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Thursday, February 22, 2024

 

Entrepreneurs’ stock losses bruise their businesses


Company growth stalls when an owner’s personal portfolio takes a hit


Peer-Reviewed Publication

UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN




When a recession takes a bite out of an entrepreneur’s personal stock portfolio, does that person’s business suffer more than those of older and larger competitors? 

New research by Marius Ring, assistant professor of finance at Texas McCombs, finds a link between the wealth of small-business owners and the health of their companies during economic downturns. When their stock portfolios lose value, their businesses suffer ripple effects: less financing and curtailed hiring. 

“Entrepreneurial wealth follows the ups and downs of economic cycles,” Ring says. “I show that for entrepreneurs whose stock portfolios take a hit, their businesses are adversely affected to a greater extent than established businesses.”

Such business constrictions are concentrated among younger companies, he noted, because older companies have more financial options. 

Ring studied stock portfolios of entrepreneurs during the 2008-2009 financial crisis in Norway, where detailed income and investing data are available. He merged the data with information from education and employment registers to trace the crash’s impacts on investors, the businesses they own, and their employees.

He found that owners’ stock shortfalls hurt businesses in multiple ways, with fledgling companies faring worse.

Hiring Hiatuses. A stock loss of 10% reduced employment growth by an average 5 percentage points from 2007 to 2010. In younger companies, job levels still had not recovered five years after the crisis began.

Shrinking employment resulted not from firings, but from less hiring. Says Ring, “Investing in new employees is likely not a top priority in a recession.” 

Investment Lessened. A 10% drop in the owner’s wealth led to cutbacks in capital available for business growth. 

  • It reduced injections of outside equity 22%.
  • For younger companies, it meant an 84% decline in the two-year rate of investment in plants and property.

Why are younger businesses more sensitive to their owners’ investment setbacks? The answer, says Ring, is that “more mature firms seem to be able to substitute other sources of financing, such as banks.”

Mature companies, he found, took on more bank debt after an owner’s wealth shock. Younger ones, on the other hand, saw a decrease in bank debt.

An important policy question, says Ring, is whether reduced business activity is driven more by financial forces or by psychological ones, such as a decrease in entrepreneurs’ willingness to take risks. 

His results suggest that financial constraints are more likely at play. That means government interventions, such as small-business lending subsidies, might help counter those constraints and help small businesses weather recessions. 

“Small businesses are important in most economies, and most of these firms rely heavily on their owners for financing,” Ring says. Owners can be a viable source of financing, but unfortunately, the owner’s personal wealth is likely to be hit at the same time as the firm is experiencing a downturn.” 

Entrepreneurial Wealth and Employment: Tracing Out the Effects of a Stock Market Crash” is published inThe Journal of Finance.

 


Tuesday, December 22, 2020

This market has all the signs of investor mania that JK Galbraith warned us about

Larry Sarb

As we approach the end of one of the most bizarre years on record, it might pay investors to reflect on a historical perspective. Hopefully, we can learn some valuable lessons. To my mind, there is no better author of such circumstances than John Kenneth Galbraith, the brilliant Canadian economist. 
© Provided by Financial Post J.K. Galbraith's A Short History of Financial Euphoria, published in 1990, deals with some of history’s most spectacular investment manias, stretching from the 17th-century Tulipmania up to the crash of 1987.

J.K. Galbraith is known for dozens of books on finance and financial history. A Short History of Financial Euphoria, published in 1990, deals with some of history’s most spectacular investment manias, stretching from the 17th-century Tulipmania up to the crash of 1987.

The must-read chapter is the second, titled “The Common Denominators,” which looks at the common threads that run though all these extraordinary events. Unfortunately, many of them are visible in today’s market.

That the same threads recur “is of no slight importance,” Galbraith notes: “Recognizing them, the sensible person or institution is or should be warned.”

However, he goes on to observe that, “the chances are not great, for built into the speculative episode is the euphoria, the mass escape from reality, that excludes any serious contemplation of the true nature of what is taking place.”

Of the factors that occur repeatedly, he says, “the first is the extreme brevity of the financial memory.”

Having been in the investment business for more than 40 years, I have witnessed this occur repeatedly. It certainly is prevalent in today’s period. Many of today’s investment population, individual and institutional participants, simply weren’t around for, or aware of, events such as the crash of Oct. 19, 1987, the dot-com bubble or the financial disaster of 2008. And, as Galbraith notes, “There can be few fields of human endeavour in which history counts for so little as in the world of finance. Past experience, to the extent that it is part of memory at all, is dismissed as the primitive refuge of those who do not have the insight to appreciate the incredible wonders of the present.”

Here’s another Galbraith insight: “Uniformly in all such events there is the thought that there is something new in the world. In all speculative episodes there is always “an element of pride in discovering what is seemingly new and greatly rewarding in the way of financial instrument or investment opportunity. The individual or institution that does so is thought to be wonderfully ahead of the mob.”

Galbraith notes an important additional truth: “As to new financial instruments, however, experience establishes a firm rule…. The rule is that financial operations do not lend themselves to innovation.”

The creation of the first index fund in 1975 was a true innovation. The following appearance of Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) in 1993 was a very successful takeoff of the original index but built upon the very same concept. The NYSE has about 2,400 companies listed while Nasdaq numbers about 3,300. Today, there are 6,970 ETFs traded on the U.S. exchanges with dozens of different structures and flavours. In this case, the idea of reinventing the wheel has grown to such an extent that there are more ETFs than publicly traded companies, an extreme example of an idea taken to excess.

Another warning, “All financial innovation involves, in one form or another, the creation of debt secured in greater or lesser adequacy by real assets…. All crises have involved debt that, in one fashion or another, has become dangerously out of scale in relation to the underlying means of payment.”

Welcome to the present. As of October 2020, America’s national debt had reached US$27 trillion. As of April 2020, debt as a percentage of GDP was 122 per cent. Ten years ago, that statistic was 84 per cent and 10 years before that, it was 58 per cent. The curve representing that statistic has gone parabolic. As Galbraith warns, excessive debt eventually can result in calamity.

