Friday, August 27, 2021

What Is the Islamic State in Khorasan?
THEY ARE TAJIK NOT PASHTUN (TALIBAN)
Friday, August 27, 2021

Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul. An IS-K attack outside the airport on Aug. 26 killed more than 100 people (Jim Kelly, https://flic.kr/p/7cR3qM; CC BY 2.0, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/)

In light of the Taliban’s reconquest in Afghanistan and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’s loss of territory in Syria and Iraq, some have argued that its province in Central Asia, the Islamic State in Khorasan (IS-K), appears to be the most likely affiliate to flourish in the Islamic State franchise. This is because its core base is located in hard-to-reach locations in Afghanistan, its structure is decentralized and well funded, and it has successfully carried out lethal attacks. Currently, the uncertain environment in Afghanistan and IS-K’s resentment toward the Taliban, which it views as Taghut (a tyrannical power), offers IS-K a ripe environment to stage attacks, exploit the local population and potentially gain a stronger footing in the region.

In recent days, U.S. intelligence noted a specific threat from IS-K to the evacuation plans at Kabul’s Hamid Karzai International Airport. On Aug. 26, these warnings were realized with two attacks outside the Kabul airport where suicide bombers detonated explosives at the airport’s Abby Gate and the nearby Baron Hotel, while gunmen opened fire on civilian crowds and military personnel. These attacks resulted in more than 100 civilian deaths, the deaths of 13 U.S. service personnel and scores of people injured. There is concern about further attacks by IS-K on civilians and U.S. forces in a bid to destabilize the country.

While IS-K has received international attention in recent days, it formed more than six years ago. In April 2014, the leadership of the Islamic State began recruiting efforts for IS-K, through the appointment of Qari Wali Rahman as special representative of the Islamic State to Afghanistan and Pakistan. By Jan. 26, 2015, the group was formally announced by Islamic State spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani in an audio recording titled “Say, Die in Your Rage!” While that period still marks a time when the Islamic State had a strong presence in Syria and Iraq, its creation of Wilayat (province or governate) Khorasan falls in line with the group’s expansion projects outside of the Levant. This approach of “remaining and expanding” (baqiya wa tatamadad) as Antonio Giustozzi, author of “The Islamic State in Khorasan: Afghanistan, Pakistan and the New Central Asian Jihad,” argues, encompasses the organization’s larger strategy of domination and legitimacy over the broader jihadist movement.

According to an IS-K leader, “Khorasan” was originally meant to encompass Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Central Asia, and swaths of India and Russia. However, in reality, IS-K’s main presence is located in eastern Afghanistan. IS-K’s connection with Pakistan, which now falls under its own wilayat, began with its first emir, Hafiz Saeed Khan, a Pakistani national and veteran Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) commander who imported other high-ranking members of TTP into IS-K. TTP was created from a small number of groups in the tribal areas of Pakistan and the North-West Frontier Province. Despite having “Taliban” in its name, TTP is not the Afghan Taliban but rather its own organization. It has been described as “one of Pakistan’s deadliest militant organizations,” having ties, although troubled at times, with al-Qaeda. Additionally, before 2015, the Haqqani network—a guerilla insurgent group in Afghanistan—sent hundreds of fighters to the Islamic State, many of whom returned from Syria and Iraq and joined IS-K.

The Islamic State’s recent 300th edition of its Al-Naba newsletter features an editorial titled “Finally, They Raised Mullah Bradley.” The article implies that the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan this month was part of a larger conspiracy between the Taliban and the U.S. It claims that the Taliban’s victory is false, while the Islamic State is on the true path of jihad—a powerful propaganda statement in a bid for legitimacy in the wider jihadist movement. This message is in line with past IS-K propaganda, which promotes an agenda of a global jihad in Wilayat Khorasan.

As a recruitment strategy, IS-K uses regional jihadist organizations, including TTP, the Taliban and local populations, to expand its ranks. It has focused its recruitment effort on Tajikistan, Bangladesh, India and Myanmar while providing financial incentives for recruits. It has been reported that IS-K pays its fighters higher salaries than organizations in the region like al-Qaeda and the Taliban, with reported IS-K incomes ranging from $400 to $800 a month, while a martyr’s family collects a one-time payment of $15,000. Thus, joining IS-K is financially beneficial for fighters and family members, especially in a country where in 2020 it was estimated that 47.3 percent of the population lived below the poverty line.

But where does this money come from? IS-K acquires some financial backing through various sources including the exploitation of natural resources, the narcotics trade, taxing the local population and kidnapping for ransom. Yet it has been reported that the majority of its funding is attained through foreign states and private donors, mainly out of Qatar, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. While no exact figure is available, outside funding for IS-K has been estimated at $300 million per year.

On the ground, IS-K’s strategy is to implement chaos, using brutal violence to create an anarchic environment to gain support and power in a region already struggling with instability. In 2019 the group had an estimated number of around 5,000 fighters, with 2,000 to 3,000 in its headquarters in Nangarhar and 1,000 to 2,000 additional recruits situated in training and indoctrination facilities in Kunar. While the number of IS-K fighters is low, the group’s responsibility for many high-level attacks in the region, along with its keenness to engage in attacks against those who diverge from its ideological leanings, including the Taliban and fellow Muslims, makes it dangerous locally and, to a degree, internationally. Attacks on Afghan government buildings, polling stations and “soft” targets have been the group’s modus operandi. A brazen IS-K attack on a prison in Jalalabad in 2020, for example, left more than 29 dead and set more than 1,000 prisoners free.

Considering IS-K’s strategies and capabilities, it poses the most immediate threat to Afghanistan and Central Asia. In the short term, this includes continued attacks on infrastructure and stability in the region, while in the long term, IS-K could morph into a much larger, well-organized group. However, in a region already saturated with militant factions, IS-K faces pushback from groups viewing it as a threat to their regional powers. Continued clashes among IS-K, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan, and the Taliban present obstacles for IS-K. Additionally, the Taliban, now equipped with a war chest of U.S. gear and weapons, may present a more daunting foe to IS-K moving forward. Nevertheless, IS-K uses the same tactics applied by the Islamic State, which benefited from regional instability, disenfranchised populations, and exploitation of volatility to develop and expand its reach. Reminiscent of al-Qaeda, IS-K also uses Afghanistan’s complex terrain and tribal society as a haven for growth and operational planning. As a result, IS-K not only threatens the stability of Afghanistan but also presents a threat to U.S. interests in the region and the effort to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a breeding ground for terror groups targeting the West. Although not its main goal, IS-K has shown interest in mounting attacks in the U.S. and on U.S. personnel in the region, signifying the desire, if not the capability, to do so.

While it is yet to be clear how the Taliban takeover will affect the region, history has shown that extremist and terror groups have found success in Afghanistan, which has provided groups with a haven and an operational base. Moving forward, it would be a grievous error to think that this will be any different in the future. With IS-K already established in the region and having a known track record of exploiting destabilized territories, the possibility of further growth is present, even though the Taliban will fight to eradicate IS-K for its territory. Therefore, although a continued U.S. presence in Afghanistan is not in the national interest, Afghanistan will pose a prolonged national security threat as groups like IS-K try to assert themselves in the region for the long haul. As a result, U.S. policymakers should consider Afghanistan as part of the national interest because the situation on the ground will continue to deteriorate, offering a base for militant groups while undermining Taliban efforts for peace and stability in the country.

NO EVIDENCE IT IS NOT ZOONOSIS
Covid-19 'Not Developed' As Biological Weapon, Says US Intelligence Community


China has denied a genetically modified coronavirus leaked from the facility in Wuhan - where the first COVID-19 cases were detected in 2019.

