Feminisms: A Global History

• 

Book:

Feminisms: A Global History
Lucy Delap
London, Pelican (imprint of Penguin), 2020, ISBN: 9780241398142; 416pp.; Price: £20.00

Reviewer:

Dr Anne Cova
University of Lisbon

Citation:

Dr Anne Cova, review of Feminisms: A Global History, (review no. 2445)
DOI: 10.14296/RiH/2014/2445
Date accessed: 20 August, 2022

The historian Lucy Delap, author of The Feminist Avant-Garde: Transatlantic Encounters of the Early Twentieth Century  (CUP, 2007), winner of the 2008 Women’s History Network Prize, has now published another book—Feminisms: A Global History (Penguin in the UK, and the University of Chicago Press in the US). This book, at nearly 400 pages, is a truly global history, dealing with 250 years of feminisms. Readers will find here a profound analysis of feminism across Africa, Asia, Australasia, the Americas, and Europe, though Delap takes a non-Eurocentric approach.

This journey across the globe is eloquently accomplished and begins with the assertion of an unknown African woman who published an article in a local newspaper in 1886: ‘We Ladies of Africa […] Although we have not white or angelic faces we are capable of as high a degree of culture as any white lady’ (p.1). Following recent events in the Black Lives Matter movement, this quotation provides an echo and sets the tone for the book, which travels back and forth from 1886 as it traces the complex history of feminisms. To de-centre (Delap does not use this term, leading this reader to wonder why) the historiography and focus on those countries that have received less attention is a challenge to which this book rises very well.

Divided into eight thematic chapters, titled Dreams, Ideas, Spaces, Objects, Looks, Feelings, Actions, and Songs (the plural is important just as is the use of the plural, feminisms, is in the title), this global history examines feminisms across a broad canvas, alternating ‘between wide-angle summaries of different feminist beliefs or campaigns, and close scrutiny of the lives of individual women who fought against gender inequities’ (p. 21).

Three apparently simple questions are asked on the cover of the book: How has feminism developed around the world?; What have feminists achieved?; and, What can we learn today from global histories of feminism? The book then demonstrates that the answers to these questions are not homogeneous, with Delap managing to clearly draw out the complexities of feminisms in different global contexts. Benefiting from a flurry of recent historical publications available at the Cambridge University Library, which the author describes in the acknowledgements as a ‘treasure trove of histories of feminisms’ (p. 349), this well-written book offers a sophisticated approach to the plurality of feminisms.

Delap explores the multiple facets of feminisms through the metaphor of the mosaic, which is: ‘built up from inherited fragments but offering distinctive patterns and pictures […] And like mosaics, feminist coalitions were built up from the bits and pieces available—other movements, committed individuals, actions and ideas. Some mosaics have been long-lived; others have crumbled, and their tiles have been reused, or have disappeared from view’ (pp. 20–21). She also notes another metaphor on conversations: ‘Metaphors of mosaics and conversations give a sense of the richness of feminist debates’ (p. 22). In doing so, Delap engages with the debate on the many metaphors used by scholars in discussion of feminisms, and challenges the best-known one, which employs the image of ocean waves: ‘The historical organizing frame of “feminist waves” has not proved up to the job of making sense of the complexities of feminist history’ (p. 5). Instead, she highlights the significance of a metaphor employed by the historian Nancy Hewitt, which uses the imagery of feminist radio waves:

Hewitt suggests that rather than seeing successive “ocean waves” of feminism, we might imagine competing, simultaneous broadcasts, some loud and clear, others disrupted by static. This helps capture the global multiplicity and inequality of voice that was poorly captured by tired talk of first, second and third wave feminism. Radio broadcasts are not neutral but can be creative, innovative and even vitriolic. The “radio waves” metaphor is suggestive of the disagreements between feminisms. But it reminds us that we can literally or imaginatively hear feminisms, through their shouts, keening, music and song (pp. 331–2).

Delap is also keen on the feminist radio waves metaphor because it allows us to hear the many voices of feminists, which is the topic of her last chapter: Songs. This is not an easy task for historians: ‘Trying to recapture what the women’s movement “sounded like” is difficult at a historical distance. Nonetheless, refusing to see feminism only as a textual affair is important’ (p. 331). Following this approach, Delap also provides insights into objects and looks, through chapter four and five, respectively. These chapters lead the reader onto the matter of archives, which are fundamental for historians.

The book questions the classification and content of archives: ‘Archival materials, where they document feminism at all, tend to lean towards the story that more powerful and privileged feminists have wanted to tell’ (p. 6). This assertion applies particularly to the first chapter, Dreams: ‘Very few dreams are recorded in historical archives […] And, of course, those written down are those the dreamer chooses to share’ (p. 49). These thoughts about the enormous dependence historians have on archives recalls the mosaic metaphor:

But mosaic pieces may be lost, destroyed or buried, and their survival is not just a matter of chance—it depends on access to power and resources. The records of feminist protest and ideas are not well archived for the poor, working-class, migrant or ethnic-minority activists who sought change. That means that all feminist histories will be partial affairs, skewed towards those who wanted to or were able to claim the mantle of feminism and who could make their voices heard. The more marginalized, or those who were wary of being termed a “feminist”, are obscured. Nonetheless, a self-consciously global, critical history can attend to and preserve what has survived, and point to the missing mosaic tiles (p. 342).

Inspired by the growing scholarly interest in how locations and spaces shape social movements, chapter three explores the idea of feminist places: the libraries, women’s centres and bookshops ‘such as the Women’s Press in London (1977), Women and Children First in Chicago (1967), the Shokado Women’s Bookstore in Kyoto, Japan (1975), the Libreria delle Donne di Milano (1975), Streelekha in India (1984) and Binti Legacy in Nairobi (1996) have formed a powerful network for the distribution of feminist ideas’ (p. 127). Chapters two (Ideas) and seven (Actions) respectively, analyse the theoretical resources that feminists have created, and their many means and methods of protest.

