Monday, June 27, 2022

Is universal basic income part of a just transition?

When you give everyone a chunk of change, does it really change their lives and their communities?


SOURCEForeign Policy in Focus

In the remote rural village of Dauphin, in the Canadian province of Manitoba, economists tried out an unusual experiment. In the 1970s, they persuaded the provincial government to give cash payments to poorer families to see if a guaranteed basic income could improve their outcomes. During the years of this “Mincome” experiment, families received a basic income of 16,000 Canadian dollars (or a top up to that amount). With 10,000 inhabitants, Dauphin was just big enough to be a good data set but not too big as to bankrupt the government.

The results were startling, including a significant drop in hospitalizations and an improvement in high school graduation rates. After four years, however, money for the experiment dried up, and this early example of universal basic income (UBI) was nearly forgotten.

Today, such UBI projects have become more commonplace. In the U.S. presidential race in 2020, Andrew Yang made his “freedom dividend” of $1,000 a month a centerpiece of his political campaign. Several pilot projects are up and running in California. In fact, at least 28 U.S. cities currently give out no-strings-attached cash on a regular basis (since the recipients are all low-income, these programs aren’t technically “universal”). In other countries, too, basic income projects have become more popular, including a new citizen’s basic income project in the Brazilian city of Maricá. Basic income programs were in place, briefly, in both Mongolia and Iran. Civil society organizations like the Latin American Network for Basic Income have pushed for change from below.

Unlike the mid-1970s, universal basic income must contend with two sets of factors: the weight of old but institutionalized social welfare systems and the demands of new priorities, particularly environmental ones.

“The old welfare systems are based on sustained economic development, on economic growth that creates jobs and fiscal resources,” points out economist Ruben Lo Vuolo, a member of the Centro Interdisciplinario de Estudios de Políticas Públicas in Argentina, at a recent discussion of UBI sponsored by the Ecosocial Pact of the South and Global Just Transition. “They are structured based on the fact that people will have jobs and contribute over the course of their lifetimes and the state will have fiscal resources to cover them. But now the state says that it can’t keep growing and can’t generate jobs as it did before. We’re seeing less growth than in 1950s or 1970s but more inequality and more carbon emissions. So, the basis of the social-welfare system has been seriously questioned by climate change.”

This conflict between the logic of the social-welfare state and the imperative to reduce resource use means that “we have to stop thinking about a state that can repair damages and start thinking about one that prevents damages: a state that’s not so concerned about economic growth and then redistribution but redistribution itself,” Lo Vuolo continues. The social welfare state provides compensation to those who have lost their jobs, experienced a health emergency, or needed extra provisions to feed the family. Instead, a new eco-social state should be thinking of ways to prevent those negative outcomes in the first place.

Key to this challenge of redistribution, of course, is the question of mechanism. Does the state rely on the market to meet basic needs or on other methods of assessing and then fulfilling those needs? One of the chief defects of the market is its focus on short-term outcomes. “With an economy based on market preferences, it is impossible to generate an intergenerational pact that takes on climate change,” Lo Vuolo adds. “If we continue on this path, future generations won’t have a healthy environment.”

One of the chief preoccupations of a social-welfare state is to make sure that those who have sufficient resources don’t receive assistance. This has led to often complex systems of “means testing.”

Universal basic income strategies, Lo Vuolo points out, flip this approach on its head. Instead of focusing so many human resources on ensuring that the well-off do not receive benefits, the universal character of UBI guarantees that no one who needs help is left out. A progressive tax policy, meanwhile, targets sectors where wealth is concentrated to address questions of “unfair distribution” as well as to finance the universal benefits. Such a “sustainable distribution” system has the additional benefit of suppressing consumption among the wealthy even as it boosts consumption among the most vulnerable sectors.

A UBI strategy can’t work, however, if individuals have to pay for public goods like education and transportation. The reduction of a country’s carbon footprint, meanwhile, requires not only robust public systems at the national level but institutions at the global level that coordinate mitigation. However, the track record so far of compliance with global pacts to reduce carbon emissions has been dismal.

The Stockton example

Stockton is a mid-sized city in California with a population of over 300,000 people. It is located about 85 miles east of San Francisco in the agriculture-rich Central Valley. In 2012, it also declared bankruptcy, the largest U.S. city to do so at the time. In response, the municipal government slashed public services. Unemployment spiked, and the lack of affordable housing led to a sharp increase in homelessness. One in four citizens lived below the poverty line.

In 2017, Stockton chose to participate in an experiment very similar to the one that took place in Dauphin in the 1970s. The Stockton Economic Empowerment Demonstration (SEED), as its name suggests, emphasizes the choices people make and the agency they exercise in making those choices. To qualify to participate in SEED, you had to be a Stockton resident in a neighborhood that was at or below the city’s median income of about $46,000. Participants were selected randomly. One hundred and twenty-five people were given $500 a month for two years. The other participants in the program, by receiving nothing, constituted a control group.

To determine the efficacy of the experiment, researchers asked three questions: how did the additional payment affect monthly income volatility, how did that volatility influence wellbeing, and how did guaranteed income improve participants’ ability to control their future?

As SEED’s Research and Program Officer Erin Coltrera explains, the group that received the universal income had considerably less income volatility. “There is an oft-cited statistic that nearly half of US citizens would choose not to pay a $400 emergency expense with cash or cash equivalent,” she reports. “They might use debt instead. But this has long-term implications because it means that a $400 emergency will cost more over time.” With the additional $500 a month, SEED participants were more likely to be able to handle an emergency with cash.

As in Dauphin, the Stockton experiment demonstrated clear improvements in mental health. Coltrera quotes one participant: “I had panic attacks and anxiety. I had to take a pill for it. I haven’t taken that in a while. I used to have to carry pills with me all the time.”

