Marine "Biomimetics" Could Be the Blue Economy's Next Big Hit

Humpback whale calf, Tonga, 2015. The bumps on the whale's head reduce drag and have inspired many engineered applications (GRID-Arendal / Glenn Edney / CC BY NC SA 2.0) 

PUBLISHED OCT 9, 2023 2:32 PM BY CHINA DIALOGUE OCEAN

 

[By Emma Bryce]

Deep in the Pacific Ocean, a strange, diaphanous balloon drifts by. Inside, tunnels and chambers coil like a miniature floating Guggenheim around the talented architect within: a tadpole-like creature called a larvacean. Incredibly, the organism has crafted this entire structure out of mucus.

“This is an animal without legs, arms, or eyes, and it secretes this complex house of mucus around itself,” explains Joost Daniels, a research engineer. Daniels is part of a team at the Monterey Bay Aquarium Research Institute that has 3D modelled these structures, which they’ve christened ‘snot palaces’. Their modelling work, carried out at the institute’s Bioinspiration Lab, revealed how the larvacean uses its tail to pump detritus-filled water through the passageways of the snot palace, using it like a filter to snag food.

The magnificent structure could inspire inventions on land. “This could be very interesting for very efficient vehicle propulsion or other pumping systems. There are lots of medical applications as well,” says Daniels.

Such innovations belong to the growing collection of ‘biomimetic’ products – which mimic the form, structure, or function of organisms. Taking inspiration from nature isn’t new, but marine biomimetics is relatively nascent partly because just 5% of the ocean has been explored. And yet, “the ocean is where all life started, and where a lot of things have evolved from,” says Daniels, which creates huge potential for discovery in its vast depths.

Researchers think that, as discoveries related to marine biomimetics grow, they could contribute billions to the economy annually, with applications across diverse industries including energy, transport, pharmaceuticals, and deep-sea exploration. This could also serve as a more sustainable source of marine revenue than industries like deep-sea mining, believes Robert Blasiak, a researcher in the sustainable management of ocean resources at the Stockholm Resilience Centre. “I think it gives a bit of a different flavour to how we can explore this ‘final frontier’,” he says.

Wild inventions

It was Blasiak’s personal enthusiasm for the subject that drove him to start cataloguing marine biomimetic inventions, which together with his colleagues he described in a 2022 research article. The paper explored a glittering array of innovations – some under development, and several already on the market.

One of them takes inspiration from the tapering fins of the humpback whale. These leviathans glide effortlessly through the water, despite having knobbly fins that look like they would slow them down. In the early 2000s, engineers discovered that those bumps, called tubercles, actually generate lift, reducing drag in the water. This has since inspired the design of bumpy fan blades and surfboard fins, as well as patents to apply tubercles to wind farms.

Another source of inspiration is shark skin, which bristles with billions of microscopic scales called denticles. Arranged in a diamond pattern and imprinted with peaks and troughs, these channel water and allow the animals to glide seamlessly through it. This structure has inspired new car tyres that aim to reduce the risk of aquaplaning, and materials for aircraft that streamline airflow and cut carbon emissions by 1.1%. Sharks aren’t coated in algae and barnacles, Blasiak explains, because their “skin is very hard for stuff to settle on, to actually stick to.” Materials scientists have replicated this microscopic architecture in antibacterial surfaces for hospitals, and antifouling materials to protect ships from organisms that may latch on to their hulls, affecting their speed and seaworthiness.

Meanwhile, animals such as the ram’s horn squid have inspired better ways to explore the ocean itself. The creature controls its buoyancy with the help of an internal coil-shaped shell containing gas-filled compartments. As the squid grows, explains Blasiak, more of these compartments appear. Most famously, these inspired the submersible used by filmmaker James Cameron to travel to the bottom of the Mariana Trench.

In 2021, scientists successfully mimicked the jelly-like structure of the deep sea snailfish to create a remotely operated soft robot, made of flexible materials, capable of withstanding the crushing ocean pressure at depths of 11,000 metres.

Many more biomimetic inventions are in the works. Materials scientists are developing hyper-strong materials for buildings based on the chitin structure of the mantis shrimp’s crack-resistant club. Others have found unlikely fashion inspiration in the slime-producing hagfish, whose goo contains thousands of silken but powerful strands that could inspire next-generation textiles. Elsewhere, researchers have patented the unique water-repelling proteins in byssus threads – the strong filaments that tether mussels to rocks – which could lead to corrosion-resistant steel for ships.

Big money in the blue economy

Marine biomimetics could generate significant revenue through novel products, designs, patents, and by reducing maintenance and materials costs in several industries, Blasiak believes. One significant area is shipping, which spends US$30 billion a year dealing with the added fuel and cleaning costs of biofouling by barnacles and other creatures. Biomimetic antifoulants, such as sharkskin-inspired coatings, could offset this expense, while also supplying the marine coatings industry that is worth nearly $15 billion.

