Hazara Shias flee Afghanistan fearing Taliban persecution

Attacks on religious minority prompt exodus of thousands across border to Pakistan to seek safety

THEY ARE PERSECUTED IN PAKISTAN AS WELL
Afghanistan – live updates

Sher Ali with his wife and small baby who fled Kabul and reached Chaman, Pakistan on Thursday. Photograph: Shah Meer Baloch

Shah Meer Baloch in Chaman
Sun 29 Aug 2021 

As word of Kabul’s fall to the Taliban spread across Afghanistan, there were few who greeted the news with as much fear as the Hazara Shias. The religious minority in this Sunni majority country were among the most persecuted groups when the Taliban last ruled Afghanistan, and the memories of the killings, torture and mass executions have not faded.

Signs point to Hazaras once again finding themselves a target of the Taliban. A recent Amnesty report found that Taliban militants were responsible for the murder of nine Hazaras in July, in the village of Mundarakht. Six of the men were shot and three were tortured to death, including one man who was strangled with his own scarf and had his arm muscles sliced off.

Attacks such as these have prompted a mass exodus of Hazara people over the border to Pakistan, and activists say that about 10,000 have arrived in the Pakistan city of Quetta, in Balochistan, where they are living in mosques and wedding halls, and renting rooms. Several Hazaras told the Guardian they had paid traffickers from £50 to £350 to get them across the border.

Among those sheltering in Quetta was Sher Ali, 24, a shopkeeper, who had escaped with his wife and baby. Ali reached Chaman on the Pakistan side of the frontier on Thursday. The journey, through territory controlled by the Taliban, had taken three days. They had driven along roads decimated by bomb blasts, passing burnt-out cars and destroyed bridges.

Ali had decided to leave after he witnessed his friend Mohammad Hussain, 23, being shot dead by the Taliban 10 days ago in Kabul. Hussain had been passing through a Taliban security checkpoint on a motorbike. He refused to stop and they fired at him with an assault rifle.

“When I went to the spot, Hussain’s dead body was lying on the road in a pool of blood. They emptied the AK-47 on him,” said Ali. “It was the moment I decided to leave. It is like a do or die situation for Hazara Shia; whether to leave and live, or stay and die.”

In recent days, there have been chaotic scenes at the Chaman border crossing, as tens of thousands of Afghans have attempted to make it across. Only those with Pakistan residency papers or people travelling to Pakistan for medical treatment are officially allowed in, but some of the Hazaras said traffickers would bribe authorities at the border to get Afghans across illegally.


‘Everyone is afraid’: Afghans fleeing Taliban push for exit into Pakistan

Ali said his remaining family members would be leaving for Pakistan within a few days. “We can’t live in the Taliban’s Afghanistan,” he said.

Mohammed Sharif Tahmasi, 21, a computer science student from Ghazni province, reached Chaman along with his two sisters and brother on Thursday. After making the border crossing, they waited in a muddy corner near the border fence for some more Hazara families so they could travel to Quetta together.

Tahmasi’s family has never been to Pakistan but his parents had given the children some money and instructed them to urgently get over the border as soon as they could.

left to right Mohammad Sharif Tahmasi, Ashmatullah Tahmasi, Nahid Tahmasi and Umaira Tahmasi who fled Kabul. Photograph: Shah Meer Baloch

“All Hazara parents are asking their children to leave Afghanistan and be safe,” said Tahmasi. “I don’t know how my parents and the other siblings are, but I hope my siblings are fine and they will cross soon.”

Sharif’s sister Nahid Tahmasi, 15, a student in an elementary school, said she did not want to abandon her parents but, before she had left Ghazni, Taliban restrictions on women had already begun to be enforced.

“I feel terrible,” she said. “I can’t go to school and I miss my city and friends. I miss my parents. I miss my school. When the Taliban took control of Ghazni province they banned girls’ entry into public parks and schools. They did not want girls to study. We could not roam outside, visit our neighbours and dress the way we want.”

Gulalai Haideri, a Hazara who worked as a teacher at the Women for Afghan Women NGO, in Faryab province, reached Quetta five days ago. She is pregnant and sold her jewellery to pay for the journey and to be smuggled across the border.

“We were rejected twice for entry but then I begged the guards to allow me to enter as I am pregnant and I can’t live in Afghanistan. I am a woman, I will be killed,” she said. “They had mercy and allowed my family to enter.”

Haideri said that after her province fell to the insurgents, the Taliban had been going door to door to find unmarried girls, orphaned girls, divorced women and widows to get married to their fighters.

Mohammad Fahim Arvin, 21, a student at the Kabul Polytechnic University, was told by his parents to leave and save his life. But he spoke of his sadness at having to leave his parents behind.

“The Taliban hate us and want us to join them and fight for them, but we can’t,” said Arvin. “It is not my fault I was born as a Hazara; it was God’s decision. It was not in my hands. Why do they [Taliban] want to kill us for being Hazara?”

Yet even in Pakistan, the Hazaras are not in safe territory. Here too they have been persecuted for three decades by the Sunni militant groups. Earlier this year, 10 Hazara miners working in Balochistan were murdered by members of Islamic State. According to a 2019 report by Pakistan’s National Commission for Human Rights, at least 509 Hazara have been murdered for their faith since 2013.

