The Irish Times view on the Estonian general election

The outgoing prime minister’s support for Ukraine appears to have been a key factor in her landslide victory


Estonian prime minister, Kaja Kallas , whose party has won a landslide victory in the general election, speaks to the media in Tallinn 

(Photo: Sergei Grits/AP)

Mon Mar 6 2023 -

The election in Estonia has delivered a clear victory for outgoing prime minister Kaja Kallas and her centre-right Reform party. Estonia, like the other Baltic republics, Latvia and Lithuania, was an integral part of the Soviet Union before winning independence in 1991. The large shadow cast by its neighbour has been an important factor in shaping the country’s politics since, particularly after the launch of Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine.

Kallas’s term in office has been particularly notable for her strong support for Kyiv, which has been not just verbal but practical: in proportion to its size, Estonia has been the largest supplier of armaments to Ukraine and the biggest recipient of refugees.

The main opposition to Reform has come from the Eurosceptic, far-right EKRE party, which in the previous election in 2019 increased its vote from 8 per cent to 18 per cent. Its leader, Martin Helme, has stated that there can be no place for black people in Estonia while the party chairman criticised participants in a Pride demonstration and said it should not enjoy police protection. In the run-up to the election EKRE campaigned against hosting Ukrainian refugees and argued that Estonia should not needlessly antagonise Russia. It also put Reform on the defensive over an inflation rate of more than 18 per cent, much of it caused by rocketing energy bills which Kallas’s rigid free-market principles initially made her reluctant to see the state subsidising.

EKRE, however, found itself alone in the Estonian political landscape in urging a softer line with Russia. Even the Centre party, traditionally supported by the large ethnic Russian minority, was critical of Putin’s invasion, which cost it some electoral support. In the final results Reform added three seats and EKRE lost two. The entrance into parliament of the new liberal centrist formation Estonia 200 with 14 seats has widened Kallas’s political options. A coalition of Reform, Estonia 200 and the social democrats, that is of the centre-right, centre and centre-left, is one option that could provide a strong working majority.

Kallas, ‘Europe’s new Iron Lady,’ wins reelection in Estonia

Estonia’s first female prime minister has emerged as a leading hawk in the European Union by insisting Russia must be defeated in Ukraine.

CAIN BURDEAU / March 6, 2023

Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas speaks at a news conference in Tallinn, Estonia, on Monday, March 6, 2023, after overwhelmingly winning the Baltic country's general election.

(CN) — Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas, a staunch supporter of Ukraine who's been dubbed Europe's new “Iron Lady,” won reelection on Sunday in a landslide.

Kallas led her center-right neoliberal Reform Party to a resounding win by taking in about 32% of the votes, the most ever for a party since Estonia gained its independence in 1991. Her party is now expected to form a coalition government, possibly with the center-left Social Democrats and Estonia 200, a new liberal party.

Amid very high inflation in Estonia and signs of war fatigue emerging across Europe, there was some doubt about the level of support Kallas could rally.

Her success then was a big boost for European Union leaders, NATO and Ukraine because Kallas is one of Europe's most hawkish politicians in her support for Ukraine.

Also, the election was a setback for far-right nationalist forces in Europe with the Conservative People's Party of Estonia picking up about 15.7% of the vote, down from 17.8% in the last parliamentary elections in 2019. This party, also known by its Estonian acronym EKRE, has anti-EU and anti-immigrant views and it has advocated reducing Estonia's military support for Ukraine in order to bolster the country's own army.

In a tweet, Kallas said her win “shows that Estonians overwhelmingly value liberal values, security founded on EU and NATO, and firm support to Ukraine.”

With her ardent backing of Ukraine and calls for unlimited military aid to Kyiv, she's given her small country of 1.3 million people an outsized voice in the EU. Estonia is providing per capita more military aid to Ukraine than any other NATO country.

She's even been dubbed by media as Europe's new “Iron Lady” because of her resemblance to former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's uncompromising stance on the Soviet Union.

Even before Russian President Vladimir Putin launched the invasion of Ukraine, Kallas was urging her counterparts in the EU to see Russia as a dangerous power bent on reconquering territories that Moscow once held.

Estonia was a former Soviet republic and shares a long border with Russia. Since Estonia gained independence, a large ethnic Russian population in Estonia has often felt marginalized because many Russian residents have been denied citizenship and accuse the state of mistreating them. About a quarter of Estonia's population is Russian.

The Baltic country has been a target of Russian meddling and cyberattacks, prompting its leaders, including Kallas, to warn that Moscow could attack the small country and use the plight of ethnic Russians in Estonia as a pretext for its aggression. Estonia, though, is a NATO member and a Russian attack is highly unlikely.

In a recent interview, Kallas said Ukraine has proven its strength after fighting off Russia's military and that it must be brought into the EU and safeguarded against Russia. She likened Ukraine's fight to that of Estonia's struggles for independence from the Soviet Union.

She said the war was “going much better than we thought even a year ago” because Ukraine “has survived” and the Western alliance has remained intact.

“Keeping this unity has been a big achievement for the European Union but also NATO,” she said.

Her anti-Russian stance can be traced to her personal family history too. Born in 1977 when Estonia was a Soviet republic, the 45-year-old prime minister comes from an elite Estonian family deeply involved in leading the fight for Estonia's independence from Russia in the first half of the 20th century. Her mother and grandmother also were among large numbers of Estonians deported by the Stalinist regime.

Her father, Siim Kallas, served as a Reform Party prime minister of Estonia between 2002 and 2003.

Courthouse News reporter Cain Burdeau is based in the European Union.

Estonia election analysis: Why the liberals won, the far-right lost, and other key takeaways

By David Mac Dougall • Updated: 06/03/2023 - 

FILE: Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas - Copyright AP Photo

The votes are all tallied, the winners declared, and the dust is settling on Estonia's first election since the COVID pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine is over.

The makeup of the next parliament - Riigikogu - looks familiar but also different: at the previous election in 2019 there were five parties represented, but now six parties have made it over the 5% threshold and returned MPs.