Intersectionality is at the core of this book and has influenced it deeply: ‘The idea of “entangled histories” has been used by global historians to capture the ways in which ideas, people and texts crossed and re-crossed borders to create multiple “intersections”’ (p. 20). Though the term ‘transnational history’ is not used even once in the book—and it would be interesting to know the reason for this—the words ‘transnational’, ‘transnationalism’, and ‘transnationally’ appeared sporadically, while some important works on transnational history are referenced in the notes and further reading sections. From the perspective of this reader, the book makes a fascinating contribution to transnational history:

...historians of feminism must take care not to erase the local specificity of struggles and activism. However, it would be a mistake to simply look at all these debates and movements in isolation; they often shared key ideas or drew inspiration from each other’s struggles. We can chart the rich interweaving of global debates on the relationship between gender and power, at the same time as recognizing feminism as a deeply historical and context-specific phenomenon (p. 10).

This value placed on the study of the specificities as well as on global debates is at the heart of the transnational approach. This approach is also evident when Delap argues: ‘histories of feminism cannot be located only within single nation states, regions or empires. Global influences have been based on the migration of individuals, as refugees, students, exiles and workers […] Historians have become newly attentive to the deliberate cultivation of transnational spaces, in the pages of globally circulating periodicals, in conventions, conferences, alliances and federations’ (pp. 18–9). Delap insists on local diversities: ‘Local diversity has meant that the emergence of organized demands for change happened in very different ways all over the world. Where they existed, “feminists” spoke for different groups, and in diverse registers. ‘“The women’s movement” or “woman question” was the terminology of nineteenth-century Europe and the Americas, while “women’s awakening” was widely debated in Middle Eastern and North African countries in the early twentieth century’ (p. 10). Delap’s preference for the expression ‘global history’ is obvious throughout the book, as in the title: ‘A global history approach also allows us to see the interactions between globally famous texts and local intellectual or activist traditions’ (p. 19).

Conflicts within feminisms are not put aside: on the contrary, they form a cornerstone of the book, and Delap’s encourages the normalisation of conflict: ‘A global history of feminism, as historian Mrinalini Sinha has insisted, will not simply pluralize our picture so that we think in terms of “feminisms”. Instead, our account of feminisms must acknowledge what Sinha terms the “discrepant histories of different women’s movements”, marked by contests, conflicts and power-play’ (p. 22).

Regarding the definitions of feminisms, Delap seems skeptical and prefers to emphasise the varieties of meanings that may change over time: ‘Though it was often defined in highly various ways, “feminism” as a term was adopted globally in the early twentieth century. It might refer to women’s “rights” as well as to campaigns of women’s advancement, protection and equality’ (p. 10). She notes that: ‘Across the world, there was fascination with this new concept, as well as suspicion of European or American influences. […] The meaning of “feminist” has continued to evolve, and to be controversial. Activists in the 1970s and 80s often preferred to talk of “women’s liberation”, since they associated “feminist” with reformist “liberal” politics of parliamentary rights and suffrage’ (p. 12). Delap insists on the pluralities of feminisms, while noting:

Despite the many varieties of feminisms, one of the overarching feminist dreams has been of a movement that could span all women: ‘‘Helping each other, all of one mind”, as the Chinese banner declared at the 1913 conference of the International Woman Suffrage Alliance. This fantasy has carried with it the paradox of an abstract political agenda that, in its very inclusivity, ignores concrete exclusions (p. 13).

Delap rises above such quarrels as ‘who can be considered feminist?’, ‘who was the first in their domain?’, etc. She argues, convincingly, that: ‘We need not engage in a competitive struggle to identify the first, or the truest, feminists. Instead, we can trace out experiences of exclusion and difference amongst gender and social justice activists, and chart their passionate, painful or strategic coalitions’ (p. 14). She also properly questions ‘the problematic idea of “backwardness”’ (p. 17), and makes us aware of anachronism and the need to avoid measuring the past by today’s standards, even if ‘there may be aspects of the feminist past that make us uncomfortable today’ (p. 23).

Another important insight worth mentioning is the emphasis on non-linear history. The book is not a narrative of the various demands raised and gradually met through the years. Delap reminds us that: ‘Rights won did not always stay won, and often needed defending or regaining after setbacks’ (p. 335). It is important to take the different political contexts into account:

Yet women’s experiences around the globe during the twentieth century were of painfully slow reform, withdrawal of rights when they experienced wars, coups and dictatorships, pervasive everyday violence, and the mockery or outlawing of feminist voices’ (p. 263). She uses feminism as ‘an entry point to understand better how campaigns over “women’s rights”, “new womanhood”, “the awakening of women” or “women’s liberation” might have shared concerns and tactics. But I will also be telling the story of the limits of feminism, its blind spots and silencings, its specificities and complicities (pp. 2–3).

Once again, Delap alerts the reader to the complexities of feminisms that cannot be summarised simply through successive struggles and achievements, and she refers to the work of historian Kathryn Gleadle, who ‘invites us to think of feminist history as a non-linear rhizome root structure, full of unexpected growth points, dead ends and patterns of influence’ (p. 20).

Throughout the book, Delap wants to demonstrate the importance of male figures because ‘to ignore men’s and women’s cooperation would be a deliberate historical effacement, as well as a loss of hope for future change’ (p. 339). Consequently, she notes that, in this book: ‘we will meet men who have worked to advance women’s rights, often through deep personal investment in feminist goals as also benefiting men’ (p. 8). One paradigmatic case is that of John Stuart Mill, even if justice is done also to his wife Harriet Taylor Mill.

 The book fully achieves the challenge its author sets, to trace ‘the evolution of global feminist themes that span a remarkable range of concerns: women’s rights to property, education and citizenship; pacifism, antifascism, the welfare and protection of mothers and children; social justice, labour rights and human rights; sexual autonomy, cultural expression and reproductive rights’ (p. 334). Delap concludes that a ‘recognition that feminists have not agreed on a single programme in the past can help reduce the toxicity of today’s disputes’ (p. 344).

This path-breaking book is an essential read for those who believe ‘we should be suspicious of attempts to flatten and simplify the landscape of feminisms, or to ignore its irredeemable ideological differences’ (p. 343). As such, it is a masterful contribution to ‘some important new ways of reading feminist practices and ideas across historical time’ (p. 21). Delap’s understanding of feminisms around the world offers fascinating insights, based on innovative sources, establishing this volume as a landmark work in the current historiography, and one that is both accessible to the experts in the field and inspiring for a broader audience.

