FROM THE ARCHIVES; WHO WON

Slowly but surely, China is moving into Afghanistan



RUPERT STONE

2013

As the war in Afghanistan winds down, China looks to make Afghanistan a bigger part of its regional ambitions.

In 2013, Chinese president Xi Jinping inaugurated the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a vast network of infrastructure projects spanning more than 60 countries. But the BRI largely excludes Afghanistan, moving through Central Asia and Pakistan instead.

That may now be changing. China has steadily increased its involvement in Afghanistan in recent years, and a nascent peace process offers some hope that stability might return to the country, bringing with it the possibility of greater trade and investment.

This shift is reflected in a major new report on the BRI’s expansion into Afghanistan by the Organization for Policy Research and Development Studies (DROPS), a Kabul-based think tank.

The 15-month research project has amassed a vast amount of material gleaned from multiple sources, including previously undisclosed government documents and interviews with high-ranking Afghan officials, making it by far the most comprehensive treatment of Afghanistan’s potential role in the BRI to date.

“Looking at the BRI map, it seemed that it was bypassing Afghanistan,” said Mariam Safi, Director of DROPS and one of the report’s co-authors. “So, we wanted to know if there is any thinking in the Afghan government and stakeholders here on the BRI when it comes to Afghanistan’s potential linkage”.

Afghanistan should fit well into the BRI. It has a serious infrastructure deficit, making it an ideal candidate for Chinese investment. It is also the shortest route between Central Asia and South Asia, and between China and the Middle East, while also serving as a gateway to the Arabian Sea.

But China’s role in Afghanistan in the past two decades has been limited. It did not contribute troops to the US-led war that began in 2001, and Beijing has so far refrained from the sorts of big-ticket investments planned for other neighbouring countries, such as Pakistan and Kazakhstan.

But its economic footprint has expanded. China is now Afghanistan’s largest business investor, it has pledged increasing amounts of aid to the country, and Chinese companies have been involved in construction projects.

Beijing has also shown some interest in Afghanistan’s cornucopia of natural resources, which includes vast deposits of essential minerals such as lithium (used in mobile phone batteries).

The country’s weak logistics and security situation make it difficult to extract and transport these resources. But China has got its foot in the door, winning rights to Amu Darya Basin oil in the north and the massive Mes Aynak copper mine near Kabul.

Moreover, Beijing has taken modest steps to include Afghanistan in the BRI. In 2016 Beijing and Kabul signed a Memorandum of Understanding. China has reportedly pledged at least $100 million in funding. However, this is a tiny amount compared to the vast sums proposed for other countries, like Pakistan. And, according to Raffaello Pantucci, director of international security studies at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), “We still don’t see large projects going forward that quickly on the ground.”

But there has been some progress. In September 2016, for example, the first direct freight train from China reached the Afghan border town of Hairatan. An air corridor linking Kabul and the Chinese city of Urumqi has also been launched under the BRI. Then, in May 2017, Afghan officials attended the massive Belt and Road Forum in China, and in October Afghanistan joined the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which funds BRI projects.

Kabul has made connectivity a key pillar of its foreign policy, launching various infrastructure projects that could eventually be “brought under the BRI fold,” Mariam Safi tells TRT World.

Reluctant bedfellows

One such initiative is the Five Nations Railway running from China to Iran via Afghanistan, which is still at the feasibility study stage but aligns well with Beijing’s priorities in the Belt and Road. Another is a planned north-south railway corridor that would connect Kunduz with Torkham on the Pakistani border.

Afghanistan has bold plans to expand its almost non-existent railway network. According to internal Afghan government documents reviewed by DROPS, China has pledged “huge support” for these efforts. The north-south railway could facilitate the transport of natural resources while also connecting to Pakistan.

Furthermore, there are various energy projects which could fit well into the Belt and Road vision, such as CASA-1000 and TAP-500 that would export surplus electricity from Central Asia to energy-starved South Asia via Afghanistan, or the TAPI gas pipeline, whose Afghan segment began construction last year (although there is reason to doubt its progress).

Another project that could be included in BRI is the Digital Silk Road fibre optic cable network, funded by China, the US and other partners, which has already connected at least 25 provinces in Afghanistan while aiming to link to China, South and Central Asia, the Middle East, and Europe, according to DROPS.

China has generally eschewed a leadership role in Afghanistan, preferring to work with foreign partners. Some projects, including the Five Nations Railway and Lapis Lazuli Corridor, are jointly financed by China and multilateral lending institutions such as the ADB.

“There has been a lot of cooperative activity on the ground,” Raffaello Pantucci told TRT World, and Beijing seems to view Afghanistan as a place where it can “test out” difficult relationships. China has collaborated with the US there, despite tensions between the two countries, and recently agreed to cooperate with its rival, India.

Sino-Indian efforts in Afghanistan face a hurdle, though, in the form of Beijing’s close relationship with Delhi’s nemesis, Pakistan. 2015 saw the inauguration of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a vast energy and infrastructure project involving more than $60 billion of potential investment. CPEC was intended to be the Belt and Road’s “flagship” corridor, and, as such, it is already more advanced than other components of the BRI.

According to the report, CPEC is “one of the most feasible options” for integrating Afghanistan into the BRI. There are some cross-border rail and road links at varying stages of development. While none of these is near completion, China clearly wants to move forward.

In 2017 Beijing convened a trilateral dialogue with Pakistan and Afghanistan partly to discuss extending CPEC, but also to ameliorate the rocky relationship between its two neighbours, which has seen border closures and skirmishes. These efforts paid off, as Afghan-Pakistani relations improved in 2018, with a new cooperation agreement in May.

Afghan officials interviewed by DROPS were generally “positive” about CPEC, the report says, but some were wary of excessive dependence on Pakistan. Indeed, as relations with Islamabad soured in recent years, Kabul has diversified its trade away from Pakistan to Iran.

However, the officials were clear “across the board” that Afghanistan still needs Pakistan because it provides the quickest route to the sea, according to Mariam Safi. And, vice versa, Pakistan hopes that Afghanistan may eventually provide access to Central Asian markets.

