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Saturday, April 06, 2024

Is Another Anarchism Possible?
An Interview with Matthew Wilson
April 3, 2024
Source: Originally published by Z. Feel free to share widely.


Matthew Wilson teaches at Prifysgol Abertawe (Swansea University) where he lectures on People, Organisation and Business. He is an active participant in the UK cooperative movement and is the author of Rules Without Rulers: The Possibilities and Limits of Anarchism.

The questions were compiled by Mark Evans who is a member of Real Utopia’s Outreach and Events Team. We are also exploring the possibility of organising a live talk with Matt on the topic of anarchism. Feel free to get in touch if you have any question: https://www.realutopia.org/contact

First of all, I want to congratulate you on writing what I think is a very important book. But before getting into the arguments you present in Rules Without Rulers, could you briefly introduce yourself and maybe say something about how you became interested in anarchism?

Thanks Mark, it’s always nice to hear people have got something out of the book. I could spend a long time answering this, so, very briefly: I became very politically active in the mid-nineties, initially within the animal rights movements, and then quickly getting involved in other radical spaces – most of which were either explicitly, or at least substantially, anarchistic in orientation. As a teenager I got to know a bit about anarchism from reading pamphlets that I’d picked up at book fairs, demos and so on when I visited my brother in London, and I suppose it just always made sense to me. I think these things are often beyond (or before?) a clear rational analysis – I didn’t sit down and weigh up different ideological positions; I just always felt that anarchism was the political culture I was most comfortable with.

You are very critical of anarchism. However, you also appear to be very interested in saving anarchism from itself. What is your relationship with anarchism? What motivated you to write on this topic?

Obviously there’s a wide spectrum of thought contained within the basic idea of ‘anarchism’, so I’d say I’m critical of the ways some people interpret anarchism, and, conversely, I’m keen to defend and promote those positions which I think make more sense. Another way to think about that is to consider that our relationship to any ‘ism’ is always fundamentally a relationship with the ‘ists’ who bring it to life: I guess that’s obvious, but it’s somehow maybe important to remind ourselves that any debate we have about an ideological position is really a debate between people, and writing the book was a way for me to have a debate (though mostly indirectly) with some of the people who I felt were approaching anarchism in the wrong way. And by ‘the wrong way’ I don’t mean they were mis-reading Kropotkin; debates that try to get to some inner truth about an ideology are entirely pointless as far as I’m concerned. I just think some anarchists do a better job of explaining how the world works, and how to change it, than others.

Probably the most famous living anarchist – Noam Chomsky – has stated “There have been many styles of thought and action that have been referred to as “anarchist”. It would be hopeless to try to encompass all of these conflicting tendencies in some general theory or ideology.” Nevertheless, you write of an “anarchist common sense”. This seems to be the bedrock of your critique of anarchism. Could you say what you mean by this term and how you arrived at it?

I’ll start by saying that when I wrote the book, I’d never read Gramsci, but now that I have, I think there’s even more value in the idea of common-sense as a sociological concept. But at the time, I used the idea of common-sense for one very simple reason. The idea that there are all these different tendencies within anarchism is true, of course, but it’s equally true that when you look at a certain time and place – say, Europe and the US in the 1990s and 2000s – it’s easy to see a huge amount of commonality amongst the broad cultures and movements that see themselves as somehow connected to anarchism. Ideas around consensus-decision making, for example, were extremely widespread, whereas discussions about syndicalism were barely to be found. So yes, there are degrees of diversity, and even contradiction, but still contained within a wider common-sense. That’s all pretty obvious, and it shouldn’t really need to be said. The reason it was important to make that point was that highlighting the diversity within an ideology is often exploited as a way to deflect criticism. If we think of every anarchist as having their own reading of anarchism – if we dismiss, as Chomsky suggests, a ‘general theory’ of anarchism – then critiquing ‘anarchism’ becomes redundant. So then you criticise an individual anarchist, but then all the other anarchists can just tell themselves the criticism doesn’t apply to them. And so you’re left with having to critique millions of individual anarchists to make your point. Which is ridiculous, but people would pretty much say that to me; what do you mean ‘anarchists’ think this? Don’t you know we’re all different? How can you lump us all together? Rather than engage in the criticism itself, they’d hang everything on this diversity, and insist that I couldn’t possibly make such generalised criticisms. So it was important for me to stress that some of the criticisms I wanted to make did apply to very significant sections of contemporary anarchist culture, despite its diversity regarding certain issues.

By the way, this is common practice; I’m reading a lot of books by capitalists at the moment, and they do exactly the same thing when they discuss criticisms of capitalism – but that was just Milton Friedman, that was the 80s, that’s just one company, that’s not my idea of capitalism.

