Sunday, November 15, 2026

 

Volkswagen targets record 9% rate of return by 2030 despite crisis


15.11.2026, 

Photo: Julian Stratenschulte/dpa

Volkswagen chief executive Oliver Blume has set ambitious targets for his struggling carmaker, telling Germany's mass-circulation Bild newspaper that he wants to sell 9 million vehicles worldwide by 2030 with a 9% rate of return.

"We have never achieved that before in the history of the Volkswagen Group," Blume said, referring to the return on investment. Bild published the interview on Sunday.

The 9 million figure is just over the 8.98 million vehicles that the company delivered worldwide last year. For that year, the operating margin was 2.8%.

This year, the latest forecast suggests that at most 1% of sales will remain as operating profit.

In the interview, Blume also defended the carmaker's planned cuts of more than 100,000 jobs across the group. "That is not a radical blow of the kind that is sometimes written about," he said.

The company has initiated extensive cuts as it struggles with increasing Chinese competition, high costs, falling car prices and US tariffs.

Blume said the group was "spending billions, including on severance agreements." He added that personnel costs at German sites were "roughly twice as high as in other European countries."

The executive expressed optimism about the company's prospects in China, which he said is "not a lost market." Blume said VW was now producing there at Chinese costs. The car market in China has slumped by 20% this year, and prices have fallen 15% within two years, he said.

 

Germany's key skilled trades sector fears 80,000 job losses per year


15.11.2026

Photo: Michael Kappeler/dpa

The crisis in Germany's skilled trades sector is worsening despite more favourable growth forecasts, the president of the German Confederation of Skilled Trades said on Sunday.

"Our business climate index is at the level of the coronavirus pandemic, investment has fallen to the level of the financial crisis," Jörg Dittrich told newspapers of the Funke Media Group.

He warned that, if nothing was done to counter this, the trade sector would "lose between 70,000 and 80,000 jobs a year." He added that more than 150,000 jobs had already been lost in the sector over the past two years.

Skilled trades are a key part of the German economy and cover jobs ranging from construction and electrical positions to food production and health and personal care jobs.

Silent death of businesses

"Many business owners lack confidence, others simply lack the financial means. And then they shut up shop," Dittrich said.

The sector was experiencing a "silent death of businesses." The high cost of living was also putting skilled trades workers under pressure.

"Anyone who spends a lot at the petrol station is more inclined to think twice about having one fewer haircut or buying one fewer cake or piece of jewellery," he added.

To halt the trend, Dittrich called for a reduction in non-wage labour costs and for the coalition to push through its promised electricity tax cut for the trades. 

He warned that successful vocational training programmes were at risk of being cut. 

"It is undignified how the trades sector is being treated."

More than 1,500 migrants reach Canary Islands in single day

15.11.2026,

Photo: Antonio Sempere/EUROPA PRESS/dpa

By Emilio Rappold, dpa

More than 1,500 migrants arrived in the Canary Islands in a single day, the highest daily figure since records began, Spanish state broadcaster RTVE reported on Sunday, citing rescue services.

The vast majority arrived on the small island of El Hierro, where 13 boats carrying migrants reached the island on Saturday alone, it reported. One additional boat each arrived on Gran Canaria and Tenerife, the report said.

On Sunday, at least four more boats reached El Hierro, with the number of people on board initially unclear. 

At least 120 of the roughly 1,500 newcomers on Saturday were minors, RTVE reported, citing the authorities. They are mainly from Senegal, Gambia, Mauritania and Guinea. The Atlantic crossing can take up to a week - if all goes well.

A sad record

The RTVE report spoke of a "sad record." The previous daily high for the Canaries was 1,461 rescued people, recorded on November 7, 2020. At the time, arrivals were concentrated on Gran Canaria.

The situation is currently particularly tense on El Hierro, an island with just over 12,000 residents.

Since the start of the month, El Hierro has received more than 9,000 migrants on 91 boats. The Spanish government has therefore declared a migration emergency for the island.

Canary Islands President Fernando Clavijo on Sunday demanded the immediate implementation of aid pledges agreed with Madrid. These include additional accommodation, better medical care and faster transfers of migrants to other islands and the Spanish mainland.

Migration route to the Canaries - one of the most dangerous

The Canary route is one of the most dangerous migration routes to Europe. 

