LA REVUE GAUCHE - Left Comment

Stéphane Dion, National Post, August 14, 2006

The role of the Canadian Armed Forces and the topic of security have long been debated throughout the Liberal Party of Canada’s leadership campaign. This debate can be attributed to the importance of the matter, its present international relevance, as well as the serious preoccupations brought on by the propensity of the Conservative government to opt above all for the use of force to resolve international conflicts. The debate is also fed by the variety of opinions on this matter of the eleven candidates. One of the candidates, as many people know, supported America’s intervention in Iraq. Nine candidates, including myself, have voiced our disapproval of the government’s motion to extend the mission in Afghanistan by two years. Many of us, but not all, immediately called for a cease-fire in Lebanon. I would like to outline the criteria that would guide me as Prime Minister in order to ensure the proper use of Canada’s armed forces.

We must avoid two naïve yet contradictory assumptions. In this “we”, I obviously include my party, since I believe it to be vulnerable to these two opposing assumptions. This is apparent in the current leadership race.

The first of these two naïve assumptions is to believe that since peacekeeping is the mandate of our forces, our soldiers will never have to resort to using their weapons. In the cease-fire monitoring missions between two regular armies, UN peacekeepers normally never have to fight and are not equipped to do so. Unfortunately, not all peacekeeping operations are able to unfold in such a manner. When in order to protect a population in danger we must help a weakened government re-establish security over its territory, such as the case of Congo in 1961, Bosnia in 1994 or present-day Afghanistan, peacekeeping operations are replaced by those of a peace-restoring nature. In such missions, soldiers must at times use force and they take the risk of incurring casualties. In refusing to include the Canadian Forces in such operations, we would be refusing to contribute to resolving the worst conflicts our world presently faces and we would be renouncing our “responsibility to protect”, a doctrine for which Canada has been an advocate on the world stage.

The opposite naïve assumption is to overestimate armed force as an instrument for spreading justice and democracy in the world. The decision by the United States to invade Iraq in 2003 was probably a result of this overestimation, and the support by some intellectuals for the invasion certainly was. The majority of Canadians – but not Mr. Harper – voiced their opposition to this invasion and our government refused to participate in it. We were not turning a blind eye to the criminal nature of Saddam Hussein’s regime; we did not believe that the Iraqi people were incapable of democracy. We did believe, however, that a war and military occupation were more likely to lead to violence and chaos rather than democracy. We participated in the Bosnian intervention as it had a good chance of ending the violence and allowing political progress in the country. For these same reasons, we are presently stationed in Afghanistan, although in much more difficult conditions. The political landscape of Iraq was very different. It was predictable that military intervention would reduce the chances of democracy in this country and in the Middle East.

We had good reason to caution our American friends against the dangers of their operation and to not participate in it. The United States is for us an ally, not a model – a distinction that eludes our current Prime Minister.

This is the direction our armed forces must adopt. Although foreign armed forces can in some cases improve the security in a country, they cannot establish democracy within it. Democracy can be established by the local population, in an improved security environment, but that is entirely outside the control of foreign troops. Canadians must continue to help populations in danger where their presence is welcome and where they have a reasonable chance of reducing violence. They must not refuse missions that force them to use weapons or that might lead to casualties. However, they must avoid participating in ventures that would increase violence, rather than keeping it at bay. We must evaluate the extension of our mission in Afghanistan according to these criteria. If an international mission is set up for Lebanon, our decision to participate in it should be based on whether it would be likely to re-establish genuine security in the region and for the Lebanese people who have suffered so much in the current crisis. These same criteria must guide us in evaluating our participation in future engagements.

ANTI-WAR

Gerard Kennedy:

Tuesday, August 29, 2006
KENNEDY CALLS FOR NEW STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN

No Sustainable peace without answers to opium trade, renewed development efforts

Toronto- Liberal leadership candidate Gerard Kennedy today called for Canada to push NATO to re-evaluate what amounts to a losing strategy in Afghanistan and for Prime Minister Harper to address the shortfall in aid development.

