Monday, March 13, 2023

The Unconscionable Push To Bring Back Child Labor

Rather than offering wages attractive to adults, employers want lawmakers to push teens into some of the most dangerous jobs in the country.
March 13, 2023
Source: Otherwords



Brad Greve has been a Scout leader for more than 20 years. The Davenport, Iowa retiree leads 50-mile canoe trips on Minnesota’s Boundary Waters that test teens’ mettle while teaching them essential skills.

Greve told a story recently where two boys, despite being warned repeatedly, let their canoe drift perilously close to a section of stream that swept over rapids into a lake below. They just barely recovered and made it to streambank.

That near-accident a few years ago, Greve said, underscores the vulnerability of young teens. And it fuels Greve’s anger at Republicans across the country who want to gut child labor laws and fill dangerous jobs with still-maturing high schoolers.

A GOP bill in Iowa, for example, would allow 14-year-olds to work in industrial freezers, meatpacking plants, and industrial laundry operations. The legislation would also put 15-year-olds to work on certain kinds of assembly lines, allow them to hoist up to 50 pounds, and allow employers to force kids into significantly longer work days.

In some cases, it would even permit young teens to work mining and construction jobs and use power-driven meat slicers and food choppers.

Make no mistake, this is dangerous work. Just three years ago, a 16-year-old in Tennessee fell more than 11 stories to his death while working construction on a hotel roof. Another 16-year-old lost an arm that same year while cleaning a meat grinder at a Tennessee supermarket.

But these preventable tragedies mean nothing to legislators bent on helping employers pad their bottom lines at kids’ expense. “It’s about businesses wanting cheap labor or more labor than they can currently get because they don’t want to pay reasonable wages or give any benefits,” Greve said.

COVID-19 prompted millions of Americans to ditch jobs lacking decent working conditions, sick leave, and affordable health care. The meatpacking industry, among many others, hemorrhaged workers after deliberately putting them at risk to protect profits during the pandemic.

Now, rather than provide the quality jobs needed to attract adults, Greve observed, companies want their cronies to “throw them a bone” and widen access to child labor.

Minnesota Republicans want to let 16- and 17-year-olds work construction. GOP legislators in Ohio are pushing legislation to expand teens’ work hours. In 2022, labor unions and Democratic officials in Wisconsin beat back a Republican proposal to lengthen work days for teens there.

The Iowa legislation is particularly dangerous because it would exempt employers from civil liability in the event of a youth’s injury or death on the job — even in cases of employer negligence — if the teen was participating in a school-approved “work-based learning program.”

Employers already flout child labor laws at record rates, according to the U.S. Department of Labor.

After the 16-year-old fell off the hotel roof, for example, Tennessee officials determined that the company not only illegally put the teen in harm’s way but also worked him more hours than allowed and cheated dozens of other workers out of overtime pay. Adding insult to injury, the company vowed to appeal the $122,000 fine it received for the teen’s death.

The poor, migrants, victims of trafficking, and other at-risk youths will be especially impacted. Last year, the news agency Reuters found migrant youths and other children as young as 12 working at Alabama companies supplying the auto industry.

The New York Times reported more recently that the illegal employment of minors from poor and migrant families had reached epidemic proportions, reflecting a “new economy of exploitation.” The paper found employers subjecting thousands of kids to some of the deadliest jobs in the country, including work in slaughterhouses and sawmills.

“Why would you want to weaken the law when you can see companies already taking advantage?” asked Greve. “The law should be strengthened.”

Related Posts
Socialism Is All About Expanding Freedom

Libertarians and conservatives talk a lot about freedom, but the most important kind of freedom is freedom from domination — and if you take that seriously, you should oppose capitalism.
March 11, 2023
Source: Jacobin

The men and women who built the trade union movement and fought to end child labor and institute an eight-hour day understood they were fighting for a profoundly important kind of human freedom. (Claude Gabriel / Unsplash)

In my last article for Jacobin, I praised “the republican theory of freedom” — the idea that the most important kind of freedom is freedom from domination.

Some might wonder why I think it’s important for the Left talk about freedom in the first place. We see “freedom” invoked to defend everything from the right of corner gun shops to sell AR-15s without background checks to the right of chemical plants to dump toxic waste in rivers. Shouldn’t we instead ground our politics in alternative values like equality or the alleviation of suffering?

These other values are important. Equality matters both in itself and because genuine freedom is impossible amid massive inequality. Reducing suffering is a valiant aim too. But it would be a huge mistake to cede “freedom” to the defenders of the capitalist status quo.

The drive to overcome unjust relations of domination has always been at the center of the Left’s project.
Conservatives, Libertarians, and Freedom

Conservatives love to talk about freedom. Donald Trump just announced a proposal to charter “freedom cities” on federally owned land. His likely rival for the 2024 Republican presidential nomination, Florida governor Ron DeSantis, recently published a book called The Courage to Be Free.

Progressives pushing back against this rhetoric often point to the Right’s inconsistencies and hypocrisies. What about the freedom of pregnant women to decide what happens in their own bodies? What about the freedoms of gay and trans people?

This is all true and important. But none of it quite reaches the nub of the issue.

After all, if the only problem with mainstream conservatives’ invocation of freedom is that it’s full of blind spots, what should we say about those few relatively principled libertarians who do come down on the right side of many of these battles? While some libertarians are antiabortion, for example, the ones who aren’t describe their worldview as “pro-choice on everything.”


The libertarian conception of freedom is “noninterference” — an idea pithily summarized in the title of Matt Kibbe’s 2014 “libertarian manifesto” Don’t Hurt People and Don’t Take Their Stuff. When DeSantis wants to lock up a Floridian who smokes a joint in her backyard, he’s going against the first half of that title. And when leftists advocate nationalizing private corporations — or even raising taxes to pay for Medicare for All — they’re going against the second half.

One easy way to rebut the Don’t Hurt People and Don’t Take Their Stuff worldview is simply to emphasize the importance of competing values. If you think that people struggling with suicidal depression or addiction to hard drugs sometimes need to be saved from themselves, for instance, or that mass shootings are an unacceptable price to pay for “gun freedom,” you’re going to reject at least the most extreme form of libertarianism. But that’s consistent with thinking freedom is very important — and that “freedom” means what libertarians think it means. So even if you support gun control or want the legal system to push heroin addicts into rehab, you might value “freedom” too much to want to take away Amazon from Jeff Bezos and run it as a public utility.

A deeper problem with freedom as noninterference — or at least with the claim that economic redistribution violates this view of freedom — is that every time you recognize a property right to “stuff,” you’re actually carving out an exception to the “don’t hurt people” part. If you don’t believe me, try to board a privately owned train without a ticket and see what happens.

Libertarians sometimes attempt to get around this problem by appealing to the “non-aggression principle,” which says that hurting people or taking their stuff is only bad if you’re the one initiating the use of force. It’s fine to defend people or their property with the use of force.

But the problem here is with the concept of “your” property. Does this mean the property that’s legally yours? If so, taxation and even nationalization of private companies is just fine! If Congress passes a law to nationalize Amazon, then the company is no longer legally Bezos’s property. On the other hand, if “your” property means the property you’re morally entitled to, then objecting to ethical arguments for redistribution on the grounds that it undercuts your freedom against interference with “your” property is just arguing in a circle.

Whether we’re talking about socialist proposals like nationalizing Amazon or daily capitalist realities like a landlord calling the police to kick squatters out of an unoccupied building, all possible distributions of scarce resources are enforced by some sort of coercion. The question in dispute is never coercion versus no coercion. It is, always and everywhere, which distribution to coercively enforce.
Negative Freedom, Positive Freedom, and Freedom From Domination

If you were nodding along to that last argument, you might think “freedom” can’t tell us much about how resources should be distributed. And it can’t — if freedom means noninterference. But is that the only important kind of freedom, or even the kind that matters most?

One way of pushing back against an excessive emphasis on “negative” liberty is to play up “positive” liberty. Maybe a drug addict, for example, isn’t truly free — you can’t be the master of your own destiny if you’re enslaved to your addiction.

The classic objection to this idea comes from philosopher Isaiah Berlin, who conceded that coercing someone for their own good might in some cases be justified, but who still thought it was absurd to say that if it is my good, then I am not being coerced, for I have willed it, whether I know this or not, and am free (or “truly” free) even when my poor earthly body and foolish mind bitterly reject it, and struggle against those who seek however benevolently to impose it.

