Sunday, June 07, 2020

The Ghost Map: The Story of London's Most Terrifying Epidemic--and How It Changed Science, Cities, and the Modern World 

by Steven Johnson (Author)  Format: Kindle Edition

A National Bestseller, a New York Times Notable Book, and an Entertainment Weekly Best Book of the Year
 
“By turns a medical thriller, detective story, and paean to city life, Johnson's account of the outbreak and its modern implications is a true page-turner.” —The Washington Post
“Thought-provoking.” Entertainment Weekly


It's the summer of 1854, and London is just emerging as one of the first modern cities in the world. But lacking the infrastructure-garbage removal, clean water, sewers-necessary to support its rapidly expanding population, the city has become the perfect breeding ground for a terrifying disease no one knows how to cure. As the cholera outbreak takes hold, a physician and a local curate are spurred to action-and ultimately solve the most pressing medical riddle of their time.

In a triumph of multidisciplinary thinking, Johnson illuminates the intertwined histories of the spread of disease, the rise of cities, and the nature of scientific inquiry, offering both a riveting history and a powerful explanation of how it has shaped the world we live in.

The Ghost Map: The Story of London's Most Terrifying Epidemic--and How It Changed Science, Cities, and the Modern World by [Steven Johnson]


Excerpt. © Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved.

Monday, August 28
THE NIGHT-SOIL MEN


IT IS AUGUST 1854, AND LONDON IS A CITY OF SCAVENGERS. Just the names alone read now like some kind of exotic zoological catalogue: bone-pickers, rag-gatherers, pure-finders, dredgermen, mud-larks, sewer-hunters, dustmen, night-soil men, bunters, toshers, shoremen. These were the London underclasses, at least a hundred thousand strong. So immense were their numbers that had the scavengers broken off and formed their own city, it would have been the fifth-largest in all of England. But the diversity and precision of their routines were more remarkable than their sheer number. Early risers strolling along the Thames would see the toshers wading through the muck of low tide, dressed almost comically in flowing velveteen coats, their oversized pockets filled with stray bits of copper recovered from the water’s edge. The toshers walked with a lantern strapped to their chest to help them see in the predawn gloom, and carried an eight-foot-long pole that they used to test the ground in front of them, and to pull themselves out when they stumbled into a quagmire. The pole and the eerie glow of the lantern through the robes gave them the look of ragged wizards, scouring the foul river’s edge for magic coins. Beside them fluttered the mud-larks, often children, dressed in tatters and content to scavenge all the waste that the toshers rejected as below their standards: lumps of coal, old wood, scraps of rope.
Above the river, in the streets of the city, the pure-finders eked out a living by collecting dog shit (colloquially called “pure”) while the bone-pickers foraged for carcasses of any stripe. Below ground, in the cramped but growing network of tunnels beneath London’s streets, the sewer-hunters slogged through the flowing waste of the metropolis. Every few months, an unusually dense pocket of methane gas would be ignited by one of their kerosene lamps and the hapless soul would be incinerated twenty feet below ground, in a river of raw sewage.
The scavengers, in other words, lived in a world of excrement and death. Dickens began his last great novel, Our Mutual Friend, with a father-daughter team of toshers stumbling across a corpse floating in the Thames, whose coins they solemnly pocket. “What world does a dead man belong to?” the father asks rhetorically, when chided by a fellow tosher for stealing from a corpse. “’Tother world. What world does money belong to? This world.” Dickens’ unspoken point is that the two worlds, the dead and the living, have begun to coexist in these marginal spaces. The bustling commerce of the great city has conjured up its opposite, a ghost class that somehow mimics the status markers and value calculations of the material world. Consider the haunting precision of the bone-pickers’ daily routine, as captured in Henry Mayhew’s pioneering 1844 work, London Labour and the London Poor:

It usually takes the bone-picker from seven to nine hours to go over his rounds, during which time he travels from 20 to 30 miles with a quarter to a half hundredweight on his back. In the summer he usually reaches home about eleven of the day, and in the winter about one or two. On his return home he proceeds to sort the contents of his bag. He separates the rags from the bones, and these again from the old metal (if he be luckly enough to have found any). He divides the rags into various lots, according as they are white or coloured; and if he have picked up any pieces of canvas or sacking, he makes these also into a separate parcel. When he has finished the sorting he takes his several lots to the ragshop or the marine-store dealer, and realizes upon them whatever they may be worth. For the white rags he gets from 2d. to 3d. per pound, according as they are clean or soiled. The white rags are very difficult to be found; they are mostly very dirty, and are therefore sold with the coloured ones at the rate of about 5 lbs. for 2d.

The homeless continue to haunt today’s postindustrial cities, but they rarely display the professional clarity of the bone-picker’s impromptu trade, for two primary reasons. First, minimum wages and government assistance are now substantial enough that it no longer makes economic sense to eke out a living as a scavenger. (Where wages remain depressed, scavenging remains a vital occupation; witness the perpendadores of Mexico City.) The bone collector’s trade has also declined because most modern cities possess elaborate systems for managing the waste generated by their inhabitants. (In fact, the closest American equivalent to the Victorian scavengers—the aluminum-can collectors you sometimes see hovering outside supermarkets—rely on precisely those waste-management systems for their paycheck.) But London in 1854 was a Victorian metropolis trying to make do with an Elizabethan public infrastructure. The city was vast even by today’s standards, with two and a half million people crammed inside a thirty-mile circumference. But most of the techniques for managing that kind of population density that we now take for granted—recycling centers, public-health departments, safe sewage removal—hadn’t been invented yet.
And so the city itself improvised a response—an unplanned, organic response, to be sure, but at the same time a response that was precisely contoured to the community’s waste-removal needs. As the garbage and excrement grew, an underground market for refuse developed, with hooks into established trades. Specialists emerged, each dutifully carting goods to the appropriate site in the official market: the bone collectors selling their goods to the bone-boilers, the pure-finders selling their dog shit to tanners, who used the “pure” to rid their leather goods of the lime they had soaked in for weeks to remove animal hair. (A process widely considered to be, as one tanner put it, “the most disagreeable in the whole range of manufacture.”)
We’re naturally inclined to consider these scavengers tragic figures, and to fulminate against a system that allowed so many thousands to eke out a living by foraging through human waste. In many ways, this is the correct response. (It was, to be sure, the response of the great crusaders of the age, among them Dickens and Mayhew.) But such social outrage should be accompanied by a measure of wonder and respect: without any central planner coordinating their actions, without any education at all, this itinerant underclass managed to conjure up an entire system for processing and sorting the waste generated by two million people. The great contribution usually ascribed to Mayhew’s London Labour is simply his willingness to see and record the details of these impoverished lives. But just as valuable was the insight that came out of that bookkeeping, once he had run the numbers: far from being unproductive vagabonds, Mayhew discovered, these people were actually performing an essential function for their community. “The removal of the refuse of a large town,” he wrote, “is, perhaps, one of the most important of social operations.” And the scavengers of Victorian London weren’t just getting rid of that refuse—they were recycling it.