According to the Spanish aid organization Caminando Fronteras, which has strong networks in Africa, at least 635 people died in the first five months of this year while trying to reach the group of islands, located about 100 kilometres off the north-western coast of the African continent.

The Canary Islands record the most migrant arrivals of any other Spanish region. However, arrivals had fallen by just over 5% compared with the same period last year, to 13,327 between January and the end of October, figures from the Interior Ministry show.

Spanish media attribute the sharp increase in arrivals in recent weeks to a worsening social and economic crisis in Senegal.

 

Inverse Flows

The end of one lucrative trade from Europe to West Africa led to the creation of another. For product carriers, it was a bonanza.

Refinery

(Article originally published in Sept/Oct 2026 edition.)

I nearly titled this article "End of an ARA," meaning (A)msterdam, (R)otterdam and (A)ntwerp, the three cities that were for many decades responsible for the European trade in blended fuels destined for West Africa.

It was a big business, for as long as it lasted. In 2023, Europe exported 1.3 million barrels of gasoline per day (b/d) with a third of that going to West African buyers, according to Kpler. The trade was valued at $17 billion by Argus, a price intelligence provider.

The fuel was dismissively called "African quality" because it didn't live up to the aspirations of European environmentalists. It sometimes had 1,500 parts per million (ppm) of sulfur (compared with the 10 ppm permitted at European pumps), and it could be mixed with benzene, manganese octane-boosters and similarly hazardous additives.

While not permitted to be sold in Europe, such fuels could be exported.

That was true until 2023 when the Dutch passed a ban, eliminating Amsterdam and Rotterdam. That left Antwerp. Then Belgium joined the ban in 2024. With that, ARA ended. By September 2024, the three cities were still drip-feeding 150,000 b/d to West Africa. And the infrastructure? Well, it was fine – the refineries and ports, anyway. More on that shortly.

But what ended the "African quality" trade was not the Dutch and Belgian bans.

The Real Story

No, while Europe cleaned up its act, the real story was unfolding in Africa. In January 2024, billionaire Aliko Dangote, Africa's richest man and the CEO of Dangote Group, opened his new behemoth refinery in Lekki, near Lagos, Nigeria's largest city.

He started planning it in 2013 with help from China's National Chemical Engineering Company and Engineers India Limited, two state-owned firms that had been hired, respectively, to build and manage the project. The Lekki refinery would ultimately cost more than $19 billion. It required stabilizing a 2,600-hectare swampland and building a private port for equipment deliveries like 150,000 tons of prefabricated steel from Hangxiao Steel Structure and boilers and furnaces from India.

The Lekki refinery began with diesel and jet fuel. In fact, its first European cargo, shipped on 27 May 2024 to (ironically) Rotterdam, was 45,000 tons of jet fuel on the Greek MR product carrier Doric Breeze. Gasoline followed in September 2024, the same month Belgium's ban took effect. Two years later, in addition to exporting to Europe and the rest of West Africa, Lekki could satisfy 87 percent of Nigeria's domestic gasoline demand, according to Nigeria's own downstream regulator.

BIMCO reported that from "April to May [of 2026], Western Africa's clean petroleum product (CPP) imports fell 44 percent year on year," reflected in a 47 percent drop in vessel ton-miles.

But the new refinery was not the only factor rearranging origins and destinations.

In 2025, Europe imported "more than half of all its jet fuel from the Middle East," according to S&P. With war between the U.S. and Iran and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz in February 2026, those sources became unavailable. Purchases from India were interrupted because of E.U. sanctions targeting Russian-origin crude oil. India's refiners had made a business of buying it, refining it and selling it to Europe.

The Lekki refinery became the largest exporter of jet fuel to Europe in June and July of 2026. U.S. Gulf refineries (collectively) came in second.

Inverted Trade Flows

Europe's fuel mix became decidedly Atlantic. That meant shorter routes but fuller holds, i.e., fewer voyages on ballast. How are ships dealing with all of this?

Let's look at three of the affected vessel categories: LR1s, LR2s and MRs.

LR1s are "small" (Panamax) product tankers between 60,000 and 79,999 deadweight tons (dwt). LR2s are large (Aframax) product tankers between 80,000 dwt and 120,000 dwt. (Yes, there are even larger tankers, but they ordinarily carry crude, not refined products.) Then come MRs: smaller, versatile ships of between 40,000 and 55,000 dwt.

