BACKGROUNDER BELARUS

“Maidan” in Belarus: threats or a real scenario
"Plošča" 2020: is the Belarusian society ready for mass protests?

mil.by 29.07.2020


In our previous analysis, “How state propaganda gives leverage to external forces,” we examined how the Belarusian authorities are trying to create the appearance of an external threat and are using it to mobilize within the country. The most striking example are the mysterious “militants” preparing a “massacre” Alexander Lukashenko spoke of at the beginning of June. Now the authorities are trying to sell this horror story for export, primarily to Russia. Judging by the reaction of the Kremlin, it is true that Russia does not want to associate itself with the organization of a false Maidan and possible blood spilled in Minsk and completely shifts all responsibility for what is happening to the Belarusian authorities.
Constructing a picture of a Belarusian “Maidan”

Monitoring of Belarusian state media and social networks shows active promotion of the topic of “Maidan,” which, of course, must be ruthlessly suppressed. Here, for example, the Telegram channel of the state news agency “Belta” is distributing anonymous provocative material called “Who is preparing the Maidan in Belarus.” Official media have been circulating Alexander Lukashenko’s statements about this threat for a long time.

The forceful dismantling of the authoritarian regime has become one of the primary bogeys in the post-Soviet space where authoritarian regimes dominate. “Color revolutions” materialize to rulers through any action of civil society. Alexander Lukashenka is no exception, but over the last month he has made the threat of “Maidan” a key point in his election campaign.

The authorities started talking about this violent scenario following the arrest of the main “street” politician Sergei Tikhanovsky at the very beginning of the election campaign. At that time, there was no “Bagration plan” from Maxim Shabutsky, nor any mention of certain Moscow puppeteers. Alexander Lukashenko personally introduced the topic of armed confrontation into official media circulation.

“In the end, no one knows how my friend Rakhmon entered the capital of Tajikistan with a machine gun to restore order. So many people died there. Oh, how they fought with those bearded men. We have forgotten how former President Karimov in Andijan crushed the putsch by shooting thousands of people. Everyone condemned him when he died – they knelt, wept, and cried. We have not gone through this, so we do not want to understand it. Some of us. Well, we’ll remind you!” he said on June 4.

Warnings about “Maidan” rained down throughout the election campaign, and at meetings with the military the president repeatedly spoke about the possibility of involving the army in suppressing protests.

“All sorts of wars now start with street protests, demonstrations, and then Maidans. At the Maidan, if there are no people of our own (we do not have enough “maidan-ers”), they will be pulled in from the side. These are professional military men, bandits who are specially trained, mainly within the framework of professional military companies around the world, and earn big money for provocations in various states,” Lukashenko said at a meeting with special forces in Maryina Gorka.

The entire information vertical is working on the bloodshed thesis. One of the top Belarusian media staff, a confidant of Alexander Lukashenko, Andrei Krivosheev, warned opponents of the authorities on social networks and advised them to “watch your backs,” recalling the fate of Nigoyan and Zhiznevsky. And the well-known state columnist Andrei Mukovozchik spoke almost openly about armed conflict:


“Are you ready for the fact that someone in your family, in your house, in your circle will die? Get ready. They can even kill, and most likely, they will certainly kill – without this, a woman’s revolt will not grow to a color revolution. And, most likely, they will kill their own: a provocation for a mutiny is the alpha and omega.”

Despite the odiousness, his texts should be carefully analyzed since the rhetoric of the “ideological mouthpiece” suspiciously coincides with the numerous “leaks” circulating in social networks about plans for a provocation. What is this? Is it just a campaign of intimidation or a scenario that the authorities are ready to implement at a critical moment?
A picture for the internal observer

As mentioned above, Lukashenka has repeatedly declared his readiness to use weapons and even the army if necessary. Moreover, messages appear on social networks (the question of their veracity is another story) about training security officials to shoot into crowds.

It is no secret that provocations have often been the reason for breaking up demonstrations in Belarus. This was the case in 2010, when provocateurs broke windows in the House of Government. Something similar happened in 2017, when tension in the information space was heightened with stories about militants storming across the border in a jeep and ending the case of the “White Legion.”

Obviously, the use of weapons against protesters will require something more significant than a clash with riot police. And here it is worth remembering the “leak” about the employees of “Alpha” who were allegedly trained in shooting at dummies in the form of riot police. In social media chats, such messages become thick with additional details: the task of training is not to kill, but to injure, and this is necessary (concluding in the message) in order to simulate an armed attack on police officers. To conceal the traces, shots can be fired, for example, from hotel rooms reserved with fake Russian passports (says the author, referring to the experience of the Ukrainian Maidan).


A logical question arises: Is it not under such a scenario that the state media warn about Maidan, while “sympathetic” protesters and disgruntled “sources” leak messages about how security forces are preparing for August 9?

To answer this question, one must assess whether such a scenario will be beneficial to authorities.

Alexander Lukashenko’s next term promises to be especially difficult. The unresolved issue of integration with the Russian Federation, growing economic difficulties, aggravated by the pandemic, the upcoming referendum on the Constitution – this is an incomplete list of problems with which the current president will enter the next term.

In such a situation, the postponed protests will turn out to be a time bomb for the authorities, which can explode at the most inopportune moment. The escalation of the conflict now, the “opening of the abscess,” and the harsh cleaning of the entire political field will become an inoculation against future speeches. In this case, one can forget about mass actions for a long time. Is this not an explanation of the logic of the “hawks” surrounding Lukashenka?

Do you think this is overstatement? But the same Mr. Mukovozchik candidly articulates this kind of scenario in the official press of the Belarusian Presidential Administration:


“We will not wait with our hands at our sides. […] We will excise, cauterize, isolate, and treat with care quickly. Only the scar will remain, but it will not harm us far into the Belarusian future. So that it never boils over again.”

The columnist Mukovozchyk and his curators do not consider or do not want to consider one important point: there are simply no real justifications for the use of force at this level in Belarus. The protests this year have been exceptionally peaceful. If there were clashes with riot police, these have been isolated cases, which, according to many observers, were provoked using disproportionate force by special forces. There is no need to talk about the possibility of full-scale collisions. In the public opposition discourse, there has never been any talk of a violent scenario for seizing power. All participants in the process have insisted on peaceful protest. Even now, after the arrests and non-registration of the main opponents of the incumbent president, the remaining actors are extremely cautious about coordinated mass action. The only statements on this score can be described as “if people come out, we will come out too.” That is, the opposition camp not only does not want bloodshed, but it is not beneficial to anyone.
External observers

The horrors of Maidan can be sold not only domestically but also exported.

Having made several significant mistakes both before and during the presidential campaign, the Belarusian authorities are trying to mold a new plan from the familiar material that was at hand.

The West is trying to sell gender-balanced elections and the threat of Russian interference. Russia, it seems, is being offered a story about “Maidan,” which the Kremlin, no doubt, fears much more than the extension of Lukashenko’s term.

According to our information, Moscow does not want a “harsh” scenario in Belarus, but rather is interested in the continuation of the “stagnation,” as a result of which the economy and society will degrade so much that they themselves will fall into the fraternal Russian arms without noise, dust or blood.

There may be several reasons for this reluctance. First, it is difficult to control the development of events, and the outcome options may not be in Russia’s favor. A real shock will lead to a change of power and Belarus’s slipping from control or to a massive clean-up of the political arena, which will also hit pro-Russian elements (when they are planning to strengthen them). Secondly, the worsening of the situation in Belarus could provoke a chain reaction in Russia itself, which is extremely undesirable given current Russian problems.

