Saturday, November 21, 2020


Left-Wing Tribalism in the Face of Climate Change

Robbert Bodegraven
Susan Neiman
AUGUST 2020
GREEN EUROPEAN JOURNAL

For years, political philosopher Susan Neiman has been urging for an increased focus on morality in politics. The Left, she argues, has lent its ears too long to the dogmas of economic growth and individual self-interest. In this conversation from before the Covid-19 pandemic, she spoke to Robbert Bodegraven about how it is time for a rehabilitation of values to enable the Left to connect and mobilise communities to address climate change.

Robbert Bodegraven: In your work, you present yourself explicitly as a left-wing political philosopher. At the same time, however, you criticise left-wing politicians for lacking the courage to practise value-driven left-wing politics. What do you mean by that?

Susan Neiman: I think one of the explanations is connected to 1989, a crucial year the Left still has not thought through well enough. The collapse of state socialism marked a watershed, together with the supposed triumph of neoliberalism. It rendered the Left helpless. In Soviet Union state socialism, the problem was, aside from the terror, its materialistic worldview. Which isn’t any different from neoliberalism. The idea that the bottom line is the bottom line. And what really counts are materialistic goals.


Without a value-driven moral compass, the emphasis on potatoes will not be enough. Sure, people want to be able to provide for their basic needs, but a just and fair society demands more than just enough food for everybody.

I think it’s Marx’ fundamental mistake. Marx himself was confused. He was not able to move people through an appeal to more potatoes. As Brecht wrote, “Erst kommt das Fressen, und dann kommt die Moral” (“Grub first, then ethics”). What really moves people to a Marxist or socialist view is the basic idea of justice. Marx made the mistake to label morality a repressive strategy of the bourgeoisie while himself making moral appeals. That leaves Marxism in basic contradiction with itself.

Without a value-driven moral compass, the emphasis on potatoes will not be enough. Sure, people want to be able to provide for their basic needs, but a just and fair society demands more than just enough food for everybody. Still, when I speak with Social Democrats about the declining support of the Left, I often hear: we have to go back to basics, we need to talk about basic meat and potatoes issues. I don’t think that’s the case. In the end, people are motivated by ideals.

The Left’s emphasis on material possessions – even if it is phrased as the fair division of goods – puts them way closer to a neoliberal view of the world than they like to think. Naturally, inequality is a theme that the Left must fight, but not because every one of us should try and collect as many material possessions as possible.

Take the neoliberal dogma of economic growth. The Left just goes along with that. Who would be against growth? No one of course. We look at GNP and say, “Oh my God, the growth is amazing”. But growth means the manufacture of stuff, the use of raw materials – it means exhausting the earth. If the Left goes along with that logic, then, in the end, the only question that remains is: “do I get my share of the pie?” At that point, the Left is closer to neoliberalism than it wants to admit.


I often hear: we have to go back to basics, we need to talk about basic meat and potatoes issues. I don’t think that’s the case. In the end, people are motivated by ideals.

You mentioned 1989, why was that such a crucial year?

As a result of the fall of the Berlin wall and the failure of state socialism, the Left totally despaired. Marxism had predicted the triumph of workers over capitalism, while socialism promised equal opportunities and a reliable, caring government. Nothing had come true of that. Many people who had wondered before the fall of the Berlin wall to which branch of Marxism they belonged, all of a sudden said they had never been Marxists. They claimed that they had known all along that state socialism and Marxism would lead to the gulags. That relieved them of the duty to think about what had really happened. The Left went into retreat.

Are there also other reasons for the despair of left-wing parties?

The confusion that overcame left parties worldwide has other causes as well, among others the rise of evolutionary psychology and post-modernism. Evolutionary psychology took over the world just about the same time as neoliberalism did. It began as a pseudoscience in America in the 1970s, where it was called socio-biology first. It argues that people are biologically determined, they act to increase the power of themselves or of the tribe they belong to. Socio-biology was fiercely attacked because it was supposedly racist and sexist. Racist I don’t know, but it was definitely sexist. That is the reason why it died out for a while. But in the 1990s socio-biology was reborn under the name evolutionary psychology; and the tragedy is that the Left went along in this evolutionary-psychological thinking: many left-wing movements believe that people are only motivated by a desire to power and wealth. That is at odds with the idealism that should characterise the Left.

And what about post-modernism?

It led to all claims to truth being negated because according to post-modernists there are only stories. Since Foucault, we have gone on to believe that all those stories only serve to increase one’s own power.[1] In post-modernism you actually see the return of the same worldview that exists in evolutionary psychology: man only lives for himself and his own tribe, groups confront each other and competitive rivalry determines who wins and who loses. This post-modernism has had a tremendous influence: whole generations of students grew up with it and it is partly responsible for the many forms of “fake news” we are dealing with today. If nothing can be said to be true, any story can stake a claim to truth.

In your work, you refer to Plato’s dialogue The State, where Socrates posed the question of what justice really means. According to Thrasymachus, it was just a smokescreen for behaviour in the service of self-interest. Socrates retorted that while individuals pursue self-interest and power, they also show empathy and solidarity with mankind as a whole. Do you think that describes the political divide between left and right?

No, that divide is not necessarily right-wing or left-wing. You can see elements of Thrasymachus’ point of view on the Left as well. Basically, there are two choices: you are either a universalist or a tribalist; either you believe in ideals, or you are a materialist.

The reason I am a Kantian is that he is a grown-up idealist. He is quite conscious of the reality of the material world with all its shortcomings, at the same time, he believes in a better world. His view allows for a universalism that is not just a universalism of needs, but also of solidarity and common goals. Historically, the Left has always tended towards universalism, while the Right veers towards nationalism and tribalism. But what worries me a great deal about today’s Left is the way it is inclined to go in the tribalist direction.


Historically, the Left has always tended towards universalism, while the Right veers towards nationalism and tribalism. But what worries me a great deal about today’s Left is the way it is inclined to go in the tribalist direction.

If tribalism means attention for the national identity, then maybe that is not a bad idea per se.

That is right. National identity is important, but it has to be one with an open, universal attitude. Without universalism, support for dispossessed groups leads to identity politics in ways that can boil down to tribalism. It leads to a focus on the needs of specifically oppressed groups, without a sense of common good.

Hannah Arendt said that Adolf Eichmann (the Nazi high official who fled Germany after the war but was arrested and tried by an Israeli court in 1960) had to be sentenced for crimes against humanity, not for crimes against the Jews. That distinction is very important. If you look at the Black Lives Matter movement in the United States, then the question is not if Black bodies are being broken; the question rather is if unarmed citizens may be shot down by people because they happen to be Black. It is about human rights, civil rights.

Right-wing nationalist and populist movements emerging everywhere are pitting people against each other. But left-wing populist parties do that as well. Apparently, it satisfies a deep human need.

I don’t think populism has been clearly defined at all; it’s used as an insult. I don’t know a single group that would describe itself as populist, left or right. I really fail to understand why someone like Carl Schmitt (the conservative German jurist who lent his scholarly power to the defence of the Nazi government’s policies) gets so much attention. He expressed extreme “us” and “them” thinking, believing that outgroups can’t exist in liberal democracies and you even have to push them out. But civilisation means you move beyond tribalism, you think beyond your own group, you want to expand your world. That is how people grow and how civilisations develop. And I draw a sharp line between civilisation and barbarism.

Left-wing political philosopher and follower of Schmitt, Chantal Mouffe, advocates for a left populism. She maintains that populism means a broad popular movement which runs through all the social classes.

Fine, I’m in favour of that. If populism means that it connects people through social layers, then I am all for it. Who would not be? But it should not pit people against each other.

So, you do not believe in the natural contrast between the population and the elite, whether they be politicians, people in managerial positions or CEOs?

Well, it is a kind of rhetoric. It is empty, or dangerous, or both. I think that very often we do not know where the sources of power are. Who are they anyway, the people who make up the elite?

I was very much involved in the Obama campaign. Some criticised him, called him a neoliberal. And yes, he was more neoliberal than he should have been. But look at the way decisions were taken under him. Whether it was the closure of Guantanamo Bay or the setting up of a reasonable healthcare system, Obama faced more opposition than any president before him ever because he was the first Black president. It was clear that there were counterforces preventing him from carrying out the changes he wanted. So, in the end, who was the elite back then? The president of the United States? Or the powerful groups obstructing him to do what he wanted to do? We have to be very clear who we mean when we talk about power and the elite.

You are saying that populism and nationalism do not provide any answers; they divide society up in groups, while the Left has to be able to connect them. In your work, you suggest taking a number of Enlightenment values as a starting point. Is that going to be of any help?

