Monday, April 11, 2022

Against disenchantment

The move away from myth and toward reason is an ancient human impulse. But must enchantment be the enemy of enlightenment?


Saint George and the Dragon (c1909-10), by Odilon Redon. Courtesy the Barnes Foundation, Philadelphia

Jason Josephson Storm
is chair and associate professor in the department of religion at Williams College in New England. His latest book is The Myth of Disenchantment: Magic, Modernity, and the Birth of the Human Sciences (2017).

Edited by Sam Dresser


Enlightenment’s programme was the disenchantment of the world… The disenchantment of the world means the extirpation of animism… the Enlightenment detected a fear of the demons through whose effigies human beings had tried to influence nature in magic rituals.
Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944)

The past few years have seen a resurgence of interest in the Frankfurt School – a group of German sociologists, philosophers, cultural theorists, psychoanalysts and their students – whose work is now synonymous with critical theory. Most of the initial members of the Frankfurt School came together in the 1920s at the Institute for Social Research in the German city of Frankfurt. Because most of the early members were Jews, many either perished or fled Germany when the Nazis came to power. The cross-fertilisation of critical social science with philosophy was particularly fertile ground. Today, their studies of ‘the Authoritarian Personality’ and Right-wing populism, and their denunciations of the ‘poverty’ of consumer culture, have come to look downright prescient.

Two of the Frankfurt School’s most important members were the philosophers Max Horkheimer (1895-1973) and Theodor Adorno (1903-69). They initially met in 1921 in a seminar on gestalt psychology at the Goethe University in Frankfurt where Adorno was an undergraduate and Horkheimer a PhD student. But their intellectual relationship really blossomed under their shared experiences as German émigrés in the United States during the Second World War years, leading to some of the sustained critiques of late-capitalist society that have made the Frankfurt School famous. As Alex Ross recently put it in The New Yorker: ‘If Adorno were to look upon the cultural landscape of the 21st century, he might take grim satisfaction in seeing his fondest fears realised.’

The single most important work produced by the Frankfurt School was the book that Horkheimer and Adorno co-authored, the monumental Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944, revised 1947), an attempt to diagnose the maladies of modernity by understanding how modernity could have produced the horrors of fascism and Stalinism alike.

To risk a broad overview for the uninitiated, Horkheimer and Adorno construct their text around the unfolding dialectical opposition between ‘enlightenment’ (Aufklärung) and ‘myth’ (Mythos). The roots of this antagonism can be found in a dilemma that could as easily be psychological as historical. Humans, who see nature as outside of ourselves, are presented with a choice: either we can elect to submit to a mysterious, mythological world full of magic and frighteningly capricious spirits; or we can elect to subdue nature. By choosing the second option and turning nature into an object to control, humanity was caught in its own trap. Chasing the domination of nature, humans began to dominate each other. Rather than being liberated into a new kind of autonomy as they had hoped, people were instead turned into objects or, more properly, into abstractions, mere numbers and statistics, leading to a new backlash of irrational forces. As Horkheimer and Adorno summarised it, ‘enlightenment reverts to mythology’. The objectification of nature had directly led toward the objectification of humanity; the concentration camps and Gulag followed.

To make sense of this narrative trajectory, we need to know that, despite a whole crowd of scholars who see themselves as defending the historical Enlightenment from Horkheimer and Adorno’s critique, the Dialectic of Enlightenment portrays ‘enlightenment’ not primarily as a particular historical period, but as an ancient human impulse ‘aimed at liberating human beings from fear and installing them as masters’ over nature. They identify its modern patriarch as the 17th-century empiricist Sir Francis Bacon, evoking the scientific revolution.

