Thursday, August 01, 2024

The politics of disability under capitalism

By Graham Matthews
Published 27 July, 2024

I would like to acknowledge the work of the late Marta Russell, a Marxist and person living with disability, particularly the framework for understanding capitalism and disability that she outlines in her works, notably Beyond Ramps: Disability at the End of the Social Contract.1

When considering the politics of disability under capitalism, it is important to understand the economic aspects of the relationship between people’s disability and the means of production. Or how we, as people with disability, interact with society (as producers and consumers) and are valued (or not).
What is disability?

The first step is to define disability.

The medical model of disability normalises the able-bodied, fit, healthy, white male heterosexual adult as the ideal. This person is the archetype and anybody who does not reflect their characteristics (gender, sexuality, ethnicity, health and ableness) is considered somehow inferior. People with disability are a case in point: by definition we are not as able as the ideal person, do not contribute (as much) to the economic wealth of capital and, in many cases, need support to participate in society.

The social model of disability is person-centred and places responsibility for disability squarely at the feet of capital and the state, rather than the individual with disability. It says disability is caused by the way society is organised, rather than a person’s impairment or difference. When barriers are removed, people with disabled can be independent and equal in society, with choice and control over our lives.2

Before I delve into the political economy of capitalism and disability, I want to briefly touch on how people with disability were treated in pre-capitalist societies.


Pre-capitalist societies

In 2003, Mutthi Mutthi woman Mary Pappin Junior discovered fossilised footprints in the Mungo National Park. The tracks, estimated to date back 20,000 years, are the oldest found in Australia. They show footprints of three hunters running across the clayplan chasing a kangaroo. There is also a fourth set of tracks left by a one-legged man running across the claypan, possibly without the use of a stick or crutch.3 The fact this one-legged man was integrated into traditional Aboriginal society, 20,000 years ago, is more than a simple curiosity.

That this person, who might be considered “disabled” or even “crippled” in contemporary society, was participating in the subsistence economy (a hunt) is significant. It suggests that, at least in Aboriginal pre-class society, persons with even significant impediments were integrated into community life in a more or less natural way and were expected and permitted to participate in, and contribute to, society in whatever way they could. The footprints appear to provide evidence that pre-class society did not necessarily segregate, discriminate against, or otherwise persecute members with significant impediments.

From a Marxist point of view, this has particular significance in our understanding that the goal of history (Communist society) is a return to the kind of social equality experienced during pre-class society, but at a higher level.4 The fossilised footprints found at Lake Mungo evidence pre-class equality also extended to persons with significant impediment. This reinforces the need to return to that state of social equality, including for people with disability.

Rise of capitalism

Impediment has existed throughout history and class society. But prior to the emergence of capitalism, it was a part of the social fabric. There is evidence that people with disability were integrated into feudal society and made a contribution based on their abilities.5 Charity was provided by the Church for those physically disabled and no longer able to make a contribution. Even the famed Joan of Arc, who rose from obscurity to lead the French armies in the 100 Years War and was ultimately Sanctified by the Catholic Church, may have suffered from schizophrenia or epilepsy.6

Karl Marx wrote rather poetically in Capital Volume 1 that “capital comes dripping from head to toe, from every pore, with blood and dirt.”7 With the rise of capitalism, the productive class — the class that works and produces value — was “liberated” from the means of production. Enclosures and legislation separated peasants from their means of subsistence, both physically and geographically, leading to mass migration to the city.

The new working class was forced to sell its labour power to afford the means of life. Broadly, if you could not find work for the capitalists, you starved. However, the factory system — and later industrial capitalism — required intense concentration, dexterity and repetitive movement. Long hours, fine detail and intense concentration are not necessarily skills possessed by all people with disability.

So, they were largely excluded from the capitalist mode of production, including those injured by the system itself. Instead, people with disability joined the ranks of the unemployed — the reserve army of labour. If they did find work, it was generally transitory, poorly paid and very insecure. Impoverished, uncertain and limited subsistence necessarily followed.

The rise of capitalism meant the breakdown of social bonds (prominent within feudalism), and with it the privatisation of responsibility for disability within the family (women) or, at the extremes, institutionalisation and segregation.

Early gains

As early as 1848, Marx and Friedrich Engels acknowledged that class struggle compelled the working class to organise: “This organisation of the proletarians into a class… rises up again, stronger, firmer, mightier. It compels legislative recognition of particular interests of the workers, by taking advantage of the divisions among the bourgeoisie itself…”8 Organisation eventually won limited social gains for working people, including limited pensions, initially for soldiers unable to fight owing to physical disability, but later generalised.

In Australia, the winning of pensions for people with disability was part of the class settlement of the Federation of the Australian States in 1901. Section 51 of the Australian Constitution gives the Australian state power to legislate for so-called invalids. Significantly, the same section also allows the state to legislate for the Age Pension.

Both the Age and Invalid pensions were introduced in 1908. The Invalid Pension (later the Disability Support Pension, DSP) initially supported critically injured workers unable to provide for their families. Its scope was later broadened to provide some level of guaranteed economic support to others with disability. Similar pensions were introduced in a number of European countries around the same time.

War, revolution, crisis and reaction

The early 20th century began a period of war, revolution, economic crisis and reaction. A series of minor imperialist conflicts and struggles for national liberation culminated in World War I. In 1917, the workers and peasants of Russia overthrew the old regime and attempted to build a socialist society.

The settlement of World War I lay the foundations of a significant economic crisis (the Great Depression). In western Europe, this led to the rise of fascism: the bourgeois extreme reaction to economic crisis and a last-ditch attempt to head off revolution. The apex of that reaction was the rise of the Nazis in Germany in 1933.

The Nazi regime introduced systematic discrimination against people with disability, who were dehumanised and dismissed as “useless eaters” or “oxygen thieves”, in a way reminiscent of the dehumanisation of Jewish people as “rats”.

Soon after the Nazi’s ascension, “mercy” killings by doctors of children with disability began to take place. Twinned with segregation came confinement into institutions. However, institutionalisation of people with disability costs money and came to be seen as a burden on the state.

Beginning in 1939, the “solution” identified by the Nazis — one I am sure many of today’s neoliberals would be envious of — was the systematic murder of institutionalised people with disability. This was known as Aktion 41 and included the development of techniques later used in the death camps against Jews and others. “Showers” using poisonous gas (carbon monoxide) were developed to murder people with disability on an industrial scale.9 The state reduced its costs through the systematic murder of people with disability. While this was formally stopped in 1941, the killings, particularly of children with disability, continued alongside the wholesale murder of Jews and others.

Fascism is an extreme version of capitalism, one that the bourgeoisie is very reluctant to release except in periods of existential crisis. Nonetheless, it is a capitalist response to crisis — one that caused the death of millions, including more than 6 million Jews, during the Holocaust. While not characteristic of “democratic” capitalism, it is a historical fact that those dedicated to making a better world must not forget.

Civil rights and disability

World War II was not the last word in social development. Foment around the Vietnam War and social movements for the rights of women, LGBTQ+, Blacks, Indigenous nations and people with disability began to develop from the late 1960s.