For many of Afghanistan’s Hazara community arriving into Pakistan with little money and no connections, they have had to rely on the kindness of the local community.

Syed Nadir was among those hosting five Hazara families, including Haideri’s family in Quetta who had arrived in recent days.

“I don’t know any of them, but all Hazara are going through one of the worst times,” he said. “They are leaving their homes and we should host them. All countries should play their part for the Hazaras and the Afghans.”

 

Perturbed over Pakistan, Qatar and Turkey's outreach to Taliban, Saudi Arabia eyes closer ties to India

Saudi Prince, Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud is expected to be in New Delhi this weekend as part of his first visit to India as foreign minister where talks will mostly focus on the evolving situation in Afghanistan

FP StaffSeptember 16, 2021 

Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in Riyadh. AFP

Saudi Arabia foreign minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud is expected to visit India this weekend to discuss the unfolding situation in Afghanistan and the Taliban’s takeover of the country.

Prince Faisal, scheduled to land in India on 19 September, is expected to hold meetings with External Affairs Minister Dr S Jaishankar, National Security Advisor (NSA) Ajit Doval and also Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

This meet comes after Prime Minister Narendra Modi discussed the Afghanistan situation with UAE crown prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan on 3 September over the telephone, External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar hosted Dr Anwar Gargash, diplomatic advisor to UAE president, on 30 August and exchanged notes on the Kabul crisis.

Qatar, Turkey’s and Pakistan’s proximity to Taliban

India's allies in West Asia, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, are worried about the security ramifications of a Taliban-led Afghanistan and the ties shared by the Taliban and global terrorist networks.

The two nations are also said to have been perturbed by the active role played by Qatar, Turkey and Pakistan in engaging with the Taliban regime.

Qatar has turned out to be a trusted mediator in this conflict.

Doha has become a key broker in Afghanistan following last month's withdrawal of US forces, helping evacuate thousands of foreigners and Afghans, engaging the new Taliban rulers and supporting operations at Kabul airport.

Since the US pullout, Qatar Airways planes have made several trips to Kabul, flying in aid and Doha's representatives and ferrying out foreign passport holders.

Meanwhile, Turkey, which has strong historical and ethnic ties in Afghanistan, has been on the ground with non-combat troops as the only Muslim-majority member of the NATO alliance there.

According to analysts, it has developed close intelligence ties with some Taliban-linked militia. Turkey is also an ally of neighbouring Pakistan, from whose religious seminaries the Taliban first emerged.

Last week, it was reported that Turkish officials held talks with the Taliban lasting over three hours. Some of the discussions were about the future operation of the airport itself, which Turkish troops have guarded for six years.

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has also stated: "Turkey is ready to lend all kinds of support for Afghanistan's unity but will follow a very cautious path."

Professor Ahmet Kasim Han, an expert on Afghan relations at Istanbul's Altinbas University, while speaking to BBC said that he believes dealing with the Taliban will provide President Erdogan with an opportunity.

He says Turkey may try to position itself as "guarantor, mediator, facilitator", as a more trusted intermediary than Russia or China, who have kept their embassies open in Kabul.

"Turkey can serve that role," he says.

According to experts, the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan has delivered a strategic victory to Pakistan, establishing a friendly government in Kabul for the first time in nearly 20 years.

Pakistan has backed the Taliban from their earliest days. Islamabad was one of only three countries to recognise the Taliban government in the 1990s and the last to break formal ties with it in 2001.

It also provided safe havens to Taliban leaders and medical facilities for wounded fighters. This assistance helped sustain the Taliban, even as they lost thousands of foot soldiers.

Pakistan last week sent supplies such as cooking oil and medicine to authorities in Kabul, while the country's foreign minister called on the international community to provide assistance without conditions and to unfreeze Afghanistan’s assets.

Additionally, a Pakistan International Airlines plane from Islamabad flew to Kabul on Monday, making it the first flight to land in Afghanistan from neighbouring Pakistan since the chaotic final withdrawal of US troops last month.

Saudi-Taliban ties

In the past, they worked together. But today, Saudi Arabia and the Taliban are separated by political and cultural differences, as well as some problematic history.

The last time the Taliban ran Afghanistan, between 1996 and 2001, Saudi Arabia was one of only three countries in the world to officially recognise the Islamist group's government. Neighbouring Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) were the other two.

The situation changed dramatically for Saudi Arabia and the UAE after Al-Qaeda, the Sunni Muslim terrorist group, carried out suicide attacks in the US on 11 September, 2001, resulting in the deaths of over 3,000 people.

This was because Saudi Arabia had a diplomatic relationship with the United States since 1940 and the American were the Kingdom's strongest allies in trade and security.

Experts note that Saudi Arabia's once-close ties will not be revived any time soon.

The Saudi-US alliance remains important, and the country's ongoing cultural changes also play a part in this.

Saudi's controversial crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman, is trying to modernise his country and the idea of a more liberal and open Saudi Arabia doesn't sit well with lending support to Islamist extremists in other countries.