“At the end of the day there was the realisation that both countries need each other,” Safi told TRT World.

Neither the Afghan nor Pakistani governments responded to requests for comment.

Increasing Chinese footprint

While China’s economic role in Afghanistan has increased, its security presence has grown even more. As the US started withdrawing forces from Afghanistan in 2011, the country became increasingly unstable, raising the risk that insecurity would spill out into Central Asia and Pakistan, potentially disrupting China’s Belt and Road projects there.

Beijing has also been concerned about what they call the threat posed by Uighur and other terrorists using Afghanistan as a base for attacks against the Chinese mainland. In response, China has intensified security on its border, reportedly engaging in joint patrols with Afghan forces and building a base in Badakhshan province, while also launching the Quadrilateral Coordination and Cooperation Mechanism (QCCM) with Afghanistan, Pakistan and Tajikistan.

To counter instability in Afghanistan, China has also stepped up its involvement in peace talks to end the war. Since 2015, it has been involved in a number of multilateral initiatives, including the Quadrilateral Coordination Group and, more recently, the Moscow Format. Beijing has cultivated good ties with the Taliban, meeting them several times in 2018 alone.

Peace may now be on the horizon. The Trump administration has made unprecedented progress in its efforts to negotiate with the Taliban, reaching a provisional agreement in January. The Afghan government still needs to join the talks, however, and there is a long road ahead.

For Beijing, peace would not only reduce the terrorist threat emanating from Afghanistan, but it could also boost Chinese economic activity.

“Afghanistan has been peripheral to the Belt and Road because it simply hasn’t been possible to pursue a serious economic agenda there,” said Andrew Small, a senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the US and author of The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia's New Geopolitics.

“If there is a political settlement, that could change – though China will still tread very carefully until it’s clear that any settlement holds.”

At the launch of the DROPS report in January, Beijing’s new ambassador to Kabul, Liu Jinsong, said that China was facilitating peace talks to enable Afghanistan’s integration into the BRI, describing the country as a “vital partner” in the initiative.

The appointment of Mr Jinsong, a former director of the Silk Road Fund, “shows that Beijing now considers Afghanistan a priority and wants to include it firmly in its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI),” according to the Berlin-based thinktank, MERICS.

While there is still a long way to go, Beijing is entering a new phase of engagement with its neighbour. “It is certainly true that China is playing a much greater (and higher profile) role in Afghanistan,” said Peter Frankopan, professor of global history at the University of Oxford, whose latest book, The New Silk Roads, examines emerging forms of connectivity in Asia.

“My best guess is that this really is a case of a new page being turned,” Frankopan told TRT World.

The Chinese embassy in Kabul could not be reached for comment. Asked to comment on CPEC’s possible extension to Afghanistan, China’s deputy chief of mission in Islamabad, Zhao Lijian, referred TRT World to a recent interview in which he described Chinese plans to facilitate trade and ease tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The odd couple: China's deepening relationship with the Taliban


RUPERT STONE

2 AUG 2019

China's first engaged the Taliban to protect its interests in Afghanistan in the 90s. Decades later, history repeats itself.

One is a communist state wary of the threat posed by Islamic extremism, the other a group of religious hardliners with alleged links to Al Qaeda. But, despite their differences, relations between China and the Afghan Taliban go back decades and appear to be strengthening.

Beijing was initially concerned when the Taliban took power in Afghanistan in the mid-1990s. The group had ties to the anti-Chinese terrorist organisation, the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), which was to allowed to operate camps in the country. China, therefore, happily supported the first round of UN sanctions against the Taliban regime.

But, driven by a mix of security concerns and economic factors, Beijing eventually sought to improve its ties with the movement.

In the late 1990s, China came to believe that the best way to manage the potential terrorist threat from Afghanistan was to engage with the Taliban and strike a deal. Diplomatic relations would also open the potential for trade.

In 1999, Chinese officials broke the ice and flew to Kabul, where they opened economic ties and launched flights between Kabul and Urumqi. China’s ambassador in Pakistan sought a meeting with Mullah Omar. A group of Chinese think tank analysts travelled to Kandahar to make preparations.

According to Abdul Salam Zaeef, former Taliban envoy to Pakistan, the Chinese ambassador was the only foreign diplomat to maintain good relations with their mission in Islamabad at this time. Indeed, Zaeef’s comments about China in his memoir are far less vitriolic than his frequent denunciations of long-time backer Pakistan, which detained Zaeef after 9/11.

The Chinese envoy eventually met Mullah Omar in Kandahar in late 2000. Beijing wanted the Taliban to stop harbouring ethnic Uyghur militants allegedly operating in Afghanistan with ETIM. In return, the Taliban hoped that China would recognise their government and oppose further UN sanctions.

But this deal did not materialise. While Omar did restrain ETIM, he did not expel them. And Beijing did not oppose new UN sanctions against the Taliban; it only abstained.

However, Chinese companies expanded their activities in Afghanistan, and, on September 11, 2001, the two sides signed an MoU to enhance economic ties further.

After 9/11 Beijing gave its backing to Washington’s ‘war on terror’ and supported Hamid Karzai’s new government in Kabul. However, it did not commit troops to the US-led invasion of Afghanistan, and its economic footprint remained small. China was wary of a long-term American military presence in its backyard.

Beijing, therefore, hedged, supporting the Afghan government while maintaining informal contacts with the Taliban. It may have used the Chinese-run Saindak mine in Pakistan for clandestine meetings with the group, according to Andrew Small in The China-Pakistan Axis.

China and Pakistan were the only states to maintain their ties with the Taliban after 9/11.

The group may even have received Chinese weapons, according to Small, and there were also suspicions that the Taliban intentionally avoided attacking Chinese infrastructure projects in Afghanistan. The copper mine at Aynak, near Kabul, had been untouched by the Haqqani Network since China secured extraction rights in 2007.