They provide direction. Values help to tell a profound tale about the world as it should be, connect people, and motivate them to make a change. The Enlightenment represents a period in which there was a strong need to rise above the material side. It stands for idealism, a belief that the world can be different from what it is now. Happiness, and the idea that we have an equal right to it, is a value that really emerged during the Enlightenment. Before, the rich were rich and the poor were poor, and they had to wait until after death to get what they deserve in heaven. Religion promised them a life in the hereafter. The Enlightenment did not reject religion but took as a starting point living people’s entitlement to a dignified life. That idea was revolutionary. To the present day, it is of significance; it stands as the basis of the fight against poverty and injustice.

Another value is reason. In it is the principle that all of us can think about what is important in life, and the capacity to think does not solely belong to the powerful. We do not have to accept things as being true, we can challenge them – that abolished the traditional division between those in power and the people.


Values help to tell a profound tale about the world as it should be, connect people, and motivate them to make a change.

Reverence as a value is about respect, for each other and for the world, for nature and the planet on which we live. It is tremendously important if we want to inspire both secular and religious people to act on the question of the planet. Many of today’s discussions still focus on the cost of countering climate change without taking into consideration that worrying about the cost is fundamentally a blasphemous argument, it lacks seeing what we have done to the earth.

Finally, hope, the fourth value, is about the world as it should be. It is different from optimism. Optimism is about the world as it is, while hope is the idea that what is, isn’t necessary—people have the possibility to change the world as it is.


Optimism is about the world as it is, while hope is the idea that what is, isn’t necessary—people have the possibility to change the world as it is.

Why do old left-wing values such as solidarity, equality and tolerance no longer suffice?

In those values, you will find hidden the notion of solidarity. It is at the basis, and so is equality. But this is not true of tolerance. It is often seen as an Enlightenment value, but we have been mistaken to elevate it. We deploy tolerance against something we do not like yet cannot change. It is not only a weak and negative emotion, but it also does not motivate people to do good. It reminds people of their powerlessness.

The respect value was met with some apprehension at the time. It was associated with religion, something that wasn’t associated with either the Enlightenment or the Left. You associate it with the climate debate. Has it become the most important of the four values?

To be honest, for a long time, I belonged to the group of people on the Left who did not take the climate problem sufficiently serious. I thought: let’s deal with inequality and racism, first. Now I must admit I was wrong, and I would like to see the Left fully committed to focusing on climate change in the next decade. If we do not have a healthy, liveable planet anymore, there is no basis to fight injustices like poverty, sexism and racism. I would even go so far as to say that other priorities have to be put in the back seat for a while.

But addressing that problem also means breaking the status quo, not gratuitously accepting the division of power. I agree with Naomi Klein that we cannot formulate a serious answer to climate change if we don’t talk about the distribution of wealth and question the basic premise of capitalism that unlimited economic growth is the right goal. It is promising not to be given plastic bags at the local market, but real change must come from tackling the assumptions of industry.

Climate policies are about accepting how bad things are and taking drastic measures to keep the world a liveable place. How can the Left close the gap between how things are and how they ought to be without antagonising people who already have a hard time?

History has shown that people can be surprisingly passive in times of crisis. What did people do during the war to fight fascism? During the first stages of the oppression, the population was divided. But people can be mobilised if things get really tense. In the war, there was a moment to say, “Okay, there are a lot of genuinely important things, but now here is a priority.” That was the moment people united and started fighting fascism.

Similarly, now, we need a broad movement, running through all population groups, devoting itself to fighting climate change and to devising climate policies. The problem is that society principally does not show any solidarity in a way that is necessary to solve the problems. There are too many marginalised groups, people who have been forgotten, whose history does not seem to count; you cannot expect them to participate in a broad social programme without incentives, without knowing that there is something at stake for them too.

So, I think the Left has to fight on several fronts at the same time. Sound climate policies go hand in hand with organising solidarity between various groups. What is more, the Left must show extra care for marginalised groups and it must not be blind to its own racism. All of this seems very important to me if the Left wants to form a community to address the climate crisis.

That sounds a lot like a Green New Deal.

Sure, I am all for it. The question is, how strong are the oppositional forces against it? And how much energy can we muster globally around the green agenda? The green movement needs an idealistic narrative, uniting all population groups.

They could learn from one of my favourite anecdotes about pope Francis. In an address to the American Congress, he states, “Well, as you know the church believes in the sanctity of all human life.” All the Republicans start clapping because they think he is going to address abortion. But then he continues, “And that is why I am against the death penalty.”

That is very political, the pope showed that he knows exactly how to bring the message across. It shows that with the right focus you can convincingly get your message across to opponents. The Left could learn something here.




[1] Foucault argues that every claim to truth is very much a product of its time and that those with the greatest power determine what is being accepted as truth (comment by RB).



This interview was first published in De Helling.
The Ocean: From Colonised Territory to Global Nation
Edouard Gaudot
Olivier Dubuquoy

Today, national borders criss-cross the ocean, carving it up in the same way as the land. But with globalisation giving rise to new ways of thinking beyond traditional approaches to territorial sovereignty, we should start to view the ocean in a new light – as both a common good and a nation in its own right.

“The sea is the vast reservoir of nature. The globe began with sea, so to speak; and who knows if it will not end with it? In it is supreme tranquility. The sea does not belong to despots. Upon its surface men can still exercise unjust laws, fight, tear one another to pieces, and be carried away with terrestrial horrors. But at thirty feet below its level, their reign ceases, their influence is quenched, and their power disappears. Ah! Sir, live – live in the bosom of the waters! There only is independence! There, I recognise no masters! There I am free!” - Jules Verne, 1869, 20,000 Leagues Under the Sea.
New maritime spaces and new borders



Planet Earth has five oceans that cover 71% of its surface, an area of 361 million km². After the Second World War, the principle of the freedom of the seas was challenged, particularly by the development of industrial fishing and offshore exploitation of hydrocarbons. The law of the sea was promulgated in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in Montego Bay in 1982, allowing states to exercise their sovereign rights over the seas and oceans.

States can appropriate maritime spaces by claiming Exclusive Economic Zones, or EEZs, and extend their continental shelves beyond the 200 nautical miles (approximately 370 km) of the EEZ up to a maximum of 350 miles (approximately 650 km). Thus, EEZs have drastically carved up the oceans, now covering a third of their total area.



Within their EEZs and their extended continental shelves, coastal states have an exclusive right of exploration and use for economic ends. They issue permits for exploration and use to industries that place pressure on fish stocks and the mineral resources of the sea bed. Largely unobserved, the sea has become the new frontier in the globalised race for fossil energy, traditionally carried out on land.


Europe is a small continent if you only take into account the EU, but considering it from the sea, it is suddenly restored to the status of the great global continent once marked out by its colonial empires.

A third of world hydrocarbon production is now offshore, taken from the sea bed. 78% of Total’s fossil hydrocarbon production is offshore, of which 30% is deep offshore (at a depth of over 1,000 metres). Between 20 and 30% of total estimated hydrocarbon reserves are located at sea. More than 90% of international trade crosses the oceans. Transportation of energy products represents nearly a third of global maritime traffic. 95% of global communications (internet, telephone, financial flows) passes through submarine cables. “Globalisation is thus largely confused with maritimisation of the world”.

Europe is a small continent if you only take into account the EU, but considering it from the sea, it is suddenly restored to the status of the great global continent once marked out by its colonial empires. Thus the European EEZ currently covers 25.6 million km².



Exclusive Economic Zone of the European Union (Wikipedia)

EU Member states, their outermost regions and their EEZs


Territories of EU member states and their EEZs


Candidate countries for membership of the EU and their EEZs



These spaces claimed by the European states are mainly located outside the EU. The colonial past of the old world is now being revived by new territories and new resources to conquer. Europe has the opportunity to play a major role in global governance of the ocean.

France, the second largest maritime country in the world after the United States, claims 11 million square kilometres of EEZ, but more than 95% of this area is overseas. Islands become strategic points for claiming maritime spaces and their resources. France’s presence around the world multiplies its maritime borders – it has 39 borders with 30 different countries. Of these 39 borders, 34 are outside mainland France. This proliferation of maritime borders leads to tensions, claims and negotiations. Overseas areas of France, which represent more than 95% of French maritime space, are therefore particularly important in terms of economic, energy-related and geopolitical issues.

Another point that the United Kingdom and France have in common is that a large proportion of their EEZs stems from territories listed by the UN as decolonised (see below).


(Wikipedia)


Although many analysts believe that “globalisation” has weakened the state, whether they celebrate or deplore this development, in fact the state has not been weakened as a pillar of the global system, nor has it been rendered obsolete by the phenomenon. Clearly the historical process of exploration and control of territory, its resources and populations that was started by the modern state in the Renaissance is not over. There are still spaces outside the control of states. National borders now cut across the ocean in the same way that they have dissected continents. It is a colonisation that does not, or rather, no longer speaks its name.