Your critique of anarchism focuses on three themes; freedom, ethics and power. From this you highlight a number of problems with contemporary anarchism that you describe as “unhelpful assumptions” and “unchallenged ideas”. To begin with, could you summarise what you see as the main problems regarding the anarchist position with freedom?

I think R.H Tawney summed up the fundamental problem with freedom very nicely with the simple maxim – freedom for the pike is death for the minnow. Ultimately, freedoms conflict with other freedoms. Politically, and emotionally, freedom is obviously an extremely powerful word; but analytically, it’s pretty much useless. It’s a classic ‘empty signifier’ which is filled with different meanings, depending on who’s using the term. You only need to look at how commonly freedom is evoked by people with entirely opposing views to anarchists to see it really doesn’t do much work as a concept on its own, and is always filled with other ideas, some of which can be pretty reprehensible. For the most part, making a demand for this or that freedom is really just a way for people to promote their own values whilst appearing to defend some universal and unambiguously positive position. Motorists need to be free from environmental zealots, hard-working people need to be free to get to work without being disrupted by protestors, markets need to be free to harmoniously organise the world, and so on…

Now, there are two ways to respond to this: either you say that certain claims to freedom aren’t legitimate – that they’re not really about freedom. Or you acknowledge that they are claims to freedom, and from there recognise that, as Tawney suggests, you’re often going to have to find a way to decide between competing freedoms. Option one just isn’t really tenable. It’s certainly not going to get us anywhere productive, because we’re just never going to get agreement on what constitutes a legitimate or illegitimate notion of freedom. So we’re left with option two, which is to do the hard work defending certain values, certain practices, certain beliefs, and making the case as to why they should have priority over other values, practices, beliefs. The problem with that, of course, is it offends our anarchist sensibility, because we’re supposed to be the defenders of freedom, not the people who take it away from others. But that’s just fundamentally dishonest and gets us off the hook from having to reflect on which things we would protect and defend, and which things we would somehow prohibit and prevent.

Ultimately, any society needs to make choices about the way it functions, the things it allows and disallows. A society can be more or less open, more or less controlling, and so on, but no society can be based on the simple notion of freedom. We need to be more honest about this, because we can’t avoid making those decisions; we can, however, stick our heads in the sand and pretend we’re not making those value judgements, and convince ourselves that we can just decide between freedom and unfreedom. By the way, this is exactly what liberal capitalism does, allowing the powerful to pass their own value judgements off as though they’re representative of everyone’s freedom. Again – we’re just defending the freedom to drive, the freedom to shop, the freedom to accumulate wealth… It’s pretty depressing to me that anarchists have so often followed the same logic, and if we ever had something approaching an anarchist society, I’d be very worried if we did so without getting a better grasp on what the abstract value of freedom really means in practice.

Next, could you summarise what you see as the main problems regarding the anarchist position with ethics?

The anarchist problem with ethics is really a corollary to its problem with freedom. And again, we see exactly the same problems within liberal capitalism, in theory and in practice. Ultimately, if you have to decide between competing demands for different freedoms than we need to make those value judgements, and if we’re going to do that, we need to think more about those values – in other words, we need to think more about ethics. I won’t go into more detail here about what that would look like, and I don’t really offer my own guidance in the book; I think this needs to be a collective, democratic project where we confront the possibilities of reasonable conflicts of values and find the best way to navigate them.

Finally, could you summarise what you see as the main problems regarding the anarchist position with power?

Anarchist views of power are more complicated, or at least, more diverse; there’s less of a common-sense. That said, the common-sense around freedom and ethics discussed above feed into anarchist understandings of power to a large extent, and the up-shot of that is that power is often seen as a totalising force held by certain elements of society – the state, capitalists, and so on – which is then used by those elements to deny the freedom of others. That’s true, up to a point, but power isn’t something we can get rid of, and if we got rid of the state and capitalism we’d still be left with questions of power. And, remembering that we’d still need to make value judgements about conflicting freedoms, we’d want to use our power to ensure certain decisions are upheld. As with freedom, and ethics, too many anarchists now believe in some possibility of a society where everyone is simply free to live the lives they want, and where power is never used to limit any one’s freedom. It’s a powerful vision which has inspired anarchists for a very long time, but I don’t see any empirical evidence or theoretical argument to suggest that’s a possibility.

Many anarchists propose consensus decision-making as a solution to these problems. You, however, are critical of this position. Could you say why?