Additional image: Women gathering for the1956 Women’s March, Pretoria, South Africa

April 2021

Finnish PM Sanna Marin takes drugs test but hits back at critics

World's youngest national leader denies wrongdoing after video surfaces showing her partying with friends

Sanna Marin holds a press conference in Helsinki on Friday to address the 

partying controversy swirling round her. AFP

The National

Aug 19, 2022

Beta V.1.0 - Powered by automated translation

Finnish Prime Minister Sanna Marin said on Friday she had taken a drugs test after video footage published earlier this week showed her partying with friends, but vowed she had never used illegal substances.

“I have today taken a drugs test and the results will come within a week,” she told a news conference. “Never in my life have I used drugs.”

Ms Marin added that her ability to perform her duties remained unimpaired during the night in question and that she would have left the party had she been required to work.

Video clips showing Ms Marin partying with well-known Finnish influencers and artists began circulating on social media this week and they were soon published by several media outlets in Finland and abroad.

When the footage surfaced, Ms Marin, who at 36 is the world’s youngest national leader, admitted she had been exuberant but insisted she had not used drugs.

“I danced, sang and partied — perfectly legal things,” she said. “And I've never been in a situation where I've seen or known of others using drugs.

“I have a family life, I have a work life and I have free time to spend with my friends. Pretty much the same as many people my age.”

She said she had known she was being filmed and was upset that it had been made public.

Ms Marin had faced calls to do a drug test from politicians in her government coalition as well as from the opposition after the videos surfaced.

However she received support on Friday from her Polish counterpart Mateusz Morawiecki, who said Ms Marin had good reason to go out and celebrate because her country is joining Nato.

“So if on this occasion the prime minister of Finland drank a little more Finlandia [vodka] and because of this danced, there is nothing terrible in that,” said Mr Morawiecki.

Updated: August 19, 2022, 

 

Ethiopian airlines flight misses landing as pilots fall asleep mid air

An Ethiopian airlines plane missed the landing after both pilots fell asleep. The aircraft, on autopilot, continued to cruise at 37,000 feet before overflying the runway


India Today Web Desk 

New Delhi

August 19, 2022



When the plane flew over the runway the autopilot was disconnected.
(Photo: Wikimedia Commons/File)

HIGHLIGHTS

Ethiopian airlines flight missed landing as both pilots fell asleep

The flight was still at cruising altitude of 37,000ft by the time it reached destination Addis Ababa

An alarm woke up the pilots who then landed the plane 25 minutes later

An Ethiopian airlines plane flying from Sudan to Ethiopia missed landing on August 15 after both pilots fell asleep. An alert was issued when flight ET343 approached the Addis Ababa airport but did not start to descend, raising concerns.

After the plane missed the landing, the Air Traffic Control tried to contact the plane’s crew while the aircraft’s autopilot system kept it cruising at 37,000ft, the Independent reported.

When the plane flew over the runway, the autopilot was disconnected, an alarm was triggered which reportedly woke up the crew. The pilots then landed the plane 25 minutes later.

READ | Flight delayed by six hours over mobile chat between couple in Mangaluru

According to air traffic control data, the aircraft continued to cruise at 37,000 feet before overflying the runway.

"Deeply concerning incident at Africa’s largest airline — Ethiopian Airlines Boeing 737 ET343 was still at cruising altitude of 37,000ft by the time it reached destination Addis Ababa," said aviation analyst Alex Macheras confirming the incident

"Why hadn’t it started to descend for landing? Both pilots were asleep," Macheras said in a Tweet.

 Ethiopian Airlines Removes Crew Who Allegedly Fell Asleep On Air, Pending Further Investigation

Share19 AUGUST 2022Addis Standard (Addis Ababa)

Addis Abeba — Ethiopian Airlines said it has "removed from operation pending further investigation," its crew who were operating the flight number ET343 en route from Khartoum to Addis Abeba on 15 August, and that "appropriate corrective action will be taken based on the outcome of the investigation".

According to a report on The Aviation Herald, "an Ethiopian Airlines Boeing 737-800, registration ET-AOB performing flight ET-343 from Khartoum (Sudan) to Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), was enroute at FL370 when the pilots fell asleep. The aircraft continued past the top of descent maintaining FL370 and continued along the FMC route set up for an approach to runway 25L without descending however. ATC tried to contact the crew numerous times without success. After overflying runway 25L at FL370 the autopilot disconnected, the disconnect wailer woke the crew up who then maneuvered the aircraft for a safe landing on runway 25L about 25 minutes after overflying the runway at FL370."

In response, Ethiopian Airlines released the following statement:

"We have received a report which indicates Ethiopian flight number ET343 en route from Khartoum to Addis Ababa temporarily lost communication with Addis Ababa Air Traffic Control on 15 August 2022. The flight later landed safely after communication was restored. The concerned Crew have been removed from operation pending further investigation. Appropriate corrective action will be taken based on the outcome of the investigation. Safety has always been and will continue to be our first priority." AS

Museum in Scotland holds ceremony to repatriate Indian artefacts

Six of the objects were removed from temples and shrines across northern India during the 19th century


Museum conservator Stephanie De Roemer holds the Indo-Persian sword during the transfer of ownership ceremony at Kelvingrove Art Gallery and Museum in Glasgow. Getty Images

Simon Rushton

Glasgow held a ceremony on Friday to officially repatriate seven Indian cultural artefacts looted during British colonial rule, calling it a first for a UK museum service.

The artefacts taken from India in the 19th century will be returned home after an agreement was reached with a museum in Scotland.

The items include a ceremonial Indo-Persian tulwar, a sword believed to date back to the 14th century, and an 11th-century carved stone door jamb taken from a Hindu temple in Kanpur.

The agreement comes as Egypt launches a new push for the return of the Rosetta Stone from the British Museum in London.

READ MORE
What is the Rosetta Stone?

There has been a change of thinking in the museum world that has led more and more countries' treasured cultural items, often taken in times of conflict or colonisation, to be returned. But this is still far from the norm.

The British Museum, for example, currently possesses the Parthenon Marbles, which Greece has for decades demanded be returned. German and French museums have already sent back some items to Greece.

