S. Embassy in Baghdad and U.S. Consulate in Erbil have been attacked in 2026, but remain open. The U.S. Consulate in Basra closed in 2018. The position of U.S. Ambassador to Iraq is vacant, and Joshua Harris has served as chargé d’affaires A.I. since September 2025. On May 31, 2026, President Donald Trump named U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Tom Barrack as Special Presidential Envoy to Iraq.

Congress has authorized counter-IS train and equip programs for Iraq through 2026, and has appropriated related funds available through September 2027. The requestfor 2027 seeks nearly $119 million for Iraq’s military and Counter Terrorism Service, but does not seek funds for the KRG Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs (MoPA).

The Trump Administration’s 2025 foreign aid review ended some U.S. aid programs in Iraq and preserved others. The Trump Administration has not requested a specific amount of Foreign Military Financing foreign assistance for Iraq in FY2027, but seeks $900,000 to continue International Military Education and Training.

Members may conduct oversight and shape implementation of U.S. policy toward Iraq, including through consideration of the FY2027 defense authorization (H.R. 8800) and appropriations bills and other measures. The House Armed Services Committee-passed version of H.R. 8800 would limit most U.S. defense aid for Iraq until the Administration certifies that Iraq’s government has reduced the capacity of Iran-aligned armed groups and improved internal controls.About the author: Christopher M. Blanchard, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

Source: This article was published by the Congressional Research Service (CRS).

About CRS
The Congressional Research Service (CRS) works exclusively for the United States Congress, providing policy and legal analysis to committees and Members of both the House and Senate, regardless of party affiliation. As a legislative branch agency within the Library of Congress, CRS has been a valued and respected resource on Capitol Hill for nearly a century.
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BAN DEEP SEA MINING

China Expands Undersea Mapping To Gain Strategic Advantage And Secure Critical Resources – Analysis


Chinese survey ship Bei Dao 996 in an undated photo. (Jessn Ocean Equipment, RFA)


June 9, 2026 
Diálogo Américas
By Guillermo Saavedra

China is carrying out an expansive effort to strengthen its position across the world’s oceans, driven by both strategic military interests and the search for critical seabed resources. Recent investigations and maritime tracking data indicate that Beijing has deployed a broad network of underwater mapping and surveillance activities spanning the Pacific, Indian, and Arctic oceans. Analysts say the information collected could provide significant advantage in future maritime conflicts, particularly in submarine operations and undersea warfare.

A Reuters report indicates that the data being gathered includes detailed information on seabed conditions, underwater terrain, and oceanographic patterns that could support submarine navigation, underwater surveillance, and the identification of critical undersea infrastructure such as communications cables. Much of this activity is conducted through civilian research vessels, allowing China to expand its maritime data collection while attracting less international scrutiny.

One of the most closely watched examples is the Dong Fang Hong 3, operated by the Ocean University of China. During 2024 and 2025, the vessel traveled through waters near Taiwan, Guam, and strategic areas of the Indian Ocean. Although officially assigned to sediment and climate research, scientific publications linked to the vessel also documented extensive deep-sea mapping operations.


The information collected could improve China’s ability to operate submarines more effectively while enhancing its capacity to detect the presence of adversary vessels. “We know that China is mapping the seabed and fishery resources. Many vessels in its fishing fleet engage in activities beyond fishing, even serving as intelligence tools and paramilitary forces,” Argentine marine conservation specialist Milko Schvartzman told Diálogo.

According to Schvartzman, these activities are not new. In the South Atlantic, Chinese vessels have been linked to suspected unauthorized mapping activity near Argentina’s continental shelf, in addition to previous illegal fishing incidents involving Chinese fleets in the region.
Critical minerals on the ocean floor

China’s maritime ambitions extend beyond military considerations. Beijing is also seeking to secure access to strategic minerals found on the ocean floor — resources considered essential for advanced technology, renewable energy systems, and defense industries.

A joint investigation by CNN and Mongabay found that several Chinese vessels, publicly identified as fishing or scientific research ships, displayed operational patterns consistent with mineral exploration activities. Over the past five years, investigators tracked eight Chinese vessels linked to deep-sea mining exploration. According to the report, only 6 percent of their time at sea was spent within officially authorized exploration zones.