The Dialectic of Enlightenment provides an account of the ascendancy of enlightenment explicitly keyed to the ‘disenchantment of the world’, which they suggest first and foremost meant ‘the extirpation of animism’ and the end of belief in magic, spirits and demons. As Horkheimer and Adorno argue, ‘the mind, conquering superstition, [was supposed] to rule over disenchanted nature’. Magic and spirits had to go if the world was to be amenable to systematic and rational interpretation. To be sure, they also described what they saw as a contemporary ‘regression’ to myth and magic in capitalistic commodification and fascist politics as a kind of backlash to enlightenment, but they generally presumed disenchantment as the return’s precondition

TO READ ON CLICK ON THE URL IN THE HEADER 
Music as Secularized Prayer: On Adorno’s Benjaminian Understanding of Music and its Language-Character

Mattias Martinson
Pages 205-220 | Published online: 25 Sep 2018

Download citation
https://doi.org/10.1080/17570638.2018.1525020


In this article
Materialism and Musical Authenticity
Walter Benjamin and Language
Language as Such and Music as Such
Music as Intention-less Language
Music, Metaphysics, and Theology
Music as Secularized Prayer
Disclosure statement
Footnotes
References






ABSTRACT


In this essay I draw attention to conceptual similarities in Walter Benjamin’s and Theodor W. Adorno’s reflection about language, with special attention to Benjamin’s 1916 essay about language as such, including its theological impulses. In Adorno’s case, I concentrate on language theory as it comes forth in relation to his philosophy of music and the supposed language-character of music. I argue that this particular connection between Benjamin and Adorno is largely unexplored in the literature, and I show that their conceptual affinities have far-reaching consequences for a proper understanding of Adorno’s philosophy as a whole. Music is of fundamental importance for Adorno’s critical theory, and this fact points to an intricate entwinement between materialism and theology, stemming from Benjamin’s theory of language. Thinking of music as secularized prayer means to emphasize that music relates to reality in a way that resembles the logic of Benjamin’s understanding of a pre-lapsarian language of divine names.

Musik ist sprachähnlich. Ausdrücke wie musikalisches Idiom, musikalischer Tonfall, sind keine Metaphern. Aber Musik ist nicht Sprache. Ihre Sprachähnlichkeit weist den Weg ins Innere, doch auch ins Vage. Wer Musik wörtlich als Sprache nimmt, den führt sie irre. (Adorno 1978, 251 )

 

Theodor W. Adorno (1903–1969) is undoubtedly one of the most distinguished music philosophers of all times, although still a highly controversial one. The verdicts about him vary from “grouchy uncle who doesn’t like any music written in the last 20 years” (Miller 2011), to “the first philosopher since Pythagoras to have something new to say about music” (Hullot-Kentor 2008, 54).1

In this essay I will not concentrate on the allegedly upsetting aspects of Adorno’s thought on music and commercial culture, which are well documented.2 However, in order to go further to the interesting side of his philosophy of music, a few things that stand behind the controversial features of his thought on music will have to be mentioned. First of all: his approach to music is thoroughly normative. Adorno makes clear statements concerning the authenticity and inauthenticity of individual musical works or oeuvres, depending on various factors.3 But he is also normative in the sense that musical expressions are evaluated in a manner that comes close to an evaluation of referential language; they appear to be taken as true or false.

In Adorno’s view, however, music can be neither wholly authentic, nor absolutely logical, nor exactly like signifying language, but its character is, in various senses, similar to language: “Musik ist sprachähnlich” (Adorno 1978, 251) – it has a “language-character” (Paddison 1991). Among other things, this gives music a distinctly cognitive aspect, which demands a serious theoretical reflection that may at lead us towards a more qualified debate about the problem of truth (Bowie 2007, 309–375).

In this context, “the problem of truth” can be comprehended as follows: how do we develop a theoretical perspective on our own time that is critically aware of the fact that we cannot transcend our context and establish a neat package of truth to have at our disposal; and yet – to approach an idea developed further by Michel Foucault in his late lecture series at Collège de France – one that is rigorously focused on the idea of a desirable, empathic truth; truth as something that we do not have at hand and therefore need to strive towards as something that may change us and liberate us (compare with Foucault 2005, 19)? It is against the backdrop of such a question about truth that I will approach the truth-dimension of Adorno’s philosophy of music, by giving close attention to an often-neglected affinity with Walter Benjamin’s early philosophy of language.4

Before I move further into that particular discussion, however, I would like to say something more about the controversial side of Adorno’s music philosophy. What about the music that Adorno generally understands as inauthentic or heteronomous? How is this inauthenticity and heteronomy related to musical authenticity and autonomy? The answers are to be found in Adorno’s materialism.