According to Blasiak’s research, biomimetics could add billions to the tissue-engineering industry, which generated sales of $9 billion in 2017, with corals and sponges becoming increasingly important ingredients. Underwater robotics, meanwhile, is projected to reach almost $7 billion by 2025. And, in 2010, researchers estimate that cancer drugs derived from yet-to-be-discovered compounds in marine organisms could be worth between $0.5 trillion and $5.7 trillion.

Yet this huge potential is being overlooked, Blasiak believes. “All these conceptualisations of the ocean economy, they’re all looking at fisheries, cruise tourism, containerships, mining of aggregates – but they’re never looking at biomimetics,” he says. In his view, not only can marine biomimetics contribute significantly to economic growth, it also aligns with the emerging ‘blue economy’ – growth that’s derived from the sustainable use of the ocean’s resources.

Sharing the ocean’s treasures

But there are growing concerns about how to share these benefits fairly. Blasiak has found that 98% of the several thousand patent applications related to marine genetic resources belong to institutions in just 10 countries. Typically, ocean discoveries are made by a small number of wealthy nations, often off the shores of less wealthy nations.

The highly productive seas surrounding the Caribbean are one example, says Judith Gobin, a professor of marine biology at the University of the West Indies in Trinidad and Tobago. “If you look [at] the literature, you will see [that] quite a few commercial drugs, already on the market, have been found from Caribbean sponges [and] organisms,” she says. “And a lot of it, we in the Caribbean weren’t even aware of.” She describes some of these scientific expeditions as “ships passing in the night,” explaining that even though they were legal, they have failed to share their benefits.

The inequality has only grown as wealthier nations have been able to advance into the little-explored deep sea that often falls beyond the jurisdiction of any one nation. But Gobin is hopeful that the recently agreed High Seas Treaty will start to even out this playing field. She explains that the historic treaty, formally adopted in June this year, includes requirements to share the scientific and financial benefits of any marine genetic resources discovered in the high seas. Gobin participated in the treaty negotiations as an adviser with CARICOM, an intergovernmental organisation that represents the interests of Caribbean countries.

More important than financial benefits is the treaty’s hard-won obligation for countries to share resources, she says. Ideally, this means that future marine expeditions led by wealthy nations will be treated as an opportunity to bring scientists from developing nations on board, to share training, technologies, and expertise. “Let’s get the local scientists involved, and then let’s build the capacity,” Gobin says.

According to Blasiak, it’s this spirit of shared curiosity and discovery that drives marine biomimetics in the first place, and which he believes could turn it into a force for the good of the ocean. “I think that one of the most attractive things about biomimetics is that it first requires you to look at the natural world, to interact with it, be curious about it, and try to understand it better,” he says. “That’s the starting point for caring about the ocean, and then for thinking we should be stewards of it.”

Emma Bryce is a freelance journalist who covers stories focused on the environment, conservation and climate change. 

This article appears courtesy of China Dialogue Ocean and may be found in its original form here. 

Top image: Humpback whale calf, Tonga, 2015 (GRID-Arendal / Glenn Edney / CC BY NC SA 2.0) ww.grida.no/resources/3544

 

Killer Whale Pod That Cut a Deal With People is Likely Extinct

European whalers and killer whales on a hunt towards the end of whaling in Eden, some time between 1910 and 1920. Eden Killer Whale Museum, CC BY-ND

PUBLISHED OCT 12, 2023 12:14 PM BY THE CONVERSATION

 

[By Isabella Reeves and Steven Holmes]

For generations, the Thaua people worked with killer whales to hunt large whales in the water of Twofold Bay, on the southern coast of New South Wales. Killer whales – commonly known as orcas – would herd their giant prey into shallower waters where hunters could spear them. Humans would get the meat, but the killer whales wanted a delicacy – the tongue.

After colonists dispossessed the Thaua, Europeans began capitalising on this longstanding partnership. From around 1844, commercial whalers worked with employed Thaua and killer whales to hunt these giants. The pods of killer whales would find a prized baleen whale, herd it closer to shore and signal the whalers, who lived in the town of Eden.

The partnership has no parallel anywhere in the world: the top predator of the oceans working with the top predator on land.

One killer whale, Old Tom, became legendary due to his active role in the hunts for at least three decades. He was seven meters long and weighed six tonnes.

In 1930, he was found dead at a local beach – the last of his group in Eden. You can see his body preserved in Eden’s Killer Whale Museum. But questions have lingered. Do Old Tom’s descendants still roam the oceans, or did they die out?