The 504 Sit-in in San Francisco in April 1977 was perhaps the first acknowledged disability rights demonstration. People with disability staged a sit-in to demand greater accessibility and better accommodation.10 A similar movement developed in Australia in the late 1970s. In April 1978, Disabled People’s Action Forum members blockaded a Medibank claims office with placards that read: “We don’t need a stairway to paradise, We want ramps to independence.”11

Blockader Geoff Bell outside Medibank, 1978. Courtesy of the Search Foundation
Blockader Geoff Bell outside Medibank, 1978. Courtesy of the Search Foundation

Pressure for the extension of civil rights to people with disability continued to grow, with the United Nations declaring 1981 the International Year of Disabled Persons. On November 10, 1981, 300 people with intellectual disabilities and their supporters rallied outside NSW Parliament to demand control over their housing and living conditions.

Formal rights but ongoing exclusion: The 1992 Disability Discrimination Act

In 1992, the Paul Keating Labor government passed the federal Disability Discrimination Act. However, more than 30 years after this formal acknowledgement of the rights of people with disability, the gains won have been limited and remain tenuous.

Disability and the labour force | Australian Bureau of Statistics (abs.gov.au)
Disability and the labour force | Australian Bureau of Statistics (abs.gov.au)

Independence and self-determination in a capitalist society are based on the ability to perform a job and be paid a living wage to support oneself (including rent, food, transport and entertainment). People with disability are significantly underrepresented in the workforce. Just over 2 million people with disability are of workforce age (15-64), according to the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS). But around 1 million of those are not in the workforce. So if 46.6% of working-age people with disability are not in the workforce, where are they and how do they live?

The DSP is an important provision for people with disability who are unable to work (or at least to work full-time). It is a guaranteed income (albeit at poverty level) that proves some level of financial independence. But now that people with disability have the right to work, we also have “the right” to be excluded from income support. Despite there being more than 1 million working-age people with disability who are not in the workforce, only 649,000 are on the DSP. So, what of the other 350,000 who neither work nor receive the DSP. How do they live?

People with disability in Australia, Income support - Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (aihw.gov.au)
People with disability in Australia, Income support - Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (aihw.gov.au)

The drive to remove people with disability from the DSP (in many cases forcing them to live on the much lower Job Search Payment) is a central part of the neoliberal drive to reduce social subsidies, privatise the cost of support and force responsibility onto the family, all under the guise of independence. It has been pursued with gusto by both Labor and Coalition governments.12 Data from the federal government’s Institute of Health and Welfare demonstrates the proportion of working-aged people on the DSP is in significant decline, as older recipients are moved to the Aged Pension while significantly fewer new recipients are enrolled.

In more ways than one, people with disability are the new “dole bludgers”: suspected of receiving social support without good reason, and viewed as a drain on the public purse.

NDIS: Commodifying the disabled body

The Julia Gillard Labor government legislated to bring in the National Disability Insurance Scheme NDIS) in 2013. From the beginning, NDIS was a privatisation exercise. It gives huge government subsidies to private businesses to provide support for (some) people with disability. NDIS has led to a massive concentration of capital in the disability sector, with large corporations dominating the provision of services in metropolitan centres while people with disability struggle to find support in rural and regional areas. Increasingly, people with disability are supported only where it is profitable to do so.

The limitations, inequities and frustrations of NDIS are well documented, including in Green Left. However, there are aspects of NDIS that socialists and supporters of the rights of people with disability should defend, such as the lack of means testing.

Within NDIS, there are elements of self-determination for people with disability (including giving participants the limited right to decide who they want to support them and in what way). We should defend the democratic aspects of NDIS: the focus on social inclusion and independent aspiration (“goals”). People with disability are individuals with a wide range of wants, needs and desires. At its best, NDIS provides assistance to achieve at least some of these.

However, the universality and applicability of NDIS is under attack from the Anthony Albanese Labor government. We need to oppose “robo-planning”, which would reduce funded support to a number generated by a formula rather than individual needs, and any plan to introduce copayments. We should also oppose cuts to NDIS funding and to the range of people considered disabled enough to receive.

Beyond capitalism

Capitalism is intended to maximise wealth concentration in an increasingly dwindling number of hands. For the majority of us, it is only our labour power that separates us from penury. For people with disability, many of whom are not able to work — at least not for a living wage — the situation can be worse.

Socialists understand that only a coalition of the oppressed has the social power to overturn the rule of the minority and establish a society based on social equality. To bring about that change, this coalition must represent the aspirations and needs of all oppressed people, including people with disability.

This article is based on Graham Matthew’s presentation to Ecosocialism 2024. Matthews is a disability rights activist, Socialist Alliance founding member and regular Green Left contributor.

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Feeling the heat: Capitalism and global warming

By Marty Hart-Landsberg

Published MastodonFacebook
Canadian wildfires

First published at Reports from the Economic Front.

We are in real trouble. Global carbon dioxide emissions (the main cause of global warming) continue to rise, hitting a new high in 2023. Last year was also the hottest in recorded history and, year by year, more Americans are feeling the consequences. Yet, we have seen only modest attempts to bring emissions down.

Unfortunately, the US government continues to believe, despite evidence to the contrary, that market forces will encourage a speedy transition away from fossil fuels. Instead, we need to organize in support of direct action to bring down energy use and emissions. We need nothing less than a system-wide transformation of our economy. Consideration of the World War II-era US conversion experience helps to demonstrate both the feasibility of such a transformation and the importance of suppressing market forces to achieve it.

It’s getting hotter

Alarm bells are ringing in government circles. As Secretary of Health and Human Services, Xavier Becerra, put it, “Heat is no longer a silent killer, From coast-to-coast, communities are battling to keep people cool, safe and alive due to the growing impacts of the climate crisis.” According to his agency, there were an estimated 2,302 heat related deaths in 2023, triple the annual average between 2004 and 2018.

However, these totals, which rely on death certificate listings where heat is listed as the main cause of death, are widely believed to be undercounts. One researcher, asked by Miami-Dade County officials to provide a more accurate count of county heat-related deaths, determined that the likely number was at least 10 times the officially published one.

And 2024 is shaping up to be another scorcher. Miami recorded its hottest May on record, with temperatures reaching 112 degrees Fahrenheit. Phoenix experienced its hottest June ever, with temperatures hitting 113 degrees. The Maricopa County heat-related death toll for the month will likely exceed 175 — an 84 percent increase over the previous June.

In fact, much of the country suffered from unusually hot weather. As the Guardian reported in June:

More than 270 million Americans – about 80 percent of the country’s population – are experiencing a kind of heatwave not seen in decades, smashing records with temperatures at or above 90F (32.2C) for long periods of time under a weather phenomenon known as a heat dome.

The Pacific Northwest is no exception, with July temperatures soaring over 100 degrees in a number of Oregon cities. As an Oregon Public Broadcasting article pointed out, “The abnormally high temperatures, part of a multiyear warming trend in Oregon, are prompting concerns about health in a state where many homes lack air conditioning.’’ While temperatures are not expected to reach levels as high as during the 2021 heatwave, when some 600 people died across Oregon, Washington, and western Canada, the threat to human life remains serious because of the expected length of this heat wave.