Moreover, Russian politics is so misogynistic that it will definitely not support the “woman’s rebellion,” our sources say.
We do not know what exactly is happening at the diplomatic level, but signals about the undesirability of such a scenario travel all over the media space. Moscow refuses outright any forceful scenarios and shifts all responsibility to Lukashenko and his circle.

Here, for example, is what the “flagship” of the Belarusian theme writes in the Russian-language Telegram space – “Nezygar”:


“Lukashenka has problems within the Family and the team. And Moscow has nothing to do with it. Moreover, Lukashenko is well aware of the balance of power and Russia’s refusal to participate in various Maidans and its desire to hear a sound position about integration… Moscow’s mission now is not to overthrow Lukashenko and create a new hotbed of tension near its own borders. The task is to weaken Lukashenko personally and his court circle.”

Another channel, Maisky Ukaz, echoes Nezygar:


“There really are no plans in Moscow to remove Lukashenko. Because any ‘Maidan’ movements in the CIS are seen as a rehearsal for destabilizing the situation in Russia itself by the Presidential Administration and by Vladimir Putin personally. Nobody dares to go to the President with such ideas for fear of being accused of alarmism.”

And there are many such messages. Not that we believe in the sincerity of Kremlin technologists. But what is written in Telegram creates an informational background for both Russians and Belarusians, on which the power scenario “from Lukashenko,” firstly, will be his responsibility, with all the blood that may be shed; and, secondly, it will build a “good” Kremlin that thinks about Belarusians, from a bad “bloody father.” Remember that the most active segment of both Russians and Belarusians use Telegram specifically.

A cursory monitoring of Russian media close to decision-making centers confirms that Moscow is not ready for such a development of events and does not want it. The Ukrainian project “Russia Today,” which also works in Belarus, usually writes about the threat of a Maidan, but notes that “Lukashenko has perceived something different.”

Key media outlets, in particular Kommersant, are also cautious about the likelihood of a real Maidan in Belarus. In Vzglyad, which is directly connected to the Russian Presidential Administration, Higher School of Economics (HSE) professor Andrei Suzdaltsev writes that “the main disseminators of rumors about Maidan are the Belarusian authorities and President Lukashenko himself, who are trying to justify repression and mobilize the pro-government electorate out of fear.” From the pages of the odious Pravda.Ru, also associated with the Russian Presidential Administration, Andrei Suzdaltsev has already stated that Lukashenko is alarming the Russian Federation so that it will support him.

“He performs flawlessly. He knows very well that in our political class, in the Russian expert community, the word “Maidan” is a coded word. We are ready to support anyone so that there will be no Maidan, and he made it so that only Lukashenka is heard and not the Belarusian people,” he said.

It seems that the Kremlin will not be able to sell a false Maidan in exchange for gas and a weakened onslaught on deep integration will also not come to fruition.
What will happen?

We do not undertake to predict now what will happen after August 9.

Only one thing is beyond doubt: the authorities are not ready to speak with society in a civilized language, and any disagreement or protests, even those peacefully structured, are perceived as direct threats and challenges.

The authorities have already made many mistakes in working with society, which was ready to take another boring election for granted in exchange for maintaining its sovereignty. But too many Belarusians do not want to wait for changes brought down from above. What is more, they seek to participate in peaceful reforms carried out in an independent and prosperous country. However, the authorities continue to speak with this segment of society in the language of ridicule, threats, dispersal, and bludgeons.

The conditional West and even the Kremlin have distanced themselves as much as possible from what is happening in Belarus before the elections and, it seems, are trying to persuade Lukashenko from different sides to be more careful with his own citizens, as no one needs blood spilled in Belarus. But the head of Belarus and his circle are increasing the degree of hysteria about external and internal enemies with each day.

Perhaps the fact is that Belarusian society has gone ahead and outgrown the ruling group and its leader. It seems to some in power that the simplest response in the form of threats is the most effective. However, without reforms and transformation of power, another presidential term may turn out to be the last term in Belarus as an independent country.

The article is also available on Reform.by

Материал доступен на русском языке: «Майдан» в Беларуси: угрозы или реальный сценарий



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BACKGROUNDER

Belarus at a Crossroads: Political Regime Transformation and Future Scenarios
Analysis of Belarus's election campaign and probable future scenarios

LONG READ 

RFE/RL's Belarus
22.07.2020 Andrei Yeliseyeu

Pre-election campaign period

Shortly after the changes in the Belarusian government in August 2018, Belarusian president Alyaksandr Lukashenka (Alexander Lukashenko) intensified his political activity. It indicated that one of the elections will likely be moved up to 2019, though both parliamentary and presidential elections were scheduled to take place in 2020. By separating the two campaigns in time authoritarian regimes intend to discourage political mobilization.

The 2nd European Games in June 2019 were beneficial to this purpose, and they inescapably became more a political than a sporting event. In the spring of 2019, amid worsened relations with the Kremlin and increased uncertainty in Belarus’s relationship with Russia, the Belarusian ruler made up his mind to hold parliamentary elections in November 2019, leaving the presidential elections for 2020.

Except for two 1,000-strong protest rallies in Minsk against the plans of further integration between Belarus and Russia in December 2019, no prominent street protest activity took place in Belarus last year. However, circumstantial evidence suggested a growing public mistrust toward the Belarusian authorities and Lukashenka personally. They were hit by a serious blow to their reputation at the 2019 Belarus’ Independence Day of 3 July. The festivities took a tragic turn after the fireworks killed a 64-year-old woman and injured 10 other spectators in Minsk. Despite state-owned media efforts to silence the incident, it was highly publicized online, particularly via websites of independent media, social networks, and Telegram channels.

In the absence of independent sociology in Belarus, assumptions concerning Lukashenka’s approval rating are based on indirect indicators such as people’s participation in state-organized events, the degree of accepted pluralism in various areas, and characteristics of state information policies.

Even prior to the 3 July accident, absenteeism at the 2nd European Games pointed at Belarusian citizens’ distrust of government. They largely ignored the European Games events, which took place from 21 June to 30 June 2019, despite enormous efforts of the Belarusian authorities. The European Games were widely labeled Hunger Games on social media due to state investments over $260 million, amid difficult economic conditions.

A completely “politically sterile” Belarus’s parliament of November 2019 was another indication of state authorities’ eroded reputation. Had his trust ratings been high, Lukashenka would have likely allowed opposition representation to have an extra bargaining chip in negotiations with the West, particularly amid tough talks with Moscow. The fact that there was absolutely no opposition in the parliament was therefore supposed to show the population and nomenklatura that the ruler retains full control of the situation.

In the past few years, a growing censorship on the internet and propaganda component in the state-owned media can also be seen as a manifestation of the political regime’s response to Lukashenka’s undermined reputation. The right to anonymity online was severely limited in December 2018 with the introduction of compulsory authentication of Belarusian internet users through SMS activation or by other means. In February 2018, the presidential administration newspaper Belarus Segodnya shut down the comments section on the website, apparently due to an increase in negative comments. Attempts to boost Lukashenka’s image by all means have led the state-owned media to an extreme departure from journalistic standards.