Moreover, Kabir Taneja, a fellow at the India-based think tank Observer Research Foundation, wrote, "To maintain its image as an upcoming investment mecca, Riyadh will have to make sure it does not once again become home to mass migration of fighters flying in and out of the Afghanistan … or become a hub of funding enabling extremist activities."

Where does India come in?

India’s policymakers must look to Saudi Arabia to expand cooperation in anti-terrorism activities and expand dialogue on relations between the two, which will help protect the India's interests related to Afghanistan.

Saudi Arabia also believes that closer ties to India will help re-balance the geopolitics of the region, whereas India believes a good relationship with Saudi will give it a chance to counter a hostile China-Pakistan axis gaining strategic depth across the Khyber.

Inputs from agencies

FROM THE ARCHIVES; WHO WON

Slowly but surely, China is moving into Afghanistan



RUPERT STONE

2013

As the war in Afghanistan winds down, China looks to make Afghanistan a bigger part of its regional ambitions.

In 2013, Chinese president Xi Jinping inaugurated the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a vast network of infrastructure projects spanning more than 60 countries. But the BRI largely excludes Afghanistan, moving through Central Asia and Pakistan instead.

That may now be changing. China has steadily increased its involvement in Afghanistan in recent years, and a nascent peace process offers some hope that stability might return to the country, bringing with it the possibility of greater trade and investment.

This shift is reflected in a major new report on the BRI’s expansion into Afghanistan by the Organization for Policy Research and Development Studies (DROPS), a Kabul-based think tank.

The 15-month research project has amassed a vast amount of material gleaned from multiple sources, including previously undisclosed government documents and interviews with high-ranking Afghan officials, making it by far the most comprehensive treatment of Afghanistan’s potential role in the BRI to date.

“Looking at the BRI map, it seemed that it was bypassing Afghanistan,” said Mariam Safi, Director of DROPS and one of the report’s co-authors. “So, we wanted to know if there is any thinking in the Afghan government and stakeholders here on the BRI when it comes to Afghanistan’s potential linkage”.

Afghanistan should fit well into the BRI. It has a serious infrastructure deficit, making it an ideal candidate for Chinese investment. It is also the shortest route between Central Asia and South Asia, and between China and the Middle East, while also serving as a gateway to the Arabian Sea.

But China’s role in Afghanistan in the past two decades has been limited. It did not contribute troops to the US-led war that began in 2001, and Beijing has so far refrained from the sorts of big-ticket investments planned for other neighbouring countries, such as Pakistan and Kazakhstan.

But its economic footprint has expanded. China is now Afghanistan’s largest business investor, it has pledged increasing amounts of aid to the country, and Chinese companies have been involved in construction projects.

Beijing has also shown some interest in Afghanistan’s cornucopia of natural resources, which includes vast deposits of essential minerals such as lithium (used in mobile phone batteries).

The country’s weak logistics and security situation make it difficult to extract and transport these resources. But China has got its foot in the door, winning rights to Amu Darya Basin oil in the north and the massive Mes Aynak copper mine near Kabul.

Moreover, Beijing has taken modest steps to include Afghanistan in the BRI. In 2016 Beijing and Kabul signed a Memorandum of Understanding. China has reportedly pledged at least $100 million in funding. However, this is a tiny amount compared to the vast sums proposed for other countries, like Pakistan. And, according to Raffaello Pantucci, director of international security studies at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), “We still don’t see large projects going forward that quickly on the ground.”

But there has been some progress. In September 2016, for example, the first direct freight train from China reached the Afghan border town of Hairatan. An air corridor linking Kabul and the Chinese city of Urumqi has also been launched under the BRI. Then, in May 2017, Afghan officials attended the massive Belt and Road Forum in China, and in October Afghanistan joined the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which funds BRI projects.

Kabul has made connectivity a key pillar of its foreign policy, launching various infrastructure projects that could eventually be “brought under the BRI fold,” Mariam Safi tells TRT World.

Reluctant bedfellows

One such initiative is the Five Nations Railway running from China to Iran via Afghanistan, which is still at the feasibility study stage but aligns well with Beijing’s priorities in the Belt and Road. Another is a planned north-south railway corridor that would connect Kunduz with Torkham on the Pakistani border.

Afghanistan has bold plans to expand its almost non-existent railway network. According to internal Afghan government documents reviewed by DROPS, China has pledged “huge support” for these efforts. The north-south railway could facilitate the transport of natural resources while also connecting to Pakistan.

Furthermore, there are various energy projects which could fit well into the Belt and Road vision, such as CASA-1000 and TAP-500 that would export surplus electricity from Central Asia to energy-starved South Asia via Afghanistan, or the TAPI gas pipeline, whose Afghan segment began construction last year (although there is reason to doubt its progress).

Another project that could be included in BRI is the Digital Silk Road fibre optic cable network, funded by China, the US and other partners, which has already connected at least 25 provinces in Afghanistan while aiming to link to China, South and Central Asia, the Middle East, and Europe, according to DROPS.

China has generally eschewed a leadership role in Afghanistan, preferring to work with foreign partners. Some projects, including the Five Nations Railway and Lapis Lazuli Corridor, are jointly financed by China and multilateral lending institutions such as the ADB.