WASTE RECYCLING IS USUALLY ASSUMED TO BE AN INVENTION of the environmental movement, as modern as the blue plastic bags we now fill with detergent bottles and soda cans. But it is an ancient art. Composting pits were used by the citizens of Knossos in Crete four thousand years ago. Much of medieval Rome was built out of materials pilfered from the crumbling ruins of the imperial city. (Before it was a tourist landmark, the Colosseum served as a de facto quarry.) Waste recycling—in the form of composting and manure spreading—played a crucial role in the explosive growth of medieval European towns. High-density collections of human beings, by definition, require significant energy inputs to be sustainable, starting with reliable supplies of food. The towns of the Middle Ages lacked highways and container ships to bring them sustenance, and so their population sizes were limited by the fecundity of the land around them. If the land could grow only enough food to sustain five thousand people, then five thousand people became the ceiling. But by plowing their organic waste back into the earth, the early medieval towns increased the productivity of the soil, thus raising the population ceiling, thereby creating more waste—and increasingly fertile soil. This feedback loop transformed the boggy expanses of the Low Countries, which had historically been incapable of sustaining anything more complex than isolated bands of fishermen, into some of the most productive soils in all of Europe. To this day, the Netherlands has the highest population density of any country in the world.
Waste recycling turns out to be a hallmark of almost all complex systems, whether the man-made ecosystems of urban life, or the microscopic economies of the cell. Our bones are themselves the result of a recycling scheme pioneered by natural selection billions of years ago. All nucleated organisms generate excess calcium as a waste product. Since at least the Cambrian times, organisms have accumulated those calcium reserves, and put them to good use: building shells, teeth, skeletons. Your ability to walk upright is due to evolution’s knack for recycling its toxic waste.
Waste recycling is a crucial attribute of the earth’s most diverse ecosystems. We value tropical rain forests because they squander so little of the energy supplied by the sun, thanks to their vast, interlocked system of organisms exploiting every tiny niche of the nutrient cycle. The cherished diversity of the rain-forest ecosystem is not just a quaint case of biological multiculturalism. The diversity of the system is precisely why rain forests do such a brilliant job of capturing the energy that flows through them: one organism captures a certain amount of energy, but in processing that energy, it generates waste. In an efficient system, that waste becomes a new source of energy for another creature in the chain. (That efficiency is one of the reasons why clearing the rain forests is such a shortsighted move: the nutrient cycles in their ecosystems are so tight that the soil is usually very poor for farming: all the available energy has been captured on its way down to the forest floor.)
Coral reefs display a comparable knack for waste management. Corals live in a symbiotic alliance with tiny algae called zooxanthellae. Thanks to photosynthesis, the algae capture sunlight and use it to turn carbon dioxide into organic carbon, with oxygen as a waste product of the process. The coral then uses the oxygen in its own metabolic cycle. Because we’re aerobic creatures ourselves, we tend not to think of oxygen as a waste product, but from the point of view of the algae, that’s precisely what it is: a useless substance discharged as part of its metabolic cycle. The coral itself produces waste in the form of carbon dioxide, nitrates, and phosphates, all of which help the algae to grow. That tight waste-recycling chain is one of the primary reasons coral reefs are able to support such a dense and diverse population of creatures, despite residing in tropical waters, which are generally nutrient-poor. They are the cities of the sea.
There can be many causes behind extreme population density—whether the population is made up of angelfish or spider monkeys or humans—but without efficient forms of waste recycling, those dense concentrations of life can’t survive for long. Most of that recycling work, in both remote tropical rain forests and urban centers, takes place at the microbial level. Without the bacteria-driven processes of decomposition, the earth would have been overrun by offal and carcasses eons ago, and the life-sustaining envelope of the earth’s atmosphere would be closer to the uninhabitable, acidic surface of Venus. If some rogue virus wiped out every single mammal on the planet, life on earth would proceed, largely unaffected by the loss. But if the bacteria disappeared overnight, all life on the planet would be extinguished within a matter of years.
You couldn’t see those microbial scavengers at work in Victorian London, and the great majority of scientists—not to mention laypeople—had no idea that the world was in fact teeming with tiny organisms that made their lives possible. But you could detect them through another sensory channel: smell. No extended description of London from that period failed to mention the stench of the city. Some of that stench came from the burning of industrial fuels, but the most objectionable smells—the ones that ultimately helped prod an entire public-health infrastructure into place—came from the steady, relentless work of bacteria decomposing organic matter. Those deadly pockets of methane in the sewers were themselves produced by the millions of microorganisms diligently recycling human dung into a microbial biomass, with a variety of gases released as waste products. You can think of those fiery, underground explosions as a kind of skirmish between two different kinds of scavenger: sewer-hunter versus bacterium—living on different scales but nonetheless battling for the same territory.
But in that late summer of 1854, as the toshers and the mud-larks and the bone collectors made their rounds, London was headed toward another, even more terrifying, battle between microbe and man. By the time it was over, it would prove as deadly as any in the city’s history.

LONDON’S UNDERGROUND MARKET OF SCAVENGING HAD ITS own system of rank and privilege, and near the top were the night-soil men. Like the beloved chimney sweeps of Mary Poppins, the night-soil men worked as independent contractors at the very edge of the legitimate economy, though their labor was significantly more revolting than the foraging of the mud-larks and toshers. City landlords hired the men to remove the “night soil” from the overflowing cesspools of their buildings. The collecting of human excrement was a venerable occupation; in medieval times they were called “rakers” and “gong-fermors,” and they played an indispensable role in the waste-recycling system that helped London grow into a true metropolis, by selling the waste to farmers outside the city walls. (Later entrepreneurs hit upon a technique for extracting nitrogen from the ordure that could be reused in the manufacture of gunpowder.) While the rakers and their descendants made a good wage, the work conditions could be deadly: in 1326, an ill-fated laborer by the name of Richard the Raker fell into a cesspool and literally drowned in human shit.
By the nineteenth century, the night-soil men had evolved a precise choreography for their labors. They worked the graveyard shift, between midnight and five a.m., in teams of four: a “ropeman,” a “holeman,” and two “tubmen.” The team would affix lanterns at the edge of the cesspit, then remove the floorboards or stone covering it, sometimes with a pickax. If the waste had accumulated high enough, the ropeman and holeman would begin by scooping it out with the tub. Eventually, as more night soil was removed, the men would lower a ladder down and the holeman would descend into the pit and scoop waste into his tub. The ropeman would help pull up each full tub, and pass it along to the tubmen who emptied the waste into their carts. It was standard practice for the night-soil men to be offered a bottle of gin for their labors. As one reported to Mayhew: “I should say that there’s been a bottle of gin drunk at the clearing of every two, ay, and more than every two, out of three cesspools emptied in London; and now that I come to think on it, I should say that’s been the case with three out of every four.”
The work was foul, but the pay was good. Too good, as it turned out. Thanks to its geographic protection from invasion, London had become the most sprawling of European cities, expanding far beyond its Roman walls. (The other great metropolis of the nineteenth century, Paris, had almost the same population squeezed into half the geographic area.) For the night-soil men, that sprawl meant longer transport times—open farmland was now often ten miles away—which drove the price of their removing waste upward. By the Victorian era, the night-soil men were charging a shilling a cesspool, wages that were at least twice that of the average skilled laborer. For many Londoners, the financial cost of removing waste exceeded the environmental cost of just letting it accumulate—particularly for landlords, who often didn’t live on top of these overflowing cesspools. Sights like this one, reported by a civil engineer hired to survey two houses under repair in the 1840s, became commonplace: “I found whole areas of the cellars of both houses were full of nightsoil to the depth of three feet, which had been permitted for years to accumulate from the overflow of the cesspools…. Upon passing through the passage of the first house I found the yard covered in nightsoil, from the overflowing of the privy to the depth of nearly six inches and bricks were placed to enable the inmates to get across dryshod.” Another account describes a dustheap in Spital-fields, in the heart of the East End: “a heap of dung the size of a tolerably large house, and an artificial pond into which the content of cesspits are thrown. The contents are allowed to desiccate in the open air, and they are frequently stirred for that purpose.” Mayhew described this grotesque scene in an article published in the London Morning Chronicle in 1849 that surveyed the ground zero of that year’s cholera outbreak:

We then journeyed on to London-street…. In No. 1 of this street the cholera first appeared seventeen years ago, and spread up it with fearful virulence; but this year it appeared at the opposite end, and ran down it with like severity. As we passed along the reeking banks of the sewer, the sun shone upon a narrow slip of the water. In the bright light it appeared the colour of strong green tea, and positively looked as solid as black marble in the shadow—indeed, it was more like watery mud than muddy water; and yet we were assured this was the only water the wretched inhabitants had to drink. As we gazed in horror at it, we saw drains and sewers emptying their filthy contents into it; we saw a whole tier of doorless privies in the open road, common to men and women, built over it; we heard bucket after bucket of filth splash into it; and the limbs of the vagrant boys bathing in it seemed by pure force of contrast, white as Parian marble. And yet, as we stood doubting the fearful statement, we saw a little child, from one of the galleries opposite, lower a tin can with a rope to fill a large bucket that stood beside her. In each of the balconies that hung over the stream the self-same tub was to be seen in which the inhabitants put the mucky liquid to stand, so that they may, after it has rested for a day or two, skim the fluid from the solid particles of filth, pollution, and disease. As the little thing dangled her tin cup as gently as possible into the stream, a bucket of night-soil was poured down from the next gallery.


Victorian London had its postcard wonders, to be sure—the Crystal Palace, Trafalgar Square, the new additions to Westminster Palace. But it also had wonders of a different order, no less remarkable: artificial ponds of raw sewage, dung heaps the size of houses.
The elevated wage of the night-soil men wasn’t the only culprit behind this rising tide of excrement. The runaway popularity of the water closet heightened the crisis. A water-flushing device had been invented in the late sixteenth century by Sir John Harington, who actually installed a functioning version for his godmother, Queen Elizabeth, at Richmond Palace. But the device didn’t take off until the late 1700s, when a watchmaker named Alexander Cummings and a cabinetmaker named Joseph Bramah filed for two separate patents on an improved version of Harington’s design. Bramah went on to build a profitable business installing water closets in the homes of the well-to-do. According to one survey, water-closet installations had increased tenfold in the period between 1824 and 1844. Another spike happened after a manufacturer named George Jennings installed water closets for public use in Hyde Park during the Great Exhibition of 1851. An estimated 827,000 visitors used them. The visitors no doubt marveled at the Exhibition’s spectacular display of global culture and modern engineering, but for many the most astonishing experience was just sitting on a working toilet for the first time.
Water closets were a tremendous breakthrough as far as quality of life was concerned, but they had a disastrous effect on the city’s sewage problem. Without a functioning sewer system to connect to, most WCs simply flushed their contents into existing cesspools, greatly increasing their tendency to overflow. According to one estimate, the average London household used 160 gallons of water a day in 1850. By 1856, thanks to the runaway success of the water closet, they were using 244 gallons.
But the single most important factor driving London’s waste-removal crisis was a matter of simple demography: the number of people generating waste had almost tripled in the space of fifty years. In the 1851 census, London had a population of 2.4 million people, making it the most populous city on the planet, up from around a million at the turn of the century. Even with a modern civic infrastructure, that kind of explosive growth is difficult to manage. But without infrastructure, two million people suddenly forced to share ninety square miles of space wasn’t just a disaster waiting to happen—it was a kind of permanent, rolling disaster, a vast organism destroying itself by laying waste to its habitat. Five hundred years after the fact, London was slowly re-creating the horrific demise of Richard the Raker: it was drowning in its own filth.

ALL OF THOSE HUMAN LIVES CROWDED TOGETHER HAD AN inevitable repercussion: a surge in corpses. In the early 1840s, a twenty-three-year-old Prussian named Friedrich Engels embarked on a scouting mission for his industrialist father that inspired both a classic text of urban sociology and the modern Socialist movement. Of his experiences in London, Engels wrote:

The corpses [of the poor] have no better fate than the carcasses of animals. The pauper burial ground at St Bride’s is a piece of open marshland which has been used since Charles II’s day and there are heaps of bones all over the place. Every Wednesday the remains of dead paupers are thrown in to a hole which is 14 feet deep. A clergyman gabbles through the burial service and then the grave is filled with loose soil. On the following Wednesday the ground is opened again and this goes on until it is completely full. The whole neighborhood is infected from the dreadful stench.


One privately run burial ground in Islington had packed 80,000 corpses into an area designed to hold roughly three thousand. A gravedigger there reported to the Times of London that he had been “up to my knees in human flesh, jumping on the bodies, so as to cram them in the least possible space at the bottom of the graves, in which fresh bodies were afterwards placed.”
Dickens buries the mysterious opium-addicted law-writer who overdoses near the beginning of Bleak House in a comparably grim setting, inspiring one of the book’s most famous, and famously impassioned, outbursts:

a hemmed-in churchyard, pestiferous and obscene, whence malignant diseases are communicated to the bodies of our dear brothers and sisters who have not departed…. With houses looking on, one very side, save where a reeking little tunnel of a court gives access to the iron gate—with every villainy of life in action close on death, and every poisonous element of death in action close on life—here, they lower our dear brother down a foot or two: here, sow him in corruption, to be raised in corruption: an avenging ghost at many a sick-bedside: a shameful testimony to future ages, how civilization and barbarism walked this boastful island together.