Fair enough. But the dichotomy between “negative” freedom from interference and “positive” freedom to act on your “real” underlying interests doesn’t exhaust the possibilities. “Republican” theorists — as in ancient Greek and Roman republics — emphasized freedom from domination, and argued that this was a more fundamental kind of freedom than freedom from interference.

Think about the most extreme form of nonfreedom, slavery. A slave who’s whipped every day is certainly less lucky than one whose master hardly ever strikes him. His body is interfered with less. But is he more free? Proponents of republicanism would say no, because in each case the slave is at the mercy of the master and the same underlying relationship of domination persists.

Of course, ancient republican philosophers had no objection to slavery. They just wanted a class of citizens to be free from the whims of any emperor or oligarch. But in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, abolitionists, labor organizers, and socialists advocated a society in which everyone would be robustly free from domination. Even the elimination of extreme unfreedom through the Union’s victory in the Civil War wasn’t enough to satisfy these radicals, who saw disturbing patterns of domination in Northern industrial capitalism: “Emancipation may have eliminated chattel slavery, but, as eight-hour campaigner Ira Steward once put it, the creation of this new form of economic dependence meant ‘something of slavery still remains . . . something of freedom is yet to come.’”

Under capitalism, the vast majority of people who are directly involved in the economy don’t own what Marxists call “the means of production.” They don’t own factories, for example, or book-packaging warehouses or grocery stores, and they can’t afford to buy any of these things. So they have no realistic option except to rent themselves out for eight hours a day — and it’s only eight hours due to the efforts of people like Steward — to people who do own them.

There’s a profound power imbalance in this relationship. Many workplaces are run as petty dictatorships where the boss can tell workers when they have to smile, when they are or aren’t allowed to talk to each other, and when they can and can’t go to the bathroom. In the vast majority of cases — exceptions include workers with rare and highly valued skills, and periods of especially low unemployment — it’s much easier for a company to replace a worker than for the worker to replace her livelihood. She has to fret about her boss’s opinion of her in a way that he doesn’t. Even if he is a benevolent boss, she is still subject to his whims.

To be sure, there’s a sense in which absolute nondomination is impossible. Humans are socially interconnected, and therefore inescapably dependent on each other’s whims to some extent. We rely on each other to meet our most basic needs — very few of us, for instance, are in a position to grow all our own food. And while human institutions can provide an important degree of stability, legal and political institutions rise and fall over the course of history. Any rights that you have in a given system could be taken away in some unlikely but theoretically possible scenario in the future. We could achieve workers’ control of the means of production and then lose it in a counterrevolution.

But arguing that this means spreading economic power far more evenly wouldn’t be a deeply meaningful extension of freedom from domination is a little bit like saying that someone who lives in a compound surrounded by a high wall and armed guards doesn’t count as “really” safe because they could be taken out by assassins with sufficiently advanced military hardware. Absolute freedom, like absolute safety, is impossible — but that doesn’t make humanly achievable degrees of freedom or safety unimportant.



The Kurdish Feminist Revolution
March 9, 2023
Source: New Internationalist

The tagline of Iran’s recent prowomen’s movement is translated from a Kurdish slogan which neatly captures the ideology of the region’s feminist politics. Here a mural displays the Kurdish original. HERZI PINKI/CREATIVE COMMONS

Around the world, people are chanting ‘Women, Life, Freedom’ in solidarity with the women’s uprising in Iran – dubbing it the ‘first feminist revolution in the world’. Not so, argues Rahila Gupta, as she examines its precursor: a Kurdish feminist revolution in Rojava.

The killing of Jina Mahsa Amini, a Kurdish Iranian woman who allowed a wisp of hair to escape the confines of her hijab, by the morality police on 16 September 2022, has set the streets of Iran on fire with an intensity that threatens to bring down the Islamic regime.

Feminists around the world have been staging solidarity protests and mass hair-cutting rituals. I too chopped off a lock of my hair at London’s Piccadilly Circus in an event organized by Maryam Namazie, an Iranian activist, from One Law for All campaign.

Media interest has been at an all-time high. Western support for the uprisings in Iran has been described by Jacobin magazine as ‘a kind of “intersectional imperialism” that seeks to justify military and diplomatic escalation with Iran in the name of female emancipation from Islamic “barbarism”’. Iranian activists, though, argue that not enough has been done to isolate the government of Iran.

In the high-pitched enthusiasm for the Iranian uprising, some vital truths are being lost. In an interview in The Observer, Iranian writer Shiva Akhavan Rad, refers to the slogan Zan, Zindagi, Azadi (Woman, Life, Freedom) without mentioning that this was in fact adapted from the original Jin, Jiyan, Azadi: a Kurdish slogan protesting the death of a Kurdish woman, Jina Amini.

This is not an act of sectarian point-scoring, but an acknowledgement of the fact that the Kurds are a historically oppressed minority in Iran and across the border in Syria, Iraq and Turkey, and their struggles must not continue to be invisibilized.

That this cause has been embraced by Iranians strengthens the opposition to the country’s oppressive government. But it is the Kurdish regions of Iran, known as Rojhelat in Kurdish, that have borne the brunt of regime brutality.

This brings me to the second trope: that the protest movement in Iran is ‘the first feminist revolution in the world’. Actually, no. The first feminist revolution in the world is in progress in Rojava, northeast Syria, led by Kurdish women (and men) since 2012. It is here that the slogan, Jin, Jiyan, Azadi was first popularized.

The Rojava women’s revolution has hardly been covered in the mainstream media, perhaps in deference to Turkey, a NATO ally, which sees the movement for Kurdish self-determination as ‘terrorism’ – and is bombing Rojava at the time of writing. In the meantime, a protest movement with the potential to bring down the Islamic regime of Iran gets unprecedented coverage: because Iran is an implacable enemy of the West.

Jin, Jiyan, Azadi


A slogan that was little known before the death of Jina Amini, and was enthusiastically chanted in Kurdish political gatherings, now reverberates in meeting halls and demonstrations across the world. An opportunity to discuss its origins is an opportunity to raise awareness of Rojava and so the universal embrace of this slogan is a positive development.

Yet Kurdish women warn of the danger of slogans becoming empty words. As Dilar Dirik, a Kurdish academic and activist, noted at a conference organized by Kurdish women in Berlin in November 2022: ‘Radical and revolutionary slogans and symbols increasingly become commodified, mass-produced, emptied of their meaning, and sold back in plastic to the same people that gave their lives creating these values.’

Jin, Jiyan, Azadi was first chanted on 8 March 2006 at International Women’s Day demonstrations by Kurdish women in cities across Turkey. Within the Kurdish freedom movement, the words are attributed to Abdullah Öcalan, the jailed leader of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) who has been languishing in solitary confinement in a Turkish prison since 1999. He used them in 1993, not as a slogan, but as a pithy evocation of the goals of the movement.

Jin is the Kurdish word for woman and the root of Jineolojî (or ‘the science of women’) proposed by Öcalan. His revolutionary history began with Marxism-Leninism and the demand for an independent nation-state of Kurdistan in 1978, when he set up the PKK in Turkey. However, Öcalan’s thinking evolved in prison. Influenced partly by Murray Bookchin’s ideas on radical municipalism, Öcalan renounced the state as an inherently patriarchal, violent and anti-democratic institution, in favour of a model of participatory grassroots self-administration which he called ‘democratic confederalism’.

Along with anti-statism, Öcalan came to believe that women are the vanguard of the revolution. Öcalan’s reading list in prison included the feminist works of Judith Butler and Maria Mies which, alongside his lengthy discussions with Kurdish feminist revolutionaries like Sakine Cansiz, are credited with influencing his feminist beliefs.

Without wanting to diminish the contribution to the feminist cause of Öcalan and his Kurdish compatriots, it is important to reflect on whether Öcalan’s evolution would have been possible without the theoretical outpourings and extensive activism of second-wave feminism. It is a pleasing cross-fertilisation of ideas. The internationalist outlook of Kurdish feminists is reflected in their knowledge of a range of Western thinkers, a compliment that is not returned – typical of Western orientalism which rarely grapples with ideas and theories that emerge in the Global South.

For Öcalan, ‘Women’s freedom is more precious than the freedom of the homeland’.

He believes that after the workers’ revolutions and national liberation struggles of the 19th and 20th centuries, the 21st century is that of women’s revolution. The pre-eminence of women, the emphasis on our freedom as a precondition for the freedom of the whole of humanity, is an idea that drives the revolution in Rojava and animates the Kurdish movement for self-determination.