Excessive heat also takes its toll on workers, greatly increasing the likelihood of serious injury or illness. This is especially true for farmworkers and landscapers; delivery and construction workers; and factory, warehouse, and kitchen workers. Although the Biden administration recently proposed new safety standards to protect workers when temperatures are elevated, business opposition makes its chances of approval unlikely. The governors of Texas and Florida, citing business concerns, each recently signed legislation preventing local governments in their respective states from requiring heat protections for those working outdoors.

As challenging as conditions are becoming in the US, they are far worse in many places in the Global South. Temperatures reached 126 degrees in parts of India and Pakistan. And, as the New York Times explained, “For laborers, not working because of the extreme temperatures can mean not eating.” Air conditioning is a true luxury. In fact, the International Energy Agency reports that more than 750 million people do not even have access to electricity.

Air conditioning isn’t the answer

Many Americans continue to dismiss the dangers from rising temperatures, believing that air conditioning will protect them. However, climate change generates its own challenges to such fixes. A case in point: a major storm hit Houston in May 2024, knocking out power for almost a million households — there was no light and no air-conditioning. The damage to the power infrastructure was so great that even after five days more than 100,000 homes and businesses remained without power. If the storm had struck during a major heat wave the heat-related death toll could have been considerable.

Recognizing that the number of major blackouts in the United States more than doubled from 2015-16 to 2020-21, several university researchers undertook a study of the probable consequences of a major blackout during a heat wave in three cities: Phoenix, Atlanta, and Detroit. According to a New York Times summary of their results:

The researchers modeled the health consequences for residents in a two-day, citywide blackout during a heat wave, with electricity gradually restored over the next three days.

The results were shocking: In Phoenix, about 800,000 people — roughly half the population — would need emergency medical treatment for heatstroke and other illnesses. The flood of people seeking care would overwhelm the city’s hospitals. More than 13,000 people would die.

Under the same scenario in Atlanta, researchers found there would be 12,540 visits to emergency rooms. Six people would die. In Detroit, which has a higher percentage of older residents and a higher poverty rate than those other cities, 221 people would die.

The higher death toll in Phoenix was largely due to two factors: the city was likely to suffer a blackout at higher temperatures than the other two cities and the effects were likely to be greater because a far higher percentage of its population relies on air-conditioning.

Critically, the rise in temperature itself increases the threat of a serious power outage. Warmer weather means more use of air conditioners and greater demand for electricity. Add in the rapidly increasing demand for electricity from tech companies and their data centers and you have a recipe for a system overload, with transformers exploding and power plants failing. In fact a 2016 study “found the potential for cascading grid failures across Arizona to increase thirtyfold in response to a 1.8 degree rise in summer temperatures.”

Markets are not the answer

President Biden has touted his administration’s many efforts to reduce US greenhouse gas emissions. At its core, his clean energy strategy can be summarized as follows: electrify as much of the economy as possible, as quickly as possible, using solar and wind power. The Biden administration has used financial incentives and regulatory initiatives to push the economy in the desired direction, but market dynamics — the expected decline in the cost of renewal energy relative to that of fossil fuels — was always expected to be the main driver. That cost crossover happened some five years ago, and the cost advantage of renewables over fossil fuels has only continued to grow. Yet our fossil fuel use has also continued to grow.

US crude oil production set a new record in 2023; the US has produced more oil than any other country in each of the last six years. And although there has been a major expansion in renewable energy production over the last years, the production of fossil fuels for use in electricity generation has also continued to grow, even if at a slower rate. The share of electricity generated by natural gas hit a record high of 42.1 percent in 2023. Coal’s share has been steadily falling, but even at its 2023 low of 16.2 percent, it remains higher than the combination of solar (3.9 percent) and wind (10.2 percent). Rather than replacing fossil fuel use, the increased generation of solar and wind power is largely going to satisfy the steady increase in overall electricity demand.

The main reason that lower solar and wind costs have yet to speed the expected transition away from fossil fuels is that investors don’t find renewable investments sufficiently attractive. As Brett Christophers, a professor of human geography, explains:

Take the S&P Global Clean Energy Index, which measures the stock performance of leading companies in clean energy, especially solar and wind power. Since the beginning of 2021, this index has lost more than half its value. . . .

The main cause of this sluggish performance is low profitability. Bluntly stated, clean energy – developing and operating solar and windfarms, and selling the electricity they generate – simply isn’t a very attractive business. Returns are typically in the 5-8 percent range. Compare that with oil and gas production, where returns generally exceed 15 percent, and it is little wonder clean energy stocks have been falling while oil and gas shares outperform.

Christophers offers several possible explanations for the low returns on renewables. One is that renewable energy production is a very competitive industry, in part because of relatively low barriers to entry compared with fossil fuel production. This market structure tends to drive down returns and thus investor interest.

Another is that most developers of renewable energy need outside financial help to cover the upfront costs of building the facilities and transmission infrastructure. And financial institutions are reluctant to provide it because of uncertainty about anticipated costs and revenues. In contrast, fossil fuel companies generally rely on internal funding for their new investments.

Regardless of the reason, the lower costs of solar and wind energy have not encouraged fossil fuel companies to shift their investments from fossil fuels to renewables. It is profitability, not prices, that matter to their CEOs and stockholders, and the profitability of fossil fuels is just too good to pass up, no matter the climate threat. And, as the economist Michael Roberts summarizes, this is not a conclusion that embarrasses them:

The chief executive of oil producer Chevron told the Financial Times last October, “You can build scenarios, but we live in the real world, and have to allocate capital to meet real world demands.” Four out of five corporate executives considered “the ability to create acceptable returns on projects a main barrier to decarbonization of the energy system.”“We should abandon the fantasy of phasing out oil and gas and, instead, invest in them adequately reflecting realistic demand assumptions,” says Amin Nasser, chief executive of Saudi Aramco. “You can argue green all day and NGOs all day, but those are the facts. I think that message is beginning to resonate,” Liam Mallon, head of ExxonMobil’s upstream business, said.

It’s not too late to act

It’s not too late to take meaningful steps to reduce emissions. While most climate scientists believe that it is no longer possible to keep the earth’s average surface temperature from rising above the 1.5C target set by the 2015 Paris Climate Conference, a Guardian survey of climate experts found that the great majority believe that “1.5C was not a cliff-edge leading to a significant change in climate damage. Instead, the climate crisis increases incrementally, meaning every ton of CO2 avoided reduces people’s suffering.”

How bad might it get? According to what the experts told the Guardian, if we allow the temperature to rise to 2.7C: “Two billion people would be pushed outside humanity’s ‘climate niche,’ i.e. the benign conditions in which the whole of civilization arose over the past 10,000 years.” At 3C: Cities including Shanghai, Rio de Janeiro, Miami and the Hague would end up below sea level. At 3C and above: “The impact of climate shocks in one place will cascade around the world, through food price spikes, food and water shortages, broken supply chains, and refugees by the millions.” As to current trends, according to the UN climate chief, speaking at the June 2024 meeting of the International Energy Agency, the planet is on track for a “ruinously high” 2.7C rise in the global temperature over that of the pre-industrial era.