KEEP READING HERE 



 The Anxiety of Influence:

Adorno’s Grappling with Walter
Benjamin’s Mysticism

by Menachem Feuer




Anyone who reads Walter Benjamin can sense, from the very first sentences of any of his essays or books, that his writing is influenced by mysticism. But Benjamin was torn between mysticism and the political. While his friend Gershom Scholem encouraged him to pursue the mystical and the theological, other friends, like Bertolt Brecht and Theodor Adorno, suggested that Benjamin move more toward the political. With this tension in mind, it’s fascinating to see how Adorno describes Benjamin’s mystical tendencies in his essay “A Portrait of Walter Benjamin.” In Adorno’s descriptions we can see that he was grappling with Walter Benjamin’s mystical influences and the mystical aspects of his work. To be sure, one can sense Adorno’s anxiety around this subject.

Adorno begins his attempt with a simple statement about the main, singular theme of “Benjamin’s philosophy”:

The reconciliation of myth is the theme of Benjamin’s philosophy. (234, Prisms)

After he points this out, Adorno notes that this theme, “as in good musical variations,” “rarely states itself openly.” Rather, it hides and has to be read by way of hermeneutics that is acutely aware of the things we find in esoteric texts. Adorno associates this kind of hermeneutics with Kabbalah and, strangely enough, blames Kabbalah (and Gershom Scholem, indirectly) for the theme’s failure to be stated in a clear manner and “legitimated”:

Instead it remains hidden and shifts the burden of its legitimation to Jewish mysticism, to which Benjamin was introduced in his youth by his friend, Gershom Scholem, the distinguished student of cabbala. (234)

Because of this influence, Adorno is confused. He knows Benjamin was influenced by Kabbalah but he doesn’t know to “what extent” Benjamin was “influenced by the neo-platonic and antinomian-messianic tradition.” Apparently, Benjamin never told him and kept the extent of his influence to himself. Benjamin didn’t shoot from the hip; he kept his cards to himself. But there is much evidence that he did make use of the mystical-textual ruse.

There is much to indicate that Benjamin – who hardly ever showed his cards and who was motivated by a deeply seated opposition to thought of the shoot-from-the-hip variety…- made use of the popular mystic technique of pseudo-epigraphy.

Adorno suspects he did this because Benjamin no longer believed that one could access truth through “autonomous reflection.” The text is “sacred.” And like a Torah exegete, one needs to be surprised by the truth, to come across it by way of textual commentary and criticism. Instead of language being the “bearer of meaning or even expression,” Benjamin thought of language as the “crystallization of the ‘name.’”(234).

Why would Benjamin do this?

Adorno surmises, after grappling with Benjamin’s mystical tendencies, that Benjamin appealed to the notion of the sacred text because he was looking to save something of the “theological heritage” from oblivion:

He transposed the idea of the sacred text into the sphere of enlightenment, into which, according to Scholem, Jewish mysticism itself tends to culminate dialectically. His ‘essayism’ consists in treating profane texts as though they were sacred. This does not mean that he clung to theological relics or, as religious socialists, endowed the profane with transcendent significance. Rather, he looked to radical, defenseless profanation as the only chance for the theological heritage which squandered itself in profanity. (234)

The “key to the picture puzzles is lost,” but, says Adorno, they “must, as a baroque poem about melancholy says, ‘speak themselves.’”(235). Adorno mocks this when he suggests that this “procedure resembles Thorstein Veblen’s quip, that he studied foreign languages by staring at each word until he know what it meant”(235). In other words, simply looking at words – just looking at them – would in some way save something of a theological heritage. This suggests form, but not content. Adrono says that, given this approach to language, “the analogy” between Benjamin and “Kafka is unmistakable.” However, while Kafka retained, in his most “negative” moments, an “element of the rural, epic tradition,” Benjamin retains the more “urban.” Although Adorno’s rural/urban contrast is interesting, he doesn’t develop it. Apparently, it’s just a side note.

The next line shows us that Adorno just gives up: Adorno skips to Benjamin’s “mature period” because grappling with Benjamin’s mystical character makes him too anxious and, quite frankly, frustrated. This Benjamin, the mystical one, is “immature.” Adorno wants to deal with the more mature Benjamin who apparently leaves mysticism behind.