Now talks begin to form the next government and here's where PM Kaja Kallas is hoping history doesn't repeat itself: in 2019 her Reform Party won the most seats in parliament but she was outflanked by right-wing parties who went on to form a coalition of their own.

So what did we learn from the campaign and the elections? Here's our key takeaways:

1. Strong new madate for Kaja Kallas and her Reform Party

Incumbent Prime Minister Kaja Kallas had a strong night, with her centre-right Reform Party picking up three new seats, while opponents further right in the political spectrum suffered losses. Estonia's public broadcaster ERR called it a "landslide" win as Reform extended its lead over the far-right EKRE party to 15 seats.

The win, Kallas said, "also shows that Estonians overwhelmingly value liberal values, security founded on EU and NATO, and firm support to Ukraine."

The new liberal bloc which has now emerged in Estonian politics could in theory mean that Reform would only need the support of one other party to form a majority government, but Kaja Kallas talked on the campaign trail about the need for building sustainable and solid alliances with other parties, so she's likely to look at two other parties with similar values to form her coalition: Estonia200 and the Social Democrats.

2. Big breakthrough for Estonia200 party

At the last general election in 2019, the Estonia200 party fell just short of the 5% threshold to return MPs to parliament. At the regional elections they sharpened their message, targeted seats in urban areas in particular where they felt their strengths and core support lay, and now translated this into national success with 14 seats in the Riigikogu -- and a likely spot in government.

So why has this liberal, centre-right party resonated now with voters? Party co-founder Kristina Kallas (no relation to Kaja Kallas) tells Euronews that her party succeeded by appealing to people across the political spectrum.

"At this election, people were looking for the option of a new, liberal force," says Kallas.

"In Tartu, where I campaigned, it's not just young liberal progressive voters worried about populism, it was also quite elderly people who might not be value-liberal as we understand it, but populism was also something they didn't want," she explains.

"Estonia200 brought more liberal voters out to vote, and to vote for a new party," says Kallas.

Electoral commission staff count ballot papers after voting closed at a polling station in Tallinn, Estonia, Sunday, March 5, 2023

Sergei Grits/AP

3. Parties on the right took a fall in support

"This year it seems to be more important who doesn't get the votes, than who does," one Estonian voter told Euronews on election day, and that feeling seems to have prevailed with a liberal, values-based centre-right bloc emerging strongly, while parties with more traditional views (Centre Party and Isamaa) or more polarising policies (EKRE) took a hit.

"Reform Party and EKRE presented themselves as the main opponents in the election, calling for supporters of other parties to vote for them to make sure that the other one does not stand a chance to become a prime minister's party," explains Merili Arjakas, a research fellow at the International Centre for Defence and Security in Tallinn.

"While EKRE's nominal loss of two seats is not major, they had expected to take over the Centre Party's position of being a strong second party with give-or-take of 25 seats. This did not happen," she tells Euronews.

Additionally, having the Social Democrats and Estonia200 fare better than in recent opinion polls also added salt to the the right wing's wounds.

"This is why there is a widespread perception that the nationalist right lost the election," says Arjakas.

The Centre Party's vote share was down more than 36,000 votes from the last election, likely lost due to a number of factors including a popular figure who was expelled from the party last year who ran as an independent; but the security situation, the war in Ukraine, a feeling of neglect or alienation among Russian-speaking voters who traditionally vote for the Centre Party, and generally lower level of political engagement.

KRE), the candidate for Prime Minister Martin Helme casts his ballot at a polling station during a parliamentary elections in Tallinn, Estonia, Sunday, March 5, 2023.

Pavel Golovkin/Copyright 2023 The AP. All rights reserved

4. Internet voting is more popular, and trusted, than ever

For the first time in an Estonian election cycle, more than 50% of people cast their ballots on the internet. That's only possible because of the wide range of services that are available to Estonians online, the investment in system security that authorities have invested in, and the high level of trust the public has in the integrity of internet voting.

The fly in the ointment the after the votes were counted is that far-right party EKRE now reportedly wants to challenge those electronic ballots in court.

Kristi Raik, Deputy Director of the International Centre for Defence and Security in Tallinn, calls that a "Trumpist" move.

"EKRE is bringing into question the reliability of the voting procedure and wants to contest the e-vote in court. This is a dangerous game of undermining people’s trust in institutions," says Raik.

"The real reason being that EKRE gets relatively few e-votes."

Activists speak with people near a campaign tent adorned with posters depicting candidates' portraits during parliamentary elections in Tallinn, Estonia, Sunday, March 5, 2023

Sergei Grits/AP

5. What happened to Russian-speaking voter turnout?

Estonia's Russian-speaking voters have found themselves a bit politically adrift in the last year or so. Although they have traditionally sided with the Centre Party, they felt let down when it comes to continuing Russian-language education in parallel with the Estonian-language education system.

EKRE had tried to woo them, and use the arrival of Ukrainian refugees as a wedge issue: but EKRE had also been very vocal about calling for the removal of Soviet-era monuments which could in turn alienate some Russian-speaking voters.

"Looking at the districts, the turnout was remarkably lower than national average in Ida-Virumaa county and a bit lower in Tallinna Kesklinna, Lasnamäe and Pirita districts, where many Russian-speakers in the country live," explains ICDS's Merili Arjakas.

While the methodology for calculating turnout has changed slightly in this year's elections, turnout in those Russian-speaking districts has always been lower than average.

PM Kaja Kallas’ Reform Party set to win in Estonia vote

5 March 2023, 22:04

Estonia Election. Picture: PA

Nine political parties in all fielded candidates for Estonia’s 101-seat parliament, or Riigikogu.

Voters in Estonia have cast their ballots in a parliamentary election where initial results suggested the centre-right Reform Party of Prime Minister Kaja Kallas is on its way to a landslide victory.

Ms Kallas faced a challenge from the far-right populist EKRE party, which seeks to limit the Baltic nation’s exposure to the Ukraine crisis and blames the current government for Estonia’s high inflation rate.