Galbraith’s common denominators are clearly in play today.

I’m not telling you not to invest. I believe you can do so successfully, as long you remember to avoid the above listed sinkholes. Remember, an astute investor has to be part investor and part historian.

Our answer to not getting caught in the traps forewarned by Galbraith: stick with investments, especially in equities, which have strong balance sheets, predictable futures, huge sustainable moats around their businesses and characteristics of necessity (you can’t live without them). Whatever the crisis that arrives, your companies will still be standing.

One example today is the commercial insurance industry. What is most attractive is that the companies are trading at bargain prices, mainly due to a long period of weak underwriting pricing. Now, we are seeing a strengthening in pricing. Many of these companies have all the characteristics listed above with careful, conservative management in place. Their behaviour has been to avoid unprofitable underwriting, thus avoiding dangerous actions. With this important price shift, an increase in underwriting by these companies is underway. Companies like Fairfax, Berkshire Hathaway and Markel, all trading at what we believe are undervalued levels, offer investors a pocket of opportunity to invest while avoiding the Galbraith dangers.

Another example is Domino’s Pizza Group plc. Domino’s U.K. is part of the largest pizza franchise in the world. Delivery of pizza has grown during the pandemic, but had been expanding before that as well. The company is reasonably priced, especially when compared to its counterparts in the U.S. and Australia. It is a high-margin business as they only supply the ingredients to the franchisees, who are the ones putting up major capital investment. Again, we believe this is a business that heeds Galbraith’s warnings.

If you chose to ignore Galbraith’s insightful observations, you may fall victim to what he reportedly said many years ago : “The old generation must die off so a new set of idiots can make the same mistakes all over again.”

Larry Sarbit is a portfolio manager at Value Partners Investments in Winnipeg. He can be reached at lsarbit@vpinvestments.ca .

Wednesday, October 05, 2022

Analysis | UK Pension Funds Shouldn’t Be This Exciting

Pension funds are supposed to be among the least exciting financial institutions. Their job is to make long-term investments to meet the predictable needs of future retirees. They should be immune to short-term shocks. Yet last week in the UK, they were the center of an incipient financial crisis.


What led to this was a novel variation on a well-known theme: Leverage meets unforeseen events. The danger when these two collide isn’t confined to any one country or market, so regulators everywhere ought to take note. Banks are somewhat safer than they were before the crash of 2008, but risks that start outside the traditional financial system still require greater attention.


The UK pension funds’ embarrassment shows how subtle those risks can be. The funds used derivatives, so they believed, to hedge their positions — that is, to make their portfolios safer. Using a popular technique called “liability driven investment,” they guarded against the risk that lower interest rates would increase their liabilities (the present value of future pension payments) more than it boosted their assets (government bonds, stocks and other investments). They did this, in effect, by borrowing to increase their exposure to government bonds.


Unfortunately, reducing the risk from lower interest rates failed to take account of the possibility that rates might abruptly and dramatically rise — which is what happened after the UK government announced a reckless new fiscal policy on Sept. 23. Higher rates (lower bond prices) reduced the pension funds’ long-term liabilities — but also caused the funds’ derivative counterparties to demand more collateral up front. That meant selling bonds, driving their prices still lower, which called for more collateral, and so on — a vicious cycle that, for many, evoked the Lehman Brothers moment of 2008.


The Bank of England interrupted this downward spiral by promising to buy bonds at “whatever scale is necessary” to restore orderly markets. It’s too soon to say how the story ends. The debacle has made investors everywhere more anxious, and the central bank’s intervention, to put it mildly, complicates its efforts to tighten monetary policy and curb inflation.

For regulators, the lesson is this: The details of last week’s breakdown are new, but the central dynamic isn’t. Just about every case of financial contagion and crisis, from the 2008 mortgage meltdown to last year’s implosion of Archegos Capital Management, shares the same basic features.


The more leverage held by non-banks such as pension funds, hedge funds and insurers, the greater the chance that dislocations will proliferate and threaten the broader system. Regulators limit bank leverage by imposing capital requirements. In the world of so-called shadow banking, this is largely up to the counterparties. In good times, they often set collateral requirements too low, leading to huge calls for additional collateral in bad times, when markets are most stressed and least able to deliver it.


Back in 2018, the Bank of England was aware that pension funds would be hit with margin calls when interest rates went up — yet concluded all was well. Its worst-case scenario envisaged interest rates rising by 100 basis points. At the time, that seemed a lot. Already moving up, they spiked by more than that in the space of a few days — and would have gone up much more if the bank hadn’t stepped in.


Regulators need to remember that low-probability events aren’t zero-probability events: Eventually they happen, and when they do, the damage can be huge. Looking beyond banks across the ever-widening landscape of non-bank finance, they need to examine leverage in all its forms more closely — and set margin requirements and other rules that reflect how much markets can move when things go wrong.


One day, if regulators do their job, pension funds will be boring again.


More From Bloomberg Opinion:

• UK Pensions Got Margin Calls: Matt Levine

• Problems Facing the Gilt Market Aren’t Unique to the UK: Richard Cookson

• Corporate Bond Doomsayers Are a Little Premature: Jonathan Levin

The Editors are members of the Bloomberg Opinion editorial board.

More stories like this are available on bloomberg.com/opinion


Friday, June 19, 2020

Texas Supreme Court Rules Against Family in 'Overworked' Truck Driver Death

FreightWaves June 19, 2020


Despite testimony that an oilfield carrier pushed truck drivers to work more than 100 hours per week and ignore federal hours-of-service regulations, the Texas Supreme Court has ruled that the family of an "overworked" truck driver killed in a rollover crash can't file a wrongful death lawsuit against the carrier because they couldn't prove the company "intended" for him to die in a crash.

Instead, the court ruled that the family of Fabian Escobedo, who worked for Mo-Vac Service Co. in its Dilly, Texas, terminal for 12 years, could only collect workers' compensation in the crash that resulted in his death.

While Texas law allows spouses and children to recover exemplary damages under the state's Workers' Compensation Act, the attorney representing Escobedo's family, Armando P. Duran, said the law doesn't apply because Escobedo didn't have a spouse or children, which he said: "must be changed."