Adorno tells us that Benjamin exchanged the mystical exegetical hermeneutic for a more political one:

During his mature period, Benjamin was able to give himself over to socially critical insights without there being the slightest mental residue, and still without having to ban even one of his impulses. Exegetical power became the ability to see through the manifestations and utterances of bourgeois culture as hieroglyphs of its darkest secret – as ideologies. (235)

What many people might miss is that this kind of Benjamin, the more political one, is in Adorno’s comfort zone. He doesn’t have to grapple with this side of Benjamin’s work. To be sure, while Brecht wanted Benjamin to drop Kafka and the mystical, Adorno prompted Benjamin to create an “image of the bow” as the model for his Kafka essay: it would retain the tension between the political and the mystical.

But, as we can see from the above passage, Adorno had little patience for this. He had no interest in Benjamin’s mystical influences because, as we saw above, Benjamin could not “legitimate” his main theme. The “reconciliation of myth,” for Adorno, had to be legitimated through an exegesis directed at “bourgeois culture” and its “darkest secret…ideologies.” Anything short of that made Adorno anxious. We also see that what Adorno was anxious about is the fact that he had no idea how influenced Benjamin was by neo-Platonism and the antinomian-messianic tradition. One wonders why. Perhaps Adorno was worried that if Benjamin was very influenced by these mystical traditions and beliefs, his interest in political exegesis would ultimately be of secondary importance to him. And that worry is legitimate since that would suggest that Benjamin was more interested in the possibility of religion and faith than in politics.






On the Art of the Kabbalah

(De Arte Cabalistica)
Johann Reuchlin
Translated by Martin and Sarah Goodman
Introduction by G. Lloyd Jones
Introduction to this edition by Moshe Idel

376 pages
Introduction, Illus., woodcut
Paperback
November 1993
978-0-8032-8946-8
$29.95Add to Cart

About the Book
Reuchlin’s keen interest in Jewish mysticism resulted in the original publication of this work in 1517. The first part of this dialogue reflects on messianism, the second part on the relation of the Pythagorean system to the Kabbalah, and the third on the "practical Kabbalah."

The German humanist Johann Reuchlin (1455-1522) defended the value of Jewish scholarship and literature when it was unwise and unpopular to do so. As G. Lloyd Jones points out, "A marked mistrust of the Jews had developed among Christian scholars during the later Middle Ages. It was claimed that the rabbis had purposely falsified the text of the Old Testament and given erroneous explanations of passages which were capable of a christological interpretation." Christian scholars most certainly did not advocate learning the Hebrew language.

Reuchlin was exceptional in pursuing and promoting Hebrew studies, believing that a working knowledge of that language was essential for a true appreciation of the Bible and rabbinic literature. Refusing to join Christian contemporaries who wished to destroy the Kabbalah and the Talmud, he spoke out against ignorance. Christians could have a useful dialogue with Jews if they gained a thorough knowledge of the writings of Jewish exegetes and philosophers. Toward that end he proposed university endowments that aroused the fury of opponents and led to the famous "battle of the books."

Reuchlin's keen interest in Jewish mysticism resulted in the publication of De arte cabalistica in 1517. The first part of this dialogue reflects on messianism, the second part on the relation of the Pythagorean system to the Kabbalah, and tdhe third on the "practical Kabbalah." According to Jones, "Reuchlin demonstrates how Christians can make profitable use of Jewish mystical writings, and therefore shares with the reader his understanding of the art of the Kabbalah." That art will reach more readers in this modern English-language translation by Martin and Sarah Goodman. It reinforces the historical importance of the man who prevented the destruction of Jewish books and anticipated the more liberal climate of the Reformation.


 Ideas

Who's drawn to fascism? Postwar study of authoritarianism makes a comeback

The Authoritarian Personality was first published in 1950 and is widely studied now

After the Second World War, Theodor Adorno (pictured) and a group of scholars wanted to understand why so many people were drawn to dictatorships. Their study, The Authoritarian Personality published in 1950, is widely referenced today to understand the shifting politics of our own time. (Goethe University Frankfurt/Harper & Brothers)

By most accounts, 2021 was a terrible year for democracy, from the attack on the U.S. Capitol to the rolling back of civil liberties in India. Liberal democracies are being challenged — from within and without — and many expect authoritarian rule to continue to metastasize in 2022

Some scholars believe that a book published over 70 years ago — The Authoritarian Personality — could help researchers, and many of us today, grapple with troubling political trends in our own era.