Glasgow Life, the organisation that manages the Scottish city’s museum collections, welcomed dignitaries from the High Commission of India for a ceremony at Kelvingrove Art Gallery and Museum where they transferred ownership of the artefacts.

Guests look at the ceremonial Indo-Persian sword. AFP

“The transfer of ownership of the Indian antiquities symbolises a significant step for Glasgow, with the city continuing its positive repatriation history by ensuring these cultural artefacts are placed back in the hands of their legitimate owners,” said Duncan Dornan, head of museums and collections at Glasgow Life.

Glasgow Life said it was the first museum service in the UK to repatriate artefacts to India.

Six of the objects were removed from temples and shrines in different states in northern India during the 19th century, while the seventh was purchased after it was stolen from the owner.

All seven artefacts were given as gifts to Glasgow’s collections.

Sujit Ghosh, acting Indian high commissioner, welcomed the return of the items.

“These artefacts are an integral part of our civilisational heritage and will now be sent back home,” he said.

“We express our appreciation to all the stakeholders who made this possible, especially Glasgow Life and Glasgow City Council.”

Glasgow Life said it has been working on the repatriation of the artefacts, alongside the High Commission of India in London, since January 2021.

“The agreement reached with the government of India is another example of Glasgow’s commitment to addressing past wrongs and remaining transparent when explaining how objects arrived in the city’s museum collections,” said group chairwoman Bailie Annette Christie.

The city is also set to return a number of other items to countries around the world, including 19 bronze pieces to Nigeria.

This process began when it was established that the artefacts bound for Nigeria — acquired as gifts and bequests as well as from auction houses — were taken from sacred sites and ceremonial buildings during the punitive Benin Expedition of 1897.

About 25 Lakota and Oceti Sakowin ancestral and cultural items — sold and donated to Glasgow’s museums by George Crager, an interpreter for the Buffalo Bill Wild West Show who visited the city in 1892 — will also be handed back to the Cheyenne River Sioux and Oglala Sioux tribes of South Dakota in the US.

Some of these objects were taken from the Wounded Knee Massacre site in December 1890, while others were personal items belonging to named ancestors or are ceremonial artefacts.

Updated: August 19, 2022

https://www.gutenberg.org/files/155/155-h/155-h.htm

Bilkis Bano: activists to petition India's top court to revoke decision to free rapists

The Muslim woman was sexually assaulted and 14 of her family members were killed by a Hindu group in March 2002

An activist holds a placard during a protest in New Delhi against the release of the men. AFP

Taniya Dutta
New Delhi
Aug 19, 2022

More than 6,000 Indians, including eminent writers, rights activists and former bureaucrats, signed a petition on Thursday urging the top court to revoke the release of 11 men convicted of gang raping a Muslim woman and murdering her family during sectarian riots in 2002.

Bilkis Bano, one of the three survivors of the mass rape and murder, was sexually assaulted and 14 of her family members were hacked to death by a group of Hindu men in March 2002 in the western state of Gujarat.

The men were convicted by a special court in 2008 and their sentences were upheld by the top court in a case that made international headlines for two decades.

“The remission of sentences for the 11 convicted of gang-rape and mass murder will have a chilling effect on every rape victim who is told to ‘trust the system’, ‘seek justice’, ‘have faith’,” a joint statement by the petitioners said.

The formal petition has yet to be filed before the top court.

READ MORE
Anger in India as 11 jailed for rape and murder of Muslim family are released

In a surprise move on Monday, the Gujarat government, administered by prime minister Narendra Modi’s Hindu nationalist party, ordered their release to coincide with the celebrations of India’s 75th Independence Day.

Ms Bano said the move left her “numb”.

Viral images and videos of the convicts being feted with sweets and garlands outside the jail have led to widespread condemnation and street protests amid demands that the courts intervene to end the “grave miscarriage of justice”.

“That such a remission was even considered, and then permitted, reveals the hollowness of the public posturing about Nari Shakti, (women's empowerment) Beti Bachao (a government campaign for girls' rights) and women’s rights and justice for victims,” the statement said.

On Wednesday, Ms Bano issued a statement saying her attackers’ release has “taken from me my peace and shaken my faith in justice”.

“I was bereft of words. I am still numb … I was learning slowly to live with my trauma,” she said.

Violence had broken out in Godhra city in Gujarat after 59 Hindu pilgrims were killed by a group of Muslims after they attacked a train coach they were travelling in on February 27, 2002.

The attack led to widespread largely anti-Muslim violence across the state and more than 1,000 people, the majority of them from the minority community, were killed in days of rioting in the state governed by the Bharatiya Janata Party.

Ms Bano was 21 and five-months pregnant when she was raped as 14 members of her family were killed by her Hindu neighbours in March 2002. Seven bodies were never found.

The dead included her mother, a day-old niece and her toddler daughter Saleha, whose head was smashed with a rock.










Women protest against the government of Gujarat state, in India's capital New Delhi. EPA
Life sentence

A court in Mumbai sentenced the attackers to life imprisonment after the trial was moved from Gujarat, where police and courts had initially dismissed her allegations.

Ms Bano had alleged intimidation and threats by the attackers during the trial and spent years in safe houses.

The convictions were later upheld by the higher courts, which also awarded her 5 million rupees ($62,700) compensation in 2019.

One of the convicts, Radheshyam Shah, approached the Supreme Court in May for remission, pleading that he had served more than 15 years in prison.

The state government authorised their release on the basis of their “age, nature of the crime, behaviour in prison”.


Several opposition political parties, including Congress, have denounced their release, saying it clearly showed the ruling party’s bias towards the Muslim community.

Dozens of women protested in the capital New Delhi on Thursday, demanding the government reverse its decision, while thousands of social media users lashed out at the government.

Mongolian Independence and the British: The Chinese Backdown
Matteo Miele
Download PDF
Aug 19 2022 •

Riska Parakeet/Shutterstock
This is a preprint excerpt from Mongolian Independence and the British: Geopolitics and Diplomacy in High Asia, 1911–1916, by Matteo Miele. You can download the book free of charge from E-International Relations.