Our new research suggests these famous killer whales are likely to be extinct.

The killer whales of Eden, including Old Tom at top right. Eden Killer Whale Museum, CC BY-ND

Old Tom’s origins

Adaptability, cultural traditions and female-led societies have made killer whales the ultimate ocean predator. These intelligent marine mammals are the world’s largest dolphin, and the only species known to successfully hunt adult great white sharks and the world’s largest living animal – blue whales.

But different groups can live very different lives. Some are constantly on the move, while others stay living in a particular region. Some feed exclusively on one type of prey, while others feed on many. Across the globe, killer whale vocalisations differ greatly, with different dialects and languages unique to families and regions.

To find out where these killer whales of Eden came from, we drilled into one of Old Tom’s teeth and analysed the resulting powder to sequence his DNA. We used the same methods used to extract DNA from Neanderthal remains and million-year-old mammoths.

When we compared Old Tom’s DNA to a global data set of killer whales, his genome was most similar to those of modern New Zealand killer whales. He shared a most recent common ancestor with killer whales from the northern Pacific, northern Atlantic, and Australasia.

But there was no sign of any recent descendants in our modern killer whales data set. Old Tom’s DNA is mostly distinct from modern populations. That suggests the famous killers of Eden may have died out.

Whale brothers

The ancestors of Steven Holmes, a Thaua Traditional Owner, had close ties to both the killer whales and to the colonist whalers. Steven has worked with us to give the Thaua perspective. His advocacy helped change the name of Eden’s Ben Boyd National Park to Beowa, which is Thaua for killer whale. Ben Boyd was a whaler as well as a notorious slaver, forcing Pacific people onto boats and into indentured labour.

Steven told us:

In Twofold Bay, the coastal Thaua people, part of the Yuin nation, had a connection with the killer whales through the Dreaming. Their long relationship was highly valued by the Thaua, who depended on the ocean for food and other resources. They considered the killer whales their brothers. When a Thaua died, they were believed to be reincarnated as killer whales. That way, the Thaua always remained one mob – whether whale or man.

Thaua people used specialised hunting strategies that encouraged killer whales to herd baleen whales, such as humpbacks, closer to shore for them to kill. After a successful kill, the killer whales were rewarded with the tongue while the Thaua got the rest of the carcass. This became known as the “Law of the Tongue”.

After colonisation, white whalers capitalised on this relationship. They hired many skilled First Nations whalers.

When killer whales found a whale, some would slap their tails in front of the whaling station to alert the whalers. Some killer whales would herd the target into shallower water, while others would harry and tire it out. Eventually, the whalers would harpoon the exhausted whale, following it with the killing lance to pierce vital organs.

Old Tom was active in these hunts, reported to grab the lines of the boat to pull the whalers out faster, or tug on the line to drive the harpoon deeper and speed up the whale’s death.

The whalers left the carcass on a buoy for up to two days to allow the killer whales to eat the tongue and lips.

Where did they go?

Eden’s whaling station did not process any whales after 1928, as whale numbers had plummeted. The killer whales had already begun to vanish.

Why did they leave? We don’t know for sure, but hypotheses include a lack of other food or even a breach of the Law of the Tongue by whalers.

What we do know is the group has never returned, and our new DNA evidence suggests, that Old Tom’s group does not have any descendants in our oceans today.

Since they left, there have been only a handful of killer whale sightings off Eden. While they are gone, they are not forgotten. The legacy of the killer whales of Eden lives on among Thaua people and local communities.

Isabella Reeves is a PhD Candidate at Flinders University.

Steven Holmes is a traditional knowledge holder of the Thaua people. 

This article appears courtesy of The Conversation and may be found in its original form here. 

The opinions expre

 

More Investment Needed in Submarine Search and Rescue Technology

The ARA San Juan of the Argentine Navy (Argentine Navy photo)

PUBLISHED OCT 13, 2023 5:17 PM BY CIMSEC

 

[By Andrew Song]

In the race against time, recent history demonstrates that technology remains limited for submarine search and rescue efforts. The November 2017 disappearance of the Argentinian Navy submarine, the ARA San Juan (S-42), highlights the particular hardship confronting submarine recovery. After completing a naval exercise near Tierra del Fuego, the diesel-electric submarine ARA San Juan (S-42) departed from the city of Ushuaia to return to its home port in Mar de Plata. The boat transmitted its last signal on November 15th, 2017 and its failure to report twice to its command the next day prompted an international search and rescue operation starting November 17th.1 This case study examines the limits of aquatic-based forensic methods along with institutional shortcomings that inhibited the investigation. It furthermore underlines how contemporary submarine search tools – for rescue, post-mishap investigation, or espionage – remain underdeveloped and require further attention.