“There has been a lot of cooperative activity on the ground,” Raffaello Pantucci told TRT World, and Beijing seems to view Afghanistan as a place where it can “test out” difficult relationships. China has collaborated with the US there, despite tensions between the two countries, and recently agreed to cooperate with its rival, India.

Sino-Indian efforts in Afghanistan face a hurdle, though, in the form of Beijing’s close relationship with Delhi’s nemesis, Pakistan. 2015 saw the inauguration of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a vast energy and infrastructure project involving more than $60 billion of potential investment. CPEC was intended to be the Belt and Road’s “flagship” corridor, and, as such, it is already more advanced than other components of the BRI.

According to the report, CPEC is “one of the most feasible options” for integrating Afghanistan into the BRI. There are some cross-border rail and road links at varying stages of development. While none of these is near completion, China clearly wants to move forward.

In 2017 Beijing convened a trilateral dialogue with Pakistan and Afghanistan partly to discuss extending CPEC, but also to ameliorate the rocky relationship between its two neighbours, which has seen border closures and skirmishes. These efforts paid off, as Afghan-Pakistani relations improved in 2018, with a new cooperation agreement in May.

Afghan officials interviewed by DROPS were generally “positive” about CPEC, the report says, but some were wary of excessive dependence on Pakistan. Indeed, as relations with Islamabad soured in recent years, Kabul has diversified its trade away from Pakistan to Iran.

However, the officials were clear “across the board” that Afghanistan still needs Pakistan because it provides the quickest route to the sea, according to Mariam Safi. And, vice versa, Pakistan hopes that Afghanistan may eventually provide access to Central Asian markets.

“At the end of the day there was the realisation that both countries need each other,” Safi told TRT World.

Neither the Afghan nor Pakistani governments responded to requests for comment.

Increasing Chinese footprint

While China’s economic role in Afghanistan has increased, its security presence has grown even more. As the US started withdrawing forces from Afghanistan in 2011, the country became increasingly unstable, raising the risk that insecurity would spill out into Central Asia and Pakistan, potentially disrupting China’s Belt and Road projects there.

Beijing has also been concerned about what they call the threat posed by Uighur and other terrorists using Afghanistan as a base for attacks against the Chinese mainland. In response, China has intensified security on its border, reportedly engaging in joint patrols with Afghan forces and building a base in Badakhshan province, while also launching the Quadrilateral Coordination and Cooperation Mechanism (QCCM) with Afghanistan, Pakistan and Tajikistan.

To counter instability in Afghanistan, China has also stepped up its involvement in peace talks to end the war. Since 2015, it has been involved in a number of multilateral initiatives, including the Quadrilateral Coordination Group and, more recently, the Moscow Format. Beijing has cultivated good ties with the Taliban, meeting them several times in 2018 alone.

Peace may now be on the horizon. The Trump administration has made unprecedented progress in its efforts to negotiate with the Taliban, reaching a provisional agreement in January. The Afghan government still needs to join the talks, however, and there is a long road ahead.

For Beijing, peace would not only reduce the terrorist threat emanating from Afghanistan, but it could also boost Chinese economic activity.

“Afghanistan has been peripheral to the Belt and Road because it simply hasn’t been possible to pursue a serious economic agenda there,” said Andrew Small, a senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the US and author of The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia's New Geopolitics.

“If there is a political settlement, that could change – though China will still tread very carefully until it’s clear that any settlement holds.”

At the launch of the DROPS report in January, Beijing’s new ambassador to Kabul, Liu Jinsong, said that China was facilitating peace talks to enable Afghanistan’s integration into the BRI, describing the country as a “vital partner” in the initiative.

The appointment of Mr Jinsong, a former director of the Silk Road Fund, “shows that Beijing now considers Afghanistan a priority and wants to include it firmly in its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI),” according to the Berlin-based thinktank, MERICS.

While there is still a long way to go, Beijing is entering a new phase of engagement with its neighbour. “It is certainly true that China is playing a much greater (and higher profile) role in Afghanistan,” said Peter Frankopan, professor of global history at the University of Oxford, whose latest book, The New Silk Roads, examines emerging forms of connectivity in Asia.

“My best guess is that this really is a case of a new page being turned,” Frankopan told TRT World.

The Chinese embassy in Kabul could not be reached for comment. Asked to comment on CPEC’s possible extension to Afghanistan, China’s deputy chief of mission in Islamabad, Zhao Lijian, referred TRT World to a recent interview in which he described Chinese plans to facilitate trade and ease tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The odd couple: China's deepening relationship with the Taliban


RUPERT STONE

2 AUG 2019

China's first engaged the Taliban to protect its interests in Afghanistan in the 90s. Decades later, history repeats itself.

One is a communist state wary of the threat posed by Islamic extremism, the other a group of religious hardliners with alleged links to Al Qaeda. But, despite their differences, relations between China and the Afghan Taliban go back decades and appear to be strengthening.

Beijing was initially concerned when the Taliban took power in Afghanistan in the mid-1990s. The group had ties to the anti-Chinese terrorist organisation, the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), which was to allowed to operate camps in the country. China, therefore, happily supported the first round of UN sanctions against the Taliban regime.

But, driven by a mix of security concerns and economic factors, Beijing eventually sought to improve its ties with the movement.