The investigation also documented cases in which vessels disabled their Automatic Identification System (AIS) to avoid detection. While these activities do not by themselves prove military involvement, analysts say they reflect China’s broader civil-military fusion strategy, which integrate civilian, scientific, and commercial capabilities into long-term national strategic objectives.

China currently holds or is linked to five of the 31 exploration contracts granted by the International Seabed Authority (ISA), the United Nations-affiliated body responsible for regulating mineral-related activities in international seabed areas. These contracts involve access to resources such as cobalt, copper, nickel, manganese, and rare earth elements — minerals increasingly important for battery production, electronics, advanced manufacturing, and military technologies.

“Strategic minerals such as manganese, essential for ferroalloys and special steels, can be found on the ocean floor,” civil engineer and metallurgy consultant Sergio Paredes told Diálogo. “Furthermore, copper, whose scarcity threatens to become a bottleneck for electromobility, is also found in these depths.”
Implications for Latin America

Latin America is not immune to these developments. In parts of the Southeast Pacific, including areas off the coast of Chile, studies have identified seabed mineral potential involving copper, manganese, and other strategic resources. Although large-scale extraction remains technologically complex and environmentally controversial, China continues investing heavily in technologies needed to expand deep-sea mining capabilities.

Argentina’s continental shelf has also drawn attention because of its relatively accessible maritime geography and the growing presence of Chinese distant-water fleets in the South Atlantic. Paredes warn that limited regulatory frameworks and challenging maritime oversight could create opportunities for unauthorized exploration or resource exploitation activities by China in the future.


Security experts also warn that seabed mapping activities could have implications for maritime domain awareness, the protection of undersea infrastructure, and the security of strategic maritime corridors and communications networks.
Dual threat: Scientific and military exploration

The growing body of evidence suggests that many of China’s maritime activities serve both scientific and strategic purposes. Experts say seabed mapping, oceanographic surveys, and the collection of fisheries data can all contribute to a broader effort to strengthen China’s long-term maritime posture.

Analysts also note that some operations continue to raise legal and sovereign concerns. As Schvartzman explained, conducting scientific studies or resource-related surveys in areas linked to another country’s maritime jurisdiction without authorization remains highly controversial.

For many governments and maritime-security specialists, the concern extends beyond environmental impact or commercial competition. What appears to be civilian scientific research may also be helping lay the groundwork for future geopolitical and military competition beneath the world’s oceans.

This article was published at Diálogo Américas

About Diálogo Américas
Diálogo Américas is a professional magazine published by U.S. Southern Command as an international forum for security issues in Latin America.
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Beached Arguments: Pete Hegseth, JD Vance And European Immigration – OpEd

June 9, 2026 
By Binoy Kampmark


Waxworks have nothing to say, but when incarnated in the form of former Fox News anchor and, at a pinch, “personality”, Pete Hegseth proves to be a marvel of sheer stupidity. It’s not that one cannot be provocative on matters of discomfort, teasing the political consciousness and prodding the sensitive. Immigration, and what makes it up, is a point of energetic disquiet in Europe, and a figure insisting on raising it is bound to add a spoke to the news cycle. But to do so in the fashion of the US Secretary of War, as he likes to be known as, was something else.

The speech, given at the Normandy American cemetery in Colleville-sur-Mer, was to commemorate the Normandy landings of June 6, 1944 to liberate Western Europe from Nazi German occupation. “Eighty-two years ago today, the survival of Western civilization hung in the balance. Dark forces had swept across Europe. Hitler boasted that his [coastal defensive] Atlantic Wall was impenetrable. But our enemy made a fatal miscalculation: they underestimated the unbreakable will of the American fighting man”.

He was not to confine himself to the heavily accented theme of American greatness. A contrast was in the offing. Western nations had become comfortably and dangerously complacent. “We forgot that freedom is not free. We forgot that peace is not wished into being. It is bought with purpose, with honor and with strength. The men who landed on these beaches knew this; the question we ask ourselves is, do we?” Examples of such complacency and wilful amnesia were offered. “Sadly, today, different European beaches are stormed by different dangerous ideologies,” he declared darkly. “Beaches in Spain, in Italy, in Greece and Bulgaria. Boats and men arrive. When will European capitals do something about that invasion?”