However, Justice Eva Guzman wrote in her opinion that the Texas legislature should align the Workers' Compensation Act with Texas' wrongful death statute to allow parents to sue.

According to Duran, the Texas Supreme Court should be "ashamed of the decision" it reached in this case.

What happened?

On May 30, 2012, Escobedo was driving a 2007 Mack truck, pulling a 1985 Reynolds tank trailer for Mo-Vac, when he veered off the road, rolled, and died of positional asphyxiation.

Urbano Garza, Mo-Vac manager from 2008 to 2012, testified that he was told by management to instruct his 30-plus truck drivers, including Escobedo, to drive past their legal driving limits to "make money" for the company.

"From what I observed, Mr. Escobedo's death was caused by greed," Garza said in his testimony.

Garza also stated that the truck drivers for Mo-Vac were ordered to work at least 100 hours per week and sometimes worked 19-24 hours straight for the oilfield carrier.

However, only a surviving spouse or heir is allowed to file for exemplary damages under Texas law. In a civil trial, exemplary damages are awarded as a way to punish a defendant for gross negligence or severe misconduct, according to Texas law.

"A hardworking Texan died alone on the side of a highway in a foreseeable accident that likely would not have occurred but for his employer's intentional disregard of laws enacted to protect workers and the public," Guzman said. "Though precedent compels me to concur in the court's conclusion that the Texas Workers' Compensation Act provides the exclusive remedy for the Escobedo family's heart-wrenching loss, I write separately to urge the Legislature to align the Act with Texas's wrongful-death statute by extending the Act's exemplary damages exception to parents who have lost a child, like the Escobedo fami

Monday, March 23, 2020

Economist Paul Krugman: Mitch McConnell is trying to create a corporate ‘slush fund’ — and Democrats should ‘just say no’

March 23, 2020 By Alex Henderson, AlterNet


Liberal economist and veteran New York Times columnist Paul Krugman has been stressing that any economic stimulus bills passed by Congress in response to the coronavirus pandemic must not be simply corporate bailouts, but provide genuine help for struggling U.S. workers. And in a March 23 Twitter thread, Krugman slams Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell for trying to create a corporate “slush fund.”

McConnell, according to Krugman, is wrong to approach the economic fallout from coronavirus like the crash of September 2008 and the collapse of Lehman Brothers.

“McConnell wants everyone to imagine that it’s like the immediate aftermath of Lehman, and that everything will collapse unless we give Trump a $500 billion corporate slush fund with no effective oversight,” Krugman asserts. “That’s totally unacceptable.”

That is, the clear and present need is for disaster relief, rather than stimulus. And notice how the debate over this relief is being framed: calls to help Americans in need are portrayed as "Democratic demands" rather than the decent thing to do.
— Paul Krugman (@paulkrugman) March 23, 2020

The economist adds, “Even aside from trust issues, we have this thing called bankruptcy law that often allows corporations to remain viable entities even when they can’t pay their debts. There may be cases where that won’t be enough — but then you want conditions attached to aid, a la auto bailout.”

Krugman goes on to explain why he distrusts McConnell, writing that the Kentucky Republican “has shown that he can’t be trusted when it comes to corporate giveaways. Remember how that huge 2017 corporate tax cut was supposed to lead to an investment boom, and instead was spent on stock buybacks?”

Krugman is equally critical of President Donald Trump in his thread, tweeting, “Nobody in their right mind believes that we can trust Trump to use a slush fund in a non-corrupt way, as opposed to rewarding friends — including himself — and punishing enemies…. I mean, he won’t even use the power he has to order companies to produce urgently needed medical supplies. Not a chance that he would require good behavior from bailed-out businesses.”

But McConnell wants everyone to imagine that it's like the immediate aftermath of Lehman, and that everything will collapse unless we give Trump a $500 billion corporate slush fund with no effective oversight. That's totally unacceptable 8/
— Paul Krugman (@paulkrugman) March 23, 2020

And McConnell himself has shown that he can't be trusted when it comes to corporate giveaways. Remember how that huge 2017 corporate tax cut was supposed to lead to an investment boom, and instead was spent on stock buybacks? 12/
— Paul Krugman (@paulkrugman) March 23, 2020

Even aside from trust issues, we have this thing called bankruptcy law that often allows corporations to remain viable entities even when they can't pay their debts. There may be cases where that won't be enough — but then you want conditions attached to aid, a la auto bailout
— Paul Krugman (@paulkrugman) March 23, 2020

In his thread, the Times columnist asserts that a spending bill passed by Congress needs to emphasize “disaster relief” for American workers.

“This isn’t 2008, when you arguably had to rush money to financial institutions to avoid immediate collapse,” Krugman tweets. “Stimulus is needed, but there’s time to do it right. Just say no to slush funds.”

So, once more: this isn't 2008, when you arguably had to rush money to financial institutions to avoid immediate collapse. Stimulus is needed, but there's time to do it right. Just say no to slush funds
— Paul Krugman (@paulkrugman) March 23, 2020

Tuesday, May 26, 2020


A predator–prey model to explain cycles in credit-led economies

Óscar Dejuán and Daniel Dejuán-Bitriá

Keywords: business cycles; financial instability; predator–prey models; post-Keynesian economics

Published in print:Mar 2018

Category:Research Article


Pages:159–179

Download PDF (648.9 KB)

This paper develops a predator–prey model to explain cycles in credit-led economies. The predator is the part of the financial sector that issues credit money for non-output transactions. It increases the indebtedness ratio and inflates bubbles that eventually have a negative impact on the real rate of growth (the prey). From this basis, we build a couple of models that may lead to self-contained or explosive cycles. Even in the first case, there is a risk of a financial collapse when certain variables move far away from their long-term equilibrium positions. In order to tame the cycle and avoid extreme positions, governments should ban the expansion of credit money for the purchase of assets and introduce permanent checks to risky credit.