Searching for the ARA San Juan (S-42)

On its one-year anniversary of the San Juan’s disappearance, Ocean Infinity – an American private seabed explorer company contracted by Buenos Aires – located the missing submarine 270 nautical miles off Argentina’s nearest coastal city at a depth of 2,976 feet – roughly three times the nominal test depth.2 Photographs taken by Ocean Infinity’s ROVs portrayed a compromised hull with propellers and a bow section discernibly separated.3 Although presumed beforehand, the imagery eliminated any possibilities that there had been survivors on the ARA San Juan.

Revisiting the initial search operations on the 17th sheds light into the immediate challenges of the submarine search and rescue operations. Argentinian Navy helicopters, U.S Navy P-8A Poseidon, and NASA P-3 Orion aircraft began search efforts with sonobuoys that possessed limited range, but which could be rapidly and widely deployed. It became apparent that space and time disadvantaged the emergency responders: The initial search box was larger than the size of Iraq.4 The ARA San Juan only had a submerged oxygen supply of seven days, giving a five-day rescue window after the last communication. Moreover, the remoteness of the search area and the tardiness in support diminished the probability of success. Over 11 countries sent nine ships and 13 aircraft to the search area, but the additional manpower and vessels arrived by November 21st (T-3 rescue window), requiring aerial-deployed sonobuoys to spearhead localization efforts – not side-scan sonars. 5 These sonobuoys offered a medium to hear distress transmissions from submarine, including via active sonar, underwater telephone, echo sounder, emergency location beacons, and hull tapping.

Other obstacles included unfavorable weather conditions. In the rescue window, investigators battled swells that reached 10 meters and wind speeds in the South Atlantic recorded around 100km/h.6 Yet, the most disappointing element to the abrupt search operation was the abundance of false signatures. In the critical rescue window, multiple incidents hindered search progress by draining resources from follow-up investigations. Table 1 summarizes these sources of hope that were later met with frustration.7

The Argentinian Navy declared the rescue aspect of the search operation to be over on November 30th, 2017 after planners eliminated an extreme survival situation. At its height, the search operation constituted over 4,000 personnel from over 13 countries and surveyed over 200,000 square miles.8 On November 16th, 2018, a Houston-based hydrographic survey company, Ocean Infinity, used a Norwegian multipurpose ship to investigate a possible ping on the San Juan’s potential position in the middle of a sea canyon.9 Finally, Ocean Infinity confirmed discovery of the San Juan on November 17th, 2018 and handed over data and visual evidence of the wreckage for forensic investigators to determine cause. Ocean Infinity’s use of five autonomous undersea vehicles (AUVs) for exploring the wreck site suggested that extensive use of AUVs was integral to the mission’s success.

Argentine Navy photos showing the submarine’s bow section, sail, and propeller that were torn off in the implosion. (Argentine Navy photo)

Forensic Shortcomings and New Questions

In the case of the San Juan’s disappearance, investigators must ask themselves about failures in the search phase and prescribe future procedures to avoid such pitfalls. The disappearance of the ARA San Juan disturbingly mirrors the loss of the Kursk in 2003, apart from the evidence that the Kursk had initial survivors post-implosion. First, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) in Vienna did detect a hydro-acoustic anomaly from its Ascension Island and Crozet Island stations that seemed consistent with an underwater explosion on November 15th around 30 nautical miles from the San Juan’s last known bearing in the morning.10

Unfortunately, the CTBTO’s automatic processing algorithm used to detect nuclear explosions did not flag the registration of the two hydrophone station’s recording.47 In an effort to minimize false alarms, the CTBTO incidentally failed to exploit data that could have been used towards the calculation of a coverage ellipse for the San Juan. CTBTO could have directed their waveform analysts to immediately deploy their standard iterative dual correspondence (IDC) automatic localization algorithm to produce a spatial diagram of the detonation’s coordinates from iterative minimization of the origin time and azimuth residuals from the seismic data.

This had been done before as Koper details how four land-based seismometers detected the Kursk’s torpedo misfire on August 10th, 2000.11 Collation of the data in the Kursk case allowed for there to be a preliminary ellipse-shaped search parameter for the Kursk. The ARA San Juan’s implosion likely mimicked features of the Kursk’s explosion – compressive first motion, significant variation and high ratio of Sn to Lg, and shear wave generation in the seismic record. The oversight in the hydroacoustic anomaly, although eventually rectified through manual processing, caused the CTBTO to inform Argentina on November 22nd about a possible localization tardy in the search phase.12 Earlier consultation between Argentina and CTBTO and better automated processing for significant non-nuclear seismic events could have produced a more refined search box sooner.

