Backgrounder

Yemen’s Tragedy: War, Stalemate, and Suffering

Yemen’s internal divisions and a Saudi-led military intervention have spawned an intractable political, military, and humanitarian crisis.

Members of the Houthi movement participate in a military parade in Yemen’s capital, Sanaa. Mohammed Huwais/AFP/Getty Images

WRITTEN BY

Kali Robinson

UPDATED

Last updated October 21, 2022 

    

What are Yemen’s divisions?

Yemen has long struggled with religious and cultural differences between its north and south and the legacy of European colonialism. The modern Yemeni state was formed in 1990 with the unification of the U.S.- and Saudi-backed Yemeni Arab Republic, in the north, and the Soviet-backed People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, in the south. Ali Abdullah Saleh, a military officer who had ruled North Yemen since 1978, assumed leadership of the new country.

However, just four years after unification, southern separatists seceded for several months and reemerged in 2007 as the Southern Movement, which has continued to press for greater autonomy within Yemen. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), an Islamist militant group, and the related Ansar al-Sharia insurgent group have captured territory in the south and east. The Houthi movement, whose base is among the Zaydi Shiites of northern Yemen, rose up against Saleh’s government six times between 2004 and 2010.

The United States lent its support to Saleh beginning in the early 2000s, when counterterrorism cooperation against al-Qaeda and affiliate groups became Washington’s overriding regional concern. In 2000, al-Qaeda in Yemen, a group that would later become AQAP, conducted a suicide attack on a U.S. Navy warship, the USS Cole, in the Yemeni port of Aden. Seventeen U.S. service members were killed in the bombing. Since then, the United States has provided Yemen more than $850 million in military aid, according to the online database Security Assistance Monitor.

Rights groups persistently charged [PDF] that Saleh ran a corrupt and autocratic government. As the popular protests of the 2011 Arab Spring spread to Yemen, the president’s political and military rivals jockeyed to oust him. While Yemeni security forces focused on putting down protests in urban areas, AQAP made gains in outlying regions.

Under escalating domestic and international pressure [PDF], Saleh stepped aside in 2012 after receiving assurances of immunity from prosecution. His vice president, Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi, assumed office as interim president in a transition brokered by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), a regional organization based in Saudi Arabia, and backed by the United States. As part of the GCC’s timetable for a transition, the UN-sponsored National Dialogue Conference (NDC) convened 565 delegates in 2013 to formulate a new constitution agreeable to Yemen’s many factions. But the NDC ended with delegates unable to resolve disputes over the distribution of power.

What caused the current crisis?

Several factors widened these political divisions and led to full-scale military conflict.

Fuel price hikes. Under pressure from the International Monetary Fund, which had extended to Yemen a $550 million loan premised on promises of economic reforms, Hadi’s government lifted fuel subsidies in 2014. The Houthi movement, which had attracted support beyond its base with its criticisms of the UN transition, organized mass protests demanding lower fuel prices and a new government. Hadi’s supporters and the Muslim Brotherhood–affiliated party al-Islah held counterrallies.

Houthi takeover. The Houthis captured much of Sanaa by late 2014. Reneging on a UN peace deal, they consolidated control of the capital and continued their southward advance. Hadi’s government resigned under pressure in January 2015 and Hadi later fled to Saudi Arabia.

Military division. Military units loyal to Saleh aligned themselves with the Houthis, contributing to their battlefield success. Other militias mobilized against the Houthi-Saleh forces, aligning with those in the military who had remained loyal to the Hadi government. Southern separatists ramped up their calls for secession.

Saudi intervention. In 2015, with Hadi in exile, Riyadh launched a military campaign—primarily fought from the air—to roll back the Houthis and restore the Hadi administration to Sanaa.

Yemen’s Front Lines

Territorial control and influence as of January 2022

Southern Transitional Council control

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) influence

Government control

Government influence

Houthi control

SAUDI ARABIA

OMAN

Saada

RED

SEA

YEMEN

Sanaa

Hodeidah

Mukalla

200 km

0

Taiz

(contested)

0

100 mi

GULF OF ADEN

Aden

Sources:  Risk Intelligence; Congressional Research Service.

Who are the parties involved?

The Houthi movement, named for a religious leader from the Houthi clan and officially known as Ansar Allah, emerged in the late 1980s as a vehicle for religious and cultural revivalism among Zaydi Shiites in northern Yemen. The Zaydis are a minority in the Sunni Muslim–majority country but predominant in the northern highlands along the Saudi border.