Before the Lekki refinery, "clean" tankers (the ones carrying refined products) would load at ARA and then unload in West Africa. They would sail back to Europe empty. Meanwhile, "dirty" tankers (the ones carrying unrefined crude) would haul their cargo from West Africa to Europe's refineries and sail back empty to Africa.

But tankers do not care whether they are bringing cargo from Europe to Nigeria or from Nigeria to Europe. A full hold is a full hold, whatever the direction.

MRs now travel in a square, not a triangle. They load product in the U.S. Gulf, then head to West Africa. There, they can load jet fuel or another product from the Lekki refinery. They haul that north to Europe. There, often at ARA, ships can sometimes pick up what little remains of the blended fuels African trade. The only side of the "square" that ships have to sail empty is from West Africa back to the U.S. Gulf.

This is working well. Kpler says that MRs' ton-miles have been consistently positive since July 2025.

LR1s were well-suited to the ARA-West Africa trade. Their West African ton-miles fell 88 percent, the worst of any class, but they've long been diversely employed "in trades between the U.S. Gulf and Asia, as well as on transatlantic routes," as Haiying Jia and Zhenming Wu stated this February in an article in the Journal of Transport Geography.

And the best for last: LR2s. In July 2026, an LR2 vessel that had earned $144,600 per day earlier in the year would be on a "downward curve with averages for June sitting at $72,700/day" for the same vessel, though these earnings are still "very healthy." For comparison, in 2025 LR2 earnings per day moved consistently in a narrow band between roughly $30-40,000.

We're holding back our tears.

Declining Output

And the European refineries, as I promised?

Shell, BP, ExxonMobil and Vitol operate at Rotterdam while Antwerp features TotalEnergies and ExxonMobil. "Very clearly," said President of Shell Nederland Frans Everts in April 2026, "every refinery in Europe is on what we call max jet mode," serving Europe's thirsty airlines.

Nonetheless, since 2009, Europe has lost about 30 of its refineries. Seventy-three still operate. This has less to do with West African competition or changes in buyer habits and more to do with plants reaching end of life.

Most of Europe's refineries were built in the 1960s and 1970s. They're ancient. The result? The U.K.'s Petroineos Grangemouth refinery, as one example, used to refine 150,000 bpd and was converted last year to a petroleum products import terminal.

Few European investors are willing to risk their capital on a new European oil refinery. Their focus is on clean energy like hydrogen and biofuels. "Europe is unlikely to build another conventional refinery on the scale of Pernis or Rotterdam. […] The continent's largest sites will require billions of dollars in cumulative spending to remain safe, reliable and commercially relevant. Some investments will extend the life of conventional units," EPCIntel says.

Europe is doubling down on its current refineries, if they're viable.

Africa Rising

Meanwhile, Aliko Dangote has announced a second refinery in Kenya at a cost of $15 billion. This one will process 700,000 bpd – another Lekki on the opposite African coast.

At least Kenya is far enough for the tankers to stretch their legs. And it's good to have two alternatives to the Strait of Hormuz, even when they both answer to one man.

Erik Kravets is a maritime lawyer whose law firm is based in Cuxhaven, Germany. He is a frequent contributor to the online Maritime Executive Newsletter and has lectured at the State Maritime College of Cuxhaven and at Bremerhaven University of Applied Sciences.

The opinions expressed herein are the author's and not necessarily those of The Maritime Executive.

 

A Wave of New Deep Seaport Projects Catches on in West Africa

Groundbreaking ceremony for the Bakassi port complex in Cross River State, Nigeria (Gov. Bassey Otu)
Groundbreaking ceremony for the Bakassi port complex in Cross River State, Nigeria (Gov. Bassey Otu)

The Asia-Africa trade lane has been one of the fastest-growing container shipping corridors globally in the past few years. The growth is supported by soaring import demand in Africa as countries in the region develop industrial capacity. Unfortunately, the surging imports have put a strain on old port infrastructure, especially in West Africa. To catch up, governments in the region are fast-tracking approval processes for deep-water port projects.

In the past week, Nigeria and Ghana have made significant progress in their port expansion efforts. After a decades-long wait, Nigeria is moving ahead with the construction of the Bakassi Deep Seaport in Cross River State. A groundbreaking ceremony was held on Friday, led by the country's Vice President, Kashim Shettima.