Pandemics do not respect international borders, and we all must better understand how COVID-19 came to be in order to prevent further pandemics, Biden said.

PTI
LAST UPDATED:AUGUST 28, 2021

SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, was “not developed" as a biological weapon, the US intelligence community has concluded in a report, with President Joe Biden reiterating the allegation that China continues to reject calls for transparency and withhold information about the origins of the virus.

The Director of National Intelligence in a report, prepared at the direction of the president, on Friday said SARS-CoV-2 probably emerged and infected humans through an initial small-scale exposure that occurred no later than November 2019 with the first known cluster of COVID-19 cases arising in Wuhan, China in December 2019.

However, there was no unanimity among the intelligence community (IC) on the origins of the coronavirus. The virus was not developed as a biological weapon. Most agencies also assess with low confidence that SARS-CoV-2 probably was not genetically engineered; however, two agencies believe there was not sufficient evidence to make an assessment either way, said the unclassified version of the report.

The IC also assesses that China’s officials did not have foreknowledge of the virus before the initial outbreak of COVID-19 emerged, it said. After examining all available intelligence reporting and other information, though, the IC remains divided on the most likely origin of COVID-19. All agencies assess that two hypotheses are plausible: natural exposure to an infected animal and a laboratory-associated incident, the report said.

Four IC elements and the National Intelligence Council assess with low confidence that the initial SARS-CoV-2 infection was most likely caused by natural exposure to an animal infected with it or a close progenitor virus-a virus that probably would be more than 99 per cent similar to SARS-CoV-2. These analysts give weight to Chinese officials’ lack of foreknowledge, the numerous vectors for natural exposure, and other factors, the report said.

One IC element assesses with moderate confidence that the first human infection with SARS-CoV-2 most likely was the result of a laboratory-associated incident, probably involving experimentation, animal handling, or sampling by the Wuhan Institute of Virology. These analysts give weight to the inherently risky nature of work on coronaviruses, it said.

Analysts at three IC elements remain unable to coalesce around either explanation without additional information, with some analysts favouring natural origin, others a laboratory origin, and some seeing the hypotheses as equally likely. Variations in analytic views largely stem from differences in how agencies weigh intelligence reporting and scientific publications, and intelligence and scientific gaps, the report said.

Meanwhile, acknowledging the receipt of the report, Biden in a statement said his administration will do everything it can to trace the roots of this outbreak that has caused so much pain and death around the world, so that they can take every necessary precaution to prevent it from happening again. Critical information about the origins of this pandemic exists in China, “yet from the beginning, government officials in China have worked to prevent international investigators and members of the global public health community from accessing it", he said.

To this day, China continues to reject calls for transparency and withhold information, even as the toll of this pandemic continue to rise, Biden alleged. According to Johns Hopkins university data, the deadly virus has so far infected 215,290,716 people and claimed 4,483,136 lives globally. The US is the worst-hit with a total of 38,682,072 infections and 636,565 deaths recorded so far.

The world deserves answers, and I will not rest until we get them. Responsible nations do not shirk these kinds of responsibilities to the rest of the world. Pandemics do not respect international borders, and we all must better understand how COVID-19 came to be in order to prevent further pandemics, Biden said.

America will continue working with like-minded partners around the world to press China to fully share information and to cooperate with the World Health OrganiSation’s Phase II evidence-based, expert-led determination into the origins of COVID-19 including by providing access to all relevant data and evidence, he said.

Biden said the US will also continue to press China to adhere to scientific norms and standards, including sharing information and data from the earliest days of the pandemic, protocols related to bio-safety, and information from animal populations. “We must have a full and transparent accounting of this global tragedy. Nothing less is acceptable, he said.

US intelligence unsure if Coronavirus emerged from lab leak or animals

By Matthew Knott
Updated August 28, 2021 — 

Washington: The US intelligence community is unsure whether the coronavirus originated in a Wuhan laboratory or emerged naturally through animals, but most agencies believe it was probably not engineered in a lab.

The findings were contained in a much-awaited unclassified version of an intelligence report commissioned by US President Joe Biden to probe the origins of the virus.

An employee studying coronavirus in a laboratory in Wuhan in February, 2020, during the first outbreak.
 CREDIT:AP

A classified version of the report, prepared by the office of the Director of National Intelligence, was delivered to the White House earlier this week.

The inconclusive nature of the report will likely only heighten, rather than end, the increasingly heated and partisan debate in the US about the origins of the coronavirus.

Prominent Republican politicians have been adamant the virus originated from a lab leak and have sought to tie infectious disease expert Dr Anthony Fauci to funding for so-called “gain-of-function” research (which alters biological organisms to enhance their property) into coronaviruses.



Following the release of the report Biden blasted China for stymieing probes into the origins of the virus by blocking investigators from accessing crucial lab records and samples.

“To this day, the PRC [People’s Republic of China] continues to reject calls for transparency and withhold information, even as the toll of this pandemic continue to rise,” Biden said in a statement.

“We needed this information rapidly, from the PRC, while the pandemic was still new.”

Biden said that nothing less than a “full and transparent accounting of this global tragedy” would be acceptable.


Fringe, feasible or false? The COVID-19 Wuhan lab leak theory gets a second look

“The world deserves answers, and I will not rest until we get them,” Biden said. “Responsible nations do not shirk these kinds of responsibilities to the rest of the world.”

The two-page summary states that most US intelligence agencies believe that SARS-CoV-2 was probably not engineered in a lab.

Two other agencies said they did not have enough evidence to make a call either way given China’s efforts to block any independent investigation into the origins of the virus.

“All agencies assess that two hypotheses are plausible: natural exposure to an infected animal and a laboratory-associated accident,” the unclassified report states.

The report says there is broad agreement in the intelligence community that the virus was not developed as a biological weapon and that Chinese officials did not have advance knowledge before the initial outbreak in Wuhan.


Residents line up to be tested for COVID-19 in Wuhan, China, this month.
 CREDIT:AP

Four elements of the intelligence community and the National Intelligence Council assessed that the initial outbreak was most likely caused by natural exposure to an animal infected with SARS-CoV-2 or an extremely similar virus.

“These analysts give weight to China’s officials’ lack of foreknowledge, the numerous vectors for natural exposure, and other factors,” the report states.

The assessment is classed as “low confidence”, meaning that while analysts believe this is the most likely scenario, they have questions about the credibility or plausibility of some information underlying the assessment.

One element in the intelligence community said they believed the first human infection was probably the result of a laboratory-associated incident. This likely involved experimentation, animal handling or sampling by the Wuhan Institute of Virology.

“These analysts give weight to the inherently risky nature of work on coronaviruses,” the report states.

This assessment is classed as “moderate confidence”, meaning the analysts believe the underlying information is plausible and comes from credible sources.


US intelligence still divided on origins of coronavirus
By NOMAAN MERCHANT

In this Feb. 6, 2021, file a worker in protectively overalls and carrying disinfecting equipment walks outside the Wuhan Central Hospital where Li Wenliang, the whistleblower doctor who sounded the alarm and was reprimanded by local police for it in the early days of Wuhan's pandemic, worked in Wuhan in central China. U.S. intelligence agencies remain divided on the origins of the coronavirus but believe China's leaders did not know about the virus before the start of the global pandemic, according to results released Friday, Aug. 27, of a review ordered by President Joe Biden. 
(AP Photo/Ng Han Guan, File)


WASHINGTON (AP) — U.S. intelligence agencies remain divided on the origins of the coronavirus but believe China’s leaders did not know about the virus before the start of the global pandemic, according to results released Friday of a review ordered by President Joe Biden.