I think there’s a lot to be said for the ideal of reaching a consensus, and I think the work that goes into finding a decision that everyone is happy with can be extremely productive. But the cultures of consensus-decision making which I’ve witnessed a lot are significantly informed by those common-senses we’ve been talking about, and it’s in the practice of consensus decision-making that you start to see how some of those flawed ideas come into play. So, for example, consensus cultures will always have certain ground rules, certain red lines, and so on, which are not covered by the process of consensus itself; too often, these are passed off as obvious, neutral positions which don’t need to be discussed or defended. So you see the parameters of particular values, of particular ideas about freedom, being enforced (implicitly or explicitly) without being open to debate. Now that might work well in a group of people who share those core values – and indeed, it often does work very well; the problem is when anarchists think that this same process will work just as well within a larger, more diverse community. It seems pretty obvious that a bunch of anarchists would struggle to reach consensus with a bunch of racists, or free-market fundamentalists or whatever. Consensus only really works when you exclude certain views from the start; of course, that is precisely what we should be doing, but we need to be honest that we’re doing that. And thinking back to power, we need to be more honest about what happens when consensus isn’t reached; there’s a great deal of depressingly naïve thinking within anarchism which sees consensus as the way to resolve those questions of conflict and power – if we all just agree, then there’s no problem. But it’s just a fantasy to think people will all just start to magically share the same set of core values, and we’re being pretty dishonest by not considering what we would do when people in a community simply can’t agree on some fundamental issues.

You propose a prefigurative approach to organising as a more hopeful way forward for anarchism. Could you say what this entails and what some of the challenges for such an approach to organising might be?

I’ve actually stopped using the term prefiguration, because it’s become so associated with a particular reading of prefigurative praxis – a reading I don’t really have a lot of time for. I’m personally using the term ‘reorganising’, but any way, the basic idea for me is that we need to be developing a counter-power, or counter-hegemony, in the here and now. For me, that means acting within and throughout every level of society, trying to organise according to different social logics; obvious examples are setting up cooperatives, building networks of mutual aid, running people’s assemblies, connecting to more progressive municipal projects like the Preston Model, and so on. None of this is new, and will be very familiar to your readers, but i think prefigurative forms organising too often fall on one side of an unhelpful binary: on one side, you have an overly purist vision where compromise is viewed as unacceptable, so you have these activist silos where people convince themselves they’re acting entirely outside of the system and that they’re not engaging with the corrupt practices of the market, or the state, or whatever. The other side almost flips this, and seems to just ignore the challenges of trying to organise differently within the systemic constraints imposed by the world we currently inhabit. So you end up with what some people call a post-political mindset, where you convince yourself it’s just people’s imagination that’s the limiting factor; inspire enough people to shop locally or whatever, and the job’s done. I think we need to be walking the awkward middle road, pushing as much as we can, recognising that the system will fight us, recognising that we’ll be making compromises. Obviously a lot of this is guided by our vision of a better world; if we want a world without anything resembling the state, or the market, then this form of organising probably feels too compromised from the start. Personally, I don’t see us ever getting rid of the market entirely, or the state for that matter. That doesn’t mean I have to celebrate either of those things, but it makes it easier to engage with them on some level. All of this raises obvious challenges – of that ever-present question of compromise, of being coopted, of fiddling round the edges… but it seems to be the best chance we’ve got.

With regards to prefigurative organising, you make an important distinction between “authoritarian models” and “positive vision”. Could you say a little bit about how you see the difference between these two notions and why you think it is significant for left-libertarian organising?

I have a real problem with the general anarchist refusal to outline elements of a world they’d like to see; it acts as a get out of jail free card, when awkward and difficult questions arise – I don’t know what an anarchist society would do with rapists, that’s for them to decide – but it’s also strategically hopeless; how are we expected to inspire and convince people to fight for change if we refuse to even consider what sort of world they might be fighting for? Arguably capitalism’s greatest weapon is the fact that so many people believe that, no matter how much they might dislike it, there is no viable alternative. We just keep helping capitalism with that, by denying the legitimacy of considering those alternatives in any meaningful level of detail. So yes, I think we absolutely need to develop some clear ideas – about how an economy might work, about how we’d deal with issues of violence, political governance, and so on.

The fear that this would be an authoritarian imposition on future societies is fundamentally flawed. Firstly, future generations will be impacted by our decisions – whatever they are; refusing to outline a blueprint has an impact on the future just as much, if not more, than offering such a blueprint. I doubt those future generations will thank us for refusing to offer people an alternative to capitalism because we didn’t want to limit their own options to decide how their society would function. Secondly, I think it’s quite clear that we can and should be considering multiple visions of a future society, and that actually the more we do that, the less likely we’ll find ourselves all beholden to one authoritarian vision.

It seems to me that the analysis that you present is very in-keeping with that which informs Real Utopia. However, rather than talking about anarchism as a proposed system for a post-state society we talk about participatory politics (parpolity). My feeling is that parpolity is a vision for a non-authoritarian political system that avoids what you refer to as the “simplistic” and “false” “promise of absolute freedom”. In other words, it addresses the authoritarianism that concerns the anarchists whilst also addressing the concerns about anarchism that you raise. Do you have any thoughts on this?