LONG READ 

A year after the Russo-Mongol Agreement, in a declaration signed in Peking on November 5, 1913 (October 23 of the Russian calendar), ‘[l]a Russie reconnaît que la Mongolie Extérieure se trouve sous la suzeraineté de la Chine’, while the Chinese accepted Mongolian autonomy (‘La Chine reconnaît l’autonomie de la Mongolie Extérieure’).[1] The Russians had come to that agreement after having faced several difficulties.

Indeed, in April 1913, while preparing to leave Urga, Korostovets had confessed to Morrison the complexity of dealing with the Mongols and also of enforcing the 1912 treaty:

My position here is a trying one in every respect and the Mongols very difficult people to deal with. I have made my best to satisfy both sides that is my own people and the Government of Urga but have hardly succeeded. The treaty has been signed nearly six months ago and according to my opinion is not enforced yet and perhaps will not be. The new Consul General Miller must arrive in a fortnight and will continue my work, but on what lines and in what direction I do not venture to say. [2]

According to the agreement, Peking still had to grant Outer Mongolia ‘le droit exclusif’ in internal administration, in commercial and industrial matters and the newborn Republic of China could not send soldiers, civilian or military officials and obviously not even settlers. Likewise, the Russians also undertook not to colonize the country, nor to send soldiers, except for the consular guards, nor to intervene in the country’s internal affairs. In an exchange of separate notes between Vasiliy Krupenskiy, Russian minister in Peking,[3] and Sun Pao-ch’i, the foreign minister in the Chinese government of Hsiung Hsi-ling,[4] the two countries agreed on the extension of the territory of Outer Mongolia, that is, those territories that had been under the jurisdiction of the amban of Urga, the ‘Général tartare’ of Uliastay and the Chinese amban of Hovd. Actually, as there were no detailed maps of the country and due to the vagueness of the administrative divisions, the Russians and Chinese agreed for a new meeting (already scheduled in point V of the agreement) to define the country’s borders. That point in fact provided for ‘pourparlers ultérieurs’ on questions relating to the interests of Russia and China in Outer Mongolia, but the exchange of notes required Mongolian involvement in these future negotiations. Furthermore, according to the exchange of notes between the foreign minister of the Republic of China and the Russian minister in Peking:

En ce qui concerne les questions d’ordre politique et territorial, le Gouvernement Chinois se mettra d’accord avec le Gouvernement Russe par des négociations auxquelles les autorités de la Mongolie Extérieure prendront part.

Not having obtained a copy of the agreement from the Russians, the Japanese minister in Peking had confidentially handed over to Beilby Alston, of the British embassy in China, the text of the document that the British diplomat had taken care to send to Grey.[5] However, the Russian minister in Peking pointed out to Alston the approximate borders of Outer Mongolia:

On the China Inland Mission atlas, published 1908, map 22, the Russian Minister pointed out to me that the frontier of Outer Mongolia, comprising the four Aimaks[6] of Tsetsen, Sassaktu, Sainoin, Tuchetu, follows closely their boundaries as therein indicated. The exact definition will not be settled until the meeting of the conference which is proposed to hold. The western frontier is roughly the Altai range ; the southern follows the dotted line across the Gobi desert.[7]

Not yet informed of the signature the day before, Sir Edward Grey had therefore written to Alston on November 6, explaining that he had suggested to the India Office and the Board of Trade to get in touch with the Mongolian government ‘with a view to recognising their autonomy and securing fair terms for British commerce’.[8] Furthermore, Grey also proposed to inform Russia of the favorable acceptance by the British of the Sino-Russian Agreement and the Russo-Mongol Treaty of 1912 ‘provided that a satisfactory commercial arrangement can be arrived at with the autonomous Mongolian Government, who were being approached in the matter’.[9] For the head of the Foreign Office it was necessary for ‘the maintenance of the “ open door ” for British commerce’.[10] More important than the commercial conditions was the case of Tibet and the possibility of exploiting for British advantage, as mentioned previously, the changed conditions in Mongolia. However according to Grey – who had spoken to Sazonov – this was not the most suitable time to open the question with Saint Petersburg:

Sir E. Grey has taken into consideration the possibility of making terms with Russia with regard to the Thibetan question in connection with the Russo-Chinese Agreement, but is of the opinion that it would be unwise to do so at present in view of the declared attitude of the Russian Government and the views expressed by M. Sazonof in his interviews with Sir E. Grey and Lord Crewe.[11]

However, the Sino-Russian Agreement was to become the model for an Anglo-Chinese agreement on Tibet and the Russian motivations for arriving at that document on Mongolia were the same as the British on Tibet:

This would not, however, preclude His Majesty’s Government from pointing out to the Russian Government should the necessity arise, that the same reason which has forced the Russian Government to stipulate with China for an autonomous Mongolia forces His Majesty’s Government to make the same stipulation with regard to Thibet, in doing which they are not, as long as they do not ask for anything in Thibet beyond the scope of the pre-existing convention, taking any action contrary to the terms of the Anglo-Russian Agreement.[12]

The problem was linked to the broader question of industrial and railway loans which had been defined in September at the Paris Conference by France, Great Britain, Germany, Japan and precisely Russia, thus opening up the possibility of aid from these states to their respective private companies in China.[13] Grey wrote about the agreement:

At meeting of groups yesterday industrial and railway loans were eliminated from the scope of the Sextuple Agreement, and at the same time the Triple and Quadruple Agreements were formally terminated. His Majesty’s Government are therefore at liberty forthwith to support independent firms and groups in obtaining concessions or making industrial loans to China, since they will henceforth interpret article 17 of the Reorganisation Loan Agreement as precluding the issue but not the negotiation of loans before 5th February next.[14]

The Russian government did not like the terms of the new agreement, and authorized the signing only to avoid isolation from the other powers.[15] Indeed, Russia feared a danger to its interests in Manchuria, Mongolia and Chinese Turkestan.[16] Therefore, following his line of not entering into conflict with Saint Petersburg on Mongolia, Grey wrote on November 13 to Hugh O’Beirne, an official of the British embassy in Russia, to reassure the tsar’s government that British intentions did not aim at prejudicing Russian interests in Manchuria and Mongolia.[17] While recognizing the special interests of Saint Petersburg in Chinese Turkestan, British interest in that region was much higher than in Mongolia, considering the proximity to India, as well as the presence of many British subjects in the territory.[18] So on November 19, O’Beirne communicated to the Russian government a memorandum with Grey’s indications.[19] Probably, according to Jordan, it was precisely on Chinese Turkestan that the Russians could ask for ‘some form of compensation’, in exchange for consent to a redefinition of the 1907 agreement on Tibet.[20] The basis of this consideration was a dispatch by Buchanan from Saint Petersburg addressed to Grey, dated July 22, 1913, where this type of exchange had already been envisaged:

Russia had not, as he [Sazonov] expressed it, a policy in Kashgar as she had in Ili, Mongolia, or Manchuria. She would confine her attention to the protection of her subjects ; and I might give you the positive assurance that she would take no action of a political nature in Kashgar, except in agreement with His Majesty’s Government, as he quite understood the interest which its proximity to British India caused them to take in this question.