Hedge your bets

China’s ambivalent foreign policy behaviour in Afghanistan is analogous to its approach in the Middle East, where it also courts opposing sides in regional disputes. As Jonathan Fulton has shown, Beijing has relations with Israel and the Palestinians, and maintains partnerships with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iran, a strategy Fulton describes as “fence-sitting”.

For the first decade of the US war in Afghanistan, China’s involvement with the country was minimal. Economic opportunities were dogged by corruption, insecurity and political instability. However, when the Obama administration announced its intention to withdraw US forces by 2014, Beijing grew concerned by the prospect of instability on its border.

The risk of terrorist violence haemorrhaging out of Afghanistan encouraged China to engage more deeply with its neighbour. Chinese diplomats became involved in several multilateral initiatives to seek a political settlement with the Taliban, first at Murree in 2015, then via the Quadrilateral Coordination Group with the US, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.

China was part of the Kabul Process convened by President Ghani in 2017 and sent its diplomats to attend talks with the Taliban and other Afghan politicians in Moscow in 2018. That year President Xi Jinping resuscitated the Afghanistan Contact Group of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which met again this summer.

There have also been multiple bilateral meetings between Chinese officials and the Taliban in recent years. These discussions were secret and unconfirmed by the Chinese government. But, in June, Beijing publicly announced that it had received a Taliban delegation led by deputy Mullah Baradar (who served eight years in prison in Pakistan before his release in 2018).

China participated in two trilateral events with Russia and the US this year, and in 2017 convened another trilateral forum with long-time foes, Afghanistan and Pakistan, to promote ongoing reconciliation efforts and discuss the possible extension of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to Afghanistan.

Beijing is concerned that an unstable Afghanistan could provide a safe haven for Uyghur militants, including those currently fighting in Syria. And China is more exposed now due to its massive infrastructure projects in Pakistan and Central Asia, areas especially vulnerable to terrorist spillover from Afghanistan.

Moreover, China’s economic role in Afghanistan has been growing. It is now the country’s biggest foreign investor and appears keen to extend the Belt and Road Initiative there. True, Beijing’s investments in Afghanistan pale in comparison to those in Pakistan, for example, but an end to the war could pave the way for deeper involvement.

A hard bargain

China is well-placed to act as a mediator in Afghanistan. It has decent relations with both sides in the conflict. It is perhaps even better placed to influence the Taliban than Pakistan, which has harassed and detained members of the group since 9/11. Moreover, it has substantial economic incentives to offer.

The Taliban are keen to avoid the isolation they experienced in the 1990s when only three governments (Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE) recognised their regime. Furthermore, they are alert to the need for foreign investment. They have discussed infrastructure with the Uzbek government, for example, and gave their backing to the TAPI gas pipeline project.

But the Taliban’s interest in exploiting the country’s natural resources goes well beyond gas. The group also profits from the mining of Afghanistan’s vast mineral deposits.

“The Taliban has realised that Afghanistan’s mineral wealth offers opportunities to get rich,” writes Peter Frankopan in his new book, The New Silk Roads.

During a trip to Beijing, Taliban delegates were “visibly moved by technology that they told their hosts was inconceivable in Afghanistan because of war,” the New York Times reported. And economic issues were again discussed on the group’s recent visit to China, according to Rahimullah Yusufzai.

Caution is warranted, though. Beijing’s engagement with the Taliban could fail as it did in the 1990s. Then, as now, the group gave assurances that it would not allow terror groups to use Afghan soil for plots against foreign countries. Then, as now, it wanted better trade with the outside world and an end to international isolation.

That all came crashing down in the carnage of 9/11. If the US leaves Afghanistan without a proper deal, history could repeat itself.

Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions, viewpoints and editorial policies of TRT World

AUTHOR
Rupert Stone
@RupertStone83
Rupert Stone is an Istanbul-based freelance journalist working on South Asia and the Middle East.

Pakistani premier claims US military equipment left behind in Afghanistan is now in militant hands

MUNIR AHMED
Mon, September 4, 2023 

In this photo released by Pakistan's President Office, President Arif Alvi, right, administrates oath from Anwaar-ul-Haq Kakar as caretaker Prime Minister during a ceremony, in Islamabad, Pakistan, Monday, Aug. 14, 2023. Kakar was sworn in as the country's prime minister to head a caretaker national government that will oversee parliamentary elections amid one of the worst economic crises the Islamic nation has faced, officials said. 

(Pakistan President Office vis AP) 

ISLAMABAD (AP) — Pakistan's caretaker prime minister claimed on Monday that U.S. military equipment left behind during the American withdrawal from Afghanistan has fallen into militant hands and ultimately made its way to the Pakistani Taliban.

The equipment — which includes a wide variety of items, from night vision goggles to firearms — is now “emerging as a new challenge” for Islamabad as it has enhanced the fighting capabilities of the Pakistani Taliban, Prime Minister Anwaar-ul-Haq Kakar said.

The Pakistani Taliban, known as Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan or TTP, have over the past months intensified attacks on Pakistan's security forces. They are a separate militant group but an ally of the Afghan Taliban.

The Taliban overran Afghanistan in mid-August 2021 as U.S. and NATO troops were in the last weeks of their chaotic pullout from the country after 20 years of war. In the face of the Taliban sweep, the U.S.-backed and trained Afghan military crumbled.

There is no definite information on how much U.S. equipment was left behind — but the Taliban seized U.S.-supplied firepower, recovering guns, ammunition, helicopters and other modern military equipment from Afghan forces who surrendered it. Though no one knows the exact value, U.S. defense officials have confirmed it is significant.

Speaking to a select group of journalists at his office Monday in the Pakistani capital of Islamabad, Kakar did not provide any evidence to support his allegation or directly link the Afghan Taliban and the TTP. He said there was a need to adopt a “coordinated approach” to tackling the challenge of the leftover equipment.

Kakar also did not criticize the Afghan Taliban — Islamabad has tried to reach out and act as an interlocutor between the international community and the new rulers in Kabul, who have been ostracized for the harsh edicts they imposed since their takeover.