The port project was initially conceived in 2014 but was delayed by a slow regulatory process. With a proposed draft of 20 meters, the facility is set to become one of Nigeria's deepest ports. Currently, Nigeria is unable to accommodate ultra-large container vessels, as its major ports have shallow-water access. This has seen Nigerian-bound cargo transhipped through Lomé in Togo and Tema in Ghana.

Speaking at the groundbreaking ceremony, Nigerian Ports Authority (NPA) CEO Abubakar Dantsoho recognized Nigeria's need to match economic growth with port modernization. Nigeria's main trade gateway, Apapa Port, is approximately 100 years old. To keep up with the evolving demands of international shipping, Nigeria needs to urgently modernise its existing brownfield ports while simultaneously developing greenfield deep-sea ports, added Dantsoho.

The Bakassi port project is estimated to cost $3.5 billion, backed by a facility from the African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank). An initial funding approval of $2.27 billion has already been made. The project will be delivered through a Public-Private Partnership arrangement.

Bakassi is one of the five deep seaports that Nigeria's government has approved. The other port projects include Badagry Deep Water Port in Lagos State, Olokola Port in Ondo State, Ibom Port in Akwa Ibom State and Bonny Port in Rivers State.

Meanwhile, Ghana has reportedly shortlisted seven companies to bid for the development of Keta port, the country's third commercial seaport. The selected firms will help finalize the project's design studies, as well as propose a financing model. The government did not reveal the names of the selected firms.

The proposed Keta port is expected to complement the existing Tema and Takoradi ports. Tema acts as Ghana's main import port, specifically for container shipping. Takoradi, on the other hand, handles bulk exports including cocoa, bauxite and manganese. Last week, the government launched construction of a new berth in Takoradi. The new facility, Berth 19, will enhance Takoradi's capacity at a time when cargo volume is rising. The berth project will cost $98 million, financed fully by the Ghana Ports and Harbours Authority (GPHA). The berth will be 300 meters long, with capacity to handle vessels of up to 75,000 dwt.

 

Arabian Sea Ports are Booming as the Conflict Drags On

Port of Salalah (file / handout image courtesy Maersk)
Port of Salalah (file / handout image courtesy Maersk)

As the conflict in the Gulf continues, with shipping disrupted in the Strait of Hormuz, logistics companies are not waiting for the war to end and for peace to break out, but are instead adapting to the new risk realities. The world of commerce is always looking for new shipping and logistics routes to overcome obstacles, each striving for better ways of doing business than those offered by rivals and competitors.

In many respects, private enterprise is better at finding cost- and time-optimized solutions than government planners, tending to uncover better solutions more quickly than any government-led initiative would. The best solutions in these circumstances tend to be where private enterprise identifies the need, develops a new trade route, and then seeks government help to speed things up, removing obstacles and bureaucratic delays.

AD Ports Group and Gulftainer operate the ports on the UAE's Gulf of Oman coast, at Fujairah, Khor Fakkan and Dibba. TEU traffic from these ports to inland distribution centers, in particular Jebel Ali, has reached about 3,500 TEU per day, representing a 30% increase in traffic within 3Q26 alone. Since the war began in earnest, DP World has moved more than 1 million TEUs from Emirati east coast ports to Jebel Ali.

Inevitably, facilities built for smaller throughput have struggled to handle these volumes, and DP World is planning to build new container-handling and cargo facilities on the east coast at Al Rugaylat and Dibba. But in the meantime, ships are now having to wait for berths off Fujairah for about 9 days, with a further 15 days to get containers off the dockside. Such delays add massively to transportation costs, and these anchorages are also vulnerable to shorter-range IRGC drones.

Besides being farther away from IRGC drone launch sites, port facilities 'round the corner' on the Arabian Sea are faring better, because the ports in Duqm and Salalah were built to cater to substantial planned increases in traffic, and therefore have spare capacity immediately available. At the end of October, waits offshore at Duqm averaged 3 days.

Asyad, the Omani shipping and logistics group, is capitalizing on Duqm's advantages by introducing a green corridor from Duqm to AD Ports Group's Al Khalifa Port via the Khatm al Shiklah border crossing and the Al Ain Dry Port, with movements covered by an integrated customs clearance procedure. CMA CGM has operated a regular container service to Duqm since December 2025. The Duqm-Khalifa Port green corridor complements a similar green corridor that Asyad already operates between Sohar and Jebel Ali.