"If NATO fails to change their strategy, Canada should pull out of the war in Afghanistan," Kennedy told Ontario Young Liberals as part of the Young Liberal Summer Speakers Series at Ryerson University last night.

"By focusing solely on military objectives in Afghanistan, Prime Minister Harper is making the same mistakes that the Bush administration made in Iraq and it will lead to similar long-term failure," said Kennedy. "The Prime Minister has failed to answer the fundamental question of whether we are building a civil society in Afghanistan along with the Afghani people, or simply occupying a troublesome part of the world. "

Kennedy pointed out that Afghanistan faces three interlinked crises: an opium crisis, a development crisis and a security crisis. "The international community and the Afghan people must deal with the opium and development crises before lasting security can become reality," Kennedy said. "The biggest failure in Afghanistan to date has been the way the international community has alienated the Afghani people. Unless we change the approach to developing a sustainable economy in Afghanistan, our mission will not succeed"

Last year's crop was worth $2.7 billion at export, or 52 per cent of the GDP, representing a 20 per cent increase in poppy planting and a record for the biggest crop in Afghanistan's history, according to the United Nations.

"These figures signal an abject failure for the British-led attempt at forced eradiation of all opium crops," notes Kennedy. "The consequences have been tragic." Revenues from opium crops fund the Taliban's operations against international forces. Additionally, without economic alternatives the allegiance of local populations shifts support away from the international community and towards Taliban insurgent factions that capitalize on growing economic desperation.

"There are both long- and short-term solutions that will bring illegal opium cultivation under control and take the money away from the Taliban, while at the same time providing economic opportunities and hope to the poverty-stricken opium growing areas of Afghanistan," Kennedy added.

Little has been achieved to relieve the extreme poverty of the majority of the rural population. The substantial efforts and vast amounts of funds provided for the stability and security of the country have not been matched by comparable measures in terms of development.

"The basic needs of the local population are not being met," Kennedy said. Despite being the world's main front in the war against terrorism, Afghanistan has so far received less per capita reconstruction and security assistance than all other recent post-conflict countries. Only $75 per capita has been pledged for this year, and this figure will slide down to $42 per capita for the next five years.

Kennedy noted that Canada has a role to play in marshalling other NATO countries to call for a winning plan in Afghanistan. "Sustainable peace cannot be achieved by military operations alone. The international coalition should focus on the immediate and long-term economic needs of the local communities, and any use of force should be balanced with extensive, visible and effective development efforts," he said.

Kennedy proposes that Canada can help lead the plan to solve the opium trade and development challenges facing the Afghani people, "The only way we can justify staying in Afghanistan is if we can create a mandate for real success."

Wednesday, September 06, 2006
AFGHANISTAN - TIME FOR A NEW STRATEGY

t's time to reevaluate NATO's strategy in Afghanistan. The current strategy is a long-term losing one. In order for the mission to be successful, Canada and its allies must win the support of the Afghani people, get smart about the opium crisis and get serious about the abject poverty and alienation facing a country recently ranked one of the 10 weakest states in the world.

Even the US Military establishment is starting to realize that their approach in Afghanistan and Iraq has failed and needs to be rethought. According to a recent Boston Globe report, the Pentagon has "undertaken a wholesale reassessment of its war strategy with a goal of identifying the mistakes made in Iraq and Afghanistan" as they now realize that "winning hearts and minds has proved far more difficult than killing enemy forces."

Just as the Pentagon is now reconsidering the US strategy in Iraq, Canada has a role to play in marshalling other NATO countries to call for a winning plan in Afghanistan.

Canadian principles have been absent in this effort since Prime Minister Harper's shotgun vote to extend the mission in Afghanistan. He has failed to answer the fundamental question of whether we're building a civil society in Afghanistan alongside the Afghani people or essentially occupying a troublesome part of the world.

There are currently three crises in Afghanistan: An opium crisis, a development crisis and a security crisis. Unless we deal with the first two in a rational, thoughtful manner, the last crisis - creating lasting security in Afghanistan - will be impossible to meet, violence will escalate and the mission will fail.