Clearly, we need to act quickly to bring down emissions. And that means radically transforming the way we live and work. The starting point for such a transformation must be a reduction in the exploration, production, and use of fossil fuels in favor of clean energy sources like solar and wind. However, given the need to reduce overall emissions and resource exploitation, we cannot aim for a simple one-to-one replacement of energy sources. As beneficial as they may be, renewable energy sources also depend on critical raw materials that are limited in supply and their extraction from the earth creates its own ecological problems, especially for those in the Global South.

Limiting our overall energy use (and emissions) in a way that protects the interest of working people means that we must also take steps to reduce the production of ecologically destructive and socially less necessary goods and services, including single-family mansions, giant sport utility vehicles, private jets, luxury cruises, fast fashion, industrially produced meat and dairy, single use/disposable products, and the like. And because the Department of Defense is, in the words of Neta C. Crawford, Co-Director of the Costs of War project at Brown and Boston Universities, “the world’s largest institutional user of petroleum and correspondingly, the single largest producer of greenhouse gases in the world,” substantial energy savings can also be achieved from reducing our military budget and global infrastructure for the projection of power.

With a sizeable reduction in energy use from the actions highlighted above, a newly expanded clean energy sector should be able to support, at a lower level of overall energy use, a significant expansion in a number of socially beneficial goods and services. Examples include a well-funded national health care system, universal education system, and accessible and affordable program of public housing; an expanded system of affordable public transportation; and support for regenerative agricultural practices. The job creation from such programs will be substantial.

After decades of unchallenged neoliberal policies, many people will understandably find it hard to imagine how such a transformation could be achieved. And the challenges and tasks will be many. Some new industries will have to be rapidly developed and the productive capacities of some existing ones expanded. We will need to create agencies capable of deciding the speed of growth as well as ownership of the new facilities, how the new investments will be financed, and how best to ensure that the materials required will be produced in sufficient quantities and made available to the designated enterprises at the appropriate time.

We will also have to develop mechanisms for deciding where new establishments will be located and how to provide the social infrastructure to house and care for the required workforce. And we will need to develop programs that will ensure that newly hired workers receive appropriate training. In sum, a system-wide transformation involves a lot of moving parts that must be managed and coordinated.

Helpfully, we have the World War II conversion experience to demonstrate the feasibility of such a transformation. Despite the many differences in times and aims, there are some significant similarities in the challenges planners faced then and ones we are likely to face now. Most importantly, then as now, there was an urgent need for a system-wide economic conversion, a conversion resisted by many of the country’s most powerful corporations.

Corporations producing goods of direct importance to the war effort — for example, those producing aluminum and steel — refused to undertake needed investments. Overall private investment fell in value over the years 1941 to 1943. That last year, business investment was only 37 percent of its 1940 level. At the same time, corporations producing consumer goods — most importantly those producing automobiles — routinely ignored government entreaties to curtail or convert their production to economize on the nonmilitary use of scarce materials.

The US government succeeded in transforming the economy from civilian to military production, converting it into the celebrated “arsenal of democracy,” only because it undertook the required spending, investing, and planning itself. Military spending as a share of GDP rose from 1.6 percent in 1940 to 36.0 percent in 1944. As a result, the combined output of the war-related manufacturing, mining, and construction industries doubled between 1939 and 1944. In that last year, federal purchases of goods for the military accounted for approximately one-half of all goods produced.

The economy was able to respond to the explosion in military spending because the government pursued an active and aggressive policy of targeted investment. A May 1940 act led to the creation of The Defense Production Corporation (DPC), which was given a blank check to finance the expansion of facilities deemed critical to the war mobilization. The DPC kept ownership of the new facilities it financed, but planned the construction with predetermined companies who were then allowed to manage them.

The DPC alone financed and owned some one-third of all the plants and equipment built during the war. At its termination in June 1945, the DPC:

owned approximately 96 per cent of the capacity of the synthetic-rubber industry, 90 per cent of magnesium metal, 71 per cent of aircraft and aircraft engines, and 58 per cent of the aluminum metal industry. It also had sizeable investments in iron and steel, aviation gasoline, ordnance, machinery and machine tools, transportation, radio, and other more miscellaneous facilities.

The successful conversion also required detailed planning. For example, newly created government agencies worked to free resources for war production by selectively ordering the curtailment or outright suppression of production by many civilian industries. As a result, between 1940 and 1944, the total production of nonmilitary goods and services fell by more than 10 percent.

Other agencies were created to ensure an efficient allocation of resources. During the first years of the fighting, the military’s demand for goods and services outpaced the economy’s ability to meet it. The result was a shortage of key materials and components, inflation, and disrupted production. Order was established only when planning agencies began directly allocating the existing stock of critical metals and components among key producers, eventually forcing the military to bring its plans in line with the economy’s capacity to produce. Still other agencies were empowered to determine the location of the new government owned plants and to finance the construction of the housing, day care programs, and urban infrastructure needed to house and support the growing workforce in the selected locations.

And despite government efforts to win corporations to the war effort, which included allowing high profit margins on government contracts and a willingness to appoint business representatives to key positions in planning agencies, corporate leaders remained critical of the government’s expanded role in the economy throughout the war. In fact, many questioned whether the cost of victory was too high. As the economist J.W. Mason describes,

J. Howard Pew of Sun Oil declared that if the United States abandoned private ownership and “supinely reli[es] on government control and operation, then Hitlerism wins even though Hitler himself be defeated.” Even the largest recipients of military contracts regarded the wartime state with hostility. GM [chair] Alfred Sloan—referring to the danger of government enterprises operating after war—wondered if it is “not as essential to win the peace, in an economic sense, as it is to win the war, in a military sense,” while GE’s Philip Reed vowed to “oppose any project or program that will weaken” free enterprise.

The wartime conversion of the US economy was a tumultuous affair, with many mistakes made. Yet, for all that, government policy succeeded in orchestrating a rapid transformation of the economy, one that enabled the US to play a pivotal role in the eventual Allied victory. Tragically, and perhaps not surprisingly, corporate leaders were able to use their structural power to ensure that the economic changes made during the war were quickly undone: government owned factories were sold off at bargain prices to the companies selected to run them and planning agencies were disbanded as quickly as possible after the end of the fighting.

There is much we can learn from this wartime conversion experience. Among other things, it demonstrates the feasibility of a rapid, system-wide conversion of the US economy. It also shows the critical role of state planning, public financing and ownership, and state direction of economic activity in achieving such a conversion. And it highlights the resistance that a conversion process can be expected to generate from business leaders.