According to an unclassified summary, four members of the U.S. intelligence community say with low confidence that the virus was initially transmitted from an animal to a human. A fifth intelligence agency believes with moderate confidence that the first human infection was linked to a lab. Analysts do not believe the virus was developed as a bioweapon and most agencies believe the virus was not genetically engineered.

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence said in a statement Friday that China “continues to hinder the global investigation, resist sharing information and blame other countries, including the United States.” Reaching a conclusion about what caused the virus likely requires China’s cooperation, the office said.

The cause of the coronavirus remains an urgent public health and security concern worldwide. In the U.S., many conservatives have accused Chinese scientists of developing COVID-19 in a lab and allowing it to leak. State Department officials under former President Donald Trump published a fact sheet noting research into coronaviruses conducted at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, located in the Chinese city where the first major known outbreak occurred.

The scientific consensus remains that the virus most likely migrated from animals in what’s known as a zoonotic transmission. So-called “spillover events” occur in nature, and there are at least two coronaviruses that evolved in bats and caused human epidemics, SARS1 and MERS.



In a statement, Biden said China had obstructed efforts to investigate the virus “from the beginning.”

“The world deserves answers, and I will not rest until we get them,” he said. “Responsible nations do not shirk these kinds of responsibilities to the rest of the world.”

China’s foreign ministry attacked the U.S. investigation ahead of the report’s release. Fu Cong, a foreign ministry director general, said at a briefing for foreign journalists that “scapegoating China cannot whitewash the U.S.”

“If they want to baselessly accuse China, they better be prepared to accept the counterattack from China,” he said.

Biden in May ordered a 90-day review of what the White House said was an initial finding leading to “two likely scenarios”: an animal-to-human transmission or a lab leak. The White House said then that two agencies in the 18-member intelligence community leaned toward the hypothesis of a transmission in nature and another agency leaned toward a lab leak.

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence on Friday did not identify which agencies supported either hypothesis. But it noted some of the same hurdles facing the World Health Organization and scientists worldwide: a lack of clinical samples and data from the earliest cases of COVID-19.

In conducting the review, intelligence agencies consulted with allied nations and experts outside of government. An epidemiologist was brought into the National Intelligence Council, a group of senior experts that consults the head of the intelligence community.

China Urges WHO to Probe US Bio Lab 
in Search for COVID Origin

WIV received 2 visits by WHO experts, concluding a lab origin is extremely unlikely. Fort Detrick & UNC has long-running coronavirus research & poor safety records. The US, insisting on the lab leak theory, should open up FD & UNC for international investigation.
 | Photo: Twitter @MFA_China

Published 26 August 2021

Washington and Beijing are in the midst of a heated exchange of accusations, pointing fingers at each other in terms of the responsibility for unleashing the coronavirus pandemic on the world. U.S. officials claim that the virus may have been unleashed due to a leak from the Wuhan Institute of Virology, while Chinese officials claim it may have originated in a U.S. military bio lab.

Chen Xu, China’s permanent representative to the UN office in Geneva, has sent the World Health Organisation a formal request asking the global health authority to open an investigation into Fort Detrick, the Maryland-based U.S. Army laboratory once known as the center of America’s biological weapons program, and its possible role in the origins of the novel coronavirus.

China Urges Us To Stop Political Manipulation on COVID Origins

Chen reiterated in his letter Beijing’s position on SARS-CoV-2, which matches the conclusions of the joint WHO-China team´s research conducted at the Wuhan Institute of Virology and in the city, stating that the Wuhan lab leak theory is an “extremely unlikely” scenario.

The letter went on to ask the WHO to probe the lab at Fort Detrick, and to investigate research carried out by University of North Carolina professor Ralph Baric, suggesting that “if some parties are of the view that the "lab leak" hypothesis remains open, it is the labs of Fort Detrick and the University of North Carolina in the U.S. that should be subject to transparent investigation with full access.”

Chen accompanied his letter with an online petition signed by over 25 million Chinese nationals demanding an investigation into Fort Detrick, as well as two documents, entitled “Doubtful Points About Fort Detrick” and “Coronavirus Research Conducted by Dr. Ralph Baric’s Team at the University of North Carolina".



The latter document, published in full by Xinhua, calls into question U.S. epidemiologist Dr. Ralph Baric’s work into coronaviruses, including gain-of-function research, and points to his team’s research into synthesizing and modifying SARS-related coronaviruses going back to at least 2003, including bat-related coronaviruses, since at least 2008.

Meanwhile, Fu Cong, director-general of the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s department of arms control and disarmament, commented during a press briefing on Chen’s letter, suggesting that “the international community has long been seriously concerned about Fort Detrick,” and pointing to the facility’s “advanced capabilities to synthesize and modify SARS-related coronaviruses as early as 2003.”

Fu pointed to “multiple” alleged biological safety-related accidents taking place at the institute, including the mysterious July 2019 shutdown, after which “outbreaks of respiratory diseases sharing similar symptoms of COVID-19” began to be reported “in the communities near Fort Detrick.”



Earlier this month, China rejected a push by the WHO to continue its investigation into COVID-19’s origins at the Wuhan lab, citing their support for "scientific, not politicized" theories on the virus’s roots. On 12 August, the world health authority called on Beijing to share raw data on the earliest cases of Covid.

US President Joe Biden, who spent the 2020 campaign dismissing then-president Donald Trump’s claims on Covid’s Wuhan potential man-made origins, reversed course and ordered a probe into how the virus may have spread to humans in May, giving intelligence agencies until the end of August to put a report on his desk. Chinese media have accused Washington of using “second-hand, unreliable evidence to compile a report that tries to smear China,” while officials in Beijing continue to support the original WHO-China joint study, which concluded that a leak from the Wuhan lab was “highly unlikely”.

   

U.S. intelligence community says it cannot solve COVID mystery without China

By Eman Kamel and Hamad Mohammed
 August 27, 2021


The word "COVID-19" is reflected in a drop on a syringe needle in this illustration

By Trevor Hunnicutt

WASHINGTON (Reuters) -The U.S. intelligence community does not believe it can resolve a debate over whether a Chinese laboratory incident was the source of COVID-19 without more information, U.S. officials said in a declassified summary on Friday.

U.S. officials said only China can help solve questions about the true origins of the virus that has now killed https://graphics.reuters.com/world-coronavirus-tracker-and-maps 4.6 million people worldwide. “China’s cooperation most likely would be needed to reach a conclusive assessment of the origins of COVID-19,” they said.

President Joe Biden, who received a classified report earlier this week summarizing the investigation he had ordered, said Washington and its allies will continue to press the Chinese government for answers.

“Critical information about the origins of this pandemic exists in the People’s Republic of China, yet from the beginning, government officials in China have worked to prevent international investigators and members of the global public health community from accessing it,” Biden said in a statement after the summary was released.

The summary, released by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, was set to worsen discord between Beijing and Washington at a time when the countries’ ties are at their lowest point in decades. In the United States, activists worried the investigation could also encourage violence against Asian Americans.

Reuters earlier reported that administration officials did not expect the analysis to settle debate about the virus’ origin.

China has ridiculed a theory that COVID-19 escaped from the state virology lab in Wuhan and pushed fringe theories including that the virus slipped out of a lab in Fort Detrick, Maryland, in 2019.

The U.S. report revealed new detail about the extent of the disagreement within the Biden administration over the so-called lab leak theory.

Several organizations within the sprawling U.S. intelligence community thought the novel coronavirus emerged from “natural exposure to an animal infected with it or a close progenitor virus,” according to the summary.

But they had only “low confidence” in that conclusion, the summary said. Other groups were not able to come to any firm opinion at all on the origins.