Another indicator of Lukashenka’s awareness of fallen approval ratings and his preparedness to increase degree of repression was the appointment of Major General Ihar Siarheyenka (Igor Sergeenko), Deputy Head of the KGB for counter-intelligence activities, as the head of the presidential administration in December 2019. Siarheyenka’s appointment was also an important milestone in the ongoing transformation of Belarus’s political regime. (More on this below.)



Pre-election mobilization and Lukashenka’s vague campaign

The presidential administration’s expectation to have non-emotional and otherwise nondescript elections of the type seen in 2015 failed to materialize due to the increased political mobilization. It was caused by economic grievances and exacerbated by inadequate response to the coronavirus epidemic clearly attributable to Lukashenka and his ruling coalition.

In early spring 2020, the normalization of relations with the Kremlin and personally with Vladimir Putin seemed to be the only significant challenging factor for Lukashenka’s election campaign. In the following months, the Belarusian strongman found himself in a much more complicated situation for several reasons.

The coronavirus epidemic began developing in Belarus in early March, exactly when the more active phase of Lukashenka’s election campaign began to unfold. Since early March the media coverage of Lukashenka’s working trips and other main topics by state-run media became much more positive and was designed to focus on (real or invented) success stories.

Over the course of March, state media covered the topics of successful diversification of oil supplies, the ceremonial presentation of passports to schoolchildren for the Constitution Day, the adoption of a presidential decree to stimulate the use of electric vehicles, and Lukashenka’s visits to rather flourishing Adani and Belgips companies.

The positive media coverage was suddenly overshadowed by the growth of the coronavirus epidemic. The Belarusian ruler did not hide his irritation, repeatedly criticizing excessive public attention to the coronavirus problem. Instead of quick adjustments to his campaign, Lukashenka repeatedly spoke out against extreme “corona-psychosis” and downplayed the risks of the epidemic. Instead of paying a single visit to a hospital or other medical institution, he made a number of controversial statements, which provoked public anger and jokes. Among other things, Lukashenka offered steaming in sauna, taking shots of vodka and working in the fields as a cure for coronavirus.

State-owned TV channels used a dozen manipulative tricks to convince the population of the insignificance of the coronavirus and the brilliant conduct of the Belarusian authorities. TV hosts repeatedly stated that no one died from the coronavirus in Belarus, cited absurd comparisons of mortality from other causes such as road accidents, and argued that world politicians were following Lukashenka’s wise actions. A representative online poll of Belarusian city residents conducted in April 2020 showed that over 70% of respondents wanted to be better informed about the spread of the coronavirus.

By June, Belarus was among 15 most-affected countries with the highest number of identified coronavirus cases per capita. At the same time, Belarus maintained one of the lowest infection fatality rates in the world. However, a number of observations (e.g., a very high share of coronavirus-related deaths among medical workers) suggest that the actual number of coronavirus-related deaths may be underestimated in official Belarusian statistics by 10 times or more. Moreover, in early May Lukashenka for a split second demonstrated a graph which was believed to contain alternative coronavirus-related statistics, with a higher number of identified cases than reported by the ministry of health.

A sheer drop of oil price over the spring of 2020 and COVID-19 pandemic implications negatively affected the economic situation in Belarus. Income from oil refining and the sale of potash fertilizers dropped, the service sector has suffered losses, and unemployment has risen. State support measures for small- and medium-sized businesses were limited and came late. As Lukashenka admitted in early July, he deliberately delayed their approval saying, “I held back this process, as I was waiting for you [business representatives] to take your money out of your pocket and invest it.” Furthermore, thousands of Belarusian households suffered from the disruption of circular migration flows as the entry to Russia and EU countries for most categories of Belarusian population remains restricted due to the coronavirus epidemic as of late July 2020.

Belarus belongs to the ten most censored countries in the world, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists 2019 report. This, combined with the large staff of state ideologists and a well-functioning system of electoral fraud, has made the Belarusian authorities quite successful at creating a myth about Lukashenka’s electoral majority. However, due to the growing popularity of new media and messengers like Telegram, access to information among Belarusian has greatly improved in recent years.

Despite various tricks by the Belarusian authorities to convince the population of the opposite (including the publication of allegedly secret documents with sociological data), during the 2020 election campaign an increasingly larger part of Belarusian society began to realize that Lukashenka’s opponents are in a majority.

A representative poll of Minsk residents conducted by the Institute of Sociology of the Belarusian Academy of Sciences throughout March and early April 2020 showed that the Lukashenka’s trust rating amounted to 24%, while the Central Election Commission enjoyed an even lower rating of 11%. Taking into account the effect of social desirability and deteriorated epidemiological and economic situation since that time, in July 2020 Lukashenka’s trust rating among Minsk residents hardly exceeded 15-20%.

While the share of Lukashenka’s supporters among the rural population and people aged 70+ is undoubtedly higher, a low level of support among the urban population is irrefutable. The people’s trust in government and Lukashenka in regional cities and smaller towns is unlikely to differ greatly from the capital region.

Earlier surveys of the population also indicate a high degree of dissatisfaction with living conditions. Asked “How would you generally assess your current life situation?,” only 6.9% of respondents answered “Better than average,” a nationwide survey of the Belarusian youth (aged 18-29 years) conducted under the auspices of the Institute of Sociology in 2017 showed. The option “It is difficult to live, but one can endure it” was chosen by 33.8% of respondents, whereas “The situation is dire, it is already impossible to endure” saw 21.1%.

Moreover, 55.1% of young Belarusians fully or partially agreed with the statement “The development of society requires somewhat drastic social and political changes from time to time.” Twice fewer (23.3%) disagreed with this statement to varying degrees, while the rest was uncertain. Today’s figures assessing the living situation are likely even more depressing. Hence the view that Belarusians prefer a vague concept of “stability” to whatever societal changes does not find support at least among young people.

By late April, Lukashenka faced a stark new political reality after high electoral support of his main political opponents became very clear. Viktar Babaryka, former head of the Board of Belgazprombank, collected around 435,000 signatures in his support, more than any other democratic candidate in Belarus’s history. Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, a wife of popular blogger Siarhei Tsikhanouski who was put in custody on dubious charges, also managed to collect over 100,000 signatures required for registering as a presidential candidate, despite multiple arrests of initiative group members and continuous state counteractions.

Amid an unprecedented political mobilization, Lukashenka’s election campaign took vague forms and became rather reactive. It proved to be proactive only in the part of repressive actions as explained in greater detail below. The Belarusian ruler even canceled his traditional annual Address to the People and Parliament. Throughout July Lukashenka repeatedly mentioned “five pandemics” that Belarus is witnessing, speaking about carbon, economic, political, and information pandemics in addition to coronavirus. His election campaign’s main message can be tentatively formulated as “We are together, we are one country,” while Belarus’s independence and sovereignty are presented as his primary achievements.

Lukashenka’s domestic political priorities

To forestall a growing political mobilization of the population, since April Alyaksandr Lukashenka prioritized the following domestic political actions:
A campaign of repression and discrediting the most popular political opponents.
Larger control over information flows, including through reprisals against popular bloggers.
Intimidation of civilian population.

Both of Lukashenka’s most popular political opponents, Siarhei Tsikhanouski and Viktar Babaryka, are facing lengthy prison terms on various dubious charges. Tsikhanousky was detained in Hrodna following a suspected provocation against him with the participation of a woman who was later identified as a Minsk-based prostitute. Among other things, Tsikhanouski is accused of threatening the life of Lidziya Yarmoshyna, the head of the Central Election Commission. The accusation is based, among other things, on a slogan mentioning Yarmoshyna and containing a Russian word that means “to swat,” which was present at one of Tsikhanouskaya’s public meetings.