The basic income made a particular difference for women performing unpaid care work. “The SEED money allowed them to prioritize themselves in ways they’d ignored, for instance to catch up on their medical care or to center themselves in their own narrative,” Coltrera explains.

One criticism of basic income payments is that they discourage recipients from seeking employment. The SEED project demonstrated the opposite. At the beginning of the experiment, only 28 percent of recipients had fulltime employment. One year later, that number had grown to 40 percent.

“Recipients were able to leverage the payment to improve their employment prospects,” Coltrera says. “The $500 allowed participants to reduce part-time work to finish training or coursework that then led to fulltime employment.” One recipient, for instance, had been eligible for a real estate license for a year but hadn’t been able to take the time off to complete the license. The $500 allowed the person to take the time off and complete their license, opening up employment and other economic opportunities.

The money also provided people with more choice. They could choose to stop living with family, for instance, which meant freeing up time previously spent on unpaid care work. “Once basic needs are met,” Coltrera explains, “people could describe small and meaningful pathways to authentic trust, choice, and a sense of safety.”

Critiques of UBI

One of the major criticisms of universal basic income is that it encourages “parasitism.” If people receive money with no strings attached, they will become dependent on these handouts and stop working. “There is this logic that if you’re not receiving remuneration for some activity, then you’re not doing anything,” reports Ailynn Torres, a Cuban researcher with the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation based in Ecuador. As the Stockton case demonstrates, however, the payments didn’t reduce participation in the labor market. And the payments reach people who are otherwise overlooked by the social welfare system, such as those who engage in unpaid household work.

Another critique of UBI is that it’s not a good way to fight poverty compared to targeted subsidies. On the other hand, the social welfare system that provides such subsidies carries substantial administrative costs. Such as system has often fostered clientelism and bureaucracy and created systemic dependency.

A third critique, from the left, is that UBI is not anti-capitalist. “UBI is not a magic pill that will put an end to bad things in society,” Torres concedes. “But because it is universal and unconditional, it helps people without anything. It allows us to rethink different realities and explore the interdependence of rights. And what is more important than sustaining life? UBI is not utopian but a political program that has been shown to be feasible.”

A final critique involves the overall cost of UBI. “We’ve seen debate on how to finance this,” Torres continues. “Critics say, ’It’s really expensive, we can’t finance it.’ But could you make it possible by eliminating local subsidies and bundling programs together, removing administrative costs and actually increasing benefits? Really, we should turn the question around. It’s not how much UBI costs. It’s how much does it cost not to have UBI.”

Several countries in Latin America are looking into some version of UBI. Uruguay is exploring the financing of UBI through a personal wealth tax. Mexico, too, is looking at progressive tax reforms to cover a universal pension of the elderly and a basic income for children. Argentina instituted an Emergency Family Income program during the pandemic to sustain about 9 million people during the lockdown and economic downturn. According to one estimate, an extended UBI would cost 2.9 percent of Argentina’s GDP. Another estimate, for Brazil, suggests that one percent of GDP could cover the basic income for the poorest 30 percent of the population.

Still, more research is necessary to show how UBI can strengthen community networks, how it can increase access to basic services including banks, and what kind of differential impact it has on different ethnic communities. Introducing more money into Amazonian indigenous communities, where livelihoods are relatively independent of capitalist market relations and people have long fought for the recognition of collective rights, might cause more harm than good, for example. Thus, in culturally diverse countries, especially around indigenous peoples, an intercultural adaptation of UBI according to the collective decisions of recipients might be in order.

Amaia Perez Orozco, a feminist economist from Spain, believes that a UBI can be part of a package deal of socio-economic transformation. Much depends, however, on how it is financed and implemented. The challenge, she notes, is the broader context of ecological collapse, racial inequality, and the greater precarity of life under spreading mercantilization. “Can UBI play an emancipatory role in this context?” she asks.

So, for instance, does a UBI provide people with money to pay for private health insurance or is the UBI embedded in a system of national health care? Does UBI contribute to greater national debt and thus dependency on global financial markets? Is UBI boosting unsustainable consumption and making the hoarding of resources worse? Will men, provided with a basic income, increase their care work or will UBIs reinforce gender divisions and others based on race class as the wealthier continue to externalize these jobs?

On the other hand, if a UBI reduces material dependency for women, “it could open the way to new jobs, new opportunities for leisure, the option to leave violent relationships,” Ailynn Torres adds. “Women would have more opportunities to negotiate their work conditions.”


John Feffer is the director of Foreign Policy In Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies. His dystopian novel, Splinterlands, a Dispatch Books original (with Haymarket Books), will appear this fall. He is a TomDispatch regular.

Bayer appeal to dismiss Roundup weedkiller lawsuits rejected by U.S. Supreme Court

Bayer said it plans to replace glyphosate-based weed-killing ingredients in products for non-professionals in the U.S. with alternative active ingredients in order to “manage litigation risk in the U.S.,” but not due to concerns about safety.


SOURCEEcoWatch

The U.S. Supreme Court has rejected an appeal by German company Bayer AG to dismiss legal claims by customers who assert one of its products — glyphosate-based Roundup weedkiller — causes cancer. The multinational chemical and pharmaceutical company could potentially owe billions of dollars in damages, reported Reuters.

The decision by the Supreme Court meant a verdict by a lower court that had upheld $25 million awarded to Edwin Hardeman — a California resident and Roundup consumer who blamed Bayer’s weedkiller for his cancer after using it at his home for 26 years — was left intact.

In 2015, Hardeman was diagnosed with non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma and contended that Bayer hadn’t given a warning as to the cancer risks of glyphosate, The Washington Post reported.