Globally, this colonisation of maritime spaces, mainly carried out by coastal countries in the North, risks aggravating existing inequalities and it may lead to conflicts. Also, nearly a quarter of states have no coast and must negotiate with their neighbours to gain access to the sea. These states are often also among the poorest and least economically developed. Bolivia, Paraguay and the Central African Republic share this fate. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea allows the richest nations to share the ocean and its resources, as it was initially designed to favour the emergence of the countries of the South. This is a paradox only in appearance, as the positive effects of extending borders to the ocean floor also extend the area of influence of large companies in the extractive industry, which are mainly in the hands of developed countries.


Globally, this colonisation of maritime spaces, mainly carried out by coastal countries in the North, risks aggravating existing inequalities.
Areas of dispute

These new borders also trigger old reflexes. If a border has come to delimit a sovereign area, this implies that the territory cannot come under a competing sovereignty. There is an exclusive right of exploitation. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), “Crude oil production from existing deposits, situated mainly on land or in shallow coastal waters, will drop by two thirds between 2011 and 2035. This decrease, according to the IEA, may be compensated, but only by replacing the current oil fields with new deposits: the Arctic, deep ocean waters and shale formations in North America”.

The Director of Public Affairs for the oil multinational Total, Hubert Loiseleur des Longchamps, cites two main reasons why the sea could be a source of tension in the area of oil and gas. The first is certainly the increase in demand, which he estimates may reach 50% in volume by 2035. However the second is even more significant: “political borders do not correspond to the natural limits of hydrocarbon reserves – that would be too easy!”

The ocean and its resources are at the heart of the ecological, economic, energy-related and geopolitical issues of the 21st Century. The areas of tension are spread around the world. For example, consider the Eastern Mediterranean, where Israel, Syria, Lebanon, Cyprus, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and the Palestinian Authorities claim oil and gas reserves in the same maritime territory. Also, London’s claim to an EEZ around the Falkland Islands (also known as Las Malvinas) and authorisation for oil prospecting has been linked to a resurgence of tensions between the United Kingdom and Argentina.

As the second largest maritime country in the world, France, for example, is implementing a programme called EXTRAPLAC (reasoned extension of the continental shelf) lead by IFREMER (the French Research Institute for Exploitation of the Sea) to orchestrate their conquests, and it has recently claimed an area of 500,000 km² – a huge playground created by public money and oil companies.

Old nationalist reflexes encourage a new form of naval battle. Professor Klare laments the situation: “In all these disputes, exacerbated nationalism is combined with an insatiable quest for energy resources, leading to a steely determination to take them. Instead of considering points of contention as a systemic problem demanding a specific strategy for resolution, the great powers have had a tendency to take the side of their respective allies.”
A common ocean to keep the peace

This grabbing of maritime spaces and competition for resources mean that the vital role of the ocean disappears entirely. However, most of the oxygen that we breathe comes from the ocean. It is also the main climate regulator. Since the early 1970s, the ocean has absorbed over 90% of the excess heat linked to the increased greenhouse effect, thus limiting the air temperature but heating the water and raising sea levels. It has also absorbed more than a quarter of anthropogenic CO2 emissions since 1750, acidifying sea water. If the ocean released everything it stores into the atmosphere, the resulting temperature increase could be as high as 20°C. If the ocean system stopped working, we would cease to exist.

The alert has been raised by various communities, including the scientific community, which calls for 80% of fossil resources to be kept in the ground if we want to limit global warming and avoid triggering an irreversible drop in biodiversity, which could cause us to become extinct by about 2100. Stopping the current pillage and resulting colonisation of the seas and oceans is an urgent need – it is now not just a moral imperative but a matter of survival.

To this end, we must stop investing in the various fossil fuel sectors. We cannot continue to subsidise the oil and gas industries that use the atmosphere and the ocean as rubbish dumps. We must escape from our dependence on oil and hasten the energy transition. However, even weaning ourselves completely off hydrocarbons will not entirely prevent this ‘grabbing’. This privatisation of ocean space under the guise of national sovereignty has made oceans the last frontier in the race for resources.


The privatisation of ocean space under the guise of national sovereignty has made oceans the last frontier in the race for resources.

The only argument that can oppose privatisation is that of the commons. Dardot and Laval define “commons” as follows: “The commons are not goods… they are a political principle that we should use to build up the commons, to help to preserve and extend them, and to enable them to live.” At the same time, the commons are resources governed by legal systems that enable sharing and collective management. We must stop thinking of the ocean as a resource, but rather as a space that is exempt from the logic of exploitation.

For the waters of the Jordan or the Mekong, the mining resources of Western Europe, the Amazon rain forest or the fishing areas of the Mediterranean, there is only one appropriate response to tensions over resources: cooperation.
One nation to surpass all others

The logical conclusion of this idea is that the principle of the commons should take precedence in states’ global governance of the ocean. To keep the peace, we must rid ourselves of colonising initiatives and establish the ocean as a common, defining forms of collective government and access to resources based on usage. This is the political aim of the “Ocean Nation” initiative: to make the ocean a nation so that it becomes subject to international law. Thus, citing various international treaties, “the Citizens of the Ocean Nation request systematic criminal prosecution of ocean poachers, of entities, whether legal or illegal, that generate pollution, and of actors that facilitate exploration that is illegal (…)”.

Founded towards the end of 2015, in the run-up to the COP 21 Climate Conference in Paris, “Ocean Nation” takes the unlikely step of linking the idea of the nation, which basically involves private control, with the idea of commons, which theoretically implies the opposite.

In a global order shaped by the separation of nations, which force is the only one that can stand up to the voracious hunger for territory and the exploitation of resources that characterise the logic of the nation state? Another nation.

The principle of non-intervention may have been challenged by Médecins Sans Frontières and the intelligence services of the large powers, but it is still at the heart of the international order. Making the ocean a fully national space is a creative way to counter the principle of national sovereignty and its absolutist tendencies. It is a declaration of independence for the ocean. As fish, dolphins and reefs have no say, it is up to the human inhabitants of the planet to make this demand. Seeing the ocean as a common nation is a way of going beyond the limited idea of the nation. It is a border to abolish borders, a state that imposes itself on all others without any imperialism.

Founding a nation outside the context of the state is a way of showing that nations do not necessarily have exclusive ownership of the territory they administer. Commons establish the principle that some things cannot be appropriated. Thus, making the ocean a nation takes the logic of the commons even further, based, as it is, on the principle that everybody should take part in deliberations and decision-making, and that usage takes precedence over ownership.

The ocean is the original source of life on earth. The primordial soup which fed us and allowed us to grow. It is the homeland and the mother that we all share. It is truly the place where we were born – our nation.

GREEN EUROPEAN JOURNAL 
Why We Need a Decolonial Ecology
Environmental destruction is inseparable from relationships of racial and colonial domination. It stems from the way we inhabit Earth, from our entitlement in appropriating the planet. All of which means we must recast the past. A conversation with Malcom Ferdinand, whose book, Une écologie décoloniale (A Decolonial Ecology), won the Foundation for Political Ecology literature prize in 2019.

Aurore Chaillou
Louise Roblin
Malcolm Ferdinand
4 JUNE 2020 


Aurore Chaillou and Louise Roblin: We often blame human activities in the industrial age for today’s environmental destruction. But you highlight how this framing hides relationships of domination that have existed for centuries. Does the Western imaginary around the environmental crisis airbrush out colonialism?

Malcom Ferdinand: I am by no means the first to point out the link between social inequality and environmental destructions: that’s what social ecology, political ecology, and ecofeminism all are about. But what I’m interested in is tying these questions to the legacy of racism and colonisation, which remains little explored (except by environmental justice movements).

Environmental destruction and social oppression have always gone hand in hand. However, as we are urged to tackle the climate emergency, we continue to see slogans devoid of social thought. This allows others to co-opt the environmental imperative and advocate a technocratic response, such as combatting pollution and resource scarcity through geo-engineering or carbon markets.

You trace the origins of the environmental crisis back to the 15th century and the age of colonisation.

We have seen several accelerations in environmental destruction, particularly in the 19th and 20th centuries, but the ecological crisis began before these. It comes from a certain way of inhabiting the earth, from some believing themselves entitled to appropriate the earth for the benefit of a few. Starting in the Caribbean, this “colonial habitation” dates back to the end of the 15th century, when Christopher Columbus arrived in America (even though the plantation model dates back even earlier, for example, in Madeira).