I think there’s a lot to be said for these ideas – and as I said above, I think they can be part of a larger mix of possibilities which we can draw on, now, and in the future. I think the really important question is how we think strategically about how to get to a world where this level of democratic politics is possible. It’s obviously not going to happen overnight, but it makes a difference to how we organise whether we think it’s possible in ten years, or a hundred years; and, of course, it matters how we think we’ll get to such a society. My concern with these sorts of visions is not that they impose something on the future, but that they impose a certain mindset on us now; by that I mean that we fall into that purity trap where we reject anything less than this ideal. So question one – how do we start building towards this vision, especially in terms of transition? (For example, can we work on reforming the system we have – strengthening local councils and weakening national government, or do we need a revolutionary fresh start?).

Anyway, I digress. Yes, I do think this offers a more honest way of thinking about a genuinely democratic politics, and which avoids some of the naïve ideas we see in a lot of anarchist discourse. I’m not sure I’m convinced about the level of engagement expected from people – which is one reason why I’m not convinced by parecon – but I think this provides a good base level, if you like, from where we can think about intermediary steps, and from where we can consider other proposals. It’s certainly doing the necessary work of getting those conversations started, getting the ideas out there that there are other ways to organise the world politically.

Critics of anarchism often associate it with things like being unrealistic, a rejection of organisation and even a celebration of chaos. Obviously anarchists deny all of this. However, given your critique, it might be argued that the critics have a point. If so, wouldn’t it make more sense to drop the label and use an alternative that does not carry the baggage of anarchism? At Real Utopia we use the phrase participatory society, for example. Any thoughts on that?

I agree, and I don’t really call myself an anarchist, or refer to my politics as being reflective of anarchism. That’s partly for the reasons you mention, but also because I’m not sure I really am an anarchist when it comes to rejecting the state out-right. I don’t really know how we would conceive of a strategy to destroy a national government, and I’m not convinced doing so would be a good idea. I don’t think many people who do call themselves anarchists have thought this through either, and for them I suppose the idea is to at least ignore the state and try to organise outside it; that’s fair enough, and has produced a huge world of mutual aid projects and so on, but I’m not convinced we’re getting as far as we might if we could open ourselves up to other strategic options. Like I said earlier, I think we need to be more open to engaging with institutions and political spaces – local councils, etc – which anarchists would often reject.

So yes, I’m not really defending the A-word; the question then becomes, what do we call ourselves, our politics, our vision? This is actually what a lot of my current thinking is focussed on; it’s a really important strategic question which we tend to overlook. But anyone familiar with counter-hegemonic thinking will know that words are of huge importance – regardless of the ideas we place into them. Like you say, words have baggage – sometimes good, sometimes bad – and we need to think carefully about those key terms – what Laclau and Moufee call articulatory principles – which can connect different political movements. I’m not convinced by participatory society, but I wouldn’t reject it out of hand, and I think the real test is how these terms fair in practice. I’m reluctant to open up a can of worms by mentioning this all too briefly, but I’m currently writing a defence of the term fair market socialism. I won’t go into too much detail here, but thinking counter-hegemonically, this is a way to take us from where we are to somewhere else; it connects to the common-sense we have now – that we need the market – to a different reading of that market; and it helps reduce the association between socialism and the horrors of the 20th century.

The last thing I’ll say on terminology; we should be more engaged in how we talk about the system we have, and not just the alternatives we want. I’m really advocating for people to stop referring to our current system as a democracy; every time we use the word, we reenforce its ideological power – and we also rob ourselves of a word we should be claiming for our own politics.

Thank you for your time! Is there anything that you would like to add before we finish?

A millions things, but I’ll leave it at that, otherwise I’ll never end. Maybe there’ll be other opportunities to mull over some of these issues in more detail in the future. Thanks Mark.

Friday, March 15, 2024

Pessimism of the Intellect, Pessimism of the Will

 

 
 MARCH 15, 2024
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Image by Ehimetalor Akhere Unuabona.

On November 14, 2019, Tim Wu, an NYU professor with a reputation for outspoken liberalism, delivered a talk on “The Curse of Bigness: Antitrust in the New Gilded Age.” Wu was accompanied by antitrust crusader Zephyr Teachout, attesting to his liberal bona fides. He gave a serviceable account of American history: the First Gilded Age’s capitalist excesses, Progressive Era reformers’ struggle to rein in the robber barons, the New Deal and the construction of the regulatory state, the postwar glory days of antitrust legislation, the Great Society and the high-water mark of American liberalism, and then the long march of deregulation and laissez-faire orthodoxy which culminated in the 2008 disaster. Then, he discussed the need for progressives to reinstate Progressive Era controls on monopolies to, Sisyphus-like, roll the rock of regulation back up the hill of capitalist resistance to regulations that would harm their profit margins.