To read those last sentences is to experience the birth of what would become a dominant rhetorical mode of twentieth-century thought, a way of making sense of the high-tech carnage of the Great War, or the Taylorite efficiencies of the concentration camps. The social theorist Walter Benjamin reworked Dickens’ original slogan in his enigmatic masterpiece “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” written as the scourge of fascism was enveloping Europe: “There is no document of civilization that is not also a document of barbarism.”
The opposition between civilization and barbarism was practically as old as the walled city itself. (As soon as there were gates, there were barbarians ready to storm them.) But Engels and Dickens suggested a new twist: that the advance of civilization produced barbarity as an unavoidable waste product, as essential to its metabolism as the gleaming spires and cultivated thought of polite society. The barbarians weren’t storming the gates. They were being bred from within. Marx took that insight, wrapped it in Hegel’s dialectics, and transformed the twentieth century. But the idea itself sprang out of a certain kind of lived experience—on the ground, as the activists still like to say. It came, in part, from seeing human beings buried in conditions that defiled both the dead and the living.
But in one crucial sense Dickens and Engels had it wrong. However gruesome the sight of the burial ground was, the corpses themselves were not likely spreading “malignant diseases.” The stench was offensive enough, but it was not “infecting” anyone. A mass grave of decomposing bodies was an affront to both the senses and to personal dignity, but the smell it emitted was not a public-health risk. No one died of stench in Victorian London. But tens of thousands died because the fear of stench blinded them to the true perils of the city, and drove them to implement a series of wrongheaded reforms that only made the crisis worse. Dickens and Engels were not alone; practically the entire medical and political establishment fell into the same deadly error: everyone from Florence Nightingale to the pioneering reformer Edwin Chadwick to the editors of The Lancet to Queen Victoria herself. The history of knowledge conventionally focuses on breakthrough ideas and conceptual leaps. But the blind spots on the map, the dark continents of error and prejudice, carry their own mystery as well. How could so many intelligent people be so grievously wrong for such an extended period of time? How could they ignore so much overwhelming evidence that contradicted their most basic theories? These questions, too, deserve their own discipline—the sociology of error.
The fear of death’s contamination can sometimes last for centuries. In the middle of the Great Plague of 1665, the Earl of Craven purchased a block of land in a semirural area to the west of central London called Soho Field. He built thirty-six small houses “for the reception of poor and miserable objects” suffering from plague. The rest of the land was used as a mass grave. Each night, the death carts would empty dozens of corpses into the earth. By some estimates, over four thousand plague-infected bodies were buried there in a matter of months. Nearby residents gave it the appropriately macabre-sounding name of “Earl of Craven’s pest-field,” or “Craven’s field” for short. For two generations, no one dared erect a foundation in the land for fear of infection. Eventually, the city’s inexorable drive for shelter won out over its fear of disease, and the pesthouse fields became the fashionable district of Golden Square, populated largely by aristocrats and Huguenot immigrants. For another century, the skeletons lay undisturbed beneath the churn of city commerce, until late summer of 1854, when another outbreak came to Golden Square and brought those grim souls back to haunt their final resting grounds once more.

CRAVEN’S FIELD ASIDE, SOHO IN THE DECADES AFTER THE plague quickly became one of London’s most fashionable neighborhoods. Almost a hundred titled families lived there in the 1690s. In 1717, the Prince and Princess of Wales set up residence in Leicester House in Soho. Golden Square itself had been built out with elegant Georgian townhouses, a haven from the tumult of Piccadilly Circus several blocks to the south. But by the middle of the eighteenth century, the elites continued their inexorable march westward, building even grander estates and townhouses in the burgeoning new neighborhood of Mayfair. By 1740, there were only twenty titled residents left. A new kind of Soho native began to appear, best embodied by the son of a hosier who was born at 28 Broad in 1757, a talented and troubled child by the name of William Blake, who would go on to be one of England’s greatest poets and artists. In his late twenties, he returned to Soho and opened a printing shop next door to his late father’s shop, now run by his brother. Another Blake brother opened a bakery across the road at 29 Broad shortly thereafter, and so for a few years, the Blake family had a mini-empire growing on Broad Street, with three separate businesses on the same block.
The mix of artistic vision and entrepreneurial spirit would define the area for several generations. As the city grew increasingly industrial, and as the old money emptied out, the neighborhood became grittier; landlords invariably broke up the old townhouses into separate flats; courtyards between buildings filled up with impromptu junkyards, stables, jury-rigged extensions. Dickens described it best in Nicholas Nickleby:

In that quarter of London in which Golden Square is situated, there is a bygone, faded, tumble-down street, with two irregular rows of tall meagre houses, which seem to have stared each other out of countenance years ago. The very chimneys appear to have grown dismal and melancholy from having had nothing better to look at than the chimneys over the way…. To judge from the size of the houses, they have been, at one time, tenanted by persons of better condition than their present occupants; but they are now let off, by the week, in floors or rooms, and every door has almost as many plates or bell-handles as there are apartments within. The windows are, for the same reason, sufficiently diversified in appearance, being ornamented with every variety of common blind and curtain that can easily be imagined; which every doorway is blocked up, and rendered nearly impassable, by a motley collection of children and porter pots of all sizes, from the baby in arms and the half-pint pot, to the full-grown girl and half-gallon can.

By 1851, the subdistrict of Berwick Street on the west side of Soho was the most densely populated of all 135 subdistricts that made up Greater London, with 432 people to the acre. (Even with its skyscrapers, Manhattan today only houses around 100 per acre.) The parish of St. Luke’s in Soho had thirty houses per acre. In Kensington, by contrast, the number per acre was two.
But despite—or perhaps because of—the increasingly crowded and unsanitary conditions, the neighborhood was a hotbed of creativity. The list of poets and musicians and sculptors and philosophers who lived in Soho during this period reads like an index to a textbook on Enlightenment-era British culture. Edmund Burke, Fanny Burney, Percy Shelley, William Hogarth—all were Soho residents at various points in their lives. Leopold Mozart leased a flat on Frith Street while visiting with his son, the eight-year-old prodigy Wolfgang, in 1764. Franz Liszt and Richard Wagner also stayed in the neighborhood when visiting London in 1839–1840.

From Amazon

Steven Johnson, bestselling author of Everything Bad is Good for You, is fantastically gifted, and anyone who doubts it need only consider this: in The Ghost Map, Johnson manages to make filth, overpopulation, feces and death the cornerstones of one of the year's snappiest page-turners. On the simplest level, The Ghost Map is the true-life tale of the cholera scourge that slammed London in 1854 and the two passionate and whip-smart men who ferreted out its cause. But it's also a biography, a detective saga, a horror story, a history lesson, a sociological rumination on cities, an unlikely but gripping celebration of the modern sewer system and a vivid portrait of historic London life.
"London's underground market of scavenging had its own system of rank and privilege, and near the top were the night-soil men," Johnson observes. "Like the beloved chimney sweeps of Mary Poppins, the night-soil men worked as independent contractors at the very edge of the legitimate economy, though their labor was significantly more revolting than the foraging of the mud-larks and toshers.
"City landlords hired the men to remove the "night soil" from the overflowing cesspools of their buildings. The collecting of human excrement was a venerable occupation; in medieval times they were called rakers. [But] the work conditions could be deadly: in 1326, an ill-fated laborer by the name of Richard the Raker fell into a cesspool and literally drowned in human shit."
Nice. Clearly much more than just a dry recitation of data--though the depth of Johnson's research is obvious--The Ghost Map is a hair-raiser that cooks from page one. A big reason is Johnson's ability to personify and animate what he terms "the invisible kingdom of microscopic bacteria," transforming cholera into a nefarious three-dimensional villain with a role to play and zest for the part.

His work as biographer also impresses. Johnson gives us two protagonists all but forgotten by history who really should be feted: Dr. John Snow, who 150 years ago in an era of superstition and tenaciously held scientific notions, managed to work out the simple equation that excrement + drinking water = death. We also meet Reverend Henry Whitehead who similarly helped to crack the cholera riddle by flat-footing it through Soho, interviewing residents and survivors and eventually coming to believe that Snow was onto something with his water-borne disease theory. (The prevailing wisdom of the day held that disease was airborne and linked to smell).