Even before the war, the port of Salalah, managed day-to-day for the present by A.P. Moller-Maersk, was enjoying substantial growth. It has been very busy as a major global transshipment hub, ranking third globally (and first in the Arab world) in the S&P Global Container Port Performance Index. Waits off Salalah are minimal, currently measured in hours. In the first half of 2026, 2.33 million TEUs were handled, an increase of 15% over the same period last year.

Also a surprising beneficiary of increased trade and changing traffic flows has been the port of Khasab on the Musandam peninsula. Being in the middle of the southern side of the Strait of Hormuz, Khasab might be thought to have suffered from a loss of shipping, and very little appears in AIS signals. But with guidance from Hutchison, the operator of the port at Sohar, and notwithstanding the war, tonnage shipped through the port has increased by 7% this year, carried generally on smaller coastal feeder ships, and mostly re-exported immediately to Ras al Khaimah and the UAE's northern emirates.

Houthis Recapture Positions Overlooking the Bab el Mandeb

Houthi positions as of Nov. 15, 2026 (CJRC / Google Maps)
Houthi positions as of Nov. 15, 2026 (CJRC / Google Maps)

Fighting between the Houthis and forces of the Internationally Recognized Government (IRG) has continued without major advances or retreats on the Yemeni battlefield in recent weeks – until the IRG announced on November 15 that it was withdrawing from the Dhubab Airfield and the Bab el Mandeb area, leaving the Houthis free to once again occupy the Ras Menhali peninsula and Perim Island, dominating the southern entrance to the Red Sea.

The IRG explained that its withdrawal was prompted by the need to redeploy forces to defend Aden, giving a clear indication not only that the Houthis have made progress towards Aden from the northwest, but also that they may be tightening their siege of Taiz to the north. For several weeks now, the vital resupply route from Aden to Taiz has been threatened at its southern end, with access to Taiz only possible by using mountain tracks.

The surrender of the Bab el Mandeb back to the Houthis is a major reverse, and for the moment it appears that the IRG does not have the forces necessary to contest the recapture and mount a counter-attack. Possession of Perim Island in particular enables the Houthis to use a wider variety of means to control traffic in the Bab el Mandeb, the narrowest part of the Red Sea, and also traffic using the Maritime Security Transit Corridor (MSTC).

Rather than merely firing drones and missiles at passing ships from afar, the Houthis will now be able to use armed speedboats to attack and board ships, making it a much more practical operation to close down traffic. This they may wish to do at the prompting of the IRGC, which still maintains a mentoring on-the-ground presence alongside its Houthi allies, and at a time when the naval blockade of Iranian ships and ports is creating major internal pressures within Iran.

In recent weeks, the Houthis have not sought to exploit their tactical successes by shutting down general traffic in the Red Sea, instead proclaiming their intent only to target Saudi and Israeli-associated shipping. This has persuaded the United States, the European Union and major shipping lines to accept that the Houthis have no desire to disrupt shipping in the long term, and container lines have once again resumed using the Red Sea route.

However, the Houthis are desperately short of finance, and they see the potential to use the Bab el Mandeb to raise revenue, often quoting as a precedent the fees charged by Egypt on ships using the Suez Canal. The nations dependent on the use of the Red Sea as a major shipping route appear not to have considered that the Houthis may not be acting in good faith, and are merely waiting to act until they have consolidated their positions elsewhere in Yemen. Hence the EUNAVFOR Operation Aspides remains a force able only to mount occasional merchant ship escorts, and is not configured for more than limited defensive operations should the Houthis choose to tighten their control of the Red Sea.


Yemeni government allies pull back from key strait as Houthis advance

15.11.2026, 

Photo: Osamah Yahya/dpa

By dpa correspondents

Fighters allied with Yemen's government and Saudi Arabia said on Sunday they were repositioning their troops away from the key Bab al-Mandab strait after an advance by Houthi rebels.

The southern forces said protecting the "threatened" port city of Aden, where the government currently has its seat, and neighbouring provinces had priority. The move also aims to end the Houthi siege of the important city of Taiz.

Sources close to the internationally recognized government said the allied fighters there had almost been encircled by the Houthis and had therefore been forced to withdraw.