It all sounded innocuous enough, but I had some doubts. I raised my hand and said, “The conservatives have undone most of the Progressives and New Dealers’ successes. Suppose we have a second Progressive Era and a second New Deal. What’s to stop them from doing the same thing? In 2060, will our children be having another discussion like this one about how to reverse the Third Gilded Age? Is slapping a regulatory Band-Aid on capitalism genuinely the best we can hope for?” Wu shrugged, smiled wryly, said something to the effect of “Yes, I think so,” and moved on to the next question.

Wu served as Joe Biden’s National Economic Council as a Special Assistant to the President for Technology and Competition Policy from 2021 to 2023. Liberals initially cheered the Biden administration on, hailing its surprising taste for Keynesian stimulus and asking breathlessly if Biden would become a second FDR. Such a line of thinking demonstrated a clear blind spot, an odd memory-holing of the recent past. Obama, Biden’s former boss, was also welcomed as FDR’s second coming. Newsweek ran an 2009 article which went further than that, declaring that “We Are All Socialists Now.” Based on their appraisals of what was politically feasible, Larry Summers and other White House economic advisers presented stimulus options between $650 and $900 billion, despite Obama economist Christina Romer’s estimate at the time that $1.8 trillion was necessary. Obama’s resultant failure to pass a large enough stimulus—and his unwarranted obsession with deficit reduction—doomed us to a lost decade and a half and set the stage for the rise of Trumpism. As Biden’s “disappearing welfare state” and the continued concentration of our economic life in the hands of oligarchs of Bezos, Musk, and Zuckerberg has demonstrated, contemporary liberals like Wu and neoliberals like Biden still suffer a poverty of political imagination. They lack the appetite to pursue permanent, long-term fixes to the corporate chokehold which plagues American life.

One might attribute this to the power of capitalist ideology and leave it at that. But I think the full answer is more interesting. As Wu suggested when he compared today’s grotesquely unequal, monopoly-ridden society to the First Gilded Age, revisiting politics at the turn of the 20th century can help us make sense of politics in the 21st. It isn’t a coincidence, I suspect, progressives like Wu admire the Progressives of the 1910s and 1920s and question the feasibility of genuine economic democracy today. Reexamining the Progressive Era will help us understand exactly where the American left went wrong and what we can do today—at least in the realm of ideas—to get things right.

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In 2011, Barack Obama explicitly drew inspiration from Teddy Roosevelt’s New Nationalism speech by traveling to Osawatomie, Kansas, to deliver a speech on the fate of the middle class. It’s understandable that Elizabeth Warren, Tim Wu, Barack Obama, and other self-styled progressives look to the original Progressives for inspiration. They accomplished a great deal: they laid the foundations for the New Deal, began to tame the great corporations, and passed a raft of laws regulating labor and rooting out corruption. And there is much to admire in the Progressives’ fiery denunciations of corporate power, especially in an era where—with the notable exception of Bernie Sanders—our politicians have accustomed us to rhetorical timidity. In the New Nationalism speech to which Obama alluded, Roosevelt declared that “our government, National and State, must be freed from the sinister influence or control of special interests…now the great special business interests too often control and corrupt the men and methods of government for their own profit. We must drive the special interests out of politics.” Even a much more conservative Progressive like Woodrow Wilson called it “absolutely intolerable” that the federal government was “under the control of heads of great allied corporations with special interests.”

Unlike Wilson and Teddy Roosevelt, most Progressives weren’t politicians. Many of them were reformers, political and community activists. Some of them, like Jane Addams, dedicated themselves to the “settlement house” movement which provided cultural and economic uplift in immigrant communities. Others worked on promoting food, factory, and drug safety regulations, abolishing tenements and unsafe housing, and putting an end to child labor. As author Joshua Zeitz writes, “The typical progressive reformer was young, college-educated, and middle-class. Reformers tended to value scientific studies and the recommendations of professional ‘experts’ whether they were promoting efficiencies in society or fighting corruption in politics.”

Nothing’s inherently wrong with coming from a middle-class background, of course. Many prominent leftists and revolutionaries throughout history—Leon Trotsky, Eugene Debs, and Karl Marx, to name just a few—have. But members of the upper middle and professional classes tend to universalize their points of view. They often act as if they are bias-free arbiters of objective truth instead of bearers of subjective, class-conditioned, education-dependent perspectives.