It is no exaggeration to say that Snow's efforts changed the world. Ditto engineer Joseph Bazalgette, whose sprawling, visionary English sewer system Johnson likens in stature and scope to the Eiffel Tower and Brooklyn Bridge. The Ghost Map is a great, great book, stuffed with cool factoids and told by a writer so conversant in his topic that it plays like an exquisite yarn shared over friendly beers. --Kim Hughes

Science and Scientism in Nineteenth-century Europe

Richard Olson
University of Illinois Press, 2008 - Science - 349 pages
2 Reviews
Exploring the natural scientific foundations of far-reaching social ideologies

The nineteenth century produced scientific and cultural revolutions that forever transformed modern European life. Although these critical developments are often studied independently, Richard G. Olson's Science and Scientism in Nineteenth-Century Europe provides an integrated account of the history of science and its impact on intellectual and social trends of the day. Focusing on the natural scientific foundations underlying liberalism, socialism, positivism, communism, and social Darwinism, Olson explores how these movements employed science to clarify their own understanding of Enlightenment ideals, as well as their understanding of progress, religion, industry, imperialism, and racism. Starting with the impact of the French Revolution on scientific thought, Olson engages with key texts from J. B. Say, Henri Saint-Simon, Kant, Goethe, Darwin, Walter Bagehot, and Edward Bellamy to demonstrate the complex set of forces that shaped nineteenth-century thinking.

https://books.google.ca/books?id=h8C7fe50J0AC&dq=Herbert+Spencer+and+scientism&source=gbs_navlinks_s




The fallacy of objectivity in educational research: scientism as neo-liberal ideology
Citation metadata


Authors: Emery J. Hyslop-Margison and John A. Dale
Date: Winter 2005

From: Journal of Curriculum Theorizing(Vol. 21, Issue 4)
Publisher: Caddo Gap Press

Document Type: Article
Length: 4,020 words


Article Preview :
There are concerted attempts to promote scientifically-based research in contemporary education to the exclusion of other research paradigms. These efforts are reflected "in the No Child Left Behind Act and the reauthorization and reorganization of the Office of Educational Research and Improvement as the Institute for Educational Science" (Maxwell, 2004, p. 3). This prevailing trend within education is predicated on empiricist assumptions that mistakenly believe student achievement and attainment are best enhanced through scientific analysis, measurement and related program reform. Further, the instrumental implications of scientism in educational research are ideological because the approach insulates foundational problems in education from critique and transformation.
The view that science improves education is at least partially indebted to Herbert Spencer's 19th century pseudo-scientific learning principles and Auguste Comte's misguided faith in positivism as a means to understand human interaction. Although science has profoundly influenced education since the middle of the nineteenth-century, its ability to enhance learning is not evident in available statistics on student achievement (Egan, 2000). Nevertheless, the Bush administration's No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act advances social science assumptions as a means to improve education by demanding that learning programs be based on research that, "employs systematic, empirical methods that draw on observation and experiment" (2000, n.p.).
In this paper, we launch a multi-pronged attack against the commitment to scientism as a means to improve student achievement, in part, by arguing that empirical research in education violates three necessary conditions of meaningful scientific inquiry: (a) empirical research in education is neither objective or value free; (b) empirical research in education commonly makes theoretical assumptions in the interpretation of collected data; and (c) the methods and theories emerging from empirical research in education are not inter-subjective (Railton, 1991). Research findings are considered inter-subjective and scientific when different investigators employing rigorous data collection and analysis methods ultimately reach the same conclusion. We are not arguing against scientific research or science in the main, but we simply wish to emphasize that scientific investigation must satisfy specific epistemological requirements that are not met by existing research practices in education. Our more general intent in this paper is to strip the veneer of science from a conservative ideologically agenda seeking to reduce research in education to instrumental and socially reproductive forms of inquiry.
Ironically, much of the available empirical data regarding academic achievement and attainment accrued by the sociology of education over the past forty years is entirely ignored by the same individuals who openly advocate empirical research in NCLB. Voluminous empirical evidence indicates unequivocally that economic status is the primary variable in determining student academic achievement (Sadovnik, Cookson, & Semel, 2001). Indeed, the significant correlation between socio-economic status and educational outcomes strongly suggests that academic achievement is largely contingent on the social structure of opportunity. This empirical data, and the inter-subjective inferences it generates, are conveniently overlooked by the authors of NCLB who choose instead to emphasize testing, measurement and micro level accountability.
Based on this convenient oversight by the political architects of NCLB, and...

The Fragility of Modernity: Infrastructure and Everyday Life in Paris, 1870-1914 by Peter S. Soppelsa

https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/62374/psoppels_1.pdf

Introduction: Modernity, Infrastructure and Everyday Life
 We tend to associate “modernity” with power, control, order, progress, durability
and mastery. We also associate it with Western cities in the grips of the twin historical
transformations unleashed by the nineteenth century: industrialization and urbanization.
We often hear that Western cities became safer, cleaner, healthier, more comfortable,
efficient and rational places to live in the nineteenth century because Europeans
judiciously applied reason, science and technology to organizing and managing everyday
urban life. While Europe underwent fundamental social, spatial and technological
changes (urbanization, industrialization and globalization), so the familiar story goes,
European ways of life became more civilized, rationalized, standard, advanced, efficient,
democratic, humane, or even universal.
 But what would happen to this view of modernity if I told the story of a city in the
grips of industrialization and urbanization, whose leaders were anxious to improve life by
applying science and technology, which, however did not only become more rational,
more efficient and more humane in many ways, but also more complicated, more risky
and more fragile? What if that city was Paris, so-called “capital of the nineteenth
century,” “capital of modernity” and “capital of the world”?1
 In this study, I argue that Paris between 1870 and 1914, the scene of massive
work in infrastructural modernization, can help us uncover a different perspective on
modernity that highlights its contingencies, contradictions, complexity and fragility.2
This study is about what I call “the fragility of modernity,” meaning the special
difficulties that confront cities dependent on increasingly complex networked
infrastructures which bind humans, technology and the natural environment in new ways.
Although we often hear that everyday life was transformed by science and technology in
these years (often called the “Second Industrial Revolution”), Paris's modernization from
1870 to 1914 is better characterized as uneven development. In 1900, Paris became the
world’s fourth city to open an electric-powered subway, but as late as 1928, 18% of its
houses did not enjoy direct to sewer drainage.3
 Parisian responses to modernization were equally uneven, expressing both
optimism and anxiety about technological change, and a number of never-completed
fantasies of perfecting, optimizing, and controlling humans, the city, technology, nature,
and their relations.4
 While France’s civilizing mission kept Paris planners, engineers and
politicians on a technological-determinist track that identified infrastructural development
with progress, results on the terrain of everyday life were quite mixed. Technical
accidents, bureaucratic inefficiency, and shortages of crucial resources like water and
affordable housing called this progress into question. In this study we will hear many
voices in Paris questioning the familiar narrative of infrastructural modernization as
progress, as well as many defending it.3

 Infrastructural development did not influence everyday life in predictable ways.
As the Paris authorities used networked infrastructures to solve urban problems
(distributing water and power, public transportation, etc.), they increased the
heterogeneity, complexity and fragility of the city, helped reproduce social inequalities,
and increased the city’s ecological impact. In this study, I show that what Parisians
recognized as urban modernity between 1870 and 1914, which after Haussmann revolved
around the application of networked infrastructures for solving urban problems, was an
increasingly heterogeneous and fragile assembly, vulnerable to disruptions of social

routine, technological function, and the forces of nature.


