INTER-IMPERIALIST RIVALRIES
China Signs Major Railroad Deal With Uzbekistan And Kyrgyzstan, Bypassing Russia
- China has signed a deal to construct a railroad through Krygyzstan and Uzbekistan that would bypass sanctions-hit Russia.
- Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and China signed the agreement on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit.
- Uzbekistan has embraced the project to improve transport and trade links from Central Asia to Turkey and onward to Europe, on a route that bypasses internationally isolated Russia.
China, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan have signed a long-anticipated agreement to push ahead with the construction of a railroad linking their countries that will, if completed, establish a shorter route to Europe, bypassing sanctions-hit Russia. The three governments signed the agreement on September 14 on the sidelines of a summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Uzbekistan.
The document does not set out a roadmap for construction of the CKU link, which was first mooted a quarter of a century ago but had struggled to get off the ground until Russia’s invasion of Ukraine breathed new impetus into it.
But it does move the project one step closer to reality, by laying out terms for a feasibility study for the Kyrgyz leg, which is the missing link to connect existing railroads in China and Uzbekistan, to be completed by the first half of 2023.
The news was announced by the transport ministries of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, which signed the agreement with China’s National Development and Reform Commission.
The costs of the study will be shared equally, the Kyrgyz Ministry of Transport and Communications said.
The ministry’s statement appeared to confirm earlier reports that a route has finally been agreed, after years of wrangling.
Kyrgyzstan had pushed for a route that would serve more populated areas further north but appears to have settled on a route restricted to the south, from which it will reap benefits – from job creation for construction of the line and transit fees.
The railroad will begin at Torugart, where there is an existing road crossing from China, and continue north through the settlements of Arpa and Makmal to Jalal-Abad, where it will link up with Uzbekistan’s rail network.
Makmal is the site of a goldmine operated by a Sino-Kyrgyz joint venture with majority Chinese ownership.
It is here that the gauge will switch from the 1.435-meter track used in China and Europe to the 1.520-meter track used in the former Soviet Union, The Economist reported recently.
The 280-kilometer route will cost $4.1 billion, to be funded either via direct investment or public-private partnership, the newspaper quoted Kyrgyz Transport Minister Erkinbek Osoyev as saying.
The cost estimate is conservative compared to previous estimates of double that for a railroad that will pass through challenging mountainous terrain requiring a series of tunnels – reportedly 90 of them – to be built.
China will also need to build 160 kilometers of track to feed into the new line, according to The Economist.
If ever completed, the new link could continue south through Turkmenistan into Iran and onward to Turkey, the gateway to Europe.
That would shorten the route from China to Europe by 900 kilometers and cut eight days off the travel time, The Economist calculated.
China has cautiously agreed on the need to advance plans to build the railroad, while warning that it will not foot the whole bill.
Uzbekistan has in recent times embraced with zeal a project it sees as part of a grand scheme to improve transport and trade links westward from Central Asia to Turkey and onward to Europe, on a route that bypasses internationally isolated Russia.
By Eurasianet.org
China Remains Supportive Of Kazakhstan As Russia Ramps Up Rhetoric
- Tensions are on the rise between Russia and Kazakhstan over Putin’s unprovoked war in Ukraine.
- Despite a rise in hostile Russian rhetoric, China remains strongly supportive of Kazakhstan, which is a key piece of its Belt and Road puzzle in Central Asia.
- President Xi’s statement during his stopover in Kazakhstan was a sharp message to Moscow to refrain from any actions that could destabilize the country.
Amid heightened tensions between Russia and Kazakhstan over the war in Ukraine, Astana is betting on high-level diplomacy to build international support for its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Pope Francis’ visit on September 13 for a highly publicized global interreligious summit coincided with the first post-pandemic international trip of Chinese President Xi Jinping, who met with Kazakhstani President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev on September 14. The two leaders then took part in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s (SCO) summit in neighboring Uzbekistan. Next, Tokayev headed to New York for the 77th session of the United Nations (UN) General Assembly on September 19–20, where he will seek Western backing for Kazakhstan’s security. This year’s gathering for the 7th Congress of Leaders of World and Traditional Religions was one of the most important for Kazakhstan, which is trying to boost its international standing as Russian military ambitions continue to threaten Central Asia.