Nine political parties in all fielded candidates for Estonia’s 101-seat parliament, or Riigikogu. More than 900,000 people were eligible to vote in the general election, and nearly half voted in advance.

With around 90% votes counted, Reform Party was in strong lead with 31.9% of the votes, followed by EKRE with 15.2% and the Centre Party, traditionally favoured by Estonia’s sizable ethnic-Russian minority, 14.5%.

Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas (Pavel Golovkin/AP)

Preliminary results suggested six parties passed the 5% threshold of support needed to be in parliament, including newcomer Eesti 200, a liberal centrist party.

By the time polls closed at 8pm local time, the overall turnout was 63.7%, according to initial information – a rate on par with the 2019 election. Preliminary election results were expected by early Monday.

National security in the wake of neighbouring Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and socio-economic issues, particularly the rising cost of living, were main campaign themes.

Ms Kallas, 45, became prime minister in 2021 and has emerged as one of Europe’s most outspoken supporters of Ukraine during the year-long war.

She is seeking a second term, with her standing enhanced by her international appeals to impose sanctions on Moscow.

A Baltic nation of 1.3 million people that borders Russia to the east, Estonia broke away from the Soviet Union in 1991 and has taken a clear Western course, joining Nato and the European Union.

Five parties were represented in the outgoing parliament. Ms Kallas’ party has led the current coalition government with the small conservative Fatherland party and the Social Democrats.

Her centre-right Reform Party, a key player in Estonian politics since the mid-1990s, continuously held the prime minister’s post during 2005-2016 and regained it in 2021.

Polls indicated Ms Kallas’ party was likely to win the most votes in Sunday’s election. EKRE party leader Martin Helme, the prime minister’s main challenger, blames Ms Kallas for the country’s inflation rate of 18.6%, one of the EU’s highest, and accuses her of undermining Estonia’s defences by giving weapons to Ukraine.

“We’ve never questioned support for Ukraine. We’ve never questioned Estonia’s membership in Nato,” Mr Helme said in an interview with The Associated Press.

“That’s just crazy talk. But we have been very critical of the government because they have not assessed the risk to Estonia and to Estonian security and defence.”

“We have basically given away all our heavy weaponry to Ukraine, and the replacement comes within two or three years. Basically, that is an invitation of aggression,” he said.

The outspoken and polarising EKRE entered into the mainstream of Estonian politics in the 2019 election, when it emerged as the third-largest party with nearly 18% of the vote.

The eurosceptic party was co-founded by Martin Helme’s father, Mart Helme, and was part of a Centre Party-led government during 2019-21.

Ms Kallas argues it is in her country’s interests to help Kyiv. The full-scale invasion of Ukraine sparked fears in Tallinn that a Russian victory could embolden Moscow to switch its attentions to other countries it controlled in Soviet times, including Baltic nations Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

She says that Estonia’s defences remain strong as the United States and other Nato allies have supplied top-notch weapons like the Himars rocket system to Ukraine and also to Estonia.

By Press Association

UK

Rishi Sunak’s Eat Out to Help Out ‘spread Covid but was covered up’

Liam Coleman

Sunday 5 Mar 2023 

METRO UK

Sunak’s Eat Out to Help Out campaign was a hit with the public during the pandemic but he has now come under criticism for it (Picture: PA)

The Prime Minister is under pressure over his ‘Eat Out to Help Out’ scheme during the pandemic with claims of a ‘cover up’ and that it spread Covid.

Rishi Sunak’s flagship campaign encouraged the public to go out and support restaurants with 50% discounts for diners.

But now leaked messages show the concern from then Health Secretary Matt Hancock about how Eat Out to Help Out was spreading the virus.

It comes after Mr Hancock was said to want to ‘frighten the pants off’ the public during the pandemic.

Around 100,000 WhatsApp messages from then Health Secretary Matt Hancock were leaked earlier this week, and in new texts, Mr Hancock can be seen showing his disapproval of the initiative.

Eat Out to Help Out part of a package of measures launched by Mr Sunak in the summer of 2020.

In August 2020, while the scheme was still operating, Mr Hancock mentioned his concerns about it in messages to Simon Case, the then Downing Street permanent secretary in charge of the Civil Service response to Covid.

Mr Hanock told Mr Case that the scheme was driving up Covid cases in some of the worst hit areas and that the problems it was causing were ‘serious’.

The PM even went to Wagamama’s and served food to promote the scheme (Picture: Rishi Sunak Twitter)

Thousands of restaurants and diners made the most of the offer during the pandemic (Picture: Getty)

But he added that he had ‘kept it out of the news’, according to the Telegraph.

He said the Treasury had been informed about the ‘problems’ the scheme was causing in Covid ‘intervention areas’.

‘We’ve been protecting them in the comms,’ he said, adding that ‘thankfully’ it has not yet ‘bubbled up’.

Eat Out to Help Out offered diners 50 per cent off food and non-alcoholic drinks on Mondays to Wednesdays in August, capped at £10 per head.

The final total cost to the taxpayer was £849 million – far in excess of the £500 million original forecast by the Treasury.

The Prime Minister has now been urged to ‘come clean’ about what he knew about the risks of the scheme and explain why ‘warnings were apparently ignored and evidence concealed.’

Matt Hancock and Rishi were announced as part of Boris’s cabinet as the pandemic began (Picture: PA)

Angela Rayner, Labour’s deputy leader, said: ‘We now know that Rishi Sunak’s Treasury was made aware of the evidence that his Eat Out to Help Out scheme was spreading Covid and risking public health.

‘These disturbing exchanges show the Prime Minister may have been complicit in a cover up when he was Chancellor to protect his own PR stunt at the expense of public safety.

‘He must now own up to what he knew and when about the risks, and explain why the warnings were apparently ignored and evidence concealed.’

Meanwhile, Lobby Akinnola of the Covid-19 Bereaved Families for Justice group said Mr Hancock’s messages ‘confirm what many have suspected for a long time – saving lives was not the priority for our Government’.