1 (1) Walter Benjamin, “Paris, Capital of the Nineteenth Century,” from The Arcades Project, trans.
Howard Elland and Kevin McLaughlin (Harvard, 2002), pp. 3-26; (2) David Harvey, Paris, Capital of
Modernity (Routledge, 2003); Patrice Higgonet, Paris: Capital of the World (Harvard, 2005).

2 This idea is inspired by a long line of critical theorists who stress the “duality of modernity.” Ideas drawn from classic German theorists like Marx, Weber, Adorno, Horkheimer and Benjamin have been
retooled by more recent scholars like Raymond Aron, Marshall Berman , Jürgen Habermas, Detlev
Peukert and David Harvey.
3 Norma Evenson, Paris: A Century of Change, 1878-1978 (Yale, 1978), p. 208.
4 Anson Rabinbach, The Human Motor: Energy, Fatigue and the Origins of Modernity (University of

California, 1992).


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Machines Are Frozen Spirit: The Scientification Of Refrigeration And Brewing In The 19th Century--a Weberian Interpretation 


RIGHT UP MY FIELDS OF STUDY, I TUTORED IN REFRIGERATION I LIKE MY BEER, AND WEBER SOCIOLOGY AND ALL THAT

Paperback – Feb. 24 1994



The Interwar Period as a Machine Age:

Volume 31, Issue 3 (Interactions of Interwar Physics: Technology, Instruments, and Other Sciences)
September 2018 , pp. 263-292

The Interwar Period as a Machine Age: Mechanics, the Machine, Mechanisms, and the Market in Discourse
Richard Staley (a1)


DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0269889718000236
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 September 2018

Argument


This paper examines some of the ways that machines, mechanisms, and the new mechanics were treated in post-World War I discourse. Spengler's 1919 Decline of the West and Hessen's 1931 study of Newton have usually been tied closely to Weimar culture in Germany, and Soviet politics. Linking them also to the writings of Rathenau, Simmel, Chase, Mumford, Hayek, and others, as well as to Dada and film studies of the city will indicate central features of a wide-ranging, international discourse on the machine and mechanization. I argue that machines were so thoroughly integrated into social and economic experience that we can treat this as a distinctive new phase in the cultural history of mechanics, what some contemporaries called the “machine age”: a period in which rather than the hand mill or steam engine, the city stands as an appropriate realization (and sometimes symbol) of the significance but also ambiguities and tensions of mechanical life; and concepts of mechanization were extended to encompass the economy and market mechanisms.
The Intellectual Appropriation of Technology: Discourses on Modernity, 1900-1939

The Intellectual Appropriation of Technology: Discourses on Modernity, 1900-1939

 Paperback – Oct. 27 1998

The American Dream — A 16 hour work week

The American Dream — The Four Hour Day
We want to work less. We have to work less. We should work less. Let’s work less?

May 2, 2017 ·


The idea of shortening the workweek has gone mainstream: Forbes ran a piece advocating a 4-day workweek, The New Yorker, a 3-day week. Though it was anarchists and socialists who originally fought for the 8-hour day, it became mainstream, too. The vision for a four hour day is quite old itself — the economist John Maynard Keynes predicted in 1930, that in 100 years, we’d be working 15 hour weeks thanks to technology.

Yet, the utopian reduction in working hours is not playing out how Keynes foresaw. Instead of working less, we’re working more! “Nearly 86% of American men and 67% of women work more than 40 hours in any given week,” reports Forbes. Yet, the unemployment rate stood at 9.4% in January 2017(using the U-6 measure, which includes discouraged workers and involuntary part-time workers).

It’s a pretty sensible idea. Productivity has increased by 80.4% between 1973 and 2011 — shouldn’t our wages and working hours reflect that? Along with the rise of productivity, work has been disappearing and is doing so ever more rapidly. A study at Oxford University found that 47% of US jobs are at risk of being automated in the next 20 years. Machines are already replacing 90% of workers at some factories in China, and the iPhone manufacturing giant Foxconn plans to automate at least 30% of its jobs by 2020. Touchscreens are replacing cashiers; artificial intelligence is replacing translators, analysts, and actuaries; even managerial tasks are being automated. And this doesn’t have to be a bad thing.

4 Hour Day/Day Week — And no wage cuts!


“Automation and other innovations result in our productivity (output per work hour) doubling every 25 years or so,” writes Jon Bekken in his essay, “Arguments for a Four Hour Day,” published by the IWW. “We now [in 2000] produce about three times as much in an hour of work as we did in 1947, but are we living three times as well or working a third as much? Far from living better, average wages (adjusted for inflation) are only slightly higher than they were 25 years ago. And we’re not putting any fewer hours in on the job either, in fact we’re working longer and harder — somebody’s benefiting from the fact that our work is producing more; but it’s not us.”


In case you need convincing, Bekken goes on to provide rationale for the four hour day/four day week he proposes:


“The most important reason to fight for shorter hours is quite simple: Our time is our life. The time we spend at work is not our own, and far too much of it is squandered on useless production, the support of parasites (bosses, supervisors, investment bankers, marketers and the like), the construction of the means of our annihilation, and so forth.”

Make unemployment a thing of the past


“We could use that time to nurture our families and rebuild our communities, to make art or music or to study subjects that interest us. We could socialize, party, reflect, relax. We could use some of the free time we so richly deserve to get together with our fellow workers to discuss the kind of society we would like to live in, and to begin a campaign to create it. More free time (for too many of us, any free time at all) would provide us the means to lead more fulfilling, truly human lives.”

The philosopher Bertrand Russell joins the club of advocates. In “In Praise of Idleness”, he not only advocates the four-hour-day but gives many a reason why. Russell envisions that freedom from work will free us to pursue science, art, and writing, without the pressure to make a living from it.


“In a world where no one is compelled to work more than four hours a day, every person possessed of scientific curiosity will be able to indulge it, and every painter will be able to paint without starving, however excellent his pictures may be. Young writers will not be obliged to draw attention to themselves by sensational pot-boilers, with a view to acquiring the economic independence needed for monumental works, for which, when the time at last comes, they will have lost the taste and capacity.”

“ Above all, there will be happiness and joy of life, instead of frayed nerves, weariness, and dyspepsia.”

Bekken cites several examples of economists who have already found that a shortened workweek is feasible. A study by engineers at Columbia University in 1932 demonstrated that workers could live comfortably on four-hours per day if industry were arranged differently. In her book The Overworked American Harvard economist Juliet Schor argued that a four-hour day could have been implemented in the 1990s without any decline in living standards.