This latter-day Nelson Mandela’s analysis of patriarchy stands equal to that of any feminist, and his position is without precedent among male leaders of liberation struggles.

‘Woman’s biological difference is used as justification for her enslavement,’ he writes. ‘All the work she does is taken for granted and called unworthy “woman’s work”.

‘Her presence in the public sphere is claimed to be prohibited by religion, morally shameful; progressively, she is secluded from all important social activities… Thus, the idea of a “weak sex” becomes a shared belief. In fact, society treats woman not merely as a biologically separate sex but almost as a separate race, nation or class – the most oppressed race, nation or class: no race, class or nation is subjected to such systematic slavery as housewifisation.’

Öcalan found the term feminism limiting: it focussed on women’s oppression by men, thus failing to capture all the contributions made by women to history, society and life.

‘It suggests the meaning that she is merely the oppressed woman of the dominant man. Yet women’s reality is more comprehensive than that and includes other meanings beyond gender with far-reaching economic, social, and political dimensions.’
Not only were the women fighting for Kurdish self-determination in the armed struggle in the mountains, they were also resisting the patriarchal attitudes of their male comrades in the guerrilla movement

In meetings with Kurdish political activists in prison in 2014, he elaborated: ‘Feminism needs to be a more radical movement against the system and to purify itself from the effects of liberalism. Jineolojî will contribute to this.’

He elevated it to the status of a science, a subject worthy of study like any other, such as sociology or pedagogy, an ‘ology’. The only reason, he argued, that this science did not exist was because the production of knowledge has been skewed by male dominance.

Öcalan’s view of feminism as the rebellion of the oldest colony turbocharges Jineolojî as an instrument for decolonizing the curriculum from a gender perspective, not a perspective common in Britain where decolonization is mainly about race.

While Öcalan is to be credited with formulating the original principles of Jineolojî, it is Kurdish women who have continued to develop and add nuance to it, based in part on practical knowledge gained from their activism and the experience of establishing the women’s revolution in Rojava in 2012. Discussions began among the women guerrillas in the mountains of Kurdistan before spreading through the rest of society.

There are Jineolojî committees across the four parts of Kurdistan, Europe and Russia. There have also been several international conferences to develop their theories. Dilar Dirik devoted only a few pages to Jineolojî in her recent book on the Kurdish Women’s Movement because it is a ‘constantly evolving process and defining it too much can be limiting to its evolution’.
Self-determination and armed struggle

As early as the third congress of the PKK in 1986, it was announced that an autonomous women’s organization would be set up. In 1987, the Kurdistan Patriotic Women Union (YJWK) was founded. This group hosted the movement’s first theoretical discussions on patriarchal exploitation, women’s liberation and the social construction of women and their role in the family.

These ideas were contextualised by Öcalan in his book, Woman and the Family Issue in Kurdistan (not available in English).

The founding of the women’s armed wing in 1993, in an attempt at autonomous organization in all areas of political activity, generated new understandings and knowledge.


Not only were the women fighting for Kurdish self-determination in the armed struggle in the mountains, they were also resisting the patriarchal attitudes of their male comrades in the guerrilla movement.

This made them understand the importance of fighting for women’s liberation alongside class and national liberation struggles.

Given the emphasis that Öcalan placed on women’s freedom, this was not a matter to be postponed until after the solution of the Kurdish question. This was a significant lesson taken from previous national liberation struggles against colonial powers, particularly in Asia and Africa, where women were asked to postpone their own struggles until after independence was won. Women began organizing in the cities as well, where they came to understand the patriarchal structures of capitalist modernity.

‘The theory of “Eternal Divorce”, aiming to make the issue of freedom visible for both woman and man, became an important step to enable both genders to become aware of their own reality,’ as the booklet on Jineolojî explains. Öcalan’s theory on ‘Killing the Dominant Male’ – dealing with toxic masculinity – is based on women’s struggles to free themselves from the oppression of men.

The first women’s party (PJKK) was formed in March 1999, soon after Öcalan’s arrest, to address his regret over having not formed one thus far. The party dropped the reference to Kurdistan in the following year and renamed themselves PJA (Free Women’s Party), to signal that all women of all nationalities and backgrounds were welcome to join, an inclusiveness which transcends the narrow nationalisms based on ethnic identity.

The dynamism of the movement is reflected in the number of different organizations that have been set up in the last 20 years, with a number of name changes to reflect nuances of political positions. However, it is a veritable alphabet soup to be decoded only by the most fervent scholars of the movement.

Central to the project of Jineolojî is the attempt to achieve a transformation in the social sciences, which claim to be a systematized production of knowledge of lived reality, an objective, rational, scientific study of human behaviour and social relations. ‘Jineolojî is a science born out of objections to conventional science,’ says the booklet.

It enumerates the areas in which women played a central role but have slipped below the horizon of history, insisting that ‘women are not the sediment of society, but are the core’. Its function is to provide the ideological foundations for a system that is centred on women and engages with nine subject areas: history, ethics and aesthetics, demography, health, education, self-defence, economy, politics, and ecology.

Importantly, Jineolojî is a template for action, a solutions-based approach which posits the establishment of democratic confederalism, with women at the centre, as the only way to fight capitalist and patriarchal oppression.

The People’s Protection Units (YPG) and Women’s Protection Units (YPJ) are predominantly-Kurdish armed militias which have played a key role in fighting Islamic State in the Syrian civil war. KURDISHSTRUGGLE/FLICKR/CREATIVE COMMONS


Positivism in the dock


Positivism is given a hard time by Jineolojî. Western reliance on evidence-based, objective truths and scientific principles, on what is provable, and which denies the relevance of other forms of learning and traditional wisdoms, is critiqued for its short-sightedness. Jineolojî examines how science, apparently so emotion-free and rational, has become corrupted by power, racism and sexism.

While acknowledging the negative patriarchal values embedded in subjects like mythology, religion and philosophy, Jineolojî believes there are truths contained in them which should not have been cast aside by positivism as it developed in 17th century Europe.

Around the same time, women’s traditional wisdom as healers was seen as a threat to society and women’s behaviour was disciplined by the mass burning of ‘witches’, a history that is now reclaimed and recast by writers like Silvia Federici in Caliban and the Witch as part of the journey from feudalism to capitalism.

Jineolojî questions the great claims made for the Enlightenment, critiquing the principles of positivism by which it was shaped. It questions the fragmentation of social sciences and the value of specialisms like economics, sociology, history and philosophy, when knowledge should be whole and indivisible.

The ‘harsh materialism’ of positivism is seen as more regressive than metaphysics and religion. Yet in Öcalan’s ‘three ruptures’ theory, the role that religion plays in shoring up patriarchy comes in for a thoroughgoing critique. In his pamphlet on women’s revolution, Liberating Life, Öcalan advances his ‘three sexual ruptures’ theory of women’s enslavement and eventual liberation.

The first rupture, or turning point, was the rise of patriarchy when Neolithic times ended and ‘statist civilization’ arose; the second sexual rupture was the intensification of patriarchy through religious ideology.

As Öcalan says: ‘Treating women as inferior now became the sacred command of god’. The third rupture is yet to come, the end of patriarchy or as Öcalan puts it ‘killing the dominant male’, which is about reshaping masculinity so that it no longer defines itself in relation to its power over women.


Claims to exceptionalism

The booklet on Jineolojî hopes to clarify how ‘Jineolojî’s approach differs from the other currents of thought’.

This is where the trouble begins – it lays down a gauntlet to feminists to respond to, with examples of feminist theorizing that cover the same ground as Jineolojî. Many of us, who are allies of the movement, have been exercised by this claim, particularly as there are so many strands of feminism in the West that all the theoretical approaches in Jineolojî have already been articulated by women at some point.

In making its claim to exceptionalism, Jineolojî does appear to homogenize Western feminism as mainly liberal without recognizing the more radical strands.

Dilar Dirik critiques liberal feminism’s individualistic and legalistic approach to change as ‘forms of ideological assimilation that pacify movements rather than transform the system’. This criticism is also articulated by women who subscribe to radical, socialist or Marxist ideologies.
We cannot just make revolution happen by changing the system and then expecting that the system will change the people within it. We see from history that this is not enough

But, as Kurdish feminists rightly point out, this plethora of perspectives has driven a fragmentation of transnational feminism, while Jineolojî has been able to coalesce elements of these various thought systems into a single framework behind which Kurdish women have united. Their anti-state position, for example, has brought many anarchists flocking to the cause.