Viktar Babaryka and his son Eduard, head of his election campaign headquarters, are accused of various financial crimes. State officials including Lukashenka have repeatedly used derogatory statements about Tsikhanouski and Babaryka and asserted their guilt. State-owned TV channels broadcast a number of reports using fragments of investigative actions and claiming Babaryka’s implication in crimes, in violation of the presumption of innocence.

As for the greater control of information flows, several popular YouTube bloggers and Telegram channel authors were arrested on charges of preparing mass events that grossly violate public order. Over 40 journalists have been detained when covering peaceful protests over the two past months, some of them were beaten by law enforcement officers. The Belarusian authorities began experimenting with shutting down mobile internet during protests. The Prosecutor’s Office made a statement that the reading of news on the internet by public servants may amount to a corruption offense.

It was reported in early June that by the decision of the Academy of Sciences, online polls on political issues were equalized to opinion polls, which, according to the law, must be licenced. Therefore by conducting an online poll Belarusian media outlets risk to be fined and to receive a warning from the ministry of information. In the event of two warnings during a calendar year a media outlet in Belarus may be closed as ordered by court decision.

At least 1,140 arbitrary detentions took place between 6 May and 20 July, over 500 people were either fined or received administrative arrests, human rights defenders report. Lukashenka and representatives of law enforcement agencies made a number of statements aimed to intimidate the population. In early June, Lukashenka praised bloody suppression of Andijan protests by the former Uzbek ruler Islam Karimov. State-run TV channels showed the KGB chief Valery Vakulchyk taunting a 81-year-old lady who had publicly criticized Lukashenka’s policies.

Lukashenka repeatedly spoke about readiness to prevent a “Maidan” at any cost, groundlessly accusing his political opponents of intention to “organize a massacre in the square.” Interestingly, a number of marginal Russian sites also published stories about possible serious provocations by “radical Belarusian nationalist groups” in the Mahiliou and Viciebsk regions adjacent to Russia.

Political regime transformation: Towards a stronger military rule

While a number of factors, primarily historically lowest level of public’s trust, make Lukashenka’s ongoing election campaign most challenging, he benefits from the highest degree of centralization of power in sovereign Belarus’s history and unprecedented strength of the security apparatus.

Belarus’s political regime is often categorized as a classic personalist type. For two decades the capacity of all state institutions in Belarus was kept very low so as not to give rise to organizational centers of opposition. In accordance with the categorization of political regimes by Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Belarus’s political regime is likewise sometimes classified as sultanism. This type of political regime is characterized by the extreme personal presence of the ruler in all elements of governance. In sultanism, the ruler is not bound by any rules or a given ideology. In their final stages of existence, sultanisms often have a very narrow social basis, often restricted to a small circle of its clients.

The original Geddes classification of authoritarian regimes reflects three ideal types: personalist, military, and one-party dictatorships. Based on the approach that differs from the existing practice of creating categorical typologies of autocratic regimes, one can speak about the recent, or rather ongoing evolution of Belarus’s political regime to a personalist military type. Indeed, lately political scientists point at the practical need to distinguish between collegial and personalist military rule.

Acknowledging that authoritarian regimes of any type almost always rely on some degree of repression against competing groups, personalist military dictatorships are characterized by much stronger military rule. Under the military not only the army, but security bodies and other law-enforcement agencies may be thought to include.

The appointment of KGB Major General Ihar Siarheyenka as the head of the presidential administration in December 2019 was an important milestone in the evolution of Belarusian authoritarianism towards a personalist military type. Until 2016 Siarheyenka was blacklisted by the EU for repressions against civil society and democratic opposition in the Mahiliou region and in Belarus. Lukashenka also put Mikhail Miasnikovich, a powerful figure in a ruling coalition, aside by sending him to Moscow upon his appointment as Chairman of the Board of the Eurasian Economic Commission.

The influence of persons specialized in the use of force in the Belarus’s ruling coalition increased even more after the June 2020 government reshuffle. Raman Halouchanka (Roman Golovchenko), who previously chaired the State Authority for Military Industry and served as a chief specialist of the State Secretariat of the Security Council, replaced liberal-minded economist Siarhei Rumas as a new prime minister.

Other than that, former KGB Deputy Chairman Major General Ivan Tertel replaced Leanid Anfimau with background in the industrial sector and management as Chairman of the State Control Committee. Tertel has been very zealous in putting his efforts to persuade the Belarusian population and international community in Babaryka’s crimes. At the closed meeting with the US and EU countries’ diplomats on 18 June 2020, which was dedicated to the Belgazprombank criminal case, Tertel reportedly played a leading role and acted rather aggressively, including towards Belarus’s foreign minister Uladzimir Makei.

A ‘civilian’ component in Lukashenka’s ruling coalition has never been as sidelined from decision-making processes as it is now. Decision-making in sovereign Belarus has never lied in the hands of the so strong military bloc consisting of siloviki as chairmen of the presidential administration and the government, the Security Council, KGB, Ministry of Interior, State Control Committee, Investigative Committee, Prosecutor’s Office, and other law enforcement agencies.

Such political transformation poses a coup threat against an eventual nascent democratic regime in Belarus until it is reformed. “The anticipation that the military will be reformed in the future acts as an additional motivation for the military to undertake coups against democratic governments,” one comparativist political study says.

The recently increased military rhetoric of the Belarusian ruler and Belarus’s state-run media reflects the evolution of Belarus’s political regime. In mid-July 2020 Lukashenka advocated for a constitutional amendment preventing a person who did not serve in the army, to become a president. Unlike Russian leadership, he did not postpone the Victory Day military parade on 9 May 2020 amid a surge of coronavirus cases, despite widespread public criticism. Reporting about Belarus’s Independence Day of 3 July 2020, state-owned TV channels claimed it has much in common with the Victory Day, making parallels between WWII war and continuous struggle for Belarus’s independence and sovereignty led by Lukashenka.

The dynamics of the Belarus-Russia relationship

In response to Minsk’s wishes for Moscow’s greater economic support, including in the form of compensations for Russia’s oil tax reform and lower gas prices, in late 2018 the Kremlin articulated the integration ultimatum. It lies in the readiness to provide Minsk with more beneficial energy deals, subject to deeper integration of Belarus with Russia in various spheres within the framework of the 1999 Union State Treaty. This would involve the introduction of common currency, creation of single Tax and Civil Codes and supranational bodies, and approximation of Belarusian legislation with Russia’s in many other spheres.

Over the last two decades Lukashenka skillfully traded geopolitical loyalty and military cooperation for Russia’s generosity. The Kremlin, however, pointed to a change in the model of bilateral relationship, declining the long-standing scheme “oil and gas in exchange for kisses” and demanding the shares of Belarus’s sovereignty instead. Since the beginning of 2019, the Belarusian authorities have been involved in intensive negotiations with Moscow over the program of action on stepping up integration. Its content and course were concealed as much as possible from the Belarusian parliament and the public.

Although the program of action was initialed and a list of 31 integration roadmaps was approved by the prime ministers of Belarus and Russia on 6 September 2019, none of these documents has been published. In December 2019 former Russian prime minister Dmitry Medvedev stated that the 31st integration roadmap foresees the introduction of a single currency and creation of supranational bodies, something that Lukashenka repeatedly denied of being discussed. In the 31st integration roadmap Moscow reportedly proposed to discuss the creation of a single Court of Audit, single customs, tax, and competition authorities, as well as common regulating agencies in transportation, industry, agriculture, and other spheres.