But having confidence that a transformation can be achieved is not the same as having the political strength to achieve it. And we face enormous challenges in building the movement we need. Among them: weakened unions, popular distrust of the effectiveness of public planning and ownership, and weak ties among labor, environmental, and other key community organizations. Overcoming these challenges will require sustained conversations and organizing to strengthen the capacities of and the connections among our organizations and to develop a shared and grounded vision of the changes we desperately need to make.

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Far-right challenge and the left-democratic response in Europe

By Akash Bhattacharya
Published 
Email
EU election tally room

First published at CPI(ML) Liberation.

In April and May 2024, as the Indian people mounted a strong fightback against Hindutva/corporate rule of the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP), the political battle between the far-right and democratic forces entered a new phase in Europe.

In the elections to the European parliament held between June 6-9, far-Right parties made massive gains. The Alternative for Germany (AfD) in Germany, the National Rally (RN) in France and the ruling “Brothers of Italy” were standout performers. In France, the French President Emmanuel Macron’s centrist grouping received only 14.6% of the votes, finishing nearly 17 points behind Marine Le Pen's RN. In response, Macron dissolved the National Assembly and called for snap polls.

The first round of elections to the National Assembly held on June 30 placed the fascist RN as the emerging pole, as it won 38 of the 76 declared seats (the remaining 501 of the 577 seats went for the second round). The Left, fighting unitedly under the banner of the New Popular Front (NFP), finished second and the ruling centrist alliance Ensemble was pushed down to the third position.

Showing great alertness, tactical flexibility and political maturity, the NFP arrived at an electoral understanding with Ensemble to avoid any split in the anti-fascist vote in the second round. As a result, the NFP emerged as the biggest bloc with 188 seats followed by the centrist Ensemble alliance with 161 seats while the fascist RN got stuck in the third position with 142 seats. The fascist advance was temporarily stalled but with 125 seats the RN emerged as the single largest party in the National Assembly.

Elections were due in Britain as part of the usual 4-year cycle. The elections brought the Labour Party back to power after a prolonged Conservative Party rule that lasted for fourteen years. But a closer look will suggest that like France, neighbouring Britain is also dogged by the challenge of far-right resurgence. Although the Labour Party’s tally of seats went past 400 in a house of 650, in terms of votes, the Labour Party polled less votes this time than in the last two elections in 2017 and 2019.

A major reason is a massive drop in Conservative vote share and almost a matching rise in the vote share of the far-Right Reform party. Reform won five seats in the House of Commons, with a 14.3% share of the vote and its leader Nigel Farage, who had promised to send all immigrants back across the English Channel from their last point of departure, entered Parliament.

Crucially, under the current leadership of Keir Starmer, the Labour Party itself has taken a pronounced rightward turn, not just in economic policy but more crucially by competing with the Conservatives in adopting anti-migrant rhetoric, by expressing support for Israel’s war on Gaza and by refusing to back the global call for a permanent ceasefire.

Many leftwing erstwhile Labour voters voted for independent Left and pro-Palestine candidates and Green Party candidates in many places. In contrast, the NFP in France upheld the left agenda in terms of both economic and social policies as well as an internationalist foreign policy, especially in the context of Israel’s war on Gaza and Palestine.

Thus, while the far-right has made important inroads — both electoral and ideological — it has also been challenged by a resurgent Left within mainstream parties/alliances as well as outside them as independent democratic voices. These developments carry important messages for the Indian left, due to the structural similarities between right-wing parties in Europe and India, and because of the necessity of global Left-democratic solidarities in thwarting fascism’s global designs.

Immigration, neo-liberalism and right-wing populism in Europe

The question of immigration, more than any other issue, unites the far-right parties in Europe. Much like the Hindu nationalists in India, these parties stoke the fear of small numbers among the majority non-immigrant white population, and draw upon racist sentiments that date back to the heyday of colonialism to create an atmosphere of xenophobia and racism.

Rampant Islamophobia, and a clear identification with Western imperialism and Zionism, are other key ideological strands that far-right parties tend to share. They are resolutely together in defending Israel; ready to dismiss any criticism of Zionism as antisemitism. These parties consistently portrayed pro-Palestine NFP leader Jean-Luc Mélenchon as antisemitic, much like what the right-wing elements in Britain did to Jeremy Corbyn in the lead up to the 2019 general election.

The rise of the far-right in Europe is in tune with increasing authoritarian and non-democratic trends throughout the world. And the right has been building toward this moment over the past 15 years: right-wing parties have been steadily gaining influence in Europe since the AfD started in 2013, and Marine Le Pen of France took over leadership of the National Rally (formerly National Front) in 2011.

For decades after World War II, though right-wing parties existed they were quite fringe and were deeply associated with fascism and Nazism. Over the past decade, as the memories of the world war became more remote and Europe has faced multiple overlapping crises including the increasing rates of immigration, the economic crisis of 2008-09, and the Covid-19 pandemic, right-wing parties have steadily increased their presence. They have cleverly used these crises to normalize themselves and strengthen their hold over their societies.

The adoption of neo-liberal policies by centrist parties under the garb of a post-ideological politics in the 1990s played a major role in enabling the rise of the far-right. Let’s take the example of Germany. Areas with higher unemployment and lower education inhabited primarily by non-immigrant white communities have emerged as core support bases for the far-right. Increasing inequality and lack of trust in the government, coupled with the systematic delegitimization of left-wing critical discourse on neoliberalism, have obscured the reasons behind peoples’ miseries. Anti-establishment sentiments against the centrist forces have led to growing electoral support for the far-right.

In France, the National Rally has adopted a populist rhetoric on the economy to convert the discontent against Macron’s neoliberal policies into votes for themselves. Rhetorically, sometimes they sound even leftist, but in real terms they oppose indiscriminate globalization only so far as French corporates need protection. The RN promises to end the job crisis, not by strengthening the public sector but by throwing immigrants out of work and out of the country. Macron’s polices have led to job cuts, decrease in public sending, and reduction in social security especially pensions. In the midst of state-created artificial scarcity, and the resultant sharp competition for resources, the RN claims to protect the right of the ethnic French to the national resources over the rights of immigrants.

Macron not only adopted neoliberal polices but also used authoritarian measures such as banning protests, using state violence against dissenters and using constitutional tricks to push ahead with unpopular policies. At the same time, Macron and his allies went to great lengths to demonize the left. Thus, in multiple ways the centrists have enabled the shift towards the far-right.

While the centrist parties lean on the left and expect the left to do their best to hold off the far-right, they seem unwilling to let the left govern, or to even share power with the left. Even now, Macron is doing his level best to thwart the NFP leader Mélenchon from becoming the Prime Minister despite the fact that he is the acknowledged leader of the largest parliamentary block.

Emerging possibilities and challenges

The developments in Europe are of great significance to India. Indian fascism’s lineage intersects with that of the far-right in Europe. The early Hindu supremacists drew ideological inspiration from Italian fascism and German Nazism. Fast forward to the 21st century: a manufactured sense of “historical wound” inflicted on Hindus by Muslims, and a fear of loss of social and political power of the upper castes to the Dalit Bahujan Adivasi peoples are driving Hindu nationalism forward.