However, two security officials in Islamabad told The Associated Press that the TTP either bought the equipment from the Afghan Taliban, or was given it as an ally. The officials spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss the subject.

The Pakistani Taliban have also released statements and video clips in recent months, claiming they possess, for example, guns with laser and thermal sighting systems.

TTP fighters now target Pakistani troops from a distance, while before their only weapons were AK-47 assault rifles, one of the officials said, without elaborating.

Still, Pakistani security forces will continue to fight militants "to defend our home, children, mosques and places of worship,” Kakar said.

Kakar, 52, was sworn in last month as Pakistan's youngest prime minister to head a caretaker government. His Cabinet will run day-to-day affairs until the next parliamentary elections. The vote, which was to be held in October or November, is likely to be delayed until at least January 2024 as Pakistan's elections oversight body says it needs time to redraw constituencies to reflect the latest census results.

Kakar ruled out any talks between the government and the TTP since the militants unilaterally broke off a cease-fire last November.

Since the Taliban takeover next door, Islamabad says TTP fighters have increasingly been given shelter by the Afghan Taliban, straining relations between Islamabad and Kabul.

Pakistan became a key ally of Washington in its war against terror after the 9/11 attacks in the United States. This majority Muslim country is currently facing one of the worst economic crises even as its political turmoil deepens.

At his news conference, Kakar also stressed that all political parties — including the Pakistan Tahreek-e-Insaf opposition party of now imprisoned former Prime Minister Imran Khan — would be allowed to participate in the upcoming elections.

“We are here just to assist electoral process,” Kakar said.

He did not directly mention Khan, who is not eligible to run in the elections as he is serving a three-year prison term for corruption. Khan, who was ousted in a no-confidence vote in April 2022, remains the country’s leading opposition figure.

 

The AP Interview: Top Pakistan diplomat details Taliban plan

By ASSOCIATED PRESS

PUBLISHED: 01:05 EDT, 23 September 2021 

 e-ma 

UNITED NATIONS (AP) - Be realistic. Show patience. Engage. And above all, don't isolate. Those are the pillars of an approach emerging in Pakistan to deal with the fledgling government that is suddenly running the country next door once again - Afghanistan's resurgent, often-volatile Taliban.

Pakistan's government is proposing that the international community develop a road map that leads to diplomatic recognition of the Taliban - with incentives if they fulfill its requirements - and then sit down face to face and talk it out with the militia's leaders.

Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi outlined the idea Wednesday in an interview with The Associated Press on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly's meeting of world leaders.

"If they live up to those expectations, they would make it easier for themselves, they will get acceptability, which is required for recognition," Qureshi told the AP. "At the same time, the international community has to realize: What´s the alternative? What are the options? This is the reality, and can they turn away from this reality?"

He said Pakistan "is in sync with the international community" in wanting to see a peaceful, stable Afghanistan with no space for terrorist elements to increase their foothold, and for the Taliban to ensure "that Afghan soil is never used again against any country."

"But we are saying, be more realistic in your approach," Qureshi said. "Try an innovative way of engaging with them. The way that they were being dealt with has not worked."

Pakistan's Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi speaks during an interview with The Associated Press, Wednesday, Sept. 22, 2021, in New York. (AP Photo/Mary Altaffer)

Expectations from the Taliban leadership could include an inclusive government and assurances for human rights, especially for women and girls, Qureshi said. In turn, he said, the Afghan government might be motivated by receiving development, economic and reconstruction aid to help recover from decades of war.

He urged the United States, the International Monetary Fund and other countries that have frozen Afghan government funds to immediately release the money so it can be used "for promoting normalcy in Afghanistan." And he pledged that Pakistan is ready to play a "constructive, positive" role in opening communications channels with the Taliban because it, too, benefits from peace and stability.

This is the second time that the Taliban, who adhere to a strict version of Islam, have ruled Afghanistan. The first time, from 1996 to 2001, ended when they were ousted by a U.S.-led coalition after the 9/11 attacks, which were directed by Osama bin Laden from Afghanistan.

During that rule, Taliban leaders and police barred girls from school and prohibited women from working outside the home or leaving it without a male escort. After they were overthrown, Afghan women still faced challenges in the male-dominated society but increasingly stepped into powerful positions in government and numerous fields.

But when the U.S. withdrew its military from Afghanistan last month, the government collapsed and a new generation of the Taliban resurged, taking over almost immediately. In the weeks since, many countries have expressed disappointment that the Taliban´s interim government is not inclusive as its spokesman had promised.

While the new government has allowed young girls to attend school, it has not yet allowed older girls to return to secondary school, and most women to return to work despite a promise in April that women "can serve their society in the education, business, health and social fields while maintaining correct Islamic hijab."

Pakistan, which shares a long border with Afghanistan, has a long and sometimes conflicted relationship with its neighbor that includes attempts to prevent terrorism there and, some say, also encouraging it. The Islamabad government has a fundamental vested interest in ensuring that whatever the new Afghanistan offers, it is not a threat to Pakistan.

That, Qureshi says, requires a steady and calibrated approach.

"It has to be a realistic assessment, a pragmatic view on both sides, and that will set the tone for recognition eventually," the Pakistani minister said. The good news, he said: The Taliban are listening, "and they are not insensitive to what is being said by neighbors and the international community."

How does he know they're listening? He says the interim government, drawn mostly from Afghanistan´s dominant Pashtun ethnic group, made some additions on Tuesday. It added representatives from the country's ethnic minorities - Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras, who are Shiite Muslims in the majority Sunni Muslim country.

"Yes, there are no women yet," Qureshi said. "But let us let the situation evolve."

He stressed that the Taliban must make decisions in coming days and weeks that will enhance their acceptability.

"What the international community can do, in my view, is sit together and work out a roadmap," Qureshi said. "And if they fulfill those expectations, this is what the international community can do to help them stabilize their economy. This is the humanitarian assistance that can be provided. This is how they can help rebuild Afghanistan, reconstruction and so on and so forth."

He added: "With this roadmap ahead, I think an international engagement can be more productive."