Only the previous day, US Vice President JD Vance had thought it appropriate to make a few choice remarks on British domestic politics and last year’s fatal stabbing of 18-year-old British student Henry Nowak, the victim of an attack in Southampton by Vickrum Digwa. Digwa, found guilty of murder and jailed for life with a minimum jail term of 21 years, had falsely claimed to have been the target of racial abuse, acting in self-defence. Nowak, on the subsequent release of police bodycam footage, was shown handcuffed and pleading before expiring.


In a social media post, Vance expansively observed that “Henry Nowak died the same way a civilization dies: abandoned, handcuffed by authorities who neither trusted nor cared for him, and accused of hate crimes he did not commit.” He would have lived had “the last few generations of European elites had stood their ground against the politics of self-hatred and the mass invasion of migrants, many of whom despite the West and the people who love it.” It would have taken a mere skimming exercise on the lengthy history and tradition of Sikhs and Sikhism in Britain (Digwa is British born) to have made a nonsense of Vance’s lashing remarks about European elites, but details are rarely sought on the rough and ready terrain of demagogy.

The remarks by Hegseth and Vance are consistent with the meddling approach of the second Trump administration towards its allies. Not only are they being repeatedly told to increase their military budgets, ostensibly to reduce their reliance on the teat of US security, they are chastised for their own policies in such areas as immigration. The 2025 National Security Strategy may have outlined proposals for “a ‘Trump Corollary’ to the Monroe Doctrine” namely “a Hemisphere whose governments cooperate with us against narco-terrorists, cartels, and other transnational criminal organizations”, one “free of hostile foreign incursion or ownership of key assets, and that supports critical supply chains” and ensured “continued access to key strategic locations.” But the document also noted the administration’s desire for “a world in which migration is not merely ‘orderly’ but one in which sovereign countries work together to stop rather than facilitate destabilizing population flows, and have full control over whom they do and do not admit.”


The NSS has various sour notes about “mass migration”, with a less than subtle stab at European states. Countries had seen the straining of domestic resources, “increased violence and other crime, weakened social cohesion, distorted labor markets” and the subversion of national security. Then comes a nasty sigh on civilisational decline, somewhat in keeping with the pessimistic though less detailed tone of Oswald Spengler’s Der Untergang Des Abendlandes (The Decline of the West). Not only did European countries risk being reliable allies, economically or militarily; here lay the prospect of morphological twilight, an eventual “civilizational erasure” steered by “the activities of the European Union and other transnational bodies” that served to, among other things, undermine political freedoms, suppress political opposition and impose incoherent migration policies. “We want Europe to remain European, to regain its civilizational self-confidence, and to abandon its failed focus on regulatory suffocation.” A big boo to those swarthy types seeking admission to the exclusive club – certainly via the beaches.

Interestingly enough, Hegseth and his colleagues remain blithely ignorant of the onerous restrictions many states within the European Union have imposed on irregular arrivals, with the promise of a more consistently harsh approach. The two-year transition phase of the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, which concludes on June 12, is intended to standardise the framework for migration, the seeking of asylum, the control of borders and integration. The European Commission hopes that the more uniform system will serve to deter irregular migrants, distribute the processing burden between the states with greater equity, and stave off such crises as took place in 2015-2016. Whether this resolves the issue of wealthier member states actually accepting more asylum seekers remains a thorny issue. Taking Denmark’s crude example, little can be expected on that score.

The Pact has certainly done nothing to impress human rights groups. In April 2024, Eve Geddie, Amnesty International’s Head of European Institutions Office and Director of Advocacy gave it a less than glowing assessment. The “package of proposals shamefully risks subjecting more people, including families with children, to de facto detention at EU borders; denying them a fair and full assessment of their protection needs.” The proposals would also encourage “new emergency measures that will put countless people at risk of pushbacks, arbitrary detention, and destitution at European borders.”

These measures, overwhelmingly slanted towards framing the management of migration in terms of collective European security hardly, suggest a soft, permissive approach to those arrivals apparently intent on upending the apple cart of European civilisation. But when it comes to scrutinising the minutiae of detail on policies, Hegseth, Vance and their goons can never be accused of being too thorough.