“[N]ow thousands of other cancer victims can continue to hold Monsanto accountable for its decades of corporate malfeasance,” lawyers representing Hardeman, Jennifer Moore and Aimee Wagstaff said in a statement, as reported by The Washington Post.

Bayer acquired Monsanto, the original maker of Roundup, in 2018.

The International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) classified the herbicide glyphosate as “probably carcinogenic to humans” in 2015.

The weedkiller is still approved for use in the U.S., Europe and other places, reported BBC News. Parts of the European Union have banned the herbicide, according to Deutsche Welle.

A 2019 analysis showed that glyphosate was the most used pesticide in the U.S., the Midwest Center for Investigative Reporting said.

Bayer is currently in the midst of thousands of lawsuits, with another Bayer appeal on the horizon for the Supreme Court in the weeks to come, Reuters reported. The Court’s rejection of the current appeal by Bayer led to a 2.9 percent dip in the company’s shares.

Last week, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was ordered by a federal appeals court to reexamine if glyphosate presents risks that are unreasonable to people and the environment. 

In a decision favorable to farm worker, environmental and food safety advocates, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that the EPA hadn’t sufficiently considered if glyphosate poses a threat to endangered species and causes cancer.

In its annual report released in March, Bayer said that about 107,000 of its approximately 138,000 cases had been resolved. The cases against the company argue that customers should have been warned of the alleged risk of cancer.

Bayer has asserted that the claims that glyphosate and Roundup cause cancer are contrary to science and the approval of the EPA, which has supported assertions that glyphosate is non-carcinogenic and, when used as the label advises, not a public health risk.

Bayer has asked for a review of the Supreme Court’s decision in the Hardeman case. The company argued that it should not be punished when the EPA wouldn’t allow a cancer warning to be put on its product and had determined it to be safe.

Bayer said it plans to replace glyphosate-based weed-killing ingredients in products for non-professionals in the U.S. with alternative active ingredients in order to “manage litigation risk in the U.S.,” but not due to concerns about safety, reported The Washington Post.

US Court of Appeals overturns EPA’s

decision that glyphosate is safe for

humans and wildlife

Glyphosate, the active ingredient in Monsanto-Bayer’s pesticide, is the most widely used pesticide in the world.


SOURCENationofChange

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled against the Environmental Protection Agency’s decision that the pesticide, glyphosate, was safe for humans and wildlife. A coalition led by the Center for Food Safety brought the case against the EPA and several ag organizations.

The Court ruled that the EPA’s “inconsistent reasoning” made its decision on cancer “arbitrary,” and therefore ruled against the Agency and sided with the Center for Food Safety.

While research and epidemiological studies  have proved glyphosate to cause Non-Hodgkin’s Lymphoma, new evidence shows a correlation between glyphosate exposure and infertility and endocrine disruption to name a few health risks, according to Dr. Zach Bush.

The Court also ruled that the EPA’s decision violated the Endangered Species Act since the Agency admitted prior that “glyphosate ‘may affect’ all listed species experiencing glyphosate exposure—that is 1,795 endangered or threatened species,” but ignored the ESA in its decision.

Glyphosate, the active ingredient in Monsanto-Bayer’s pesticide, is the most widely used pesticide in the world.






ALTERNATIVE FACTS
Denunciation of Vladimir Putin’s 2021 essay on the history of Russia and Ukraine is unwarranted

By Roger Annis, A Socialist In Canada, June 21, 2022 (This essay was originally published by Covert Action Magazine, June 20, 2022. Read that version to see extensive, accompanying photos.)

Far from condemning the national aspirations of Ukrainians, the Russian president defends them

In July 2021, Vladimir Putin published a historical essay on Russia and Ukraine on the website of the President of Russia. The essay is a very informative read, written by someone with a deep knowledge of the subject. It is titled ‘On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians’ and was published in Russian, English and Ukrainian.


Vladimir Putin, historian, pictured in March 2022

The essay’s appearance occasioned a round of gratuitous condemnations by Western media and pro-Western academics. The pro-NATO think tank Atlantic Council, for example, published a series of short comments on the essay that carefully avoided any substantive reporting of the essay content.

A member of the Ukrainian Rada (legislature) is quoted: “Ukraine holds the key to Putin’s dreams of restoring Russia’s great power status. He is painfully aware that without Ukraine, this will be impossible.” He continues, “[The current conflict] is a war for the whole of Ukraine. Putin makes it perfectly clear that his goal is to keep Ukraine firmly within the Russian sphere of influence and to prevent Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration.”

There is nothing new or informative here. Russia IS a great power. The Russian government warned NATO and the world back in December 2021 that a “Euro-Atlantic integration” of Ukraine and the accompanying political and military measures constitute a further escalation of threats against the Russian people and their sovereignty that would not go unanswered. That month, the government published the text of a proposed treaty with the U.S. aimed at resolving the conflict over Ukraine’s future. So, again, the MP is telling us nothing new.

A member of the ‘Kyiv Security Forum’ is also cited by the Atlantic Council survey. He states: “Putin understands that Ukrainian statehood and the Ukrainian national idea pose a threat to Russian imperialism.”


Here we have an example of the gratuitous term ‘Russian imperialism’ used as an epithet in place of political analysis. The term is more commonly seen or heard from the Western ‘leftists’ suffering self-inflicted amnesia over NATO’s decades-long, expansionist aggression against Russia. They are calling for a Russian “withdrawal” from Ukraine, which amounts to a call to bow to Ukrainian and NATO aggression.

Another accusatory voice of ‘Russian colonialism’ and ‘Russian imperialism’ is the pro-Western Yale University professor Timothy Snyder in an essay published in The New Yorker in April 2022. Snyder’s novel contribution to 20th century history is his 2010 book Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin, along with various accompanying essays, arguing that the Soviet Union before and during World War Two was a greater evil than Hitler’s Nazi Germany. (A withering rebuttal of Snyder’s extreme-right thesis is contained in a book review by Daniel Lazare published in July 2014 and titled ‘Timothy Snyder’s lies’.)