In 2010, the New Economics Foundation published a report, “21 Hours: The Case for a Shorter Workweek”. Their rationale:


“Overwork, unemployment, over-consumption, high carbon emissions, low well-being, entrenched inequalities, and the lack of time to live sustainably, to care for each other, and simply to enjoy life.”

Why work pointless jobs?

Not only are we working too much, but our work has become meaningless. In “Why Capitalism Creates Pointless Jobs,” David Graeber lists off the administrative and managerial positions that dominate the US workforce.

From personal experience, Graeber claims that even those who work these jobs often find them pointless, to the point where they harbor jealousy towards those that hold meaningful jobs, such as in teaching or medicine.

“Huge swathes of people, in Europe and North America in particular, spend their entire working lives performing tasks they secretly believe do not really need to be performed,” he writes.

This hunch is supported by several studies.

“In a 2013 survey of 12,000 professionals by the Harvard Business Review, half said they felt their job had no ‘meaning and significance,’” reported Rutger Bregman in a recent article in Wired. “Another poll among 230,000 employees in 142 countries showed that only 13 per cent of workers actually like their job. A recent poll among Brits revealed that as many as 37 per cent think they have a job that doesn’t even need to exist.”

We’re tired of working. Put on your party hats.
Aside from meaninglessness, we have to question the notion of “productivity” as a positive thing. What is the point of productivity if it has no benefits for the working classes, no benefits for the world at large outside of profit for the ruling class? Moreover, greater productivity means productivity in creating not only that which is unnecessary, but in that which is harmful. Building oil pipelines that will endanger our water supply, or cars instead of public transit. Aside from stayin’ alive, what incentive is there to participate if our economic activity is ultimately harmful? And does that not make those absent from the job market somehow ethically superior?

Russell, the liberal philosopher, nails it again, almost 100 years ago:


“Owing to the absence of any central control over production, we produce hosts of things that are not wanted. We keep a large percentage of the working population idle, because we can dispense with their labor by making the others overwork. When all these methods prove inadequate, we have a war: we cause a number of people to manufacture high explosives, and a number of others to explode them, as if we were children who had just discovered fireworks. By a combination of all these devices we manage, though with difficulty, to keep alive the notion that a great deal of severe manual work must be the lot of the average man.”

Think of all the pointless or redundant jobs that exist under capitalism but wouldn’t be necessary in a socialist one. For example, while socialism may still require banking services, perhaps in the form of credit unions or nationalized banks, we certainly don’t need so many bankers. And twenty different phone and Internet companies? Why? Fifty multinational toy manufacturers making cheap plastic crap? Unnecessary.

Yet getting rid of unnecessary work isn’t even necessary to reduce the workweek dramatically. The future is here, automated.

21 Hours: The Case for a Shorter Working Week

Of the necessary, non-automated work that sticks around, we can divvy it up evenly, solving unemployment immediately.

How can a shorter workweek be achieved?

The “21 Hours” report suggests that a number of conditions would be necessary to realize this goal. They propose “reducing hours gradually over a number of years in line with annual wage increments,” along with policies that encourage employers to shorten hours, training programs for the previously unemployed, and regulations that would standardize a shorter workweek and discourage overtime.

These conditions seem reasonable. From my point of view, the most direct way to achieve a shorter workweek would be to 1) legislate a 21 (or whatever other magic number) hour work week (discouraging overtime by legislating that it be paid extra), as FDR mandated the 40-hour-week in the Fair Labor Standards Act, and 2) to double or triple the minimum wage so that fewer hours would not have an effect on income.

We can expect that employers would scoff at such a wage increase. Recently, when American Airlines raised employee wages (certainly not doubling them), investors protested. “This is frustrating,” Citi analyst Kevin Crissey wrote in a note to clients, as reported by the LA Times. “Labor is being paid first again. Shareholders get leftovers.”

While it makes technological, economic, environmental, and social sense, implementing the shortened workweek would likely prove challenging politically. Wage increases at this level may require unrest, revolts, or even revolution and a total overhaul of the economic system.

Though, while corporations may pay more per hour, they will not have to pay the robots with which they have replaced most of these hours, thus profiting from an increase in productivity, and so some concession on their part would be reasonable, if not easy. Yet we should still expect protest on their behalf, for they are profit-addicts. If we are to take the movement for a four-hour-day seriously, this should be our main concern.

With automation doing rote tasks and the elimination of unnecessary work, there is space to nevertheless increase employment in the necessary work that we’ve been slacking on: teaching, developing renewable energy, environmental restoration, mass-scale recycling projects, R&D, public transit, etc. Even with work disappearing, we still have a lot of work to do to save the planet, which is why we still need a green jobs program.
What if we don’t organize for a 15 or 20 hour work week?

There won’t be work for all of us — so will we mostly be unemployed, and fighting over freelance scraps?

“Workers of the future will need to be highly adaptable and juggle three or more different roles at a time,” said Anand Chopra-McGowan, head of enterprise new markets for General Assembly, as reported by The Guardian in its article, “Will Jobs Exist in 2050?”.
Time for a four hour day!!!

“This is either going to be very good or very bad — and either way there’s not going to be much in the way of work,” added author Richard Newton in the same article.

Certainly, no matter how you slice it, if we don’t restructure jobs and the economy to fit the times, we are heading towards a future of unemployment.
My proposal? A tripartite economic program
Creating and destroying jobs. While we destroy pointless jobs and they destroy themselves through automation, we’ll create green and socially beneficial jobs through a green jobs program. This is not just a feel-good idea but must be taken seriously as a real and urgent priority and policy point if we are to save the planet — or rather the human race from the environmental havoc we have wreaked under 150 years of capitalism.
Drastic reduction in the workweek. Perhaps we could start with 20 hours, with an eventual goal of 10.
How would these hours be remunerated? Would we all be poorer? The reduction in work hours must be met by some increase in the minimum wage. Alternatively, or additionally, these hours could be traded in exchange for basic goods and services: food, housing, energy, education, health care, and transport, and/or a universal basic income.



WRITTEN BY Mary Lorax
Some reveries, memories, and tonterias

THE EVOLUTION OF INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY ABNER WOODRUFF C.E.



With the development of the machines there also developed the grooms of the machines—the machine proletariat (workers possessing no specialized skill). These workers have always been denied recognition by the craftsmen, because the craft attitude was one of contempt for the unskilled; and further, the craftsmen have always had an instinctive knowledge of the difference of the proletarian outlook upon industry and life, and feared that the machine men would refuse to accept the "God-given" leaders and would rule the labor organizations by reason of their superior numbers. However, these workers are now organizing on their own account and, since they are now the most numerous and most militant class in production, with the most urgent need to be served, they must in the end become the dominant force within the working class and their form of organization become the prevailing form.