On Wednesday night, U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said after a meeting of the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council that all five nations - the United States, China, Britain, Russia and France - want "an Afghanistan at peace, stable, where humanitarian aid can be distributed without problems or discrimination."

He also described a hoped-for "Afghanistan where the rights of women and girls are respected, an Afghanistan that won´t be a sanctuary for terrorism, an Afghanistan where we have an inclusive government representing the different sectors of the population."

Qureshi said there are different forums where the international community can work out the best way to approach the situation. In the meantime, he asserted, things seem to be stabilizing. Less than six weeks after the Taliban seized power on Aug. 15, he said, Pakistan has received information that the law-and-order situation has improved, fighting has stopped and many internally displaced Afghans are going home.

"That´s a positive sign," Qureshi said.

He said Pakistan hasn´t seen a new influx of Afghan refugees - a sensitive issue for Pakistanis, who are highly motivated to prevent it. A humanitarian crisis, a foundering economy and workers who return to jobs and school but aren't getting salaries and don't have money could cause Afghans to flee across the porous border into Pakistan, which has suffered economically from such arrivals over decades of conflict.

Qureshi prescribed patience and realism. After all, he says, every previous attempt to stabilize Afghanistan has failed, so don't expect new efforts to produce immediate success with the Taliban. If the United States and its allies "could not convince them or eliminate them in two decades, how will you do it in the next two months or the next two years?" he wondered.

Asked whether he had a prediction of what Afghanistan might be like in six months, Qureshi turned the question back on his AP interviewer, replying: "Can you guarantee me U.S. behavior over the next six months?"

___

Edith M. Lederer, chief U.N. correspondent for The Associated Press, has been reporting internationally for nearly 50 years. Follow her on Twitter at http://twitter.com/EdithLedererAP

Pakistan's Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi smiles during an interview with The Associated Press, Wednesday, Sept. 22, 2021, in New York. (AP Photo/Mary Altaffer)

Pakistan's Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi speaks during an interview with The Associated Press, Wednesday, Sept. 22, 2021, in New York. (AP Photo/Mary Altaffer)

Pakistan's Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi speaks during an interview with The Associated Press, Wednesday, Sept. 22, 2021, in New York. (AP Photo/Mary Altaffer)

Pakistan's Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi speaks during an interview with The Associated Press, Wednesday, Sept. 22, 2021, in New York. (AP Photo/Mary Altaffer)

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The AP Interview: Top Pakistan diplomat details Taliban...

‘Taliban consulted Gen Bajwa before reaching out to India’

Anwar Iqbal

WASHINGTON: Taliban Fore­ign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi had a detailed meeting with Pakistan’s former army chief Gen Qamar Javed Bajwa before asking India to send back its diplomats and technical staff to Kabul, says a new book on Afghanistan’s de facto rulers.

The Return of the Taliban reveals “the pivotal decisions leading to the Taliban’s seizure of power” and describes “how as rulers they struggle to reconcile pressures for transition with their rigid ideology”, said Marvin G. Weinbaum, the senior scholar of South Asian affairs in Washington.

The book is authored by Hassan Abbas, who teaches international relations at the National Defence University (NDU), Washington, and will be released in the US later this week.

India’s return to Kabul “could not have happened without Pakistan — and Pakistan acted this way because it just might open up prospects of some aid for the Taliban in Afghanistan,” Mr Abbas writes, arguing that Pakistan is as desperate about getting financial support to run Afghanistan as the Taliban themselves.

Upcoming book claims Kabul wants to mend fences with New Delhi for sake of ‘international legitimacy and recognition’

The book points out that India has strategic interests in Afghanistan, although it notes that unlike Russia and China, India had cut off diplomatic ties with Afghanistan after the Taliban takeover.

But the book also notes that “India is now seriously reassessing its position and moving towards a balancing act in its effort to engage with the Taliban and help stabilise Afghanistan”.

Discussing why the Taliban are eager to mend ties with India, the book says that “the Taliban desire is simple — international legitimacy and recognition”. Kabul’s new rulers also need “huge external investments … to reconstruct and revive the country” and India has the resources to do so.

To demonstrate Gen Bajwa’s influence in Afghanistan, the book narrates the story of Taliban minister for finance Hidayatullah Badri, who was also known by the name of Gul Agha Ishaqzai, who is said to have suffered at the hands of the Pakistani security apparatus following 9/11.

Later, Mr Muttaqi “personally took him to Gen Bajwa to extend the hand of friendship. Only Mr Bajwa’s favorable nod gave him the opportunity” to become the country’s finance minister, the book claims.

The book also discusses former ISI chief Faiz Hamid’s visit to Kabul soon after the Taliban takeover, claiming that Foreign Office had advised Gen Hamid to stay at the Pakistan embassy in Kabul, “but the overconfident spy chief dismissed it”.

Later, at a meeting with Pakistani politicians, including Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto-Zardari, he defended his action saying that US and Chinese intelligence chiefs had also visited Kabul around then.

He was reminded that “he was the only one photographed” and “photographs and video clips of him sipping tea in the Serena Hotel, Kabul, went viral”.

The book argues that the “visuals provided evidence of the huge influence” Pakistan had on the Taliban and hurt Pakistan as well as the Taliban.

The book also reviews the growing influence of the IS militant group in Afghanistan, noting that from August 2021, when the Taliban captured Kabul, to August 2022 it claimed responsibility for 262 attacks in the country.

“This trend was an important agenda item in the conversation between ISI chief Lt Gen Nadeem Anjum, and CIA Director William Burns in early May 2022, in Washington. The Pakistani delegation included the former ISI chief Gen Hamid as well,” the book claims.

“Mr Burns told them that at this rate of growth, IS could gain control of 20 per cent of Afghanistan by mid-2023. In response, Gen Anjum stressed the need for targeting (the group’s) top leadership … and intelligence sharing.”

The book says that at the end of the meeting: “both sides reached an interesting conclusion, … the Afghan Taliban are no longer a primary threat to the national security of the US and Afghanistan’s neighboring countries.” It’s ISIS.