In the late 1990s, China came to believe that the best way to manage the potential terrorist threat from Afghanistan was to engage with the Taliban and strike a deal. Diplomatic relations would also open the potential for trade.

In 1999, Chinese officials broke the ice and flew to Kabul, where they opened economic ties and launched flights between Kabul and Urumqi. China’s ambassador in Pakistan sought a meeting with Mullah Omar. A group of Chinese think tank analysts travelled to Kandahar to make preparations.

According to Abdul Salam Zaeef, former Taliban envoy to Pakistan, the Chinese ambassador was the only foreign diplomat to maintain good relations with their mission in Islamabad at this time. Indeed, Zaeef’s comments about China in his memoir are far less vitriolic than his frequent denunciations of long-time backer Pakistan, which detained Zaeef after 9/11.

The Chinese envoy eventually met Mullah Omar in Kandahar in late 2000. Beijing wanted the Taliban to stop harbouring ethnic Uyghur militants allegedly operating in Afghanistan with ETIM. In return, the Taliban hoped that China would recognise their government and oppose further UN sanctions.

But this deal did not materialise. While Omar did restrain ETIM, he did not expel them. And Beijing did not oppose new UN sanctions against the Taliban; it only abstained.

However, Chinese companies expanded their activities in Afghanistan, and, on September 11, 2001, the two sides signed an MoU to enhance economic ties further.

After 9/11 Beijing gave its backing to Washington’s ‘war on terror’ and supported Hamid Karzai’s new government in Kabul. However, it did not commit troops to the US-led invasion of Afghanistan, and its economic footprint remained small. China was wary of a long-term American military presence in its backyard.

Beijing, therefore, hedged, supporting the Afghan government while maintaining informal contacts with the Taliban. It may have used the Chinese-run Saindak mine in Pakistan for clandestine meetings with the group, according to Andrew Small in The China-Pakistan Axis.

China and Pakistan were the only states to maintain their ties with the Taliban after 9/11.

The group may even have received Chinese weapons, according to Small, and there were also suspicions that the Taliban intentionally avoided attacking Chinese infrastructure projects in Afghanistan. The copper mine at Aynak, near Kabul, had been untouched by the Haqqani Network since China secured extraction rights in 2007.

Hedge your bets

China’s ambivalent foreign policy behaviour in Afghanistan is analogous to its approach in the Middle East, where it also courts opposing sides in regional disputes. As Jonathan Fulton has shown, Beijing has relations with Israel and the Palestinians, and maintains partnerships with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iran, a strategy Fulton describes as “fence-sitting”.

For the first decade of the US war in Afghanistan, China’s involvement with the country was minimal. Economic opportunities were dogged by corruption, insecurity and political instability. However, when the Obama administration announced its intention to withdraw US forces by 2014, Beijing grew concerned by the prospect of instability on its border.

The risk of terrorist violence haemorrhaging out of Afghanistan encouraged China to engage more deeply with its neighbour. Chinese diplomats became involved in several multilateral initiatives to seek a political settlement with the Taliban, first at Murree in 2015, then via the Quadrilateral Coordination Group with the US, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.

China was part of the Kabul Process convened by President Ghani in 2017 and sent its diplomats to attend talks with the Taliban and other Afghan politicians in Moscow in 2018. That year President Xi Jinping resuscitated the Afghanistan Contact Group of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which met again this summer.

There have also been multiple bilateral meetings between Chinese officials and the Taliban in recent years. These discussions were secret and unconfirmed by the Chinese government. But, in June, Beijing publicly announced that it had received a Taliban delegation led by deputy Mullah Baradar (who served eight years in prison in Pakistan before his release in 2018).

China participated in two trilateral events with Russia and the US this year, and in 2017 convened another trilateral forum with long-time foes, Afghanistan and Pakistan, to promote ongoing reconciliation efforts and discuss the possible extension of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to Afghanistan.

Beijing is concerned that an unstable Afghanistan could provide a safe haven for Uyghur militants, including those currently fighting in Syria. And China is more exposed now due to its massive infrastructure projects in Pakistan and Central Asia, areas especially vulnerable to terrorist spillover from Afghanistan.

Moreover, China’s economic role in Afghanistan has been growing. It is now the country’s biggest foreign investor and appears keen to extend the Belt and Road Initiative there. True, Beijing’s investments in Afghanistan pale in comparison to those in Pakistan, for example, but an end to the war could pave the way for deeper involvement.

A hard bargain

China is well-placed to act as a mediator in Afghanistan. It has decent relations with both sides in the conflict. It is perhaps even better placed to influence the Taliban than Pakistan, which has harassed and detained members of the group since 9/11. Moreover, it has substantial economic incentives to offer.

The Taliban are keen to avoid the isolation they experienced in the 1990s when only three governments (Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE) recognised their regime. Furthermore, they are alert to the need for foreign investment. They have discussed infrastructure with the Uzbek government, for example, and gave their backing to the TAPI gas pipeline project.

But the Taliban’s interest in exploiting the country’s natural resources goes well beyond gas. The group also profits from the mining of Afghanistan’s vast mineral deposits.

“The Taliban has realised that Afghanistan’s mineral wealth offers opportunities to get rich,” writes Peter Frankopan in his new book, The New Silk Roads.