Full Text

1 INTRODUCTION

This is a theoretical paper whose backdrop is the credit boom leading to the financial crash of 2007 and the first great recession of the twenty-first century. This crisis witnesses the ‘financial instability hypothesis’ of Minsky (1964; 1982; 1986; 1992). It also shows that the ‘originate-to-distribute model of banking,’ which characterizes our financialized economy, has accelerated the deterioration of the debt structures. Section 2 revises the key data of this process in the USA – the epicenter of the financial turmoil.

The Minskyan ‘financial instability hypothesis’ is deployed by means of a predator–prey model. This model was introduced in the natural sciences by Lotka and Volterra. Through a system of differential equations, they captured the systemic interdependency among marine species. In Volterra (1926), the higher the population of whiting (prey), the higher the food ratio and population of sharks (predator). After a certain point, the smaller population of whiting is bound to check the expansion of sharks. The traditional idea of the survival of the fittest is not always true in nature, he concluded.

Goodwin (1967) introduced the predator–prey model to explain the counter-clockwise movement in the employment rate and the labor share in income. A profit squeeze may damage the accumulation process and, therefore, the employment rate. Goodwin's model has prompted numerous extensions to the relation between distribution and accumulation. Goodwin et al. (1984) offer a survey. More recently, Arnim and Barrales (2015) have concluded that the Goodwin–Kalecki model of ‘profit squeeze’ continues to be the preferable approach to explain supply-driven cycles.

Taylor and O'Connell (1985) used a predator–prey model to formalize Minsky's hypothesis of an ongoing climate of financial fragility leading to economic crises. In a nutshell: the endogenous deterioration of the debt structure increases liquidity preference and checks productive investment.

Taylor and O'Connell (1985) was the seminal paper that encouraged post-Keynesian economists to study the dynamic competition between the real and financial sectors of the economy. 1 The new models differ mostly on the variables playing the roles of prey and predator. For Asada (2001; 2011), private debt is the predator, and income (related to capacity utilization) is the prey. In Dejuán and González-Calvet (2005), the predator is the rate of interest, while the prey is the rate of growth of real GDP. Fazzari et al. (2008) and Oreiro et al. (2013) relate the cashflow of firms (inversely related to the rate of interest) to their investment decisions. Taylor (2012) relates Minsky with Goodwin-style cycles.

Without using a proper predatory–prey model, Ryoo and Skott build a variety of stock-flow consistent models to show the relationship between the increasing leverage of firms, the capital gains resulting from the sale of stocks, and the investment decisions that depend on Tobin's q. The final effects on the real economy will depend on whether we adopt a Kaleckian view (capacity utilization closure) or a Kaldorian one (profit share closure). In the Kaldorian version, the real sector itself has an inherent tendency towards cyclical behavior (‘short cycles’), along with the cyclical forces generated by endogenous changes in financial practices (‘long waves’) (Skott 1994; Ryoo and Skott 2008; Skott and Ryoo 2008; Ryoo 2013a; 2013b). 2 Palley (1994; 2011) contrasts the long financial cycles leading to financial crashes with the traditional business cycles. Palley (2013, p. 65) states that credit-led capitalism has developed a ‘predator–prey’ mechanism.

Our paper has also been influenced by Badhuri et al. (2006) and Werner (1997; 2005; 2015). Badhuri et al. confront the real economy (from which output and profits accrue) and the virtual one that inflates bubbles and capital gains. Werner differentiates between the circuit of output transactions and the circuit of non-output transactions (assets). The first circuit is a positive-game. The second circuit is a zero-sum game where bubbles are inflated. He reinstates the ‘quantity theory of credit’ to explain asset inflation.

In our paper, the prey will be the productive sector represented by the rate of growth of real GDP. 3 Since our interest is in the impact of financial forces, we will consider an economy that is growing at the autonomous trend marked by the expansion permanent autonomous demand, with inflation controlled by the central bank. In Section 3 we combine the Keynesian–Kaleckian principle of effective demand (Keynes 1936; Kalecki 1971) and the multiplier-accelerator mechanism. This is the supermultiplier model introduced by Hicks (1950), Serrano (1995), Bortis (1997), Dejuán (2005; 2016), and Serrano and Freitas (2015).

Following Werner (1997), the predator has been identified with the financial sector when it provides credit for non-output transactions. It brings about higher indebtedness ratios and bubbles that (eventually) damage the real economy. Section 4 analyses the forces that affect creditworthiness and their influences on aggregate demand: default rate, indebtedness ratio, burden of debt, vertigo–stampede effects, wealth effects.

In Section 5 (and in the mathematical Appendix 1) we build a variety of predator–prey models leading to self-contained or explosive cycles. Even the first ones may lead to a credit crunch and a recession. This happens when the gap between the current trend of certain variables and their long-term equilibrium rate becomes too broad. Arguably, one of the main contributions of this paper is the presence of gravity centers compatible with the principle of effective demand. The expected growth of permanent demand, provided it endures long enough, is an attractor of the growth of output at full capacity (not full employment). The same rate plus the inflation target fixed by the Central Bank marks the long-term equilibrium growth of credit. In a Sraffian mood, the fundamental value of assets (discounted at the normal rate of profit) becomes a gravity center of asset inflation (Sraffa 1960).

The conclusions of the paper are summed up in Section 6. In order to tame the cycle and avoid extreme positions, governments should ban the expansion of credit money for the purchase of assets and introduce permanent checks to risky credit.

Wednesday, October 27, 2021

Starbucks to boost US starting wage to $15 per hour, targeting $17 average by 2022

Wed, October 27, 2021, 3:36 PM

Starbucks (SBUX) on Wednesday became the latest company to hike pay for its workers, announcing plans to increase all U.S. hourly wages to at least $15 per an hour, up from the current $12 rate, by the summer of 2022. Yahoo Fiannce's Brooke DiPalma shares the details with Seana Smith.

Video Transcript

SEANA SMITH: Want to get to some breaking news. Starbucks is raising its minimum wage for all employees, hiking it to $15 an hour. Brooke DiPalma has more on this for us. Brooke.