The question of racism is almost entirely absent from French political ecology.

The Caribbean occupies an important place in modernity, because the violent meeting of Europeans with Amerindians coincided with the “enclosing” of the earth. We could now measure the resources available on the planet. For many scholars, this moment marked the beginning of globalisation.

You contrast the Anthropocene with the Negrocene, based on “colonial habitation”. Is this different from capitalist exploitation?

The people exploited during colonisation weren’t just anybody: although French peasants were also victims of social violence, they could always consider themselves superior to Blacks. The question of racism is almost entirely absent from French political ecology. On this point, I disagree with certain eco-Marxists for whom capitalism explains everything or who claim that social inequality and structural racism are one and the same. While colonisation and slavery were also driven by capitalist rationales, these processes were above all based on a colonial world view that invented a hierarchy between races and different lands of the globe.

In the colonial era, the lands of the Americas were subordinated to the lands of Europe. They were seen as a means of keeping shareholders happy, and this legitimised any practice. Even measures to protect the fertility of the land were ultimately aimed at maintaining its exploitation. These lands were thought of as different from those of France. It was a violent and misogynistic process, an awful way to inhabit the earth promoted by a coloniser for whom other human beings were dehumanised and for whom colonised lands and the non-humans that inhabited them mattered less than his desires. This is what I call “colonial habitation”. Colonial habitation is a violent way of inhabiting the earth, subjugating lands, humans, and non-humans to the desires of the coloniser.


Colonial habitation is a violent way of inhabiting the earth, subjugating lands, humans, and non-humans to the desires of the coloniser.

A host of justifying narratives and practices – drawing on religion, metaphysics, law, culture, and so on – are then created. In 1848, for example, the second abolition of slavery in France and its colonies was undoubtedly a major political and legal milestone. Yet various fictions were used to keep former slaves on plantations and limit the development of the peasantry. Landowners, who had to grow monocultures on their land under the colonial model, perpetuated a colonial habitat after 1848: the mentality of appropriation and hierarchy remained unchanged.

This way of inhabiting, now conceivable without slavery, spread its practices to other places. Banana growing, silk farming, and mining grew across the French Empire. Regarding the case of the infamous chlordecone pollution in the French islands of Martinique and Guadeloupe, in just 20 years these practices contaminated lands for centuries and poisoned thousands of people to fill the coffers of a few. My work has shown that we can get caught in a technocratic reading of environmental problems. A chemical is toxic? We take it off the market. Too much pollution? We regulate, or implement a technical solution. But “subalterns” don’t just want to be decontaminated or even want justice for a crime of this magnitude. Rather, five centuries later, with still no indictment made, it’s about changing the way lands are inhabited.

When you talk about “subalterns”, whom do you mean? Oppressed people in general, the working class, women, sexual minorities?

I use the word “negro” fairly freely (in Negrocene, for example). Subalterns are today’s “plantation” negroes, regardless of their gender or skin colour. We’ve essentialised the negro as black: it comes from Spanish, in which the two words are the same. But Blacks are not the only ones who have suffered and who still suffer on plantations. This word was first de-essentialised by writers. A “negro” is a being who does the work of someone else without being recognised for it.


The history of Black enslavement has long been ignored in France; it is still mainly thought of in terms of social or gender relations. But we overlook how it is connected to environmental history.

The Negrocene draws attention to all those beings whose life force was used to satisfy the selfish desires of others. The history of Black enslavement has long been ignored in France; it is still mainly thought of in terms of social or gender relations. But we overlook how it is connected to environmental history. We need to link the exploitation of bodies to that of lands. If we start from the unmodern principle that there are continuities between bodies and ecosystems, we realise that to harm one is to harm the other. This prism helps us to understand anti-slavery revolts also as resistance to this colonial habitation. Marronage – the escape of slaves from plantations – is central to my work because it’s another way of inhabiting. Maroons do more than resist slavery: they adopt a different relationship with the earth and non-humans.

What are the consequences of this “colonial silence” today?

I see two problems. On the one hand, it wasn’t until the 150th anniversary of the abolition of slavery that we started thinking about acknowledging what happened. Slavery is a touchy subject in France. When I give racism and slavery awareness sessions in schools, some teachers don’t want me to talk about Blacks. Presidential candidate François Fillon perfectly illustrated this mentality in 2017 when, on the subject of colonial history, he said that France should “not feel guilty for having wanted to share its culture with the peoples of Africa”. On the other hand, environmentalism is constructed differently to racism. It’s also true that environmental activists are mostly white (as they admit).

I would say, then, that colonial silence contributes to the “double divide” (that separates environmental and colonial thinking) and excludes a whole swath of people who inhabit the earth. Yet people who have been colonised can also contribute to environmentalist thinking. By perpetuating the belief that racialised people are not interested in the environment, we perpetuate the exclusion of racialised people and the way they conceptualise normal spheres and arenas for thinking about environmentalism. This exclusion in turn breeds distrust among the racialised. From its very beginning, the imaginary built around environmentalism has erased the roles and words of others.

What’s more, the colonial divide means environmental issues are downplayed. My book, Une écologie décoloniale, attempts to bridge the divide between environmentalism and decolonisation because it harms both. Contrary to collapsology narratives, I try to show that, since 1492, there have already been collapses, and many communities have already proposed alternative relationships with the world. Their voice has not been heard, at least in the environmentalist movement. Yet it’s by continuing to publish anthologies of environmentalist texts in which not a single Black author appears that we perpetuate the myth of environmentalism only being driven by Whites from the Global North and the myth of an absence of environmentalist thinking among peoples who were once colonised and enslaved.

How should we think about social justice, the fight against racism, and the preservation of ecosystems together? Would redefining the concept of nature allow this link to be made?

Eurocentrism and Western-centrism have prevented us from seeing other worldviews. And, if we do reference them, it’s romantically: “Oh! If only we could all live like the Guarani!”  Yet we can’t celebrate their way of life without recognising their history and their social and political marginalisation. Among indigenous peoples, suicide rates are often 10 times higher than average.


We urgently need to make environmentalism about the world: what world do we want to live in? We must recognise culture and colour, rather than simply addressing the issue through technical environmental management.

So, we should let their worldviews challenge us, without forgetting the history of these peoples and what they are asking for. What are the terms that these people use to assert their relationship with the world? That’s how we will bridge environmental justice’s double divide. Talking about ecocide, for example, creates an intergenerational fabric (we connect our actions to the lives of our children, we take responsibility for our legacy, we negotiate that of our parents), but this fabric is thought about in environmentalist terms, rather than social and political ones. Yet understanding that destruction was possible thanks to the exploitation of indigenous peoples means recognising these peoples’ need for justice, as well as demands for slavery reparations.

Today’s political and economic decision-makers have every interest in continuing to conceal this colonial dimension…

We urgently need to make environmentalism about the world: what world do we want to live in? We must recognise culture and colour, rather than simply addressing the issue through technical environmental management. This is what I mean when I talk about “decolonial ecology”.

This change in paradigm looks very much like a change in the imaginary. Your book is written in an almost literary style.

If I’ve taken literary licence, it’s to make things felt, and not just demonstrate them. Historians, when they claim to be scientific, give numbers. But once we have the facts, we are not necessarily ready to think about and feel what has happened. Putting names to numbers, retracing journeys, that’s what lets us make slavery a story about the world and the earth.

“Touching the world” requires values like love and justice. If we ask how we can build a world after colonisation and slavery, the answer is not for everyone stay away from one another. In my book, I present on side figures who flee (because of the violence done onto them), and on the other side figures who deny the world to the other. But I also talk about those who decide to stay on board the ship shared with all beings. We’re all in the same boat after all.


You cannot build a world on either an ark or a slave ship. I propose imagining a world-ship, populated with humans and non-humans, by taking into account the history of each and every one.

But among environmentalists, this image is haunted by the story of Noah’s Ark. Michel Serres, for example, uses paintings and images of Noah’s Ark to put forward a political theory of the environment: “We are all Noah.” It’s a foundation myth for society that allows a theorisation of the relationship with the world. But Noah’s Ark talks about a selection process which I consider violent. Furthermore, it focuses on the boarding process: we know nothing of what happens on board. The way it is used politically seems problematic.

I prefer to use the slave ship, an imaginary shared by many afro-descendants in the Americas, because while we are all in the same boat, we are not all in the same conditions. Historically, the question of who would have been saved among the Black populations of the Americas is painful: we know very well who would have been saved and who would have been abandoned. You need look no further than the Mediterranean to understand this. Even today, the climate storm could become an excuse for not living with others and for building walls.

That said, you cannot build a world on either an ark or a slave ship. I propose imagining a world-ship, populated with humans and non-humans, by taking into account the history of each and every one. On this boat, there is nobody in the hold. Everyone lives on deck.