So what does President Putin actually say in his 14-page essay? The remainder of this present essay is a summary, concluding with brief comment by this writer on several points of Russian and Soviet history in the 20th century which President Putin’s essay arguably overlooked.

The early history of the future Ukraine

Putin begins his essay with the following:

First of all, I would like to emphasize that the wall that has emerged in recent years between Russia and Ukraine, between the parts of what is essentially the same historical and spiritual space, to my mind is our great common misfortune and tragedy. These are, first and foremost, the consequences of our own mistakes made at different periods of time. But these are also the result of deliberate efforts by those forces that have always sought to undermine our unity. The formula they apply has been known from time immemorial—divide and rule…

This is hardly the stuff of denigration of Ukraine. Putin continues with a review of the invasion and occupation of ‘Kievan Rus’ by Mongol forces beginning in the 13th century and lasting nearly two centuries in Russia. (Wikipedia). He describes ‘The Great Northern War’ (1700–1721) by Russia against the Swedish monarchy that established much of Russia’s modern Western borders. He then writes that modern Russia (during the autocratic monarchy of the Russian Tsars) was “a multilingual and multinational entity.”

Of the emergence of the Ukrainian language, Putin writes:

Many centuries of fragmentation and living within different states naturally brought about regional language peculiarities, resulting in the emergence of dialects. The vernacular enriched the literary language. Ivan Kotlyarevsky, Grigory Skovoroda, and Taras Shevchenko played a huge role here. Their works are our common literary and cultural heritage… How can this heritage be divided between Russia and Ukraine? And why do it?

He writes further:

The south-western lands of the Russian Empire–Malorussia [present-day Ukraine] and Novorossiya, and Crimea–developed as ethnically and religiously diverse entities. Crimean Tatars, Armenians, Greeks, Jews, Karaites, Krymchaks, Bulgarians, Poles, Serbs, Germans, and other peoples lived here. They all preserved their faith, traditions, and customs.

I am not going to idealize anything. We do know there were the Valuev Circular of 1863 and then the Ems Ukaz of 1876, which restricted the publication and importation of religious and socio-political literature in the Ukrainian language. But it is important to be mindful of the historical context…

Speaking of historical context, the years that Putin describes here were the years (and several centuries) during which the future NATO powers were waging wars of colonial conquest all around the globe. The U.S. and Canada, in particular, were waging wars of internal conquest against their Spanish and French-language speakers and wars of genocide or policies of cultural genocide (eg. residential schools) against their Indigenous populations. But that is another story for another time.

Putin traces the early development of Ukraine national sentiments during the 19th century:

The idea of Ukrainian people as a nation separate from the Russians started to form and gain ground among the Polish elite and a part of the Malorussian intelligentsia.

Then:

Further developments had to do with the collapse of European empires, the fierce civil war that broke out across the vast territory of the former Russian Empire [following the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution] and foreign intervention [ditto].

This pre-1917 history of the future Russia, Ukraine and Belarus occupies about one-third of Putin’s text. Then we move into the most complex and controversial part of Russian and Ukrainian history, that which was opened by the Russian Revolution of 1917.

The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and its aftermath


Strike by mostly female textile workers in Petrograd (now St. Petersburg) in late-February 1917 spark revolution that overthrew Tsarist monarchy

Putin traces the efforts of bourgeois forces in Ukraine following the 1917 Revolution in the Tsarist empire to create an independent and pro-Western Ukraine. He describes the role of Symon Petliura and the “Ukrainian People’s Republic” of 1918-20 which Petliura helped to found. That project foundered due to the decisions of Petliura et al. to ally with German imperialism against the lofty goals of the 1917 Revolution.

THE REVOLUTION IN THE UKRAINE INCLUDED THE ANARCHIST ARMY OF NESTOR MAKHNO AND THE INDEPENDENT BOLSHEVIK PARTY OF UKRAINE (BOROBITZ)
PETLURA'S RADA WAS IN KIEV AND THAT REGION, PETLURA ALONG WITH THE BANDIT SKOROSPASKY WERE ANTI SEMITES WHO PROMOTED POGROMS WHICH MAKNHNO OPPOSED, HE ELIMINATED THE BANDIT LEADER AND AFTER THE REVOLUTION A JEWISH MEMBER OF MAKHNO'S ARMY ASSISSANATED PETLURA, IN PARIS 1923.

The most interesting and relevant section of Putin’s 14-page document is his tracing on pages six and seven of the foundation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1922, by which time a Soviet Ukraine had emerged and stabilized. The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was one of the founding republics of the USSR.



1989 map showing territories of the former Soviet Union now independent republics (Wikipedia)

Putin is highly critical of the self-determination policies of the early, revolutionary government of the USSR and its predecessors as led by Lenin and his Bolshevik Party. He writes:

The right for the republics to freely secede from the Union was included in the text of the Declaration on the Creation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and, subsequently, in the 1924 USSR Constitution. By doing so, the authors planted in the foundation of our statehood the most dangerous time bomb, which exploded [in 1990-91] the moment the safety mechanism provided by the leading role of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was gone, the party itself collapsing from within. A ‘parade of sovereignties’ followed.

In tracing this aspect of the history of the USSR, Putin notes:

In 1954, the Crimean region of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic was given to the Ukrainian SSR, in gross violation of legal norms that were in force at the time.