He added: ‘It is now laid bare before us; instead of listening to scientific experts, acting urgently to save lives when it was proven that Eat Out to Help Out was risking lives… our Government chose to treat the pandemic as a vanity project to garner political points.’

A study by Warwick University, published in October 2020, concluded that the scheme had ‘caused a significant rise in new infections… accelerating the pandemic into its current second wave’.

Academics claimed the scheme contributed between eight and 17 per cent of new Covid infections at the time.

https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/centres/cage/news/30-10-20-eat_out_to_help_out_scheme_drove_new_covid_19_infections_up_by_between_8_and_17_new_research_finds

'Eat Out to Help Out' scheme drove new COVID-19 infections up by ... 

Oct 30, 2020 ... The government initiative, which cost around £500 million, caused a significant rise in new infections in August and early September ...

https://www.theguardian.com/business/2020/oct/30/treasury-rejects-theory-eat-out-to-help-out-caused-rise-in-covid

'Eat out to help out' may have caused sixth of Covid clusters over ... 

Oct 30, 2020 ... “The empirical estimates suggest that the scheme may be responsible for around 8-17% of all new detected Covid-19 clusters (at least two new ...

http://www.trfetzer.com/subsidizing-the-spread-of-covid-19-evidence-from-the-uks-eat-out-to-help-out-scheme

Subsidizing the spread of COVID-19: Evidence from the UK's Eat ... 

'Eat Out to Help Out' scheme drove new COVID-19 infections up by between 8 and 17%, new research finds. The government initiative, which cost around £500 ...

Half of Yemenis Who Fled to Europe Last Year Chose Netherlands as Their Destination

March 6, 2023

© Jan Kranendonk | Dreamstime.com

The Netherlands has recorded an increase in the number of asylum seekers reaching the country from Yemen in the last two years.

According to the Dutch Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND), almost half of Yemenis who fled to Europe last year chose the Netherlands as their destination, becoming one of the main countries of origin, SchengenVisaInfo.com reports.

“An analysis by the IND shows that last year almost half of the Yemenis who fled to Europe chose the Netherlands as their destination. This makes our country a popular destination in the EU for Yemenis seeking asylum,” the statement of IND reads.

IND reveals that of the total number of first-time asylum applications filed in 2022, seven per cent of them were of nationals of Yemen. The same noted that in 2021, the percentage stood at three per cent.

The number of Yemenis choosing to flee to Europe started to increase significantly following the country’s civil war, and taking into account the security situation in Yemen, the majority of asylum seekers from the country have a high chance of obtaining a residence permit.

According to IND, 93 per cent of asylum applications filed by nationals of Yemen receive a positive decision. The same stressed that the trend keeps increasing, suggesting that the country expects to record more asylum applications this year.

“From 2018, a clear increase in the Yemeni community can be seen in the Netherlands. There are signs that Yemenis on their way to the Netherlands possess remarkable knowledge of Dutch laws and regulations,” IND stressed.

IND further emphasised that the majority of asylum applicants from Yemen are men and noted that most are highly educated, which makes it easier for them to find a job and integrate.

The Netherlands keeps on registering a high number of asylum applications from other countries too. Previously, SchengenVisaInfo.com reported that in January 2023, the Netherlands recorded 2,991 asylum applications.

Syria and Türkiye represented the two main countries of origin, with their nationals filing 638 and i63 asylum applications, respectively, in January 2023.

The Netherlands registered a high number of applications filed by nationals of Somalia, Yemen, and Algeria, too. Data show that in January 2023, nationals of Somalia filed 161 asylum applications in the Netherlands, nationals of Yemen filed 156 applications, and nationals of Algeria filed 153 applications.

The number of asylum applications submitted by minors in January 2023 remained high too, standing at 261. The main countries of origin for minor applicants in January of this year were Syria, Somalia, and Eritrea.

There’s Still No End in Sight to Yemen’s Catastrophic War

Ongoing efforts to negotiate a peace agreement in Yemen haven’t brought an end to fighting between the Houthi movement and a Saudi-led alliance. Even if those efforts bear fruit, Yemenis will suffer the consequences of a humanitarian disaster for years to come.

Fighters loyal to Yemen’s Saudi-backed government march during a mass funeral for fellow fighters, killed during clashes with Houthi rebels, in Yemen’s western province of Hodeida on October 31, 2022. (Khaled Ziad / AFP via Getty Images)

BY HELEN LACKNER

03.06.2023

Jacobin .

Events in April 2022 raised hopes that Yemen’s war might finally be coming to an end. The United Nations Special Envoy Hans Grundberg, appointed in September 2021, successfully persuaded the fighting groups to engage in a two-month renewable truce while he tried to initiate serious negotiations for a long-term political settlement.

In the same month, the Saudi and Emirati governments terminated the ten-year tenure of Yemeni president Abdu Rabbu Mansur Hadi and the six-year tenure of his vice president, Ali Mohsen. They were replaced by an eight-man — as usual, no women — Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) composed of the rival leaders of the major anti- Houthi military and political factions.

After two renewals, the truce that Grundberg had managed to broker expired on October 2, 2022. The warring factions were not yet ready to end the suffering.
Stalemate

Over the past eight years, the overall military situation has remained largely unchanged. The Houthi movement, officially known as Ansar Allah (AA), governs about two-thirds of Yemen’s population living in one-third of its territory. A major Houthi offensive to take Marib governorate and city, which started in early 2020, remained the main military front until the 2022 truce.The Houthi movement governs about two-thirds of Yemen’s population living in one-third of its territory.

This was important because success there would have given AA control over the last remaining northern stronghold of the internationally recognized government (IRG) as well as one of the country’s major sources of hydrocarbons, in particular gas. This explains Houthi determination to continue their assaults despite very heavy losses: between June and November 2021 alone, the Houthis admitted to losing almost fifteen thousand men. When Mareb seemed likely to fall in late 2021, the Saudi-led coalition brought units from the Tihama region to prevent this from happening.