The Houthis became politically active after 2003, opposing Saleh for backing the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq but later allying with him after his resignation as president. This alliance was a tactical one: Saleh’s loyalists opposed Hadi’s UN-backed government and, feeling marginalized in the transition process, sought to regain a leading role in Yemen. Saleh won the allegiance of some members of Yemen’s security forces, tribal networks, and political establishment. But in 2017, after Saleh shifted his support to the Saudi-led coalition, he was killed by Houthi forces.

Iran is the Houthis’ primary international backer and has reportedly provided them with military support, including weapons. Hadi’s government also accused Hezbollah, Iran’s Lebanese ally, of aiding the Houthis. Saudi Arabia’s perception that the Houthis are an Iranian proxy rather than an indigenous movement has driven Riyadh’s military intervention. But many regional specialists say that Tehran’s influence is likely limited, especially since Iranians and Houthis adhere to different schools of Shiite Islam. Still, Iran and the Houthis share geopolitical interests: Tehran seeks to challenge Saudi and U.S. dominance in the region, and the Houthis oppose the U.S.- and Saudi- backed government.

At Hadi’s behest in 2015, Saudi Arabia cobbled together a coalition of Sunni-majority Arab states: Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Qatar, Sudan, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). By 2018, the coalition had expanded to include forces from Eritrea and Pakistan. They launched an air campaign against the Houthis with the aim of reinstating Hadi’s government. For Riyadh, accepting Houthi control of Yemen would mean allowing a hostile neighbor to reside on its southern border, and it would mark a setback in its long-standing contest with Tehran.

After Saudi Arabia, the UAE has played the most significant military role in the coalition, contributing some ten thousand ground troops, mostly in Yemen’s south. However, the UAE removed most of them after entering into conflict with its coalition allies in 2019, when it backed the separatist Southern Transitional Government (STC), which captured Aden. That November, Hadi and the STC president signed the Riyadh Agreement, which affirms that the factions will share power equally in a postwar Yemeni government. The separatists reneged on the deal for several months in 2020, but eventually they joined a unity government with equal representation of northerners and southerners. Though the formation of a government signaled progress in bridging Yemen’s internal divisions, it did little to accelerate peace talks. In April 2022, Hadi ceded power to a governing council and fired a deputy scorned by the Houthis in hopes that the rebels would return to the negotiating table.

Although the U.S. Congress has been divided on the matter [PDF], the United States has backed the Saudi-led coalition, as have France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. U.S. interests include security of Saudi borders; free passage in the Bab al-Mandeb strait, the choke point between the Arabian and Red Seas and a vital artery for the global transport of oil; and a government in Sanaa that will cooperate with U.S. counterterrorism programs. But uproar over civilian deaths in coalition air campaigns, which often use U.S.-made weapons, and Saudi Arabia’s role in the 2018 killing of Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi led the United States and other Western powers to limit some weapons sales and refueling of coalition aircraft. Lawmakers have also raised concerns that U.S.-made weapons are falling into the hands of AQAP and Houthi fighters. Still, the United States is Saudi Arabia’s largest arms supplier, and President Donald Trump thrice vetoed bills that would have halted arms sales to Saudi Arabia.

President Joe Biden said he would end U.S. support for the coalition’s military offensive, including the sale of weapons, and signaled a shift to diplomacy by appointing a special envoy to Yemen. Yet, U.S. defense contractors still oversee the servicing of Saudi aircraft that carry out offensive operations, and the administration has approved the sale of weapons to Saudi Arabia for defense purposes. Shortly after taking office, Biden reversed the Trump administration’s last-minute designation of the Houthis as a terrorist group, citing the move’s potential damage to aid deliveries in Yemen.

What is the role of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula?

AQAP, in Yemen since the early 1990s, has benefited from the more recent chaos. In 2015, it captured the coastal city of Mukalla and released three hundred inmates, many believed to be AQAP members, from the city’s prison. The militant group expanded its control westward to Aden and seized parts of the city before coalition forces recovered much of the region in 2016. AQAP has also provided Yemenis in some areas with security and public services unfulfilled by the state, which has strengthened support for the group.

The U.S. State Department warns that Yemen’s instability has weakened long-running counterterrorism efforts [PDF], which rely heavily on air strikes. The Barack Obama administration conducted an estimated 185 strikes over eight years, while the Trump administration launched nearly 200 in its four years. These air strikes have killed several high-level AQAP members, including former leader Nasser al-Wuhayshi and top official Jamal al-Badawi, who was allegedly involved in the USS Cole bombing. But the U.S. strikes have also resulted in the deaths of more than one hundred civilians, watchdog groups say.