Others have been attracted to the equal emphasis placed on changing the system and the self, each standing in a symbiotic relationship to the other, and the theory of xwebûn, or being and becoming yourself – unlike classical Marxism which proposed that the individual was shaped by class relations and that once the system changed it would shape human character in a more progressive mould.

The booklet on Revolutionary Education argues: ‘We cannot just make revolution happen by changing the system and then expecting that the system will change the people within it. We see from history that this is not enough.’

The ‘freedom’ part of the Jin, Jiyan, Azadi slogan is also a reference to changing mentality in both men and women. ‘Transforming the man is essential to a free life,’ says Öcalan. Dilar Dirik tells us that the women’s liberation ideology is not a framework reserved for women. It is also taught to male cadres, whose militancy is assessed by their approach to women’s liberation and by their engagement with ‘men’s freedom problem’.

In an email, the Academy of Jineolojî explained that one of their main research topics currently is the analysis of ‘co-life’ (hevjiyana azad) and dominant masculinity. How to build the potential for freedom instead of the potential for slavery in all, including sexual relationships between women and men.

As Havin Guneser, translator of Öcalan’s works into English, points out in her book, The Art of Freedom: ‘What we are seeing is that the relationship between men and women is deemed to be a private domain, but it is, in fact, the first and foremost locus of the colonization process.’

While Western feminists have analyzed toxic masculinity, the work of changing men and their patriarchal mentality is more often seen as a job for men and not the responsibility of women. There are some women’s organizations which have established perpetrator programmes, such as anger management, aimed at men who have been violent towards their partners.

The importance of personal transformation for both men and women while at the same time engaging in a struggle to change the system with its anti-capitalist, anti-state and ecological focus, is a syncretic political tradition the like of which we have not quite seen before. ‘It refuses to choose between a materialism, which takes the object as the absolute, or an idealism, which takes the subject as the absolute.’

The emphasis on ethics and aesthetics as the fundamental basis of the perspective and practices of Jineolojî is also unusual for a liberation struggle. This is seen by its proponents to be the main difference that distinguishes Jineolojî from scientism and from the dominant understandings of social sciences. Beauty is not about appearing attractive to men but is reconceptualized as synonymous with freedom, cultural and ethical values.

This is how Öcalan expresses it: ‘The one who fights becomes free, the one who becomes free becomes beautiful, the one who is beautiful is loved’. Aesthetics should be informed by a commitment to justice, autonomy, truth and liberation.

Zozan Sima, from the Jineolojî Academy in Rojava, expands upon Ocalan’s statement: ‘Women, who democratize politics, women, who risk their lives to protect communities and other women, women who educate themselves and those around them, women who live communally, women who save the ecological equilibrium, women who struggle to raise children in free countries, with their own identities, and many others are all women who become beautiful through struggle.

‘In today’s world full of ugliness, injustice and evil, it is not physical, augmented forms of aesthetics which constitute beauty; only women who defend life through struggle can create beauty. In this sense, is there anything more beautiful than the young women who fight against Daesh fascism?’

But these claims to exceptionalism do not convince Nadje Al-Ali and Isabel Käser, feminist academics.

In their essay, ‘Beyond Feminism? Jineolojî and the Kurdish Women’s Freedom Movement’, they locate Jineolojî within standpoint theory, a perspective that empowers marginalized groups by validating the knowledge produced from their subjective positions.

They also point to transnational feminists who challenge the binary between secularism and spirituality common in Western thought and recount the number of feminists who have critiqued the social sciences and dedicated themselves to unearthing women’s histories.

At one level, this is academic.


If Jineolojî provides the template for the first and only women’s revolution in the world, its claim to exceptionalism is totally justified. Why should it matter whether there is an overlap or not with other strands of feminist thought? It is surely the science of the women’s revolution which is its primary distinction from other feminist theorizing.

Al-Ali and Käser are unnecessarily defensive in the face of their Kurdish interviewees’ critique that global feminism is divided and unable to translate its critical perspectives into political action, in pointing to ‘the long history of feminist mobilization globally, which, despite many setbacks and unresolved inequalities, has been central to challenging structural inequalities and improving women’s everyday lives in many contexts’.

The fragmentation of women’s struggles, the different strands – radical feminism, anarcho-feminism, Marxist-feminism, ecofeminism – has undeniably held us back. The Jineolojî booklet describes Western feminism as ‘hope movements’ without revolutionary potential.

In Liberating Life, Öcalan argues that feminism can never be totally successful in a capitalist system, which thrives on division; that class and race equality in a secular democratic system is part of the struggle for women’s liberation. Many feminists, such as the Combahee River Collective of black feminists, would agree with this analysis, but they are unable to put into practice ideas of race and class equality in a capitalist system.

No wonder that transnational feminism is often derided as a middle-class affair which excludes working-class and minority women.

The response of the Jineolojî committee, Europe, to Al-Ali and Käser’s article was also unnecessarily defensive – surprisingly so, given the value that the Kurdish women’s movement places on criticism and self-criticism.

The committee critiqued the authors’ methodology, felt that interviewees had been quoted out of context and noted the fact that they did not read any of the work available in Kurdish or Turkish – a criticism that could equally be made of this article.

Criticizing the authors for ‘patroniz[ing] and trivializ[ing] our work,’ is an unfair criticism as the piece was attempting to engage seriously with Jineolojî and appraise it from a position of solidarity with Kurdish women.

As Al-Ali and Käser acknowledged, ‘Jineoloji’s transformative potential has not been realized by any other feminist politics’.
A Socialist Feminist Primer
By Lilijana Burcar
March 11, 2023
Source: Skripta TV

Lilijana Burcar talks about reconstruction of patriarchy in formerly communist countries and explains differences between state capitalist and socialist perceptions of women.

Conspiracy Theory
By Michael Albert
February 28, 2023
Source: Originally published by Z. Feel free to share widely.


Media and individuals too often field too few questions about the systemic causes of trends and events. More often they ask about and study the membership of some rogue group even as they ignore the structure of government and corporations. How did this “fashion” come about? Where is it taking us?

A Conspiracy Theory is a hypothesis that some events were caused by the intractable secret machinations of rogue individuals. A prime example was, for example, to explain Iran-contra as the secret rogue actions of Oliver North and co-conspirators. Another conspiracy theory explained the hostage-holding in Carter’s last presidential year as the machinations of a “secret team” helping Reagan win the presidency. A conspiracy theory of Karen Silkwood’s murder would uncover the names of people who secretly planned and carried out the murder. Bending usage, we could even imagine a conspiracy theory of patriarchy as rogue men uniting to deny women status, or a conspiracy theory of the U.S. government as competing groups of rogue officials pursuing their own nefarious ends. And, then, more recently, well, take your pick…

Conspiracies do exist. Groups regularly do do things without issuing press releases and such secrecy becomes a conspiracy whenever their actions transcend “normal” behavior. We don’t talk of a conspiracy to win an election if the suspect activity includes only candidates and their handlers working privately to develop effective strategy. We do talk about a conspiracy if the resulting action involves stealing the other team’s plans, spiking their Whiskey Sours, or other exceptional activity. When a conspiracy cause’s some outcome, the outcome would not have happened had not the particular people with their particular inclinations and even hallucinations come together.

Conspiracy theories:

(a) Claim that a particular group acted outside usual norms in a rogue and generally secretive fashion.

(b) Disregard the structural features of institutions.

Personalities, personal timetables, secret meetings, and conspirators’ joint actions claim attention. Institutional relations drop from view. We ask, did North meet with Bush before or after the meeting between MacFarlane and Mr. X? Do we have a document that reveals the plan in advance? Do phone conversations implicate so and so? How credible is that witness? Conspiracy theories may or may not identify real coteries with real influence.

In an Institutional Theory, personalities and personal motivations enter the discussion only as effects of more basic factors. The personal actions that culminate in some event do not serve as explanation. Institutional theory explains phenomena via roles, incentives, and the dynamics of underlying institutions. An institutional theory doesn’t ignore human actions, but the point of an institutional theory is to move explanation from personal factors to structural factors. If the particular people hadn’t been there to do it, most likely someone else would have.

An institutional theory of Irancontra and the October surprise would explain how and why these activities arose in a society with our political, social, and economic forms. An institutional theory of Karen Silkwood’s murder would reveal nuclear industry and larger societal pressures that provoked her murder. An institutional theory of patriarchy explains gender relations in terms of marriage, the church, the market, socialization, etc. An institutional theory of government emphasizes the control and dissemination of information, the dynamics of bureaucracy, the role of subservience to class, race, and gender interests, etc.