During a trip to Beijing, Taliban delegates were “visibly moved by technology that they told their hosts was inconceivable in Afghanistan because of war,” the New York Times reported. And economic issues were again discussed on the group’s recent visit to China, according to Rahimullah Yusufzai.

Caution is warranted, though. Beijing’s engagement with the Taliban could fail as it did in the 1990s. Then, as now, the group gave assurances that it would not allow terror groups to use Afghan soil for plots against foreign countries. Then, as now, it wanted better trade with the outside world and an end to international isolation.

That all came crashing down in the carnage of 9/11. If the US leaves Afghanistan without a proper deal, history could repeat itself.

Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions, viewpoints and editorial policies of TRT World

AUTHOR
Rupert Stone
@RupertStone83
Rupert Stone is an Istanbul-based freelance journalist working on South Asia and the Middle East.

Pakistani premier claims US military equipment left behind in Afghanistan is now in militant hands

MUNIR AHMED
Mon, September 4, 2023 

In this photo released by Pakistan's President Office, President Arif Alvi, right, administrates oath from Anwaar-ul-Haq Kakar as caretaker Prime Minister during a ceremony, in Islamabad, Pakistan, Monday, Aug. 14, 2023. Kakar was sworn in as the country's prime minister to head a caretaker national government that will oversee parliamentary elections amid one of the worst economic crises the Islamic nation has faced, officials said. 

(Pakistan President Office vis AP) 

ISLAMABAD (AP) — Pakistan's caretaker prime minister claimed on Monday that U.S. military equipment left behind during the American withdrawal from Afghanistan has fallen into militant hands and ultimately made its way to the Pakistani Taliban.

The equipment — which includes a wide variety of items, from night vision goggles to firearms — is now “emerging as a new challenge” for Islamabad as it has enhanced the fighting capabilities of the Pakistani Taliban, Prime Minister Anwaar-ul-Haq Kakar said.

The Pakistani Taliban, known as Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan or TTP, have over the past months intensified attacks on Pakistan's security forces. They are a separate militant group but an ally of the Afghan Taliban.

The Taliban overran Afghanistan in mid-August 2021 as U.S. and NATO troops were in the last weeks of their chaotic pullout from the country after 20 years of war. In the face of the Taliban sweep, the U.S.-backed and trained Afghan military crumbled.

There is no definite information on how much U.S. equipment was left behind — but the Taliban seized U.S.-supplied firepower, recovering guns, ammunition, helicopters and other modern military equipment from Afghan forces who surrendered it. Though no one knows the exact value, U.S. defense officials have confirmed it is significant.

Speaking to a select group of journalists at his office Monday in the Pakistani capital of Islamabad, Kakar did not provide any evidence to support his allegation or directly link the Afghan Taliban and the TTP. He said there was a need to adopt a “coordinated approach” to tackling the challenge of the leftover equipment.

Kakar also did not criticize the Afghan Taliban — Islamabad has tried to reach out and act as an interlocutor between the international community and the new rulers in Kabul, who have been ostracized for the harsh edicts they imposed since their takeover.

However, two security officials in Islamabad told The Associated Press that the TTP either bought the equipment from the Afghan Taliban, or was given it as an ally. The officials spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss the subject.

The Pakistani Taliban have also released statements and video clips in recent months, claiming they possess, for example, guns with laser and thermal sighting systems.

TTP fighters now target Pakistani troops from a distance, while before their only weapons were AK-47 assault rifles, one of the officials said, without elaborating.

Still, Pakistani security forces will continue to fight militants "to defend our home, children, mosques and places of worship,” Kakar said.

Kakar, 52, was sworn in last month as Pakistan's youngest prime minister to head a caretaker government. His Cabinet will run day-to-day affairs until the next parliamentary elections. The vote, which was to be held in October or November, is likely to be delayed until at least January 2024 as Pakistan's elections oversight body says it needs time to redraw constituencies to reflect the latest census results.

Kakar ruled out any talks between the government and the TTP since the militants unilaterally broke off a cease-fire last November.

Since the Taliban takeover next door, Islamabad says TTP fighters have increasingly been given shelter by the Afghan Taliban, straining relations between Islamabad and Kabul.

Pakistan became a key ally of Washington in its war against terror after the 9/11 attacks in the United States. This majority Muslim country is currently facing one of the worst economic crises even as its political turmoil deepens.

At his news conference, Kakar also stressed that all political parties — including the Pakistan Tahreek-e-Insaf opposition party of now imprisoned former Prime Minister Imran Khan — would be allowed to participate in the upcoming elections.

“We are here just to assist electoral process,” Kakar said.

He did not directly mention Khan, who is not eligible to run in the elections as he is serving a three-year prison term for corruption. Khan, who was ousted in a no-confidence vote in April 2022, remains the country’s leading opposition figure.

 

The AP Interview: Top Pakistan diplomat details Taliban plan

By ASSOCIATED PRESS

PUBLISHED: 01:05 EDT, 23 September 2021 

 e-ma 

UNITED NATIONS (AP) - Be realistic. Show patience. Engage. And above all, don't isolate. Those are the pillars of an approach emerging in Pakistan to deal with the fledgling government that is suddenly running the country next door once again - Afghanistan's resurgent, often-volatile Taliban.