Reflecting this rationalist bourgeois naïveté, many Progressive reformers behaved as if they were unimpeachably civic-minded. They tended to presume that the new sciences of sociology, psychology, political science, and epidemiology were pure sources of truth, generally uncontaminated by prejudice, racism, or economic incentives. They often succumbed to the savior syndrome, viewing the immigrants and workers whose interests they purported to represent as less than fully developed citizens who were dangerously susceptible to European doctrines like socialism, anarchism, and communism, in need of American teachers to instruct them in the etiquette and practice of democracy (this despite socialism’s deep American roots). Progressives were proud Americans, believers in American exceptionalism. The fact that Teddy Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, both ardent imperialists, were also progressives is instructive.

Many Progressives dismissed socialism as excessively anti-individualistic, reliant on the theory of class conflict as opposed to consensus and disinterested decision-making in the public interest. Famed Progressive Robert LaFollette gave voice to this suspicion when he proclaimed that “the Progressive Movement is the only political medium in our country today which can provide government in the interests of all classes of the people. We are unalterably opposed to any class government, whether it be the existing dictatorship of the plutocracy or the dictatorship of the proletariat. Both are essentially undemocratic and un-American. Both are destructive of private initiative liberty.” In the name of the “general will” and civic republicanism, the Progressives declared a ceasefire in class conflict—without consulting the working classes.

LaFollette made it seem like the Progressive movement was unified and easily defined. But as Joshua Zeitz nicely observes, “Historians have struggled for decades to characterize the progressive movement. Was it a coalition of middle-class reformers dedicated to good government? A top-down drive by politicians and businessmen to smooth out the sharper edges of industrial capitalism and blunt the appeal of socialism? The political project of urban working men and women who demanded better working and living conditions? A full assault against concentrated economic power? A case could be made for any of these interpretations.”

The fact that it’s difficult to characterize Progressivism is telling. In this, the Progressives differed greatly from the Populists, who famously vowed to “raise less corn and more hell” and whose 1892 platform railed against Wall Street and called for postal banking and the nationalization of railroads and telecommunications. Progressives were willing to combat vested interests, but only to a certain point. Their taste for disruption to the status quo was limited, attenuated by a desire to avoid strife. The ideals of technocracy and disinterested bureaucracy exerted a sirenic appeal upon the progressive imagination. Progressives found the promise of resolving social discord through social scientists’ ministrations; government adjudication between capital and labor; and bureaucrats’ expert, competent administration immensely more pleasant than the clash of class conflict, the rough-and-tumble of combative politics. They preferred to stay aloof from the conflict between capital and labor, advocating compromise because such a resolution seemed more statesmanlike.

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All this should sound familiar. It describes bien-pensant liberals of the Obama-Clinton-Biden persuasion to a tee: their aestheticization of politics, their fetishization of entrepreneurialism and expertise; their studied avoidance of polarization, partisanship, and partiality; their distaste for class conflict; their elevation of technocracy and science as beacons of reason; their belief in the pretense that politics can be reduced to interest-group bargaining and consensus seeking; their desire to keep the labor movement at a distance; their continued fealty to American exceptionalism even when looking to European models would be exceptionally edifying; and their general attitude of deference towards big business. Neoliberals’ demography—disproportionately white, upper middle class, professional, and college-educated—also parallels the original Progressives.

Obama and Biden’s desire to portray themselves as above the fray clashes with labor unions’ traditional question “Which side are you on?,” and that’s no accident. Progressives sought a third way between collectivism and individualism, hesitating to fully embrace the workers’ movement and policies administered directly through the federal government. This “third way” became a straitjacket which has constrained mainstream progressives’ imagination for many decades, well before the term “third way” was coined to describe neoliberalism in the 1970s and 1980s. Recently, it’s the reason that the Obama administration never attempted to fight for “Medicare for all” or nationalize the banks, it’s the reason Obama reneged on his promise to pass card check legislation which would have strengthened labor unions immensely, and it’s the reason that Joe Biden resisted Medicare for all and had to be cajoled into countenancing even very incomplete student debt relief.

The love of triangulation—the original Progressives’ vestigial attraction for unfettered capitalism and individualism and their wariness of forthrightly socialist economic policy—also helps explain why liberal economic policy has long been so confusingly inconsistent vis-à-vis monopoly and oligopoly. Two major approaches to monopoly predominated among the Progressives: one camp advocated strict regulation but no limits on size, while the other advocated “breaking them up” and then championing free-market competition.