For years, AQAP vied for influence with the Houthis and the self-declared Islamic State, especially in the central al-Bayda Governorate. The Islamic State marked its 2015 entrance into Yemen with suicide attacks on two Zaydi mosques in Sanaa, which killed close to 140 worshippers. Though the group has claimed other high-profile attacks, including the assassination of Aden’s governor in late 2015, its following lags behind that of AQAP. In 2021, the United Nations estimated that the Islamic State had hundreds of fighters [PDF] in Yemen, while AQAP had around seven thousand [PDF] as of mid-2020. Opposition from the Houthis has reportedly debilitated both groups, but experts warn against discounting their possible resurgence.

What has the humanitarian impact been?

With around three-quarters of its population living in poverty, Yemen has long been the Arab world’s poorest country, and its humanitarian crisis has been called one of the worst in the world. Disease runs rampant; suspected cholera cases passed two hundred thousand [PDF] in 2020. The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic is harder to assess, since there is no comprehensive caseload data. Some twelve thousand cases have been reported to the World Health Organization, but health analysts say the actual count is likely much higher. Moreover, many countries cut back on critical aid to Yemen amid the crush of the pandemic, leading the United Nations to reduce food rations for some eight million Yemenis in January 2022. Three out of four Yemenis require humanitarian aid and protection, and four million are internally displaced [PDF], according to the UN refugee agency. 

The situation has worsened under a yearslong de facto land, sea, and air blockade imposed by coalition forces, which has obstructed the flow of vital supplies of food and medicine and helped drive up prices of essential goods. Under the 2022 cease-fire, prices dropped significantly, but with the expiration of the truce, many Yemenis fear that high costs will return. The UN Development Program estimates that more than 370,000 people have died as a result of the war, with indirect causes such as lack of food, water, and health services causing almost 60 percent of deaths.

In addition, the United Nations has found [PDF] that both Houthi and coalition forces have knowingly attacked civilian targets in violation of international law. This includes the destruction of a hospital run by Doctors Without Borders in 2015. Torture, arbitrary arrests, and forced disappearances are among the other alleged war crimes perpetrated by both sides.

What are the prospects for a solution to the crisis?

UN-backed peace negotiations have made limited progress. The 2018 Stockholm Agreement averted a battle in the port city of Hodeidah, a vital hub for aid; but there has been little success in implementing the accord’s provisions, which includes the exchange of more than fifteen thousand prisoners and the creation of a joint committee to de-escalate violence in the city of Taiz.

Observers worry that friction among regional actors, including Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, is prolonging the war. Conditions deteriorated in late 2019, when the Houthis claimed responsibility for a missile attack on Saudi oil facilities. UN monitors concluded that the Houthis did not carry out the attack, while the Saudi-led coalition blamed Iran. 

Peace efforts gained momentum in April 2022 when Yemen’s new governing council helped consolidate anti-Houthi forces, a move that could set the stage for inclusive negotiations. Later that month, the Houthis and coalition forces coordinated their first nationwide cease-fire in years, which allowed commercial flights to resume from Sanaa and some fuel ships to dock in Hodeidah. The parties extended the truce several times, but after six months of relative peace, failed to renew it again. Both the Yemeni government and the Houthis have blamed each other for the disintegration of the deal, which could lead back to heavy fighting and plunge Yemen into a full-scale crisis.

Recommended Resources

For Foreign Affairs, the International Crisis Group’s Michael Wahid Hanna and Peter Salisbury argue that negotiations on Yemen should be more inclusive.

CFR’s Global Conflict Tracker follows the latest developments in Yemen’s civil war.

The New York Times’ Declan Walsh and Tyler Hicks capture the war’s human toll.

Ohio State University’s Asher Orkaby explains how Yemen’s internal divisions were centuries in the making.

In late 2021, the UN Development Program assessed the impact of Yemen’s war and charted potential pathways for recovery.

‘Swarm’ of drones spotted flying above UK nuclear plant

Josh Layton - Yesterday - Metro UK

Up to six drones were seen flying over a nuclear plant, it has been revealed.


The drones were seen flying above the Capenhurst facility in Cheshire

 (Picture: Getty Images)

The unidentified aerial vehicles (UAVs) spotted above the Capenhurst facility in Cheshire were reported to the Civil Nuclear Constabulary (CNC).

The sighting – logged as a ‘report of 5 – 6 drones flying over and around the site’ – was one of two in the space of four days in 2019.