M. Sazanof spoke to me in such frank and categorical terms that I see no reason to doubt the sincerity of his assurances. His use, however, of the words “ except in agreement with His Majesty’s Government ” confirm the impression which I have more than once expressed, that, in the event of our proposing to revise the Anglo-Russian Agreement to our advantage with regard to Thibet, he will ask for some counter concessions in Kashgaria.[21]

There was indeed a significant disproportion between Mongolia and Tibet; the status of Tibet had been regulated by the 1907 Convention, while this was not the case for Mongolia. Therefore, any British claim in the new order of High Asia that emerged from the end of the Ch’ing Empire, however logical in geopolitical terms, had to challenge the agreement that had put an end to the Great Game. British requests had to interfere with the delicate balance that had assigned the respective roles in Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet. The Russian interventions in Mongolia, on the other hand, did not formally touch the agreement, even if those actions could mean – without too much imagination – a possible reopening of the issues on the Roof of the World, given the strong link between Urga and Lhasa. Therefore, it was not even possible for Saint Petersburg to pass any alteration of things in Mongolia as unrelated to a broader redefinition of balances and influences in High Asia. Formally, however, the British had to revise a treaty that had been signed in very different geopolitical and institutional conditions, when Tibet and Mongolia were still both within the Manchu imperial system, and not two territories that claimed their independence from a newborn Republic of China.

Therefore, in the event of a modification of the agreement, the British ambassador in Peking advised Grey to also take into consideration China, whose authorities for months had already suspected an Anglo-Russian negotiation on Tibet.[22] A possible loss of territory, without any involvement of Peking, could – according to Jordan – damage the British image in China to such an extent as to put British interests in severe crisis:

any agreement made independently with a third Power, which affected a portion of Chinese territory, would cause deep resentment throughout the country, impair our prestige as traditional upholders of Chinese integrity, and inflict serious damage upon British interests in China, for which any concession in Thibet would be a poor compensation.[23]

Grey found Robert Crewe-Milnes in favor of the position of not communicating to the Russians – for the moment – London’s position on the Tibetan question.[24] The head of the India Office, however, suggested that he wait to inform Saint Petersburg of British views on Mongolia until the Russian attitude towards Tibet was clarified.[25] Crewe-Milnes, knowing the imminent disclosure of the matter, wanted to ascertain in advance the possible Russian reaction:

The Marquess of Crewe agrees with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that it is not desirable to couple the Thibetan question with that of Mongolia at the present stage. But as it seems likely that the former question will shortly have to be taken up with the Russian Government, there might be advantage in deferring any communication to them on the subject of Mongolia until their attitude in regard to Thibet has been ascertained. His Lordship would therefore suggest for Sir E. Grey’s consideration that this matter should be held in abeyance for the time being.[26]

In managing relations with Mongolia, prudence was necessary. British interests in the country were extremely limited, but any connection between Urga and London could turn, as a counterpoint, into a pretext for contact between Lhasa and Saint Petersburg:

Lord Crewe is scarcely in a position to estimate the importance of British commercial interests in Mongolia. He agrees, however, as to the desirability of maintaining the “ open door ” for British trade ; and he sees no objection to the course of action proposed, provided Sir E. Grey is satisfied that direct negotiation with the Mongolian Government will not, in the event of our citing the analogy of Russian proceedings in Mongolia in support of our proposals regarding Thibet, lead to a demand by Russia for similar direct negotiation with the authorities at Lhasa.[27]

Furthermore, for Crewe-Milnes it was necessary, in the aftermath of the Sino-Russian Agreement on Mongolia and during the negotiations on Tibet in Simla, to clarify the legitimacy of the treaty between the Tibetans and the Mongols, and therefore to know whether that text had been actually authorized or not by the political leader of Tibet.[28] According to Crewe-Milnes and Grey, therefore, it was necessary to ask the Tibetan minister (blon-chen) Bshad-sgras[29] for clarification on the matter.[30] We have the reply of the blon-chen Bshad-sgras which is explained in a telegram from the Government of India to the Marquis of Crewe:

He pretends to know nothing of conclusion of agreement in question, but does not deny that Thibet and Mongolia have all along had an alliance of mutual support and assistance, and that, irrespective of any new agreement, this is still in force. He adds that Dorjief was given two letters by Dalai Lamai [sic], the first of which laid down that the two countries should give each other help for benefit of Buddhism, while the second authorised Dorjief to work to this end. This second letter confers powers as wide as, if not wider than, those which Lonchen himself now holds ; it was given to Dorjief when Dalai Lama was in Urga, despondent about help from China or His Majesty’s Government, and in close relations with Russia. To judge by phraseology of third article agreement of November 1912 between Russia and Mongolia, and by chain of thought which runs consecutively through series of Mongolian agreements which runs consecutively through series of Mongolian agreements, it appears quite probable that Russia inspired the Thibet-Mongolia agreement ; and whether or not existence of new agreement is admitted by Dalai Lama, we see no reason why its existence should be considered uncertain, or why we should doubt that its terms are as Korostovetz reported. Further, in absence of any provision in it for ratification, Dalai Lama may find difficulty in repudiating it even if he wants to do so, and would, in any case, have difficulty in refusing to Mongolia privileges for which it makes provision.