Since the assassination of former president Ali Abdullah Saleh in 2017 by his erstwhile Houthi allies, Ansar Allah has been fully and exclusively in control of most of Yemen’s population. Members of other parties in these areas are mere “tokens” unable to assert verbally or otherwise any views differing from those of the dominant Houthi movement.

The different political tendencies within the Houthi movement are kept under control thanks to the ultimate authority of AA’s leader, Abdul Malik al- Houthi. Tensions and internal dissent are likely to emerge into the open either if they suffer military reverses, or once peace returns and the glue of “external aggression” disintegrates.

By any standards, AA rule is authoritarian and retrograde, manifesting no respect for fundamental human rights of any kind. Any expression of dissent is liable to lead to arrest and ill-treatment. Arbitrary arrests and lengthy prison sentences are imposed capriciously, and executions, even of minors, follow court cases that bear no relationship to recognized legal procedures or proper transparency.

Freedom of expression is nonexistent: journalists are arrested, imprisoned, and given heavy sentences (including death) for no more than doing their jobs. Restrictions on women’s rights include having to be accompanied by male relatives when traveling and having to wear loose-fitting abayas to conform with Houthi dress codes. Arrested under the flimsiest of pretexts, women suffer even more than men when detained, facing violations including sexual harassment and assault.

The Stockholm Agreement

In 2017, the coalition allies, particularly the United Arab Emirates (UAE), were ready to launch a major offensive to retake Hodeida from AA, believing that this would force the Houthis to the negotiating table. Whether this might have worked will never be known, as the Western states supporting the coalition prevented this offensive from happening in anticipation of its expected disastrous humanitarian consequences.The Stockholm Agreement of December 2018 raised hopes among many that it would lead to a wider peace settlement.

A year later, the offensive was launched, with mainly Sudanese and Yemeni ground forces under UAE leadership. They succeeded in taking most of coastal southern Tihama and reached the outskirts of Hodeida city. As fighting took the predicted heavy civilian toll, the international community intervened and forced its interruption. Later in the year, with the Saudi government disgraced by its assassination of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi in Istanbul, international pressure drove it to bring about a meeting of the warring parties in Sweden.

The resulting Stockholm Agreement of December 13, 2018 raised hopes among many that it would lead to a wider peace settlement. The first part of the three-part agreement was a commitment to establish a committee to discuss the situation in Taiz. Nothing has been heard of this since. The second part was supposed to lead to the exchange of sixteen thousand prisoners, but there were just 1,080 prisoners exchanged in the end, almost two years later, in mid-October 2020.

The third part, known as the Hodeida Agreement, included the creation of the UN Mission to support the Hodeida Agreement (UNMHA) in January 2019 under UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2452. This achieved a significant reduction in fighting in Hodeida governorate and stabilized the military front, limiting fighting until September 2021, when the main anti- Houthi forces withdrew one hundred kilometers southward, leaving the Houthis to take over.

The UAE-supported forces retained control over the southern part of the Tihama, including the Bab al-Mandab Strait, which controls the entrance to the Red Sea and, by extension, access to the Suez Canal. In May 2019, UNMHA failed to prevent Ansar Allah’s full takeover of Hodeida port.

The UNSC continues to renew the mandate of the UNMHA. However, the rationale for its existence is obscure, as all of Hodeida city and its governorate have been firmly under Houthi control since late 2021.

Southern Separatism

Following his dismissal as governor of Aden in April 2017, Aydaroos al-Zubeidi announced the creation of the Southern Transitional Council (STC) in May and appointed himself as its president. He installed his close ally, the Salafi leader Hani bin Breik, as his second-in-command.The formation of a joint government in which half were southerners — there were more than half in the previous one — took more than a year.

In the following years, tension between the STC and the Hadi government systematically worsened. Two major military confrontations took place, first in January 2018, and then decisively in August 2019, when the STC expelled the IRG forces and ministers from Aden.

The Saudis initiated months of difficult negotiations, finally achieving the signing of the Riyadh Agreement in November 2019. Intended to reconcile the two factions, it was the high point of Saudi-Emirati cooperation on this issue, as Crown Princes Mohammed bin Salman of the Saudi kingdom and Mohammed bin Zayed of the UAE both attended the signing ceremony.

Further cooperation between the two coalition partners in relation to southern separatism was limited. The UAE supported the STC, including its military actions, against the IRG after the signing of the Riyadh Agreement. According to its clauses, the entire agreement was to be implemented within two months. In reality, the redeployment of military forces had simply not happened by the time Hadi was replaced by the PLC in April 2022.

The formation of a joint government in which half were southerners — there were more than half in the previous one — took more than a year. It was finalized on December 18, 2020. During the remaining period of Hadi’s presidency, the presence of government officials in Aden was on sufferance by the STC, which has controlled the city since 2019. Hadi’s last visit to Aden as president took place in June 2018.

A few points need to be made about southern separatism. First, the STC is only one of many southern separatist factions, and many southerners continue to support Yemeni unity. Second, the STC’s international public prominence is due to political, diplomatic, financial, and military support from the UAE.

Third, the STC’s actual military control and political influence on the ground are limited to the areas of origin of its leaders. By contrast, IRG support in the south came mainly from the eastern part of Abyan and Shabwa governorates. Most Hadramis and Mahris do not support either of these factions.

Finally, STC governance is characterized by the same authoritarianism and oppression as found elsewhere. There are disappearances, arbitrary arrests including torture, and assassinations, particularly of Islamists despite the fact that their party, the Islah, is an important part of the IRG.

Saudi-Emirati divergence

Relations between the two main partners of the Saudi-led coalition have continued to follow increasingly divergent paths in the Yemen war and beyond. Following the interrupted Hodeida offensive of 2018, in the absence of a strategy to defeat AA and with the war proving to be a public-relations disaster, the UAE announced its “withdrawal” from Yemen in July 2019. It also promised to shift from a military to a diplomatic strategy.Relations between the two main partners of the Saudi-led coalition have continued to follow increasingly divergent paths in the Yemen war and beyond.