A note on the second incident simply states: ‘Report of a drone overflying the site.’ A log previously released by the government suggested that there had been a ‘swarm’ incident – where interlinked drones take part in the same operation or attack – at an unnamed nuclear facility.

Capenhurst enriches toxic uranium, allowing nuclear plants around the world to generate electricity.

The sightings were among 11 reports of ‘unauthorised aerial incursions’ at UK nuclear facilities between May 2019 and last November. The latest was at Springfields, near Preston.

Peter Burt, of the Drone Wars UK website, said: ‘Some of the incidents are probably just cases of careless flying by individual drone operators. But others, if accurate, seem far more malicious in their intent, such as the report of several drones flying over and around the Capenhurst uranium enrichment site in July 2019.’

The reports come at a time of heightened tensions between the West, China and Russia, which have both been linked to physical and cyber spying operations in the UK.

A spokesman for the CNC said: ‘To our knowledge, there has been no confirmed malicious use of a drone in relation to the UK’s civil nuclear sites.’

Trudeau joins Canadian demonstrators in support of Iran protests

Canada's Prime Minister Justin Trudeau speaks at protest in support of freedom for women in Iran October 29, 2022 in Ottawa, Canada. Iran has been rocked by protests since 22-year-old Mahsa Amini's death on September 16, three days after she was arrested. (AFP)

AFP
Published: 30 October ,2022: 

Prime Minister Justin Trudeau marched with protesters in the Canadian capital of Ottawa Saturday in support of demonstrations that have swept Iran for more than 40 days.

“The women in Iran, daughters and the grandmothers and the allies... they are not forgotten,” Trudeau said, standing in front of a white banner covered with dozens of red hand prints.

Iran has been gripped by six weeks of protests that erupted when Mahsa Amini, 22, died in custody after her arrest for an alleged breach of Iran’s strict dress rules for women.

“We will stand with you. I’ll march with you, I will hold hands with you. We will continue to stand with this beautiful community,” Trudeau said, before ending his speech by shouting Persian slogans, his fist raised.

The prime minister’s wife, Sophie Gregoire Trudeau, also joined the protest, saying, “I stand with you because when one woman’s right is being denied, it is a sign of disrespect for all women.”

“And we will leave no sister behind.”

Trudeau highlighted several rounds of sanctions imposed by the Canadian government against senior Iranian officials over the last month, levied due to the regime’s “gross and systematic human rights violations.”

Amini supporters also attended rallies in other Canadian cities, including Vancouver, Montreal and Toronto, where marchers formed human chains.

And thousands also protested Saturday in Paris and throughout France.

US to put United Nations focus on Iran protests

Protesters march in solidarity with protesters in Iran on the National Mall in Washington, DC, on October 22, 2022. (AFP)

Reuters
Published: 28 October ,2022:

The United States will next week put the United Nations spotlight on protests in Iran sparked by the death of a young woman in police custody and look for ways to promote credible, independent investigations into Iranian human rights abuses.

The United States and Albania will hold an informal UN Security Council gathering on Wednesday, according to a note outlining the event, seen by Reuters. Iranian Nobel Peace Prize laureate Shirin Ebadi and Iranian-born actress and activist Nazanin Boniadi are set to brief.

“The meeting will highlight the ongoing repression of women and girls and members of religious and ethnic minority groups in Iran,” the note said. “It will identify opportunities to promote credible, independent investigations into the Iranian government’s human rights violations and abuses.”

Independent UN investigator on human rights in Iran, Javaid Rehman, is also due to address the meeting, which can be attended by other UN member states and rights groups.

Iran has been gripped by protests since the death of 22-year-old Kurdish woman Mahsa Amini in police custody last month. The unrest has turned into a popular revolt by Iranians from all layers of society, posing one of the boldest challenges to the clerical leadership since the 1979 revolution.

Iran has blamed its foreign enemies and their agents for the unrest.

“The meeting will underscore ongoing unlawful use of force against protesters and the Iranian regime’s pursuit of human rights defenders and dissidents abroad to abduct or assassinate them in contravention of international law,” read the note about the planned meeting.

Rights groups have said at least 250 protesters have been killed and thousands arrested across the country. Women have played a prominent part in the protests, removing and burning veils. The deaths of several teenage girls reportedly killed during protests have fueled more anger.

UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has called on Iranian security forces to refrain from unnecessary or disproportionate force against protesters and appealed to all to exercise restraint and avoid further escalation.

Guterres has also called for a investigation of Amini’s death by an “independent competent authority.”

Iran on Fire: Women Forcing Change


After the news of Amini's death emerged on social media of her lying in a Tehran hospital in a coma, people throughout the country became enraged.