This interview was first published in French in Revue Projet. 

GREEN EUROPEAN JOURNAL
COVID-19: Anti-lockdown militias on streets of Michigan as virus surges across US

The number of coronavirus-related deaths in Michigan alone is up 150% on what it was two weeks ago.


By Helen-Ann Smith, news correspondent in Lansing, Michigan


Thursday 19 November 2020 14:25, UK
Image:Anti-government militia The Boogaloo Bois say they will use force to defend their freedoms

On the first day of a new lockdown in Michigan hundreds of people ventured out to one of the only places still open for business - a COVID-19 testing site.

People waited for up to four hours to be swabbed. Not all had symptoms, but all shared a weariness at spiralling infections and new lockdown measures in their state.


There's a sense that America has been distracted. People, politicians and media alike all focused on a gripping national election.

But while the world looked away the virus has surged.

The number of coronavirus deaths across the US has passed 250,000, there are an average of 150,000 new daily cases and more people are in hospital than at any other time during the pandemic.


In Michigan alone COVID-related deaths are up 150% on what they were just two weeks ago.


The new rules here mean no in-person teaching at schools or colleges, no inside dining and no theatres, cinemas or gyms can open.

"I'm retired," says Terry Fiedler who has come to get tested. "I'm just glad I'm not trying to make a living. If I was trying to make a living it would put me right out of business. They need to be fair with them somehow. Trump would have been a lot fairer but that's the way it goes."

And that's the striking thing here, very few people talk about the pandemic without also mentioning politics.

Many rolled their eyes when we asked why some Americans are resistant to new restrictions.

One man was more blunt: "One word, Trump."

The politicisation is understandable. Few issues divided Joe Biden and Donald Trump more on the election trail.


Trump has already it made clear there will be no national lockdown under his watch - the imposition of new measures, in Michigan as elsewhere, is being taken by local, largely Democrat, politicians.

It means many of his supporters feel restrictions are unnecessary and unfair.

And they're joined by other vocal groups who resist being told what to do by lawmakers in the name of freedom and liberty.

Image:Zakkari Clark is opposed to the Michigan lockdown

"You've been told 'no' by the people, you've been told 'no' by the Supreme Court and you're still continuing to do this, people aren't gonna stand for that," says Zakkari Clark addressing the Michigan governor directly.

He's a member of the so-called Boogaloo Bois, a self-styled, anti-government militia.

A small number of them gathered outside the state capital today, their faces covered and heavily armed with assault rifles.

"Right now, we're the rational people. If you keep pushing out you're gonna get irrational people."


This isn't a big group but their presence speaks of palpable tension and distrust.

"We're gonna do everything in our power to try the peaceful route, you know, civil disobedience and stuff like that," says Nomad, another heavily armed Boogaloo Boi. "But when it comes to our livelihoods and our rights that we are born with as humans, we're not going to budge."

Would he use violence? "If my life was threatened. Or my rights."

No matter where they are, the imposition of measures to protect lives often means a threat to livelihoods.


Under the new restrictions bars will have to close.

Stephanie Fox has worked in hospitality most of her adult life, she has no safety net and says she's deeply fearful of what the next few months will bring.

She looks emotional when she talks about the impact on her personally.

"I'm seeing all my savings are gone, my bills are coming up, my dog needs surgery, you know. But at the same time I get it, but it's scary, really scary."

Joe Biden has said he'll step up efforts to bring the virus under control and reduce the tensions surrounding it.

If Michigan is anything to go by, it won't be easy.

Far right groups in Norway instigate more street provocation than before

New groups are adopting more radical measures.


In November last year, the group Stop Islamisation of Norway (SIAN) set fire to a Quran in Kristiansand. Counter-protesters reacted, resulting in a brawl.
(Photo: Tor Erik Schrøder / NTB scanpix)


Ida Kvittingen
JOURNALIST
Ingrid P. Nuse
ENGLISH VERSION
Wednesday 29. january 2020 - 

They march in the streets, burn the Quran and hoist the Nazi flag.

Activists from the far right are trying to be provocative other places than the Internet more often than before, according to a study of seven groups in Norway.

The researchers have tracked what the groups say about their own activities on their websites and on YouTube, and everything the newspapers write about them. They found a total of 553 incidents over eleven years.

“Before 2011 we saw the far right make a shift from the streets to the Internet. Now we’re seeing that they’re on their way back to the streets, whether it’s Stop Islamisation of Norway (SIAN) or the neo-Nazi Nordic Resistance Movement (NRM) demonstrating,” says Anders Ravik JupskÃ¥s.

Jupskås is a political scientist and the deputy director of the Center for Extremism Research (C-REX) at the University of Oslo.

New groups

The nationalist groups range from right-wing radicals working within democracy to right-wing extremists who reject democracy and in some cases condone the use of violence.

Their activities change as new groups emerge.

Engagement accelerated when Pegida arrived on the scene in 2015. Of the various groups, this anti-Islamist group has been the one that has gathered most often in the streets between 2008 and 2019. About 200 people showed up for their first demonstration.

The following year, Soldiers of Odin (SOO) were very visible. They patrolled the streets in the evening.

The researchers denote ‘confrontational activism’ when groups tape off the entrance to organizations they don't like or burn the Quran.

Most of the time, however, so-called ‘mailbox activism’ – like handing out flyers and hanging posters – is still the most prevalent.

These were the most common type of activities before 2015. At that time, the People's Movement Against Immigration (FMI) tended to be behind the activities, which peaked in 2012.

For the past three years, SIAN and NRM have been the most active groups.

Little violence

Only five times during the eleven years of the study has the far right initiated violence.

Counter-protesters tend to start the fights far more often. This happened 26 times during the period. In seven instances, it is unclear who started the clashes.

The researchers did not collect reports from the police.

“We may have missed some violent incidents because the groups themselves didn’t want the attention. But serious violence is likely to be picked up by the media,” says JupskÃ¥s.


At the opposite end, it’s conceivable that putting brochures in mailboxes is so commonplace for the groups that they don’t bother to mention it on their own websites. If the local newspaper also chooses not to write about it, the researchers won't have captured the activity.
Websites disappearing

The far right groups in Norway have been quite unsuccessful as street activists, according to researcher Anders Ravik Jupskås at the University of Oslo. (Photo: Tron Trondal, UiO)

Jupskås and his colleagues are writing a scientific article, so their findings have not yet undergone quality assurance by other researchers.

Lars Erik Berntzen does research on anti-Islamic activism in Western Europe. He previously worked at the same centre as Jupskås, now he is a postdoctoral fellow at the University of Bergen.

He encountered challenges when mapping the activities of Pegida and other groups.

“Websites are constantly being shut down and information disappears, especially on Facebook, so there may have been more past events than what we’re detecting here,” says Berntzen.

He still finds it likely that the number of confrontational activities has increased.
Failed activists

Berntzen found that when the media reported on the Pegida demonstrations, many people flocked to the group’s websites afterwards.

“One of the main goals of these stunts is attention. Being seen and heard is challenging and requires more drastic measures,” he says.

Jupskås and his colleagues have not yet investigated whether what the groups do on social media is related to their activities outside the Internet.

“But it’s clear that they haven’t been able to mobilize on the street. About 17 people show up at the demonstrations on average,” says JupskÃ¥s.

At the same time, 31 000 people follow SIAN on Facebook.

On the whole, they are quite unsuccessful as street activists, according to Jupskås.

Far right groups in Norway 2008-2019


Folkeaksjonen mot innvandring (FMI). The People’s Movement Against Immigration is the longest-lived far-right organization. Founded in 1987.

Vigrid. Founded in 1998.

Stop Islamisation of Norway (SIAN). Founded in 2000; became part of Stop Islamisation of Europe in 2008.

Norwegian Defence League (NDL). Founded in 2011. Norwegian branch of the English Defence League.

Den nordiske motstandsbevegelsen (DNM). The Nordic Resistance Movement. Founded in 2011, began with activism in 2012. Norwegian department of the Swedish organization.

Patriotiske europeere mot islamiseringen av Aftenlandet (Pegida). Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the Western World. Founded in 2015. Inspired by German organization founded a few months before.

Odins soldater. Soldiers of Odin. Founded in 2016. Norwegian branch of Finnish organization.


“I think they get too much media attention,” he says.

“None of the groups are particularly lasting. After two or three years they often split into factions.”
Thinks we take them a little too seriously

The groups often disagree on what to do, and personal conflicts abound.

Three of the groups have already almost left the streets: Pegida, Soldiers of Odin and the Norwegian Defence League.

The same people keep coming around. Ronny Alte is a well-known figure who has been in three groups.