An adviser to President Rashad al-Alimi told the pan-Arab newspaper Asharq Al-Awsat, however, that the move was a planned military step that should be understood not as a withdrawal but as a redeployment of troops.

The civil war in Yemen, which has been running for more than 10 years, escalated again this year. The Houthis are fighting the government, which is backed by local militias and Saudi Arabia.

Houthi rebels advanced along the western coast in a lightning offensive and captured the port city of Mokha near Bab al-Mandab.

Lying between the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa, Bab al-Mandab is the shortest sea route between Europe and Asia. In normal times, around 10% of global seaborne trade and 30% of global container traffic pass through the waterway. Shipping in the strait had come under severe pressure in late 2023 from threats and attacks by the Houthi militia.

The withdrawal of the southern forces could allow the Houthis to gain even more control over the Bab al-Mandab. The government has launched a counteroffensive in response to the new fighting, but has so far failed to push the Houthis back decisively, even with help from Saudi airstrikes on militia targets.

The Houthis have increasingly targeted Saudi Arabia in recent weeks in response. On Sunday evening, the militia again claimed responsibility for an attack on the airport and financial centre in Riyadh. The Houthis said the targets had been hit by two ballistic missiles, according to the Saba news agency, which is controlled by the militia. There was no initial confirmation from Saudi Arabia.


 

Flash Flood Warning in Nepal Came Far Too Late. How Could it be Improved?

 Pascal Egli conducting fieldwork at a weather station on a glacier. Photo: Gotheca/NTNU
Flash flood engulfs a Chinese checkpoint on the Nepali border, Aug. 2026 (Chinese social media)

[By Sølvi Normannsen]

At least 1,455 people are confirmed dead following the flood disaster in Nepal on 26 August. Over 5,000 more are missing. Fourteen power stations and 38 schools were completely or partially destroyed, while 68 bridges and 42 kilometers of roadway were washed away.

Staggering scale

“The scale of the tragedy is immense and overwhelming. This is likely the greatest disaster we have seen in the Himalayas in decades. The videos we have seen show that this is a type of event that is extremely difficult to predict or issue warnings for,” says Pascal Emanuel Egli, a glaciologist and associate professor at NTNU.

Egli is an expert in geophysics and glacier hydrology. He works on numerous international projects concerning natural hazards and water resources related to permafrost, snowmelt, and glaciers.

Researcher friend lost his entire village

Egli monitored the disaster in Nepal closely after the tragedy. Updates from international research colleagues arrived in his inbox several times an hour: analyses, seismic data, new satellite photos, aerial and drone imagery, and data logs from whatever monitoring equipment remains along the riverbed.

The NTNU researcher has conducted fieldwork in the region on several occasions. He has also visited the area in Nepal that has been hardest hit. A friend and fellow researcher, who currently works abroad, is from a village that has been completely wiped out by the mudflow.

20 kilometers in seven minutes

On Wednesday 26 August, at 08:37, the disaster began at an altitude of over 5,000 meters in the Rasuwa region, along the border between Nepal and Chinese-controlled Tibet. According to Egli, the event was likely triggered when the mountain slope next to the glacier collapsed, taking part of the glacier with it.

A massive block of the glacier terminus collapsed and fell hundreds of metres straight down. The debris then surged onward and into the Trishuli River at breakneck speed.

“The flash flood raced 20 kilometers down the river course in the first seven minutes. The warning from the authorities arrived at 0900, 23 minutes after the glacier collapse. Approximately 623,000 people received an SMS alert about the approaching disaster. By then, it was far too late for many of them. The warning only reached people living furthest downstream,” says Egli.

What role did the glacier play?

The massive landslide was initially registered as an earthquake. Between 100 and 250 million cubic metres of rock, ice, and soil were set in motion. Together, they formed a wall of debris that moved at up to 170–190 kilometres per hour at its peak speed, smashing everything in its path.

“Experts are currently debating what actually triggered the disaster. The landslide itself was massive. Geological factors may be to blame. But the question also remains as to what role the glacier played,” says the NTNU researcher.

Glaciers melt, natural hazards arise

Egli has conducted fieldwork on alpine glaciers in Norway, Switzerland, Chile, Pakistan, India, and Nepal. He currently leads NTNU’s contribution to the major EU project CryoSCOPE (CRYOsphere Science Concluding in new Observations and Productive Exploitation). Researchers from nine countries and twenty research institutions are investigating the impact of climate change on hydrology, on snow and retreating glaciers, and on the natural hazards that can arise as a result.