One of the biggest failures in Afghanistan has been the approach to the omnipresent opium trade. Opium production in Afghanistan has exploded under the current policy, signaling an abject failure for the British-led attempt at forced eradication of all opium crops. Last year's crop was worth $2.7 billion at export, or 52% of GDP. The United Nations says poppy planting increased by 20% this year and is projected to break a record for the biggest crop in Afghanistan history.

Ineffective opium policies have had two tragic consequences: the sale of opium now represents a virtual ATM to the Taliban, funding their operations against international forces without any end in site. As importantly, since the international community's opium policy has been to forcibly eradicate the poppy fields without providing any economic alternative, the allegiance of local populations is now shifting away from support for the international community and towards Taliban insurgent factions cashing in on growing local anger and economic desperation. The international community's approach to the poppy fields has resulted in more opium being grown and in farmers turning against the international community.

Effectively replacing the opium crop with sustainable alternatives will be neither easy nor cheap - it will cost billions of dollars to replace opium with a new economy. However, Afghanistan cannot build a long-term viable economy based on the trade of an illegal substance. As the former Afghani Interior Minister wrote in a Parameters journal article in May 2006, "Eradication without providing for meaningful alternative livelihoods is not sustainable. Eradication does not hold promise as a near-term solution, and forcible eradication can be counter-productive...There are no quick and simple solutions."

Canada should take a leadership role in working with its international allies and the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) on demonstration projects to move the replacement of the opium economy forward. Another short-term solution is assisting the country to produce essential opium-based medicines such as morphine and codeine in accordance with the legal framework found in the new Afghanistan Counter- Narcotics Law passed in December 2005. Implementing these provisions would partly bring illegal opium cultivation under control, take the money away from the Taliban and provide new economic opportunity and hope to the poverty-stricken opium growing areas of Afghanistan.

The second crisis facing Afghanistan is a development challenge. After five years of international presence in Afghanistan and the establishment of a democratically elected government, little has been achieved to relieve extreme poverty facing the majority of the rural Afghan population. The basic needs of the local population are not being met and, as a result, the population is returning its support to the Taliban and other local power-holders.

Despite being the world's main front in the war against terrorism, Afghanistan has so far received less per capita reconstruction and security assistance than all other recent post-conflict countries. In Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor, donors spent an average of $250 per capita per year in aid. In Afghanistan, only $75 per capita has been pledged for this year, sliding down to $42 per capita for the next five years. While Canada has spent more than $4 billion by some estimates on the military mission in Afghanistan, it has spent less than $100 million in aid since March 2005.

Canada and its allies need to develop a better balance between short-term emergency assistance (food, shelter, and water) and long-term development (there has not been a single new highway or power plant built in Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban). Afghanistan urgently needs an injection of financial aid earmarked for the short-term relief of pervasive extreme poverty.

The international coalition should focus on the immediate and long term economic needs of the local communities and any use of force should be balanced with extensive, visible and effective development efforts. Sustainable peace in Afghanistan cannot be achieved by military operations alone: comprehensive and long-term development efforts are desperately needed. The success of the international mission in Afghanistan relies on convincing the Afghani people that development will provide for a better future than the Taliban offers and on the realization of these promises.

The only way Canada can justify staying in Afghanistan is if we can create a mandate for real success. Loss of life, lack of progress and no end in sight weigh heavily on our national conscience. By focusing solely on the military objectives in Afghanistan, Prime Minister Harper is making the same mistakes that the Bush administration made in Iraq and it will lead to similar long-term failure. It's time Canada advocated and led a strategy that tackles the real issues of the opium economy and the development challenges under which the Afghan people are attempting to rebuild.