All this had consequences on the ground. First of all, it led to the abovementioned STC takeover of Aden. The growing breach between the Saudi and Emirati rulers is mostly visible in Yemen where the UAE has supported the STC against the IRG, including through direct military action.

Secondly, it increased UAE reliance on its Yemeni clients. None of these groups is likely to act against its UAE paymaster. Indeed, the rivalries and mutual hostility between them further strengthen UAE influence.

It is also notable that the UAE’s “withdrawal” remains partial. Although it withdrew military forces from positions in Aden, it remains present in the coalition headquarters in Aden, as well as keeping forces in Mokha and in positions controlling the Bab al-Mandab, including the air facilities constructed in 2021 on Perim Island.

Further east, the UAE has not relinquished control of Mukalla’s airport in Riyan, which remains mostly closed to civilian traffic and whose role as a prison and torture site may continue. Most importantly, it has shown no sign of abandoning its base and control over the Balhaf gas export port and terminal.

One military event affected the strategies of the Saudi and Emirati regimes alike and had a medium-term impact on their policies. Following a series of maritime and other incidents in 2019, a drone and missile strike on Saudi Arabia’s major oil facilities in Abqaiq and Khurais on September 14 that year caused major fires and forced the temporary closure of the facilities, reducing Saudi oil exports by half for weeks.

Although the Houthis claimed it, it was soon clear that the attack came from the north and east and consequently could not have been initiated by the Houthis. The lukewarm response of then US president Donald Trump was certainly below the expectations of the Gulf states:

That was an attack on Saudi Arabia, that wasn’t an attack on us. If we decide to do something, they’ll be very much involved, and that includes payment, and they understand that fully.

Looking for an Exit

Following this, and the actual Houthi attack on Abu Dhabi in January 2022, both states decided that they could not rely on the United States to defend them, and that self-reliance was therefore essential.

Houthi missile and drone attacks on Saudi Arabia increased in accuracy and frequency, with a focus on oil-related installations. In response to UAE support for the forces that expelled them from Shabwa governorate, they launched the first serious attacks on Abu Dhabi in January 2022, which damaged oil facilities and killed three civilians.Houthi missile and drone attacks on Saudi Arabia increased in accuracy and frequency, with a focus on oil-related installations.

Concerned about weak support from the United States, particularly after Joe Biden’s new administration asserted its intention to bring the Yemen war to an end, the Saudis and Emiratis agreed to transfer formal authority from Hadi to the PLC in Riyadh on April 7, 2022. Both parties hoped that ensuing negotiations would end attacks on their territories and enable them to terminate their military involvement in Yemen.

Both do indeed appear determined to end direct engagement in Yemen, though their perception of what a solution will entail is unlikely to bring sustainable peace and development for Yemenis. The establishment of the PLC may have been intended to create a united front between Emirati- and Saudi-backed elements to confront the Houthis. However, its first six months were predictably characterized by internal divisions and conflict between its disparate factions.

Legacies of War

Popular suffering increased as the Yemeni economy continued to collapse with the worsening stranglehold of Hodeida and other ports. The country’s GDP has contracted by 50 percent since the war started, leaving Yemenis with a per capita income of about US$600 — less than half of its value before the war.

Alongside the blockade of the Red Sea ports, the economic war has been the main cause of the worsening living conditions for the population at large. In addition to manipulation of fuel supplies and prices, the IRG’s shift of the headquarters of Yemen’s central bank has been the main weapon of the economic war.

This led to the interruption of salary payments to about 1.2 million government staff, most of whom have been paid intermittently since then, averaging about half a month’s salary every few months. To help the IRG finance the import of basic necessities — remember that Yemen imports 90 percent of its staples, and all of its medical supplies — the Saudi kingdom provided the Aden Central Bank of Yemen with $2 billion in 2018 — an amount that was exhausted by the end of 2020.

The other major policy intended to strangle the Houthis financially has been the printing of currency by the IRG. This has led to a widening divergence in the value of the Yemeni riyal between the Houthi-controlled areas and the rest of the country. Starting at a ratio of 215 to 1 with the US dollar in 2014, the currency rapidly lost value. However, it was only with the printing of new banknotes that the situation became critical.In 2020, 2021, and 2022, there were devastating floods in many parts of the country on a largely unprecedented scale.

Ansar Allah banned use of the new notes in the area it controls, thus keeping the exchange rate there at about six hundred riyals to the dollar. The currency’s value rapidly deteriorated in the rest of the country, reaching a peak of 1700 riyals to the dollar in late 2021. The ousting of Hadi was accompanied by a renewed Saudi and Emirati commitment to provide $3 billion to support the Aden-based central bank.

Environmental issues also play a major role in the worsening living conditions of the population. In 2020, 2021, and 2022, there were devastating floods in many parts of the country on a largely unprecedented scale. This trend is likely to become more frequent.

The Way Ahead

Having endured more than eight years of military destruction, economic collapse, disintegration of social infrastructure, and fragmentation, the vast majority of Yemen’s thirty million people have been reduced to the extremes of despair and destitution. Even if a “peace” agreement is reached in the short or medium term, Yemenis will be left to try and restore acceptable living conditions in an extremely hostile and difficult regional political, social, and economic environment, in an increasingly divided world and an Arabian Peninsula dominated by two particularly authoritarian monarchs.The vast majority of Yemen’s thirty million people have been reduced to the extremes of despair and destitution.

In recent months, Grundberg has continued his efforts to end the war by engaging with all those who may have any influence both inside and outside Yemen. As well as making regular trips to Riyadh and the Omani capital Muscat, he has also traveled to Abu Dhabi and even Moscow. Grundberg’s efforts have intensified since the beginning of 2023, partly in response to a significant new political development: the publicly acknowledged direct negotiations between the Saudi authorities and the Houthi movement that started shortly after the expiration of the truce in October 2022.

Coming after years of occasional secret exchanges, these negotiations are important. They represent another concession to long-standing Houthi demands that Saudi Arabia — in their view the main adversary — should negotiate directly with them, and that any internal negotiations between Yemeni factions are a secondary issue to be addressed in the future.