October 21, 2022 by Broad Agenda 


By Vrinda Narain and Fatemeh Sadeghi

On Sept. 16, 2022, Mahsa Amini, a 22-year-old Iranian woman, died in Tehran, Iran, while in police custody. Amini was arrested by the Guidance Patrol, the morality squad of the Law Enforcement Command of the Islamic Republic of Iran that oversees public implementation of hijab regulations, for not wearing a hijab properly.

Soon after the news of her death was broadcast and a photograph emerged on social media of her lying in a Tehran hospital in a coma, people throughout the country became enraged.

Amini’s death starkly illustrated the systematic violence of police and highlighted particularly the brutality of the regime towards women and minorities. She was Kurdish, a member of one of the most oppressed minority ethnic groups in Iran.

All Iranian women who are routinely humiliated because of their gender can empathize with her. But Kurds and Kurdish women in particular understood the political message of her death at the hands of police and the state’s subsequent violent response to the protests.

The huge wave of protests in Iran following Amini’s death represents a historic moment in Iran. People have taken to the streets shouting slogans against the compulsory hijab and denouncing Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei.

Protests have raged in 31 provinces, including Kurdistan and Tehran as well as cities such as Rasht, Isfahan and Qom, among Iran’s most conservative communities. Dozens of people have been killed by security forces and hundreds more have been arrested.

The Girls of Revolution Street

Although the current uprising may seem unprecedented, it is in fact part of a deep-rooted and longstanding resistance movement by women in Iran.

In what is widely seen as a punishment to the hundreds of women who participated in the anti-regime protests leading to the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the hijab became compulsory two years later in 1981.

Consequently, publicly removing hijabs became a challenge to the regime in Iran.

Decades later, in 2017, Vida Movahed climbed onto a platform on Enghelab (Revolution) Street in the centre of Tehran, took off her headscarf and waved it in the air as a sign of opposition to compulsory hijab.

She was followed by other women and the movement quickly became known as The Girls of Revolution Street or Dokhtaran-e Khiaban-e Enghelab.

The Girls of Revolution Street represented a fundamental challenge by younger women to Iran’s compulsory veiling laws. Their actions resulted in an increase in the number of women who braved the streets without hijab in defiance of the state.

Unsurprisingly, when religious hardliner Ebrahim Raisi became president in the contested 2020 election, the message was clear: Women would be further oppressed.
Zan, Zendegi, Azadi: Woman, life, freedom

This recent uprising is a link in a chain of protests that together have the potential to bring about fundamental change in Iran.

It began with the pro-democracy Green Movement in 2009 followed by popular uprisings in 2018 and 2019. The Green Movement was largely peaceful, but the uprisings grew increasingly more confrontational with each wave of repression.

Women have been in the lead in all these protests, posing a real challenge to the regime. They’re the leaders of transformative change, the vanguard of a potential revolution, challenging the legitimacy of the current government..

The current protests are focused on two main demands: dignity and freedom. Both have been absent from political life in Iran, and both have a prominent presence in almost all slogans during this uprising, particularly “Woman, Life, Freedom.”

The recent uprising makes it clear that the demand for radical change in Iran today is strong and significant.

With every wave of protest, the desire for freedom gets stronger, the voices get louder and success is within reach. Once again, Iranian women are at the forefront of demanding transformative change.

With the strong support this time of men, political and ethnic minorities and other disenfranchised groups, they may be leading their country closer to a freer and more just society.

—

This post was previously published on Broad Agenda.

PERSONAL ESSAY
I was born in Iran, and misogyny pushed me away from my culture. Now I have hope for Iranian girls

Protests led by brave women and girls in Iran raised feelings in me I thought I had buried deep

By REBECCA MORRISON
PUBLISHED OCTOBER 22, 2022

Rebecca Morrison as a child (Phot courtesy of author)

As a woman from Iran who carried shame about her country of birth for four decades, watching the widespread protests turn into a feminist revolution in Iran has raised feelings I thought were deeply buried. The protests, sparked by the death of Jîna Amini, also known as Mahsa, an Iranian Kurdish woman who was reportedly beaten by the "morality police" for improperly wearing her hijab, have transformed into a nationwide revolution led by women and school-aged girls. Some in the Iranian diaspora, including my family, have stayed silent. Not because they don't support the people fighting and dying every day, but because they are numb as a result of the decades of suffering the regime has caused.