One intelligence community segment, however, developed “moderate confidence” that the first human infection with COVID was likely due to a “laboratory-associated incident, probably involving experimentation, animal handling, or sampling by the Wuhan Institute of Virology” in China.

A team led by the World Health Organization (WHO) that spent four weeks in and around Wuhan in January and February dismissed that theory. But their March report https://www.who.int/health-topics/coronavirus/origins-of-the-virus, which was written jointly with Chinese scientists, has been faulted for using insufficient evidence to dismiss the theory.

The new U.S. report concluded that analysts would not be able to provide “a more definitive explanation” without new information from China, such as clinical samples and epidemiological data about the earliest cases.

Initially, U.S. spy agencies strongly favored the explanation that the virus originated in nature. But people familiar with intelligence reporting have said there has been little corroboration over recent months that the virus had spread widely and naturally among wild animals.

“While this review has concluded, our efforts to understand the origins of this pandemic will not rest,” Biden said. “We will do everything we can to trace the roots of this outbreak that has caused so much pain and death around the world, so that we can take every necessary precaution to prevent it from happening again.”

The World Health Organization’s director-general, Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, has said the group has not ruled out any hypothesis. The Geneva-based organization is set to impanel a new committee to develop next steps on studying the virus SARS-CoV-2.

But epidemiological experts said the window was closing for any useful data to be collected, particularly from people infected by the disease in 2019, when the virus likely first emerged.

(Reporting by Trevor Hunnicutt, Eric Beech and Tim Ahmann in WashingtonEditing by Daniel Wallis and Matthew Lewis)


ERDOGAN KILLS WOMEN KURD FIGHTERS
Turkey’s targeted killings signal new strategy against Syrian Kurdish forces

A series of Turkish drone strikes targeting senior Kurdish figures in northeast Syria appears to be the prelude of an attrition strategy to further restrict the main Syrian Kurdish group in the region and hamper its autonomy project.


Turkish soldiers stand guard atop an outpost as smoke billows from burning tires during a demonstration against Turkey's perceived inaction over the latest Syrian regime attacks, in the village of Balyun in the rebel-held southern countryside of Syria's northwestern province of Idlib on July 22, 2021. - OMAR HAJ KADOUR/AFP via Getty Images

Metin Gurcan
@Metin4020

August 27, 2021

Breaking a long lull in its military campaign against Kurdish forces in northeast Syria, Turkey has launched a series of drone strikes targeting high-profile members of the People’s Protection Units (YPG), apparently with quiet nods from Russia and the United States.


The YPG lost around two dozen members, including senior figures, in about 20 drone strikes that hit YPG targets last week, including vehicles carrying military commanders, meeting places and command centers.

The YPG forms the backbone of the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces, which controls much of northeast Syria, as part of a de facto autonomous administration along the border with Turkey. Ankara views both outfits as terrorist groups for their links with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which took up arms in southeast Turkey in 1984 and is designated as a terrorist organization by Ankara, Washington and much of the international community. Washington, however, makes a distinction between the PKK and the SDF, its chief local ally in Syria.

One of the strikes hit a YPG vehicle on the Qamishli-Amuda road Aug. 19, killing Salahuddin Shahabi, a senior field commander known also by his nom de guerre Renas Roj, a member of the YPG military council and their driver. It was the first Turkish attack against a YPG target since Operation Peace Spring in fall 2019, when Turkish forces and allied Syrian rebels wrestled control from the YPG in a border pocket between Ras al-Ain and Tell Abyad, including a section of the strategic M4 highway. According to Turkish news reports, the strike went ahead after Turkey’s intelligence service learned that Shahabi, the commander of the YPG’s Hasakah-Qamishli headquarters, had left Hasakah by car. A Turkish TB-2 Bayraktar drone hit the vehicle in the pre-dawn hours after it left residential areas, according to the reports.

A second strike followed later that day, targeting YPG headquarters in the town of Tal Tamer, north of Hasakah, where a high-level meeting was underway. The building was reportedly the venue of meetings between US generals and YPG commanders in the past. The attack claimed the lives of seven YPG commanders including Sosin Birhat from the Women’s Protection Units, the all-female branch of the YPG, and left nine people injured.

On Aug. 22, a drone attack destroyed a car in the village of Himo near Qamishli, killing a YPG commander and leaving three other people seriously injured, according to local sources. It came shortly after a drone hit a vehicle in the village of Qara Mazrah, southeast of Kobani. According to sources in Ankara, the vehicle belonged to a YPG commander who was killed in the strike.

Are the drone attacks the harbinger of a new Turkish strategy of a war of attrition? Is Turkey bent on expanding its long-running drone operations against PKK targets in northern Iraq to northern Syria? Are the strikes taking place with tacit US and Russian approval?

The existing diplomatic and operational outlook in the region, including the US-Russian relationship, precludes another large-scale Turkish ground operation. Thus, Turkey seems to be bracing for a protracted war of attrition to restrict the YPG’s mobility, weaken its command, control and communication capabilities and demoralize its fighters. Such a strategy would draw on drone strikes as well as the Turkish-made air-to-land SOM cruise missiles, which have a range of 200 kilometers and could be fired by Turkish warplanes and drones from the other side of the border without entering Syrian airspace. The strategy, it seems, will focus on targeted killings of YPG leaders, relying on human and signal intelligence to detect the whereabouts and activities of the targets. Unlike the US drone campaign in Syria, thanks to its geographical advantage Turkey can sustain a war of attrition with armed drones and cruise missiles for a long time.

Given their silence over the raids, Russia and the United States appear to have both preferred Turkey’s drone strikes as an alternative to a large-scale ground operation. Such a war of attrition would keep tensions in check to a certain extent, while at the same time meeting Turkey's need to weaken the YPG’s military capabilities. This seems to be the most reasonable option on which Turkey, the United States and Russia could compromise. Consequently, Turkey must have reached an understanding with Russia and the United States to use Syrian airspace to strike YPG targets, and perhaps the United States and Russia prefer to keep mum in return for gains elsewhere.

Russian air raids in the south of Idlib, the northwestern province held by Islamist militants, have increased simultaneously with the Turkish drone strikes, fueling suspicion of a potential Turkish-Russian deal, whereby Russia and the Syrian regime would take areas in Idlib in return for letting Turkey take areas in the northeast.

Washington has so far refrained from any public reproof or a clear stance on Turkey’s drone strikes, either because it is preoccupied with the chaos in Afghanistan or too pleased with Turkish cooperation in the evacuations from Kabul. Either way, Turkey appears to be looking for a free hand for airstrikes in both northeast Syria and northern Iraq in return for the support it has offered the United States in Afghanistan.


But could a war of attrition eradicate the threats that Ankara perceives from the YPG and its drive for an autonomous Kurdish region abutting Turkey’s own Kurdish-populated areas across the border? With a war of attrition, Turkey can certainly liquidate some senior YPG figures, weaken YPG’s military capabilities, restrict its mobility, disrupt its logistic routes and foment fear and demoralization in YPG ranks, but it can hardly undo the YPG’s political progress and de-territorialize its political vision. Moreover, attacks on the YPG cannot destroy the popular base the group enjoys in northeast Syria and might even backfire in this respect, especially in the event of civilian casualties.

That said, de-territorializing the YPG remains Ankara’s ultimate military objective in northern Syria, meaning that it will continue to look for an opportunity to launch another large-scale ground operation to seize territory from the YPG. Such a campaign would require the acquiescence of the United States and Russia, including a green light for Turkey’s use of Syrian airspace. Judging by the existing diplomatic climate and the operational outlook on the ground, neither the United States nor Russia are likely to agree to such a Turkish move, at least in the short term of six to eight months. Turkey’s targeted killings of high-profile YPG figures, meanwhile, will almost certainly continue.