The implications of a direct Saudi-Houthi agreement are clear. It would effectively marginalize the IRG, despite a few assertions to the contrary, and it would consolidate Houthi rule over millions of Yemenis, although it would also threaten the internal cohesion of their movement derived from its resistance to the external aggressor. Such an agreement would also fundamentally change the position of the Houthis internationally, as it would give them formal recognition.

UN mediation efforts have focused on attempting to prevent the exclusion of the IRG from any final agreement. Such an agreement would obviously benefit the Saudi regime by formalizing its extrication from the Yemeni quagmire. Once again, the Houthis have obtained major concessions from their opponents without making any notable concessions of their own. The outcome remains to be seen.

Economically, the Houthis are strengthening their position at the expense of the IRG. First of all, their systematic and effective taxation system means that they are financially viable, even if they are under stress. Their strategy to reopen Hodeida port to all cargo has led them to block goods unloaded in Aden from areas under their control, thus ensuring their access to the additional port funds while reducing those of the IRG.

With the UN calling for more than $4 billion in aid funding for 2023, it is clear that the humanitarian situation is continuing to worsen. With many competing demands for such funding in other parts of the world, pledges are likely to be well-below requirement. An appeal for a similar amount in 2022 reached just 52 percent of the target — the lowest level since the crisis started. Yemenis will continue suffering while their own leaders and those of the main external parties remain utterly indifferent to their plight.

This is an extract from the new updated edition of Helen Lackner’s book Yemen in Crisis: Devastating Conflict, Fragile Hope (Saqi Books).

Helen Lackner is the author of Yemen in Crisis: The Road to War (2019) and Yemen: Poverty and Conflict (2022). She worked in rural development and lived in the three Yemeni states for fifteen years.

Ukraine Space Agency calls the Vega-C failure investigation findings ‘premature’

Seth Kurkowski - Mar. 6th 2023

Friday, Arianespace released its findings from its independent review commission’s investigation into December’s Vega-C failure, blaming a Ukrainian supplier. Now, it looks like Ukraine disagrees with the commission’s findings.

Ukraine Space Agency rebukes the blame

In a statement, the Ukrainian State Space Agency claimed that the commission seated by Arianespace and European Space Agency officials released its finding prematurely. The results blamed a Carbon-Carbon insert found inside Vega-C’s second-stage engine bell. According to the commission, the Carbon-Carbon was found to have errors in its makeup of materials, failing standards for the launch.

According to Ukraine, its experts that took part in the investigation did not see the same conclusion, and all materials supplied by manufacturers were in compliance. The agency also stated it was only informed about the decision by the media. Nevertheless, Ukraine calls on Arianespace and the ESA to continue investigating the Vega-C launch failure.

On the contrary, Arianespace said in its statement that the Ukrainian company has already begun work to replace the Carbon-Carbon insert. So now the question is, who’s right?

Ukraine’s long spaceflight history

Ukraine might not be the first nation you think of to have a thriving space industry. First, it’s never really mentioned by companies that use its exports, and the country is currently fighting off an invasion from Russia.

However, Ukraine has been home to a well-respected space industry dating back to when it was a part of the Soviet Union. From developing engines to building tanks and boosters, Ukraine has its hands in many places regarding rockets.

The first stage booster of Northrop Grumman’s Antares rocket was being built by a Ukrainian company in Dnipro, which was reported damaged by Russian missile strikes early in the invasion. Currently, Northrop is working with Firefly for a new first-stage booster to replace it, as it has lost the booster source and source of engines from Russia.

While put very politely by Ukraine, this developing disagreement will be interesting to watch if anything comes of it.

UK

Pay rise will be a lifeline for some firefighters, union leader says

6 March 2023

Industrial strike. Picture: PA

Firefighters have voted to accept a pay deal, aimed at averting strike action.

The new pay rise for firefighters will be a “lifeline” for those in the service who have “horror stories” about how the cost-of-living crisis has affected them, a union leader has said.

Firefighters voted to accept a pay deal, aimed at averting strike action, earlier on Monday.

General secretary of the Fire Brigades Union (FBU) Matt Wrack told the PA news agency that although the pay rise will “alter” lives in the context of the cost-of-living crisis, the service still needs further investment and a long-term solution on pay.

An improved offer was made in February to the FBU of a 7% pay rise backdated to last July and a further 5% from July this year.

Some 96% of FBU members voted to accept the deal on an 84% turnout.

Mr Wrack told PA that the deal will be a “lifeline” for some members.

He said: “We’ve certainly heard some horror stories about how the cost-of-living crisis is affecting firefighters and some members have clearly, very clearly, said to us, the pay rise will very much alter their lives in that context.”

However, Mr Wrack said that although the deal resolves pay for 2022 and 2023, as well as the threat of strike action “for now”, a “long-term solution on pay” is still needed.

It is understood the 7% backdated pay rise is below the rate of inflation for those 12 months while the 5% figure is predicted to be slightly higher than inflation.

Mr Wrack said members want the FBU to campaign for “decent pay in the long term”.

“Firefighters do a brilliant job across the UK dealing with traditional incidents – like fires and road traffic collisions, but also the new emerging threats like those arising from climate change, like extreme weather events, wildfires and floods and so on,” he added.

We’ve certainly heard some horror stories about how the cost-of-living crisis is affecting firefighters and some members have clearly, very clearly, said to us, the pay rise will very much alter their lives in that context

Matt Wrack, FBU general secretary

“Our members were over in Turkey during the earthquake over the past few weeks and to do that we think there needs to be investment, including investment for the long term in pay.”

Investment is needed in other areas besides pay, the union boss continued.

He told PA: “If you take last summer, the fire service was massively stretched by wildfires including fires breaking into areas of London and houses destroyed as a result of wildfires in London.

“We’ve not really seen anything like that in the UK before.”

He added: “If you want to deal with the threat of wildfires, or major floods, then you’ve got to discuss it, you’ve got to plan for it and then you’ve got to invest in the service.”