Despite its historical and geographical distinctiveness, Indian fascists and the European right-wing have a lot in common: majoritarian mindset, xenophobia, hatred, Islamophobia, authoritarian governance, and a violent and exclusionary cultural nationalism. Different degrees of cooperation with big corporations, and enmity with ideologies espousing socio-economic equality — especially leftist ideologies — also unite the Indian and European right.

These intersections are well-understood by the fascist forces. They have left no stone unturned to side with each other. The burgeoning friendship between Italian Prime Minister Georgia Meloni and the Indian Prime Minister is a case in point. Since Meloni’s visit to India in 2023, the bilateral relationship has been elevated to the level of strategic partnership in business and defense.

The Indo-Italian friendship is part of a global pattern of far-right/fascist cooperation based on business and defense at the cost of working-class interests. The Indo-Israeli friendship, for example, is evidently for the benefit of Indian corporations such as Adani, Ambani, Mahindra and Tata, who are set to profit from India’s economic tie-ups within the West Asia Quad consisting of America, Israel, India and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). This friendship puts the working classes at a great disadvantage, since the Indian government has offered Israel cheap labor in exchange for Israel’s participation in defense and economic partnerships.

Right-wing allies all over the world now consider Israel as the frontier zone of conflict between their majoritarian, authoritarian, and corporate models of nation-building on the one hand and pro-people anti-imperialist democratic currents on the other. They have all united in defending Israel’s genocide in Gaza.

Under these circumstances, the fight against fascism in India cannot be won on the national plane alone. Indian fascism’s European, American and Zionist friends need to be exposed and fought, both in India and abroad. The myth of the Indian Prime Minister being a world leader needs to be destroyed. Indian democratic sections must find friends in other societies that are battling against right-wing politics. Fortunately, the current developments in Europe are likely to enable new solidarities between left-democratic ideologies.

The NFP’s rise to prominence in France not only as a core constituent of the democratic section but as its leader is a great sign. As are the victories of independent left candidates in Britain. These victories are incomplete, given a hugely compromised Labour Party’s rise to power in Britain, and the NFP shortfall of around 100 seats from the outright majority mark. Yet these victories indicate that ideologically powerful left-democratic forces can push back the right and also help reorient democracy towards justice, equality and pluralism. These victories tell us that grassroots mobilization and mass movements, and above all uncompromising leftist resistance, can win.

The far right and radical left after the European and French elections

By Pablo Stefanoni & Federico Fuentes

Published 

Le Pen Melenchon

Pablo Stefanoni is a journalist, editor and author of ¿La rebeldía se volvió de derechas? (Has Rebellion Become a Thing of the Right?). Currently based in Paris, he spoke to Federico Fuentes for LINKS International Journal of Socialist Renewal about the recent European and French elections — in which the former saw a strong showing for the far right while the latter resulted in a win for the broad left Nouveau Front populaire (New Popular Front, NFP) — and what it means for both sides.

After the June European parliament elections, there was talk of a far-right wave given the vote for France’s Rassemblement National (National Rally, RN) and other radical right forces. But a month later, the talk is of a radical left victory in France and a crushing defeat for the Conservatives in Britain. How do you explain this supposed swing? Is there a better way to understand trends in European elections?

The idea of waves tends to work in journalistic terms, but less so for analysis. Evidently, the far right has been steadily growing in Europe and is setting the national political agenda in several countries. This was ratified in the European elections. The far right is stronger than before and, above all, has achieved normalisation [in that is seen as a normal part of the political landscape]. However, it has not yet managed to break the hegemony of conservatives and social democrats in the European Parliament, who held onto their majority and re-elected Ursula Von der Leyen [as President of the European Commission].

The far right came first in six countries (France, Italy, Hungary, Austria, Belgium and Slovenia) and second in six more (Germany, Poland, the Netherlands, Romania, the Czech Republic and Slovakia). But it is important to also look at the percentage of votes. [Italian Prime Minister Giorgia] Meloni [and her radical right Fratelli d’Italia (Brothers of Italy)] clearly won with 28.7% of the vote, but the Partito Democratico (Democratic Party), led by Elly Schlein, held on with 24%. Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany, AfD) came second with 15.9%, but the real news was the abrupt fall in votes for the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany, SPD), which only managed 13.9% — one has to go back to the 19th century to find a similarly bad result.

This is occurring within the context of a very fragmented electoral landscape and a strong mood of rejection towards traditional politicians. Even the slightly more institutionalised far right has had to deal with the emergence of new and more disruptive forces competing for their votes, such as Se Acabó la Fiesta (The Party’s Over) in Spain, Přísaha a Motoristé (Oath and Motorists) in the Czech Republic and Konfederacja Wolność i Niepodległość (Confederation of Freedom and Independence) in Poland.

But it is not all one way traffic. In the Nordic countries — Sweden, Finland, Denmark — the far right went backwards while the left did well, including forces to the left of social democracy. In Spain, a progressive coalition led by the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (Spanish Socialist Workers' Party, PSOE) remains in power for now, and in Britain the Conservatives collapsed, largely due to Brexit. Labour swept the board in terms of seats, though not votes.

The context is different in France. Here, the left managed to quickly unite for the legislative elections called by [French President Emmanuel] Macron and select united candidates for every constituency. This, in the context of Macronism’s crisis, meant it could present itself as an alternative bloc. Nevertheless, the situation is complex: Marine Le Pen's party won the most votes, though the “Republican front” [formed between the NFP and Macron’s Ensemble (Together) coalition] ensured that RN came third in terms of deputies, despite rising from 89 to 142 seats in parliament. At the same time, this Republican front, which involved left-wing and Macronist candidates standing down for the second round in constituencies where the extreme right could win, benefited Macron more: despite his support dropping significantly, Macronists won more MPs than expected.

There has been a reorganisation of the radical right in the European Parliament. What are the main dividing lines between the different groups? Where do they stand on key issues such as the European Union and Russia’s war on Ukraine? Why has complete support for Israel and opposition to antisemitism become such important banners for the radical right, given its traditional association with antisemitism?

Various realignments within the far right have occurred in the European Parliament after the elections, though things have not changed as much as it seems. The Identity and Democracy bloc shifted almost en bloc to Patriots for Europe, which is led by [Hungarian Prime Minister] Viktor Orbán and Le Pen. It represents a more pro-Russian sector. Surprisingly, they have incorporated the Spanish party Vox (Voice), which until now had been very close to Meloni. Vox’s support has stagnated in recent months and it is unclear whether this realignment at the European level reflects internal differences. Meanwhile, AfD created a group with its allies: Europe of Sovereign Nations.

Without doubt, relations with Russia, especially in the context of the invasion of Ukraine, is a point of tension (the Visegrad group — Slovakia, Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic — has seen itself caught up in this conflict). Relations with the European People’s Party (EPP) — the Christian Democrat/conservative right — which Meloni has long flirted with, is another source of divergence. The European Conservatives and Reformists Party (ECR), another radical right-wing group in the European Parliament, is closer to the EPP.