The machine proletariat recognizes itself as the product of the machine, and, just as the craftsmen organized into craft unions on the basis of the hand tool, because it was the source of their living, so do the proletarians organize into industrial unions, on the basis of the machine—that being the source of life. They do not recognize skill as a property, giving anyone an aristocratic standing in labor, for the conquering machine rapidly destroys such skill as yet survives. Manual training, industrial schools and shop experience quickly fit the worker for his place at the machine, so the industrial union practices no exclusion, but accepts all who enter at only a nominal fee. It regards the wages system as a passing phase and, instead of offering "a fair day's work for a fair day's wage," inscribes on its banner "the abolition of the wage system" and endeavors to build up the co-operative and communal instincts of its class. It demands the full product of its collective toil, declaring that modern conditions and modern needs have set aside all the rights of private property that may have existed heretofore, and that the modern absentee owner is a parasite, doing nothing to earn his keep. It accepts collective bargaining, but sets no time limits to its agreements and holds no contract sacred—in fact, it abhors the contract with a master—and stands ready to disregard all contracts when an observance of the same would force it into the attitude of a strike breaker, or compel it to give countenance to organized scabbery.

The machine proletariat, recognized its subject position in modern class society, stands squarely on the class struggle, organizes to carry on the class struggle, and prepares itself to direct industry and administer society when that struggle shall have been won.

In all the various social systems of the past, the wealth and power of the ruling class has depended upon the wealth producing capacity of the working class and the degree to which it could be exploited. If the tools were simple and the portion of the wealth remaining after the workers were provided for was small, then the master class which took this surplus was relatively poor. But when modern machinery is used and the working class is highly productive, then the surplus of wealth is vastly increased and the master class actually wallows in a glut of wealth. The gulf between the workers and the masters yawns wider and deeper, and the workers, increasing in intelligence, grow ever more bitter and impatient with their poverty.

The chattel slave and feudal serf might well have toiled and suffered in silence—they knew no better—ignorance, superstition and bestial conditions held them in thrall, but not so the machine proletarian. He must be quick of body and alert of intellect—only as a trained man is he useful to the masters—therefore his reactions on his environment are more intelligent and more vigorous than those of any servile worker that has preceded him. He takes up the cudgel to defend himself. All the knowledge of the world is at his command and he quickly learns that labor power applied to the materials of the earth is the source of all wealth, and that the source of the master's riches lies in his appropriation of the surplus of wealth remaining after the workers are miserably fed, clothed and housed. Conversely, he learns that the worker's poverty arises from the fact that he does not retain the surplus of his own labor for himself, but allows it to be taken by another. The proletarian learns that governments and laws are used to awe him into submission to the looting of his labor; and that school and church and press are used to lull him into quietness. Is it then strange that he despises governments, despises courts, rebukes teachers, loathes editors, abhors priests and seeks only to seize the materials and machinery of production, that thereby he may turn them to his own advantage and, through them, destroy the domination of class and the governments, laws, schools, presses and pulpits that uphold class domination?

The machine proletariat attacks private property as a human institution. It recognizes the fact that through that institution all the other institutions of modern society have their force and effect, and nothing short of its destruction as an institution will ever be satisfactory. The proletariat knows that it can build a better society—a society, into which poverty, with all its hideous concomitants, can never come—and it is thoroughly determined to build it.

THE PROCESS OF TRANSFORMATION

The historic mission of the proletariat is to overthrow the present master class and to replace this civilization with a new and better civilization. In the meantime it is under the necessity of making growth and developing itself within the framework of modern capitalism in preparation for this great transformation. Let us see what are the transforming processes going on in modern society which promote the growth of the proletariat and on which we may predicate the structure of its new society.

The greatest of these processes are: First, the perfecting of the machinery of production and distribution, which goes on by means of invention; second, the perfection of the processes of manufacture, which goes on by means of chemical and engineering experimentation; third, the perfecting of management, which goes on by means of the study of cost data and automatic systems of superintendence; fourth, the centering of wealth in the hands of a few great Plutocrats, which goes on by means of manipulation and stock jobbery; fifth, the development of the proletariat, which goes on by means of the intimate contact of the workers with the machinery of production and management; and sixth, the awakening of the proletariat to a realization of the fact that it must take over and operate the industries in order to save itself from an impending condition of Industrial Serfdom and preserve such culture as the genius of man has handed down through the ages.

So great is the inventive faculty of the human animal, that, in all of the civilized countries, great bureaus are maintained for the examination and classification of the inventions; and each great industrial plant keeps a corps of trained men constantly at work trying to perfect the machines and make them truly automatic. Prizes and bonuses are paid to workmen, who suggest valuable changes or bring in useful hints; and so great are the improvements, that, at times, entire plants are scrapped to make way for new devices that have actually revolutionized the methods in a particular line of production.
New combinations of chemical elements and new facts in regard to the qualities of old materials are constantly being discovered, with the result that new industries spring up to make and supply new wants of the people. The craftsmen are constantly threatened by the machines and whole crafts are, at times, swept off the boards to be replaced by an automatic device that can be operated by unskilled labor.

When the machines seem to be perfected, the workers themselves are experimented upon to discover new ways of doing old tasks. Motion studies are made to develop methods for increasing the output and efficiency of individuals. Rearrangement of plants and team work are devised to get the most and best work out of gangs and working forces. Automatic systems of management, by which the workers practically drive themselves, are introduced; and profit sharing, piece rate and bonus systems of payment, which are intended to induce the slaves to work themselves to death for a supposed increase of pay, are instituted.

Although the middle class, which is being consistently wiped out, screams with agony and uses every possible reactionary device, the process of the centering of wealth goes steadily forward. The personnel of the Plutocracy may change from time to time, but the number grows beautifully less and the control of industry centers into fewer hands. So also, the real government centers into these same hands; through a show of democracy is maintained to keep the ignorant and patriotic deceived as to the true state of affairs. Salaried managers, engineers, chemists and accountants, together with the workers specialized at the machines, carry on production, while the Plutocrats thimblerig the middle class with Stock Exchanges, Boards of Trade and other similar gambling devices.
skill is no longer needed, and by members of the middle class, who have lost out altogether in their efforts to buck the gigantic brace game that the Plutocrats maintain for their special benefit.

The tendency of the machines toward perfection, naturally causes the great majority of the workers to become machine attendants to the approximate a level, so far as skill is concerned; thus breaking down the craft and other artificial barriers that formerly divided them. The machine process of production prevents the separating out of individual outputs and results in a practical equality of wages. This equality of wages naturally standardizes the livings of the various workers and causes them to flow together as a class. They find themselves subjected to almost identical conditions in all sections and begin to recognize themselves as a class, regardless of races, nationalities or creeds. Recognition of class generates that sense of duty known as the social conscience—the moral sense of the working class. They study their class needs and, through their identity of interest, associate so that they may harmoniously promote those interests.

The workers now become critical of their environment. They tear it to pieces and examine its parts—they study its effects upon themselves—and see to what depths of degradation they have been reduced. They perceive the growing numbers of the unemployed (displaced by the perfecting of the machines and the long hours of labor) and the steady operation of the law of wages towards further reductions of the standard of living. They learn also that there must be a constant effort to raise the rate of pay to keep pace with the increased production and cheapening of gold, on which the prices of all commodities, including labor power, are based.

The proletariat is at bed rock. It views the world and the institutions of society from the standpoint of utter disillusionment. Everything is naked before it and its attitude is one of absolute disgust and uncompromising hostility. In fact, it is at bay—its back is against the wall—it has turned upon its tormentors. The "social revolution" is on.

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