The book claims that in the early days of the Taliban takeover, Gen Hamid requested the Taliban high command to “offer both Abdullah [Abdullah] and Hamid Karzai some high-sounding positions” but they did not agree to do so.

The book also underlines China’s desire to stay engaged with the Taliban regime, noting that “China not only kept its embassy open but also welcomed the Taliban’s new status” and urged the UN Security Council to unfreeze Afghanistan’s funds.

Published in Dawn, April 26th, 2023

AFGHANISTAN

What went wrong?

Touqir Hussain 

Published March 15, 2023 

REGARDLESS of whoever ruled Afghanistan, the country has always been a problem for Pakistan. The latter’s strategic planners may have hoped that with the Afghan Taliban’s return to power the problem would be resolved. Instead, it has worsened.

The Taliban’s rise has reflected the larger failure of Afghanistan that has several architects. Pakistan’s own contribution to the failure may be arguable but not so its Afghanistan policy. The policy had been a failure since the 1990s when the Afghans’ bitter wrangling about the implementation of the Peshawar and Makkah accords, negotiated through Pakistan’s painstaking diplomatic efforts, set the stage for unending conflict in the country.

Pakistan has not been a party to the conflict but has been part of it contributing to the Taliban’s success of which we now face the conseque­nces. The truth is there would have been no TTP had there been no Afghan Taliban. They are but two sides of the same coin.

Afghanistan presented challenges affecting Pakistan’s security and economic future, as well as regional stability. But Islamabad saw it as only a security challenge.

We failed to see that the Taliban’s rise, fall and resurgence was, in fact, the culmination of the long process that began with the overthrow of Afghanistan’s monarchy in 1973. And that the struggles for power triggered by the event had merged and collided with the Soviet invasion in 1979, America’s two Afghanistan wars, and the war against terrorism, impacting the social and political dynamics in Afgha­nis­tan and Pakistan, especially among the Pakhtun population along the border.

It enabled jihadist/sectarian currents present in Pakistan to mingle with other extremist and militant organisations in the region, and transnational networks like Al Qaeda. Afghanistan became a hinterland for some, home to others, and the flagship for all when the Taliban ruled the country. When they lost power, the Taliban’s fight became their fight too.


The Afghans have been badly served by their rulers.

The Taliban have returned to power but lack legitimacy and military control. It can be argued they won through a political deal rather than on the battlefield, and face possible resistance by Afghans and threats from new stakeholders such as the IS-K. It is doubtful if they can ever stabilise Afghanistan. And this would have consequences for Pakistan.

Pakistan failed in its Afghanistan policy, but so did the Americans and Afghans. In a nutshell, the causes of American failure were: lack of knowledge of Afghanistan’s history and culture, poor war aims, the Iraq war distraction, frequent changes of strategy and commanding generals, inept Afghan partners, the dual authority of Kabul government and the US whose interests did not always match, and, last but not least, electoral politics in Washington. Finally, America lost the appetite for failure and simply walked out.

Arguably the biggest failure was of the ruling establishment in Kabul. The Afghans are a great people and nation. They should not be ruled by the Taliban. But they have been badly served by their ruling elite who must share the bulk of the responsibility for what has happened to their hapless country.

Afghanistan has ethnic, linguistic, sectarian and tribal fault lines. Historically, its horizontal power structure has been contested by a Pakhtun-dominated elite run by Kabul and regional strongmen, providing for continued power struggles and conflicts within conflicts.

Its competitive and conflict-prone geopolitical environment has offered opportunities to its neighbours to intervene to their advantage. Neither America’s war nor the Taliban were the answer to Afg­h­a­nistan’s foundat­i­onal challenges.

Kabul should have reached out to Pakistan to jointly find a solution to the Taliban problem, which could have happened only in the complicated context of Pak-Afghan relations. Instead, it tried to use America and India to coerce Pakistan to solve the Taliban problem for them. That was never going to work.

Where do we go from here? Afghanistan is a political challenge with a military dimension — and not a military challenge with a political dimension.

The Afghan policy should be developed in a Foreign Office-led but security establishment-supported process. The pursuit of a declaratory policy by one institution and operational policy by another, with one not knowing what the other was doing, was a prescription for failure. It created credibility problems, affecting foreign policy across the board.

We have to now make the best of a bad situation and help Afghanistan by facilitating its international engagement aimed at neither strengthening nor weakening the Taliban, nor a regime change, all of which are bad options.

The writer, a former ambassador, is adjunct professor Georgetown University and Visiting Senior Research Fellow National University of Singapore.

Published in Dawn, March 15th, 2023

‘My heart is crying’: Afghan refugees wait on family members to join them in Canada



By Canadian Press

Dec 22, 2022 | 

TORONTO — Khalid Khogiani arrived in Canada from Afghanistan through Pakistan more than a year ago and has been waiting for the Canadian government to process the refugee applications for his wife, mother and siblings ever since.

The 34-year-old, who worked as a computer assistant and interpreter with the Canadian Armed Forces in Kandahar between 2009 and 2011, said he applied for asylum at Canada’s embassy in Kabul and got his visa before the Taliban seized control of the Afghan capital in August 2021. He arrived in Canada two months after the takeover, but the rest of his family stayed in the family’s house in Afghanistan.

“When I remember my mother, I cry, my heart is crying, my mind is crying,” he said.

“We spend difficult time … when you are separated from your family and you come to Canada and your family is in Afghanistan, you know the pain.”

Khogiani is among the Afghan refugees who came to Canada on their own or with some of their family members since the fall of Kabul. Many who applied for their loved ones to join are left to wait for their applications to be approved.

The federal Liberal government initially promised to settle 20,000 Afghan refugees and then doubled that commitment to 40,000 during the election campaign in 2021.More than 26,000 Afghan refugees have already arrived in Canada.

As many more wait, the situation in Afghanistan is further deteriorating — especially for girls and women. The Taliban rulers banned female students from attending university this week in their latest crackdown on women’s rights and freedoms.

The Taliban was ousted from power by a U.S.-led coalition, that included Canada, in 2001 in the aftermath of 9/11, but returned last year after the U.S. abruptly and chaotically departed.