JupskÃ¥s thinks there’s something comical about the internal quarrels and the constant divisions.

He believes that the community often takes the amateur street activists a little too seriously, but emphasizes that it is important for the police and the authorities to monitor what the groups do.

Berntzen reminds us that the actions of a few people can have major consequences.

"Burning the Quran can generate debate about legislative changes, the limit to freedom of speech and national security with fear of retaliation from jihadists," he says.
Inspired from abroad

Four out of ten activities target immigrants, and three out of ten target Muslims.

The Nordic Resistance Movement differs slightly from the other groups. Every tenth time they mobilize offline, they try to recruit new members. They are against everything from globalization to Jews and gays.

But the groups themselves are quite international. The NRM is governed by Sweden.

SIAN is part of Stop Islamisation of Europe, and Pegida was originally a German organization.
The hard core

Why is provocative activism increasing?

Although they are few, street activists can create a ripple effect in society, says researcher Lars Erik Berntzen at the University of Bergen. (Photo: forskning.no)

Jupskås wants to do more research on this question. So far he has some theories.

In addition to being inspired by groups in other countries, he thinks that the Norwegian far right reacted to the refugee crisis in 2015. He believes the public conversation about immigration in Norway became more negative and facilitated the growth of the groups.

At the same time, the anti-immigration Progress Party established itself in government and lost its role as a protest party.

Berntzen, for his part, believes that the shift in activities has a lot to do with internal strife in the groups.

“Members argue about who will decide what, and those who are willing to sacrifice something for the cause can use their activism to achieve status. Burning the Quran can present a real risk of being subjected to violence. In some circles that commands respect,” he says.

Constant confrontations with counter-protesters can also harden the lines,” the researcher believes.

Police response sharpened

Police response has also changed in recent years. Far-right groups are now more often arrested or fined than before.

Even more often, the police ask them to leave.

Most often, however, the police are content to simply observe demonstrations and other activities.

The far right took to the streets most often in 2018. In 2019, activity levels dropped slightly. The number of confrontations, demonstrations and violent incidents has not increased since 2016.

Jupskås believes there might have been even more activity if the police did not react as decisively and quickly as they have.

“We’ve seen examples of activism that have been stopped by the police, like when Soldiers of Odin were not allowed to walk in uniform with their hoodies in the streets. It wasn't so much fun anymore then,” he says.

But it could have just as well gone the other way, according to Berntzen. Some animal and environmental protection organizations, for example, have become more extreme when the police tighten their grip.

“The groups may lose support when the less risk-averse drop out, leaving just the hard core. Given the internal leadership struggles, this may increase the likelihood that these hard-core members will push their cause that much harder", he says.


Right Now!
Dying for the Cause? Not really.

The Far-Right has its own take on “martyrdom”.

Suicide attacks are virtually absent in far-right terrorism. A recent study of the subcultural, strategic, and historic references to martyrdom, self-sacrifice, and suicide in the contemporary far right shows the potential reasons for this, highlighting the peculiar political mythology of “martyrdom” that characterizes this extremist environment.


Martyrdom of St Lawrence by Lawrence OP.

Daniel Koehler
DIRECTOR OF GERMAN INSTITUTE ON RADICALIZATION AND DE-RADICALIZATION STUDIES (GIRDS)
Thursday 22. october 2020 - 

Immediately after 17-year-old Kyle Rittenhouse was arrested for shooting 3 and killing 2 persons with an assault rifle during the August 25, 2020 Kenosha protests, a stunningly quick and widespread process of idolization and heroization within the far-right began to kick in.

Many in fact addressed Rittenhouse, who was charged with two counts of first-degree murder, as a “true American hero”. Memes glorifying him, crowdfunding campaigns in his support or even cosplaying as Rittenhouse during far-right rallies are only few examples for the intense idolization surrounding him.

Similar forms of “lionization” are common in other, politically more extremist milieus, such as the white supremacist or neo-Nazi environment.

It was the case with right-wing terrorists Anders Breivik (who killed 77 persons on July 22, 2011 in Oslo, Norway), Dylann Roof (who killed 9 persons on June 17, 2015 in Charleston, USA) or Brenton Tarrant (who killed 51 persons on March 15, 2019 in Christchurch, New Zealand).

Breivik quickly became an inspiring hero among far-rightists, Roof and his bowl haircut were made the core symbol of militant neo-Nazi online groups (for example the so called “Bowl Patrol” or “Bowlwaffen Division”), and Tarrant is typically called a “saint” within the militant far-right online milieu, accompanied with picture montages placing his face into paintings of Christian martyrs and saints.


But all these cases have at least one element in common: All of the perpetrators actually survived the violent acts. None of them is actually a “martyr” in the true meaning of the term, as none of them die for the cause.

More broadly, far-right terrorists have almost never used suicide tactics for their attacks, neither did they commit suicide afterwards to avoid arrest.

In a recent study, I looked at the potential reasons for this, by assessing subcultural references, far-right strategic manuals, and the role model concept of Nazi martyrdom cult in the contemporary extreme right.
Celebrating the Warrior but Shunning Death

Of course, there are cases of far-right terrorists or murderers who commit suicide before arrest.

Take the examples of white supremacist Wade Michael Page, who shot and killed 6 persons on August 5, 2012. After what came to be known as the Wisconsin Sikh Temple attack he turned the gun on himself.

In a similar fashion, the German neo-Nazis Uwe Böhnhardt and Uwe Mundlos killed each other before they could be apprehended for a killing and bombing spree that lasted over a decade producing 10 victims.

Even Dylann Roof reportedly attempted to commit suicide but failed.

Yet, living to fight another day appears to be the main requisite for large-scale idolization in the extreme right.

As Cynthia Miller-Idriss has shown in her seminal work “The Extreme Gone Mainstream”, modern extreme right subculture includes abundant references to death.

Typically, they come in three forms:

(1) abstract death (e.g., the SS death head)

(2) collective death (e.g., the death of a whole nation or ancestral group as existential threat to evoke violence for restauration or salvation from destruction)

(3) specific death (e.g., being political soldiers). A person sacrifices himself or herself to save the nation from destruction. Dying for one’s race, the nation, or as an honourable soldier in battle are omnipresent themes in extreme right music, clothing, literature, or other subcultural products.


So why then, is right-wing terrorism and violence almost completely deprived of suicide tactics (in a narrow sense, whereby the death of the attacker is part of the attack design)?

One important explanation for suicide terrorism, the rational choice perspective, maintains that for such a tactic to appear in significant scale within a given extremist environment, there must be personal, social, and religious incentives. Of course, there is much more to it, but this is a good place to start.

Even though the far-right is a diverse and heterogenous milieu, one can hardly find elaborate incentives in these categories. Religious support for suicide is not to be expected in the Christian fundamentalist parts. Much more present is the “fight till the end” notion praised among pagan far-rightists worshipping Norse gods and Viking warrior culture.

The far-fight also has little to offer in terms of social or personal incentives. There is no known widespread practice of providing for families of those members who committed suicide, even during an act of violence against the enemy. Those who killed themselves during an attack are not even remotely celebrated as much in subculture (e.g. music, clothing etc.) as compared to those who survived.

The contemporary far-right widely communicates to its members that death must be embraced as the consequence of fighting for the cause until the end, meaning until the “political soldier” is stigmatized, ostracized, and eventually killed by the enemy.

Steadfastness in the face of a much superior opponent and surviving to continue the fight is typically seen as the highest virtue in this milieu. This appears to connect well to the role model of martyrdom in Nazi Germany, which also sacralised those Nazis who were killed during street fights with Communists (e.g., Horst Wessel): the “Blutzeugen” (blood witnesses).

Strategic manuals also rarely include references to suicide terrorism.

One notable exception are the “Turner Diaries”, deemed “one of the most influential works of violent extremist propaganda in the English language”. Chapters XIV and XVI feature a planned suicide attack against a power plant involving radioactive material. In the end, the main protagonist is ordered to embark on a suicide mission at the climax of the book. He flies an agricultural aircraft equipped with a nuclear warhead into the Pentagon and destroys it.

Other important manifestos or strategic manuals (e.g., Tarrant’s “The Great Replacement” or Breivik’s “2083 - A European Declaration of Independence”) are much more focused on the “political soldier” theme: finding honourable death in the battle to save the white race.

In short, within the contemporary extreme right, personal, social, and religious/ideological rewards are mostly structured to incentivize murder-suicides or “death by cop” in the most extreme form. “Martyr” status is usually reserved for those who remain ideologically committed in the face of persecution, imprisonment, or societal stigmatization.
Implications for Future Threats

Summing up this short overview of my recent study on modern far-right suicide, martyrdom, and self-sacrifice, it is fair to say that the extreme right environment is highly unlikely to produce significant suicide tactics in the narrow sense.