State capabilities also hampered search execution. Ocean Infinity discovered the San Juan in a grid site that had a 90 percent probability of wreckage to be found – at the beginning of search planning.13 Argentinian officials defended themselves by stating that sub-canyons presented a hazard that its Navy could not outmaneuver. In other words, even if the crew was deemed to be alive, Argentina lacked methods and technology like a McCann Rescue Chamber or Deep Submergence Rescue Vehicle (DSRVs) required for a delicate retrieval operation. This deflection of blame, however, shared no merit as U.S operators from Undersea Rescue Command in San Diego arrived with Submarine Rescue Diving and Recompression System and a tethered Pressurized Rescue Module Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV) in only two days.14

Comodoro Rivadavia, Argentina (Nov. 26, 2017) U.S. Navy Undersea Rescue Command (URC) sailors and Argentine construction workers prepare the motor vessel Sophie Siem for the installation of the Submarine Rescue Diving and Recompression System (SRDRS) which operates the deep diving rescue vehicle, the Pressurized Rescue Module (PRM). (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Christopher Lange)

Lastly, the relegation and sidelining of side-scan sonar and UUVs contributed to inefficiency and lack of coverage. Tardiness in the arrival of logistical support signified that these methods could not be practically implemented so total blame could not be place on the planners. Absence in information regarding scenarios and hypotheses did not allow for Bayesian search strategies to be fully utilized, although submarine officers blame a short-circuit in the battery tray in the prow due to water intake from the submarine’s snorkel as a precedent event to the suspected implosion.

That being said, forensic investigators still confront distinct challenges irrelevant to traditional geophysical investigations. Unlike terrestrial-based forensics, pre-established knowledge of a local maritime environment is sparse. Scientists have mapped 1/5th of the sea floor to modern standards with 100m resolution, but that means almost 290 million square kilometers of seafloor – twice the surface area of Mars – has not yet been surveyed. The absence of existing charts, therefore, necessitates simultaneous 4-D mapping of the area.15 Submarine debris are unidentifiable in satellite and aerial images due to surface opacity and the extreme depth of wrecks. Stratification conceals wrecks and clearing sedimentary buildup becomes extremely complicated due to sheer volume. An onsite “walk-over” survey, as described by Fenning and Donnelly in their description of geophysical methodologies, is simply impossible in a marine environment.16 Acidity and pH levels of the water also influence rates of decomposition, and must be considered for a simulation in the casualty scenario. In the future, the undersea recovery field must overcome these variables in order to find any success in submarine search and rescue.

A screenshot showing the wreckage of the ARA San Juan laying 920 meters below the surface. (Argentine Navy photo)

The loss of the ARA San Juan devastated the Argentinian public and had harmful repercussions on its naval service. Not only did Argentina lose 44 sailors, but one of the San Juan’s crewmembers was the first female submarine officer (Lieutenant Eliana Krawczyk) in Argentina’s history.17 Federal policemen raided the Navy’s headquarters for document requisition to piece together culpability and allocate responsibility. Argentina’s Minister of Defense unceremoniously fired Marcelo Srur, the Navy’s Chief of the General Staff, and the events surrounding the ARA San Juan’s mission — tracking British assets near the Falkland Islands — was publicly leaked by an Argentinian media source, further embarrassing the Navy.18

Conclusion

The task of finding lost submarines is an enigma complicated even further by the very reason these boats exist: to be undetectable assets for national security. Unlike their geologist peers, marine forensic investigators rely on robotics and invisible sound waves as surrogate sensors to hands and eyes. The development of side-scan sonar systems, and the consolidation of UUVs for search operations and site verification amalgamate the practice of maritime search into a forensic field heavily invested and intertwined with technological innovation. When establishing an inaugural search parameter, best practices in Bayesian search strategy call for officers and scientists to weigh qualitative hypotheses in order to allocate priorities to search boxes that will offer maximum efficiency.

The ARA San Juan represents a recent case, where these methods did not seem utilized to the fullest capacity. Prior success in the history of these methodologies being used for finding WWII vessels demonstrate that perhaps governments must rethink quick reaction plans to lost submarines. In order to save lives and honor the gravesites of individuals lost in times of conflict, advancement of these methods and a reevaluation of the ARA San Juan’s loss will be beneficial for the global submarine community and for navies around the world.

Ensign Andrew Song is a U.S. Navy submarine officer assigned to the USS San Francisco (MTS-711). His past publications have appeared in peer-reviewed military journals and outlets including Military Review, Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, USNI Proceedings, Yale Review for International Studies and the Wall Street Journal. He graduated from Yale University with a B.A. in Global Affairs.

This article appears courtesy of CIMSEC and may be found in its original form here.

Endnotes

1. Politi, Daniel; Londoño, Ernesto (30 November 2017). “Hope for Argentina Submarine Crew Fades”. The New York Times. Nov 30, 2017.