The program of action was not, however, approved by the Belarusian and Russian leaders on 8 December 2019 to coincide with the 20th anniversary of the Treaty on the Union State. The negotiation process was put on hold since December 2019. The Belarusian authorities conditioned the signing of integration agreements with top-priority concessions from Russia, primarily in terms of oil revenue compensation and reduced gas price, and were reluctant to discuss the 31st integration roadmap, presenting it as the issue of a distant future. In turn, the Kremlin counted on Minsk’s written commitments as for the deeper integration within the agreed timeline, before providing concrete economic concessions in the energy field and others.

One can assume that the erosion of Lukashenka’s reputation among Belarusian officials has been relentless since late 2018 due to unsuccessful series of negotiations with Putin. The two leaders met 11 times, including for 2- and 3-day negotiations, between December 2018 and December 2019. By 2020 Minsk did not succeed in getting either compensations for Russia’s oil tax reform or lower gas prices. Over the years, Lukashenka’s ability to provide Russian resources has shaped him as an irreplaceable earner. In the event of a conclusive inability to find a mutually beneficial solution with Moscow, an accelerated Lukashenka’s delegitimization among nomenklatura may occur. As of mid-July 2020 no signs of disloyalty in his ruling coalition were observed.

A growing political mobilization and heightened repressions in Belarus, and hence worsening relations with the West, increase the probability of a new Lukashenka’s integration package with Russia in exchange for Kremlin’s political and economic support.

Prior to or immediately after the two previous presidential elections, Lukashenka ensured the deepened integration between Belarus and Russia. Ten days before the presidential elections of 19 December 2010, Lukashenka and Medvedev agreed on the terms of Belarus’s accession to the Common Economic Space. Shortly after the brutal dispersal of street protests on election day, all 17 documents pertaining to the CES creation were ratified by Minsk. A year before the 2015 presidential elections, Minsk ratified the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union. For each of these deals, Belarus was awarded with larger oil revenues.

After a series of public squabbles between Belarusian and Russian officials over the response to the coronavirus pandemic in the spring of 2020, a dialogue over deeper integration has intensified in June.

During the online discussion “Russia and Belarus: The post-pandemic future” on 4 June, Belarusian Ambassador to Russia Uladzimir Siamashka (Vladimir Semashko) stated, “Minsk is ready at any time to sit down at the negotiating table [to discuss integration roadmaps] if we have the goodwill of our Russian partners and friends.” Such a moment for the continuation of negotiations may come in September of October, Siamashka added.

During the same event Russian ambassador Dmitry Mezentsev said that the West follows Brzezinski’s commandments and wishes to tear Belarus away from Russia. He also criticized the fact that on account of “far-fetched, artificial pretexts and obstacles” resulting from “political nuances and conjuncture” Belarusian goods cannot make it to Crimea.

On June 5, an online meeting of the High-Level Group of the Council of Ministers of the Union State of Russia and Belarus was held. During the meeting, several issues were resolved, including those related to integration roadmaps, while other issues were postponed until September.

Another online conference with the participation of high-ranking officials of Belarus and Russia and Secretary of the Union State Grigory Rapota was held on 10 June. At the conference, entitled “Russia and Belarus: Horizons of Strategic Cooperation,” Mezentsev mentioned Siamashka’s promise to continue negotiations in the fall and again spoke about alleged attempts by external forces to tear Belarus away from Russia. In his opinion, soon such attempts will surely be “even tougher and more refined.”

During the online conferences, it turned out that Minsk and Moscow have different understandings of the number of agreed integration roadmaps. According to Mezentsev, 27 documents out of 31 have been approved, whereas Siamashka stated that 28 and a half out of 30 roadmaps had been agreed upon. Apparently, the Belarusian side continues to ignore the existence of the 31st roadmap, although in early July it was confirmed by the Secretary of the Union State Grigory Rapota.

The format of future Belarus-Russia relationship remains in the state of uncertainty given the strained personal relationship between Lukashenka and Putin, upcoming presidential elections in Belarus amid low Lukashenka’s electoral rating, and possible negative impacts that the novel coronavirus outbreak is poised to bring for both counties. At the same time, likely due to Lukashenka’s signals to Moscow about his readiness to proceed with a new integration round in exchange for the much needed political support, the bargaining process over deepened integration restarted in June. The rather restrained reaction of the Russian side to the Belgazprombank criminal case and recent statements by Russian officials favouring further integration indicate that the Kremlin is eyeing the possibility to strike a new integration deal with the politically weakened Lukashenka.

Dilemmas and Future Scenarios

In Belarus the state organs such as courts, electoral commissions, and Prosecutor’s Office are in the hands of the ruler and his inner circle. It allows him to unilaterally control the organization, monitoring, and adjudication of elections. Opposition unity and a consequent threat of massive civil disobedience can compel autocrats to hold clean elections and leave office by triggering splits within the state apparatus, one article suggests.

Although the contours of the Belarusian opposition unity emerged on 16 July with the decision of Viktar Babaryka’s and Valery Tsepkala’s campaign headquarters to unify around Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, so far no genuine threat of massive massive civil disobedience was posed, therefore a vast electoral fraud remains very likely.

The existing institutions have not been transformed and election-related malpractices continue. For the upcoming presidential election, out of 1,989 members of the territorial election commissions only two represent opposition parties, whereas out of over 63,000 members of local election commissions only a few represent the Babaryka-led “Honest People” initiative. Minsk’s refusal to invite OSCE / ODIHR observers also points to the Belarusian authorities’ plans to announce another Lukashenka’s devastating victory, without any regard for real voting results.

The two most important factors for the further development of the political situation in Belarus will be the Kremlin’s position and the level of opposition mobilization capacity. The West’s actions will hardly be decisive given its very limited leverage over the situation in Belarus.

In the event of limited mobilization capacity with no genuine revolutionary threat, Lukashenka will get more maneuverability in negotiations with Moscow. However, even in this situation, it will not be easy for him to continuously postpone a new integration deal with Russia. Faced with an increasingly problematic balance of payments, Minsk’s needs for rapid external financial assistance will likely increase in the coming months. In this situation the West may find itself in an awkward position: To provide macroeconomic assistance to Belarus despite mass violations of human rights and electoral standards, or to leave Minsk alone in tough negotiations with Moscow which will increase risks to Belarus’s sovereignty.

The less the ‘civilian’ component in the Belarus’s ruling coalition, the lower the probability of its split over the issue of a new integration package with Russia will likely be. However, one cannot rule out a repeated opposition’s mobilization stemming from the activation of deepened integration talks.

If, despite the efforts of repressive apparatus, the opposition’s mobilization capacity remains high and massive acts of civil disobedience take place, the likelihood of a new Belarus’s integration deal with Russia will increase exponentially. In the situation of an even greater Lukashenka’s delegitimization the Kremlin will, however, face deeply uncomfortable choices: To provide Lukashenka a life-saving support, to push him into a deeper integration but create a time bomb for Russia’s image among Belarusians, or to avoid providing political support to Lukashenka therefore risking to get a more problematic bilateral relationship with an eventual new Belarusian leadership.

The first option entails a combination of heightened repressions in Belarus, possibly with Russia’s direct or indirect support in one form or another, and buying loyalties thanks to greater economic support from Moscow. This scenario will result in the coercion of the Belarusian population towards a new reality of a deeper integration with Russia under the continuous rule of Lukashenka, even in the situation of his record low approval rating.