This holds true even though some groups have openly flirted with admiration for jihadist martyrdom and suicide terrorism in general.


Much more likely, and oftentimes no less harmful, are the attack tactics evolving around mass shooting murder-suicides, with a particular hypermasculine connotation, which open the threat spectrum for male lone actor attacks fuelled by the far-right’s glorification of the (male) “warrior hero” who goes down fighting till the end.

About this blog:


Welcome to the “Right Now!” blog where you will find commentary, analysis and reflection by C-REX’s researchers and affiliates on topics related to contemporary far right politics, including party politics, subcultural trends, militancy, violence, and terrorism.

The Center for Research on Extremism, C-REX, is a cross-disciplinary center for the study of right-wing extremism, hate crime and political violence. It is a joint collaboration with five of the leading Norwegian institutions on extremism research, hosted by the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Oslo.

Read more blog entries from Right Now!
Germany's anti-mask movement draws strange bedfellows

Issued on: 21/11/2020 - 
A demonstrator carries a mock grave marker inscribed "German Basic Law" (constitution) in Berlin on November 18 
Odd ANDERSEN AFP/File

Berlin (AFP)

A dancer in harem pants moves down a Berlin street next to a skinhead wearing a "Reich" flag: Germany's escalating anti-mask protests in the coronavirus pandemic draw from a wide, seemingly contradictory range of political camps.

A rally of nearly 10,000 opponents of government-imposed social restrictions to curb the spread of Covid-19 in Berlin this week brought together a motley band of demonstrators with ostensibly little in common -- apart from crumbling faith in institutions and representative democracy.

On Saturday, another demonstration is set to take place in the eastern city of Leipzig. The protest in the German capital, which led to 365 police detentions, gives a taste of what could be expected.


The scene in front of the Brandenburg Gate Wednesday marked a dizzying confluence of LGBT rainbow flags and Gandhi banners intermingled with posters for the increasingly international QAnon conspiracy movement.

Marchers wearing red Trump "MAGA" hats could be spotted in the crowd next to evangelicals, climate activists and "peace"-shouting hippies.

Most of the protesters remained peaceful while they railed against vaccines and dismissed the dangers of the virus, but a violent hard core attacked police.

Some 77 officers were injured at the demonstration, with Berlin police chief Barbara Slowik saying that "the brutality of the violence was immense."

"Some have told me that we have not experienced something like that in decades," she told the Tagesspiegel daily.

"We are moving away from a very colourful public and are now increasingly dealing with a spectrum of people who generally reject our system and are prepared to use extreme violence."

- New conspiracy theorists -

Repeating a common but false refrain of the demonstrations, one protester, Ina Meyer-Stoll, claimed: "The death rate isn't higher than ones you see for flu outbreaks."

Another activist on the streets, Achim Ecker, an erstwhile Greens voter in his 50s, said he had "lost confidence in the political parties" particularly with regard to potential approval of a vaccine.

Others' harmless appearance belied jaw-dropping views.

Grandmother Birgit Vogt, 75, denied the existence of the pandemic and didn't hesitate to draw a parallel between the restrictions and the seizure of dictatorial powers by the Nazis in 1933: "Fear and panic allow you to control the masses, as in Hitler's time".

"Just like after 9/11, which gave way to countless conspiracy theories, I worry that we're seeing the same phenomenon with the pandemic," warned Miro Dittrich of the anti-extremism group Amadeu Antonio Foundation.

He told AFP that such movements were "dramatically increasing their followers and many are newcomers. The shutdown has played a role, as people are cut off from their social environment and spend an extremely large amount of time online."

- 'Think differently' -

In the meantime, right-wing extremist groups and the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party have been effective in harnessing a wide range of objections to the government response to the pandemic.

On Wednesday, about a dozen demonstrators began shouting "Sieg Heil" while performing the banned stiff-armed Hitler salute, in the presence of police, an AFP reporter saw.

Anti-Semitic slogans have been a fixture of some of the corona-sceptic demonstrations in Germany this year.

"The link between the conspiracy theorist scene and the far right is unfortunately quite logical because they have a lot in common," Dittrich said.

"Both believe that a small elite secretly controls events at the expense of 'the Germans', as well as controlling the mass media, and that the truth can only be found in 'alternative' media."

The umbrella group for most of the demonstrations since the outbreak of coronavirus is called Querdenken or "Lateral-thinkers".

Founded in Stuttgart, it calls itself a "freedom movement" that embraces "peaceful and non-partisan" ideals and claims to have more than 100,000 supporters, including personalities such as international footballer Thomas Berthold.

But "the organisers of Querdenken have shown in the past that they're not afraid of contact with the (virus) deniers and conspiracy theorists," warned Simon Teune, a researcher at Berlin's Technical University who specialises in protests.

"The original intention of the demonstrations -- namely to protest against the measures initiated by the state -- is often overshadowed," it said.

"Instead, they are being used to turn governments and the media themselves into 'objects of protest and hatred'."

© 2020 AFP

Rally Around the Flag? The Far-Right Response to Covid-19















11 SEPTEMBER 2020
Alexander Ruser
Amanda Machin

Europe’s far-right parties such as Alternative für Deutschland, the Lega and the Swedish Democrats have all struggled to find a message amid the pandemic. However, things might be changing. As populations tire of lockdowns and fear for their livelihoods, these parties are attempting to harness discontent and speak for “the people”. While some hope that scientific truths will win out against populist lies, the prominent place given to experts could produce a backlash. Ultimately the social and economic consequences of government measures will be decisive for the future of far-right populism.

The coronavirus pandemic has brought huge changes to all corners of the world. Daily life has been fundamentally transformed; working conditions, social events and international travel have all been disrupted. Besides the profound economic and social transformations in the wake of a global health crisis, how has the political landscape been affected? How have political parties fared? What has been the response of the far-right populist parties, who might have been expected to appreciate the closed borders? Six months ago, these parties were poised to make sweeping electoral gains. Before the pandemic, a populist surge was regarded by some as almost inevitable due to deep structural changes across Europe and the lack of political alternatives. An important question today is whether the coronavirus pandemic has dampened this surge or whether, on the contrary, it will provide it with new fuel.

Though there is good reason to be wary of sweeping generalisations and simplistic assumptions often made about populism in general, and right-wing populism in particular, it is worth comparing these parties in order to understand the variations and commonalities of far-right populism. Broadly speaking, populism works by championing “the people”, who are distinguished in populist discourse from “elites” or the “establishment”.[1] While left-wing populism makes the people an inclusive category, the populism of the far right constructs them in exclusive and ethnic terms, and distinguishes them from an unresponsive elite as well as from immigrants.[2]


Perhaps unsurprisingly in a war-like situation, we have witnessed what is referred to as a “rally around the flag” effect: many leaders and parties of governments have seen an increase in their approval ratings.

This division has apparently been difficult to maintain over recent months. Perhaps unsurprisingly in a war-like situation, we have witnessed what is referred to as a “rally around the flag” effect: many leaders and parties of governments have seen an increase in their approval ratings. This has made it difficult for far-right populist opposition parties to find and assert a strong message. And indeed, as Cas Mudde points out, “Populist parties and politicians have responded very differently, in part depending upon whether they are in government or opposition. They are also faced with very different contexts, both in terms of number of infections and control of the media.” Things might be changing. As populations tire of lockdowns and fear for their livelihoods, these parties are attempting to harness discontent and speak for the people against what is construed as hostile government policy.

This certainly seems to be the case with three far-right parties: the Italian Lega, the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in Germany, and the Swedish Democrats (SD). These parties have had striking electoral successes over recent years. They have acted very differently in response to the coronavirus-induced crisis but they all seem to struggle to carve out an appealing message and a strong identity during the pandemic. Currently, these parties are all continuing to construct national government policy as illegitimate and damaging. What is most pertinently revealed in our comparison is that this indictment is made regardless of government response to the crisis. Whether the strategy is to enforce a lock-down or resist it, populist parties construct a division between the people and the “other” by exploiting the coronavirus crisis.


Whether the strategy is to enforce a lock-down or resist it, populist parties construct a division between the people and the “other” by exploiting the coronavirus crisis.
Wavering message, wavering support

The Italian Lega, led by Matteo Salvini, is certainly not letting up on its populist framing of the crisis. With slogans such as “let’s close our borders”, the Lega is notorious for connecting immigration to insecurity as well as promoting the fining and expulsion of migrants. The Lega connected the Covid-19 virus directly to immigration from the outset. According to Salvini, the “terrible virus” was “spreading from China”. Note that in his discourse, the specific characteristics of the migrant might have changed (they no longer come from Africa but from Asia), but the construction and blaming of a foreign other has not.