His overall judgment of Bolshevik national rights policies is harsh. He writes:

The Bolsheviks treated the Russian people as inexhaustible material for their social experiments. They dreamed of a world revolution that would wipe out national states. That is why they were so generous in drawing borders and bestowing territorial gifts. It is no longer important what exactly the idea of the Bolshevik leaders who were chopping the country into pieces was. We can disagree about minor details, background and logic behind certain decisions. One fact is crystal clear: Russia was robbed, indeed.

Putin speaks very positively of the economic and social development of Ukraine leading up to the dissolution of the USSR. “Ukraine and Russia have developed as a single economic system over decades and centuries. The profound cooperation we had 30 years ago is an example for the European Union to look up to. We are natural complementary economic partners. Such a close relationship can strengthen competitive advantages, increasing the potential of both countries.”

He then details the long and sharp economic decline of Ukraine since its post-Soviet independence and asks:

Who is to blame for this? Is it the people of Ukraine’s fault? Certainly not. It was the Ukrainian authorities who wasted and frittered away the achievements of many generations.

He writes further:

Even after the events in Kyiv in 2014 [the anti-Russia coup in February of that year], I charged the Russian government to elaborate options for preserving and maintaining our economic ties within relevant ministries and agencies. However, there was and is still no mutual will to do the same. Nevertheless, Russia is still one of Ukraine’s top three trading partners, and hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians are coming to us to work. They find a welcome reception and support.

These are historical descriptions worthy of study and debate. They hardly constitute the ideology of an “aggressor Russian state” against Ukraine.

Putin details in several pages the economic, political and cultural decline in Ukraine since 2014. He goes on to summarize:

The coup d’état [of February 2014 in Kiev] and the subsequent actions of the Kiev authorities inevitably provoked confrontation and civil war.

Far from condemning the national aspirations of Ukrainians, Putin voices respect and tolerance for them. He writes near the end of his essay:

In the anti-Russia project, there is no place either for a sovereign Ukraine or for the political forces that are trying to defend its real independence. Those who talk about reconciliation in Ukrainian society, about dialogue, about finding a way out of the current impasse are labelled as ‘pro-Russian’ agents. But for many people in Ukraine, the anti-Russia project is simply unacceptable. There are millions of such people, but they are not allowed to raise their heads.

He underlines further his respect for Ukrainian nationhood in the closing section of his essay:

The entire Ukrainian statehood, as we understand it, is proposed to be further built exclusively on this [anti-Russia] idea. Hate and anger, as world history has repeatedly proven, are a very shaky foundation for sovereignty, fraught with many serious risks and dire consequences.

And further:

Russia is open to dialogue with Ukraine and ready to discuss the most complex issues. But it is important for us to understand that our Ukrainian partner defend its national interests not by serving someone else’s, that it not be a tool in someone else’s hands to fight against us.

Putin closes his essay with these three paragraphs:

We respect the Ukrainian language and traditions. We respect Ukrainians’ desire to see their country free, safe and prosperous.

I am confident that true sovereignty of Ukraine is possible only in partnership with Russia. Our spiritual, human and civilizational ties formed for centuries and have their origins in the same sources, they have been hardened by common trials, achievements and victories. Our kinship has been transmitted from generation to generation. It is in the hearts and the memory of people living in modern Russia and Ukraine, in the blood ties that unite millions of our families. Together we have always been and will be many times stronger and more successful. For we are one people.

Today, these words may be perceived by some people with hostility. They can be interpreted in many possible ways. Yet, many people will hear me. And I will say one thing – Russia has never been and will never be ‘anti-Ukraine.’

It is impossible to read Vladimir Putin’s words as those of a ‘Great Russian chauvinist’, as pro-NATO apologists, including self-declared socialists, are doing (see here and here). Meanwhile, the real great power chauvinists and their ideologues—in the NATO countries—have little to say in answer to Putin’s carefully presented history. They resort to superficial name-calling and epithets.

Rethinking the national self-determination policies of Lenin and his Bolshevik Party

President Putin’s essay should serve to stimulate more historical study and debate of Russia, Ukraine and the historical relations between the two.


132-page booklet, first published in 1914

STALIN PROMOTED THE RIGHTS OF NATIONS TO BE INDEPENDENT IN THE USSR

The self-determination policies of the 1917 Revolution should be front and center in that. Sadly, the prevailing anti-Russian propaganda in the West gets in the way of this, including among historians and left-wing thinkers. Instead, all we get are blind condemnations.

Two vital areas of study of the self-determination policy are largely missing from the president’s essay.

One is the portrait of the world and the far-reaching aspirations for national self-determination or independence at the outset of World War One.

The self-determination policies of Lenin and the Bolsheviks were crafted precisely in response to the clamor for national freedom by the subjects of the large empires of the day—Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Britain, France, the USA and others. Self-determination for the oppressed peoples of the Russian Tsarist Empire, in particular, was a key driving force of the 1917 Revolution which began, let us recall, with the toppling of the Tsarist monarchy in February of that year.

Two is the calamitous, four-year military intervention against the early Soviet Union by the world’s imperialist powers, aimed at overthrowing the Bolshevik-led government and the 1917 Revolution itself.

That intervention ultimately failed, but it was accompanied by an economic blockade that lasted for decades longer (interrupted by the Western powers for a few years only for the sake of the exigencies of their wars against Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan). The extreme economic hardship caused by the blockade contributed greatly to the factional breakdown of the Soviet government and leadership following the death of Lenin in 1924.

Overall, imperialist intervention and blockades contributed greatly to the rise of authoritarian socialism in the early Soviet Union and to its eventual demise decades later.

Looking back, one can fairly judge and criticize the self-determination policies of the Bolshevik Revolution. But the fact that the most idealistic and far-reaching of these policies did not succeed or were seriously compromised is not an argument per se against them. Rather, it is an argument for more study and learning of the exact reasons why some of the policies (not the entirety) failed or were compromised during the 1930s and in later decades.