Pakistan's government is proposing that the international community develop a road map that leads to diplomatic recognition of the Taliban - with incentives if they fulfill its requirements - and then sit down face to face and talk it out with the militia's leaders.

Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi outlined the idea Wednesday in an interview with The Associated Press on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly's meeting of world leaders.

"If they live up to those expectations, they would make it easier for themselves, they will get acceptability, which is required for recognition," Qureshi told the AP. "At the same time, the international community has to realize: What´s the alternative? What are the options? This is the reality, and can they turn away from this reality?"

He said Pakistan "is in sync with the international community" in wanting to see a peaceful, stable Afghanistan with no space for terrorist elements to increase their foothold, and for the Taliban to ensure "that Afghan soil is never used again against any country."

"But we are saying, be more realistic in your approach," Qureshi said. "Try an innovative way of engaging with them. The way that they were being dealt with has not worked."

Pakistan's Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi speaks during an interview with The Associated Press, Wednesday, Sept. 22, 2021, in New York. (AP Photo/Mary Altaffer)

Expectations from the Taliban leadership could include an inclusive government and assurances for human rights, especially for women and girls, Qureshi said. In turn, he said, the Afghan government might be motivated by receiving development, economic and reconstruction aid to help recover from decades of war.

He urged the United States, the International Monetary Fund and other countries that have frozen Afghan government funds to immediately release the money so it can be used "for promoting normalcy in Afghanistan." And he pledged that Pakistan is ready to play a "constructive, positive" role in opening communications channels with the Taliban because it, too, benefits from peace and stability.

This is the second time that the Taliban, who adhere to a strict version of Islam, have ruled Afghanistan. The first time, from 1996 to 2001, ended when they were ousted by a U.S.-led coalition after the 9/11 attacks, which were directed by Osama bin Laden from Afghanistan.

During that rule, Taliban leaders and police barred girls from school and prohibited women from working outside the home or leaving it without a male escort. After they were overthrown, Afghan women still faced challenges in the male-dominated society but increasingly stepped into powerful positions in government and numerous fields.

But when the U.S. withdrew its military from Afghanistan last month, the government collapsed and a new generation of the Taliban resurged, taking over almost immediately. In the weeks since, many countries have expressed disappointment that the Taliban´s interim government is not inclusive as its spokesman had promised.

While the new government has allowed young girls to attend school, it has not yet allowed older girls to return to secondary school, and most women to return to work despite a promise in April that women "can serve their society in the education, business, health and social fields while maintaining correct Islamic hijab."

Pakistan, which shares a long border with Afghanistan, has a long and sometimes conflicted relationship with its neighbor that includes attempts to prevent terrorism there and, some say, also encouraging it. The Islamabad government has a fundamental vested interest in ensuring that whatever the new Afghanistan offers, it is not a threat to Pakistan.

That, Qureshi says, requires a steady and calibrated approach.

"It has to be a realistic assessment, a pragmatic view on both sides, and that will set the tone for recognition eventually," the Pakistani minister said. The good news, he said: The Taliban are listening, "and they are not insensitive to what is being said by neighbors and the international community."

How does he know they're listening? He says the interim government, drawn mostly from Afghanistan´s dominant Pashtun ethnic group, made some additions on Tuesday. It added representatives from the country's ethnic minorities - Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras, who are Shiite Muslims in the majority Sunni Muslim country.

"Yes, there are no women yet," Qureshi said. "But let us let the situation evolve."

He stressed that the Taliban must make decisions in coming days and weeks that will enhance their acceptability.

"What the international community can do, in my view, is sit together and work out a roadmap," Qureshi said. "And if they fulfill those expectations, this is what the international community can do to help them stabilize their economy. This is the humanitarian assistance that can be provided. This is how they can help rebuild Afghanistan, reconstruction and so on and so forth."

He added: "With this roadmap ahead, I think an international engagement can be more productive."

On Wednesday night, U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said after a meeting of the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council that all five nations - the United States, China, Britain, Russia and France - want "an Afghanistan at peace, stable, where humanitarian aid can be distributed without problems or discrimination."

He also described a hoped-for "Afghanistan where the rights of women and girls are respected, an Afghanistan that won´t be a sanctuary for terrorism, an Afghanistan where we have an inclusive government representing the different sectors of the population."

Qureshi said there are different forums where the international community can work out the best way to approach the situation. In the meantime, he asserted, things seem to be stabilizing. Less than six weeks after the Taliban seized power on Aug. 15, he said, Pakistan has received information that the law-and-order situation has improved, fighting has stopped and many internally displaced Afghans are going home.

"That´s a positive sign," Qureshi said.

He said Pakistan hasn´t seen a new influx of Afghan refugees - a sensitive issue for Pakistanis, who are highly motivated to prevent it. A humanitarian crisis, a foundering economy and workers who return to jobs and school but aren't getting salaries and don't have money could cause Afghans to flee across the porous border into Pakistan, which has suffered economically from such arrivals over decades of conflict.

Qureshi prescribed patience and realism. After all, he says, every previous attempt to stabilize Afghanistan has failed, so don't expect new efforts to produce immediate success with the Taliban. If the United States and its allies "could not convince them or eliminate them in two decades, how will you do it in the next two months or the next two years?" he wondered.