During the first months of the lockdown, this anti-immigration discourse seemed to be completely out of touch with reality. First of all, due to the lockdown, NGO rescue boats had effectively ceased to operate, resulting in a sharp decline of people reaching Italy. Secondly, concerns over fresh food shortages, created by the disruption of the influx of legal seasonal workers, has sparked an acknowledgement of the importance of illegal immigrants for Italy’s agricultural sector.

Up until now at least, Salvini’s messages have largely fallen flat. Part of the reason may be that the lively rallies, where the Lega thrives most, are now banned under social distancing rules. Another may be that he has promoted inconsistent messages and flip-flopped. In February, Salvini argued that the Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte was not doing enough but by July, he began touting that the prime minister was doing too much. Now Salvini is pronouncing the lockdown as unnecessary and harmful to the Italian people: “keeping them terrified, distanced and locked up is an attack on our democracy and our economy.” Although the Lega remains Italy’s strongest party, with 26 per cent share of the national voting intention, it has slipped in the polls. Yet it is important to acknowledge this slip as not indicating a weakening of the far right in Italy, but rather shifts of popularity within the country. The Lega has lost 10 per cent to the post-fascist party Fratelli d’Italia (FdI), turning its leader and Salvini’s most important ally, Giorgia Meloni, into a potential rival.
Germany’s struggling far right

The challenge for the far right in Germany has not been to maintain a consistent message but rather to find one in the first place. Like the Lega, the AfD is overtly populist. Consider its 2017 manifesto in which the party publicised its wish to: “maintain our language and traditions in a peaceful, democratic, and sovereign nation state for the German people” since “Germany’s political class has exploited and modified election laws and procedures with increasing cunningness in order to reduce the influence of the electorate.” It also targets migrants, in particular Muslims (established Muslim communities are targeted too), unambiguously declaring that “Islam does not belong to Germany. Its expansion and the ever-increasing number of Muslims in the country are viewed by the AfD as a danger to our state, our society, and our values.”


[…] while the stringent travel restrictions and strict border controls fit within the far-right discourse, the enactment of such policies has deprived the AfD of a distinctive position.

The problem for the AfD since the pandemic, however, has been that the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, has been widely credited with effectively managing the crisis. Her party, the Christian Democrats, has seen the most noticeable increase in support in Europe. And this simply does not fit with the AfD’s populist insinuation that elected elites do not serve the German people. So while the stringent travel restrictions and strict border controls fit within the far-right discourse, the enactment of such policies has deprived the AfD of a distinctive position.

In general, the leadership of the party has been quite subdued throughout 2020, and the party has slipped to 10 per cent of the national voting intention. The pandemic came at a time when the party was already dealing with internal division and party infighting. The party has a radical far-right wing (known as “the wing”) which was formally dissolved in late March 2020, after the German domestic intelligence agency deemed it a potential threat to the constitution and put it under surveillance. In addition, prominent figures in the party have been pushed out due to their former membership in a banned neo-Nazi group.

But the formal dissolution of the wing has clearly done nothing to stop some of its members from questioning the reality of the global health crisis: various prominent party figures and former wing members have publicly referred to the “alleged corona crisis” while one posted a “checklist” to distinguish a pandemic from a “fake pandemic”. Prominent wing activists have also been active in the so-called “Hygiene Demonstrations” which have drawn thousands of people in cities across Germany to protest the government’s coronavirus policy. Protestors blame Jews and immigrant communities for the spread of Covid-19 in Germany.

These responses have begun to dominate the public impression of the AfD’s current position, and party leaders are concerned that the connection of members to neo-fascist groups, conspiracy theorists and anti-vaccination activists will alienate more moderate conservative voters. The coronavirus has therefore exposed the cleavage between the national-conservative party mainstream and the marginalised far-right wing – a divide that may, according to former party leader Alexander Gauland, actually end with the dissolution of the party.


The coronavirus has […] exposed the cleavage between the national-conservative party mainstream and the marginalised far-right wing – a divide that may, according to former party leader Alexander Gauland, actually end with the dissolution of the party.
Swedish exceptionalism, one step too far for populists

In contrast to both Italy and Germany, countries that have been experiencing strict lockdown policies, Sweden has kept its schools, restaurants and borders open. Its exceptional approach to the pandemic has been defended as entirely in line with science. The Swedish Minister for Health and Social Affairs Lena Hallengren stated: “All countries do the best they can, but so far there is no one who knows exactly how to best deal with this virus”. Swedish health experts have been given priority over advice from the World Health Organization (WHO), especially since their strategy is considered more in line with cultural particularities of the Scandinavian country.

This has left the far-right SD in a difficult position. Over the last decade, they have sharply increased their share of the vote to 20 per cent. Their unambiguously populist and ethnic-majoritarian discourse constructs an ethnically homogenous Swedes as antagonised by immigrant-friendly and politically correct elites. In order to oppose the Swedish government, the SD not only decries the relatively high mortality rate resulting from Sweden’s solo run a “massacre”, but they also urge the government to fall in line with the “international consensus”. This is an odd situation: the Swedish government’s strategy on the coronavirus crisis is based on highlighting the country’s exceptionalism and, of all parties, the SD is advocating the adoption of international blueprints.
No time for a victory lap

What can be concluded from the comparison of the three parties? Despite operating in different political landscapes and coping with their own issues, these parties have, nevertheless, continued to maintain a populist division between the people and the other (discursively constructed as immigrants and elites). Until recently, this has not resonated with publics. Commentators have observed that, so far, the far right might well be floundering in opposition while those in power are also struggling. However, this may well not be the case for much longer. Far-right populist parties are using the crisis to continue to divide the people from others: immigrants, foreigners, and social and political elites. As Yannis Stavrakakis and Giorgos Katsambekis note in an important recent report, crises are often seen as particularly opportune moments for the exaggeration of social and political divisions. The unevenly distributed effects not only of the virus itself, but of the strategies to tackle it, create an environment ripe for far-right populism.


The unevenly distributed effects not only of the virus itself, but of the strategies to tackle it, create an environment ripe for far-right populism.

Whether populist messages strike a chord with voters in the near future may well hinge on the way the forthcoming economic turbulence and uncertainty is handled. The potential of far-right parties to speak to popular discontent will depend upon the extent to which government responses to the crisis are seen to be legitimate, representative and democratic. This applies not only to the national and regional but also the European level. The general lack of coordination between EU institutions and the bitter negotiations between the member states on post-pandemic relief efforts may have opened the opportunity to reinforce the far-right populist divisions between national peoples and European elites. FdI leader Meloni, for example, directly accused the European Commission president of bias: “When the coronavirus was just an Italian problem it didn’t interest anyone in the European Union. When we had the first red zones in Lombardy, Ursula von der Leyen was with Greta Thunberg. They only did things when the virus arrived in Germany.”

Some believe that the recent struggles of the far right can be seen as a result of the triumph of scientific truth and rational decision making. They claim that people have finally realised that in a crisis what is needed is expertise rather than the conspiracy theories, shocking exaggerations, blatant mistruths, and the entertaining antics of certain populist parties. However, these claims downplay the impact that developments in the upcoming months will have on public opinion of government policies, and the fact that the privileged role of scientists in political decision-making is in danger of being anti-democratic.


Any claim to epistemic authority, in the face of an unknown virus especially, can be challenged.

Politicians have relied upon the “epistemic authority” of medical experts, which has not only been a valuable resource during the pandemic but has allowed them to shift responsibility for stringent measures. However, any attempt to delegate policymaking to experts is likely to further justify populist backlash against professional elites. Any claim to epistemic authority, in the face of an unknown virus especially, can be challenged. Politicians have to choose experts from a large pool of trained professionals leaving plenty of room for criticising a particular choice. Moreover, different experts can deliver diverging or even directly contradictory advice.

The distinct path taken by Sweden illustrates that scientific evidence can be interpreted in various ways; in a context of uncertainty created by a health crisis, the prior scientific knowledge available is often deficit. To be democratically valid, a decision must not only be based on expertise but on genuine political debate between real alternatives. Governance of the pandemic should not only be a matter of following the science, but of sustaining a tangible commitment to economic equality, social justice and political discussion. If not, Europe might well witness a renewed surge of far-right populism.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Stavrakakis, Y. and Katsambekis, G., 2020. Populism and the pandemic: A collaborative report. Available at: < https://bit.ly/2Rc9kll > [Accessed 10 Sep. 2020].

[2] Ruth Wodak (2015). The politics of fear: what right-wing populist discourses mean. London : SAGE Publications Ltd.