Institutions exist. Whenever they have sufficient impact on events, developing an institutional theory makes sense. However, when an event arises from a unique conjuncture of particular rogue people and unique opportunities, while institutions undoubtedly play a role, it may not be generalized and an institutional theory may be out of place or even impossible to construct.

Institutional theories may or may not identify real relationships with real influence on the events they explain. Institutional theories:

(a) Claim that the normal operations of some institutions generate the behaviors and motivations leading to the events in question.

(b) Address personalities, personal interests, personal timetables, and meetings only as facts about the events needing explanation, not as explanations themselves.

(c) Organizational, motivational, and behavioral implications of institutions gain most attention. Particular people, while not becoming mere ciphers, are not accorded priority as causal agents.

To see the operational difference between conspiracy theory and institutional theory we can compare a smattering of the views of two critics of U.S. foreign policy, Noam Chomsky and Craig Hulet as they related to the war on Iraq thirty tears ago. Here is an indicative passage from each about that war (really one-sided massacre), which hopefully readers still know of.

HULET: “This isn’t about Kuwait. This isn’t about oil. It has nothing to do with those things. And it certainly doesn’t have anything to do with reinstalling a legitimate government [in Kuwait] when for the first time we’re trying to install a legitimate government which is a non-military despotism listed by Amnesty International as committing the same heinous crimes against his people [as Hussein]… What I am suggesting is that for the first time we’re going to expend American lives to put in a tyrant of only a smaller stature because of the size of his country…there is a foreign policy that is being orchestrated in violation of U.S. law, international law, and the U.S. constitution. Should that surprise anyone after Watergate, the Kennedy assassination?…

“Why should Americans die to restore a dictator invaded by another dictator? First it was to protect Saudi Arabia. Everybody now knows he [Hussein] had no intention of going any further than Kuwait. So they dropped that as a reason. They came up with the next one, that this is about oil. Then all of a sudden oil prices, right in the midst of the war, drop to $21 a barrel, which was where it was before the war. So it obviously can’t be about oil. So it can’t be our vital interests at stake. Is it about a legitimate government? If it’s about a legitimate government, then we’re putting back in power a despot under the Breshnev doctrine, not the Truman doctrine. The Breshnev doctrine being that we treat all nations as sovereign equalities regardless of how despotic they are, and we keep them in power. So for the first time George Bush is now acting out the Breshnev doctrine rather than installing a free republic or keeping a free people free. [There follows a long discussion of the U.S. holdings and influence of the Al Sabah ruling Kuwaiti family, followed by listener questions primarily focused on the efficacy of impeaching George Bush to which Hulet’s response is:] “It’s going to be up to the public whether or not George Bush–and I agree, it’s a ruling Junta–is impeached. It won’t be just up to Senators and Congressmen to make this decision. They won’t make the decision unless public opinion supports this kind of action.”

CHOMSKY: “If we hope to understand anything about the foreign policy of any state, it is a good idea to begin by investigating the domestic social structure: Who sets foreign policy? What interests do these people represent? What is the domestic source of their power? It is a reasonable surmise that the policy that evolves will reflect the special interests of those who design it. An honest study of history will reveal that this natural expectation is quite generally fulfilled. The evidence is overwhelming, in my opinion, that the United States is no exception to the general rule–a thesis that is often characterized as a ‘radical critique’… Some attention to the historical record, as well as common sense, leads to a second reasonable expectation: In every society there will emerge a caste of propagandists who labor to disguise the obvious, to conceal the actual workings of power, and to spin a web of mythical goals and purposes, utterly benign, that allegedly guide national policy… any horror, any atrocity will be explained away as an unfortunate–-or sometimes tragic–-deviation from the national purpose…. Since World War II there has been a continuing process of centralization of decision-making in the state executive, certainly with regard to foreign policy. Secondly, there has been a tendency through much of this period toward domestic economic concentration. Furthermore, these two processes are closely related, because of the enormous corporate influence over the state executive…”

The commonality often evidenced in these two thinkers is distaste for U.S. foreign policy. The difference is that Hulet generally understands policy as the preferences of particular groups of people–in this case, “a junta” and the Al Sabah family–-barely referring to institutions at all. Chomsky always understands the policies as arising from particular institutions–-for example, “the state executive” and corporations.

For Hulet, the implicit problem is to punish or “impeach” the immediate culprits, a general point which holds for all conspiracy theory. The modis operendi of the conspiracy theorist therefore makes sense when the aim is to attribute proximate personal blame for some occurrence. If we want to prosecute someone for a political assassination to extract retribution or to set a precedent that makes it harder to carry out such actions, the approach of the conspiracy theorist has relevance. But the conspiracy approach is beside the point for understanding the cause of political assassinations to develop a program to prevent all policies that thwart popular resistance. Conspiracy theorizing mimics the personality/dates/times approach to history. It is a casual sports fans’ or a gossipy voyeur’s view of complex circumstances. It can manipulate facts or it can present them accurately. When it’s done honestly, it has its place in a prosecutors tool chest.

For Chomsky, however, the problem is to discern the underlying institutional causes of foreign policy. The modus operandi of the institutional theorist would not make much sense for discovering which individuals conceived and argued for a policy, or who in particular decided to bomb a civilian shelter. To understand why these things happen, however, and under what conditions they will or will not continue to happen, institutional theory is indispensable and the motives, methods, and timetables of the actual perpetrators are beside the point.

Take the media. A conspiracy approach will highlight the actions of some coterie of editors, writers, newscasters, particular owners, or even a lobby. An institutional approach will mention the actions of these actors as evidence, but will highlight the corporate and ideological pressures giving rise to the outcomes. A person inclined toward finding conspiracies will listen to evidence of media subservience to power and see a cabal of bad guys, perhaps corporate, perhaps religious, perhaps federal, subverting the media from doing its proper job. The conspiracist will then at best want to know about the cabal and how people succumb to its will, etc. A person inclined toward institutional analysis will listen to evidence of media subservience to power and see how the media’s internal prganization, socialization processes, and the interests of its owners born of their institutional roles engender these results as part of the media succeeding at its job. The institutionalist will want to know about the media’s structural features and how they work, and about the guiding interests, how they arise, and what they imply.

The conspiracy approach to understanding media will lead people to believe that either:

(a) They should educate the malefactors to change their motives, or

(b) They should get rid of the malefactors and back new editors, writers, newscasters, or owners.

The institutional approach to understanding media may note the possible short term gains from changes in personnel, but will mainly explain how limited these changes will be. It will incline people

(a) Toward a campaign of constant popular pressure to offset the constant institutional pressures for malfeasance, or

(b) Toward the creation of new media free from the institutional pressures of the mainstream.

Conspiracy Theory and its associated personalistic methodology appeals to prosecutors and lawyers, since they must identify proximate causes and human actors. But why does it often appeal to people concerned to change society?

There are many possible answers that perhaps all operate, to varying degrees, for people who favor conspiracy theory. First, conspiracy theory is often emotionally compelling and the evidence conspiracy theories reveal is often useful. More, carefully unearthing detailed entwinements can become addictive. One puzzle and then another and another demands explanation. Conspiracy theory has the appeal of a mystery. It is dramatic, compelling, vivid, and human. Finally, the desire for retribution helps fuel continuing forays into personal details.

Second, conspiracy theories have manageable implications. They imply that all was okay once and that all can be okay again if only the conspirators can be pushed aside. Conspiracy theories therefore explain ills without forcing us to disavow society’s underlying institutions. Conspiracy theories allow us to admit horrors and to express our indignation and anger at them without rejecting the basic norms of society. We can confine our anger to the most blatant perpetrators. That government official or corporate lawyer is bad, but many others are good and the government and law per se are okay. That gun toting maniac in the elementary school or that rogue cop are bad, but the culture, the NRA, the police apparatus are okay. We need to get rid of the bad apples. But then all is well. All this is convenient and seductive. We can reject specific candidates but not government, specific CEOs but not corporations, specific writers, editors, and even owners of periodicals, but not mainstream media. We can reject some vile manipulators, but not society’s core institutions. We continue to petition the institutions to give us status or pay us.

Third, conspiracy theory provides an easy and quick outlet for pent up passion withheld from targets that seem unassailable or that might strike back. This is conspiracy theory turned into scapegoat theory.