The self-determination policies of the early Russian Revolution were astonishing and world-shaking in their scope. They helped to transform the Russian empire into the modern state of the Soviet Union. They inspired peoples around the world to take up struggle against imperialism and for national independence, including another world-shaking event, the Chinese Revolution of 1949.

What’s more, the echoes of the Bolshevik-led self-determination policy can easily be seen in the present-day structure and constitution of the Russian Federation.

It is a truly federated and multilingual country. Examples of this were seen recently in the referendum vote in Crimea in 2014 to secede from Ukraine and join the Russian Federation, and in the rebellion of the people of Donbas against the extreme-right coup in Ukraine in 2014.

Vladimir Putin voiced this at a meeting of Russia’s National Security Council on March 3, 2022 which honored the soldiers of the Russian army fighting in Ukraine. He told the meeting:

I am a Russian. As they say, all my relatives are Ivans and Marias. But when I see heroes like this young man, Nurmagomed Gadzhimagomedov, a resident of Dagestan and an ethnic Lak, and our other soldiers, I can hardly stop myself from saying: I am a Lak, a Dagestani, a Chechen, an Ingush, a Russian, a Tatar, a Jew, a Mordovian, an Ossetian… It is impossible to name all of the more than 300 nationalities and ethnic groups that live in Russia. I think you can understand me. I am proud to be part of this world, part of our powerful and strong multinational people of Russia.

These and many other such examples which could be cited are compelling evidence that the embers of the self-determination policies of the Bolshevik Revolution remain alive in the Russian Federation and the former Soviet sphere. Even more, these policies remain extremely relevant in an imperialist-dominated world that routinely seeks to crush self-determination and national independence aspirations of oppressed peoples.

The principles of peace, social justice and national determination are often voiced but always trampled into the dirt by the imperialist powers that dominate todays’ planet and human society. But that doesn’t mean the policies should be discarded. Rather, it means we must redouble efforts to realize them.

Background and additional reading:

Causes of the 2014 crisis in Ukraine and the history of Russia-Ukraine relations, talk by the late U.S. historian Stephen Cohen, broadcast on YouTube (24 minutes, date is October 2015. Stephen Cohen was one of the world’s leading scholars on the history of Russia and the Soviet Union. He passed away in 2020 at the age of 81. He is the author of Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution: A Political Biography, 1888–1938 , first published in 1971. It is, arguably, the most important book in English for understanding the first 20 years of the Russian Revolution and the Soviet Union.]

The causes and consequences of the Ukraine war, lecture by John J. Mearsheimer, October 2022 (60 minutes. This lecture was delivered by John Mearsheimer to the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute. He addresses the July 21 historical essay by Vladimir Putin at the 26-minute mark of the lecture. [John Mearsheimer is a professor at the University of Chicago and a proponent of the ‘foreign policy realism’ school within U.S. academia. He advocates that U.S. imperialism and its allies should target China, not Russia, for ‘containment’. See this recent interview with him (18’30” mark).]

75th anniversary of victory in the Great Patriotic War: Shared responsibility to history and our future, essay by Vladimir Putin, published on the website of the President of Russia, June 20, 2020 …The events of the Great Patriotic War have long become a distant memory, so why does Russia celebrate May 9 as its biggest holiday? Why does life almost come to a halt on June 22? And why does one feel a lump rise in their throat? They usually say that the war has left a deep imprint on every family’s history. Behind these words, there are fates of millions of people, their sufferings and the pain of loss. Behind these words, there is also the pride, the truth and the memory. For my parents, the war meant the terrible ordeals of the Siege of Leningrad where my two-year old brother Vitya died. It was the place where my mother miraculously managed to survive. My father, despite being exempt from active duty, volunteered to defend his hometown…

[The above essay is an overview of events leading up to the invasion of the Soviet Union by Nazi Germany in June 1941. The Russian president writes: “…I believe that it is academics with a wide representation of respected scholars from different countries of the world who should search for a balanced assessment of what happened. We all need the truth and objectivity. On my part, I have always encouraged my colleagues to build a calm, open and trust-based dialogue, to look at the common past in a self-critical and unbiased manner. Such an approach will make it possible not to repeat the mistakes committed back then and to ensure peaceful and successful development for years to come…”]

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Important new book: ‘The catastrophe of Ukrainian capitalism’

Book review by Jim McIlroy, 
 (originally published in Green Left (Australia), June 17, 2022.)

Reviewing: The Catastrophe of Ukrainian Capitalism: How privatisation dispossessed and impoverished the Ukrainian people, by Renfrey Clarke, published by Resistance Books, 2022, 176 pages $AUS 25


From the book publisher’s description: In the years before its independence in 1991, Ukraine had been among the most industrialised, technologically advanced regions of the Soviet Union. Thirty years later, it was being rated by the IMF as the poorest country in Europe. Why did Ukraine’s transition to capitalism result in such disaster? Was this purely the outcome of an ill-conceived model of ‘reform’? Or was capitalism itself the wrong choice? Has ‘association’ with the European Union provided any answers?

Note by A Socialist In Canada: Below the book review text, will find links to published articles and reports on the privatization of Ukraine’s agricultural industry and agricultural lands, two distinct but parallel privatization drives. In 2020, the Ukrainian legislature (Rada) approved an historic law allowing for private sale or purchase of agricultural land by Ukrainian citizens. The new law entered into force in July 2021.

Full book review text here:

The promotional note on the back of Renfrey Clarke’s important new book on Ukraine asks: “In the years before its independence in 1991, Ukraine had been among the most industrialised, technologically advanced regions of the Soviet Union. Thirty years later, it was being rated by the [International Monetary Fund] as the poorest country in Europe — its people poorer, on average, than those in many countries of the developing world. Why did Ukraine’s transition to capitalism result in such a disaster?”