"We see so many variations of right-wing populism, of authoritarianism, of neo-fascism around the globe that a book like this has gained, unfortunately, new relevance," said Peter E. Gordon, professor of history at Harvard University, who wrote the introduction to a new edition of The Authoritarian Personality published on its 70th anniversary.

Whether something like fascism could persist or re-emerge was something that concerned them deeply.- Peter E. Gordon

The lead author of the study was Theodor Adorno, a German philosopher and leading member of the Frankfurt School of social theory and critical philosophy. His three co-authors were: psychologist Else Frenkel-Brunswik, who fled anti-Jewish persecution in both Poland and Austria in the 1930s; University of California psychology professor, R. Nevitt Sanford; and PhD student Daniel J. Levinson, researcher into the psychology of ethnocentrism.

"These four individuals brought to their study a very deep concern about the future of democracy in Europe and also in America," according to Gordon.

Harvard history professor Peter E. Gordon says lessons from The Authoritarian Personality study and of recent history 'is that democracy is an extraordinarily fragile political form.' (Submitted by Peter Gordon)

"The question as to whether something like fascism could persist or re-emerge was something that concerned them deeply." 

Adorno and Frankel-Brunswick were both directly affected by Nazi Germany's antisemitism. Adorno's father, for example, was brutalized by the Gestapo. Both scholars were living in exile in southern California in the 1940s, part of a community of German émigrés living in and around a tiny neighbourhood of Pacific Palisades, which one writer once dubbed "Weimar on the Pacific."

The F-scale

The four scholars surveyed 2,000 people living in southern California in 1945 and 1946. 

"They want to figure out how do otherwise fairly normal individuals get drawn into radical-right authoritarian movements," said Gordon, but he warned that The Authoritarian Personality is often misunderstood.

"It's not a study of what causes fascism… it's a study of what they call the potentially fascist individual, by which they mean they want to figure out: what is it that makes someone susceptible to fascist propaganda?"

Children looking at Nazi propaganda from the Second World War at the Imperial War Museum in London, U.K., 1974. The top poster is an election poster for Adolf Hitler with the slogan 'Only Hitler.' (Evening Standard/Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

To answer that question they came up with questionnaires to determine where participants fell along four different scales: the antisemitism scale; the ethnocentrism scale; the political-economic conservatism scale; and the best-known, F-scale, to test for fascism. 

The original F-scale questionnaire included 77 questions to test for a person's susceptibility to fascist propaganda. Participants were asked how much they agreed or disagreed with a series of statements. For example: "obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn" and "the businessman and the manufacturer are much more important to society than the artist and the professor."

A subset of the study participants also underwent in-depth interviews, informed by Freudian psychoanalysis and the belief that relationships between children on the one hand, and parents and authority figures on the other were key to the shaping of a person's personality. 

"Each of the questions was designed to help the researchers determine how much the subjects of the study were influenced by a kind of deep bias toward a world that is unchangeable," said Kathy Kiloh, associate professor at OCAD University and the co-founder of The Association for Adorno Studies.

"Where the study is going here is the idea that we need to recognize that this reliance upon authority, it goes deep. It goes very deep."

Members of the Nazi German Women's Youth movement, 1935. (Keystone/Getty Images)

When the nearly 1,000-page study was published in 1950, it rocked the academic world. But it soon fell out of favour. Kiloh says The Authoritarian Personality was seen as "too dark," overly Freudian and simply not relevant for the times. 

During the post-war economic boom, democratic optimism ran high. "This book became one of merely historical interest because the scale was plotting something that people thought belonged purely to the past," said Gordon. 

Revival of the authoritarian personality

Donald Trump's entrance onto the political scene on June 16, 2015 was a turning point. That day he descended a golden escalator at Trump Towers in New York City and declared: "the American Dream is dead; I will bring it back" and announced he was running to be leader of the Republican party and president of the United States.

Matthew MacWilliams was shocked by what he saw.

"I watched Trump come down and then I listened to the speech and I said: that was an authoritarian speech," he said. "I've never heard anything like that in America."