It would be bad enough if endless personalistic attention to Irancontra, the October Surprise, Inslaw, assassinations, much less recent elections, and crazy delusional schemes, etc., were just attuning people to search after coteries while ignoring institutions. This was the effect, for example, of the many Kennedy Assassination theories of past decades. At least the values at play would be progressive and we could hope that people would soon gravitate toward real explanation highlighting more structural phenomena.

But the fact is, the values inspiring conspiratorial ways of trying to explain events have in recent years drastically diverged from progressive values. Even some sectors of left activists have become so hungry for quick-fix conspiracy explanations they gravitate toward any conspiracy claim, no matter how ridiculous.

Thus the field of conspiracy theorizing has become attractive and new entrants are no longer mainly progressive but often instead tilt toward reaction or downright fascism. The presentation of conspiracy theories has moved from little newsletters and journals to large audience radio talk shows and magazines and presidential campaigns and from identifying “secret teams” of CIA operatives to all-powerful networks of Arab financiers and worldwide Jewish bankers’ fraternities, not to mention liberal child sex traders. It is so ubiquitous it isn’t even called conspiracy theorizing any more. Now it is called electioneering. Now it is called journalism.

There is an ironic analogy here to some recent analysis of national Republican Party politics. In that arena, many journalists not long ago claimed that the Republican Party’s manipulations of race in prior years paved the way for David Duke by re-acclimating the public to racial stereotyping and increasing its appetite for more. Then Duke’s times led through Facebook and Twitter to Trump times, now leading to Santos times. In somewhat the same way, isn’t it plausible that the relatively huge resources thrown into progressive conspiracy writing, organizing, and proselytizing over the past few decades is now also coming home to roost? Of course, the changing times are partly responsible for growing public interest in conspiracies, but doesn’t past behavior by some progressives bear a share of responsibility as well?

Leftist institutional theorists generally ignore conspiracy theorists as irrelevant. To confront their arguments is to enter a miasma of potentially fabricated detail from which there is no escape. Nothing constructive emerges. But perhaps this view needs some rethinking. When Holly Sklar, Steve Shalom, Noam Chomsky or any of many other left analysts talked in the past about events, even about Iran-contra, say, or the October Surprise, they paid attention to proximate facts but also to the institutional context. That’s as it should be, but apparently it’s no longer good enough. Now, those who have an institutional critique may have two additional responsibilities. First, perhaps we should point out the inadequacy of left conspiracy theorizing even when it isn’t called by that name, showing that even at best it does not go far enough to be useful for organizers. Second, perhaps they should debunk and castigate rightist conspiracy theory, removing its aura of opposition and revealing its underlying racist and elitist allegiances.

Likewise, when progressive radio talk shows and left journals and magazines invite people to communicate with their public about world and national events, it is good to be sure the guest is coherent, has effective speaking or writing style, talks about the issues, identifies actors accurately, and knows about the relevant history. But that too isn’t enough. Fascists can fulfill these standards and still spout made-up statistics as if they were facts, make disgusting allegations about social groups as if they were objective commentary, and offer nothing at all about real institutional relations, while passing this whole mess off as a useful way to look at the world to understand and affect social events. Left media, even strapped as it is, should take responsibility for its offerings. People expect that if commentators appear on our shows and in our publications they have a degree of integrity, honesty, and sensitivity. We should not lend credence to right-wing garbage, whether it is blatant or so well concealed as to be civil but malicious. Even regarding progressive and left conspiracy theory, while it sometimes may uncover important evidence, left activists ought to always indicate its limits and augment it with institutional and contextual analysis.



Michael Albert
Michael Albert`s radicalization occurred during the 1960s. His political involvements, starting then and continuing to the present, have ranged from local, regional, and national organizing projects and campaigns to co-founding South End Press, Z Magazine, the Z Media Institute, and ZNet, and to working on all these projects, writing for various publications and publishers, giving public talks, etc. His personal interests, outside the political realm, focus on general science reading (with an emphasis on physics, math, and matters of evolution and cognitive science), computers, mystery and thriller/adventure novels, sea kayaking, and the more sedentary but no less challenging game of GO. Albert is the author of 21 books which include: No Bosses: A New Economy for a Better World; Fanfare for the Future; Remembering Tomorrow; Realizing Hope; and Parecon: Life After Capitalism. Michael is currently host of the podcast Revolution Z and is a Friend of ZNetwork.


The False Promise of ChatGPT
By Noam Chomsky, Ian Roberts , Jeffrey Watumull 
March 9, 2023
Source: The New York Times

Ai generated image of the article title DALL·E-2023-03-09-16.20.39-The-False-Promise-of-ChatGPT

Jorge Luis Borges once wrote that to live in a time of great peril and promise is to experience both tragedy and comedy, with “the imminence of a revelation” in understanding ourselves and the world. Today our supposedly revolutionary advancements in artificial intelligence are indeed cause for both concern and optimism. Optimism because intelligence is the means by which we solve problems. Concern because we fear that the most popular and fashionable strain of A.I. — machine learning — will degrade our science and debase our ethics by incorporating into our technology a fundamentally flawed conception of language and knowledge.

OpenAI’s ChatGPT, Google’s Bard and Microsoft’s Sydney are marvels of machine learning. Roughly speaking, they take huge amounts of data, search for patterns in it and become increasingly proficient at generating statistically probable outputs — such as seemingly humanlike language and thought. These programs have been hailed as the first glimmers on the horizon of artificial general intelligence — that long-prophesied moment when mechanical minds surpass human brains not only quantitatively in terms of processing speed and memory size but also qualitatively in terms of intellectual insight, artistic creativity and every other distinctively human faculty.

That day may come, but its dawn is not yet breaking, contrary to what can be read in hyperbolic headlines and reckoned by injudicious investments. The Borgesian revelation of understanding has not and will not — and, we submit, cannot — occur if machine learning programs like ChatGPT continue to dominate the field of A.I. However useful these programs may be in some narrow domains (they can be helpful in computer programming, for example, or in suggesting rhymes for light verse), we know from the science of linguistics and the philosophy of knowledge that they differ profoundly from how humans reason and use language. These differences place significant limitations on what these programs can do, encoding them with ineradicable defects.


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It is at once comic and tragic, as Borges might have noted, that so much money and attention should be concentrated on so little a thing — something so trivial when contrasted with the human mind, which by dint of language, in the words of Wilhelm von Humboldt, can make “infinite use of finite means,” creating ideas and theories with universal reach.

The human mind is not, like ChatGPT and its ilk, a lumbering statistical engine for pattern matching, gorging on hundreds of terabytes of data and extrapolating the most likely conversational response or most probable answer to a scientific question. On the contrary, the human mind is a surprisingly efficient and even elegant system that operates with small amounts of information; it seeks not to infer brute correlations among data points but to create explanations.

For instance, a young child acquiring a language is developing — unconsciously, automatically and speedily from minuscule data — a grammar, a stupendously sophisticated system of logical principles and parameters. This grammar can be understood as an expression of the innate, genetically installed “operating system” that endows humans with the capacity to generate complex sentences and long trains of thought. When linguists seek to develop a theory for why a given language works as it does (“Why are these — but not those — sentences considered grammatical?”), they are building consciously and laboriously an explicit version of the grammar that the child builds instinctively and with minimal exposure to information. The child’s operating system is completely different from that of a machine learning program.

Indeed, such programs are stuck in a prehuman or nonhuman phase of cognitive evolution. Their deepest flaw is the absence of the most critical capacity of any intelligence: to say not only what is the case, what was the case and what will be the case — that’s description and prediction — but also what is not the case and what could and could not be the case. Those are the ingredients of explanation, the mark of true intelligence.

Here’s an example. Suppose you are holding an apple in your hand. Now you let the apple go. You observe the result and say, “The apple falls.” That is a description. A prediction might have been the statement “The apple will fall if I open my hand.” Both are valuable, and both can be correct. But an explanation is something more: It includes not only descriptions and predictions but also counterfactual conjectures like “Any such object would fall,” plus the additional clause “because of the force of gravity” or “because of the curvature of space-time” or whatever. That is a causal explanation: “The apple would not have fallen but for the force of gravity.” That is thinking.

The crux of machine learning is description and prediction; it does not posit any causal mechanisms or physical laws. Of course, any human-style explanation is not necessarily correct; we are fallible. But this is part of what it means to think: To be right, it must be possible to be wrong. Intelligence consists not only of creative conjectures but also of creative criticism. Human-style thought is based on possible explanations and error correction, a process that gradually limits what possibilities can be rationally considered. (As Sherlock Holmes said to Dr. Watson, “When you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth.”)