2. “First photos of submarine emerge as families implore Argentine government to recover wreck”. NewsComAu. 18 November 2018.

3. “ARA San Juan.” Ocean Infinity, June 16, 2020. https://oceaninfinity.com/projects/ara-san-juan/.

4. Kirby, John. “Argentine Navy Says Sounds Detected Aren’t from Missing Sub.” CNN. Cable News Network, November 21, 2017. http://edition.cnn.com/2017/11/20/americas/argentina-missing-submarine/index.html.

5. Ibid.

6. Pecoraro, Natalia. “El Fuerte Viento Demora El Operativo y Complica Las Tareas De Rescate.” La Nación, November 26, 2017. https://www.lanacion.com.ar/politica/el-fuerte-viento-demora-el-operativo-y-complica-las-tareas-de-rescate-nid2085829/.

7. “Avanza Un Operativo Donde Hace 8 Días Se Detectó Una ‘Anomalía Hidroacústica.’” Télam, November 23, 2017. https://www.telam.com.ar/notas/201711/225405-ara-san-juan-busqueda-armada-argentina-ruido-anomalia-hidroacustica.html (2) Goni, Uki. “Argentina’s Navy Says Fresh Noises Are Not from Missing Submarine.” The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, November 21, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/20/missing-argentina-submarine-running-out-of-air-as-search-enters-critical-phase.

8. “San Juan Submarine: ‘Explosion’ Dashes Crew Survival Hopes.” BBC News. BBC, November 23, 2017. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-42100620.

9. “ARA San Juan.” Ocean Infinity, June 16, 2020. https://oceaninfinity.com/projects/ara-san-juan/.

10. Nielsen, P.L., Zampolli, M., Le Bras, R. “CTBTO’s Data and Analysis Pertaining to the Search for the Missing Argentine Submarine ARA San Juan.” Pure Appl. Geophys. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00024-020-02445-9. January 31 2020.

11. Koper, K. D., et al., 2001. Forensic seismology and the sinking of the Kursk, Eos, 82, 45-46.

12. Politi, Daniel, and Mihir Zaveri. “Argentina Minister Says Country without Means to Rescue Submarine.” thestar.com, November 17, 2018. https://www.thestar.com/news/world/2018/11/17/missing-argentine-submarine-found-at-bottom-of-atlantic-one-year-after-disappearance.html.

13. Ibid.

14. “Argentina Missing Navy Submarine: Search Stepped Up.” BBC News. BBC, November 18, 2017. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-42030560.

15. Amos, Jonathan. “One-Fifth of Earth’s Ocean Floor Is Now Mapped.” BBC News. BBC, June 20, 2020. https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-53119686.

16. Fenning, P. J., Donnelly, L. J., 2004. Geophysical techniques for forensic investigation. Geological Society of London Special Publications, 232, 11-20.

17. Argentina: Wreck of ARA San Juan Submarine Found after One Year . Al Jazeera English, 2018. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MxufaPwlTOA.

18. Gidget Fuentes, Special Correspondent. “Specialized Undersea Rescue Force on Call to Aid Submariners in Trouble.” Seapower, October 20, 2020. https://seapowermagazine.org/specialized-undersea-rescue-force-on-call-to-aid-submariners-in-trouble/.

WW3.0

Op-Ed: How Many Nuclear Submarines Would Be Worth Buying for Australia?

The U.S. Navy's Virginia-class will be Australia's first nuclear-powered attack sub (USN file image)

PUBLISHED OCT 15, 2023 2:35 PM BY THE STRATEGIST

 

[By Peter Briggs]

The September 2021 announcement of Australia’s transition to nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) under the AUKUS program indicated that ‘at least eight’ would be acquired. More recently, the rhetoric has firmed up to eight, with the program director telling a Senate committee in May that there would be three Virginia-class SSNs and five AUKUS SSNs. Vice Admiral Jonathan Mead implied that this was the full extent of the program and that decisions for what followed would be left for a future government.

A decision to stop at eight overlooks critical strategic, industrial and personnel considerations that determine the number of submarines Australia acquires.

Since the 2009 defence white paper, successive reviews have affirmed the need for 12 submarines supported by a base on each coast providing specialised infrastructure, workshops and a submarine squadron staff. While nuclear propulsion provides much greater mobility, a submarine can only be in one place at a time. Once its position is revealed by counter-detection or its own offensive actions, uncertainty over its location is removed and with that, its deterrent value diminishes for a period. Added to the reality of our geography, a force able to deploy at least two submarines on each coast would require at least 12 SSNs to provide ongoing uncertainty (for an adversary) and, if needed, operational impact.