Asked whether he had a prediction of what Afghanistan might be like in six months, Qureshi turned the question back on his AP interviewer, replying: "Can you guarantee me U.S. behavior over the next six months?"

___

Edith M. Lederer, chief U.N. correspondent for The Associated Press, has been reporting internationally for nearly 50 years. Follow her on Twitter at http://twitter.com/EdithLedererAP

Pakistan's Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi smiles during an interview with The Associated Press, Wednesday, Sept. 22, 2021, in New York. (AP Photo/Mary Altaffer)

Pakistan's Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi speaks during an interview with The Associated Press, Wednesday, Sept. 22, 2021, in New York. (AP Photo/Mary Altaffer)

Pakistan's Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi speaks during an interview with The Associated Press, Wednesday, Sept. 22, 2021, in New York. (AP Photo/Mary Altaffer)

Pakistan's Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi speaks during an interview with The Associated Press, Wednesday, Sept. 22, 2021, in New York. (AP Photo/Mary Altaffer)

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The AP Interview: Top Pakistan diplomat details Taliban...

‘Taliban consulted Gen Bajwa before reaching out to India’

Anwar Iqbal

WASHINGTON: Taliban Fore­ign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi had a detailed meeting with Pakistan’s former army chief Gen Qamar Javed Bajwa before asking India to send back its diplomats and technical staff to Kabul, says a new book on Afghanistan’s de facto rulers.

The Return of the Taliban reveals “the pivotal decisions leading to the Taliban’s seizure of power” and describes “how as rulers they struggle to reconcile pressures for transition with their rigid ideology”, said Marvin G. Weinbaum, the senior scholar of South Asian affairs in Washington.

The book is authored by Hassan Abbas, who teaches international relations at the National Defence University (NDU), Washington, and will be released in the US later this week.

India’s return to Kabul “could not have happened without Pakistan — and Pakistan acted this way because it just might open up prospects of some aid for the Taliban in Afghanistan,” Mr Abbas writes, arguing that Pakistan is as desperate about getting financial support to run Afghanistan as the Taliban themselves.

Upcoming book claims Kabul wants to mend fences with New Delhi for sake of ‘international legitimacy and recognition’

The book points out that India has strategic interests in Afghanistan, although it notes that unlike Russia and China, India had cut off diplomatic ties with Afghanistan after the Taliban takeover.

But the book also notes that “India is now seriously reassessing its position and moving towards a balancing act in its effort to engage with the Taliban and help stabilise Afghanistan”.

Discussing why the Taliban are eager to mend ties with India, the book says that “the Taliban desire is simple — international legitimacy and recognition”. Kabul’s new rulers also need “huge external investments … to reconstruct and revive the country” and India has the resources to do so.

To demonstrate Gen Bajwa’s influence in Afghanistan, the book narrates the story of Taliban minister for finance Hidayatullah Badri, who was also known by the name of Gul Agha Ishaqzai, who is said to have suffered at the hands of the Pakistani security apparatus following 9/11.

Later, Mr Muttaqi “personally took him to Gen Bajwa to extend the hand of friendship. Only Mr Bajwa’s favorable nod gave him the opportunity” to become the country’s finance minister, the book claims.

The book also discusses former ISI chief Faiz Hamid’s visit to Kabul soon after the Taliban takeover, claiming that Foreign Office had advised Gen Hamid to stay at the Pakistan embassy in Kabul, “but the overconfident spy chief dismissed it”.

Later, at a meeting with Pakistani politicians, including Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto-Zardari, he defended his action saying that US and Chinese intelligence chiefs had also visited Kabul around then.

He was reminded that “he was the only one photographed” and “photographs and video clips of him sipping tea in the Serena Hotel, Kabul, went viral”.

The book argues that the “visuals provided evidence of the huge influence” Pakistan had on the Taliban and hurt Pakistan as well as the Taliban.

The book also reviews the growing influence of the IS militant group in Afghanistan, noting that from August 2021, when the Taliban captured Kabul, to August 2022 it claimed responsibility for 262 attacks in the country.

“This trend was an important agenda item in the conversation between ISI chief Lt Gen Nadeem Anjum, and CIA Director William Burns in early May 2022, in Washington. The Pakistani delegation included the former ISI chief Gen Hamid as well,” the book claims.

“Mr Burns told them that at this rate of growth, IS could gain control of 20 per cent of Afghanistan by mid-2023. In response, Gen Anjum stressed the need for targeting (the group’s) top leadership … and intelligence sharing.”

The book says that at the end of the meeting: “both sides reached an interesting conclusion, … the Afghan Taliban are no longer a primary threat to the national security of the US and Afghanistan’s neighboring countries.” It’s ISIS.

The book claims that in the early days of the Taliban takeover, Gen Hamid requested the Taliban high command to “offer both Abdullah [Abdullah] and Hamid Karzai some high-sounding positions” but they did not agree to do so.

The book also underlines China’s desire to stay engaged with the Taliban regime, noting that “China not only kept its embassy open but also welcomed the Taliban’s new status” and urged the UN Security Council to unfreeze Afghanistan’s funds.

Published in Dawn, April 26th, 2023