Mr Wrack said it was “fortunate” that strike action was not necessary in this dispute.

He hailed the power of collective bargaining – the ability of workers to negotiate directly with their employers – in helping to avoid walkouts.

“If you look at some of the other disputes, that’s where you have so called independent pay review bodies, actually government-appointed pay review bodies,” he said.

“We don’t have that, we don’t want it, we don’t want interference by government in our pay negotiations.

“We want to be able to negotiate separately and independently with our employers. The Westminster Government wants to attack that in England and we’re going to resist that.”

He added: “Collective bargaining in this case has avoided strike action, a pay review body would have guaranteed strike action.”

PA understands the FBU will also campaign against anti-strike legislation and “resist it every step of the way”.

Mr Wrack said: “We’ve got this legislation being pushed through Parliament now at breakneck speed to attack the right to strike through the Minimum Service Levels Bill and again, for us, that’s a fundamental attack on our rights as workers.

“It’s undemocratic, it’s authoritarian, it was not in the Conservative manifesto in relation to firefighters or health or teachers or so on, so it seems completely undemocratic to change the rules of industrial relations without a mandate from the electorate.”

On industrial action taking place across other sectors, Mr Wrack said that workers are “angry” at being asked to pay the price for the failures of economic systems and government policy.

Asked how he would respond to people who may be frustrated with the strikes, Mr Wrack said public support is there and that attempts by politicians to “whip up anti-union feeling” have backfired.

By Press Association

Hyundai supplier plans $67 million Georgia plant, 400 jobs

Mon, March 6, 2023 

BLOOMINGDALE, Ga. (AP) — The South Korean company PHA, which makes latches, hinges and other parts for vehicle doors and hoods, will become the sixth major supplier to locate near a Hyundai Motor Group plant being built in coastal Georgia.

PHA announced Monday it would invest $67 million at a site about 15 miles (24 kilometers) west of Savannah, with plans to hire 400 workers. The company already has a plant in Montgomery, Alabama, near the Hyundai facility in that city.

Hyundai said in May it would build a $5.5 billion plant to assemble electric vehicles and batteries in Ellabell, Georgia. The site could grow to 8,100 employees and is slated to begin producing vehicles in 2025.

PHA said operations would begin in 2024.

Hyundai suppliers have now announced $1.8 billion of investments in the region.

The state will pay to train workers, but the total incentive package from state and local governments wasn’t immediately clear Tuesday.

The local community will donate land for the plant, said Angela Hendrix, a spokesperson for the Savannah Economic Development Authority. She said Chatham County would abate property taxes for 15 years, saving the company a projected 60% on taxes. Hendrix did not release a dollar value for the abatements.

PHA also could qualify for nearly $8 million in state income tax credits, at $4,000 per job over five years, as long as workers make at least $31,300 a year.

Among other suppliers, Sewon Precision Industry Co. plans a $300 million metal stamping plant near Savannah, with 740 workers. Seoyon E-HWA plans a $76 million plant near the city to make interior and exterior trim parts, hiring 730. Hyundai Mobis announced a $926 million powertrain plant in Richmond Hill, employing 1,500. Joon Georgia plans a $317 million plant near Statesboro, employing 630, and Ecoplastic plans a $205 million plant with 456 workers in Register.

The Associated Press

Georgia nuclear plant begins splitting atoms for first time

Mon, March 6, 2023 


ATLANTA (AP) — A nuclear power plant in Georgia has begun splitting atoms in one of its two new reactors, Georgia Power said Monday, a key step toward reaching commercial operation at the first new nuclear reactors built from scratch in decades in the United States.

The unit of Atlanta-based Southern Co. said operators reached self-sustaining nuclear fission inside the reactor at Plant Vogtle, southeast of Augusta. That makes the intense heat that will be used to produce steam and spin turbines to generate electricity.

A third and a fourth reactor were approved for construction at Vogtle by the Georgia Public Service Commission in 2009, and the third reactor was supposed to start generating power in 2016. The company now says Unit 3 could begin commercial operation in May or June.

Unit 4 is projected to begin commercial operation sometime between this November and March 2024.

The cost of the third and fourth reactors was originally supposed to be $14 billion. The reactors are now supposed to cost more than $30 billion. That doesn't include $3.68 billion that original contractor Westinghouse paid to the owners after going bankrupt, which brings total spending to more than $34 billion.

The latest set of delays at Unit 3 included a pipe part of a critical backup cooling system that was vibrating during startup testing. Construction workers had failed to install supports called for on blueprints. The company has also said it had to repair a slowly dripping valve and diagnose a problem involving water flow through reactor coolant pumps.

Georgia Power said Unit 3 would continue startup testing to show that its cooling system and steam supply system will work at the intense heat and pressure that a nuclear reactor creates. After that, operators are supposed to link the reactor to the electrical grid and gradually raise it to full power.

“We remain focused on safely bringing this unit online, fully addressing any issues and getting it right at every level,” Chris Womack, chairman, president and CEO of Georgia Power, said in a written statement. “Reaching initial criticality is one of the final steps in the startup process and has required tremendous diligence and attention to detail from our teams.”

Georgia Power owns a minority of the two new reactors. The remaining shares are owned by Oglethorpe Power Corp., the Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia and the city of Dalton. Oglethorpe and MEAG would sell power to cooperatives and municipal utilities across Georgia, as well in Jacksonville, Florida, and parts of Alabama and the Florida Panhandle.

Georgia Power's 2.7 million customers are already paying part of the financing cost, and state regulators have approved a monthly rate increase of $3.78 a month as soon as the third unit begins generating power. The elected Georgia Public Service Commission will decide later who pays for the remainder of the costs.

Vogtle is the only nuclear plant under construction in the United States. Its costs and delays could deter other utilities from building such plants, even though they generate electricity without releasing climate-changing carbon emissions.

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Follow Jeff Amy at http://twitter.com/jeffamy.

Jeff Amy, The Associated Press