My mother always says I was American before I knew what America was. She tells the story of when I was seven and stormed into our living room where my relatives were having a meeting to divide my grandfather's substantial estate and declared, "Why is everyone saying my mom and my aunts get less than my uncle? Why should they get less than the one man? It's not fair!"
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Horrified by my outburst, my mom apologized to everyone, then grabbed my arm and pulled me out of the room.

Once it became clear my homeland would be controlled by a new theocratic authoritarian regime, my secular family decided not to go back.

She tells this story with frustration and a hint of pride. "You were a difficult child," she insists, "not listening to anybody, always too opinionated and ready to fight."

A year after my outburst, in 1979, we fled Iran because of the protests, strikes and demonstrations throughout the country and the resulting violent government crackdowns. Once it became clear my homeland would be controlled by a new theocratic authoritarian regime, my secular family decided not to go back. We moved from country to country trying to find a new home before settling in Vancouver two years later.

My home life in Canada was strained by conflict. My parents struggled to figure out their place in this new world. My mother with her broken English tried to make a home for me and my two brothers. My father, his business and home both taken by the new government, had to find a career in order to support his family.

There was another problem. My mother was angry about my weight gain during this time. In Iran, every example around her showed that a woman's power was her beauty and being thin was the key to achieving it. The most beautiful women found the best husbands. She was a striking woman who'd married a successful businessman. So, the formula worked.

Mom and my community made it clear that an ideal Iranian woman should be slender, modest, and measured. Instead, I was big, opinionated, bold, and ready to tell them what I thought was wrong with their way of life. But when my parents sent me away to boarding school in California, these qualities proved to be strengths. I was praised for expressing myself and fighting for my ideas. I embraced everything Americana, from baseball – I played shortstop on our forever-losing softball team — to apple pie — baked it, ate it, loved it. My friends often told me I was more American than anyone they knew. Before long, I was excelling in school and getting affirmation from my teachers.

One summer, in my early teens, while visiting my grandparents, my imposing grandfather with a round belly and stern face hired a doctor to figure out why I was so fat, maybe a size 10. In my grandparent's dark antique-cramped living room, I sat across from a wrinkly-faced doctor, his spectacles sliding down his pronounced nose. "Tell me about your periods, girl?" he said. I looked down at the elaborate pattern on the Persian carpet, disconnecting.

Not getting a response, the doctor and my grandfather, with his deep gruff voice, took turns asking why I couldn't lose weight. Was it because I was lazy? Undisciplined? The meeting ended when my heaving sobs made it impossible for the interrogation to continue.

Because I didn't have the body my family thought I needed to attract a suitable husband, to survive I told myself my worth was my intelligence, my will, my ideas. Whenever they shamed me or made me feel inadequate, I reminded myself I had these secret weapons no one could take away.

I believed I was working towards a virtuous goal, to be everything American and nothing Iranian.

After high school, I moved across the country for college and law school in Washington, D.C. I stood as an equal to my male friends in learning, debating, and leading. My views about this country became more refined but my adoration didn't wane.
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Most importantly, my adopted homeland allowed me the opportunity to have a legal career. That translated into financial independence, an understanding of my rights, and the thing I wanted most — not to have to depend on anyone, especially a man.

When I was 29 — in the spring of 2001 — I stood in front of a silver-haired judge, next to men and women from all over the world wearing suits, saris, headscarves and dresses. With my hand over my heart, I recited the pledge of allegiance in unison with my fellow immigrants. My kind mild-mannered boyfriend from Kansas looked on as I got the one thing I wanted most, to be an American. Two years later, I married him and took his last name, becoming Rebecca Morrison. With the release of my ethnic maiden name, Khamneipur, I took another step towards assimilation and shedding my past.

I believed I was working towards a virtuous goal, to be everything American and nothing Iranian. I was ashamed of what I thought were the cornerstones of my culture and country of birth — misogyny, inequality, control. Iranian men in my community set the rules, handled the money and diminished women, including me. I was independent with a successful career, but continuously reminded that my worth was measured by my body, its purpose to get a man for marriage.

My ideas of the greatness of my new home and the horridness of my old one were simplistic and limited. As an Iranian exile, my view of the Persian culture that went back thousands of years was shaped by several dozen people. And my understanding of the values in the U.S. was propped up by my self-selected bubbles in big coastal cities where I saw the fairytale cliché that echoed my idealistic views.

Weeks after 9/11, I heard stories from family and in media reports of acts of hate against Middle Eastern immigrants. Nervous about being targeted, on a pre-planned road trip through several Midwestern states, at every gas station I bought an American hat, flag or red-white-and-blue T-shirt along with my Pringles and Kit Kats. My beat-up black Honda Accord looked like a diplomatic car with little flags in every corner

My ideas of the greatness of my new home and the horridness of my old one were simplistic and limited.