About Binoy Kampmark

Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge. He lectures at RMIT University, Melbourne. Email: bkampmark@gmail.com

View all posts by Binoy Kampmark →

 

Nokia Unveils Deepfield Genome Shield To Strengthen DDoS Defense In The AI Era

 June 9, 2026  

By Eurasia Review

Nokia announced Tuesday the launch of Nokia Deepfield Genome Shield, the industry’s first security automation system that delivers proactive, always-on DDoS protection for telecommunications providers, hosting companies, internet exchange points, and cloud builders in the AI era. Genome Shield addresses the fundamental shift in DDoS threats driven by the emergence of residential proxy botnets, which now comprise approximately 200 million compromised devices worldwide. 

The DDoS threat landscape has shifted over the past 12 months, Nokia said, noting that attacks now come from real subscriber devices, deliver multi-terabit bursts that last seconds to minutes, and rapidly rotate IPs across thousands of nodes. Residential proxy botnets — estimated at 250–600 Tbps – are used to dynamically leverage large numbers of residential users who are unaware their connections are used to generate evasive attacks impacting many national networks. Traditional scrubber-based diversion and reactive mitigation can’t respond quickly enough to these sub-minute attacks. Automated, AI-driven DDoS has industrialized the residential proxy supply chain used by botnets like Kimwolf, while AI-assisted code generation is accelerating the evolution of evasion techniques, the company said.

Nokia said its Deepfield Genome Shield introduces a new class of proactive, network-wide security automation that extends Deepfield Defender to address previously unaddressable use cases. The solution has been shaped through close engagement with customers and the wider security community as part of ongoing efforts to combat DDoS and botnet-driven threats. It shifts protection from reactive mitigation to proactive enforcement leveraging existing network infrastructure. Genome Shield aggregates continuously updated threat intelligence from multiple sources, including Nokia Deepfield Secure Genome® (spanning over five billion internet endpoints), GDTA telemetry, and Deepfield’s cyber range, where live malware and botnet command-and-control (C2s) generate real-time insights. All of this intelligence is compiled in Deepfield Defender into automated DDoS policies and enforced as a security shield across the network.

“Protecting our infrastructure from inbound DDoS attacks while managing compromised subscriber devices requires carrier-grade automation. By implementing Nokia Deepfield Genome Shield, we have transitioned from reactive, manual workflows to a proactive, unified security platform. Disrupting botnet command-and-control at the network edge, before attacks hit, ensures maximum uptime and clean traffic. This deployment guarantees that when clients connect to Reddot, they are choosing a network engineered for absolute security and peace of mind,” said Charlie Attoum, Network Infrastructure Director at Reddot.

“The past year has fundamentally changed DDoS security. Residential proxy botnets have invalidated 25 years of assumptions about how attacks work and how to defend against them. The hard problem today is maintaining dynamic, massive IP threat feeds and enforcing protection against them in real time, at network scale, continuously and automatically. Genome Shield is the industry’s answer to that challenge. It combines several intelligence sources, including our unique cyber range and Secure Genome’s visibility into more than five billion internet endpoints, with automated policy compilation and enforcement across the entire network. For the more than 1,000 hosting companies, service providers, and internet exchange points that face this new generation of threats, Genome Shield delivers the commercial, scalable answer,” said Jeff Smith, Vice-President and General Manager of Nokia Deepfield.

Genome Shield extends Deepfield Defender’s existing DDoS countermeasure portfolio with network-wide automated enforcement, organized across four pillars: Botnet C2 Disruption, which blocks command-and-control communications so attacks cannot be launched; DDoS Policers, which suppress amplification and volumetric traffic through proactive rate limiting; Custom Policies, enabling user-defined rules via open APIs for easy integration; and Observability, providing dashboards for compromised devices, botnet endpoints, and emerging security trends.

Genome Shield requires Nokia Deepfield Defender and is compatible with both router-based edge mitigation and with the Nokia 7750 Defender Mitigation System (DMS) for dedicated L4-L7 DDoS scrubbing. It supports on-premises, cloud-based (SaaS), and hybrid deployment models with flexible pay-as-you-grow licensing.

Initial capabilities of Genome Shield have already been introduced within Nokia Deepfield Defender and are in use by customers today. Additional features will be rolled out throughout 2026, the company said.