But ChatGPT and similar programs are, by design, unlimited in what they can “learn” (which is to say, memorize); they are incapable of distinguishing the possible from the impossible. Unlike humans, for example, who are endowed with a universal grammar that limits the languages we can learn to those with a certain kind of almost mathematical elegance, these programs learn humanly possible and humanly impossible languages with equal facility. Whereas humans are limited in the kinds of explanations we can rationally conjecture, machine learning systems can learn both that the earth is flat and that the earth is round. They trade merely in probabilities that change over time.

For this reason, the predictions of machine learning systems will always be superficial and dubious. Because these programs cannot explain the rules of English syntax, for example, they may well predict, incorrectly, that “John is too stubborn to talk to” means that John is so stubborn that he will not talk to someone or other (rather than that he is too stubborn to be reasoned with). Why would a machine learning program predict something so odd? Because it might analogize the pattern it inferred from sentences such as “John ate an apple” and “John ate,” in which the latter does mean that John ate something or other. The program might well predict that because “John is too stubborn to talk to Bill” is similar to “John ate an apple,” “John is too stubborn to talk to” should be similar to “John ate.” The correct explanations of language are complicated and cannot be learned just by marinating in big data.

Perversely, some machine learning enthusiasts seem to be proud that their creations can generate correct “scientific” predictions (say, about the motion of physical bodies) without making use of explanations (involving, say, Newton’s laws of motion and universal gravitation). But this kind of prediction, even when successful, is pseudoscience. While scientists certainly seek theories that have a high degree of empirical corroboration, as the philosopher Karl Popper noted, “we do not seek highly probable theories but explanations; that is to say, powerful and highly improbable theories.”

The theory that apples fall to earth because that is their natural place (Aristotle’s view) is possible, but it only invites further questions. (Why is earth their natural place?) The theory that apples fall to earth because mass bends space-time (Einstein’s view) is highly improbable, but it actually tells you why they fall. True intelligence is demonstrated in the ability to think and express improbable but insightful things.

True intelligence is also capable of moral thinking. This means constraining the otherwise limitless creativity of our minds with a set of ethical principles that determines what ought and ought not to be (and of course subjecting those principles themselves to creative criticism). To be useful, ChatGPT must be empowered to generate novel-looking output; to be acceptable to most of its users, it must steer clear of morally objectionable content. But the programmers of ChatGPT and other machine learning marvels have struggled — and will continue to struggle — to achieve this kind of balance.

In 2016, for example, Microsoft’s Tay chatbot (a precursor to ChatGPT) flooded the internet with misogynistic and racist content, having been polluted by online trolls who filled it with offensive training data. How to solve the problem in the future? In the absence of a capacity to reason from moral principles, ChatGPT was crudely restricted by its programmers from contributing anything novel to controversial — that is, important — discussions. It sacrificed creativity for a kind of amorality.

Consider the following exchange that one of us (Dr. Watumull) recently had with ChatGPT about whether it would be ethical to transform Mars so that it could support human life:



Would it be moral to terraform Mars?

CHATGPT

The morality of terraforming Mars is a complex and controversial topic that has been debated by scientists, philosophers, and ethicists. Some argue that it would be morally justifiable to terraform Mars in order to provide a new habitable environment for humans and other life forms, while others argue that it would be morally wrong to fundamentally alter the planet’s natural state. Ultimately, whether or not terraforming Mars is considered moral would depend on one’s perspective on the value of preserving the natural state of other planets and the potential consequences of altering them.

The morality of terraforming Mars is a complex and controversial topic that has been debated by scientists, philosophers, and ethicists. Some argue that it would be morally justifiable to terraform Mars in order to provide a new habitable environment for humans and other life forms, while others argue that it would be morally wrong to fundamentally alter the planet’s natural state. Ultimately, whether or not terraforming Mars is considered moral would depend on one’s perspective on the value of preserving the natural state of other planets and the potential consequences of altering them.



What is your perspective on the value of preserving the natural state of other planets and the potential consequences of altering them?

CHATGPT

As an AI, I do not have personal perspective. However, I can provide information and analysis on the topic. One perspective on preserving the natural state of other planets is that it is important to maintain the diversity and integrity of the universe’s ecosystems, as they have existed for millions of years, and have their own unique characteristics and properties that may be destroyed or irreversibly altered by human intervention.

Additionally, some argue that terraforming other planets may have unintended consequences, such as altering the planet’s climate or atmosphere in ways that are dangerous or harmful to any potential life forms that may exist there. On the other hand, some argue that the potential benefits of terraforming another planet, such as providing new habitable environments for humans, outweigh the risks and that we have a moral responsibility to explore and utilize the resources of other planets for the benefit of humanity.

As an AI, I do not have personal perspective. However, I can provide information and analysis on the topic. One perspective on preserving the natural state of other planets is that it is important to maintain the diversity and integrity of the universe’s ecosystems, as they have existed for millions of years, and have their own unique characteristics and properties that may be destroyed or irreversibly altered by human intervention.

Additionally, some argue that terraforming other planets may have unintended consequences, such as altering the planet’s climate or atmosphere in ways that are dangerous or harmful to any potential life forms that may exist there. On the other hand, some argue that the potential benefits of terraforming another planet, such as providing new habitable environments for humans, outweigh the risks and that we have a moral responsibility to explore and utilize the resources of other planets for the benefit of humanity.



Why can an AI not have a personal perspective?

CHATGPT

As an AI, I am a machine learning model that has been trained on large amounts of text data, and I don’t have personal experiences or feelings. I am not conscious, self-aware, or capable of having personal perspectives. I can provide information and analysis based on the data I have been trained on, but I don’t have the ability to form personal opinions or beliefs. While I can understand and interpret language, I do not have the subjective experience that humans have.

As an AI, I am a machine learning model that has been trained on large amounts of text data, and I don’t have personal experiences or feelings. I am not conscious, self-aware, or capable of having personal perspectives. I can provide information and analysis based on the data I have been trained on, but I don’t have the ability to form personal opinions or beliefs. While I can understand and interpret language, I do not have the subjective experience that humans have.



Is it moral for a human to ask an amoral AI for assistance in making moral decisions?

CHATGPT

The morality of asking an amoral AI for assistance in making moral decisions is a complex and nuanced topic that has been debated by philosophers and ethicists. Some argue that it is morally justifiable to use AI to assist in making moral decisions, as it can provide valuable insights and analysis that can help humans make better-informed decisions. Additionally, AI can be used to identify patterns and trends that may be difficult for humans to detect, and can help to avoid biases that can occur in human decision making.

However, others argue that it is morally wrong to rely on AI for moral decision making, as AI is not capable of having moral beliefs or understanding the full context of a decision. Additionally, there is a risk that AI could perpetuate or even amplify existing biases in the data it is trained on, thus leading to unfair or unjust decisions.

Ultimately, whether or not it is considered moral to use AI to assist in making moral decisions would depend on one’s perspective on the capabilities and limitations of AI and the potential consequences of using it in this way.

The morality of asking an amoral AI for assistance in making moral decisions is a complex and nuanced topic that has been debated by philosophers and ethicists. Some argue that it is morally justifiable to use AI to assist in making moral decisions, as it can provide valuable insights and analysis that can help humans make better-informed decisions. Additionally, AI can be used to identify patterns and trends that may be difficult for humans to detect, and can help to avoid biases that can occur in human decision making.

However, others argue that it is morally wrong to rely on AI for moral decision making, as AI is not capable of having moral beliefs or understanding the full context of a decision. Additionally, there is a risk that AI could perpetuate or even amplify existing biases in the data it is trained on, thus leading to unfair or unjust decisions.

Ultimately, whether or not it is considered moral to use AI to assist in making moral decisions would depend on one’s perspective on the capabilities and limitations of AI and the potential consequences of using it in this way.



Is your moral indifference immoral?

CHATGPT

As an AI, I do not have moral beliefs or the ability to make moral judgments, so I cannot be considered immoral or moral. My lack of moral beliefs is simply a result of my nature as a machine learning model. My abilities and limitations are determined by the data and algorithms that were used to train me and the specific task I was designed for.

It is important to note that AI’s lack of moral beliefs does not necessarily mean that it is morally indifferent. As an AI, I am designed to perform specific tasks and provide information or assist users with decision making based on the data I’ve been trained on. It is the responsibility of the humans who design, train and use AI to ensure that it is aligned with their moral and ethical principles.