As the famous Progressive Louis Brandeis described it, “Those who advocate ‘regulation of monopoly’ insist that private monopoly may be desirable in some branches of industry, or is, at all events, inevitable; and that existing trusts should not be dismembered nor forcibly dislodged from those branches of business in which they have already acquired a monopoly, but should be made ‘good’ by regulation. The advocates of this view do not fear commercial power, however great, if only methods for regulation are provided.” On the other hand, he wrote, those who sought to break up large corporations “believe[d] that no methods of regulation ever have been or can be devised to remove the menace inherent in private monopoly and overweening financial power” but wanted the government to simply restore the initial conditions of markets before monopolies began forming. This tension persists to the present day. It played out in both the 2016 and 2020 presidential elections, with Bernie Sanders largely playing the role of break-them-up progressive and Hillary Clinton and Joe Biden playing the role of (not particularly credible) advocates of subjecting Big Business to stringent regulation while permitting it to exist.

Both these positions are incomplete: the strict-regulation position is overly blasé about the dangers of concentrated private economic power, while the break-them-up camp romanticizes market competition and individualism. The break-them-up Progressives did have a better appreciation of the possibilities of public ownership, though. As Brandeis notes, they believed that “if, at any future time, monopoly should appear to be desirable in any branch of industry, the monopoly should be a public one—a monopoly owned by the people, and not by the capitalists.”

But it is there—in their refusal to forthrightly champion the socialization of key industries—that we see the Progressives’ squeamishness about following their analysis through to its logical conclusion. We will never be safe from capitalist assaults on our economic security and democracy as long as capitalism exists. This requires us to strive to end capitalism altogether; liberalism leads logically to socialism. The famed liberal philosopher John Dewey acknowledged this when he wrote in 1935 in Liberalism and Social Action, “If radicalism be defined as perception of need for radical change, then today any liberalism which is not also radicalism is irrelevant and doomed.” Reinhold Niebuhr, Obama’s favorite theologian, agreed and wrote in Moral Man and Immoral Society that, in human societies, “conflict is inevitable, and in this conflict power must be challenged by power.” But the unwillingness to admit this truth, which both Niebuhr and Dewey readily accepted, manifests in liberal political analyses like Tim Wu’s to this day.

We are only condemned to Wu’s Sisyphean vision of history as an unending cycle of reform, regulation, reaction, and deregulation if we accept capitalist domination as an essentially unchangeable feature of American life. Contemporary liberals’ choice to hearken back to the original Progressives imprisons them in this traditional center-left acquiescence to the status quo. Yet even during the Gilded Age and Progressive Era, millions of Americans, Populists, trade unionists, and socialists alike, recognized that this was a false choice and that there was an alternative: taking control of the economy and running it for the people, not for profit. Many years ago, the great Progressive Louis Brandeis said, in words which ring equally true today, “We must make our choice. We may have democracy, or we may have wealth concentrated in the hands of a few, but we can’t have both.” Whether our democracy survives our Second Gilded Age may well depend on whether the center-left recognizes this fundamental truth.

Scott Remer has published in venues such as In These Times, Africa Is a Country, Common Dreams, OpenDemocracy, Philosophy Now, Philosophical Salon, and International Affairs.

Wednesday, March 13, 2024

 

WE NEED A PLETHORA OF TACTICS

diversity of tactics

From Freedom News UK

Considering “metacrisis” and the ever greater need to re-embrace Bookchin’s social ecology.


‘Metacrisis’ is my chosen umbrella term for the escalation of multiple global crises of climate, ecology, and political economy, which have reached such a point now that all radical organising is a form of crisis response. And I know for folk on the sacrificial frontlines of capitalism, the terms ‘radical organising’ and ‘crisis response’ belie that they have to fight just to survive. The metacrisis is hidden from many of us a lot of the time. Until it isn’t.

Meanwhile, three records have been smashed on climate, as well as the continuing series of natural disasters in 2023 made worse and more likely by the climate crisis. These are average global surface air temperature, global sea temperature and Antarctic ice loss. Ecological and social tipping points are upon us.

Social ecology is an appropriate response to the metacrisis that will lead to widespread societal collapse within our lifetimes, even as some are already living through it or have been sunk by it. Murray Bookchin first developed his theory of social ecology in the 1960s. Its foundation is dialectical naturalism (Dianat), which Bookchin developed from Hegel’s dialectics and Marxian dialectical materialism. Dianat is a deceptively simple ecological philosophy that explores how the human domination of other humans leads to us also oppressing non-human nature and how to stop one we need to stop the other.

These times of crisis are fuelling the rise of the far right, who sometimes adopt “ecological” arguments for locking borders against “polluting” refugees and blame the climate crisis on China and Africa, preferring to set up World War III rather than take responsibility for fossil fuel emissions. This is nothing new. We saw it in the blood and soil doctrine of the Nazis in 1930s Germany. So, all organising in the metacrisis must be deeply ecological and explicitly anti-fascist.