The truth is that since the 1980s, the far right has been unable to unite. The idea that the left is divided by ideology while the right is united by its wallets is attractive but not really true. There is a section of the far right that emerged from a culture of small groups riven with various programmatic discussions. To this we can add the more concrete problems of what the French call la politique politicienne (the politics of politicking). In several countries, there is more than one far-right group, each with their own links at the European level.

Regarding the EU, the far right has, in general, moved from a position of “exit” to seeking to change Brussels from within in order to make the Union less federalist and more sovereignist. Hungary’s bid for EU enlargement (especially by incorporating the Western Balkans) could go hand in hand with this goal: more countries — with nationalist governments — within a less cohesive bloc. Orbán assumed the transitional presidency of the European Council using the Trumpist slogan “Make Europe Great Again” and has spoken of the need for a cultural counterrevolution in Europe. The far right did not achieve its expected majority, but its growth has impacted the EU.

Antisemitism is indeed a key issue because “anti-antisemitism” is one avenue through which the far right has sought normalisation. There are several overlapping issues here. One is the far right having replaced Jews with Arab Muslim as their target of discrimination, together with the fact that Jews have gone from being the “other” in the West to becoming the core of a “Judeo-Christian” West. Moreover, the fact Israel is governed by the far right, with its own radical ethno-nationalist positions, means there are many points of commonality between European and Israeli ultrarightists. Jean-Marie Le Pen referred to the gas chambers as a “detail” of World War II, but his daughter Marine has made the fight against antisemitism one of her banners. At the same time, the right has sought to manipulate the question of secularism and accused the left, especially the radical left, of “Islamo-leftism” and being a conduit for the Islamisation of European societies. This discourse sometimes reaches levels of absurdity: for example, Éric Zemmour of Reconquête! (Reconquest), went as far as saying that if the French left won, France would become a mixture of Soviet Stalinism and Sharia or Islamic law.

There is an important point to make here. It is true that, in the context of the rightward shift of Jewish communities, certain sections of the left that have lost Jewish votes have sometimes underestimated the issue of antisemitism. But indiscriminate accusations of antisemitism — often simply over criticism of Israel and the massacre in Gaza — are an obscene and dishonest manipulation and trivialisation of antisemitism, including when they come from official Jewish organisations.

While RN finished third in terms of deputies, it won the most votes. This included a high vote not only in the countryside, but among blue-collar workers. What factors explain RN’s continued rise?

The French far right has been steadily growing within the framework of a double process of normalisation or dédiabolisation (de-demonisation) — from above and from below. From above, because RN now has 142 seats in the Chamber of Deputies (in 2017 it only had 8), and today has elected representatives on numerous departmental and municipal councils. Its presence in political institutions has become increasingly “legitimate”. And from below, because voting RN, and saying so, no longer means being treated as a political pariah.

Generally speaking, the big issue in recent elections has been the cost of living and deterioration of public services, especially in peri-urban and rural France. But this is being linked to other issues, such as immigration. The far right has constructed a “moral economy” in which immigration is responsible for this deterioration and precarious living conditions.

Sociologist Félicien Faury has shown how this can operate in different, even contradictory, ways. On one hand, through the idea that immigrants are “stealing” jobs from the French (“A million unemployed is a million immigrants too many” was an old Lepenist slogan). On the other hand, there is the image of the immigrant as unemployed who, in this scenario, is not “stealing” jobs from the French but rather budget resources through the social benefits they receive. In this scenario, the French pay taxes to maintain foreign immigrants, derogatorily referred to as the assistanat [roughly translates as those living off welfare assistance].

In terms of RN’s electorate, there is a risk of trying to construct an overly caricatured typical voter. Generally speaking, its voters tend to be less educated and live in the interior of France: RN’s vote is lower in Paris, which is primarily contested by Macronists and the left. There is an RN vote that is tied to the issues raised by the gilets jaunes (Yellow Vests) protests [of 2018-19]: the deterioration of public services and sense of being treated with social contempt by the elites. We should also not forget the existing widespread sentiment of rejection towards traditional politicians and the media’s role (particularly 24-hour news channels), such as the Bolloré group’s channels, which hammer away with an extreme right-wing discourse.

But we should also acknowledge that there are very different realities. In north-east France, there is indeed an RN vote from those who lost out from globalisation in old depressed industrial areas. Yet, as Faury shows, RN voters in south-east France — another stronghold — are very different: they are neither unemployed nor afraid of losing their jobs, yet still feel that resources are being distributed unfairly and complain that their personal efforts are being held back by taxes. They are people who are neither poor enough to benefit from social welfare nor rich enough to feel that their future is secure. Cutting across this in a very complex manner is the question of racism: the idea that people no longer recognise their own country, which has been transformed by multiculturalism. This, in one way or another, is linked to the theory of the “great replacement”.

Marine Le Pen’s decision to put forward 28-year-old Jordan Bardella as party president and candidate for prime minister has refreshed the far right’s image, including on social networks such as TikTok. All this contributed to its electoral breakthrough.

The feeling is that the Republican front — as the democratic cordon sanitaire (protective barrier) against the far right is referred to in France — is becoming increasingly difficult and costly, and that the dam is becoming evermore leaky. In fact, the big question — which no one can answer — is whether Le Pen will become president in 2027. This time round, the Republican front resisted better than expected. The process of de-demonisation has not progressed enough for RN to win. But it has progressed enough for it to grow in a way that seemed unimaginable in the past.

What can you tell us about the radical left La France Insoumise (France Unbowed, LFI), the NFP it helped form, and its campaign? What lessons can we learn from the NFP experience?

When Macron called surprise early legislative elections, he thought the left would be unable to unite again. Indeed, the left was entangled in various debates, as we saw in the European elections, including over Gaza and Ukraine. But the left responded quickly and effectively. Within 24 hours, it had formed the NPF. Its predecessor was the Nouvelle Union populaire écologique et sociale (New Ecological and Social People's Union, NUPES), a united front established in 2022 but dissolved before the European elections.

The NFP spans from the Parti socialiste (Socialist Party) through to the LFI, passing through Les Écologistes (The Ecologists), the Parti communiste français (French Communist Party, PCF), and even the Nouveau Parti anticapitaliste (New Anti-Capitalist Party, NPA, of which Philippe Poutou was an NFP candidate but was not elected). Within 48 hours, united candidates were selected for all 577 constituencies across France. Within 72 hours, a common program was agreed upon, which is well to the left and took clear positions on Gaza and Ukraine that avoided double standards: condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and supporting Ukrainian resistance; condemning Israel’s massacre in Gaza — as well as Hamas’ October 7 attacks — and recognising a Palestinian state. It also took clear positions on the need for an economic program to restore public services and workers’ purchasing power.

However, the crisis inside LFI — where [party leader] Jean-Luc Mélenchon operates as a genuine caudillo (party boss) — marred the NFP’s campaign. Instead of talking about their program, NPF candidates from the various parties had to talk about the “Melénchon purges” of two critical LFI MPs who were excluded as candidates. Mélenchon also appeared in numerous interviews, which contributed to his instrumentalisation by the right who presented him as the future prime minister if the left won a majority in parliament, even though this was not part of the NFP agreement.