The Catastrophe of Ukrainian Capitalism was written in early 2020, well before Russia’s invasion in February. Thus it does not deal with the current conflict or its immediate genesis. However, unlike the torrent of lies and distortions that pass for mainstream media coverage of the Ukraine war, Clarke’s book tackles the reality of modern Ukraine, providing essential background to the political and economic state of the country in the lead up to Russia’s invasion.

Clarke’s preface notes: “The focus [of the book] is on the economy and general social system of Ukraine in the decades since independence, and in a more limited way, on the country’s labour movement. The specific aim is to throw light on the reasons why, following independence and despite Western tutelage, the attempt to install capitalism in Ukraine has fared so badly.

“The causes relate in the immediate sense to the economic structures inherited from the [Soviet Union], to the mechanisms of managerial control and to the closely associated political culture that became fixed in the country as it emerged from central planning.

“But Ukraine also shares in a wider fate: it has been turned into a broadly typical part of capitalism’s world ‘periphery’, ruled by a weak, often dysfunctional state apparatus and possessing an economy fitted to the needs of the ‘core’ of the global system for a low-wage, semi-developed hinterland.”

Clarke stresses that the central theme of his book is “the inability of world capitalism to solve the economic and social problems of a country now very much part of the world’s ‘periphery’.” He explains that Ukraine, as a key victim of this process, suffered from low investment and reduced productivity, because the logic of accumulation within global capitalism today means that the most profitable functions are increasingly centred in the developed ‘core’.

The patterns of trade and investment, within which post-Soviet Ukraine has been trapped, systematically stripped the country of capital and assigned it the role of cheap producer of low-value commodities, including primary products. After the ‘Euromaidan Revolution’ of 2014, previously strong economic ties to Russia began to be downgraded.

The pro-Europe, post-Maidan government led the country into a classic “development trap”, Clarke explains. The years following the “turn to Europe” were a period of crushing depression, from which Ukraine has barely recovered.

Ukraine joined most of the post-Soviet Union countries, notably Russia itself, in being transformed into the social and economic order now described as “oligarchic capitalism”. In essence, a process of “exchanging power for property” was implemented. This involved senior Communist Party state officials and industrial managers turning the authority of their posts, via various corrupt means, into the solid legal entitlements of asset ownership, Clarke explains. Applied throughout a large part of the former Eastern bloc, this created possibly the greatest “kleptocracy” in modern history. “The ‘turn to Europe’ of the years since Euromaidan has not addressed the causes of Ukraine’s decline. To the contrary, it is seeing the country driven further into a trap of Western-enforced marginalisation, dependency and de-development,” Clarke explains.

Privatisation of large and small industry, as well as agriculture, was rampant from the early 1990s. This process led to a significant rise in inequality, with one study noting that during the pre-Euromaidan period, 100 plutocrats owned 80–85% of the country’s wealth.

As of 2016, official statistics reveal that the bulk of Ukrainian workers received incomes below the “ethical poverty line” — calculated as the necessary amount to allow a chance of normal life expectancy — of US$7.40 a day. Workers in Ukraine at that time received wages around one-tenth of those in Western Europe.

The post-Euromaidan government signed an Association Agreement (AA) with the European Union (EU) in March 2014. The AA was not strictly economic: it required Ukraine to make a definite political and military commitment to the West. The logic of the AA was for a steady growth of military cooperation between Ukraine’s armed forces and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), with the goal of eventual NATO membership. “Signing the [AA] … thus guaranteed a dramatic heightening of tensions with Russia,” Clarke stresses.

While the growth of far-right organisations received limited popular support, reflected in low votes in national elections, their increased organisational strength after Euromaidan led to burgeoning attacks on the left and labour movements, including the surviving Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU). Ultra-right groups also played an increasing role in combating pro-Russian forces that emerged after Euromaidan, demanding autonomy for the majority Russian-speaking Donbas region in eastern Ukraine.

While attempts were made by reform-minded forces to reduce the levels of nepotism and corruption during the post-Euromaidan period, little progress was made. At the same time, the left and labour movement has struggled to make significant impact on the growing crisis, Clarke writes.

“The oligarchic system, in sum, was not being challenged at any fundamental level. It retained substantial control of the state apparatus, and this power encompassed not just administrators, but also the mechanisms of state coercion.

“The reform effort had never made much impact on the prosecution system, and despite the setting up of the new patrol police, the country’s criminal investigation police continued robbing and brutalising ordinary citizens while protecting well-heeled malefactors.

“Additionally, the deeply corrupted security service, the SBU [Security Service of Ukraine], remained an organ of extralegal harassment — and in some cases, violence — employed by powerful figures against opposing business interests and reform activists,” Clarke notes.

The sudden rise of actor turned “anti-politician” Volodymyr Zelensky to the presidency of Ukraine [in 2019] was a sign of the alienation of the mass of people from the established political system. But Zelensky, despite his popularity, was hiding his own private wealth and links to one particular faction of the oligarchy.

Despite the weakness of the left and labour movement in Ukraine, Clarke expresses hope that developing forces of the working class and the progressive movement will grow from the current crisis. The Russian war against Ukraine has caused huge destruction of the country. Whatever the final outcome of the conflict, popular pressure for progressive change in Ukraine away from its system of “oligarchic capitalism” will undoubtedly strengthen in the coming period.

Amid the “fog of war” we face in the West over the realities of Putin’s unjust invasion [sic] of Ukraine, Clarke’s detailed and fascinating account of the harsh truth about Ukraine’s recent history is an essential backgrounder to the current crisis.