It takes three to four submarines to guarantee having one available for deployment. The ‘rule of three’ was validated by the Coles review, but that doesn’t include any spare capacity to cope with unexpected defects. The UK and French experiences confirm that four nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) are required to sustain one at sea—noting that SSBNs operate in a much lower mechanical and operationally stressed environment than SSNs.

Industrial issues are significant factors in the cost of ownership and effectiveness of the force. Australia intends to build the AUKUS SSNs in Adelaide. That is thoroughly commendable, but we should expect delays and difficulties as we learn how to do it. In all shipbuilding programs, the time and cost of successive vessels reduces as the workforce and processes are optimised. Typically, based on Australian (and global) experience, the third submarine will cost some 40% less than the first, with much smaller reductions anticipated as later submarines are built.

This only works if the building program is continuous. Stop–start shipbuilding is a well-known recipe for prolonged delays and grossly inflated costs, as demonstrated by Britain’s Astute class, which, according to a House of Commons Defence Committee report in early 2010, was already by then 57 months late and 53% over budget.

Once we have mastered the complexities of building SSNs, as I am sure we will, we shouldn’t stop building.

Australia is planning on a three-year interval between delivery of submarines, driven by the time it will take to generate a crew from our small submarine personnel base and limited sea training capacity in operational Collins-class and US and UK submarines.

Construction of the first submarine will take longer and reduce to a steady state after three or four are built and the workforce has made its way up the learning curve and processes have been optimised. The building process is a production line—at any time, submarines will be in different states of completeness. Construction time doesn’t determine the drumbeat for delivery; rather, construction starts in sufficient time to achieve the delivery drumbeat.

Three years is a slow drumbeat industrially. Shorter would be more efficient but is currently not feasible because of personnel limitations. The personnel training limitation should ease once Australia has at least six SSNs at sea. The drumbeat could then be shortened. A slow drumbeat is more expensive due to idle production but is also likely to contribute to a loss of skilled workers; witness the UK’s experience at Barrow in Furness because of the slow Astute drumbeat.

A construction program building eight submarines at a three-year drumbeat would take 21 years. Submarines typically have a hull life of 25–30 years. Thus, this production line would have nothing to build for four to nine years, and would then be then back into stop–start shipbuilding.

A force of 10 SSNs at a three-year drumbeat with a planned 27-year life is the minimum to provide a continuous-build program, avoiding the stop–start situation. A force of 12 could achieve a shorter drumbeat in the later stages when the personnel restrictions are not so severe.

Decisions on the final size of the force must be made now, at the program’s inception. They drive industrial issues such as the size of facilities, production-line technology, the supply chains supporting the force and the ordering of long lead items such as the reactor. The decision cannot responsibly be left for a future government.

My study of British, French and US submarine-crewing policies, summarised in my 2018 ASPI report, concluded that a force of 10 SSNs with 10 crews was essential to generate the minimum critical mass of experienced personnel. A smaller force will not generate sufficient highly experienced personnel to oversee the safe technical and operational aspects of the program. That calculation assumed one base and one submarine squadron. Two-ocean basing with an additional 200 highly experienced squadron staff, a key link in the operational and safety chain, would require at least 12 SSNs.

Britain’s Royal Navy has six or seven SSNs and four SSBNs operating from one base in a single squadron. Its personnel situation is dire. High wastage rates and shortfalls in many critical categories have reportedly necessitated drafting non-volunteers to submarine training and cannibalising parts and crew to get even one submarine to sea. At times, the RN is unable to achieve even one. Is that where Australia is heading?

The issues are undoubtedly more complex than simply the size of the force, but it reinforces the point that a force of eight SSNs requiring six to seven crews is below critical mass, vulnerable to personnel shortfalls, will struggle to sustain two SSNs deployed, and won’t be able to sustain two-ocean basing.

Even more problematic is whether Australia can achieve an operational, sustainable and deployable SSN capability from eight boats made up of a mix of Virginia and AUKUS designs. The mix of classes adds to the complexity, cost and risk because it entails two supply chains and differing major onboard equipment, spares, and training systems and simulators.

Australia requires at least 12 SSNs to sustain two-ocean basing with two deployable on each coast in the good times. A force of 18—nine on each coast—would be more resilient, reliably providing two deployable SSNs, with three available in the good times.

Eight is plainly insufficient on all counts.

Leaving the decision for a later government will mean greater expense and increase the risk that the program doesn’t produce the needed strategic capability, while stripping funds from other key defence capabilities. A lack of decision, along with Australia’s failure to join the AUKUS SSN initial design effort, indicates inadequate commitment.

A ‘damn the torpedoes’ transition to SSNs could leave us with no submarine capability.

If Australia is not prepared to, or cannot, invest the resources to achieve a viable SSN force, we are better off not continuing down this path.