MacWilliams wondered if Trump were "activating" authoritarians in his party. To find out, he conducted a poll of Republican primary voters and found that those with authoritarian leanings were much more likely to prefer Trump.  

"Even when you put in education and other big, big variables that should soak up all of the predictability of the variable," said MacWilliams, "and it didn't for any other candidate. Ted Cruz, nope. Marco Rubio, nope. It was Donald Trump."

'The U.S. has become a dumping ground for everybody else’s problems,' said Donald Trump during the announcement of his presidential candidacy on June 16, 2015. (Christopher Gregory/Getty Images)

MacWilliams wrote an op-ed arguing that Trump appealed to people with authoritarian tendencies in the party. The article went viral. It also triggered a backlash and MacWilliams received threats. 

"It sort of fits with that American exceptionalism that somehow we came across in our little boats and during that long voyage, we were washed of all authoritarianism. And the fact is, no, that didn't happen," said MacWilliams.

"The institutions and the politics aren't responding to the threat because they still think it can't happen here." 

The poll MacWilliams conducted — and the questions he asked to test for authoritarian leanings — drew on the intellectual history and tradition that infused The Authoritarian Personality. Although work on authoritarianism fell out of fashion in academic circles, a small group of scholars kept working to address the original study's methodological shortcomings and biases.

Testing for authoritarianism today

Rather than the long list in the original F-scale questionnaire, researchers today are asking four to eight simple questions, none of them directly about politics. They're parenting questions, designed to get a sense of a person's relationship with authority. The original F-scale questionnaire included several questions about parenting that are quite similar to the questions being asked by researchers today. 

These four questions have been asked around the world by MacWilliams and other scholars. 

F-scale used for parenting

People have different ideas about the ways that children should be raised. Here are four pairs of attributes that are considered:

  • Independence or Respect for Elders
  • Curiosity or Good Manners
  • Self-Reliance or Obedience
  • Being Considerate or Being Well-Behaved

"The thing about the questions [is] they have nothing to do with politics or political behaviour," said MacWilliams. "And that's what makes them so powerful. Because it isn't like I ask: do you think we need a strong leader to ignore the Constitution and Parliament? Yes, I do! Oh, you might be an authoritarian!... But we know it's out there. We can observe it. These questions are our filter for observing it. They aren't perfect, but they're really good at what they're doing." 

Of course, most parents value all eight attributes and encourage them in their children.

"What's interesting is what happens when you force people to make a choice to prioritize," said Jonathan Weiler, professor of global studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and co-author of Prius or Pick Up: How the Answers to Four Simple Questions Explain America's Great Divide.

"When people do prioritize, when they are forced to make a choice, the choices they make have an incredibly powerful relationship to their views about gay marriage, about race, about gender in society, about politics more broadly." 

Scholars like Jonathan Weiler and Matthew MacWilliams have found that about 25 per cent of the American population are on the non-authoritarian end of the spectrum, 35 per cent are somewhere in the middle and 30-35 per cent are on the authoritarian end of the scale.

Weiler says those numbers haven't changed much over the years. What has changed is the relationship between a person's worldview and their politics. Politics used to be about the role of the state and the size of government.

Now it's much more about feelings, according to Weiler.

'The era of rationality is over,' says Jonathan Weiler. ‘People, in general, are more motivated by their emotions and by social pressures … than most of us want to believe.' (Jonathan Weiler/Mariner Books)

A new, highly emotional partisan divide has opened up in this era of polarization and it's apparent in the evolution of how Americans answer the four parenting questions.

"When these questions were first being asked in 1992, there was a pretty even split among Democrats between those who answered these questions in an authoritarian direction and those who answered them in a non-authoritarian direction," he said.

But all of that had changed by 2020.

"People who identified as Democrat were far more likely to answer these parenting questions in a non-authoritarian way and people who identified as Republican were far more likely to answer these questions in an authoritarian way."

Frank Graves is president and founder of Ekos Research Associates and an adjunct professor in the Department of Sociology at Carleton University. He sees a similar pattern now playing out in Canadian politics. 

"What we're seeing is the centre is hollowed and what we're seeing is [an] increasingly more fragmented political landscape, where there is a place for you if you're a right-wing authoritarian," said Graves.