Background:

* The moratorium on the sale of agricultural land is lifted in Ukraine, report published by the Center for Eastern Studies (OSW, Warsaw), April 1, 2020

* Ukraine unblocks the sale of farm land, report by Xinhua, July 2, 2021

* New report and fact sheet published by Oakland Institute details western agribusiness interests in Ukraine, press release by the Oakland Institute, Dec 10, 2014 [This late-2014 report by the Oakland Institute examined a poorly-reported side of the capitalist transformation of agriculture in Ukraine beginning in 2014, namely, how the agricultural conglomerates of the Western imperialist countries have successfully swooped in to privatize much of Ukraine’s agricultural industry. This is distinct from the slower and more complicated and controversial drive to privatize land ownership.]

New study solves long-standing mystery of what may have triggered ice age

New study solves long-standing mystery of what may have triggered ice age
At the beginning of the last ice, local mountain glaciers grew and formed large ice sheets, like the one seen here in Greenland, that covered much of today's Canada, Siberia, and Northern Europe. Credit: Annie Spratt/Unsplash

A new study led by University of Arizona researchers may have solved two mysteries that have long puzzled paleo-climate experts: Where did the ice sheets that rang in the last ice age more than 100,000 years ago come from, and how could they grow so quickly?

Understanding what drives Earth's glacial–interglacial cycles—the periodic advance and retreat of ice sheets in the Northern Hemisphere—is no easy feat, and researchers have devoted substantial effort to explaining the expansion and shrinking of large ice masses over thousands of years. The new study, published in the journal Nature Geoscience, proposes an explanation for the rapid expansion of the ice sheets that covered much of the Northern Hemisphere during the most recent ice age, and the findings could also apply to other  throughout Earth's history.

About 100,000 years ago, when mammoths roamed the Earth, the Northern Hemisphere climate plummeted into a deep freeze that allowed massive ice sheets to form. Over a period of about 10,000 years, local mountain glaciers grew and formed large ice sheets covering much of today's Canada, Siberia and northern Europe.

While it has been widely accepted that periodic "wobbling" in the Earth's orbit around the sun triggered cooling in the Northern Hemisphere summer that caused the onset of widespread glaciation, scientists have struggled to explain the extensive ice sheets covering much of Scandinavia and northern Europe, where temperatures are much more mild.

Unlike the cold Canadian Arctic Archipelago where ice readily forms, Scandinavia should have remained largely ice-free due to the North Atlantic Current, which brings warm water to the coasts of northwestern Europe. Although the two regions are located along similar latitudes, the Scandinavian summer temperatures are well above freezing, while the temperatures in large parts of the Canadian Arctic remain below freezing through the summer, according to the researchers. Because of this discrepancy,  have struggled to account for the extensive glaciers that advanced in northern Europe and marked the beginning of the last ice age, said the study's lead author, Marcus Lofverstrom.

"The problem is we don't know where those ice sheets (in Scandinavia) came from and what caused them to expand in such a short amount of time," said Lofverstrom, an assistant professor of geosciences and head of the UArizona Earth System Dynamics Lab.

To find answers, Lofverstrom helped develop an extremely complex Earth-system model, known as the Community Earth System Model, which allowed his team to realistically recreate the conditions that existed at the beginning of the most recent glacial period. Notably, he expanded the ice-sheet model domain from Greenland to encompass most of the Northern Hemisphere at high spatial detail. Using this updated model configuration, the researchers identified the ocean gateways in the Canadian Arctic Archipelago as a critical linchpin controlling the North Atlantic climate and ultimately determining whether or not ice sheets could grow in Scandinavia.

The simulations revealed that as long as the ocean gateways in the Canadian Arctic Archipelago remain open, Earth's orbital configuration cooled the Northern Hemisphere sufficiently to allow ice sheets to build up in Northern Canada and Siberia, but not in Scandinavia.

In a second experiment, the researchers simulated a previously unexplored scenario in which marine ice sheets obstructed the waterways in the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. In that experiment, the comparatively fresh Arctic and North Pacific water—typically routed through the Canadian Arctic Archipelago—was diverted east of Greenland, where deep water masses typically form. This diversion led to a freshening and weakening of the North Atlantic deep circulation, sea ice expansion, and cooler conditions in Scandinavia.

"Using both climate model simulations and marine sediment analysis, we show that ice forming in northern Canada can obstruct ocean gateways and divert water transport from the Arctic into the North Atlantic," Lofverstrom said, "and that in turn leads to a weakened ocean circulation and cold conditions off the coast of Scandinavia, which is sufficient to start growing ice in that region."

"These findings are supported by marine sediment records from the North Atlantic, which show evidence of glaciers in northern Canada several thousand years before the European side," said Diane Thompson, assistant professor in the UArizona Department of Geosciences. "The sediment records also show compelling evidence of a weakened deep ocean circulation before the glaciers form in Scandinavia, similar to our modeling results."

Together, the experiments suggest that the formation of marine ice in northern Canada may be a necessary precursor to glaciation in Scandinavia, the authors write.

Pushing climate models beyond their traditional application of predicting future climates provides an opportunity to identify previously unknown interactions in the Earth system, such as the complex and sometimes counterintuitive interplay between ice sheets and climate, Lofverstrom said.

"It is possible that the mechanisms we identified here apply to every glacial period, not just the most recent one," he said. "It may even help explain more short-lived cold periods such as the Younger Dryas cold reversal (12,900 to 11,700 years ago) that punctuated the general warming at the end of the last ice age."Scientists shine new light on role of Earth's orbit in the fate of ancient ice sheets

More information: Marcus Lofverstrom, The importance of Canadian Arctic Archipelago gateways for glacial expansion in Scandinavia, Nature Geoscience (2022). DOI: 10.1038/s41561-022-00956-9. www.nature.com/articles/s41561-022-00956-

Journal information: Nature Geoscience 

Provided by University of Arizona