The other option, envisaging Moscow’s deliberate lack of political support to Lukashenka amid possible massive civil disobedience in Belarus, is rather improbable. Such form of the regime’s replacement in Russia’s vicinity, particularly in the neighbouring Belarus, will be seen in the Kremlin as an undesirable turn. Moscow will unlikely play such a risky game and bet on any alternative political force in Belarus, if only Lukashenka’s position becomes extremely weakened. This development, however, would rather prompt Moscow to force him into a new integration deal on Russia’s terms. At the same time, the odds of success for deliberate strategies of any major actor will lengthen in the light of quickly evolving circumstances and imperfect information.

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https://isans.org/multimedia-en/sputnik-belarus-propaganda-and-disinformation.html

Twisting reality: Due to biased selection of commentators Sputnik Belarus consistently discredits Ukraine, Poland, the Baltic states, the EU and the West as a whole, and promotes the so called Russian World. Absurd parallels between the modern Western countries and Nazi Germany and many conspiracy theories stand out.

SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES REBORN FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

 by Alexander M. Perkins December 2018 Thesis 

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS 
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1069692.pdf

ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) 

Americans were largely surprised when the intelligence community revealed that Russia had launched a widespread influence operation focused on the 2016 U.S. presidential election. With their hightech, social-media focus, these practices struck many as a newly implemented tactic against the United States. However, throughout the Cold War, the Soviet Union developed and deployed influence operations—then called “active measures”—against the United States and its allies. During the last decade of the Cold War, the United States actively and systematically combatted this threat. But with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, active measures seemed to fade into history as well. This thesis argues that Russia has reincarnated this Cold War relic and is using active measures throughout the world to advance its strategic interests, especially in its post-Soviet space. Russia is utilizing 21st-century technology to gain access to Western populations and sow discord, distrust, and disorder. Thus, this thesis examines the Soviet-era active measures, the U.S. Cold War countermeasures, and Russian active measures today to make recommendations on ways to counter this form of malevolent influence. This thesis finds that the United States should organize purposefully and consistently to counter Russian active measures, educate the American public to increase its resiliency against foreign influence, and intensify its strategic public diplomacy efforts throughout Europe.

RUSSIA IN REVIEW: TURMOIL IN BELARUS BENEFITS THE KREMLIN

Aug 14, 2020 - Press ISW

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By Paisley Turner and Mason Clark

Key Takeaway: Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko will likely survive current mass protests but will emerge substantially more vulnerable to Russian pressure. Lukashenko claims to have won the August 9 election with 80 percent of the vote, sparking mass protests. Lukashenko is successfully containing the demonstrations and forced leading opposition candidate Svetlana Tsikhanouskaya to flee to Lithuania and denounce the protests. Lukashenko’s domestic position is nevertheless weakened by these unprecedented displays of public opposition, and his ability to resist pressure from the Kremlin is reduced.

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko will likely remain in power despite mass protests following the August 9 presidential election. The Belarusian Central Electoral Commission (CEC) claimed Lukashenko won 80.23 percent of the vote while leading opposition candidate Svetlana Tsikhanouskaya received only 9.9 percent.[1] An unverified exit poll by vote monitor Golos reported that Tsikhanouskaya received 80 percent of the vote.[2] Lukashenko manipulated the vote by arresting election observers, cutting internet service to prevent vote monitoring coordination, and simply falsifying vote counts with mass ballots.[3]

Well-organized protesters are contesting the election results. Tsikhanouskaya rejected the result and encouraged Belarusians to protest on August 9.[4] Thousands of Belarusians began protesting on August 9 following early exit polls proclaiming a Lukashenko victory.[5]  Protests continued into August 10 and 11.[6] Several Telegram accounts established just before the election are issuing detailed instructions and coordinating protesters.[7] The protests likely emerged organically within Belarus without significant foreign support.

Belarusian security forces are successfully controlling the protests. Belarusian security forces detained 3,000 across Belarus on August 9 and reportedly killed one protester.[8] The security forces remain loyal to Lukashenko, despite localized incidents of police refraining from violence they were ordered to commit against protesters.[9]

Lukashenko is likely directly threatening Tsikhanouskaya and her family in order to break up the protest movement. Tsikhanouskaya fled Belarus to Lithuania on August 10 after Belarusian security personnel detained her at the Belarusian CEC headquarters for three hours. She then personally released a video implying she left for the safety of her children, whom she sent to Lithuania during the election campaign.[10] Tut.by, a pro-Lukashenko news outlet, later released a video of Tsikhanouskaya reading a prepared statement asking Belarusians stop protesting and accept the stated results of the election in a second video, likely recorded during her time in the CEC.[11]

Lukashenko’s decisions in the last 6 months provoked the current historic protests and weakened his position.

Lukashenko’s botched COVID-19 response sparked public outcry. Lukashenko refused to implement lockdown measures, labeled the virus a “psychosis,” and recommended Belarusians drink vodka and go to saunas to “poison” the virus.[12] 150,000 Belarusians signed a petition to the World Health Organization asking for safety measures in Belarus in early April.[13]

Protests against Lukashenko’s repression of opposition candidates merged with pre-existing COVID protests in May. The CEC banned and later arrested opposition blogger Sergei Tsikhanouski, Svetlana Tsikhanouskaya’s husband, in May.[14] Two thousand protesters marched in Minsk on May 31 in response.[15] Authorities arrested opposition candidate Nikolai Statkevich while he was en route to support Tsikhanouski.[16] Belarusian police next arrested leading opposition candidate Viktor Babriko, who was formerly chairman of Belgazprombank, a subsidiary of Russian gas giant Gazprom, on June 18.[17]

Babriko’s arrest led thousands to protest in 10 cities on June 19 and 20.[18] The CEC officially blocked Babariko and opposition candidate Valery Tsepkalo from the election on July 14, provoking further protests.[19] Belarusian security forces arrested an estimated 1,140 protesters, journalists, and opposition candidates from May to July in response.[20] Svetlana Tsikhanouskaya emerged as the opposition frontrunner following Babariko’s detention.

Lukashenko’s crackdown in late June exposed fissures in his security services. Members of the Belarusian security forces expressed support in uniform for the June protests on social media.[21] Members of the Belarusian military also attended a rally for Tsikhanouskaya in Brest on August 2.[22] Riot police at an August 9 protest lowered their shields while protesters chanted “well done” and hugged them.[23] These protests are the first visible cracks in the reliability of the security forces. Lukashenko retains strong but incomplete control over his security forces; he is successfully using them to crush post-election protests but declining support will likely weaken him in the long-term.

Lukashenko’s incompetence and repressive measures coalesced to provoke an unprecedented protest movement prior to the August 9 election. Belarusian mass protests historically occurred after elections and were quickly suppressed, as in 2006 and 2010. [24] Lukashenko used open threats of violence and leveraged the threat of the then-recent Maidan revolution in Ukraine to prevent protests altogether in 2015.[25] The formation of a protest movement before the 2020 election, exacerbated by anger at Lukashenko’s COVID-19 response, uniquely challenged Lukashenko.

Lukashenko likely underestimated Tsikhanouskaya due to her political inexperience. On July 30, Tsikhanouskaya held the largest political rally since Belarus’s independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 with over 60,000 people in attendance.[26] This rally was followed by another historic protest, the largest political rally in the history of the city of Brest with 20,000 people in attendance on August 2.[27] The protest movement developed at scale with surprising speed, considering Belarus’ lack of established civil society networks and Lukashenko’s control over communication services.