Read more: https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/08/turkeys-targeted-killings-signal-new-strategy-against-syrian-kurdish-forces#ixzz74oHaMqmQ
Controversial cleric’s ‘modesty call’ to Turkish volleyball team bounces back at him

Following a victory by the Turkish women's volleyball team over China at the Tokyo Olympics, the all-too-familiar debate on women’s decency and clothes raised its head when a cleric urged the players to observe modesty in dress and behavior.

Turkey's women's volleyball team celebrates after defeating China in a Women's Pool B match at the Tokyo 2020 Olympic Games at Ariake Arena on July 25, 2021, in Tokyo. - Toru Hanai/Getty Images

Nazlan Ertan
@NazlanEr
July 27, 2021

The 3-0 victory over China by Turkey's “Sultans of the Net,” the national women’s volleyball team, on July 25 at the Tokyo Olympics lifted national spirits and gave Turks a much-awaited victory on the international sports scene after a series of disappointments in soccer, the country’s most popular sport.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan called the team captain, Eda Erdem Dundar, to congratulate her and the team and promised to watch their next match, against Italy, which is ranked among the best globally. The Sultans lost 3-1. All eyes are now on their next game — against the United States — scheduled to take place July 29.

Amid the jubilation, however, an all-too-familiar debate on women’s decency and clothes raised its head when arch-conservative theologian Ihsan Senocak urged the volleyballers to observe modesty in dress and behavior.

“Daughter of Islam! You are the sultan of faith, chastity, morality and modesty .. not of sports fields,” he tweeted. “You are the child of mothers who refrain from showing their nose [out of modesty]. Don’t be … the victim of popular culture. You are our hope and our prayer.”

His tweet went viral immediately, with 47,000 likes and just as many protesting his words for bigotry and misogyny. Some blamed Senocak's words for the Sultans' defeat by Italy, saying they had been demoralized.

Senocak, a media-savvy figure with over 926,000 followers on Twitter, is no stranger to controversy with his fiery advocacy of a conservative lifestyle. In 2017, he criticized fathers who allowed their daughters to go to the university in “tight jeans” and “with plucked eyebrows” and said they were doomed. “Doesn’t your heart burn when you see your daughter, entrusted to you by God, like that? If it does not, you are destined for hell,” he had said.

The remark brought him a three-month suspension from Turkey’s General Directorate of Religious Affairs, known as Diyanet. He was restored to duty in early 2018, though he was given a peripheral post as “education expert” in the Black Sea city of Sinop.

Diyanet and its powerful leader, Ali Erbas, carefully refrained from comment on Senocak's remarks, but support for him came from Mehmet Boynukalin, the former imam of Hagia Sophia. “The hijab is the command of Allah; the dignity of Muslim women and the symbol of Islam. In many places like Maras [the southeastern city occupied by France at the end of the First World War], our War of Independence started because of the attack on the veil. Those who remind us of Allah's command and Ihsan Senocak are not alone,” he tweeted under the viral hashtag #IhsanSenocakisnotalone.


Pro-secular Twitter users shot back with a photo of Dundar taken during the game by photojournalist Mert Bulent Ucma, showing the team captain raising a determined index finger to an opponent.

Faced with a barrage of reactions, Senocak sought to explain himself both via Twitter and on TV, saying his intention was to “recall that the winning team was a team of Muslim women” and a reminder of what women “should and should not be in Islam.”

“What I have said is nothing new or out of line,” he told journalist Cuneyt Ozdemir. “I have even written a book titled ‘To the Daughter of Islam.' ... I am simply saying that they should practice sports but dress according to Islamic code of dress. … I have nothing against women playing volleyball or practicing sports.”

Attacks, verbal or physical, on women wearing shorts are growing common in Turkey. In 2016, a young Turkish woman, Aysegul Terzi, was attacked by a man on an Istanbul public bus for wearing shorts. Conservative pundits periodically criticize sportswomen for wearing body-revealing clothes; conservative papers such as Yeni Akit use photos that obscure sportswomen’s legs, prompting mirth in the pro-secular media.

But verbal attacks against women’s clothes do backfire. Last year, Birol Sahin, the mayor of the Black Sea town of Kaynasli from the far-right Nationalist Movement Party, faced disciplinary action when he referred to the Sultans as “exhibitionists” for wearing shorts. “Islam allows women to practice sports among each other … not while wearing scanty costumes in front of men,” he said when the team beat Germany last year to pave their way to the Tokyo Olympics. The party’s chairman, Devlet Bahceli, who had congratulated the team the day before, asked for Sahin’s resignation from the party.

“Volleyball is traditionally one of the fields where women excel ever since the 1970s,” Ahu Ozyurt, the editor-in-chief of WomenTV.com, told Al-Monitor. “Today, there are many good teams sponsored by giant corporations, from [pharmaceutical company] Eczacibasi to [state-owned bank] Vakifbank.”

In the last two years, Vakifbank in particular has been combing Anatolia to recruit talent. Giovanni Guidetti, who is the chief coach of both the National Women’s Volleyball Team and the Vakifbank team, heads the “Sultans of Tomorrow” platform that aims to empower girls in socioeconomically disadvantaged regions of Turkey through sports and to remove obstacles to their becoming professional athletes. Guidetti and his volleyball player wife, Pinar Toksoy, were named advocates for gender equality of the United Nations Development Program in Turkey in June 2020.

“Volleyball is more of a sport for urban women,” said Ozyurt. “But in Anatolia, there is another trend among girls. Girls from modest families start taking lessons in martial sports, sometimes given by some of the municipalities. For many, it is their ticket to travel, a scholarship, to friends and freedom.”
Russia tries to compete with US in Mideast weapons market

Russia's prospects in the Middle East arms market will depend on its ability to master fast production of the latest models of military equipment.


A prototype of Russia's new Sukhoi Checkmate Fighter is on display during the presentation at the MAKS 2021 International Aviation and Space Salon, in Zhukovsky, outside Moscow, Russia, July 20, 2021. - Dimitar Dilkoff/AFP via Getty Images

Kirill Semenov
@IbnRasibi
TOPICS COVERED
Military Industry
August 2, 2021


The MAKS-2021 International Aviation and Space Salon, held in the Russian city of Zhukovsky just outside Moscow, concluded July 25 with over $3.5 billion in contracts awarded to attendees. Modern samples of Russian military equipment were presented throughout the six days of the show, including combat aircraft, helicopters, drones and anti-aircraft missile systems. The greatest interest was aroused by the demo model of the newest Russian tactical fighter, the Sukhoi LTS, which has already received the unofficial nickname of “Su-75 Checkmate.” Russia has especially emphasized that the countries of the Middle East could become its potential buyers. In terms of its characteristics and dimensions, Moscow is marketing the fighter as a close analogue of the American F-35.

While the list of states with which military weapons contracts were concluded has not been disclosed, it was announced that Russia reached preliminary agreements with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) for the supply of civilian helicopters.

Although the first recipient of the Sukhoi LTS fighters will be the Russian Ministry of Defense, there is indication that there are plans for a focus on export. It has already been reported that deliveries of the fighter abroad could begin in about 5½ years. The point price of a new fighter for a foreign customer will be about $30 million, excluding any additional costs. Yet the contract price of the aircraft may turn out to be significantly higher, in the range of $55 to $70 million. This fighter will be able to compete in price not only with the much more expensive fifth-generation aircraft of the F-35 type, but also with the remaining so-called “generation 4+” fighters of the F-type, including the latest F-16.