Graves has been asking the four parenting questions in polls in Canada and he is noticing that feelings on the authoritarian end of the scale have been morphing over the last two years of living during the pandemic.

Like the virus itself, "it seems that under a variety of pressures, this ordered populist outlook is also mutating," he said. Graves believes misinformation is playing a key role: "the individuals in this group exhibit almost zero trust for government, science, media."

"The space for thoughtful discussion is being hollowed out by social media forums that reward the loudest voice and the most extreme attitude," said Peter Gordon.

"All individuals have that potential to become stereotypical and to respond to the world in a stereotyped or rigid fashion and the ultimate warning of the book is that's what's going to destroy democracy." 


Guests in this episode:

Stuart Jeffries is a journalist and the author of Grand Hotel Abyss: the Lives of the Frankfurt School.  

Peter E. Gordon is the Amabel B. James Professor of History at Harvard University. He wrote the introduction to a new edition of The Authoritarian Personality, published in 2019, ahead of the study's 70th anniversary.

Kathy Kiloh is an associate professor at OCAD University in Toronto and co-founder of The Association for Adorno Studies.

Molly Worthen is associate professor in the history department at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

Matthew MacWilliams is a scholar of American politics and political culture and the author of On Fascism: 12 Lessons From American History.

Jonathan Weiler is a professor of global studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and the co-author of two books about political psychology and polarization in the United States, including Prius or Pick Up: How the Answers to Four Simple Questions Explain America's Great Divide. 

Frank Graves is the president and founder of Ekos Research Associates and an adjunct professor in the Department of Sociology at Carleton University.


*This episode was produced by Kristin Nelson. 

THEODOR ADORNO STUDIES

ERIC EJ960330 
John Locke and the Myth of Race in America: Demythologizing the Paradoxes of the Enlightenment as Visited in the Present

The English Enlightenment philosopher John Locke (1632-1704) is one of the most prominent figures in the development of liberal Anglo-American political thought. Locke's writings had a significant influence on the American Revolution and founding principles of the United States in fundamental ways. The author argues that Locke's influence is pervasive not only in American political ideology but also in the contradictions between stated ideals and institutions that have sustained inequality and oppression in a land that values equality and freedom. Max Horkheimer and Theodore Adorno in their work on the Enlightenment note that every effort to rationalize the foundations of civil society also embedded those foundations in ideology and mythology. One of the myths that emerged out of the scientific revolution and effort to ground human progress in reason was the fiction of multiple races of humankind. This idea, while not uncommon in Anglo-European thought by the 19th century, became especially important in the United States in spite of the fact that it directly contradicts the ideology of equality stated in the founding documents. The author argues that this apparent contradiction reflects and is consistent with contradictions in Locke's attempt to logically ground the rationale for a civil society in self-evident laws of nature. The political thought of Locke is examined through his writings. Locke's personal life is also relevant as it set up the dialectic of his thought in relationship to the uneasy times in which he lived. Locke's political philosophy supported the rise of democratic institutions and basic principles of universal human rights and the character of just governments, while he was also a strong advocate for colonialism and early forms of entrepreneurial capitalism, including the formation of a colony based on slave labor. America had a special meaning for Locke as he worked through his arguments on the rationale for human advancement in economic and civic life. This study focuses on the inconsistencies in Locke's political thought and writings related to equality and inequality. The discussion begins with the impact of the Lockean tradition in relationship to the origin of Locke's ideas in his personal circumstances. As such, the analysis examines the intersection of liberalism with illiberalism, democracy, and concepts of race and racism. The conclusion cites historical examples of legal racial segregation and inequality in the United States with a call to better understand the logic of the past so that people can advance arguments for the ideals of liberal government in the future. (Contains 40 footnotes.)