We think that, in these circumstances, it is safer to reckon on the agreement as really existing, and to get it produced openly.[31]

So, there was a letter from the dalai lama authorizing Dorzhiyev to negotiate with Urga and, according to the Government of India, the Russians were likely at the bottom of the agreement between Lhasa and Urga. It was therefore necessary for the British to act taking into account, without any doubt, the existence of that document.

The Board of Trade was also in favor of Grey’s position:

The Board concur with Sir E. Grey in thinking that, in the interest of British trade, it would be desirable for His Majesty’s Chargé d’Affaires to be instructed to get into touch with the Mongolian Government with a view to concluding an arrangement for securing fair terms and the maintenance of the “ open door ” for British trade, and that the Russian Government should also be informed that His Majesty’s Government are prepared to receive favourably the Russo-Chinese Agreement and Russo-Mongolian Treaty and Protocol, provided that reasonable conditions can be secured for British subjects and their commerce.[32]

According to the Board the Russians were guaranteed the right to import ‘goods of any origin free of duty’.[33] For the Board of Trade equal rights had to be guaranteed to the British and also


that no import, transit, or other duties shall be imposed on the produce or manufactures of any part of His Majesty’s territories which are not equally imposed on those of any other foreign countries.[34]

A draft agreement with the Mongolian authorities was also proposed by the Board; according to that, Britain was to be granted the status of most favored nation.[35] Naturally, the Board was more interested in the economic-commercial aspects, than in the broader function, in the Asian context, of the Mongolian question and therefore no political analysis was required.

Sayn noyon han Namnansüren’s letter to the British ambassador

In December 1913, Sayn noyon han Namnansüren,[36] president of the Mongolian Council of Ministers and chargé of the extraordinary mission, wrote a letter to the British ambassador in Saint Petersburg, George Buchanan.[37] In the document, the Mongolian politician ‘PAR la volonté de […] le Souverain de Mongolie, et de son Gouvernement’ communicated the transition to independence of Mongolia,

[a]u moment de la chute en Chine de la dynastie mandchoue, à laquelle elle était liée par un pacte spécial […] à l’effet de sauvegarder son unité et son indépendance nationales et l’intégrité de son territoire.

The text is particularly important: it clearly expresses the position of the Mongolian government on the issues at the center of the Sino-Russian dialogue on Urga and it was a further implicit brick of the political-diplomatic pillar that lay at the basis of the Simla agreement. The Mongols told the British that their link with the Empire was to be considered a link with the Manchu dynasty and not with the new Republic. Regarding the Mongol-Russian agreement of 1912, but also that of November (October, according to the Russian calendar) of 1913, Namnansüren expressed enthusiastic terms, considering the documents as proof of the recognition of Mongol independence not only by the Russians, but even by the newly formed Republic of China:

Le Gouvernement mongol a pu constater avec la plus vive satisfaction que lesdits documents comportaient la sanction de la part de l’Empire de Russie et de la République chinoise de l’indépendance de l’État mongol, auquel était garantie pleine liberté dans toutes les affaires touchant à l’administration intérieure, au commerce, à l’industrie, aux lignes de chemin de fer et de télégraphe, et dans toutes les questions financières et économiques, avec toutes les conséquences résultant de cet état de choses, ainsi qu’une parfaite liberté de traiter amicalement avec d’autres États souverains.

The Mongols were evidently not satisfied with the Chinese recognition of internal autonomy. The letter to the British clarified Urga’s interpretation of the agreements of 1912 and 1913, namely that of full Mongol sovereignty, also in terms of foreign affairs. The break with the Republic of China was total and therefore no suzerainty was recognized and the Mongolian government also claimed the right to annex territories inhabited by Mongols, beyond the limits set by the 1913 convention, which although still not defined with absolute certainty, excluded, without any doubt, Inner Mongolia:

Néanmoins, le Gouvernement de Mongolie a cru de son devoir de rappeler aux Gouvernements de l’Empire de Russie et de la République chinoise qu’il a toujours maintenu, et maintient encore, que la Mongolie a rompu définitivement tous liens avec la Chine et qu’aucun droit de suzeraineté ne peut être reconnu à personne sur la Mongolie sans son approbation. En conséquence, le Gouvernement mongol se réserve une parfaite liberté d’appréciation touchant certains points de la déclaration et des notes diplomatiques ayant trait aux relations entre la Caine [sic, ‘Chine’ recte] et la Mongolie. En particulier, la Mongolie affirme son droit d’annexer les territoires qui ont toujours fait corps avec elle et à une telle délimitation de ses frontières qui comprendrait toutes les peuplades de race mongol qui ont déjà adhéré à l’État mongol. Sous ces réserves le Gouvernement de Mongolie se déclare prêt à prendre part aux pourparlers entre la Russie, la Chine et la Mongolie, prévus par la déclaration et les notes susindiquées.

In order to reach a peaceful condition between Mongolia and its neighbors, Namnansüren nevertheless communicated that his government had issued an order to suspend military activities against the Chinese:

De plus, le Gouvernement de Mongolie, désireux de rétablir le plus tôt possible la bonne entente entre la Mongolie et les États limitrophes, a donné ordre à ses troupes de suspendre les opérations militaires contre les troupes chinoises et d’évacuer les positions avancées qu’elles occupaient, et il a adressé en même temps, par l’intermédiaire du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères de Russie et du Ministre de Chine à Saint-Pétersbourg, l’invitation au Gouvernement chinois d’avoir à retirer les troupes qui ont envahi le territoire de la Mongolie intérieure dont la population est intimement liée avec nous par affinités de race.