Lukashenko attempted to frame his suppression efforts as combatting international, primarily Russian, interference. Lukashenko admitted he personally ordered security forces to arrest Babariko and Tsikhanouski, claiming they were Russian puppets and he was upholding democracy by preventing foreign interference.[28] Belarusian security forces arrested 33 Russians from the Kremlin-backed private military company (PMC) “Wagner Group” on July 29, claiming they were sent by the Kremlin to instigate protests.[29] Ukrainian officials confirmed 28 of the 33 alleged Wagner personnel fought with Russian-backed proxies in Donbas on July 31.[30] Lukashenko repeatedly claimed Russia, Ukraine, or the United States would attempt to overthrow him during the election.[31] Lukashenko domestically portrayed the election as a choice between stability and chaos to justify crackdowns on protests.[32] 

Implications:

Lukashenko will likely retain power but is increasingly susceptible to Kremlin pressure. Lukashenko forced Putin to miss a publicly stated late 2019 deadline to advance the Union State process, a supranational agreement with the stated goal of the federal integration of Russia and Belarus under a joint structure.[33] ISW has previously assessed that Putin may have sought to use the Union State as way to retain power after the expiration of his presidential term.  Following this defeat, Putin instead amended the Russian Constitution to allow himself to remain effectively president for life.[34]  Lukashenko’s weakened domestic position following his COVID-19 response and ongoing protests will likely increase Russian leverage and reverse Lukashenko’s successes.

The Kremlin’s objective is to cement Russian suzerainty over Belarus. The Kremlin has two main courses of action to achieve this objective – supporting Lukashenko while weakening him or supporting a new regime. The Kremlin likely prefers Lukashenko in power over a possible alternative who would attempt to break relations with the Kremlin or block the Union State, or the likely international repercussions of a hybrid intervention in Belarus. The Kremlin retains the capability, however, to take advantage of a collapse of the Lukashenko government to permanently cement its control over Belarus.

The US must be prepared to deter any potential effort by Putin to take advantage of the protest movement in order to subjugate Belarus. However, the US must avoid legitimizing Lukashenko’s undemocratic actions and crackdown on the protest movement. Increased Kremlin dominance over Belarus would advance the Kremlin’s strategic goals of regaining control over the Soviet Union and free up Russian resources to further pressure Europe, which the US must contest - but not at the expense of support for essential liberal values.

---

[1] Mary Ilyushina, Helen Regan and Tara John, "Protests in Belarus as disputed early election results give President Lukashenko an overwhelming victory,” CNN, August 10, 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/08/10/europe/belarus-election-protests-lukashenko-intl-hnk/index.html; Andrei Makhovsky, “In Belarus, some don't wait for Lukashenko to start worrying about coronavirus,” Reuters, April 1, 2020, https://www.reuters(.)com/article/us-health-coronavirus-belarus/in-belarus-some-dont-wait-for-lukashenko-to-start-worrying-about-coronavirus-idUSKBN21J4YV.

[2] Mary Ilyushina, Helen Regan and Tara John, "Protests in Belarus as disputed early election results give President Lukashenko an overwhelming victory,” CNN, August 10, 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/08/10/europe/belarus-election-protests-lukashenko-intl-hnk/index.html.

[3] [“Elections in Belarus: Users Report Internet Disruptions,”] NV, August 10, 2020, https://nv(.)ua/world/countries/vybory-v-belarusi-nachalis-problemy-s-internetom-novosti-belarusi-50105180.html; [“Human rights activists say that independent observers are being detained at polling stations in Belarus,”] TASS, April 6, 2020, https://tass(.)ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/9133547;

[4] Mary Ilyushina, Helen Regan and Tara John, "Protests in Belarus as disputed early election results give President Lukashenko an overwhelming victory,” CNN, August 10, 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/08/10/europe/belarus-election-protests-lukashenko-intl-hnk/index.html.

[5] "Lukashenko wins Belarus presidential vote, according to official exit poll,” DW, August 10, 2020, https://www.dw.com/en/lukashenko-wins-belarus-presidential-vote-according-to-official-exit-poll/a-54500994

[6] "Protester Dies In Minsk As Clashes Over Election Go Into Second Night,” Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, August 10, 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/belarus-president-lukashenka-reelected-in-landslide-amid-violent-protests-over-rigged-vote/30775437.html.

[7] Nexta Telegram Channel, https://t(.)me/s/nexta_live?fbclid=IwAR3yX5kEuh8IkQ-9WZar8SdL03VHviaugWVdYskTQN3A0fTEPmwIYxlQuRk; Belamova Telegram Channel, https://t(.)me/s/belamova.

[8] "Hundreds detained in post-election protests. Multiple injured. One reported dead,” Vyasna, August 10, 2020, https://elections2020.spring96.org/en/news/98920. "About 3,000 People Detained During Protests in Belarus, Interior Ministry Says,” TASS, August 10, 2020, https://tass.com/world/1187671.

[9] NEXTA, Twitter, August 9, 2020, https://twitter.com/NEXTA_EN/status/1292593863257919488; Denis Kazakiewics, Twitter, August 9, 2020, https://twitter.com/Den_2042/status/1292509748466790401.

[10] Isabelle Khurshudyan, “Belarus Opposition Candidate Leaves Country Amid Protests Over Disputed Election,” The Washington Post, August 11, 2020,  https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/violent-clashes-in-belarus-over-disputed-election-heat-up-as-main-opposition-candidate-flees-country/2020/08/11/a9cbadec-db91-11ea-b4f1-25b762cdbbf4_story.html; Svetlana Tsikhanouskaya, [“I Went to the Children,”] Youtube Country for Life, August 11, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9DzisJ388Xs.

[11] PostersAsh, Twitter, August 11, 2020, https://twitter.com/PostersAsh/status/1293143534246285313; Tut.by, Twitter, August 11, 2020, https://twitter.com/tutby/status/1293129757148807169; [“Tsikhanouskaya Recorded a New Video,”] Tut.by Telegram channel, August 11, 2020 https://t(.)me/tutby_official/10172; “Presidential Candidate Svyatlana Tsikhanouskaya On Leaving Belarus: ‘A Very Difficult Decision’,” https://en(.)currenttime.tv/a/30777678.html.

[12] Andrei Makhovsky, “In Belarus, some don't wait for Lukashenko to start worrying about coronavirus,” Reuters, April 1, 2020, https://www.reuters(.)com/article/us-health-coronavirus-belarus/in-belarus-some-dont-wait-for-lukashenko-to-start-worrying-about-coronavirus-idUSKBN21J4YV.

[13] [“150 Thousand Belarusians Applied to WHO due to Coronavirus Situation,”] Lenta, April 7, 2020, https://lenta(.)ru/news/2020/04/07/150_tysyach/.

[14] "Belarus: Activists, Journalists Jailed as Election Looms,” Human Rights Watch, April 22, 2020, https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/05/22/belarus-activists-journalists-jailed-election-looms; "Belarus: Full-scale Attack on Human Rights Ahead of Presidential Election,” Amnesty International, June 29, 2020, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/06/belarus-fullscale-attack-on-human-rights-ahead-of-presidential-election/.