Khogiani said his horrific one-and-a-half-month journey from Kabul to Toronto started when agents working with Canada smuggled his brother and him through the border to Pakistan at night.

They had to hide from the Pakistani police in Islamabad until his flight to Canada was finally booked, he added.

He tried to bring the rest of his family, but the Canadian government told him that adding others to his application would jeopardize his evacuation.

“I said to the (immigration department), I have my family there, so I cannot go to Canada without my family,” Khogiani said.

“They said, ‘if you want to include your other family members, your case will be delayed. Do not do that’.”

The Afghan refugee, who now works as a technician with Bell Canada in Bradford, Ont., said he eventually decided to come to Canada on his own and apply from here for his family members to join him.

His brother landed in Toronto a few weeks after him but the rest of his family members, who recently moved to Pakistan, are still waiting for their refugee applications to be processed, he said.

“I was scared. I was worried. So, I decide I need to go alone,” Khogiani said.

Mona Elshayal, co-founder of a volunteer group called Canadian Connections that has been helping Afghan refugees to come to Canada, said many of the Afghan refugees who arrived here last year filled out the forms to bring their family members right after landing in Canada.

“People who came (after) August 2021 who are trying to bring their families, other family members, who helped the Canadian government or military and followed their processes, called in, registered them, filled in the paperwork, there’s no updates on their paperwork,” she said.

“There’s no way to get an update on the application — if anybody is ever going to come.”

She said the delay has a negative affect those who came here, but it’s devastating those who are waiting overseas to be united with their loved ones in Canada.

“There’s people who have travelled outside Afghanistan waiting for the Canadian government to bring them in and there’s no update on their application,” she said.

“They’re in limbo, because they’re stuck. They can’t go back. They don’t know if the Canadian government is ever going to bring them.”

A spokeswoman for the federal immigration department said the government recognizes that’s it’s important to keep families together but it’s facing a “significant challenge” to process the family reunification applications for Afghan refugees as many of the family members are still in Afghanistan.

“We are navigating a constantly evolving situation in Afghanistan in which the government of Canada has no military or diplomatic presence,” Michelle Carbert said in a statement.

“Movement out of Afghanistan by air and land continues to be very difficult and dangerous, and the absence of stable conditions and ever-changing circumstances around exit documentation requirements impacts our ability to move people quickly.”

Carbert said the government is generally unable to process an application until applicants reach a third country, submit their biometrics and meet other requirements.

“Applications continue to be processed as quickly as possible both remotely and digitally through our network of visa officers,” she said. “These cases are also often very complex and processing will take longer as we work to receive information and work through their application. Every step along the way can bring a unique challenge depending on the individual’s circumstances.”

Stephen Watt, co-founder of Northern Lights Canada, a non-profit that’s been helping Afghan refugees in Toronto, said Canada’s response to the refugee crisis in Afghanistan has not met the expectations and needs of those who helped Canada in Afghanistan.

“Canada talks about trying to be humanitarian and help these people, but then it handicaps its own programs with things like quota limits and paperwork requirements.”

“The consequence of all this is not that people (here) feel happy that they’re able to help people (in Afghanistan) who deserve it, they just feel frustrated and dismayed and disappointed.”

The government introduced a new program in September to allow Canadian individuals and organizations to privately sponsor up to 3,000 Afghan refugees who don’t have refugee status from the United Nations refugee agency or a foreign state.

But for Watt, it is another example of Canada’s lacklustre response to the crisis in Afghanistan because it was not only capped at 3,000 applications, but it also required private sponsors to complete a special training course.

“If Canada really meant what it said about being a humanitarian country that has close ties with Afghan people, especially the ones who have relatives here or who have helped us, they would make things easier, not harder every time,” he said.

This report by The Canadian Press was first published Dec. 22, 2022.

Maan Alhmidi, The Canadian Press

Ottawa urged to pressure Pakistan not to deport Afghan refugees in line for Canada

The federal Liberal government is facing calls to intervene amid reports that Pakistan is preparing to arrest and expel Afghan refugees, many of whom are waiting to escape to Canada.


Ottawa urged to pressure Pakistan to stop deporting Afghans, speed up refugee claims© Provided by The Canadian Press

The Liberal government promised in August 2021 to resettle 40,000 Afghans who have fled their country to escape the Taliban.

That includes thousands of Afghans with connections to Canada, including former interpreters who served alongside the Canadian Armed Forces.

But only about 27,000 Afghan refugees have arrived in Canada more than a year later, with thousands waiting in Pakistan for word on when they can depart.

Now there are fears that Pakistan will start arresting and deporting Afghans who have sought temporary refuge, including hundreds already approved to come to Canada, at the end of the month.

The Pakistan government has set a deadline of Dec. 31 for foreigners without visas, or with expired visas, to leave. If not, they face the risk of arrest and deportation.

The fear is that if sent back, they will face persecution or death at the hands of the Taliban.

"This threat will compound what is already one of the world's worst humanitarian crises ever," said Wendy Cukier of Lifeline Afghanistan, an organization that has been helping bring Afghan refugees to Canada.

"Canada must use every means at its disposal ⁠— diplomacy, humanitarian aid, even trade negotiations and economic partnerships ⁠— to persuade Pakistan to work with Canada to resolve this issue."

The Canadian government has received assurances from Pakistan that it will not arrest or deport Afghans after the Dec. 31 deadline, Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada spokeswoman Isabelle Dubois said in a statement on Friday.

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"While there have been concerns that some Afghan refugees in Pakistan may be returned to Afghanistan or jailed after the Dec. 31 expiration of this waiver, the government of Pakistan has indicated that the only enforcement action that could be taken against foreigners overstaying their visas will be the re-imposition of fines and potentially being blacklisted from returning to Pakistan," she said.

"Canada appreciates the ongoing efforts by the government of Pakistan to facilitate the safe passage of Canada-bound Afghan refugees," Dubois added.