The Su-75 may indeed garner interest in the Middle East, where many states are in need of modern 5th generation fighters. The states that produce such jets, primarily the United States and China, are extremely reluctant to export them. Therefore, for the time being, most countries in the region with the appropriate financial capabilities are forced to be content with aircraft of the 4+ generation. The only exception is Israel, which has received F-35s. While a deal to sell F-35s to the UAE was announced in the final days of the Trump administration, it has faced difficulties and no date has been set for delivery.

The absence of a Russian-made new 5th generation fighter — ready for full-scale production and export — reduces Moscow's ability to gain a foothold in the arms markets and those Middle Eastern countries where Russia has already been able to supply certain samples of its modern weapons. The sale of S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems to Turkey was an absolute success of Russia. This has already caused controversy between Ankara and Washington, and led to the United States expelling Turkey from the F-35 program. However, Russia was unable to take full advantage of this development, since it could not offer Turkey an alternative to this American fighter jet.

The Russian fifth-generation aircraft Su-57 is still far from the start of mass production. The jet is still produced in individual copies, a time-consuming process that is unlikely to be able to satisfy the needs of the Russian Aerospace Forces themselves in the near future. The aircraft has not been accepted into service in the Russian military. Moreover, it is prohibitively expensive. In this situation, there are hardly any buyers who would want to get a combat aircraft that is not used by the manufacturing country itself. However, if the Su-57 were launched into mass production, it cannot be ruled out that Ankara could purchase a small batch of these aircraft in order to put additional pressure on Washington to lift the blockage of F-35 sales to Turkey.

In addition to the United States, Russia is also competing with China, which is ahead of Russia in the development and production of fifth-generation aircraft and may bring its jets to the Middle East arms market earlier than Russian ones. We are talking about the heavy Chinese fighter Chengdu J-20, which is used by the Chinese military but will not be exported until the needs of the Chinese armed forces are met. Also in China, a lighter 5th generation fighter — Shenyang FC-31 — has been developed and, unlike the Russian Su-75, it has already passed several stages of flight tests.

Russia's difficulty in accessing the arms markets of the rich Middle Eastern states, primarily the Persian Gulf countries, is explained by the absence of mass production of any modern types of weapons that go beyond modernized Soviet models.

In the 1990s, Russia had strong military-technical ties with the states of the Persian Gulf, since at that time it possessed types of weapons that were modern for this period, created in the last years of the USSR, which were of interest to the Arab monarchies. It was then that Russia was able to deliver large batches of BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles, Smerch and Uragan MLRS, Pantsir air defense missile systems and other weapons systems to the UAE and Kuwait. However, in Russia itself the creation and design of new types of weapons ceased until the 2000s.

Thus, Russia will likely return to the arms market of the Gulf states only after new types of weapons enter full-scale mass production in Russia itself. In addition to the above-mentioned Su-57 and Su-75 combat jets, this applies to the T-14 Armata tank, the T-15 and Kurganets infantry fighting vehicles, the Boomerang wheeled combat armored vehicles, the coalition artillery systems, among others. Although these weapons have been shown at parades and exhibitions for many years and Moscow has announced the start of their serial production, in fact they have not yet been made in any noticeable volume and are still a rather experimental series. It is premature to talk about the start of their export.

Also, the statements by various Russian representatives claiming that modern types of Russian-made weapons were successfully tested in Syria, which will now find their buyer, are also far from reality. Russia failed to use its military operation in Syria to promote its own weapons for export to the countries of the Middle East.

In the Syrian campaign, Russia used mainly equipment based on Soviet developments. So the newest attack aircraft Su-34, which Russia used in Syria, is a modernization of the Su-27 fighter and began to be designed back in the USSR, as an analogue of the American F-15E aircraft with similar characteristics. At the same time, the F-15E has been in service with many states for more than 30 years and has significantly more experience in various conflicts than the Su-34. It thus has no export prospects in the Middle East, despite unverified rumors about Algeria's interest in this aircraft.

Recent large-scale deliveries of Russian weapons to Egypt also did not result from high assessments of their use during the Syrian campaign. The contracts through which Cairo began to buy large consignments of weapons from Moscow were signed in 2014, even before the start of the Syrian operation by the Russian armed forces. Such an arms deal was the result of a change of power in Egypt, when the government of President Abdel Fatah al-Sisi decided to diversify its military ties due to fears of a decrease in the volume of military cooperation with the United States and European countries, after a military takeover in Egypt in 2013. This allowed Moscow to significantly increase its arms exports by supplying Egypt with MiG-29 and Su-35 fighters, Ka-52 attack helicopters, S-300 anti-aircraft missile systems, T-90 tanks, and so on. At the same time, Russian military equipment was purchased by Egypt in parallel with Western equipment.

In addition to Egypt, Algeria is a major importer of Russian military equipment in the Middle East. In particular, in 2019 at the MAKS-2019 exhibition, Algeria signed a contract for the purchase of 16 Su-30MKI (A) fighters and 14 MiG-29M / M2 fighters from Russia. These aircraft supplemented the country's fleet, which already had these types of fighters. In addition, Terminator tank support combat vehicles, T-90 tanks and other equipment were supplied to Algeria.

Among the operators of Russian military equipment, Iraq should also be noted, which, after being subjected to aggression by the Islamic State, has noticeably intensified its military-technical cooperation with Russia. Since 2014, Moscow has supplied Baghdad with Su-25 attack aircraft, Mi-28NE attack helicopters, T-90 tanks and BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles.

At the same time, it is too early to talk about the resumption of Russian arms exports to Iran. Tehran needs modern offensive models such as Su-30 fighters, but Moscow would not want to spoil relations with the Gulf countries and Israel and will probably refrain from supplying Iran with such equipment.

Thus, on the whole, Russia's prospects in the Middle East arms market will depend on the ability of the Russian military industry to master the production of the latest models of military equipment and begin delivering it to the Russian armed forces. Only then will export orders for this equipment be possible. At the same time, as in the case of Egypt or Algeria, there is still the possibility of supplying older types of weapons for those states that will try to diversify their ties in the field of military-technical cooperation.


Why a Turkish dictator let himself lose an election

Turkey's second president Ismet Inonu surprised the world by stepping down in 1950. Could Erdogan do the same after the 2023 elections?


Ismet Inonu at the Republican People's Party congress in the late 1930s. - Wikicommons

Nicholas Danforth
@NicholasDanfort
August 6, 2021

Would President Recep Tayyip Erdogan actually allow himself to lose an election? And could pressure from Turkey’s Western allies help ensure that he does? These are two of the most pressing questions confronting Turkish political commentators in the years leading up to Turkey’s 2023 presidential elections. They also mirror the still unanswered questions surrounding the origins of Turkish democracy 71 years ago. Looking back on this history doesn’t offer any certain predictions about the future, but it can help better frame the stark challenge Turkey is facing today.

In 1950, just a decade or so after he inherited uncontested authoritarian rule from Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, Turkish President Ismet Inonu beat back opposition within his own government to hold free, multiparty elections. He expected to win. When he didn’t, he dismissed offers from his security services to reverse the result and simply stepped down. In the immediate aftermath of World War II, with fascist dictatorships ruling the Iberian Peninsula and Communist dictatorships ruling Eastern Europe, this act of liberal statesmanship appeared truly remarkable. Indeed, it may have appeared all the more remarkable to those who had experienced the brutality of Inonu’s policies — whether Kurdish villagers who lived through the 1938 Dersim massacre or Istanbul Christians who had been exiled after failing to pay a confiscatory wealth tax in 1942.