BROOKE DIPALMA: Seana, that's right. Certainly a game changer or perhaps even happening in the fast-food industry. So now all hourly wage employees or what Starbucks likes to call partners will have a minimum wage of $15 an hour. Now that moves the average wage of Starbucks employees-- or baristas they like to call them as well-- up to $17 an hour and [? influxes ?] that range of $15 to $23. Now, that's up from the average hourly wage of $14 per an hour and a minimum of $12 an hour range.

Now, in order to raise the floor, they must also raise the ceiling, and so what this means for employees who have two-plus years is a 5% increase, and for employees that have five or more years at Starbucks, they will get a 10% increase.

Now, I do want to note in an internal memo that employees-- or partners as I said Starbucks likes to call them-- received today from North America's executive vice president. Williams noted, "Our wage increases from December 2020 and to the summer of 2022"-- which is when they're going in [INAUDIBLE]-- will mean at least a 17% increase for partners and at least 20% for tenured partners in two years." She goes on to say, "I share all of this only to reaffirm our belief that investing in our partners is not a cost. It's an opportunity, and we intend to let our shareholders and peers know the same."

Now, this is the third investment over the last 24 months that Starbucks has made in order to raise the minimum wage for its employees. But I do want to note that other companies are doing the exact same thing. Here we have Target, $15 minimum wage. Disney World, $15. Costco, $16. Ben and Jerry's going along with their local Vermont minimum wage of $18.13. McDonald's, $13. Chipotle, we just heard from them $15 earlier this year.

All note that as of today, October 27, the federal minimum wage still lies at $7.25 per an hour. So lots of work to do all across the board, Seana.

If bosses want workers, they have to actually try



Ryan Cooper, National correspondent
Wed, October 27, 2021

A help wanted sign. Illustrated | iStock

A class of Americans has become lazy and entitled. Too used to a government that caters to their every whim, they're facing a difficult situation not with grit and determination, but by throwing tantrums and demanding special treatment.

That's right, I'm talking about business owners. Complaints about a labor shortage abound, but it's time these coddled snowflakes learned some discipline. Employers need to put in the work to staff their own businesses instead of relying on the government do it for them.

The plain fact is we've had an employer's economy for a decade. After the Great Recession, unemployment was chronically high — only touching something like full employment in 2019, 11 years after the crash. Bosses got used to having the pick of the litter. With so many credentialed people thrown out of work, hiring managers were able to demand extravagant experience and over-qualification for low-level jobs. Many employers came to believe they were owed workers who would take any position and mutely absorb any abuse.

This sense of entitlement is a major reason both state and federal governments were so eager to end the boost to pandemic unemployment benefits. Without people lining up around the block to take crummy, low-wage positions, employers ran crying to the government for help.

But, as I wrote previously, their strategy didn't work. Some workers took early retirement when they got laid off last year; some parents can't find childcare at a reasonable price, so they are staying home; some workers saved up money during quarantine and would rather not work for the moment; and a great many workers are simply dead.

Meanwhile, among those actively in the job market, millions are changing careers. The pandemic has been a nightmare for the workers who keep America's rattletrap society staggering forward — the cashiers, cooks, nurses, truck drivers, meatpackers, child care workers, fruit pickers, and so on. It was one thing for overeducated millennials to scrape by in dead-end, low-wage jobs, like bagging groceries or getting screamed at while waiting tables. It was quite another to do so while at risk of gruesome death.

Simultaneously, the pandemic rescue packages have created a huge spending boom. Americans are buying stuff at a record pace, creating all sorts of snarls in shipping and production (in part because there was little excess capacity, again thanks to weak demand during the feeble post-2008 recovery). Higher-productivity firms are scrambling to expand, offering jobs with much better pay and benefits. This too puts a strain on employers whose business model is premised on exploited, low-wage labor.

Together, all this has given the American working class its greatest leverage in more than 20 years. People are quitting over pay, benefits, and working conditions. Thousands of workers are on strike at hospitals, tractor factories, and elsewhere. Thousands more may strike soon. Job applicants have turned the tables on employers, treating them with the same apathy they received after 2008 — ghosting hiring managers on outreach, interviews, or even job offers.

Employers don't like it, but they're finally recognizing something has changed. "Our governing body became very used to the job market conditions during the recession and for several years after where the employer had all the leverage," one anonymous public sector worker wrote on a manager discussion blog. "They are only now beginning to realize how the roles have reversed."

They need to realize it faster, and they need to learn how to entice workers. Better wages and benefits are the most obvious mechanism — indeed, we're already seeing wages rising strongly in sectors like hospitality, where jobs are notoriously poorly paid. Employers should also ditch the idea that they can always get someone perfectly experienced for every position. They'll need to train inexperienced people and offer extra training, raises, and new benefits to retain their existing workers.

There's also a less expensive strategy many employers may have to consider: shorter hours and employee say in workplace conditions. As Josh Eidelson writes at Bloomberg, one of the common demands of union workers currently striking or threatening to strike at John Deere, Kellogg's, and in Hollywood is more time off and safer working conditions. These workers are often quite well-paid, but they're sick of mandatory overtime, 12-hour shifts, 7-day weeks, and few vacation days. Onerous schedules leave people no time to relax and recharge — and can even be dangerous. A sleepy person should not be operating heavy machinery.

Overwork is also related to the lousy post-2008 recovery and employers' resultant entitlement. With a huge glut of labor, bosses got addicted to running their workforce ragged and economizing on health and safety systems. When grueling Amazon warehouse jobs destroy people's backs and knees, for instance, the company has typically hired new people instead of changing its practices. This cruel and lazy habit will have to be unlearned.

That will be difficult, because these problems didn't originate in 2008, though certainly the last decade exacerbated them. As I show in a paper for the People's Policy Project, average American working hours have barely declined since the 1970s, while hours have plummeted in all other rich nations. When you think about it, that's how things should work: As nations become wealthier and more productive, people should be able to work less and relax more. If Americans worked as little as Germans, for instance, we'd get almost 11 more weeks of vacation every year.

The pandemic has taught us that reasonable work conditions and plenty of time off are just as important as pay and other benefits. Money isn't much good if you can't enjoy it, and no job is worth your health or your life.