Peter Briggs is a retired submarine specialist and a past president of the Submarine Institute of Australia.

This article appears courtesy of The Strategist and may be found in its original form here. 

 

Fincantieri to Build LNG and Battery-Powered Ferry in Sicily

Fincantieri's design for an LNG and battery pwoered ferry (Fincantieri)

PUBLISHED OCT 9, 2023 8:10 PM BY THE MARITIME EXECUTIVE

 

Fincantieri is set to build a unique passenger-car ferry for Sicily under a new Italian government effort to enhance local transportation. The shipyard highlights that the project will help to restore domestic shipbuilding capabilities and the vessel will use a new innovative power system that includes batteries for zero-emission operations in port.

The contract for the new ferry was signed today in Sicily to further highlight the uniqueness of the effort. It will be the first vessel financed under Italy’s new law for the enhancement of public transportation. The law established a fund that will support the purchase of the vessel, which will be owned by the government in Sicily.

To further emphasize the domestic nature of the unique project, Fincantieri has committed to building the vessel entirely at the Palermo shipyard. Signing the agreement, the governor boasted that the vessel would be “Made in Sicily” and “represent a turning point for connections to the smaller islands.”

The ferry will be a Ropax Class A vessel at about 14,500 gross tons. It will measure approximately 460 feet and have a capacity for 1,000 passengers. It will also transport up to 200 cars.

 

 

“The awarding of this order represents an important test for Fincantieri. In an industrial sector that over time has moved to Asian shipyards, we have the opportunity to bring ferry production back to Italy, rehabilitate our historical competencies in the sector, and demonstrate our ability to be competitive while ensuring the highest production standards,” said Pierroberto Folgiero, CEO and Managing Director of Fincantieri. 

It will also be one of the first passenger vessels built by Fincantieri with a dual-fuel LNG propulsion plant. The shipyard is currently building its first large, LNG-powered cruise ships with the first due for delivery early in 2024 to Carnival Corporation’s Princess Cruises. The propulsion plant, which will give the ferry a maximum speed of 19 knots, will operate on LNG or diesel fuel.

Another unique feature will be a battery energy storage system. It will be equipped with a photovoltaic system that will store energy in batteries. The vessel will be able to use the batteries to provide up to four hours of power while in port to ensure it operates with zero emissions. The vessel will also be equipped with a stabilizer system that they said is similar to those on oil platforms and will permit the vessel to dock even in bad weather.

The government of Sicily will also have an option to build a second vessel. The first ship is due to enter service in 2026 and will operate between Sicily and the islands of Lampedusa and Pantelleria.

 

Report: Korea's Hanwha Ocean Moves to Buy Philly Shipyard

File image courtesy Philly Shipyard

PUBLISHED OCT 10, 2023 1:27 PM BY THE MARITIME EXECUTIVE

 

Hanwha Ocean is reported to be making moves to purchase Philly Shipyard, the Jones Act shipbuilder known for commercial and government shipbuilding for U.S. coastwise trade.

According to Korean media, Hanwha has sent an inspection team to Philly Shipyard in connection with the planned acquisition. 

In a brief statement, Philly Shipyard said that it was aware of the press reports and "is continuously looking at strategic alternatives to maximize shareholder value." It said that it would not comment on "rumors or speculation," and will issue a market update "if and when appropriate."

If accurate, it would not be Philly's first negotiation with Hanwha: it has a longstanding business relationship with DSEC, the engineering and naval architecture division of Hanwha Ocean's predecessor. DSEC has supplied the detail design and much of the equipment for multiple Philly ships, including the National Security Multi-Mission Vessel (NSMV) program. According to customs records, DSEC has delivered thrusters, pumps, engine room modules, and other components for NSMV hulls. 

The acquisition would also be a continuation of longstanding foreign ownership at Philly, which has been a Norwegian company from the outset. After the closure of the U.S. Navy's Philadelphia Shipyard in the 1990s, the government drydocks were leased to Kvaerner Shipbuilding to found the yard. Today it is majority-owned by Aker Group, a Norwegian maritime conglomerate, which holds about 60 percent of the firm's shares.

Philly is listed on the Euronext Oslo Exchange, and its share price has risen by about 35 percent over the past five days. 

Hanwha Ocean has telegraphed its plans to expand into U.S. shipbuilding for months. In August, it raised a total of $1.5 billion in a rights issue, with $680 million earmarked for "secure overseas production bases and advanced technologies, targeting the global maritime defense market in the United States and Europe." Foreign participation in these shipbuilding markets generally requires localized production, as demonstrated by Australian-owned Austal USA and Italian-owned Fincantieri Marinette Marine, which build surface combatants for the U.S. Navy.