EDUCATION AFTER AUSCHWITZ
THEODORE ADORNO






When Adorno had his appearances in the lecture hall or auditorium at Frankfurt
university in the 1960s not all of the students present found it a pleasure to
listen and taking notes mainly because they were teacher training students and
didn´t feel comfortable with two facts in the curriculum they were obliged to
follow: a) they weren´t allowed to merely concentrate on their core school
subjects (Fachstudium) and b) they had to pass an exam in philosophy and
could well meet Prof. Adorno in the exam room, being asked awkward question
about ontology, history or epistemology. To give us an impression of what was
usual at the time I quote from a text in this collection entitled “Philosophy
and Teachers”: “This test therefore should permit us to see whether those
candidates, who as teachers in secondary schools are burdened with a heavy
responsibility for the spiritual and material development of Germany, are
intellectuals, or, as Ibsen said more than eighty years ago, merely specialized
technicians (bloße Fachmenschen).” (21) To pass the Staatsexamen
was the conditio sine qua non in the teacher´s profession - the federal
state being - as a monopsonist - virtually the only source of employment on the
scondary level in the whole country, because for a German mind it was - and in
a major part still is - unquestionable that a teacher on the secondary level
not only has passed several university exams but also has to join the ranks and
files of the civil service (Beamte, Besoldungsgruppen). For
Adorno in particular and the subject of philosophy in general it was then quite
a privileged situation compared with today when as a lecturer in the subject of
philosophy you will hardly meet any student that has not signed up voluntarily
for your subject and for your class. This might explain why Suhrkamp Verlag,
Adorno´s main publisher, every now and then and on a regular basis threw new
paperback books written and compiled by Adorno on the market for an audience of
students that had manifestly a much larger catchment area than it would have
today. The book here in question was subsequently published by Columbia UP in
1998 comprising two different of such publications from the 1960s - Eingriffe.
Neun kritische Modelle, FfM 1963 (es 10) and Stichworte. Kritische Modelle
2, FfM 1969 (es 347) which together add up to some twenty essays by Adorno that
range from Television to Law Today and from Progress to the question ´What is
German?´. I cannot advice readers to take an overdose of Adorno by reading it
all and at once but to take their time and to pick and choose. I myself have
written the following text in German on chapter two (see under Reviews).


Reviewed Work(s): 
The Origin of Negative Dialectics by Theodor W. Adorno; Walter Benjamin; Frankfurt Institute; Susan Buck-Morss 
The Frankfurt School. The Critical Theories of Max Horkeimer and Theodor W. Adorno by Zoltan Tar; Michael Landman
 Gillian Rose History and Theory, Vol. 18, No. 1. (Feb., 1979), pp. 126-135



29
Jun
10
By criticalkabbalist
Categories: Uncategorized
Tags: Frankfurt School, kabbalah, marxism, Theodor Adorno, Tiqqun, Walter Benjami

For the critical thoughtist, Theodor Adorno (1903 – 1969) is a guiding light. A secular Jewish marxist of the Frankfurt School, he proposed a negative critique of exisiting social conditions that must avoid the affirmative illusions of the present. Interesting then that in one of his key works, ‘Minima moralia: reflections on a damaged life’ he concluded in a tone clearly influenced – like his late friend Walter Benjamin – by Jewish religious conceptions, possibly even the notion of Tiqqun as the redemption of the broken world associated with Lurianic Kabbalah:

‘The only philosophy which can be responsibly practised in face of despair is the attempt to contemplate all things from the standpoint of redemption. Knowledge has no light but that shed on the world by redemption: all else is reconstruction, mere technique. Perspectives must be fashioned that displace and estrange the world, reveal it to be, with its rifts and crevices, as indigent and distorted as it will appear one day in the messianic light. To gain such perspectives without velleity or violence, entirely from self contact with its objects – this alone is the task of thought. It is the simplest of all things, because consummate negativity, once squarely faced, delineates the mirror-image of its opposite. But it is also the utterly impossible thing, because it presupposes a standpoint removed, even though by a hair’s breadth, from the scope of existence, whereas we well know that any possible knowledge must not only be first wrested from what is, if it shall hold good, but is also marked, for this very reason, by the same distortion and indigence which it seeks to escape. The more passionately thought denies its conditionality for the sake of the unconditional, the more unconsciously, and so calamitously, it is delivered up to the world. Even its own impossibility it must at last comprehend for the sake of the possible, but beside the demand thus placed on thought, the question of the reality or unreality of redemption itself hardly matters.’


Mar 24, 2015 — Adorno and Horkheimer's essay “Elements of Anti-Semitism: Limits of ... of the Kabbalah profanes the secular absolute of historicism, ...