Mountain lost its structural support

Egli explains that the Himalayan glacier in question has been retreating for years due to climate change. Part of the mountainside had been supported by the glacier for thousands of years. As the glacier melts, that support for the mountain is disappearing.

“In addition, large quantities of meltwater may have exacerbated the instability already present in the mountain.”

The third factor is permafrost, which acts much like a glue holding the rock mass together. As temperatures rise, the permafrost degrades. According to Egli, this can also reduce the mountain’s stability.

Climate and natural hazards

Drawing on field studies from Norway and Switzerland, Egli’s CryoSCOPE group aims to contribute further knowledge regarding glacial hydrology – specifically water flow from melting glaciers and outburst floods. The latter are also known by the Icelandic term jøkullaup, or Glacier Lake Outburst Floods in English. They originate from lakes formed by glacial ice, meltwater, and precipitation. Glacial lakes can drain in a matter of hours, and these outbursts can cause extensive damage as they surge downstream.

Climate-driven or geological instability?

It was not an outburst flood that caused this disaster, contrary to what many people had assumed. Egli notes that some researchers believe the event was less about climate impact and more about purely geological instability.

“Others – perhaps the majority of people – believe the timing and massive scale suggest that multiple mechanisms were at play simultaneously. There appears to be a broad consensus that melting and warming have accelerated, destabilizing the mountain massif surrounding the glacier.”

The challenge of early warning

Egli is also launching a project in collaboration with Swiss and Indian colleagues. The project will take place in Ladakh, India, with the aim of establishing a cost-effective system for monitoring and providing early warnings of natural hazards.

“The early warning technology itself often works well. However, the risk of failure increases if the scale of an event is massive. Training the local population on how the systems operate can also be a challenge,” he says.

System collapse

Researchers from Nepalese universities and research institutions raise critical questions in a situation report: “Why did we fail to foresee the risk? Why did our warning system not work? Why were the consequences for lives, livelihoods, and infrastructure so severe? And, most importantly: What could we have done differently to reduce such losses?”

Egli refers to a research forum he is part of, which reveals that while the authorities have some measures in place regarding early warning and monitoring, significant failures exist. A memo seen by Gemini states that “the system is collapsing in several ways”.

Standard SMS alerts about floods and high water levels are sent out but lack concrete advice on what people should do. Responsibility is unevenly distributed among local, regional, and national authorities.

Low trust level in researchers and authorities

Furthermore, people in local communities have little trust in either researchers or the authorities. Many openly admit to having ignored warnings in the past. Some only take action when they see for themselves that “something’s happening in the river”, or when a danger alert comes from someone they trust in the village. Many initiatives intended to improve this situation stall once external funding runs out. Training and technical maintenance are not sustained.

Much remains unknown

This region of the Himalayas alone has thousands of glaciers and glacial lakes, raising the question of what lies ahead as the planet warms.

“The number of glacial lakes has increased as glaciers retreat. This is dangerous, but fortunately we know a lot about their locations; almost all of them have been mapped. What we know less about–and need to investigate more–is the stability of the moraines damming these lakes,” Egli says.

NTNU’s glacier expert notes that there is still a lot that we do not know, like how much permafrost the moraine contains. Consequently, we don’t know if or when they might collapse. We also lack information about subglacial lakes, unstable mountain slopes and moraines that could trigger landslides.

Where did all the water come from?

The flash flood in the Himalayas carried between 100 and 250 million cubic meters of rock and ice. According to Egli, one of the mysteries is why such enormous volumes of water were released in such a short time. Why didn’t the water lose momentum when the terrain levelled out after approximately seven kilometers, instead continuing with nearly the same violent force and speed?

He speculates aloud. Perhaps part of the explanation lies in the significant drop in elevation and the fact that the meltwater originated not only from beneath the glacier but also partly from within the mountain itself. On its way down, the mass of rock and ice encountered “dead ice” – remnants of another glacier – and may have melted it.

“But that is just a hypothesis. We still have a lot to figure out.”

Originally published in Norwegian, by Sølvi W. Normannsen – 2 September, 2026. It appears here courtesy of Gemini News and may be found in its original form here. 

The opinions expressed herein are the author's and not necessarily those of The Maritime Executive.