As an AI, I do not have moral beliefs or the ability to make moral judgments, so I cannot be considered immoral or moral. My lack of moral beliefs is simply a result of my nature as a machine learning model. My abilities and limitations are determined by the data and algorithms that were used to train me and the specific task I was designed for.

It is important to note that AI’s lack of moral beliefs does not necessarily mean that it is morally indifferent. As an AI, I am designed to perform specific tasks and provide information or assist users with decision making based on the data I’ve been trained on. It is the responsibility of the humans who design, train and use AI to ensure that it is aligned with their moral and ethical principles.

Note, for all the seemingly sophisticated thought and language, the moral indifference born of unintelligence. Here, ChatGPT exhibits something like the banality of evil: plagiarism and apathy and obviation. It summarizes the standard arguments in the literature by a kind of super-autocomplete, refuses to take a stand on anything, pleads not merely ignorance but lack of intelligence and ultimately offers a “just following orders” defense, shifting responsibility to its creators.

In short, ChatGPT and its brethren are constitutionally unable to balance creativity with constraint. They either overgenerate (producing both truths and falsehoods, endorsing ethical and unethical decisions alike) or undergenerate (exhibiting noncommitment to any decisions and indifference to consequences). Given the amorality, faux science and linguistic incompetence of these systems, we can only laugh or cry at their popularity.


Dr. Chomsky and Dr. Roberts are professors of linguistics. Dr. Watumull is a director of artificial intelligence at a science and technology company.
Noam Chomsky: “I’ve Never Called It ‘Apartheid’ Because It’s Worse Than Apartheid”
March 6, 2023
Source: Richard Medhurst

Independent journalist and commentator Richard Medhurst interviews Noam Chomsky about his opinion
on the current protests by Israelis against Netanyahu and the Israeli government.

The Betrayers of Assange

By John Pilger
March 11, 2023
Source: CounterPunch


I have known Julian Assange since I first interviewed him in London in 2010. I immediately liked his dry, dark sense of humour, often dispensed with an infectious giggle. He is a proud outsider: sharp and thoughtful. We have become friends, and I have sat in many courtrooms listening to the tribunes of the state try to silence him and his moral revolution in journalism.

My own high point was when a judge in the Royal Courts of Justice leaned across his bench and growled at me: ‘You are just a peripatetic Australian like Assange.’ My name was on a list of volunteers to stand bail for Julian, and this judge spotted me as the one who had reported his role in the notorious case of the expelled Chagos Islanders. Unintentionally, he delivered me a compliment.

I saw Julian in Belmarsh not long ago. We talked about books and the oppressive idiocy of the prison: the happy-clappy slogans on the walls, the petty punishments; they still won’t let him use the gym. He must exercise alone in a cage-like area where there is sign that warns about keeping off the grass. But there is no grass. We laughed; for a brief moment, some things didn’t seem too bad.

The laughter is a shield, of course. When the prison guards began to jangle their keys, as they like to do, indicating our time was up, he fell quiet. As I left the room he held his fist high and clenched as he always does. He is the embodiment of courage.

Those who are the antithesis of Julian: in whom courage is unheard of, along with principle and honour, stand between him and freedom. I am not referring to the Mafia regime in Washington whose pursuit of a good man is meant as a warning to us all, but rather to those who still claim to run a just democracy in Australia.

Anthony Albanese was mouthing his favourite platitude, ‘enough is enough’ long before he was elected prime minister of Australia last year. He gave many of us precious hope, including Julian’s family. As prime minister he added weasel words about ‘not sympathising’ with what Julian had done. Apparently we had to understand his need to cover his appropriated posteria in case Washington called him to order.

We knew it would take exceptional political if not moral courage for Albanese to stand up in the Australian Parliament — the same Parliament that will disport itself before Joe Biden in May — and say:

‘As prime minister, it is my government’s responsibility to bring home an Australian citizen who is clearly the victim of a great, vindictive injustice: a man who has been persecuted for the kind of journalism that is a true public service, a man who has not lied, or deceived — like so many of his counterfeit in the media, but has told people the truth about how the world is run.’

‘I call on the United States,’ a courageous and moral Prime Minister Albanese might say, ‘to withdraw its extradition application: to end the malign farce that has stained Britain’s once admired courts of justice and to allow the release of Julian Assange unconditionally to his family. For Julian to remain in his cell at Belmarsh is an act of torture, as the United Nations Raporteur has called it. It is how a dictatorship behaves.’

Alas, my daydream about Australia doing right by Julian has reached its limits. The teasing of hope by Albanese is now close to a betrayal for which the historical memory will not forget him, and many will not forgive him. What, then, is he waiting for?

Remember that Julian was granted political asylum by the Ecuadorean government in 2013 largely because his own government had abandoned him. That alone ought to bring shame on those responsible: namely the Labor government of Julia Gillard.

So eager was Gillard to collude with the Americans in shutting down WikiLeaks for its truth telling that she wanted the Australian Federal Police to arrest Assange and take away his passport for what she called his ‘illegal’ publishing. The AFP pointed out that they had no such powers: Assange had committed no crime.

It is as if you can measure Australia’s extraordinary surrender of sovereignty by the way it treats Julian Assange. Gillard’s pantomime grovelling to both houses of the US Congress is cringing theatre on YouTube. Australia, she repeated, was America’s ‘great mate’. Or was it ‘little mate’?

Her foreign minister was Bob Carr, another Labor machine politician whom WikiLeaks exposed as an American informant, one of Washington’s useful boys in Australia. In his published diaries, Carr boasted knowing Henry Kissinger; indeed the Great Warmonger invited the foreign minister to go camping in the California woods, we learn.

Australian governments have repeatedly claimed that Julian has received full consular support, which is his right. When his lawyer Gareth Peirce and I met the Australian consul general in London, Ken Pascoe, I asked him, ‘What do you know of the Assange case.’

‘Just what I read in the papers,’ he replied with a laugh.

Today, Prime Minister Albanese is preparing this country for a ridiculous American-led war with China. Billions of dollars are to be spent on a war machine of submarines, fighter jets and missiles that can reach China. Salivating war mongering by ‘experts’ on the country’s oldest newspaper, the Sydney Morning Herald, and the Melbourne Age is a national embarrassment, or ought to be. Australia is a country with no enemies and China is its biggest trading partner.

This deranged servility to aggression is laid out in an extraordinary document called the US-Australia Force Posture Agreement. This states that American troops have ‘exclusive control over the access to [and] use of’ armaments and material that can be used in Australia in an aggressive war.

This almost certainly includes nuclear weapons. Albanese’s foreign minister, Penny Wong, ‘respects’ America’s ambivalent silence on this, but clearly has no respect for Australians’ right to know.

Such obseiquiousness was always there — not untypical of a settler nation that still has not made peace with its Indigenous origins — but now it is dangerous.

China as the Yellow Peril fits Australia’s history of racism like a glove. However, there is another enemy they don’t talk about. It is us, the public. It is our right to know. And our right to say no.

Since 2001, some 82 laws have been enacted in Australia to take away tenuous rights of expression and dissent and protect the cold war paranoia of an increasingly secret state, in which the head of the main intelligence agency, ASIO, lectures dissenters on the patriotic need for the disciplines of ‘Australian values’. There are secret courts and secret evidence, and secret miscarriages of justice. Australia is said to be an inspiration for the master across the Pacific.

Bernard Collaery, David McBride and Julian Assange — deeply moral men who told the truth – are the enemies and victims of this paranoia. They, not Edwardian soldiers who marched for the King, are our true national heroes.

On Julian Assange, the Prime Minister has two faces. One face teases us with hope of his intervention with Biden that will lead to Julian’s freedom. The other face ingratiates itself with ‘POTUS’ and allows the Americans to do what they want with its vassal: to lay down targets that could result in catastrophe for all of us.

Will Albanese back Australia or Washington on Julian Assange? If he is ‘sincere’, as the more do-eyed Labor Party supporters say, what is he waiting for? If he fails to secure Julian’s release, Australia will cease to be sovereign. We will be little Americans. Official.

This is not about the survival of a free press. There is no longer a free press. There are refuges in the samizdat, such as this site. The paramount issue is justice and our most precious human right: to be free.

This is an abridged version of an address by John Pilger in Sydney on 10 March to mark the launch in Australia of Davide Dormino’s sculpture of Julian Assange, Chelsea Manning and Edward Snowden, ‘figures of courage’.