[15] [“The Interior Ministry Said that $900,000 and a Radio Station had been Found in Tikhanovsky's Possession,”] Svaboda, June 4, 2020, https://www.svaboda(.)org/a/30652252.html.

[16] “Belarusian Opposition Leader Statkevich Detained On Way To Rally,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, May 31, 2020, https://www.rferl(.)org/a/belarusian-opposition-leader-statkevich-detained-on-way-to-rally/30644527.html.

[17] Linas Jegelevicius, “Victor Babariko, Main Rival of Alexander Lukashenko, Barred from Belarus Presidential Election,” Euronews, July 30, 2020, https://www.euronews(.)com/2020/07/14/victor-babariko-main-rival-of-alexander-lukashenko-barred-from-belarus-presidential-electi.

[18] Olga Demidova, [“Ministry of Internal Affairs of Belarus Reports 270 Arrested after Pickets,”] DW, June 20, 2020, https://www.dw.com/ru/%D0%BC%D0%B2%D0%B4-%D0%B1%D0%B5%D0%BB%D0%B0%D1%80%D1%83%D1%81%D0%B8-%D1%81%D0%BE%D0%BE%D0%B1%D1%89%D0%B8%D0%BB%D0%BE-%D0%BE-270-%D0%B7%D0%B0%D0%B4%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%B6%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%BD%D1%8B%D1%85-%D0%BF%D0%BE%D1%81%D0%BB%D0%B5-%D0%BF%D0%B8%D0%BA%D0%B5%D1%82%D0%BE%D0%B2/a-53885281.

[19] “Protests Erupt Across Belarus After Top Lukashenka Challenger Barred From Presidential Election,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, July 14, 2020, https://www.rferl(.)org/a/babaryka-not-registered-among-four-presidential-challengers-to-incumbent-lukashenka-in-belarus/30725827.html; [“Lukashenko's main rivals in the elections Babariko and Tsepkalo were not registered as presidential candidates in Belarus,”] Censor, July 14, 2020, https://censor(.)net.ua/news/3207973/osnovnyh_sopernikov_lukashenko_na_vyborah_babariko_i_tsepkalo_ne_zaregistrirovali_kandidatami_v_prezidenty.

[20] “Belarusian Authorities Accused Of 'Fostering Fear' Ahead Of Presidential Vote,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, July 27, 2020, https://www.rferl(.)org/a/belarusian-authorities-accused-of-fostering-fear-ahead-of-presidential-vote/30749247.html.

[21] Evgeny Dvornikov, [“You are not our president ": Belarusian security officials staged an online protest against Lukashenko,”] Radio KP, June 24, 2020, https://radiokp(.)ru/politika/ty-ne-nash-prezident-siloviki-belorussii-ustroili-onlayn-protest-protiv-lukashenko_nid25694_au5860au;Steven. 

[22] [“Svetlana Tikhanovskaya Held the Largest Rally in the History of Brest,”] Charter 97, August 2, 2020, https://charter97(.)org/ru/news/2020/8/2/387938/.

[23] NEXTA, Twitter, August 9, 2020, https://twitter.com/NEXTA_EN/status/1292593863257919488.

[24] Aileen Eisenberg, “Belarusian Citizens Protest Presidential Election, 2006,” Global Nonviolent Action Database, February 24, 2013, https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/belarusian-citizens-protest-presidential-election-2006; Myers, Steven Lee and C.J. Chivers. “Arrests Hold Down Protests on Belarus Vote” NY Times International, 22 March 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/22/international/europe/22belarus.html?.

[25] Shaun Walker, “Belarus Election: Alexander Lukashenko Wins Fifth Term with Election Landslide,” The Guardian, October 12, 2015,

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/11/alexander-lukashenko-expected-to-remain-as-belarusian-president.

[26] Andrew Roth, “Huge Crowds Rally for Belarus Opposition Leader in run-up to Presidential Election,” The Guardian, July 31, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jul/31/huge-crowds-rally-for-belarus-opposition-leader-in-run-up-to-presidential-election.

[27]  [“Svetlana Tikhanovskaya held the largest rally in the history of Brest,”] Charter 97, August 2, 2020,  https://charter97.org/ru/news/2020/8/2/387938/.

[28] [“To be in Time in 10 seconds: Sasha Tarakan Insists that Negotiations with Putin Were,”] Charter 97, July 1, 2020,  https://charter97.org/ru/news/2020/7/1/384250/; [“Lukashenka Blames "Russian Puppeteers" for Election Interference,”] Rosbalt, June 25, 2020, https://www.rosbalt.ru/world/2020/06/25/1850722.html.

[29]  “Belarus Arrested 33 Russian Mercenaries Outside of Minsk Today. Here’s What we Know, So Far,” Meduza, July 29, 2020, https://meduza.io/en/feature/2020/07/29/belarus-arrested-33-russian-mercenaries-outside-of-minsk-today-here-s-what-we-know-so-far.

[30] [”The Office of the Prosecutor General Informed the Competent Authorities of Belarus of their Intentions to Demand the Extradition of the Participants in the Armed Conflict in Eastern Ukraine Detained on its Territory,”] The Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine, July 31, 2020,  https://www.gp.gov(.)ua/ua/news?_m=publications&_c=view&_t=rec&id=277950&fbclid=IwAR0A8kZujVpnYsocgevF-2w1_M0xcfGL3Dr-f7JCYtwkOlQomdEdwx00xEg.

[31] “Message to the Belarusian People and the National Assembly,”] President of the Republic of Belarus, August 4, 2020, http://president.gov.by/ru/news_ru/view/poslanie-belorusskomu-narodu-i-natsionalnomu-sobraniju-24168/.

[32] “Interview with Lukashenko,” Dmitry Gordon, August 5, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R5UmsPFMUaw.

[33] “Russia in Review: Belarus Update: Lukashenko Uses Oil Tariffs to Delay Integration with Russia,” Institute for the Study of War, February 4, 2020, https://www.iswresearch.org/2020/02/russia-in-review-belarus-update.html.

[34] Nataliya Bugayova, “Vladimir Putin’s Stages Power Play,” Institute for the Study of War, January 31, 2020, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/vladimir-putins-staged-power-play; George Barros, “Russian in Review: Putin Deploys New Authoritarian Controls during the COVID-19 Pandemic,” Institute for the Study of War, July 2, 2020, http://www.iswresearch.org/2020/07/russia-in-review-putin-deploys-new.html; “Russia in Review: Belarus Update: Lukashenko Uses Oil Tariffs to Delay Integration with Russia,” Institute for the Study of War, February 4, 2020, https://www.iswresearch.org/2020/02/russia-in-review-belarus-update.html; Mason Clark and Nataliya Bugayova, “Russia in Review: May 9-13, 2019,” Institute for the Study of War,  May 14, 2019, https://www.iswresearch.org/2019/05/russia-in-review-may-9-13-2019.html.

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Our History

Dr. Kimberly Kagan founded ISW in May 2007, as U.S. forces undertook a daring new counterinsurgency strategy to reverse the grim security situation on the ground in Iraq . Frustrated with the prevailing lack of accurate information documenting developments on the ground in Iraq and the detrimental effect of biased reporting on policymakers, Dr. Kagan established ISW to provide real-time, independent, and open-source analysis of ongoing military operations and insurgent attacks in Iraq. General Jack Keane (U.S. Army, Ret.), the Chairman of ISW’s board, also played a central role in developing the intellectual foundation for this change of strategy in Iraq, and supported the formation of the Institute in 2007.
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