Erdogan has always been unrelenting in his criticism of Inonu, calling him both a drunk and a fascist, and drawing attention to the undeniable Hitler mustache he wore for a number of years. For Erdogan, Inonu represents the worst of the Kemalist regime — all its authoritarianism and secularism without the heroic and patriotic aura of Mustafa Kemal himself. Moreover, the personal contrast between the two men is striking. Erdogan is tall, charismatic and proudly provincial; Inonu was short, hard of hearing and seen by many of his European peers as a savvy and sophisticated statesman.

Inonu came to power as a dictator and left as a Democrat. After coming to power as a Democrat, Erdogan is now on the reverse trajectory. The next few years will determine whether Erdogan will ultimately display the best or the worst qualities of the man he hates.

Washington to the rescue?

Neither liberal academics nor Erdogan supporters credit the US government with a great deal of sincerity when it comes to supporting democracy in the Middle East. So it is surprising that so many members of both groups largely agree US pressure was a central factor in Turkey’s democratization. This shared assumption, which can be traced all the way back to the 1950s, reflects widespread amazement at the dramatic and otherwise inexplicable transformation that occurred in Turkey at the outset of the Cold War. It is also a tribute to the enduring hostility Erdogan and many of his followers feel toward Inonu that they are willing to give Washington the benefit of the doubt in order to deny him credit for his most principled achievement.

Turkey’s democratic transition occurred at the outset of its alliance with the United States, at a moment when Ankara was desperately trying to secure membership in NATO as a guarantee against the Soviet Union. Democracy was central to US rhetoric during this period and “free institutions” were specifically cited in Article 2 of NATO. In this idealistic context, seeing a causal relationship between US values and Inonu’s actions made sense. Moreover, Washington was perfectly happy to take its share of the credit. Turkey’s Democratic Party, which came to power in 1950, was also happy to perpetuate the idea that it enjoyed the support of the country’s new superpower ally.

And yet, the closer you look, the harder it is to believe that the United States really deserves credit for Turkey’s turn toward democracy. Declassified State Department records from the period provide little evidence of US policymakers pressuring Ankara to democratize, and ample circumstantial evidence suggesting that Inonu knew he could have had both one-man rule and US support if he had wanted. Which in turn raises the more elusive, and perhaps unanswerable question, of why he ultimately made the decision that put Turkey on its real if tortuous path to democracy.

“A strongman of the right sort”

In 1947, President Harry S. Truman called on Congress to provide aid to Turkey and Greece in order to help both countries resist the threat of Soviet expansion. In his speech, which became the basis of the Truman Doctrine, he described Greece, with several caveats, as an imperfect democracy. Turkey, by contrast, was “an independent and economically sound state” whose future was “important to the freedom-loving peoples of the world.”

Indeed, at the end of World War II, the reigning US attitude toward Inonu was perhaps best characterized by the description of Ataturk in a contemporary guide for US soldiers: “Many accused him of being a dictator. If so, he was a strong man of the right sort.” When the US-Turkish relationship began, this was the status quo US officials assumed would continue indefinitely, and they did not seem unduly perturbed by it. Moreover, when Portugal, under the Salazar dictatorship, became a founding member of NATO in 1948, Inonu had every reason to believe his government was democratic enough for the Western alliance as well.

But even assuming Inonu would have been susceptible to US pressure, Washington never gave him a chance to feel it. Finding evidence of absence is difficult, but US State Department records from 1945 to 1950 have not, so far, divulged any examples of US officials actually trying to convince their Turkish counterparts that free or fair elections were necessary to secure American backing. To the contrary, on one of the few occasions the subject came up, officials of the Republican People's Party (CHP) appeared remarkably confident in their position.

In December 1948, a member of the US military mission discussed with Naci Perkel, head of the Turkish National Security Service, rumors that the United States had abandoned Chiang Kai-shek because of his undemocratic behavior. The American colonel drew Perkel’s attention to “remarks by some of the Turkish opposition members that the United States would realize that Turkey is also not democratic and would take similar action here to withdraw US aid.”

“Naci’s response,” the colonel reported, “was to laugh and say that since aid is still coming in, the US evidently is convinced that Turkey is democratic.” Perkel then went on to explain that “Turkey could not be democratic until the level of education is much higher, and such a condition is many, many years away.”

When Turkey’s parliamentary elections were scheduled for May 1950, State Department officials and CIA analysts largely expected Inonu to once again use ballot rigging and intimidation at the polls to achieve victory. Tellingly, in private conversations with Inonu about US-Turkish cooperation in the months before the elections, US participants made it clear they expected relations to continue apace.

Nine foxes, no clear answers

So if America did not force Inonu’s hand, what prompted him to take a step that countless dictators have promised but all too few have actually followed through with? And can this tell us anything about the prospects for democratic change in Turkey today?

Ismet Inonu was described as a man with “nine foxes running about inside his head” whose “tails did not even touch.” Perhaps to truly understand his motives it would have been necessary to ask the foxes. But a few observations seem relevant.

As an individual, Inonu earned a reputation for embracing the Kemalist project with greater personal sincerity than many of his fellow revolutionaries. One story involves him listening to classical music records in his tent while on a campaign in order to teach himself to enjoy them. Another involves Ataturk’s companions, who continued to use the Ottoman script in private after the 1928 alphabet reform, hiding their handwritten notes in embarrassment on hearing Inonu approaching. It is possible that, at a personal level, he also took Kemalist rhetoric about democracy more seriously, and was more prepared to make real sacrifices in service of it.

More importantly, Turkey’s democratic change was also facilitated by the considerable political and ideological continuity it belied. Celal Bayar, who replaced Inonu as president, had also served, like Inonu, as Ataturk’s prime minister. (Democratic Party newspapers were happy to remind readers of this by printing pictures of Ataturk and Bayar together on every appropriate occasion.) Adnan Menderes, like the other founders of the Democratic Party, had been a parliamentarian in Inonu’s government during the '40s.

Famously, before giving Bayar and Menderes permission to create a new party, Inonu asked for assurances that they would continue to support his government’s anti-Soviet foreign policy and defend the principle of secularism. And — as minority voters who supported the Democrats seeking respite from the CHP’s heavy-handed nationalism soon discovered — the new government proved eager to preserve some of the most problematic aspects of Kemalist nationalism as well.

Certainly, it must have been easier for Inonu to hand power to a government made up of men who broadly shared his vision for the country and who had served by his side in both war and peace. But again, these factors have seldom been enough to convince other dictators they can comfortably surrender control.

Years later, Inonu was asked by an American social scientist whether he had held elections in response to US pressure. He responded to the effect that, regardless of the reason, it had nevertheless been the right decision. Looking back today, this may be the best verdict possible.

What now?

Could the same thing happen today? The circumstances in Turkey in 2021 are so different as to make comparisons difficult. On the positive side, Erdogan, despite his best efforts, does not enjoy the same degree of consolidated authoritarian power Inonu did. Seven decades of competitive elections have also created powerful public expectations, which even previous military juntas ultimately deferred to. As a result, the choice of whether to honor election results may not be entirely Erdogan’s own, as it was for Inonu.

If it is, though, neither the similarities nor differences with 1950 are particularly encouraging. The United States remains rhetorically committed to democracy. But the limits of this rhetoric were already apparent in the 1950s, and decades of US support for Middle Eastern dictatorships now make it all the more difficult for any leader to believe free elections are a requirement for good ties with Washington. Like Inonu, Erdogan clearly shares a broadly nationalist worldview with many of his political opponents. But his unrelenting efforts to demonize them as traitors and enemies of the nation mean that this is unlikely to play the same positive role that it did during the early Cold War.