On my first night of the trip, self-conscious, I walked into an Indiana Holiday Inn looking around for clues of hate. Afraid of being identified as one of them, I used what I thought was a small-town accent to talk to the young woman at the counter.

"How y'all doin? Lovely night we're havin! I'm checkin' in for the night!" I said way too loud. A young couple sitting in the lounge looked up when they heard me. I smiled at them and raised my hand to wave as if to say I'm a good one, don't worry. They gave me an awkward half-smile and went back to what they were talking about. I turned to the receptionist and grabbed my room key.

This clownish behavior was my misguided attempt at patriotism. In the months that followed, my guarded behavior continued as I saw cruelty towards others because of how they looked or where they came from.

While the attacks on innocent people were heartbreaking and enraging, my behavior during that time was also disappointing. Desperate and terrified of losing the story of my adopted home, which I had nurtured for decades, I demeaned myself, betraying who I was in order to belong. These experiences pushed me to grow up and see the U.S. for what it is: a flawed and imperfect country.
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* * *

A few years later when I became a mother, my ideas about the two disparate parts of myself fundamentally shifted. Seeing my own mother through different eyes, I understood that she did what she believed was best for her daughter. I opened up to her about my pain. She shared her regrets. We found a way to accept and love each other.

This opened the door for me to look at my culture through a different lens.

I tried to come to terms with its shortcomings and develop a deeper understanding and connection with my Persian heritage. This helped me let go of the anger and shame about how I'd been treated as a young woman, and the misogyny I'd seen. I made Nowruz, a pre-Islamic Zoroastrian tradition where Iranians gather with family and friends to celebrate the first day of spring, a part of our family traditions. I taught my children the beautiful writings of Rumi, the Persian scholar and theologian and one of the world's most-read poets. Also, on the Fourth of July, I made sure my children celebrated our country's independence with an appreciation for the opportunities it had given me as an immigrant.

Today, I celebrate my Iranian and American identities without fear or shame. These countries, no matter their governments, are made up of the same people, women and men yearning for freedom, equality and prosperity. I watch as the astoundingly brave people of Iran fight for their most basic human rights. And mourn from afar as they are slaughtered, beaten or jailed.

"Nothing will change, the government will kill and jail them, until they stop," my mother told me on our daily call a few days ago. She said my relatives in Iran are scared and heartbroken about the killing of Iran's youth but they don't think anything will change. I hope they are wrong.

I remember scattered scenes of the day we left Iran. Driving down Pahlavi Street, the main road stretching through downtown Tehran, I watched the city fly by with the majestic snow-topped Alborz mountains in the distance. The wind carried a hint of the freshly roasted chestnuts and charcoal-cooked corn on the cob street vendors were selling. I couldn't have imagined on that day, 43 years ago, I would not see Iran again. After four decades, even with the enormous obstacles in their way, I have hope for the first time about the possibility of Iran's women having a free society with gender equality — the very thing I came here to find, and what every human being deserves.

My mother was right — I was meant to be American. But I'm also of Iran, my place of birth and where my ancestors, heritage and history are grounded. I will not diminish my pride, admiration and support of these countries in order to be accepted by the other. That's what makes America great — the fact that I don't have to. As immigrants, we have the right and privilege to celebrate and take pride in our heritage and still be fully Americans.

By REBECCA MORRISON
Rebecca Morrison is a lawyer, writer and painter. She lives with her husband and two sons in the Washington, D.C., area. She’s writing a memoir about leaving Iran and pursuing her American dream. You can follow her on Twitter @contactrebecca and read her work on www.rebeccakmorrison.com.MORE FROM REBECCA MORRISON

HAPPY HALLOWEEN/SAMHAIN

Explainer: What is the Palestinian militant group ‘Den of Lions’?


Palestinian militants attend the funeral of those killed in an overnight Israeli raid, in the occupied West Bank city of Nablus on October 25, 2022. (AFP)

THEY APPEAR TO HAVE DARKSEID ON THEIR SIDE

Reuters
Published: 25 October ,2022

Israeli forces killed a leader of the so-called “Den of Lions,” a fast-rising Palestinian militant group from the city of Nablus on Tuesday in a targeted operation that set off one of the biggest gunfights seen in the West Bank in weeks.

In a statement on Tuesday, the Israeli military said its forces had raided an apartment in the market area of the Old City that was used as an explosives manufacturing site, killing 31-year-old Wadi al-Houh, who it said was responsible for making pipe bombs and obtaining weapons.