Pope Francis called for dialogue and peace in the face of Russia’s “senseless and tragic war” in Ukraine. He earlier had described the conflict as “a war of particular gravity, in terms of the violation of international law, the risks of nuclear escalation and the grave economic and social consequences” (Vatican.va, September 8). Pope Francis was still in Kazakhstan when the graves of victims of war crimes, evidently murdered by the Russian military, were found in liberated Izyum in eastern Ukraine (Ukrainska Pravda, September 15).
President Xi’s remarks, however, were surprisingly direct in offering strong support for Kazakhstan, as hostile Russian rhetoric against the country increases. “No matter how the international situation changes, we will continue our strong support of Kazakhstan in protecting its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as firm support of the reforms you are carrying out to ensure stability and development and strongly oppose the interference of any forces in the internal affairs of your country,” Xi was quoted as saying during his meeting with Tokayev (Akorda.kz, September 14).
Threatening messages toward Kazakhstan coming from Russian politicians and propagandists have undoubtedly alerted Chinese leadership (Eurasianet.org, April 28). With a 3.5 million ethnic Russian minority (18 percent) settled mostly in the northern regions close to the 4,750 mile-long border with Russia, the Kazakhs are worried about becoming another target of President Vladimir Putin’s “Russian World” concept that was used to justify the invasion of Ukraine (Eurasianet.org, April 28). The war has polarized society, with ethnic Kazakhs firmly opposing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, while many Russians have been influenced by Kremlin propaganda (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, August 29). As the country is embarking on political and economic reforms, following public unrest in January 2022, ethnic peace will be essential for the successful implementation of these changes (See EDM, January 21).
The Kazakhstani government has tried to retain a neutral position on the war in Ukraine but has refused to assist Moscow’s military campaign, either by sending troops or providing direct military assistance. In addition, Astana has also declined to recognize the proxy Donetsk and Luhansk “people’s republics,” citing the UN principle of territorial integrity and inviolability of borders (DW, June 17).
Since Kazakhstan borders Russia to the north and China to the east, any instability in Central Asia’s largest economy will impact not only Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and trade corridors but also the security of China’s Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. During the public unrest in Kazakhstan in January, Beijing did not welcome the dispatch of troops by the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), as China does not want to see a strong Russian presence in Kazakhstan (News18.com, January 12).
Thus, President Xi’s statement during his stopover in Kazakhstan was a sharp message to Moscow to refrain from any actions that could destabilize the country. Later, in Samarkand, Xi also expressed concerns about the war in Ukraine while meeting with Putin, which the Russian leader surprisingly admitted to in a later press conference (Golosameriki.com, September 16).
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Among notable recent events was Kazakhstan’s refusal to send troops to Karabakh on the request of Armenia to quell fresh violence with Azerbaijan. Kazakhstan is a founding member of the CSTO, whose Article 4 establishes that aggression against one signatory would be perceived as an aggression against all. “It is clear that in a situation of conflict with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan is in no way interested in sending troops there, somehow supporting Armenia to the detriment of our relations with Azerbaijan,” Aidos Sarym, a member of the Majlis (Kazakhstan’s lower house of parliament) Defense and Security Committee, told a Russian radio station (Govoritmoskva.ru, September 14). The refusal triggered rumors that Kazakhstan will leave the CSTO next year, which were denied by the authorities in Astana.
In addition to new security concerns, Kazakhstan is also facing enormous economic challenges as Russia remains a major trade partner. Although a member of the Eurasian Economic Union, Kazakhstan has now complied with the US and EU sanctions regime against Russia to avoid secondary sanctions. Kazakhstani authorities continue to refuse to trade with Russia in a way that circumvents sanctions, despite Moscow’s pleas for an increased import of goods to replenish empty shelfs. Kazakhstani Foreign Minister Mukhtar Tleuberdi said that transactions between Kazakhstani companies and the Russian Federation, which could potentially violate the sanctions regime, are subject to regular consultations with the US and EU authorities (The Moscow Times, September 14).
In sum, unlike Russia, which just incorporated the “Russian World” concept in its foreign policy, Astana is deepening relations with neighbors and Western partners based on the principle of equality. As Kazakhstan needs international support to weather security and economic challenges, it can also offer the world its energy supplies and food production, especially grains, which are in acute shortage due to Russia’s all-out war against Ukraine.
By The Jamestown Foundation
China Replaces Russia As Dominant Force In Central Asia
- Moscow’s already-eroding influence in Central Asia is set to decline even more rapidly.