American workers know that now. If they want to have staff, American employers will need to catch up.

Sunday, November 11, 2007

9/11


Not September 11, 2001 but November 9, 2007 which can also be written 9/11.

The day the U.S. stock market crashed from its current consumer credit crisis.
Stocks fell for a third session on Friday after a disappointing outlook from Qualcomm Inc triggered more weakness in technology shares and helped send the Nasdaq down to its biggest weekly point loss since the September 11, 2001, attacks.

I just thought the coincidence of the dates was one of those interesting occult significators that occurs as part of the psychology of the market. A market in a recession that many dare not admit is happening.

Adding to the negative tone, Fannie Mae , the largest source of mortgage financing in the United States, posted a third-quarter net loss that was double its loss from a year ago. Its shares ended the session down 1.6 percent at $49.00, after earlier dropping 10.6 percent to a fresh 52-week low at $44.54.

And Wachovia Corp , the fourth-largest U.S. bank, shook up financial markets some more by reporting a potential $1.7 billion loss on mortgage-related debt. Wachovia's stock fell more than 5 percent to a 52-week low at $38.05, but then rebounded to finish the day up 0.9 percent at $40.65.



And while Wall Street will continue its daily boom and bust cycle it is now part of global stock market, one which means that crashes occur not just on the street but around the globe as we witnessed with the bank crash last month in England.
The Economist cites various phenomena that are contributing to converging global markets. Among them: reduced controls on capital, a larger number of cross-border listings, and multinational mergers.

In just the past few months alone, some of the world's biggest stock exchanges have announced agreements or mergers to integrate trading systems. Back in April, NYSE Group merged with European market Euronext to create what is now NYSE Euronext. The European Union's internal market commissioner, Charlie McCreevy, said that the NYSE/Euronext union marks the beginning of stock market mergers and "at some point we will see moves toward a common pool of liquidity."

Furthermore, many companies are listed in multiple global markets in order to gain access to foreign capital. Just as some foreign companies appear on U.S. exchanges -- like GlaxoSmithKline (NYSE: GSK), Novartis (NYSE: NVS), and CNOOC (NYSE: CEO) -- U.S. companies such as IBM (NYSE: IBM), Home Depot (NYSE: HD), and General Electric (NYSE: GE) are listed on the Frankfurt and London exchanges.

Finally, a few major international mergers have taken place in the past five years, including Alcatel-Lucent and Arcelor Mittal. The effects of such unions increase global market correlation because the newly formed companies are known in multiple countries and generate revenues in multiple markets.
CIBC joins the writedown parade
Bank will take a $463-million hit in fourth quarter on its exposure to U.S. mortgage market

The credit crunch, which has been hammering the largest U.S. financial institutions, is increasingly taking its toll on Canadian banks.

Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce yesterday said it will take a $463-million fourth-quarter charge on its exposure to the U.S. mortgage market, bringing its total writedowns to the market to $753-million in the past six months.

In other developments late yesterday, Bank of Montreal's shares fell almost 5 per cent - much of that decline in the final hours of trading - as that bank contends with its exposure to structured investment vehicles, or SIVs. And Royal Bank of Canada's stock closed yesterday near its 52-week low.

In the sector at large, tens of billions of dollars have already dropped off the banking system's balance sheets, and the dominoes continue to fall.



It is America's Main Street, which has kept the U.S. economy going on cheap credit and the resulting consumption, is now drowning in the quicksand of rising rates, personal bankruptcies and foreclosures. Whose impact will continue through out
2008.

And both the pro-business types and the left agree that the American financial markets have an addiction to being bailed out.

The U.S. Federal Reserve Board acted "like a bartender" in lowering interest rates and its actions are contributing to a stock market bubble in the U.S., Marc Faber, the Hong Kong-based publisher of The Gloom, Boom & Doom Report, said.

"Each time you bail out, it becomes bigger and bigger, and the credit problems become much, much larger," said Faber, managing director of Marc Faber Ltd. The Fed "feeds its customers with booze, and when they get totally drunk and are about to fall off their chairs, the bartender gives them more booze to keep them going. One day, it will lead to the ultimate breakdown."

"The best for the system would be if a major player would go bust," Faber said. "Then there would be an example for investors and for the players, the Wall Street establishment, the banks, to be more prudent."

As most people now realize, the mortgage industry is on life-support. Many of the ways that the banks were generating profits have vanished overnight. The “securitization” of debt (mortgages, car loans, credit card debt etc) has ground to a halt. What had been a booming multi-billion dollar per-year business is now a dwindling part of the banks’ revenues. Investors are steering clear of anything even remotely associated to real estate.

Bloomberg News ran a story last week which sheds more light on the jam the banks now find themselves in:

Banks shut out of the market for short-term loans are finding salvation in a government lending program set up to revive housing during the Great Depression. Countrywide Financial Corp., Washington Mutual Inc., Hudson City Bancorp Inc. and hundreds of other lenders borrowed a record $163 billion from the 12 Federal Home Loan Banks in August and September as interest rates on asset-backed commercial paper rose as high as 5.6 percent. The government-sponsored companies were able to make loans at about 4.9 percent, saving the private banks about $1 billion in annual interest.

Is it possible that anyone with a pulse and a minimal ability to reason couldn’t see the inherent problems of building a financial edifice on the prospect that millions of first-time homeowners with bad credit history and no collateral would pay off there mortgages in a timely and responsible manner?

No. It is not possible. The real reason that the subprime swindle mushroomed into an economy-busting monster is that the markets are no longer policed by any agency that believes in intervention. The pervasive “free market” ideology rejects the notion of supervision or oversight, and as a result, the markets have become increasingly opaque and unresponsive to rules that may assure their continued credibility or even their ability to function properly.

The “supply side” avatars of deregulation have transformed the world’s most vital and prosperous markets into a huckster’s shell-game. All regulatory accountability has vanished along with trillions of dollars in foreign investment. What’s left is a flea-market for dodgy loans, dubious over-leveraged equities and “securitized” Triple A-rated garbage.