In 1950, a man with well-honed authoritarian instincts displayed an unexpected and historically exceptional commitment to democracy. Despite the relatively conducive domestic and international circumstances of the time, this was impossible to predict and remains hard to explain even now. It can only be hoped, in the absence of any compelling historical grounds for optimism, that the man running Turkey today might behave in an equally unexpected way.


As Syria’s foreign jihadis eye Afghanistan, new challenges arise for Moscow

The potential that foreign fighters may move from Syria’s Idlib province to Afghanistan could pose major threats to Russia and its Central Asian allies.


A van belonging to members of Syria's top jihadi group, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), led by al-Qaeda's former Syria affiliate drives with a banner congratulating the Taliban on their takeover of Afghanistan during a parade through the rebel-held northwestern city of Idlib on Aug. 20, 2021.
- OMAR HAJ KADOUR/AFP via Getty Images

Kirill Semenov
@IbnRasibi
August 27, 2021

The situation in Afghanistan's capital, Kabul, escalated sharply Thursday after a suicide attack by militants from the local affiliate of the Islamic State killed over 100 Afghan civilians and 13 US troops at a gate to Hamid Karzai International Airport.

US Central Command head Gen. Kenneth "Frank" McKenzie said American military leadership is in a state of readiness for new attacks in Kabul by the Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K) terrorist group. “We’re prepared to continue the mission,” he told reporters at a briefing Thursday. According to him, the United States has shared limited intelligence with the Taliban — who are guarding the airport — about threat assessments and preparations by IS to commit terrorist attacks. “We believe attacks have been thwarted by [the Taliban],” he added.

These attacks demonstrated that after the United States and its allies ceased their anti-terrorist activities in the country due to the rapid advance of the Taliban and their capture of the capital, the security situation began to deteriorate sharply.

The situation also poses new challenges for Russia and its Central Asian allies such as Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. While the Americans were present in Afghanistan, they could provide counterterrorism measures that benefitted Afghanistan’s Central Asian neighbors. But after the arrival of the Taliban, a security vacuum may emerge, and the Taliban may face serious difficulties in solving this problem. After the Americans left, Russia hoped that the Taliban would be able to take control of the security situation and destroy terrorist cells in Afghanistan, something Taliban representatives had repeatedly assured the Russians they could do.

However, it should be borne in mind that the main reason for the rapid advance of Taliban forces was not so much the group’s military power as it was the collapse of the government in Kabul, which was unable to fight without external support. Such a quick establishment of power by the Taliban suggests that the group was able to easily take full control of all areas from which government troops fled practically without a fight, and where fighters from other radical groups — including the Islamic State — could now find refuge.

Thus, it remains possible that Afghanistan will once again become a base for international Salafi jihadism. And the reason for this may be not only "gaps" in the activities of the Taliban to exert their power, but also the purposeful position of some groups within the Taliban that have their own views different from the leadership of the movement. For example, this concerns the Taliban’s so-called Peshawar shura, or council, which became a cover for the activities of the shadowy Haqqani Network. The latter is the subgroup of the Taliban most ideologically close to al-Qaeda and has used suicide bombers to attack civilian targets.

Despite statements by the Taliban that Afghanistan will no longer serve as a base for the activities of terrorist groups that threaten other states from its territory, in addition to the Islamic State there are still al-Qaeda militants who may try to start taking advantage of the security vacuum. These could be, for example, international jihadis remaining in the Taliban structures from the so-called 055 Brigade, an organization entirely composed of al-Qaeda militants who committed numerous crimes against peaceful Afghans. The brigade was integrated into the Taliban army between 1995 and 2001.

Anton Mardasov, a nonresident scholar in the Middle East Institute's Syria Program, told Al-Monitor that over the past years the Taliban have actively been in contact with the core of al-Qaeda as well as its rather autonomous branch al-Qaeda on the Indian Subcontinent. According to Mardasov, members of al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent are present in 13 provinces of the country, including Helmand and Kandahar. Al-Qaeda, he noted, has also strengthened its presence in Badakhshan, a province in the east of the country that borders Tajikistan. There are other areas of al-Qaeda presence, including Barmal County in the eastern Afghan province of Paktika where the Haqqani Network dominates, and more generally on the Afghan-Pakistani border where al-Qaeda operates in close cooperation with the Haqqani Network with the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba.

There is also the potential for Afghanistan to see the arrival of radical groups from Syria’s Idlib province. Recently Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the terror group that controls Idlib, began to pursue a policy aimed at eradicating non-Syrian jihadis from its territory. In this regard, it is highly probable that under pressure from HTS, a number of such groups may move to Afghanistan. This could happen both with the approval of some structures within the Taliban and in spite of them.

Such factions capable of transit from Syria to Afghanistan may include, for example, Katibat al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad (not to be confused with the Iraqi group of the same name), consisting of fighters from the Central Asian republics, primarily Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, many of whom came from Russia where they were looking for work. Abu Salah al-Uzbeki (Sirojiddin Mukhtarov), the leader of this group, was arrested by HTS’s security services back in June. Another Uzbek radical Islamist, Abu Rofik al-Tartarstani (Sukhrob Baltabaev), was killed in action by HTS militants.

Thus, the activities of the remaining radicals from Katibat al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad in Idlib are threatened and they could try to infiltrate the territory of Afghanistan.

Imam Bukhari Jamaat is a fairly large Uzbek group fighting in Idlib. Although at the moment the group has no conflict with HTS, nevertheless — based on HTS leader Abu Muhammad al-Jolani’s conviction of the need to "cleanse" the region from non-Syrian factions — it is another candidate for transfer to Afghanistan.

In addition, the local branch of the Uyghur Islamic Party of Turkestan, whose cells are also located in Afghanistan, remains active in Idlib. It is possible that under pressure from the HTS, this group may also move to the Afghan regions. The same applies to the Caucasian jihadist groups — Junud al-Sham and Ajnad al-Kavkaz. In particular, Junud al-Sham has already been disbanded by the HTS, and its militants are looking for opportunities to continue their activities directed primarily against Russia in other countries.

Of course, much will depend on Turkey's position on this issue and its readiness to provide a corridor for the transfer of foreign fighters from Syria to Afghanistan. Considering the current level of relations between Ankara and Moscow on the one hand and the Central Asian republics on the other, it’s unlikely Turkey will provide assistance to these groups. But their presence in Idlib and the potential for them to move to the Turkish-controlled zones in Syria also threatens Ankara’s security interests.

The areas where militants from Idlib could potentially move are the Afghan provinces of Badakhshan, Kunar and Nuristan. These regions became known as the Afghan Waziristan and were not completely controlled by either the former Afghan authorities or the Taliban. This is where branches of various radical Salafi groups have found their refuge.

For example, in Badakhshan, fragments of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) are still operating — namely, the part of them that refused to be part of the local branch of IS-K. The latter also retains its presence there.

The Tajik radical group Jamaat Ansarullah, which split from the IMU and has carried out terrorist attacks in Tajikistan, is also operating in this region. There are allegations that Ansarullah is closely cooperating with the Taliban, and that it was even given the task of securing part of the Afghan-Tajik border. The Taliban denies these accusations.

In addition, these regions are a refuge for local Salafis with whom the Taliban have quite serious ideological contradictions (the Taliban are Hanafis from the Deobandi school). But it was in the regions of Kunar and Nuristan that the Taliban were forced to allow the activities of Afghan Salafis, some of whom operate under the flags of the Taliban but at the same time have their own goals and objectives. Others, meanwhile, create independent Salafi groups not controlled by the Taliban.

Thus, the rise to power of the Taliban leaves more questions not only concerning the plans of the group itself but also its ability to solve tasks entrusted to it by states working to develop ties and contacts with this movement.