The Den of Lions emerged around a year ago in Nablus, where posters of its dead fighters, almost all young men posing with their automatic weapons and combat gear, are now plastered all over the narrow streets of the Old City and its covered market.

While members of the group have great prestige in the Old City, none of its leaders has established a wide profile outside their hometown.

Mourners attend the funeral of Palestinians killed in an overnight Israeli raid, in the occupied West Bank city of Nablus on October 25, 2022. (AFP)

The group gained greater prominence across the West Bank following the killing in August of a 19-year-old militant called Ibrahim al-Nabulsi, whose death has been used a rallying cause for disaffected youths in the Old City and refugee camps.

According to local Palestinian officials, the original core group of four young militants was mainly motivated by anger at the encroachments of Israeli settlers and confrontations with the Israeli military.

The group is not linked to the mainstream Palestinian factions or the deeply unpopular Palestinian Authority and does not appear to have any fully articulated political goals beyond fighting the Israeli occupation. But it may receive financial or logistical support from other groups, Palestinian officials say.

Clashes with settlers at Jacob’s Tomb, a well-known monument and pilgrimage site in Nablus, were taken by members of the group as a particular challenge.

There is little reliable information on its numbers but one Palestinian official with good connections in the Old City of Nablus said there were perhaps 25 active gunmen, with a larger number of supporters outside the core group.

The Palestinian Authority, which has struggled to come up with a response to the group’s wide popular support in Nablus, has tried to buy their weapons from them or integrate them into their security forces, according to Nablus governor Ibrahim Ramadan, but with little success.

ZIONIST ETHNIC CLEANSING WHERE IS THE OUTCRY

Two Palestinians killed by Israeli forces in West Bank: Palestinian health ministry

Young Palestinian protesters run from tear gas fired by Israeli security forces during confrontations at the northern entrance to the occupied West Bank city of Ramallah, on October 12, 2022. (AFP)
Israel Palestine

AFP, Nablus, Palestinian Territories
Published: 28 October ,2022: 

Two Palestinians were killed Friday by Israeli forces in the occupied West Bank, the Palestinian health ministry said.

The ministry announced the death of Imad Abu Rashid, 47, who “was killed by the Israeli occupation, after being shot in the abdomen, chest and head”.

In a later statement, it announced the death of Ramzi Sami Zabara, 35, “from a critical wound by the occupation (Israeli) bullets in the heart, in Nablus”.

The Israeli army said in a statement it had received information “regarding a shooting attack from a moving vehicle” on a military target near Nablus.

“Soldiers conducting routine activity in the area identified two suspicious vehicles and responded with live fire towards them, hits were identified,” it added, without specifying whether any fatalities had occurred.

Local sources told AFP that the two men, who hailed from Askar camp near Nablus, were members of the Palestinian Security Forces and were killed during an armed clash with the Israeli army at Huwara, south of Nablus.

The incident is the latest in a deadly week in Nablus, where Israeli forces have conducted regular raids and imposed tight restrictions on movement.

On Tuesday, five Palestinians were killed in an Israeli operation in the city targeting a nascent militant group called “The Lions’ Den”.

The group is a loose coalition of fighters that emerged in recent months, in parallel with a sharp rise in Israeli raids on the northern West Bank.

This week, an army spokesperson told AFP the group had carried out “approximately 20 terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians and security forces over the past month”.

CRIMINAL CAPITALI$M HIGHER EDUCATION
Sacked director of Saudi university admits to embezzling over $133 million



The logo of Saudi Arabia’s Oversight and Anti-Corruption Authority. 

Amani Hamad, Al Arabiya English
Published: 29 October ,2022: 

The president of Saudi Arabia’s King Abdulaziz University, who was relieved of his duties on Thursday, admitted to embezzling over $133 million (SAR 500 million) from the university funds, the Oversight and Anti-Corruption Authority said.

The authority added that it had seized the funds embezzled by Abdulrahman Obaid al-Youbi and will return the money to the state treasury.

Meanwhile, the authority’s spokesperson, Ahmad al-Hussein, told Al Arabiya that the authority began investigating al-Youbi after learning he committed several financial violations, including exploiting his authority which gave him access to several of the university’s bank accounts.

After gathering evidence showing al-Youbi had exploited his position for personal gain, the authority interrogated him, al-Hussein said, adding that he confessed to the crimes he was accused of and of embezzling more than SAR 500 million.

Al-Hussein said that other people were also involved in the case, adding that the authority was still interrogating these suspects and will take all legal measures against them.