Post-Covid, we also need to be explicitly anti-fantastical-conspiracist. As the planet heats even further, so will distracting narratives. As well as being anti-liberatory — we can’t organise against enemies who will be forever hidden from us — this conspiracism is often implicitly anti-Jewish.

A part of social ecology which some anarcho folk take issue with, which is not a dogma so much as Bookchin’s preferred program for introducing a stateless social ecological society, is known as libertarian municipalism. This means using existing local power structures to gradually wrest power back from the centre as a gateway to confederated, communitarian self-government. It’s unlikely that such a society would materialise just as Bookchin prescribed on any significant scale. However, in times of crisis, all efforts to draw power from the state back towards the local (whether direct democracy or consensus decision-making) are to be welcomed.

It could be using ZAD-type tactics, seizing the local means of production, sabotaging local outposts of deathly corporations out of existence, strengthening and extending mutual aid networks and localised food-growing initiatives, or indeed implementing libertarian municipalism. I love Peter Gelderloos’ perspective that “the solutions are already here” and the “build and fight” formula suggested by the Black-led Cooperation Jackson project in the US.

Whoever we are with on a given day, how can we instigate conversations about crisis organising, especially with people “not like us” who may seem to be sold on capitalism? Not easy, I know. My main job is teaching English online to students worldwide (for a terrible corporate platform which pays below UK minimum wage), and 95% of the time, any attempt at radical connection with my students is hopeless. However, 5% of the time, something special happens. You may be surprised at what revolutionary ferment is happening in some of the young minds of China, especially among women.

I like to imagine social ecology and other forms of ecological, social anarchism as a hidden potential in every quarter of human society, a kind of quantum magnet underlying everything that could draw everything else to it. Everyone can give in to that magnet, even if just a little. Aric McBay’s Full Spectrum Resistance is useful here. I have an idea of “even fuller spectrum resistance”, which means leaving no stone or member of society unturned. In a Colin Ward-esque way, what can we observe around us through “anarchism in action and escalation” in times of crisis, and how can we plug into that? Locally, this includes extending a hand to conservative-minded folk whilst being uncompromisingly anti-oppression. Online, this includes utilising resources like A Radical Guide. Even AI could be useful for organising without giving in to accelerationism. Algorithmic Justice League, Not My AI and Queer in AI signal how AI could be democratised and liberated from patriarchy, notwithstanding its ecological impact.

In times of crisis, as anarcho types, we could also build bridges with existing activist groups, even if we sometimes find them infuriating. From my own experience, I have to look at what I half-affectionately and half-frustratedly term the XR milieu, which includes Extinction Rebellion, Just Stop Oil and the Deep Adaptation / Transformative Adaptation crowds — the latter is a kind of extra urgent reiteration of the Transition Movement. I got arrested with XR in the early days, but I have taken a critical attitude towards them since then. I don’t believe in the disempowering strategic stance of pleading with an illegitimate government to create Citizens’ Assemblies, with the assumption that these assemblies would be well-advised and empowered enough to transfer the power of capital back to ecology and the people – what the metacrisis demands. Beyond the XR milieu, from the collapsitarian perspective, Just Collapse are great in that they centre marginalised groups. (I’ll be interviewing Just Collapse on my YouTube channel Epic Tomorrows in the coming months).

We need more affinity groups or study and action. Bookchin’s idea of an affinity group is not just one that does actions but one that engages in deep regular study of texts for collective liberation, including a revolutionary understanding of history that is not deterministic or statistical, that gives us plenty of options. Organising in times of crisis could even mean organising our own lives and memories into something more pointed and in a better direction.

On a more personal note, my stepdad runs Ely’s folk sing-around at a pub in Somerset. I sing there occasionally and imagine a pub-based social-ecological revolution. Many of the traditional tunes sung are very grounded in ecology and the seasons, with a deep understanding of farming (the old way) —or else they tell of tragic events that have befallen common folk through the ages, where an oppressive class system often features in the background. I reflect that all sorts congregate in pubs. What ground could we find for anti-authoritarian crisis organising, for drawing power back from the centre? The beauty of pub-based organising could be when we get it wrong; we can put it down to the drink and try again next week. AGs can meet in pubs if everyone is alright with it. Just be careful who’s watching or listening.

I don’t want to detract from what anyone is doing to fight against all forms of authoritarianism and capitalism and to fight for life and a reasonable standard of living for everyone. Nevertheless, maybe the good fight is best framed as a social-ecological one, where every oppressed human is understood in the context of a damaged local ecology, and every thoughtlessly ripped up plant or killed animal is understood as the result of human hierarchies. This is a conversation that we could continue down the pub. Urgently. Mine’s a real ale or cider. Cheers.

~ Matthew Azoulay