Naturally Ivan Korostovets, the architect – for the Russian side – of the 1912 agreement, had denied to Buchanan that kind of interpretation of the 1913 treaty: there had been no recognition of sovereignty to the Mongols as regards the railways, the telegraphs and foreign policy, nor, of course, was granted the right to annex parts of Inner Mongolia.[38] Korostovets recognized the fact that in the 1912 agreement, by Mongolian will, the name of the country was simply «Mongolia», without the adjective «Outer», but according to Korostovets it was Russia that had the right to define the borders of the territory covered by the convention.[39] Russian foreign minister Sazonov had also confirmed Korostovets’ statements to Buchanan and had also communicated to the British diplomat that a meeting of Russians, Mongols and Chinese had soon be held to define the borders of Outer Mongolia.[40] Russia, of course, did not want to surrender on the Inner Mongolian issue, because, as seen above, it had already committed to a secret agreement with Japan and could not therefore allow that region to end up inside independent Mongolia:

Their task would not be an easy one, and he need not remind me that Russia was precluded by her secret convention with Japan from allowing any portion of Inner to be incorporated in Outer Mongolia.[41]

[1] Full text of the Déclaration in French and Russian (with exchange of notes between the foreign minister of the Republic of China and the Russian minister in Peking): Извѣстія Министерства иностранныхъ дѣлъ, Третій годъ нзданія, 1914, К. І, С.-Петербургъ 1914, Ст. 2801. Высочайшее повелѣніе, предложенное Правительствующему Сенату Министромъ Юстицій. Объ утвержденіи Деклараціи о признаніи автономія Внѣшней Монголіи и двухъ нотъ, дополняющихъ означенную Декларацію, N. 270, 6 Декабря 1913 г., Отдѣлъ первый, pp. 14-20.

[2] The Correspondence of G. E. Morrison 2013, n. 588, Korostovets to G. E. Morrison, April 19, 1913, p. 134.

[3] ONON – PRITCHATT 1989, p. 66.

[4] KUNG SHU-TO 龚书铎 ET AL., Chung kuo chin tai shih kang 中国近代史纲, ti erh pan 第二版, Pei-ching 北京 1993, p. 367.

[5] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 421, Mr. Alston to Sir Edward Grey, November 8, 1913, p. 397*.

[6] Ajmag, in Chinese: 艾馬克 (ai-ma-k’o).

[7] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 421, Mr. Alston to Sir Edward Grey, November 8, 1913, p. 397*; the atlas cited by Alston is: E. Stanford, Atlas of the Chinese Empire, London 1908.

[8] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 417, Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Alston, November 6, 1913, p. 394. The text of the letter from the Foreign Office to Board of Trade is in TNA, FO 535/16, No. 420, Foreign Office to Board of Trade, November 7, 1913, p. 396; the text of the letter from the Foreign Office to the India Office is in TNA, FO 535/16, No. 421, Foreign Office to India Office, November 7, 1913, pp. 396-397.

[9] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 417, Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Alston, November 6, 1913, p. 394.

[10] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 420, Foreign Office to Board of Trade, November 7, 1913, p. 396.

[11] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 421, Foreign Office to India Office, November 7, 1913, p. 397.

[12] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 421, Foreign Office to India Office, November 7, 1913, p. 397.

[13] TNA, FO 405/212, No. 168, Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation to Foreign Office, September 26, 1913, pp. 111-112.

[14] TNA, FO 405/212, No. 171, Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Alston, September 27, 1913, p. 112. The notes of the agreements are in the annexes of TNA, FO 405/212, No. 178, Mr. Addis to Foreign Office, September 29, 1912, pp. 112-116A.

[15] TNA, FO 405/212, No. 183, Mr. O’Beirne to Sir Edward Grey, October 5, 1913, p. 118.

[16] TNA, FO 405/212, No. 183, Mr. O’Beirne to Sir Edward Grey, October 5, 1913, p. 118.

[17] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 425, Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O’Beirne, November 13, 1913, p. 401.

[18] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 425, Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O’Beirne, November 13, 1913, pp. 401-402.

[19] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 438, Mr. O’Beirne to Sir Edward Grey, November 19, 1913, p. 417; TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure in No. 438, Memorandum, pp. 417-418.

[20] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 443, Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey, November 27, 1913, p. 427.

[21] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 327, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey, July 22, 1913, p. 328.

[22] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 443, Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey, November 27, 1913, p. 427.

[23] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 443, Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey, November 27, 1913, p. 427.

[24] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 437, India Office to Foreign Office, November 19, 1913, p. 417.

[25] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 437, India Office to Foreign Office, November 19, 1913, p. 417.

[26] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 437, India Office to Foreign Office, November 19, 1913, p. 417.

[27] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 437, India Office to Foreign Office, November 19, 1913, p. 417.

[28] TNA, India Office to Foreign Office, November 17, 1913, FO 535/16, No. 432, p. 412.

[29] Blon chen Bshad sgra dpal ’byor rdo rje. Transcribed as Lonchen Shatra in the British documents.

[30] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 432, India Office to Foreign Office, November 17, 1913, p. 412.

[31] TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure in No. 459, Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe, December 9, 1913, p. 442.

[32] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 444, Board of Trade to Foreign Office, November 27, 1913, p. 427.

[33] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 444, Board of Trade to Foreign Office, November 27, 1913, p. 427.

[34] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 444, Board of Trade to Foreign Office, November 27, 1913, p. 427.

[35] TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure in No. 444, Board of Trade’s proposal for an agreement with Mongolia, p. 428.

[36] Sayn noyon han Tögs-Ochirϊn Namnansüren.

[37] Full text of the letter: TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure in No. 471, Letter left at British Embassy in St. Petersburgh by Member of Mongolian Mission (Traduction), le [missing] jour du mois moyen d’hiver de la IIIa année de l’ère “Olana ergougdeksn”, December 1913, pp. 461-462.

[38] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 471, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey, December 24, 1913, p. 460.

[39] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 471, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey, December 24, 1913, p. 460.

[40] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 471, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey, December 24, 1913, p. 461.

[41] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 471, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey, December 24, 1913, p. 461.

Further Reading on E-International Relations

New Book – Mongolian Independence and the British: Geopolitics and Diplomacy in High Asia, 1911–1916

Mongolian Independence and the British: Twentieth-Century Geopolitical Notes

London and Mongolian Independence

Mongolian Independence and the British: At the End of the Great Game

The End of the Manchu Dynasty and Tibetan Independence

Opinion – Challenges for the Expansion of the BRICS

ABOUT THE AUTHOR(S)
Matteo Miele is an Affiliated Assistant Professor at the Center for Southeast Asian Studies (CSEAS) of Kyoto University and a Fellow of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland. Between August 2011 and July 2012, he was a Lecturer at the Sherubtse College, Royal University of Bhutan. He received his Ph.D. (Dottorato di Ricerca) from the University of Pisa in 2014.