But the LFI’s internal crisis is above all tied to its lack of internal democracy and organisation. For various reasons, Mélenchon, who in 2022 was a great asset for the left in terms of votes, is today a liability — because of his demonisation in the media and his absorbing cult of personality within the movement. During the second round campaign, François Ruffin — a leading left figure and sitting deputy standing in a northern French constituency where RN was the frontrunner after the first round — decided to leave LFI. With some difficulties, he was re-elected after assuring his constituents he would not sit in parliament with LFI.

There are also strategic discussions inside LFI, one of which is over how to maintain its influence in multicultural urban peripheries (banlieues) — some of which remain strongholds — without writing off small provincial towns, where the far right is strong. In Ruffin’s words, the left has “three deficits”: a geographical deficit, in terms of small-town France; a demographic deficit, in terms of the elderly; and a social deficit, in terms of low-income earners. For example, in the Picardy region where Ruffin ran, 13 of 17 elected deputies are far-right MPs. What is at stake is not just the question of votes, but the “soul” of the left. Putting together “chains of equivalences” to build a socio-political popular bloc is not easy.

But the NFP’s success — no poll placed it first in terms of deputies — was also due to the dynamic it unleashed from below. Grassroots associations — trade unions, neighbourhood, professional and cultural groups, etc — and unaffiliated individuals appropriated the NFP’s acronym and went out to campaign. Even young people with no previous campaigning experience went house-to-house to convince neighbours not to vote for the far right. This was perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the campaign, especially given the left everywhere finds itself in a rather bleak situation.

For the second round, it was decided to “form a barrier” against the far right that involved voting for Macronist candidates detested by the left. The system of constituencies with a second round of voting allows for this: if no one gets a majority, a second round occurs involving those who obtained more than 12.5% of the electoral roll (this normally means two or three candidates go through to this round). This is not possible, for example, in Britain, where whoever wins by one vote takes all. This Republican front ended up benefiting Macronism and the traditional right more, given they won more deputies than expected thanks to “smart voting” by the left.

More than a great victory, this is an opportunity the left can seize — or miss. But each sector has very different strategic outlooks and political calculations, which complicates unity. We have seen the difficulties in choosing a prime minister candidate. This would put pressure on Macron who, after the elections, has sought an alliance with the conservative right to form an unstable and precarious relative majority that could allow him to govern without the left.

These internal debates threaten to leave NFP voters disappointed. Of course, it is not a question of naively talking about unity: there are different visions, ranging from the PS to the LFI. The issue is finding common ground for action to process differences in the most democratic way possible.

One big election winner was the PS, which went from just about disappearing a few years ago to having almost as many MPs as LFI. How did it manage to revive itself? What impact might this have within the NFP? More generally, given the results for British Labour and the PSOE, can we say the fortunes of social democracy are changing in Europe?

When the PS collapsed electorally after François Hollande’s government — PS presidential candidate Anne Hidalgo obtained just 1.75% in 2022 — it decided under the leadership of Olivier Faure to ally with the left within NUPES for legislative elections that same year. This decision provoked considerable internal resistance. In the recent European elections, each party went its own way. The PS managed to reposition itself by promoting an independent candidate, Raphaël Glucksmann, son of philosopher André Glucksmann. Given his ideologically erratic past, Glucksmann opted to denounce his previous liberal positions and adopt a more classical social democratic discourse, albeit with a rather elitist style. A good debater, he managed to attract urban progressive voters who did not feel represented by Mélenchon.

In these elections, the major media outlets and Macronism virulently attacked the PS for supposedly “allying itself with antisemites”. On the other hand, the PS, which sees itself as a party of government, has to coexist with a left that is more radical on issues such as police violence. LFI deputies will, for example, say “the police kill”, which puts the Socialists on the spot in debates.

I do not think social democracy is changing. Social democracy has for some time been going through a very strong identity crisis, especially after its Third Way experiments. In some cases (Sweden, Germany) we can see a very cautious attempt at renewal, though without any great ideological audacity.

In the Spanish case, [Prime Minister] Pedro Sánchez has been able to interpret the moment — more because of his political savviness than due to any ideological reasons. He has positioned the PSOE as the axis of a progressive coalition that has so far survived, but is far from having consolidated any kind of ideological hegemony. The fact that the PSOE is still in government is mostly down to simple political maths: the conservatives of the Partido Popular [Popular Party] needed Vox, but Vox was a red line for the “bourgeois” nationalists of Catalonia and the Basque Country, so a right-wing majority became impossible. The space to the left of social democracy — Sumar, Podemos — has also collapsed, electorally and emotionally. Sánchez is politically very skillful, but his views are not in the majority among broader society.

Labour won in Britain — with fewer votes than when Jeremy Corbyn was leader — thanks to the unprecedented collapse of the Conservative Party. It remains to be seen whether [Labor leader Keir] Starmer’s positioning somewhere between the Third Way and more classical social democracy will pay off. For now, it appears he has not been able to generate much enthusiasm, though he does have a large parliamentary majority to pass reforms.

We will have to see if the PS will once again play a central role in French politics. Undoubtedly, the LFI is no longer as hegemonic on the left as in recent years, and internal divisions portend the emergence of new spaces. There is no certainty that the NFP will remain united, which will be key if the left is to be a major player in the coming period.

Taking all this into account, there are at least two possible readings of the French election results. The first is that broad left unity in the first round, and the tactical alliance with Ensemble in the second, were crucial to stopping RN. The other is that this has only slowed, but not stopped, RN’s rise. Furthermore it benefited the PS and Macronism at the expense of the radical left, and has allowed the RN to present itself as the only real opposition to the political class, as the NFP supported Macronist candidates and some of its affiliates may enter government. Which of these is more accurate? Or do you have a different reading? What lessons can we draw on how to best confront the radical right?

All of this is true. Democratic cordon sanitaires come with a cost. As part of the Republican front, the French left had to hold its nose and vote for figures such as repressive interior minister Gérald Darmanin and former prime minister Élisabeth Borne who is strongly associated with the unpopular pension reform. The problem is the same in the United States: stopping Trump means allying with mainstream Democrats. No doubt the far right will use this to demonstrate that they are the ones who represent something “different” and “new”.

Nevertheless, the French left has won in political-moral terms. It led the cordon sanitaire against the far right, which posed a threat to republican equality. However, it is a long way from ideologically convincing a majority of the population. Ideological rearmament is not easy. It will require combining theory and practice. When it comes to its program, the left today has little credibility anywhere.

It seems clear today that neither the radical left nor the social democrats can go it alone, and that broad progressive coalitions are needed. The big question is whether these coalitions can offer responses to the key issues of the day, which are, above all, reversing the crisis of the public sector and providing some certainty about the future. Beyond its advances and setbacks, new far right forces have managed to capture the mood of the times, the crisis of the future — viewed by many as a mix of dystopian and catastrophist scenarios — and the anxieties of the present.


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