- Beijing has important, and growing, economic interests in Central Asia.
- China’s rise could bring more economic opportunities but it could bring new risks for the region, as well.
Vladimir Putin’s stature shrank in Samarkand. At the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Uzbekistan last week, Russia’s beleaguered leader essentially apologized to his Chinese counterpart, faced verbal reprimands from India’s Prime Minister, and waited uncomfortably for the Kyrgyz President to arrive late to a bilateral meeting. The SCO summit provided visual, real-time evidence of Russia’s diminished standing in Central Asia, which has faded due to the Kremlin’s foolish and poorly executed invasion of Ukraine.
While Moscow’s already-eroding influence in Central Asia is set to decline even more rapidly, China will remain somewhat reluctant to assume regional hegemony, due to fears of upsetting its junior partner. Still, Xi Jinping’s recent visits to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, Central Asia’s wealthiest and most populous countries, respectively, and other Chinese actions suggest that Beijing is increasingly willing to assert its regional interests, even at Moscow’s expense. While China’s rise will bring new risks for the region, it could also bring more economic opportunities.
Beijing and Moscow have, in recent history, conducted a division of labor in Central Asia: China has enjoyed a leading economic role, but has generally deferred to Russia on security matters, including the uprising in Kazakhstan this past January, which was suppressed, in part, by the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization.
Russia’s ability and willingness to retain its regional security role is doubtful. The Russian military’s performance in Ukraine has been extraordinarily unimpressive – it will take years to return the Russian armed forces to their pre-war state. While Russia will remain an important actor in Central Asian security affairs, its influence is waning.
China will likely fill this security vacuum, albeit somewhat ambivalently. The People’s Republic wields the world’s second-most capable military and has the capacity to dominate Central Asian security. But China will continue to try to minimize its role for political reasons. Beijing still views Moscow as a useful companion in its competition with the West, particularly the United States, and will attempt to symbolically defer to the Kremlin when possible, given Russia’s historical role in the region and the need to soothe Moscow’s ego and anxieties. Moreover, Central Asia is only a tertiary priority for Beijing, which has grander ambitions for Taiwan and Southeast Asia.
Beijing does have important, and growing, economic interests in Central Asia, however, as China and the five Central Asian countries conducted $48 billion in bilateral goods trade last year. Central Asia is also an important hydrocarbon exporter and directly affects Chinese economic interests, through the Central Asia-to-China natural gas pipelines, and indirectly, via Kazakhstan’s west-bound oil exports. Central Asia also has good solar and wind energy potential, which could provide a market for Chinese manufacturers. Moreover, the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) railway has made some headway over the past year; if realized, it could cut China-Europe rail freight distances by 900 kilometers and shave a week off shipping time.
Some of Beijing’s regional economic interests contradict Moscow’s. Central Asia’s oil and gas exports compete with Russia’s, while the CKU railway would also bypass Russia.
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Beijing also shows an increasing willingness to assert its regional interests.
Beijing responded to Russia’s blockading of Kazakhstani oil exports by halting major investments in Russia, warning state-owned energy firms to avoid any “hasty” purchases, and publishing a history of natural gas in Beijing that conspicuously omitted the $55 billion, Russia-to-China Power of Siberia pipeline that opened in 2019. While visiting Kazakhstan’s president the day before seeing Putin at the SCO summit, Xi also pledged to “resolutely support Kazakhstan in the defense of its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity,” warning – in a clear nod to Russian threats – against “interference by any forces in the internal affairs of your country.”
Beijing and Moscow continue to share many common interests in Central Asia. Both sides are deeply hostile to the Washington and Brussels-led constitutional democracies, neuralgic about regional pro-democracy movements, and fearful that Islamist extremist groups could use Central Asia as a springboard. Nevertheless, the two sides may jostle for regional influence, due to conflicting economic and security interests. With Russia’s power and influence rapidly eroding due to its invasion of Ukraine, China is the most important regional actor and is increasingly willing and able to shoulder aside its weaker, junior partner.
While a regionally dominant China will bring new risks for Central Asian states, it could also bring economic benefits. Beijing is traditionally much more accommodative of international trade than Moscow and more supportive of intra-regional economic linkages. While Central Asian countries will continue to have limited space for maneuver due to the overwhelming power of their authoritarian neighbors, the region’s power transition could bring new opportunities.
By Eurasianet.org