"We continue to advocate for streamlined procedures and strengthened protections for vulnerable Afghans and appreciate Pakistan's support in helping secure routes of safe passage."

But that is cold comfort to NDP immigration critic Jenny Kwan, who says she has been warning the government about the impending deadline since the Pakistan government first announced its plan in October.

Kwan pointed to numerous reports in recent weeks of Pakistan authorities checking foreigners' visas and making arrests as proof of the threat.

"The situation on the ground for people who are trying to escape persecution from the Taliban is that this is not reassuring at all," she said. "The reality is that they are living in fear every day."

Kwan said she has personally received text messages about Pakistani police having raided a hotel where Afghan refugees were staying.

"And the only way I'm told that people cannot get arrested in that process is to pay heavy bribes," she said.

"The reality is that people have been hiding, and they have not been working. They don't really have the resources to be able to afford to pay these hefty bribes. That is what's happening on the ground for people."

The federal government has been repeatedly criticized for the pace of its work to bring Afghan refugees to Canada, facing anger and frustration over delays and what many see as a lack of urgency.

Kwan echoed Cukier's call for the government to put whatever pressure possible on Pakistan not to act on its Dec. 31 deadline, and for Ottawa to speed up resettlement efforts.

"There are people who served Canada, they are the loved ones of people who put their lives at risk in serving Canada, and now the Taliban is hunting them down aggressively," she said.

"So, the government needs to make good on their promise that they would bring these Afghans to safety."

Amid clashes with Kabul, Pakistan tells Ottawa it won't deport Canada-bound paperless Afghan migrants

Story by Raffy Boudjikanian • 


In an apparent reversal from an announcement this fall, Pakistan's government has told Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada it will not deport paperless Afghan migrants or throw them in jail after the end of this month, but rather impose fines or perhaps a ban on their return to Pakistan.

"The Government of Pakistan has indicated that the only enforcement action that could be taken against foreigners overstaying their visas will be the re-imposition of fines and potentially being blacklisted from returning to Pakistan," the Immigration Department said in a statement to CBC.

As a country neighbouring Afghanistan, Pakistan has been a go-to destination for Afghan migrants hoping to qualify for Canada's resettlement program. Twenty-one charter flights carrying Afghans from Islamabad have come to Canada this year, according to IRCC.

In October, Pakistan's Ministry of the Interior had started running ads on television and social media telling migrants to the country whose visas had expired that they would risk deportation or jail time after Dec. 31, 2022.

Those ads did not explicitly target any ethnicity but ran in Urdu, Pakistan's national language, as well as Pashto and Dari, two languages that are commonly spoken by Afghans.

In November, Pakistan's High Commission in Ottawa told CBC News that Afghans with valid visas/documents for onward travel would be "facilitated by the government of Pakistan."

This latest change comes as the country's relationship with Afghanistan has deteriorated. Pakistan continued to hold diplomatic ties with the Taliban after it took over Kabul in September 2021.

But since last month, the two countries have been involved in border clashes. As well, inmates belonging to a Pakistan off-shoot of the Taliban took over a Pakistani jail and there was a gunfire attack on Pakistan's embassy in Kabul.

Pakistan caught in 'murky politics:' expert

With no sense of how much worse the conflict could get, one observer of the region said migrants could well remain in limbo.

"The murky politics of the region are now coming home to roost for Pakistan," said Elliot Tepper, a professor of international relations at Carleton University in Ottawa.

He said Islamabad supported the Taliban for years until the latter's return to power in 2021, hoping to foster a regional ally.

"They thought they were buying that strategic depth, the friend in Kabul that they required," he said. "Now that the Taliban are back in power, they are looking after their own traditional interests, and those interests conflict with Pakistan's."

Tepper said this has left Afghan migrants who were former Canadian military personnel in the lurch.


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"The people who have helped us materially ... those that we owe, that we have an obligation to, and people in Canada are working to assist, they are paying the cost of this politics between the powers of Afghanistan and Pakistan," he said.

Migrants concerned

Between the government ad, the uncertainty over the conflict between the two countries and the long wait for Immigration Canada to process their applications to fly to Canada, some migrants were still worried.

"We are waiting and waiting for the email [for] when will we be able to get our flights," said one former Canadian military interpreter living in Islamabad with his wife and 10 children.

CBC News has agreed not to name him, as his brothers, who also served with the Canadian military, are still living in Kandahar City.

All of them are targets of the Taliban.



A screenshot from the official government of Pakistan ad warning of jail time or deportation for paperless migrants after New Year's Eve this year, which has Canada-bound Afghan migrants concerned.© Government of Pakistan

He and his immediate family moved to Islamabad in May, arriving legally on visas that cost him $6,000 US in savings.

But he has been unable to renew the paperwork after it expired, and other expenses piled up with no income, as he does not have the right to work in Pakistan.

"The money which I had, I just spent the whole money on [the family]," he said, enumerating "shoes, clothes, medicine or buying fruits or buying something for the kids."

The interpreter has completed his application to Canada and is now waiting to see whether he will be accepted or rejected.

Returning to Afghanistan 'is suicide'

Mohammad Younas Nasimi has been waiting longer, having arrived in Islamabad with his family last year.

The former Canadian military contractor said he cannot keep up that wait, as he eyed the Dec. 31 deadline.

Rather than risk jail for him and his family in Pakistan, or all of them being handed over to the Taliban, he said he will sneak back across the border alone.

"I know that going back ... is suicide," he said. But he believes he faces better chances eking out a living for his wife and six children in Afghanistan.

Nasimi has been corresponding with the Canadian Embassy in Abu Dhabi over his immigration file for months, always receiving replies telling him his case was still being processed.

He showed CBC News an embassy answer to one of his last emails, where he had let them know he was thinking of going back to Afghanistan, and asking for advice.

"We are sorry to hear about the very challenging circumstances," the embassy had written back.

"We encourage you to take whatever lawful steps you deem necessary outside of this application, to provide for the safety and security of yourselves and your family."

SEE

https://plawiuk.blogspot.com/2022/12/refugee-group-says-ottawa-will-help.html