James Laxer: Layton and Kennedy Have Transformed the Afghanistan Debate

Here is a comment on the Liberal Candidates from a member of Canada's Defense Establishment from June:

Liberal leadership race needs honest foreign policy debate

By Bob Bergen
Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan is emerging as a central and likely decisive issue in the federal Liberal Party leadership race.
When the Liberals were in power, it was easy to tell where they stood on foreign policy and national defence.
However, the leadership race has exposed the New Democratic Party’s influence on high-profile
leadership candidates like Bob Rae and some anti-American sentiments on the part of both Rae and Joe Volpe that muddies the water considerably. Only two of the 11 candidates supported extending Canada’s mission in Afghanistan, but Rae and Volpe are using the Liberal leadership race as a platform to argue that Canada risks losing its way as a nation of
peacekeepers by following America’s lead.
They both ought to know that the Liberals got out of the peacekeeping business a long time ago and have a made-in-Canada record of sending the Canadian Forces into combat when necessary.
For starters, it was Jean Chretien’s Liberal government which sent Canadian Forces peacemakers – not peacekeepers – into the former Yugoslavia as part of a United Nations effort to put an end to Slobodan Milosevic’s reign of terror in the early 1990s.
Not to put too fine a point on it, it was Chretien’s Liberal government that sent CF-18 warplanes with our North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies to bomb Milosevic’s military and government into submission and end Serbian “cleansing” of ethnic Albanians during the 78-day Kosovo air war in 1999.
It was the Chretien Liberal government that originally committed Canadian land, sea and air forces to the international war against terrorism in the wake of the September 11, 2001, attack in New York. Further, it was the Chretien Liberal government that was the driving force behind “The Responsibility to Protect”, the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty also in 2001.
In the aftermath of the Rwanda genocide in 1994, the Srebrenica massacre in Bosnia in 1995 and Kosovo, the Report advanced a case for muscular military intervention by the international community to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing when their own governments fail to do so.
That “Responsibility to Protect” initiative was adopted by the United Nations at the World Summit at UN headquarters in September 2005.
It was also Paul Martin’s Liberal government which produced the Canadian International Policy statement in 2005 that guides Canada’s current foreign policy in defence, diplomacy and development. At the heart of the policy statement is, in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, that Canada needs a robust military to protect Canada against terrorism and the spillover of failed and failing states like Afghanistan.
Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s Conservative government is following the International Policy
Statement’s lead, but appears to be taking it many steps further by beefing up Canada’s military and extending to 2009 the Afghanistan mission the Liberals initiated.
But, by some unfathomable twist of logic, former Ontario NDP premier Rae now argues against the Liberal party’s foreign policy thinking and history, saying that Canada risks losing its way as a nation of peacekeepers in Afghanistan.
Just when and where have Canadians been acting as a nation of peacekeepers since the early 1990s?
Meanwhile, Volpe disingenuously argues that Canada has moved away from peacekeeping into
peacemaking in Afghanistan with a made-in-Washington foreign affairs policy.
The front-runner in the race is reportedly Michael Ignatieff, a well-traveled journalist, a former Harvard scholar and a widely-published author with a highly-developed view of Canada’s place in the world. Ignatieff’s critics label him un-Liberal and un-Canadian for the decades he spent at Harvard. Volpe hascalled him Republican-minded.
They ignore the fact that Ignatieff wrote about NATO’s Kosovo intervention in his book Virtual War, which served as a virtual blueprint for the Liberals’ “The Responsibility to Protect”.
Ignatieff was one of the commissioners who sat on the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty which authored “The Responsibility to Protect”.
Ignatieff’s thinking, if not variations of his exact phrasing from Virtual War, can be found throughout it like a watermark.
Should Ignatieff come to lead the Liberals in opposition, he will bring a sophisticated world view to thedifficult defence and foreign policy issues facing Canada and the United States.
The problem is Ignatieff may be surrounded in his own caucus by the likes of Rae and Volpe who don’t debate at the same level and prefer to simply bash Ignatieff and Washington instead.
Still worse, Ignatieff’s opponents don’t appear to think that Canadians need to hear an enlightened and honest debate on these central issues, which is a sad enough commentary in itself.

Bob Bergen, Ph.D., is a Research Fellow with the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI) in Calgary.

The opinions expressed in this document are those of the author and not necessarily those of CDFAI, its Board of Directors, Advisory Council, Fellows or donors. Bergen’s column appears bi-weekly. Learn more about the CDFAI and its research on the Internet at www.cdfai.org

Also See:


Liberal Leadership Race

Afghanistan






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