U.S. Financial business is crying for state intervention while their political cronies in the Republican party deny their citizens universal health-care, child care, pharma-care, and secure pensions because that smacks of socialism. But socialism for the rich is okay.

See:

Bank Smack Down

Purdy Crawford Rescues the Market

Sub Prime Exploitation

Canadian Banks and The Great Depression

Wall Street Deja Vu

Housing Crash the New S&L Crisis

US Housing Market Crash


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Sunday, May 05, 2019

Domenico Moro: Fascism was the open and brute dictatorship of the elite of capital

Domenico Moro (1964, Rome) is an Italian economist, sociologist and political researcher who for years has been analyzing and researching the European monetary system as well as large multinacional financial monopolies and groups such as Bilderberg and the Trilateral commission. So far, he has published several books: “Il gruppo Bilderberg” (2014), “Globalizzazione e decadenza industriale” (2015), “La terza guerra mundiale e il fundamentalismo islamico” (2016), “La gubbia dell’euro” (2018).

First I would ask you if the European Union has a future in the form of a corporate project of the ruling elites?
I think we have to distinguish between Eu and single European currency. It is difficult that Euro can survive, in the same way as other previous monetary unions in the History, for example the Latin union. First of all, the Euro system is unfit for coping with the evolution of world economy, because makes impossible to the single countries to adapt themselves to economic cycles. Without any control on exchange and interest rates, and on money emission of the central bank is impossible for a single State making any industrial policy and contrasting the decrease of GDP and employment. Euro is broadening the differences between countries, producing millions of poor people and, more of all, makes difficult resisting to external shocks. Another crisis, like the 2008-2009 one (the worst one since 1929), would means likely the collapse of euro system. But for which reason the ruling classes in Europe are so determined to defend Euro? Euro is a political project.  From a class point of view, Euro is the tool to force the working class to accept the European rules, written in the Treaties. The target is removing the control of public budget and industrial policy from other classes and put it only into hands of the superior sector of capital, the biggest and more internationalized one. Above all Euro is the tool to accept limitations on popular and democratic sovereignty, as it was established during a century of struggles, and make the Parliaments more weak with no power in public budget and industrial policy decisions. In this way, Euro and treaties has made possible modify the balance of power between capital and labour that was defined in favour of working class after the fall of fascism and after the struggles in sixties and seventies. With regard to the Eu treaties, also the European targets that force the decrease of debt to 60% on GDP are impossible to be reached. Perhaps what could survive is another system of relationships among European countries, with agreements which establish some kind of trade rules among countries.
How do you look at Brussels latest pressures on fiscal monetary policy of Italy, in terms of her debt?
Italian government actually is not doing an expansionary policy. It would be exaggerated call it a Keynesian policy. A public deficit of 2.4% is just 0.1% above the deficit of the previous Pd government. Notwithstanding the European commission is attacking the government as if it was doing a policy of strong spending, which can destroy Europe. It is the demonstration that European Commission is far from reality. According to Junker and Moscovici, Italy should cut public expenses further after years of austerity in order to pass from 131% to 60% of debt on GDP just in a couple of decades of years. All this during a period of economic stagnation with an inflation between zero and one per cent and with 5 million of absolute poors. It is ridiculous.
Italian public debt has already reached 131% of the state GDP, which is more of 2340 billion euros, while economic growth is below the EU average, and the unemployment rate is 11%, which amongst the young population is unbelievable 32%. How can Italy deal with these problems and can it at all?
That’s for sure that Italy cannot cope with unemployment and its big debt if it follow the European rules and cut the public expenses. We need to increase investments, particularly in construction, in order to revitalize the domestic market. Only the state can do it. For this reason Italy has to go much further a 2.4% deficit. In this case, it should be inevitable to crash with European authorities.
Right-wing populist “5stelle” and Lega Nord government in Rome are opposed to austerity measures, but will they step in front of the Brussels bureaucrats, as did in Greece once?
Italy is not Greece. First of all for its dimensions. Without Italy euro can arrive to the end quickly. Secondly, Italian industrial structure is quite strong and quite competitive. Italy has been realizing strong trade surpluses (goods and services) for the last 7 years (53 billion of euros in 2017). Instead France and Uk continue to have trade deficit. Italy has been doing public primary surpluses for last 20 years (Germany for only 12 years), i.e. Italy State expenses are less than its revenues. Furthermore in Italy household savings are quite high. International investments funds know it, as JP Morgan said recently. For this reason they are investing in Italian debt even now. From the other side, we do not have to forget the euro is a strong cage. Exiting from this cage requires a strong political determination. The question is if M5S and Lega will be firm and concerned to it. I have some doubt about this. In my opinion the true government target is to negotiate better conditions with Eu. Lega and M5S are bourgeois parties. They represent some sectors of capital and middle and petty bourgeoisie damaged by austerity.  Do not forget that Italy has a biggest sector of little and middle firms than other European countries, like Germany and France. In any event the situation could fall if the Commission hardens its position, but it is difficult forecast what will happen.
We are witnesses today that the Italian left is at the lowest possible level of its existence and socio-political action. Which is the real reason for it?
The reasons of collapse of Italian left are many and have origin in the past twenty-thirty years of Italian history. When Italian communist party (Pci) broke up in 1991, it was divided in two parts. The majority organized  a party (called Pds and then Ds and Pd), which was rather liberal democratic than social democratic. It was the demonstration of how Pci was changed in the last decade, surrendering on the political and ideological field. This party become the spokesperson of big capital interests and in particular of European union and single currency. All of this was hidden by the opposition of Berlusconi, depicted as the most important danger for Italy. The minority of former Pci and some other far left little organizations and groups organized the Party of Rifondazione Comunista (Prc). This party was the assembly of many political and ideological currents in perpetual fight each against other rather than an organization composed by well-blended elements. Not much was done in this direction by the leadership, more interested in electoral tactics. Furthermore, in order to fight Berlusconi, considered the most (or the only) dangerous enemy, the sole political tactic of Prc was the centre-left coalition with Pds (later Ds) and leaded by Romano Prodi, a former State top manager, the person responsible for privatization of many State enterprises. The second Prodi government (2006-2008) was a disillusionment for many voters of Prc, PdCI (a 1998 secession from Prc) and Greens. At the elections in 2008 the votes of this parties decreased from 12% to 3% and they were expelled from Parliament. This result was destinate to do not change. For two reasons. Firstly, a part of far left electorate moved to abstention and a bigger part passed to Movimento cinque stelle, which will began the first Italian party in 2013 and go to the government in 2018. Secondly, because of the defeat, the political and ideological differences broke up inside Prc and the far left. Some people wanted go on with centre-left collation, some did not. Some people thought that was necessary get rid of communism and marxism, some did not. There were many secessions, which weakened Prc. The situation fell with the 2008-2009 crisis and European austerity, in particular during Monti government, a sort of Eu commissioner, supported by Pd and Berlusconi. The moderate left was the more sure supporter of European constrictions and payed the price for this at the last elections,  in the same way the as moderate left did in France, Greece, Spain, Germany. The far left was negative with austerity, but its position on Eu and the single currency was little clear, confusing defense of Eu with internationalism and the fight against Euro with nationalism. Summarizing, moderate left was the defender of big capital interests while far left was not able to understand the modification of the Italian and European society, in particular the impact of Euro on economy and policy. On the contrary, M5S and Lega were able to do it. It was remarkable the ability of Lega to transform from defender of North Italy interests into defender of “national” interests, building a social alliance (in the sense which Gramsci gave to the word) with some sectors of capitalist firms (which have the leadership), middle classes and working class. In a way, today we assist to a civil war inside the Italian (but also European) capitalist class, of which the birth of last Italian government is the evidence.
How do you see today on this growing rising climax of fascism in Europe and whether a modern left can even oppose this trend and how?
The rising of fascist groups depends on the European austerity and crisis, in the same way as nazism depended on the austerity policy with which was faced the 1929 crysis. They also depend on the tolerance towards them of moderate left and centre-right parties that underestimated antifascism and Resistance importance in the last decades. But the true question is: there is a danger of fascism regime in Europe? In order to answer we have to understand what was fascism and why took power. Fascism was the open and brute dictatorship of the élite of capital. This dictatorship was useful to remove popular and democratic sovereignty, eliminating Parliament and elections, as well as trade unions and working class parties. Furthermore fascism and its nationalistic soul was coherent with a capitalistic accumulation that was mainly domestic and with a territorial shape of imperialism. Fascism was the preparation to the second time of the world war for the defeated country (Germany) and the unsatisfied country (Italy) of the First World War. Today  – we have to ask ourselves – what has eliminate o reduced popular and democratic sovereignty? What has neutralized the universal suffrage, trade unions and popular parties? The answer is simple. European treaties and single currency. You can vote a policy after that the European constraints and Euro prevent to put into practice. Thanks to them, élite of capital do not need to abolish democracy or use direct brutality. Furthermore, the capitalist accumulation is much more global than in the thirties and imperialism is not territorial but managed by multinational enterprises. The most bizarre thing is that M5S and Lega – a centre and a far right party – seem the defender of the vote results (and of the democratic sovereignty) against the international market and European Commission influence on the political decision. Meanwhile, Pd, Berlusconi and President of Republic defend the European Commission and say “We have to respetct the rules, otherwise the markets will punish us”. The problem is that Italian workers and unemployed people has been punished for a decade by austerity, of which is impossible to see a end. You can imagine the consequences of Junker declarations on Italian electorate: Lega has increased its votes from 17,3% to 30%. This is the demonstration of the confusion existing in Italy (but also in many European countries) and of the difficulties of the left to fight the M5S and Lega positions. For this reason we have to be clear about European treaty and single currency. Exit from Euro or even from Eu do not resolve all the problems but is a necessary conditions, particularly if we want to be credible. It is true that the problem is the capital, but capitalism fights its class battle and do profits in different historical ways. Today European integration takes on a strategic role for European capital egemony and capital accumulation.
All this does not mean that does not exist any difference inside capital and between capitals of different nations and consequently that does not exit competition among capitals and among States. On the contrary, Euro, widening differences in economy and reducing domestic markets, increases the imperialistic tendency to expansion abroad and tensions among States, strengthening the role of the national State, as well as nationalism and xenophobia. Euro and Eu do not abolish or weaken national-States, but change them, redefining their parts and the relationship among these in order to put in a cage the subordinate classes.
Consider one of the best experts when it comes to organizations such as the Bilderberg Group and the Trilateral Commission. Tell me how really these organizations really are capable of carrying the decision on the international political scene, and is there any cooperation between them and the NATO military alliance through an institution such as the Club of Rome?
Usually people connect Bilderberg to conspiracy theory. They think that there is a little group of people that decide about all what concern the events in the world. Actually Bilderberg and its sister organization, Trilateral Commission, are think tanks of a part of the superior sector of international capital of western countries, the majority member countries of Nato (Usa, Canada, Uk, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, etc.). Their target is discussing and defining policies useful to their interests. Even if there is no conspiracy, the strategical importance of Bilderberg and Trilateral is evident in connection with European integration. The proposal of a single currency in Europe was proposed in a meeting of Bilderberg in Buxton in 1958, in order to control the public budget and reduce the power of Parliaments. Particularly meaningful is The Crisis of democracy, a report for the Trilateral meeting at Tokyo in 1975, written by Huntigton and Crozier. The crisis of democracy, according to the two authors, was depending on an excess of democracy, which should have been reduced. The tool to reach this goal was European integration. The strength of Bilderberg and Trilateral depends on the connection between business élite (top managers and member of boards of multinationals, transnationals, and internationals banks), policy élite (prime ministers and heads of State, finance and foreign ministers, European Commission members, Nato council members), élite of European and national bureaucracy (International monetary fund, central banks and Bce members), and élite of University and mass media.  Many European prime ministers has attended the meeting, among them Blair, Merkel, Prodi, Monti. In this way the business élite can exercise an influence on politics. Summarizing, there is no conspiracy theory but hegemony building of transnational capital in western society.
This interview was taken by Gordan Stosevic.